From 25d5431024c27772db62a4dd4a7aa483e809c2f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: D3M-Sudo <264661602+D3M-Sudo@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2026 10:26:40 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] security: validate direct sensitive paths in path_validator

Ensure validate_path checks both direct input paths and realpath resolved
paths against SENSITIVE_PATHS to prevent direct scanning of sensitive
system directories. Add unit tests for path validation.
---
 src/core/path_validator.py   | 25 +++++++++++++-------
 tests/test_path_validator.py | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tests/test_path_validator.py

diff --git a/src/core/path_validator.py b/src/core/path_validator.py
index 5fdb28f..a9a88e6 100644
--- a/src/core/path_validator.py
+++ b/src/core/path_validator.py
@@ -44,20 +44,29 @@ def not_path_traversal(path: str) -> bool:
     return ".." not in Path(path).parts
 
 
-def not_symlink_to_sensitive(path: str) -> bool:
-    """Il path non deve essere un symlink che punta a un path sensibile."""
-    if not os.path.islink(path):
-        return True
+def not_sensitive_path(path: str) -> bool:
+    """Il path non deve essere un path sensibile né un symlink a un path sensibile."""
     try:
         resolved = os.path.realpath(path)
     except OSError:
-        return False
+        resolved = path
+
     for sensitive in SENSITIVE_PATHS:
-        if resolved == sensitive or resolved.startswith(sensitive + os.sep):
+        if (
+            path == sensitive
+            or path.startswith(sensitive + os.sep)
+            or resolved == sensitive
+            or resolved.startswith(sensitive + os.sep)
+        ):
             return False
     return True
 
 
+def not_symlink_to_sensitive(path: str) -> bool:
+    """Funzione di compatibilità: verifica che il path non sia sensibile."""
+    return not_sensitive_path(path)
+
+
 def validate_path(path: str) -> tuple[bool, str | None]:
     """Valida un path di input per la scansione.
 
@@ -69,6 +78,6 @@ def validate_path(path: str) -> tuple[bool, str | None]:
         return False, f"Path inesistente o non leggibile: {path}"
     if not not_path_traversal(path):
         return False, f"Path traversal non ammesso: {path}"
-    if not not_symlink_to_sensitive(path):
-        return False, f"Symlink a path sensibile non ammesso: {path}"
+    if not not_sensitive_path(path):
+        return False, f"Path sensibile non ammesso: {path}"
     return True, None
diff --git a/tests/test_path_validator.py b/tests/test_path_validator.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..018351e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_path_validator.py
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+import os
+import tempfile
+from src.core.path_validator import validate_path
+
+
+def test_validate_path_sensitive_direct():
+    valid, reason = validate_path("/etc/shadow")
+    assert not valid
+    assert "sensibile" in reason or "non leggibile" in reason
+
+
+def test_validate_path_sensitive_proc():
+    valid, reason = validate_path("/proc")
+    assert not valid
+
+
+def test_validate_path_sensitive_symlink():
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
+        symlink_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, "shadow_link")
+        try:
+            os.symlink("/etc/shadow", symlink_path)
+            valid, reason = validate_path(symlink_path)
+            assert not valid
+            assert "sensibile" in reason or "non leggibile" in reason
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+
+
+def test_validate_path_normal_file():
+    with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) as tmpfile:
+        tmp_name = tmpfile.name
+    try:
+        valid, reason = validate_path(tmp_name)
+        assert valid
+        assert reason is None
+    finally:
+        if os.path.exists(tmp_name):
+            os.unlink(tmp_name)
+
+
+def test_validate_path_traversal():
+    valid, reason = validate_path("/tmp/../etc/passwd")
+    assert not valid
+    assert "traversal" in reason.lower()