diff --git a/docs/SECURITY_DESIGN.md b/docs/SECURITY_DESIGN.md index cdf6f2e..13510da 100644 --- a/docs/SECURITY_DESIGN.md +++ b/docs/SECURITY_DESIGN.md @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ A security tool that won't name its limits shouldn't be trusted. Privex does **n - **Voluntary exposure.** If you share your identity or messages, that's outside the model. - **Legal risk in your own jurisdiction.** Privex provides *technical* privacy, not legal immunity. It can make your data impossible to produce; it can't make an activity legal where you are. - **Traffic-analysis perfection.** Mixnet delays plus cover traffic narrow the correlation window dramatically but don't provably close it to zero. This is an acknowledged, industry-wide hard limit, not a solved problem. +- **Disruption by whoever holds a session token or sits in the path.** Someone with a valid session token (tokens last up to 24 hours), the TLS-terminating proxy in front of the server, or a compromised server can make the first message of any new chat with you fail by adding or replacing your one-time prekeys (unsigned by design, like Signal's one-time curve prekeys), or empty your message queue by confirming its messages. They can't read anything, and the proxy or server could just drop your traffic anyway. --- @@ -132,6 +133,7 @@ Being specific here is the point of open-sourcing before it's finished. - **Solo-maintained.** One person's blind spots are real. Independent review is the mitigation, and it's wanted. - **File sharing is disabled** in Phase 1 pending client-side, zero-knowledge CSAM protection (PDQ perceptual hashing + OPRF-based PSI + a Groth16 proof the server can verify without seeing the file or the hash). A messenger this private has a duty not to become a safe distribution channel for abuse material; shipping that safeguard is a precondition for enabling files. - **Groups and calls** (MLS, WebRTC + SFrame) are specified and partly scaffolded, not shipped. +- **One mailbox per account.** Live messages go to your newest open connection. With two active devices, one that can't decrypt a message (its chat session lives on the other device) confirms it, and the other never gets it. Per-device mailboxes would fix this but would tell the server how many devices you have, so they aren't built. ---