Each item below was adversarially verified as unreachable/unused at runtime against HEAD. All are low-risk removals; the last two need a one-line "no live install depends on it" confirmation first.
Related stale-comment cleanup: #776.
Filed from the v0.8.2b3 codebase assessment sweep; finding adversarially verified against HEAD (`chore/release-0.8.2b3`).
Each item below was adversarially verified as unreachable/unused at runtime against HEAD. All are low-risk removals; the last two need a one-line "no live install depends on it" confirmation first.
slots/manager.py:1517-1529route_for_request— compat wrapper; every prod caller (omni_router/filter.py:113,omni_router/dispatch.py:127) usesresolve_for_request. Only its own tests reference it. Remove (+ its tests) or drop the "callers that have not moved yet" framing.providers/llama_server.pyLlamaServerProvider— registered as_PROVIDERS["llama-server"]butget_provider()is only ever called with"comfyui"(api/routes/v1.py:1068). The llama path goesContainerProvider.container_spec→_llama_launch_plan, never this provider.__init__.py:10mis-describes it as "consumed by container profiles". Delete or demote to a clearly-labelled reference (stop registering it as dispatchable) and fix the docstring.providers/base.py:292-400Provider.render_systemd_override— no src caller (live renderer iscontainer.py:_render_unit_from_plan). Worse,base.py:340unpacksspec.mountsas 2-tuples but plans now carry frozenMountdataclasses →TypeError; and it emitsEnvironmentFile/${VAR}drop-ins thatcontainer.py:696-700actively strips as legacy (Migration: clean stale lemonade-era hal0-slot@<name>.service.d drop-ins when converting slots to container runtime #694). A maintenance trap. Delete (+_quote_for_systemd/_SYSTEMD_VAR_REFhelpers + its test) or fix to coerce Mounts.providers/flm.py:435_FLM_PROBE_OK— write-only module global (assigned at 577/600/612, never read). Remove, or expose an accessor if "probe failed" vs "probe empty" needs distinguishing.install/perms.py:124-189hardened-flip branches —ownership_table()is only ever called with the defaultservice_user="root"(sole consumer:hal0 doctor); the non-root branches are live but unreachable since the hardened mode was removed. Confirmhal0 doctornever passes a non-root user, then collapse to the root-era table.memory/migrate.py+hal0 memory migrate— dry-run only (cli/memory_commands.py:199-203hard-fails--apply); its own docstring says the Cognee store has been dark since v0.4. ADR-0023 removed cognee. Confirm no live install carrieshal0_memory_index.sqlite, then retire the module + command +_DEFAULT_COGNEE_DIR.Related stale-comment cleanup: #776.
Filed from the v0.8.2b3 codebase assessment sweep; finding adversarially verified against HEAD (`chore/release-0.8.2b3`).