From 735c5b8fbeebae35c2ef59a8a3d447705e81e2c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ferdinand99 Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 18:30:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] docs: security review October 2026 --- README.md | 4 ++ docs/security-review-2026-10.md | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 80 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/security-review-2026-10.md diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index de5501d..842924d 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -196,6 +196,10 @@ swift test The core builds and tests on Linux too; the parts that use UIKit, AppKit or WatchKit only build on Apple platforms. CI runs the tests on Linux and macOS and builds for every Apple platform. +## Security + +The October 2026 security review of the SDK (what was found, fixed and left open) is in [`docs/security-review-2026-10.md`](docs/security-review-2026-10.md). + ## License [MIT](LICENSE). The SDK goes into your app, so it uses a permissive license: it can ship in any diff --git a/docs/security-review-2026-10.md b/docs/security-review-2026-10.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f1df11 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/security-review-2026-10.md @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +# Security review, October 2026 + +Date: 27 October 2026. Covers the KestrelKit Swift SDK up to the 0.1.1 release. The matching server-side review is in +the Keen Kestrel repository. + +## Method and limits + +This was a read-only code review done by an AI reviewer, as a privacy and transport review of the SDK. It was not an +external audit and it was not done by a professional security firm. The reviewer read the code and rated each +finding; the fixes were written with tests and merged after review. Nothing was run on a device: there was no +dynamic testing and no fuzzing. Tests ran on Linux (Swift 6.2) in CI; one redirect test only runs on Apple +platforms, where the macOS CI job covers it. + +Treat this as one careful review, not as a guarantee. + +## Scope + +`main` at `591625a`: the whole SDK, including the engine and flush loop, the persistent queue, scrubbing and limits, +the transport, identifiers and opt-out. No High finding was reported. + +Found solid: random install and session ids that are deleted on opt-out, no IDFA or IDFV, queue bounds, handling of +`Retry-After`, the project key sent only in a header, cookies and cache off for the SDK's requests, and no +third-party dependencies. + +## Findings + +| ID | Severity | Title | Status | +|---|---|---|---| +| KS-01 | Low | Opt-out not immediate for an in-flight flush | Fixed in #10 | +| KS-02 | Low | Scrubbing ran before control characters were removed, so they could split emails and card numbers past the patterns | Fixed in #10 (SDK) and in Keen Kestrel #45 (server) | +| KS-03 | Low | Scrubber missed compressed IPv6 and cards separated by dots or non-breaking spaces; payload keys such as `password` or `token` were not dropped | Fixed in #10 (SDK). Server side: sensitive keys dropped in Keen Kestrel #45; the IPv6 and card patterns are not added on the server. Open | +| KS-04 | Low | Quadratic regex time on long values | Fixed in #10 | +| KS-05 | Low | No transport policy (http allowed, redirects followed with the key header, unbounded response, 7-day resource timeout) | Fixed in #10 | +| KS-06 | Low | Unbounded command stream; a full queue rewrote up to 5 MB per signal | Fixed in #10 | +| KS-07 | Low | Any 2xx counted as delivered; some 4xx dropped batches; 401, 403 and 404 silenced the SDK until relaunch | Fixed in #10 | +| KS-08 | Info | Sharp edges | Open, not changed | + +### What was changed + +- The flush loop checks the opt-out before every batch and after every upload, and cancels an upload in flight. +- Control characters are removed before scrubbing. Compressed IPv6 addresses and card numbers separated by dots or + non-breaking spaces are scrubbed. Payload keys containing `pass`, `secret`, `token`, `auth`, `key`, `card`, + `cookie`, `cvv`, or `ssn` as a word, are dropped with their values. Values are cut to 2000 characters before + scrubbing, and the email and `name=value` patterns have bounded runs. +- `http://` is refused except for `localhost` and debug builds. Redirects are not followed, answers over 64 KB are + ignored, and the resource timeout is 60 seconds. +- Only a `202` with `{"accepted": n}` counts as delivered. Other 2xx, 3xx, 405, 407, 408 and 410 answers keep the + batch and retry with backoff. 401, 403 and 404 pause sending for an hour instead of until relaunch. +- The command stream is bounded to 1000 (oldest dropped, an opt-out is never lost). A full queue file is appended to + and compacted after a batch of drops instead of being rewritten per signal. + +## Accepted and open items + +- **KS-08, sharp edges, open.** Calling `description()` on arbitrary objects, debug builds sending to production, and the install id in `UserDefaults` surviving a device restore. These are + informational and were not changed. +- **Server-side IPv6 and card patterns (KS-03), open.** Shortened IPv6 addresses and dotted or non-breaking-space + card groupings are scrubbed on the device only. A modified or older client can still send them, and the Keen + Kestrel server does not scrub them. +- **Scrubbing is best effort.** It is pattern-based and cannot recognise every kind of personal data. Do not put + personal data in signal payloads. + +## Not covered + +- Dynamic behaviour on devices: nothing was run on iOS, macOS or watchOS hardware, and no network capture was done. +- The Keen Kestrel server, which is reviewed in its own repository. +- CI workflows and the release pipeline, and the documentation site. + +## Notes for app developers + +Release notes: [0.1.1](https://github.com/Ferdinand99/KestrelKit/releases/tag/v0.1.1). + +- Payload keys that contain `key`, `auth`, `pass` and the other words above (for example `keyboard_layout` or + `author`) are now dropped. +- `http://` endpoints stop working in release builds except for `localhost`. +- A wrong project key no longer silences the SDK until relaunch; it retries after an hour. +- Delivery now requires a `202` answer from the server.