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General discussion on RFC-0035 (FIPS) and RFC-0036 (Phase 4 pilot) #181
Replies: 6 comments 7 replies
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With regards to: FRC-CLD-CTP: What is a Class G Certified offering? I do not believe I have seen or heard references to that previously. Thank you! |
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The Notes in the rules are undefeated. My favorite is the one in CMU-CSO-TSC: "Adding a non-validated algorithm while a CMVP-validated module still protects federal customer data, such as hybrid implementation, is not such a change." Allows a CSP to add a PQC-approved algo. as an option to the algo that was validated as part of the module without going through a transformative. |
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Just wanted to make sure im understanding something correctly in RFC-0036 FedRAMP 20x Class D Cloud-Hosted Pilot Requirements This rule FRC-CLD-PCD Progressive Certification to Class D would apply to Class D 20x generally post pilot and not just the pilot correct? |
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Does We want to confirm our reading of We also read the note that "transitions from Rev5 Class D will still be expected to move through 20x Class C first" as applying only to a later move from Rev5 Class D to 20x Class D, not to obtaining the Rev5 Class D certification. Is that correct? Thank you. |
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Hi FedRAMP Team, CMU-CSO-TSC (Transformative Significant Changes of Modules): Could you clarify what counts as a "change" under this rule? In particular, does it cover bug fixes and security patches, which are our most common changes? Or does it apply only to changes in the algorithms a module uses? Thanks |
RFC-0035 / RFC-0036: Microsoft feedbackRFC-0036KSI-IAM-MST: Monitoring SuitabilityThe term “funds” in the note does not establish clear expectations about what information is required or how compliance should be demonstrated. Obtaining and attributing relevant financial information across a hyperscale cloud environment can also be difficult given the scale and complexity of operations. Microsoft recommends removing “funds” to reduce ambiguity and support clear, measurable, and consistently applicable expectations. KSI-IAM-MPI: Managing Personnel IdentitiesMicrosoft recommends consolidating KSI-IAM-MPI with KSI-IAM-MST, as meeting MST’s requirements also satisfies MPI’s requirements. Maintaining MPI as a separate KSI introduces redundant compliance obligations without adding security value. KSI-RPL-MCA: Maintaining Cryptographic AccessMicrosoft recommends specifying whether this KSI applies to customer-managed assets, cloud service provider-managed assets, or both. Defining this scope would establish clear compliance expectations and support consistent interpretation and implementation across cloud service models. KSI-SVC-IED: Inspecting Encrypted DataMicrosoft recommends removing this KSI or clarifying that it does not require providers to decrypt customer traffic for inspection. Decrypting customer traffic would expose sensitive customer data to additional systems and create new opportunities for unauthorized access. Decryption can also affect service performance and reliability. The requirement should focus on detecting threats while allowing providers to use security controls appropriate to their architecture without requiring decryption of customer traffic. KSI-SVC-UAS: Using Automated SecurityMicrosoft believes this KSI can be met, but its scope is broad and overlaps with other KSIs. Microsoft recommends clarifying what additional security outcome it is intended to achieve and allowing evidence from related KSIs to demonstrate compliance without duplicating assessment efforts. KSI-PIY-DFC: Detecting FOCI ChangesMicrosoft recommends clarifying whether this KSI applies to hardware supply chain risks, software development and supply chain risks, or both. Defining this scope would establish clear expectations for implementation and compliance. RFC-0035CMU-CSO-UVM: Using CMVP-Validated ModulesMicrosoft supports the use of SHOULD for Class D. This encourages the use of CMVP-validated modules while allowing flexibility for technical needs and newer cryptographic technologies. Providers should clearly document their use so agencies can make informed risk decisions. Agency obligations under FIPS 140-3 remain unchanged. CMU-CSO-TSC: Transformative Significant Changes of ModulesMicrosoft recommends clarifying the note as follows: Updating a CMVP-validated module through its update stream is not such a change when the update uses only previously validated algorithms. Using an algorithm that an update stream adds, and that is not within the module's validation, in place of a validated algorithm is such a change. When multiple algorithms are used on a single data stream, adding a non-validated algorithm while a CMVP-validated module still protects federal customer data, such as in a hybrid implementation, is not such a change. CMU-CSO-CAT: Configuration of Agency TenantsMicrosoft recommends changing SHOULD to MUST in this requirement: “Providers MUST configure agency tenants by default to use cryptographic services that use CMVP-validated modules when such modules are available.” Using SHOULD could lead engineering teams to interpret validated cryptography as optional. MUST would establish a clear expectation while retaining the existing qualification, “when such modules are available.” Any additional exceptions should be explicitly defined so providers, assessors, and agencies apply the requirement consistently. |
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Hey all - as a reminder, FedRAMP can't answer questions or generally participate directly in RFC threads to avoid influencing public comment. Sometimes this creates confusion because folks just want to talk about details of something proposed in an RFC to understand it better or learn more about it, so we create these side-threads at times for RFCs.
The two open RFCs in question are:
Please feel free to use this thread to discuss, ask questions, etc. - but don't forget to add public comment with feedback either way!
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