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+# Domain workflow policy — decision record (not building it now)
+
+Date: 2026-07-26
+Status: **Decided — do not build in this form now.** Revisit only under the trigger below.
+
+## The question
+
+ORRO compiles a workflow from one of six fixed profiles (`code-change`, `critic-only`,
+`review-only`, `verification-only`, `docs-change`, `release-readiness`). The phase order inside a
+profile is a hardcoded table in `witnessd/orro_workflow.py` (`_profile_spec`), profile selection is
+either explicit or recommended by regex rules in `witnessd/cli/advisory.py`, and lane contents
+(`--write-scope`, `--check`, `--command`, `--adapter`) are always declared by a human and never
+inferred.
+
+The proposal was to add a layer above that: a *change class* (schema migration, dependency change,
+auth surface, public API contract change, release) mapping to *required steps*, so that the workflow
+reflects what the domain actually demands rather than one generic shape.
+
+## What we found
+
+Four parallel investigations (standards, prior art, verifiability, adversarial) reached a consistent
+picture.
+
+**No authoritative framework prescribes change-class-specific required steps.** NIST SSDF
+differentiates by activity type, SLSA by artifact trust level, OWASP ASVS by application risk
+profile, ITIL by urgency and repeatability. The closest thing to a real legal instance is EU AI Act
+Article 12, which adds specific record-keeping obligations for one *system* category, not for change
+classes. What can be cited honestly is narrow: releases (SLSA levels, OpenSSF Scorecard checks),
+dependency changes (SSDF PW.4, Scorecard, and NIST publishes SSDF as an OSCAL catalog so task IDs can
+be referenced rather than invented), and API contract changes (SemVer 2.0.0 for the
+breaking-change-means-major rule). Nothing standard requires a "dry run against production-like data"
+or a "rollback plan" as a named control, and the auth/authz class had no citable basis beyond generic
+threat modelling.
+
+**The empirical evidence argues against gating.** DORA's finding is direct: external approvals were
+negatively correlated with lead time, deployment frequency, and restore time, and had *no* correlation
+with change fail rate. A required-steps layer implemented as a pre-merge gate reproduces the change
+advisory board, which the same research associates with lower performance. Notably, no standards body
+warns against over-proceduralisation — they are structurally biased toward prescribing more process —
+so the brake comes only from empirical work.
+
+**The classification step is the historical weak point.** Policy-as-code deployments document
+misclassification as a core pitfall; approval boards degrade into rubber-stamping; command denylists
+are widely bypassable. If a change class is self-declared, the cheapest path under time pressure is to
+declare the least demanding class, and the layer becomes voluntary in practice.
+
+**Almost nothing in the candidate set is verifiable from sealed bytes.** Of seven candidate required
+steps, exactly one supports a falsifiable verdict without appealing to an external norm: *if a
+dependency manifest is in the bound touched-set, the lockfile must be too.* That one is defensible
+because it is repository self-consistency, not a borrowed prescription. "A rollback exists" reduces to
+"a file was written". "A dry run ran against a copy" is an argv claim, not a byte fact. "A threat
+review happened" is unverifiable. "A human approved" is both unverifiable *and*, per DORA, of negative
+value. The rest reduce to what declared checks already do.
+
+## Why not now
+
+The implementable core is a single predicate, and that predicate is already reachable today:
+`orro flow --verification-only --check 'uv lock --check'` runs a declared check under observation and
+seals its output. In most repositories a missing lockfile update already fails CI. The marginal value
+of a new conformance axis for that one predicate does not justify its cost (a comparable axis measured
+roughly 650 lines in Depone plus 800 in the witnessd producer).
+
+The differentiating capability would be verifying that *a declared verification actually executed* —
+not merely that a path exists. That was blocked by the evidence substrate: health gate exit files were
+producer transcriptions rather than bundle-bound artifacts, so command-based claims had a structural
+advisory ceiling. That gap is now closed (witnessd #204, shipped in 2.31.0 with Depone 0.2.11), which
+means the sequencing was backwards, not the idea.
+
+## If it is built later, this is the shape
+
+These constraints are the durable output of the investigation and should not be re-derived.
+
+- **Refutable claims, not required steps.** Absence of evidence is advisory; only contradiction between
+  sealed bytes and the declared class blocks. This keeps the layer out of the deployment gate and
+  therefore out of the failure mode DORA documents.
+- **Repository self-consistency, not borrowed prescription.** The only justification that survives
+  without a citation is "this repository's own bytes contradict each other". Anything framed as
+  industry requirement needs a real citation or it is the overclaiming this project exists to prevent.
+- **Monotone classification.** Do not accept a freely chosen class. The verifier re-derives the
+  policy's triggers against the bound observed touched-set; if a stricter class fired and was not
+  declared, that is a failure. Declaring a stricter class is always allowed. The effect is that an
+  AI-proposed classification can only *add* obligations, never remove them — the same falsifiable
+  declaration pattern used in ORRO #70.
+- **No shipped default policy.** Policy provenance should admit only `detected` (derived from tooling
+  the repository already adopted, the way health gates are detected) and `operator-authored`. There
+  must be no third value representing an ORRO-supplied best-practice pack; making that unrepresentable
+  in the schema is what prevents the prescription problem structurally.
+- **A repository can always weaken its own policy.** That is not a defect to hide. The verdict can be
+  honest about how weak a policy is; taking enforcement away from the repository would make this an
+  external approval gate, which is the thing to avoid.
+
+## Revisit trigger
+
+Build it when real use — including our own dogfooding — produces at least one case that a declared
+check cannot catch but a class-bound claim would. Until such a case exists, the evidence says the
+layer would restate what the product already does.
+
+## References
+
+- OVERT 1.1 conformance statement: `witnessd/docs/conformance/OVERT.md`
+- Evidence substrate binding: witnessd #204, witnessd 2.31.0, Depone 0.2.11
+- Falsifiable declaration precedent: ORRO #70
+- Consensus-citation precedent: `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-22-orro-code-health-axis-design.md`