From 8d7c1cd617d7d7b96ce636d715186b9d774138b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Lamb Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 10:45:14 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 1/9] Add Parquet security policy: format vs implementations, and general security posture Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 --- content/en/docs/ASF/security.md | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 112 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md index 7ed215a1..2ffb0db3 100644 --- a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md +++ b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md @@ -21,4 +21,115 @@ linkTitle: "Security" weight: 2 --- -[Security](https://www.apache.org/security/) +This page describes the security policy of the Apache Parquet project: how to +report a suspected vulnerability, and what the project does and does not +consider a security issue. + +## Reporting a Vulnerability + +Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately to the Apache Software +Foundation (ASF) security team at +[security@apache.org](mailto:security@apache.org), who will triage the report +and coordinate with the relevant project. Do **not** file a public GitHub issue +or pull request for a suspected vulnerability, as that would disclose it before +a fix is available. + +The ASF vulnerability handling process is described at +. + +## Parquet is a File Format, Not an Implementation + +Apache Parquet is a file format. The format is defined by the specification in +the [parquet-format] repository, and it is read and written by many independent +implementations, several of which are maintained by projects other than Apache +Parquet. + +Most security issues, such as crashes, out-of-bounds memory access, or +excessive resource consumption when reading a file, are issues in a particular +implementation rather than in the format. Each implementation has its own +threat model, security policy, and release process. Please consult the security +information for the implementation you use, for example: + +| Implementation | Security information | +|----------------|----------------------| +| [parquet-java] | [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/apache/parquet-java/blob/master/SECURITY.md) | +| Parquet C++ (part of [Apache Arrow]) | [Apache Arrow security](https://arrow.apache.org/security/) | +| [arrow-rs] (the Rust `parquet` crate) | [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/blob/main/SECURITY.md) | + +For any other implementation, see that project's documentation. + +[parquet-format]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-format +[parquet-java]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-java +[Apache Arrow]: https://arrow.apache.org/ +[arrow-rs]: https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs + +## General Security Posture + +The following applies to the format itself, and describes what users and +implementers of Parquet should assume. + +### Parquet files may come from untrusted sources + +Parquet files are frequently exchanged between systems and organizations. +Implementations should treat the contents of a file, both data and metadata, as +untrusted input and validate it before use. Reading a malformed or malicious +file should result in an error or in incorrect data, and not in memory +corruption, code execution, or disclosure of information from outside the file. +How far each implementation goes to guarantee this, and what resource limits +(memory, time, input size) applications are expected to impose themselves, is +described in that implementation's security information. + +### Incorrect results from a crafted file are not a security issue + +Whoever writes a Parquet file controls its entire contents. A file whose +contents are internally inconsistent can cause a reader to return incorrect +results, or cause different readers (or the same reader with different +settings) to return different results for the same file. The Parquet project +does not consider this a security issue: a party able to craft such a file +could equally have written different data values in the first place. + +In particular, the metadata that readers use to skip data, such as +[statistics], the [page index], and [bloom filters], is an optimization and +**not a security control**. A reader that uses this metadata for filter +pushdown trusts it to describe the data accurately. If it does not, for example +because the minimum and maximum values recorded for a column chunk do not match +the values actually stored, rows may be silently omitted from query results. +Likewise, other fields in the metadata, such as row counts and null counts, may +be used to answer queries without reading the data. + +Systems must therefore not rely on the contents of a Parquet file for +enforcing security decisions (such as access control or row-level filtering) +unless they trust the writer of that file. + +[statistics]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-format/blob/master/src/main/thrift/parquet.thrift +[page index]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-format/blob/master/PageIndex.md +[bloom filters]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-format/blob/master/BloomFilter.md + +### Integrity and authenticity + +By default, a Parquet file carries no proof of who wrote it or that it has not +been modified. The optional page checksums (CRC) detect accidental corruption +only and offer no protection against deliberate modification. + +Applications that need to detect tampering should either use +[Parquet Modular Encryption], which can protect both the confidentiality and +the integrity of data and metadata against parties that do not hold the keys, +or use a mechanism external to the file, such as digital signatures or access +controls on the underlying storage. Note that none of these protect against a +writer that is itself authorized but malicious or faulty. + +[Parquet Modular Encryption]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-format/blob/master/Encryption.md + +### What is a security issue in the format + +Examples of issues that the Parquet project would treat as security issues in +the format specification include: + +* A flaw in the design of Parquet Modular Encryption that weakens the + confidentiality or integrity guarantees it describes. +* A requirement in the specification that cannot be implemented without + exposing readers or writers to a vulnerability. + +If you are unsure whether an issue is in the format or in an implementation, or +whether it is a security issue at all, please err on the side of reporting it +privately as described above. From f90c7d0656eaa70fd4ad9bf7d4ff499ad94747fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Lamb Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 10:47:50 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 2/9] Fix grammar in security policy Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 --- content/en/docs/ASF/security.md | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md index 2ffb0db3..b4aee0e1 100644 --- a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md +++ b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md @@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ Implementations should treat the contents of a file, both data and metadata, as untrusted input and validate it before use. Reading a malformed or malicious file should result in an error or in incorrect data, and not in memory corruption, code execution, or disclosure of information from outside the file. -How far each implementation goes to guarantee this, and what resource limits -(memory, time, input size) applications are expected to impose themselves, is -described in that implementation's security information. +The extent to which each implementation guarantees this, and the resource +limits (memory, time, input size) that applications are expected to impose +themselves, are described in that implementation's security information. ### Incorrect results from a crafted file are not a security issue @@ -97,9 +97,9 @@ the values actually stored, rows may be silently omitted from query results. Likewise, other fields in the metadata, such as row counts and null counts, may be used to answer queries without reading the data. -Systems must therefore not rely on the contents of a Parquet file for -enforcing security decisions (such as access control or row-level filtering) -unless they trust the writer of that file. +Systems must therefore not rely on the contents of a Parquet file to enforce +security decisions (such as access control or row-level filtering) unless they +trust the writer of that file. [statistics]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-format/blob/master/src/main/thrift/parquet.thrift [page index]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-format/blob/master/PageIndex.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ Applications that need to detect tampering should either use [Parquet Modular Encryption], which can protect both the confidentiality and the integrity of data and metadata against parties that do not hold the keys, or use a mechanism external to the file, such as digital signatures or access -controls on the underlying storage. Note that none of these protect against a -writer that is itself authorized but malicious or faulty. +controls on the underlying storage. Note that none of these mechanisms protects +against a writer that is authorized but malicious or faulty. [Parquet Modular Encryption]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-format/blob/master/Encryption.md From c4ef884073109ff84227907cea1cf70451e353eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Lamb Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 10:58:15 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 3/9] trim --- content/en/docs/ASF/security.md | 90 ++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-) diff --git a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md index b4aee0e1..56e746e2 100644 --- a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md +++ b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md @@ -21,9 +21,7 @@ linkTitle: "Security" weight: 2 --- -This page describes the security policy of the Apache Parquet project: how to -report a suspected vulnerability, and what the project does and does not -consider a security issue. +This page describes the security policy of the Apache Parquet project ## Reporting a Vulnerability @@ -39,16 +37,13 @@ The ASF vulnerability handling process is described at ## Parquet is a File Format, Not an Implementation -Apache Parquet is a file format. The format is defined by the specification in -the [parquet-format] repository, and it is read and written by many independent -implementations, several of which are maintained by projects other than Apache -Parquet. +Apache Parquet is a file format defined by the specification in the +[parquet-format] repository, and read and written by many independent +implementations. -Most security issues, such as crashes, out-of-bounds memory access, or -excessive resource consumption when reading a file, are issues in a particular -implementation rather than in the format. Each implementation has its own -threat model, security policy, and release process. Please consult the security -information for the implementation you use, for example: +Therefore, most security issues related to Parquet are specific to a particular +implementation rather than the format, and you should consult the security +policy for that implementation. For example: | Implementation | Security information | |----------------|----------------------| @@ -56,80 +51,15 @@ information for the implementation you use, for example: | Parquet C++ (part of [Apache Arrow]) | [Apache Arrow security](https://arrow.apache.org/security/) | | [arrow-rs] (the Rust `parquet` crate) | [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/blob/main/SECURITY.md) | -For any other implementation, see that project's documentation. - [parquet-format]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-format [parquet-java]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-java [Apache Arrow]: https://arrow.apache.org/ [arrow-rs]: https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs -## General Security Posture - -The following applies to the format itself, and describes what users and -implementers of Parquet should assume. - -### Parquet files may come from untrusted sources +## General Security Model Parquet files are frequently exchanged between systems and organizations. Implementations should treat the contents of a file, both data and metadata, as untrusted input and validate it before use. Reading a malformed or malicious -file should result in an error or in incorrect data, and not in memory -corruption, code execution, or disclosure of information from outside the file. -The extent to which each implementation guarantees this, and the resource -limits (memory, time, input size) that applications are expected to impose -themselves, are described in that implementation's security information. - -### Incorrect results from a crafted file are not a security issue - -Whoever writes a Parquet file controls its entire contents. A file whose -contents are internally inconsistent can cause a reader to return incorrect -results, or cause different readers (or the same reader with different -settings) to return different results for the same file. The Parquet project -does not consider this a security issue: a party able to craft such a file -could equally have written different data values in the first place. - -In particular, the metadata that readers use to skip data, such as -[statistics], the [page index], and [bloom filters], is an optimization and -**not a security control**. A reader that uses this metadata for filter -pushdown trusts it to describe the data accurately. If it does not, for example -because the minimum and maximum values recorded for a column chunk do not match -the values actually stored, rows may be silently omitted from query results. -Likewise, other fields in the metadata, such as row counts and null counts, may -be used to answer queries without reading the data. - -Systems must therefore not rely on the contents of a Parquet file to enforce -security decisions (such as access control or row-level filtering) unless they -trust the writer of that file. - -[statistics]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-format/blob/master/src/main/thrift/parquet.thrift -[page index]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-format/blob/master/PageIndex.md -[bloom filters]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-format/blob/master/BloomFilter.md - -### Integrity and authenticity - -By default, a Parquet file carries no proof of who wrote it or that it has not -been modified. The optional page checksums (CRC) detect accidental corruption -only and offer no protection against deliberate modification. - -Applications that need to detect tampering should either use -[Parquet Modular Encryption], which can protect both the confidentiality and -the integrity of data and metadata against parties that do not hold the keys, -or use a mechanism external to the file, such as digital signatures or access -controls on the underlying storage. Note that none of these mechanisms protects -against a writer that is authorized but malicious or faulty. - -[Parquet Modular Encryption]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-format/blob/master/Encryption.md - -### What is a security issue in the format - -Examples of issues that the Parquet project would treat as security issues in -the format specification include: - -* A flaw in the design of Parquet Modular Encryption that weakens the - confidentiality or integrity guarantees it describes. -* A requirement in the specification that cannot be implemented without - exposing readers or writers to a vulnerability. - -If you are unsure whether an issue is in the format or in an implementation, or -whether it is a security issue at all, please err on the side of reporting it -privately as described above. +file should result in an error or incorrect data, not in memory corruption, code +execution, or disclosure of information from outside the file. \ No newline at end of file From 769d98751a09f1ed652b09152684c7ed20d6514a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Lamb Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 10:58:38 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 4/9] Fix punctuation in security policy Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 --- content/en/docs/ASF/security.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md index 56e746e2..44dd9cc3 100644 --- a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md +++ b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ linkTitle: "Security" weight: 2 --- -This page describes the security policy of the Apache Parquet project +This page describes the security policy of the Apache Parquet project. ## Reporting a Vulnerability From 26c8451d882743ef1547f156b5c8f3fcb4cc2566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Lamb Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 11:04:29 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 5/9] rework --- content/en/docs/ASF/security.md | 24 ++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md index 44dd9cc3..c2fecf2b 100644 --- a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md +++ b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md @@ -35,15 +35,18 @@ a fix is available. The ASF vulnerability handling process is described at . -## Parquet is a File Format, Not an Implementation +## Security Model -Apache Parquet is a file format defined by the specification in the -[parquet-format] repository, and read and written by many independent -implementations. +Parquet files are frequently exchanged between systems and organizations. +Implementations should treat the contents of a file, both data and metadata, as +untrusted input and validate it before use. Reading a malformed or malicious +file should result in an error or incorrect data, not in memory corruption, code +execution, or disclosure of information from outside the file. -Therefore, most security issues related to Parquet are specific to a particular -implementation rather than the format, and you should consult the security -policy for that implementation. For example: +Apache Parquet is a file format that is read and written by many independent +implementations. Therefore, most security issues related to Parquet are specific +to a particular implementation rather than the format, and you should consult +the security policy for that implementation. For example: | Implementation | Security information | |----------------|----------------------| @@ -56,10 +59,3 @@ policy for that implementation. For example: [Apache Arrow]: https://arrow.apache.org/ [arrow-rs]: https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs -## General Security Model - -Parquet files are frequently exchanged between systems and organizations. -Implementations should treat the contents of a file, both data and metadata, as -untrusted input and validate it before use. Reading a malformed or malicious -file should result in an error or incorrect data, not in memory corruption, code -execution, or disclosure of information from outside the file. \ No newline at end of file From 42726a69cf4de5301aa93df63c18bc96915dcc1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Lamb Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 11:59:17 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 6/9] add note about resource exhaustion --- content/en/docs/ASF/security.md | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md index c2fecf2b..9a55cada 100644 --- a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md +++ b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md @@ -41,7 +41,9 @@ Parquet files are frequently exchanged between systems and organizations. Implementations should treat the contents of a file, both data and metadata, as untrusted input and validate it before use. Reading a malformed or malicious file should result in an error or incorrect data, not in memory corruption, code -execution, or disclosure of information from outside the file. +execution, or disclosure of information from outside the file. Note that +resource exhaustion, while good to prevent or protect, is not considered a +security issue. Apache Parquet is a file format that is read and written by many independent implementations. Therefore, most security issues related to Parquet are specific From 22282b1deaeb4e15122f62e7f68e1551cdb1ff13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Lamb Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 12:06:32 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 7/9] Apply suggestion from @RussellSpitzer Co-authored-by: Russell Spitzer --- content/en/docs/ASF/security.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md index 9a55cada..ef7db936 100644 --- a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md +++ b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Implementations should treat the contents of a file, both data and metadata, as untrusted input and validate it before use. Reading a malformed or malicious file should result in an error or incorrect data, not in memory corruption, code execution, or disclosure of information from outside the file. Note that -resource exhaustion, while good to prevent or protect, is not considered a +resource exhaustion, while good to prevent or protect against, is not considered a security issue. Apache Parquet is a file format that is read and written by many independent From b387e43ef31f1ba722653c577ae802444b8aafd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Lamb Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 13:52:22 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 8/9] clarify what incorrect results means --- content/en/docs/ASF/security.md | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md index ef7db936..64a01a48 100644 --- a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md +++ b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md @@ -38,12 +38,12 @@ The ASF vulnerability handling process is described at ## Security Model Parquet files are frequently exchanged between systems and organizations. -Implementations should treat the contents of a file, both data and metadata, as -untrusted input and validate it before use. Reading a malformed or malicious -file should result in an error or incorrect data, not in memory corruption, code -execution, or disclosure of information from outside the file. Note that -resource exhaustion, while good to prevent or protect against, is not considered a -security issue. +Implementations should treat the contents of a parquet file as untrusted input +and validate it before use. The behavior of reading a file that does not match +the specification is undefined. Reading such files can result in errors or +unexpected data, but should not result in memory corruption, code execution, or +disclosure of information from outside the file. Note that resource exhaustion, +while good to prevent or protect against, is not considered a security issue. Apache Parquet is a file format that is read and written by many independent implementations. Therefore, most security issues related to Parquet are specific From f585998cf3db82a5057780df39e0f9bbb5fc8e51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Lamb Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 13:52:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 9/9] Add Hardwood to list of implementation security policies Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 --- content/en/docs/ASF/security.md | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md index 64a01a48..d1d63d61 100644 --- a/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md +++ b/content/en/docs/ASF/security.md @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ The ASF vulnerability handling process is described at ## Security Model Parquet files are frequently exchanged between systems and organizations. -Implementations should treat the contents of a parquet file as untrusted input +Implementations should treat the contents of a Parquet file as untrusted input and validate it before use. The behavior of reading a file that does not match the specification is undefined. Reading such files can result in errors or unexpected data, but should not result in memory corruption, code execution, or @@ -55,9 +55,11 @@ the security policy for that implementation. For example: | [parquet-java] | [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/apache/parquet-java/blob/master/SECURITY.md) | | Parquet C++ (part of [Apache Arrow]) | [Apache Arrow security](https://arrow.apache.org/security/) | | [arrow-rs] (the Rust `parquet` crate) | [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/blob/main/SECURITY.md) | +| [Hardwood] | [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/hardwood-hq/hardwood/blob/main/SECURITY.md) | [parquet-format]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-format [parquet-java]: https://github.com/apache/parquet-java [Apache Arrow]: https://arrow.apache.org/ [arrow-rs]: https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs +[Hardwood]: https://github.com/hardwood-hq/hardwood