11_Professional-Notes

 

  p. 2175 (#1131)                      

PROFESSIONAL NOTES
ARRANGED BY
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER H. W. UNDERWOOD
FROM SEPTEMBER 3 TO OCTOBER 3
2176
2176
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
GREAT BRITAIN
The Imperial Navy ......
The Cruiser Program .....
The New Cruisers .......
New Treaty Battleships Nelson and Rodney
The New Battleships
Sir....
Warship Maintenance Costs ....,
Juggling With a Destroyer .
The Plight of the Shipbuilding Industry ..
2180
2183
2186
2188
2189
2190
FRANCE
French Navy Notes ..
..............
2102
2192
AVIATION
Airplane Replacements in the Early Part of War ......
Bombing Accuracy
Flying Ships ......
2196
2197
2200
ENGINEERING
Propulseur Trompe for Airplanes ........
The Whaley Constant Pressure Oil Engine .
The Metering of Fluids ....
......
.........
2202
2203
2205
MERCHANT MARINE
.....
Commissioner Haney and Admiral Palmer ..
2207
Water-Borne Commerce through U. S. Ports in 1924 ............ 2208
MISCELLANEOUS
Warships of the Future ....
CURRENT NAVAL AND PROFESSIONAL PAPERS
2209
..........
221


  p. 2176 (#1132)                      

2176.
[Nov.
V. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
GREAT BRITAIN
The Imperial Navy
The Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette, 5 September, 1925.-Little
attention has been aroused by the completion of the first exchange of
cruisers between the Imperial and the Australian Navies, but the event
marks a great step forward in the achievement of a common understanding
for mutual defense of the empire. The Commonwealth cruiser Brisbane
has served for about five months with the China squadron of the Royal
Navy, and her place has been taken during that period by the Concord,
lent for the purpose from the Mediterranean. It happened that the China
squadron was called upon for a busy time while the Brisbane was attached
to it, so that her officers and men have had experience, during the disturb-
ance at Shanghai and elsewhere, of the sort of duty which often falls to the
British Navy in acting as the world's policemen in the interests of human-
ity generally.
The exchange of duties appears to have given complete satisfaction. It
naturally raised the question of the exact purposes for which Common-
wealth ships might be used while on loan to the imperial government, and
this has been settled between the Australian and the home authorities. In
cases where the admiral of a squadron to which a Commonwealth ship is
attached has authority to use, at his discretion, the vessels under his com-
mand without reference to the Admiralty, for the protection of the lives
and property of British subjects, the Commonwealth agrees that such dis-
cretion may be exercised in the case of an exchanged cruiser without refer-
ence to the Australian Government. In other cases, where it is necessary
to receive instructions from the Admiralty before action is taken, the ad-
miral must seek direct permission from the Australian Government before
he can use their vessels. An event which would make this necessary would
be rare, but when it did occur the admiral would merely have to ask for
instructions from two sources instead of one.
The interchange policy between the Imperial and Australian Navies is
to be continued, and much good should result from it. More officers and
men of the Royal Navy can thereby have the opportunity of service in
Australian waters, and on the other hand the Australian personnel get
more chances of seeing the world and of improving their professional
knowledge by working with larger squadrons than exist in their own sery-
ice. The next exchange, which begins about mid-November, will be
between the Brisbane and the Delhi, the former coming to the Mediter-
ranean and the latter taking over duty in Australia. While no other domin-
ion is yet in a position to exchange a cruiser-although New Zealand may
soon be, when she has her second ship, the Diomede-the idea would seem
to be capable of expansion. What is there, for instance, to prevent the
South African surveying ship Protea from taking a turn of duty else-
where, in place of the Iroquois in China, or the Ormonde in the West
Indies, while one of the latter takes her place at Simonstown? Then the
Canadian destroyers Patriot and Patrician have made cruises in the At-
lantic and Pacific in company with imperial vessels; if one of them came
further from home, to the North Sea or Mediterranean, a destroyer from
one of the flotillas there could replace her at Halifax or Esquimalt. New-
foundland, too, has a sloop employed on fishery duties, the Lobelia; she
would be a suitable craft to spend a few months with the North Sea fishing
fleets while the Godetia or a similar vessel replaced her on the Newfound-
land fisheries. But, the great thing is that the idea of one common naval
service for the empire, with local units maintained by the various nations,
is making such good progress.
The Cruiser Program
Engineering, 2 August, 1925.-A government can make out a case for
warship construction by publishing tables in which the programs of other


  p. 2177 (#1133)                      

1925]
2177
Professional Notes
powers are set out and explained; or, by showing that certain units will
be obsolete at certain dates and by making proposals for replacing them in
time; or, by describing the strategical duties which the fleet will have to
perform in war. It is rather surprising that the present Board of Admiralty
has persistently ignored the third method of argument, which, if properly
employed, invariably builds up the strongest case. They could quite easily
have related their very reasonable proposals for cruiser building to the
concrete problems of imperial defense without committing a single indis-
cretion or divulging a single secret; and, had they done so, they would
have raised the level of recent debates, and have stifled a great deal of very
irrelevant criticism.
Trade routes may be protected by one of two methods. First, covering
forces may be stationed, permanently, at those points on the ocean high-
ways where merchantmen are bound to congregate; elsewhere, the bulk of
the trading ships may be dispersed by orders issued at the ports of de-
parture by the consular officers, acting under Admiralty instructions.
Secondly, all merchantmen may be grouped into convoys which sail, under
armed escort, at regular intervals, from ports at which they are ordered to
congregate. The first of these two methods was adopted at the outbreak
of war and lasted until 1917, when the successes of the German sub-
marines compelled us to adopt the second, and to escort all out-going and
in-coming trade in the Atlantic.
Obviously, then, the case for cruiser and destroyer programs is little
more than an elaborated reply to a very simple question : do the forces
which we at present possess suffice to protect trade by cover and dispersion,
or by placing it under permanent escort in those oceans where a possible
opponent has a chance of attacking it?
Although the weapons and types of ships used for attacking and de-
fending trade vary with every decade, the war has none the less set up a
fairly reliable standard for calculating the forces necessary for ensuring the
safety of British sea borne commerce. In August, 1914, the British Ad-
miralty had to provide against an attack upon trade in all the oceans of the
world, for the German cruisers were able, and did actually operate in the
Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Oceans. The distribution of the
cruiser forces necessary to meet the danger was as follows:
Number of
Cruisers in the
Area to be Covered Cruiser Force Allocated
British
Squadrons.
Western approaches to Eleventh cruiser squadron.
the British Islands.
Western approaches to Twelfth cruiser squadron.
the Channel.
Bay of Biscay to the Ninth cruiser squadron.
Azores.
North America and the Fourth cruiser squadron.
West Indies.
Canary Islands to north- Fifth cruiser squadron.
eastern Brazil.
River Plate
H.M.S. Glasgow
Total for the Atlantic
24
To this total must, however, be added the cruisers on the China station (4):
the Australian station (4); the East Indies station (2); and the Cape
station (3); so that our cruiser defense on the outer oceans consisted of
thirty-seven units. This, however, was by no means the whole force al-
lotted to the purpose. The Japanese reinforced our patrol of the Pacific
routes by cruiser squadrons which varied in number, but which were never
less than five units strong; and the French Admiralty assisted us in the


  p. 2178 (#1134)                      

2178
(Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
north Atlantic with ten cruisers. The whole Allied force employed was
thus well over fifty units.
It is quite obvious from this that, if the post-war problems of imperial
defense corresponded to those which confronted the country in 1914, we
should not possess a cruiser force sufficient to cover the vital points on
the ocean highways. At the present moment Great Britain has some fifty
cruisers on active service or in reserve. If, therefore, the Admiralty con-
templated defending trade in all oceans, every one of these vessels would
at once be required on the outer routes, and not a single unit would be
left with the feet in home waters and the Mediterranean. The conditions
are obviously changed, and the reason for the change is purely political.
Germany was able to attack trade in all oceans and to supplement her attack
by another in the approach routes to the British Islands, which none of our
possible opponents in the postwar world would be able to do. But, as at
least two of these powers would be in a position to develop an attack upon
British trade, which our cruiser fleet would have to thwart, an analysis of
the strategical implications of a naval war with some of these powers is
probably the best test which can be applied to the Admiralty's proposals,
and, indeed, to our whole naval position. The cordial and friendly relations
which exist between Great Britain and these three powers make it possible
to pursue the analysis without impropriety. Its object is purely arith-
metical: to establish a proper method of calculating the cruiser forces
necessary for defending the imperial trade routes, and the assumptions
upon which the calculation is erected have nothing to do with the actual
facts of international politics. In view, however, of the possibility of
partial and misleading quotation, it may be well to refer to the suppositi-
tious opponents respectively as transatlantic, European, and Asiatic powers.
The slight obscurity will not embarrass the reader.
War with a transatlantic power would inevitably mean that the Canadian
route would be closed, and that the West Indies would be overrun; and
these calamities would be followed by a violent struggle for the mastery of
the Plate trade route. The enemy bureau of operations would detach
every available cruiser to attack trade in the Rocas, Fernando Noronha
area; and, by bringing pressure to bear upon South American states, would
endeavor to establish operating bases as near the Plate as possible, and so
cut the trade from its point of departure. As local influence would make
it quite impossible for Great Britain to do as she did during the last war,
that is to establish a secret coaling and operating base in Brazilian territory
at the Abrolhos rocks, the British Admiralty would certainly be compelled
to answer an enemy attack upon the Plate route by escorting all merchant-
men from the Plate to the Canaries area, and then dispersing them. The
opponent's fleet, as at present constituted, would not be able to maintain a
sustained attack in the approach routes to the British Islands; and merchant
fleets when past the meridian of 20° W., would be outside the zone of
attack. In such a war, trade defense would, therefore, be a combination of
the two systems, which, as has been shown, are the essence of any pro-
tective plan, covering cruiser forces, and permanent escort. The forces
required for the purpose would, of course, vary with the forces allocated
to the attack, but they are none the less calculable, within a certain margin.
At the present moment the navy department of the transatlantic power has
allotted eleven cruisers in full commission to the scouting and battle fleets,
and four to the Gulf of Mexico. An approximately equal force of fourteen
cruisers has been left in reserve, and we may assume that about this num-
ber of ships would be available for an attack upon those British trade
routes which were left open to us. This, however, by no means implies
that fourteen ships would be incessantly attacking on the Plate route. If
one cruiser is to be kept continuously operating in a given area, a total
force of two or three has to be allocated to it, so that the enemy would
be lucky if they could maintain three attacking cruisers in the Fernando
Noronha zone, and three more off the Plate. On the other hand, our pro-


  p. 2179 (#1135)                      

1925)
2179
Professional Notes
tective forces could not possibly be less than twenty-five cruisers. At least
two ships would be required at Bathurst and Sierra Leone, to convoy the
trade from the River Plate and, although the waters east of the twentieth
meridian would be fairly immune from attack, some forces would neces-
sarily be allocated to the route between the Canaries and the western
channel. We therefore arrive at the result that, if Great Britain were at
war with the first of her three possible opponents, the Admiralty would
have to distribute half her available cruiser forces to the defense of trade.
If every other ocean were denuded, some twenty-five cruiser units would
be left for fleet work in home waters and the Mediterranean. If, on the
other hand, the political atmosphere compelled us to maintain some vessels
in oceans not immediately threatened, as may well be taken as probable in
the hypothetical event we are discussing, this narrow margin of tactical
safety would be very much reduced. The conclusion to be drawn is that
our present cruiser fleet just, but only just, meets the first of our require-
ments. If our building program were modeled on purely strategical
grounds, any government could make out an unanswerable case for a very
considerable increase.
The strategical implications of a war with a European power are less
easy to estimate, because such a power would be in a position to make a
double attack upon our trade routes. With sufficient cruisers, she could
operate in the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans, and with her light craft and
submarines she could make a sustained attack upon the approach routes to
the British Islands between Cape Clear and the northwest coast of Spain.
The attack in these three areas would, however, be of very different in-
tensity. Unless her navy were very much increased, the attack of the
possible opponent in the Indian Ocean could easily be met by a force of three
cruisers stationed at the Gulf of Aden, at Colombo, and at Singapore. The
attack in the Atlantic would, however. be very much more severe. If the
existing Mediterranean squadron and its attendant auxiliaries represent
the force which this power considers necessary for keeping the communi-
cations open in that sea, her Admiralty would have available for operations
in the Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic: (1) A squadron of three old battle-
ships, one cruiser and seventeen destroyers; (2) nine cruisers kept in re-
serve; and (3) a submarine fleet of some fifty units, of which twenty
would be continually at work. If, moreover, her Admiralty succeeded in
establishing a composite force of cruisers and submarines on the west
coast of Africa, and in keeping them supplied, their attack upon trade
would be continuous from the coast of Brazil to the approaches to the
Thames. The resulting situation would so closely resemble that which the
Germans set up in 1917 that we should doubtless be compelled to do what
we then did; that is, put all of our trade in the Atlantic under armed
escort. The forces necessary for this purpose are thirty cruisers for es-
corting oceanic trade; sixty to seventy destroyers for escorting the convoys
in the approach routes, and an enormous number of mosquito craft for
setting up an anti-submarine patrol in the inshore lanes, and escorting the
coastal traffic. In the summer of 1917 some three thousand yachts, drifters,
trawlers, motor boats, and submarine chasers were employed in this way
along the coasts of the British Islands. As the enemy submarines would
operate from bases which flank the main approach to the British Islands,
and as the smallest coast defense type of submarines could be used in the
Channel, such an attack upon commerce would certainly call for a similar
effort from the British auxiliary feet, and immobilize an equal number
of small craft along the traffic lanes.
Undoubtedly, Great Britain, with her fifty cruisers and her 189 destroy-
ers, could detach sufficient forces to take the necessary counter measures ;
and, undoubtedly, the maritime resources of the empire, from which the
auxiliary mosquito fleet is drawn, would suffice. But, when the deductions
for meeting a trade war were made, the Admiralty would be left with a
dangerously narrow margin of cruiser and destroyer strength for the


  p. 2180 (#1136)                      

2180
(Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Mediterranean, which would certainly be the theater of a prolonged and
bitter struggle; and the cruiser forces necessary for cutting off enemy over-
seas trade would be very difficult to find. Once again, therefore, this
analysis of possible contingencies leads to the same result: the British naval
forces, as at present constituted, are sufficient for national security; but
no more.
The cruiser and destroyer forces necessary for a war with an Asiatic
power cannot be calculated in the same way. In both the cases we have
considered the enemy would be able to maintain an attack upon British
trade in at least one ocean, and against an important complex of traffic
routes. Any Asiatic fleet is unable to do either, and in referring to an
Asiatic fleet the only possible reference can be to that of Japan. In these
circumstances, as we have already in these columns made some anaylsis of
the possible employment of the Japanese fleet, we trust that, without of-
fense, it may be allowable to abandon our fictitious obscurity and refer to
that power openly in what follows. The Japanese fleet cannot operate in
the Indian Ocean; and although some persons believe that the Tokyo Ad-
miralty might set up some kind of advanced operating base at Jaluit, it
is difficult to see what they would gain by it; as, if they did so, they would
carry their cruisers away from the trade which they desired to attack. The
probable consequences of a trade war between the two countries would be
that certain routes would automatically close down; and that each side
would endeavor to keep some others open by running convoys through the
danger zones. On the British side trade north of the Yangtze would cease,
and an effort would be made to maintain the Shanghai trade against inter-
ference from Sasebo, by placing it under escort from Hong Kong north-
ward. The Japanese would probably make a serious effort to keep open
their oil route to Dutch Borneo, against interference from a British advanced
base at Sandakan. Each side would, in fact, find its available cruiser and
destroyer forces absorbed in purely defensive operations. The conse-
quences of a serious offensive movement by either party have already been
dealt with in these columns. It has been shown that, if Great Britain
ever attempted to carry naval war into Japanese waters, she would require
tonnage on a scale which would mean economic ruin, unless it were
especially built for the purpose. It has also been shown that Japan has
not sufficient maritime resources to launch overseas expeditions against
the British dominions, and, at the same time, to provide herself with food,
oil, coal, iron, and machinery. It is therefore unnecessary to calculate
whether our present cruiser and destroyer forces suffice for carrying on
a form of warfare which economic laws would make impossible, the
question does not arise.
The New Cruisers
By Sir Herbert Russell, The Naval and Military Record, 19 August,
1925.-The decision of the Admiralty to build two distinct types of cruiser
under the program of five years' replacements is most probably an ex-
pedient imposed by the necessity for economy. I image there can be very
little question that had the board been unfettered by any other consideration
than that of the highest standard of tactical efficiency they would have
plumped for all Class A ships, which we know to be vessels of 10.000 tons,
armed with 8-inch guns, and probably good for 35 knots. In the alternative
they have elected to maintain numbers at the expense of uniformity of
fighting value. The general impression is that the Class B cruisers will be
vessels of about 7,500 tons, but exactly what detailed loss of sea-keeping
and combative qualities this reduction of displacement by 25 per cent will
entail must remain conjectural. I do not believe that this partial reversion
to the system of graded cruisers which existed until the cruiser was prac-
tically evolved out of existence by the battle cruiser is deliberate, but I do
believe that it can be adequately justified.


  p. 2181 (#1137)                      

1925]
2181
Professional Notes
Warship design stands as the material embodiment of current tactical
ideas. At the present day tactical ideas of naval warfare are probably sim-
pler and more concrete than they have ever been since the advent of steam.
The Great War is now sufficiently remote to permit of a clear, judicial
perspective. The strategical situation has been greatly simplified by the
fact that there are now only three sea powers in the first-class category
as against seven before the war. The proposition before the Admiralty
is that we are called upon to maintain a nominal equality with the United
States Navy and a 40 per cent superiority of strength over the Japa-
nese Navy. This is the simple meaning of the 5-5-3 formula agreed
upon at the Washington Conference. The other naval powers have volun-
tarily taken up a purely passive attitude; their rôle is reduced to one of
national defense only, as expressed by ensuring the security of territorial
waters. Therefore, we have no cause for active concern in the policy of the
other naval powers.
Our fleet is "wearing out" and needs replacement. We can only measure
the extent and character of this requisite replacement by reference to what
the other two first-class powers are doing. The question of "friendly re-
lations" has nothing to do with the Admiralty view. This is a political,
not a military, aspect. The Admiralty is only called upon to contemplate
two great fleets-in-being, and to keep pace with their progress so that the
5-5-3 ratio shall not become a meaningless formula. There is no implied
threat to anybody in the principle of "keeping fit.” A nation must keep
fit quite as much as an athlete if it hopes to maintain an authoritative voice
in the counsels of the world.
I think we may define the present tactical period as the cruiser era. There
is considerable diversity of opinion as to the precise value of the capital
ship: there is none regarding the cruiser. The emergence of the Pacific
zone into the strategic vision of naval thought gives a new aspect to our
traditional conception of war at sea. Heretofore, we have environed Euro-
pean waters as the decisive area, the Narrow Seas in the foreground, and the
Mediterranean as the ultimate limit. Fighting beyond this area we have
looked upon as episodical, and as likely to amount to only a small collective
factor in the final issue.
Now this is all changed, and the change brings us to the prospect of
ocean warfare in its widest sense. The tactics which always presuppose
a base within a day or two's steaming are rather in the melting pot, and
the type of warship essentially designed to materialize this conception is
rather in the melting pot with them. Tactics must necessarily be governed
by geographical ideas. Some day we may find ourselves back at the base
operations principle. For a great many years ahead, as far as it is
humanly possible to foresee, we are very much at sea. Therefore, we want
the type of warship which will best enable us to keep at sea.
All of the great sea powers are likewise great maritime powers in the
commercial sense. The one follows the other: a nation with no trade
interests worth speaking about at sea is not going to the expense of keeping
up a big navy. Let us take this as an elementary strategical thesis. A
country possessing a great sea borne trade can be struck most effectively
through that trade. Great Britain and Japan could be speedily reduced to
submission by an effectual blockade, assuming such a thing were possible
to establish. The United States is self-supporting, but the destruction of
her ocean commerce would be a blow under which, even with her colossal
wealth, she would stagger very heavily indeed.
Commerce destruction-or capture, which has the same result-figures
more prominently in the present-day scheme of naval warfare than ever
it did before. Unquestionably, this is due to the effect of the German
submarine campaign, which, in spite of our dominance of the sea's surface,
came perilously near to starving us into capitulation. The doctrine of de-
struction automatically imposes the obligation of protection, and in the case


  p. 2182 (#1138)                      

2182
(Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
of commerce a similar type of vessel is suitable to both purposes. Hence,
this new rivalry in cruiser construction.
It is very unlikely that when the Washington Conference framed its
agreement it foresaw just where that agreement would lead. The real
purpose of the conference was to restrict naval armaments altogether. It
has only been successful in diverting the growth of them. Had there been
more foresight, I fancy the limits of cruiser displacement would have been
set lower; but probably this would have resulted merely in the construction
of larger numbers. Anyway, it is significant that Great Britain, France,
Italy, Japan, and the United States are building up to the fullest limits in
tons and guns, and, but for the Washington restrictions, this competition
must have resulted already in a growth which by now would have equalled
the biggest pre-war armored cruiser type.
The British Admiralty is being forced into reaction from this maximum
building. I say "forced” because it cannot be a matter of pure choice. A
big cruiser can do all that a small cruiser can do, and a great deal more: a
small cruiser cannot compete with size when it comes to gun power, sea-
keeping endurance, and (save at a serious relative sacrifice) speed. On
the score of fighting efficiency the Admiralty would have preferred that the
new program should consist wholly of Class A cruisers.
The conditions which produced such a wide variety of cruiser types be-
tween the passing of the Great Naval Defense Act in 1889, and the advent
of the three Invincibles in 1905, have been largely dissipated. As I have
said before, tactical ideas are now much simpler and more concrete. The
principle of using a sledge hammer for a butterfly is always to be avoided,
but we no longer admit that the best way to avoid it is to build a special
type of cruiser for every conceivable character of work. The system which
produced the first class, second class, and third class cruiser—with plenty
of variety in each class-was even more wasteful than the sledge hammer
threatened to be.
More than three fifths of our new cruisers (counting the five laid down
during last year) will be of the 10,000-ton type. It is always possible to
foresee tactical probabilities with sufficient certainty to provide for meeting
them in the sense of determining where the big ships and the lesser ships
may be disposed to best advantage. By keeping the Class B cruisers within
a more limited radius of action they should prove of just as much value,
under a similarity of conditions, as the bigger ships, always providing that
speed and gun calibers are maintained. They are not intended to fight any-
thing more formidable than their own types, and if they encounter anything
more formidable on the surface-they will have sufficient mobility to
deny action.
But, it seems to me that we shall pass through a long transition period
during which the British Navy will again possess three classes of cruiser.
We shall have the A class, in which may be included the Hawkins group;
the B class, in which may be included the Enterprise and the Emerald,
now completing, and the C class, comprising all of the light cruisers now
remaining on the effective list. History is repeating itself, not through
design, but through the exigencies of economy. As the light cruiser class
dies out it is difficult to believe that it will be repeated. Ships of 5,000
tons, with 6-inch guns, were perfectly adequate for service on the remote
foreign stations all the time that our main objectives remained in European
waters, but now that foreign 10,000-ton cruisers with 8-inch guns are ap-
pearing on those remote stations, they are clearly outclassed. The Blue
Water School has been revived by changed strategical conditions, and we
can no longer be satisfied to build with a view to maintaining the Admiralty
of the Atlantic-which really meant the boundary of the western approaches
and the grand junction of the middle sea.


  p. 2183 (#1139)                      

19251
Professional Notes
2183
New Treaty Battleships “Nelson” and “Rodney"
The British Interpretation of the Lessons of the Jutland Battle, by
Hector C. Bywater, The Scientific American, October, 1925.—Britain's
new battleships, Nelson and Rodney, are now approaching the launching
stage, and both will go afloat before the end of the year. Naval experts
the world over have long displayed a lively interest in these ships, due to
the rumored novelties of their design. They are known to incorporate all of
the modifications suggested by war experience, and especially by the Battle
of Jutland, so far as this has been possible within the limits of displacement
and gun power dictated by the Washington Naval Treaty.
Interest has been further excited by the reticence of the British Ad-
miralty, which, up to now, has declined to release any information about
the ships beyond their principal measurements. This policy of secrecy has
had an unfavorable reaction abroad. It has given a handle to publicists
and agitators who pander to anti-British sentiment, and these people have
contrived to generate a suspicion in the United States that Great Britain is
deliberately flouting the technical clauses of the treaty by endowing her
new battleships with unauthorized powers of offense.
A simpler and more convincing reason for the Admiralty's "hush"
policy might be advanced. It is conceivable that the British naval chiefs,
regarding as their exclusive property the hints on ship design which they
acquired during the war, are not disposed to share this invaluable knowledge
with other countries that did not pay the same price for it. Such an atti-
tude is natural enough, for the British Navy unquestionably bore the brunt
of the struggle at sea, and had far heavier losses than were suffered in the
aggregate by all of the other naval forces associated with it. Nor should
it be forgotten that the United States naval mission which visited Europe
after the war was allowed to inspect all of the latest ships, including the
then unfinished Hood. An American officer who made that tour of in-
spection has assured me that nothing whatsoever was withheld from the
cognizance of the visitors by the British naval authorities.
In the case of the new battleships a closer reticence has been observed ;
but while the fact may be open to criticism on political grounds, it certainly
does not justify the allegations of bad faith in regard to the treaty, which
have been made so freely by certain writers in the United States. It has
now become possible to furnish some information relating to the Nelson
design which, although not official, may be accepted as reliable. As will be
seen, these details completely refute charges preferred by American critics
to the effect that the ships are camouflaged aircraft carriers.
Dimensions of the Nelson and Rodney
Length overall
.........702 feet
Extreme breadth ........
........106 feet
Normal draft ..........
.............. 30 feet
Standard displacement ..
...........35,000 tons
Nine 16-inch guns in three 3-gun turrets
Armament
Twelve 6-inch guns in six 2-gun turrets
Numerous anti-aircraft pieces
Turrets, 13-inch
Belt, 12-inch
Armor (probable) .....
Heavy deck protection, particularly at
the forward group of 16 inch turrets
Speed (probable) ............
...........23 knots
Voted under the Navy Estimates for the fiscal year 1922-23, both ships
were laid down on December 28, 1922—the Nelson by Armstrong, Whit-
worth and Company, at Newcastle-on-Tyne, the Rodney by Cammell Laird
and Company, at Birkenhead. Industrial troubles have delayed their com-
pletion, and, if launched in the coming fall, they will have been on the


  p. 2184 (#1140)                      

2184
[Nov.
U. S. Vuval Institute Proceedings
stocks the better part of three years. They are scheduled for delivery some
time in 1927.
Their leading dimensions are: length 702 feet over all, extreme breadth
106 feet, normal draught 30 feet, standard displacement 35,000 tons. This
last figure refers to the weight of the ship as complete in every respect, but
without fuel or reserve feed water on board. When these items are added,
the gross displacement will be nearer 40,000 tons. The form of hull
resembles that of H.M.S. Hood, with the same clipper stem, a cut-away
stern, and sides falling inward to minimize the chance of direct hits.
Unlike the Hood, however, bulge protection is not fitted as an external
element, but is incorporated as an integral part of the ship's structure.
From the dimensions given, which are official, it is clear that the Nelsons
have not been designed for very high speeds. What they can do in the
way of speed is still confidential, but it will be surprising if they prove to
be much swifter than the 22-knot Royal Sovereigns. In other words, they
are battleships pure and simple, with no pretensions to the high mobility
of battle cruisers.
Their main armament has been a more or less open secret for some con-
siderable time past. It consists of nine 16-inch guns, each weighing about
106 tons, and probaly akin in ballistic properties to the American piece
mounted in the Marylands. Following the omne ignotum pro magnifico
rule, some foreign publications credit the British 16-in. gun with a length
of 50 calibers, but this is almost certainly incorrect. Very long guns do not
seem popular in the British service, which has only once employed a
50-caliber gun of large bore: namely, the 12-in. Mark XII mounted in the
St. Vincent and Neptune ships, and then with qualified success.
The nine 16-in. guns of the Nelson are carried in triple turrets, so that
Great Britain, after many years of hesitation, at last falls into line with the
United States and Italy, the pioneers in this type of gun mounting. It is,
of course, a compromise ; for, regarded as a unit a gun mounted singly
is more efficient than as one of a pair, and for rapid fire a two-gun turret
is equal to one of three guns.
Ammunition supply and loading operations are complicated by the three
gun mount, while the deflection set up by the firing of the outer guns has to
be corrected by a very delicate and not always infallible system of synchro-
nized discharge. The subject, however, is too large to be explored further
on this occasion. Suffice it to say that when the pros and cons are nicely
balanced, the three-gun turret tips the scales by reason (1) of its economy
in weight, and (2) its adaptation to other tactical requirements, which will
be dealt with later.
The triple turret is no novelty, save in the British service, but the really
striking feature of the Nelson class is the disposal of the turrets them-
selves. Contrary to all precedent, the guns are grouped together in the
forward part of the ship, leaving the after section denuded of heavy
armament. The first and third turrets are on a level, the second being raised
on a high barbette. This enables six 16-in. guns to fire directly ahead, leay-
ing the other three guns to join in as soon as the target bears a few points
on either beam. Over a fairly wide arc on either broadside all nine guns
have an unrestricted field of fire. But, if an enemy ship were astern, or bear-
ing several points abaft the beam, it could not be brought under fire
from the big guns. From the tactical viewpoint this is unsatisfactory, if
only because guns should not be mounted on the assumption that the target
will always be in a given position and never stray into one of the "blind
spots" or neutral zones outside the field of fire.
When Beatty made his famous 16-point turn at Jutland, racing ahead of
the German battle cruisers to lure them and their oncoming battle fleet
into the arms of Jellicoe, his big guns could not have fired a shot had they
been disposed on the principle adopted in the Nelson class. With this object
lesson before them, it seems odd that the Admiralty experts should have
decided to sacrifice stern fire altogether.


  p. 2185 (#1141)                      

1925]
2185
Professional Notes
That they did so was in deference to another and perhaps still more
important lesson learned at Jutland: that the really vulnerable points of a
capital ship are its turrets, barbette trunks, and contiguous magazines. At
least two out of the three British capital ships lost in that engagement were
sunk by shells that pierced the turret walls or roof and transmitted a flash
to the powder rooms. In the case of the third ship, the Indefatigable,
there is reason to suppose that projectiles, striking just below the upper
deck level, penetrated one of the barbette trunks and so gained access to a
magazine.
Other ships that came within an ace of destruction through turret hits
were the British Lion and the German Derfflinger and Seydlitz. It would
seem, therefore, that the most vulnerable part of a capital ship is no
longer the waterline but the gun positions. The effect of hits betwixt wind
and water may be localized by subdivision; but if a shell penetrates to a
magazine, or even transmits a tongue of flame that far, the whole ship is
placed in deadly peril.
It was in order to avert this calamity that the grouping of the main
armament on the forward deck was decided upon for the Nelson class,
since it makes possible the concentration of very thick armor on the turrets
and barbettes themselves, as well as on the waterline and topsides in way
of the gun positions, and the fitting of stout protective decks over this par-
ticular area of the ship.
Although the actual strength of the vertical and horizontal armor to be
fitted is not disclosed, these ships will probably be the most heavily-plated
vessels afloat. This feature alone serves to indicate how wide is the gulf
that divides current British practice in capital ship design from the principles
enunciated by Lord Fisher, who had little use for armor and pinned his
faith to big guns plus speed-a combination that failed to make good in
the fiery test of Jutland. Admiral von Tirpitz's dictum, “The first require-
ment of a fighting ship is that it shall remain afloat under fire," evinced a
shrewder appreciation of actualities.
The fact that the Nelsons are to mount the largest battery of 16-in. guns
hitherto placed in one ship, and are to have their vitals shielded by massive
armor plate, disposes of yet another fiction entertained by some naval
critics: that is, that the ships in question are to be virtually bare of armor
in order that they shall have the speed of battle cruisers. As a secondary
battery each has twelve 6-in. rapid-fire guns in twin turrets, stationed on the
broadside amidships. The housing of these guns in closed turrets is a
tribute to the murderous efficacy of high-explosive shell, the blast and
splinters from which took a heavy toll of men behind open gun shields in
every naval action of the World War. There were occasions on which a
few salvos of medium-caliber shell were enough to silence every gun not
mounted in a closed turret. Additional to the guns enumerated, the ships
will have a large equipment of anti-aircraft pieces.
Since the placing of all the main turrets on the foredeck pre-empts room
that is usually occupied by machinery, the propelling plant has perforce had
to be shifted further toward the stern. The boilers are, therefore, aft of
the midship line, and the single funnel into which all the uptakes lead is
situated aba ft the mainmast. This gives the type a very singular appearance,
further accentuated by the huge conning-towers and bridges, and still more
so by the substitution of a veritable skyscraper of steel for the customary
tripod foremast. Yet another grotesque touch is imparted by the "gallows"
mainmast, built up with four legs, three of which are topped by director
towers for the secondary armament.
The thrusting back of all this tophamper has done away with the spacious
quarterdeck found in dreadnoughts of more conventional design. It looks,
indeed, as though the deck space in the after part of the ship will be ex-
tremely limited, and it would be manifestly difficult to provide a landing
platform for airplanes. This fact is a sufficient commentary on the rumor
that each ship is to carry sixty or eighty airplanes.


  p. 2186 (#1142)                      

2186
Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Considering the U.S.S. Saratoga-a ship in which practically the whole
of the top deck, measuring some 880 feet by 104 feet, is left free for avia-
tion purposes—is equipped to carry and operate only seventy aircraft, it
would be interesting to learn where the Nelson could stow an equal number
of machines, to say nothing of the provision of landing facilities for the
same. Although positive information on this point cannot be quoted, it
seems more than likely that the Nelson's contingent of aircraft will be
restricted to a few light machines of the type already carried by British
and American battleships for reconnaissance and gun-spotting.
Such, then, are the two mystery ships about to be added to the British
fleet, in exchange for a quartet of older dreadnoughts earmarked for the
scrap heap. Comparing the Nelson type with the U.S.S. Colorado, it will
be found that there is little to choose between them with regard to artillery
power. The Nelson's extra gun is not likely to give her an advantage in
volume of fire, for the reason that the triple mounting, however ingeniously
planned, does not conduce to ultra-rapid working of the guns; and I be-
lieve that the umpire in a war game would not allow nine guns in triple
turrets a larger aggregate of rounds within a given period that eight
similar guns twin-mounted.
So far as ahead fire is concerned, the Nelson has a 50 per cent margin
over the American ship. In broadside discharge they may be rated as
equal, for the reason given; while in stern fire the Colorado would have
everything her own way. As for speed, the Nelson is probably superior by
a couple of knots. Failing publication of armor figures for the British
ship, no comparison of protective attributes is feasible. It may, however,
be taken as reasonably certain that the Nelson is less vulnerable at certain
vital points, such as turrets, magazines and boilers, though her average
thickness of armor may be somewhat less than that of the Colorado whose
protection is unusually heavy.
On the whole, the Nelson may be a better all-round fighting ship to the
extent of her additional few thousand tons, but her tactical supremacy over
the Colorado is by no means pronounced. Her design constitutes a some-
what radical departure from accepted canons of naval design, and it re-
mains to be seen whether it will come up to expectation.
The New Battleships
The Engineer, 28 August, 1925.—The construction of the battleships
Nelson and Rodney, which were laid down simultaneously in December,
1922, has proceeded at a leisurely pace, owing in part to motives of economy
and in part to industrial disputes. As regards economy, it will probably
be found in the end that the slow rate of building has tended to inflate the
initial cost of the ships, as it has done in the case of certain cruisers left
over from the war program. For example, the Effingham, which has been
eight years in the builders' hands, will have cost £2,175,000 by the time
she is ready for sea, while the Hawkins, a ship of identical design, which
was built more rapidly, cost only £1,636,745. Even the comparatively small
cruisers, Emerald and Enterprise, which have been in hand for seven years,
will average £1,575,000 apiece. The individual cost of the new battleships
is officially returned as "about £6,000,000," but it will be a pleasant sur-
prise if this estimate is not exceeded. In any case, it is uncertain whether
the figure in question includes armament. If not, the total bill for each
ship will be largely increased. According to naval reference books, the
Queen Elizabeths averaged £2,336,750 each, but, in fact, the cost was con-
siderably greater. A Parliamentary answer on May 4, 1921, gave
£2.473,103 as the expenditure on the hull, machinery, and equipment of
H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth, with an additional £541,000 on her armament,
bringing the total outlay on this ship to £3,014,103. As her sister ships
were completed during the war period, when labor and material charges had


  p. 2187 (#1143)                      

1925)
2187
Professional Notes
reached a high level, the average cost of the class must certainly have been
nearer £3,500,000. On the whole, it will be safer to regard the official
estimate of £6,000,000 apiece for the Nelson and Rodney as a purely
nominal figure, which may bear only an approximate relationship to the
actual expenditure.
The launching of the Nelson, which is to take place on September 3—
that of the Rodney will not be effected till January next-will be an event
of more than casual interest, for it is nine years since the last battleship,
Ramillies, went afloat in this country, and seven years since the last capital
ship, Hood, was launched for the British Navy. It is already clear that
the virtual suspension of heavy warship construction has not been an
unmixed blessing. Unemployment, with all of its attendant evils, is now
rife in districts to which the steady flow of Admiralty contracts used to
bring work and prosperity. If, on the one hand, vast sums have been
saved by the naval "holiday," on the other hand sums equally vast have
been paid out in relieving the workless victims of this international experi-
ment, to say nothing of the losses incurred through the depreciation of
idle plant. In view of the circumstance that this country, to a far greater
extent than any other, has specialized in the construction of warships and
naval armaments, both for the home and foreign governments, it follows
that the economic effects of naval disarmament have been felt here far
more severely than elsewhere, though the fact does not appear to be gener-
ally appreciated. That the building of even two battleships has done some-
thing to relieve unemployment is self-evident. In this connection some
official statistics may be quoted. The industries that have mainly benefited
are the shipyards and allied concerns, engineering establishments, ammuni-
tion factories, steel works, mines, railways, and shipping. During the first
three months after the placing of contracts four to five thousand men were
employed. In the first six months an average of 13,000 men was engaged,
rising in the second six months to 29,000, and subsequently for a time to
40,000. The average employed during the whole period of construction has
been about 21,000. By the time the ships are finished about £10,000,000
will have been paid out in wages. This money is circulating in Sheffield,
Manchester, Barrow, and Glasgow, as well as in the districts where the
ships are being built and where the government ordnance factories are
situated. It is anticipated that details of the type will be released for publi-
cation as soon as the first battleship goes afloat. Hitherto, these particulars
have been jealously guarded, though the official embargo has not prevented
the leakage of information into the press. The first description of the ships
appeared in the Italian semiofficial review, Revista Marittima, two years
ago, and the data there presented were subsequently laid before a Com-
mittee of the American Congress by Captain Hough, chief of the United
States Naval Intelligence Office. As they correspond very closely to fore-
casts which since have been published in this country, there is good war-
rant for accepting them as substantially accurate. This notwithstanding,
we propose to defer any detailed examination of the design until such time
as the Admiralty sees fit to lift the veil. Where so much mystery has been
observed, we may reasonably hope for something in the way of novelty.
Public attention has hitherto been attracted by the unique disposition of the
main armament, which is reputed to consist of nine 16-in. guns in three
turrets grouped on the center line in the forward part of the ship. This
is the arrangement which is understood to have been approved for the
four super-Hood battle cruisers, which were ordered in 1921 and cancelled
shortly after the Washington Conference. It has the advantage of permit-
ting the concentration of thick armor on the gun positions, which, as
Jutland experience showed, are the most vulnerable parts of a capital ship,
and at the same time it tends to simplify the lay-out of boilers and machinery.
The only drawback is the loss of stern fire; but while that would be a very
serious defect in ships planned for independent action, it is of less moment


  p. 2188 (#1144)                      

2188
(Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
in battleships designed to serve as units of a fleet which is able, collectively,
to train a large number of heavy guns on a target bearing astern. If the
new ships can fire six 16-in. guns ahead and nine on the beam, their tactical
value will be very high. While there has been much speculation at home
and abroad as to their offensive qualities, little has been heard about less
obvious features of the design. It would be of great interest to know, for
example, whether the ships are to be driven by steam alone, or whether the
possibilities of the Diesel system as a prime mover in large men-of-war
have been turned to account. It is already known that oil engines are in-
stalled in the mine laying cruiser Adventure for propelling her at cruising
speeds. The adoption of such engines for auxiliary propulsion in the new
battleships would not come as a surprise to those who are aware of the
practical interest which the Admiralty has displayed in Diesel development
for a number of years past. When the design of the Hood was under con-
sideration, as far back as 1916, it was proposed to fit two sets of eight-
cylinder Diesel engines, each of 4,500 horsepower, running at 185 revolu-
tions per minute, on the wing shafts, with three sets of turbines on the
center shaft. This proposal was subsequently abandoned, but the fact of its
having been made at that early date is very significant.
The strategic conditions prevailing before the war were such as to
exalt the importance of high speed. As the North Sea was then the pro-
spective battleground, it was obvious that an enemy in inferior strength,
operating from bases near at hand, could not be brought to action unless
our ships were faster by several knots. Today, however, the North Sea
requirements no longer affect the design of our ships. Any future war in
which the empire may be involved is likely to be an oceanic war, and the
ships capable of rendering the most efficient service will be those with the
greatest radius of action. The advantages of the internal combustion
engine in this connection are too well known to need emphasis. While it
is still inferior to the steam turbine in output of power per unit of weight,
and is therefore not yet suitable for adoption as the main propelling plant in
ships of high speed, the oil engine is sufficiently developed to justify its
use for auxiliary drive in large vessels, as has been done in H.M.S. Ad-
venture. To apply the system to 35,000-ton battleships would be a bolder
experiment, but there is no reason why it should prove unsuccessful. In the
projected light battle cruisers of 17,500 tons and 35 knots, which the French
Ministry of Marine is now considering, oil engines are provided for cruis-
ing speed and geared turbines for full power, and it is claimed that the
ships would have a radius of 12,000 miles at economical speed. British
firms are perfectly able to construct oil engines of the power required to
propel large battleships at the moderate velocities which are normally
maintained in peace time. But, in the case of the Nelson and Rodney, which
conform to the tonnage limit imposed by the treaty, the factor of weight
has necessarily dominated the whole design, and it may therefore have
proved impracticable to utilize the oil engine as an auxiliary means of pro-
pulsion in these particular vessels. This is but one of the many intriguing
points which will, no doubt, be cleared up when the naval authorities, in
their own good time, decide to tell the public something about its new
battleships.
Warship Maintenance Costs
The Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette, 22 August, 1925.—The Parlia-
mentary Secretary to the Admiralty states that the cost of a battleship
of the latest type, inclusive of torpedoes, ammunition, and so forth, is ap-
proximately £7,000,000. Of this, about £3,200,000 is due to labor, and
£2,100,000 to material, the remainder being due to profit and to estab-
lishment charges, such as rent, rates, light, power, maintenance, and so
forth. The cost of a battle cruiser similar to H.M.S. Hood would be about
£6,000,000, of which approximately £2,700,000 is due to labour, and


  p. 2189 (#1145)                      

1925]
2189
Professional Notes
£1,800,000 due to material. The corresponding figures for a modern light
cruiser are £2,000,000, £900,000 and £600,000; for a modern destroyer
£325,000, £145,000, £98,000; and for a modern submarine £400,000,
£180,000, £120,000. Particulars of the approximate annual cost of main-
tenance of each type are given in the following table :
Approximate annual cost of maintenance in full commission in home waters
at present prices.
Battle
Sub-
Battleship Cruiser Cruiser Dästroy'r marine
O
Nelson* Hood
Kent* Amason* Class*
195,000
180,200
109,900
17,500
13,200
Full pay, marriage and other al-
lowances, National Health In-
surance, and Unemployment
Insurance
........
Victualling, Clothing and mess
gear
.
.......
......................
Medical stores, etc. .............
Miscellaneous effective services..
Fuel and lubricating oils.
Sea stores .......
Repairs
Armament stores ......... .....
55,500
650
7,700
22,600
16,000
40,000
42,570
52,700
000
7,360
48,300
16,000
45,000
25,140
34,100
350
4,700
15,900
7,000
19,000
16,600
5,300
60
750
8,400
1,800
5,000
2,690
2,300
30
320
3,000
1,000
15,000
1,100
Total direct charges..
380,020
375,300
207,550 41,500
35,950
Liability in respect of retired
pay and pensions ..........
Grand total ..........
* Under construction.
52,940
432,960
51,970
427,270
31,300 5,200
238.850 46,700
2,080
38,030
Juggling with a Destroyer
Remarkable Salvage Work at Scapa, The Naval and Military Record,
16 September, 1925.—The end of the first phase of the salvage operations
at Scapa Flow was completed when the V -78 was finally beached on the
shore of Mill Bay. The vessel, the first of the smaller 800-ton type of the
ex-German destroyers scuttled in Scapa Flow, presented a most formidable
task when her turn came for salvage by Messrs. Cox and Danks, Ltd., of
168 Regent Street, London.
She had the unique experience of being hauled halfway to the surface
out of a bank of sand, towed in a rope cradle like a submarine about four
miles, sunk again in deep water, turned completely over on the sea bed,
raised again, and placed on the beach practically high and dry. This re-
markable feat was necessary owing to the vessel having "turned turtle" at
the time of sinking, and taking what the Germans thought was a final rest-
ing place, her keel uppermost, and bridge, funnels, and upperworks squashed,
and buried in about five fathoms of water on the north coast of the Island
of Fara, one of the Orkneys. During the years that she has been lying
there, a siltation occurred around the ship, resulting in about eight feet of
gravel and sand forming what might be likened to a chrysalis.
The floating docks were moored over the destroyer's position and divers,
by the use of powerful 12-in. pumps, had to "blow" channels through the
sand in order to allow passage for the 9-in. wire hawsers under the deck of
the ship. This was a formidable task, and in the process one part of the
destroyer had to be sealed and pumped with compressed air in order to give


  p. 2190 (#1146)                      

2190
[Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
a little buoyancy. The divers were finally successful, and the ship was then
fast in a cradle of wire ropes, and was hauled up out of her bed. Tugs
took charge of the dock with its captive destroyer hanging below, and pro-
ceeded to tow it steadily through Gutter Sound, which is now clear of all
the wrecks which have till recently encumbered this narrow strip of water.
In the greater depth of Mill Bay the destroyer was dropped once again to
the bottom in about twelve fathoms of water. The sinking was necessary
in order to give sufficient depth of water to turn the vessel over, and this
was done by skilful maneuvering in hauling up by one dock and paying out
by the other, the friction of the ropes on the one side of the ship resulting
in the complete turning over of the ship in its rope cradle. Once in its
upright position, the destroyer was hauled to the surface and beached in
very shallow water almost high and dry in Mill Bay, whence it will be
patched up and floated round to the firm's adjacent depot at Lyness for
breaking up.
The whole operation was carried out within thirteen days, the docks hay-
ing taken up their position over the wreck on August 26, and the destroyer
being raised on September 7. During seven days no work was possible,
owing to gales which swept the locality with hurricane force, and, of
course, special precautions were necessary to keep the floating docks secure.
The second phase of the operations will commence within the next few
days, when the first of the seven remaining destroyers of a tonnage of
1,300 tons each will be commenced, and these it is planned will be dealt
with in precisely the same way as the smaller eighteen destroyers now
salved.
The Plight of the Shipbuilding Industry
The Engineer, 21 August, 1925.-Evidence accumulates week by week that
the position of the home shipbuilding industry is such as to give grave cause
for anxiety to all engaged in it, whether on the employer or the labor
side. It is true that, judged by the test of output, the position disclosed in
the statistics issued by Lloyd's Register is not unsatisfactory, for the ton-
nage put into the water during the June quarter of the present year was
nearly 300,000 tons and it was 340,000 tons during the first quarter. Fur-
thermore, .Clyde yards during some periods of the present year have been
setting up new records of launchings, but the real tests of the position of
the shipbuilding industry are the quantity of work at present in hand and
that commenced during the period covered by the statistics. When those
tests are applied it is at once apparent that a period of intense depression
and an almost unprecedented percentage of unemployment lie immediately
ahead of the shipbuilding industry. The tonnage under construction at the
end of June, and the position in this respect is rather worse today, had
declined as compared with the corresponding period of 1924 by 423,000
tons, and if the comparison be carried back to the immediate pre-war
period, by more than 796,000 tons. The amount of tonnage commenced
during the June quarter, and since, has been an almost insignificant quantity,
Against the British figures foreign shipbuilders were able to record at the
end of June not only an increase in the tonnage launched, but an improve-
ment in the tonnage commenced and in that under construction. The
British industry has not only lost the old predominance of building more
tonnage than all the rest of the world's shipyards, but has been compelled
by the pressure of foreign competition to surrender a large amount of
building for foreign owners which in earlier years was a regular feature
of the activities of home yards. It has had even, in a few instances, to
admit inability to retain the custom of important British ship-owning in-
terests. Unless these tendencies can be arrested they spell disaster to the
home shipbuilding industry.
To some extent, no doubt, the falling off in the quantity of work in hand
is due to the marked decline in warship building and to the depression


  p. 2191 (#1147)                      

1925]
2191
Professional Notes
W
in the shipping industry, which has caused owners to defer the carrying out
of a large replacement program which would otherwise have been overdue.
These are not, however, the only reasons why the tide of unemployment in
home shipyards has risen to the average figure of 33 per cent, which is far
higher than during the slump period of 1908. On the northeast coast un-
employment in shipbuilding has soared to the appalling figure of 45.6 per
cent, and it is 35 per cent in Scotland. An important contributory cause of the
high percentage of unemployment in shipbuilding is that costs of pro-
duction are not only well above the prices which in the present condition
of the shipping industry owners feel justified in paying for new tonnage,
but they compare very unfavorably with the corresponding costs in con-
tinental shipbuilding establishments. Many explanations have been put
forward for the disparity between shipbuilding costs in home and foreign
yards. Continental builders pay less for materials, the percentage of skilled
to semi-skilled and unskilled labor employed is lower than in British ship-
yards, trade union rules and regulations have been relaxed, in some cases
a longer working week is in operation, and in certain instances it would
appear that financial aid is being given. Nobody suggests that there is
on the purely technical side either in respect of organization and equipment
or the skill of the workers anything really wrong with British shipbuilding.
Yet in spite of the publication of details of recent tenders of home and
foreign builders for new tonnage which show that the margin between
British and continental shipbuilding costs is being narrowed, it is still true
that foreign tenders are well below bare actual costs in British yards. Un-
til this position is redressed it seems quite unlikely that any real revival
in the home shipbuilding industry can be brought about.
Those engaged in the industry are not blind to the dangers of the situ-
ation. It is now some three months since, on the invitation of the Ship-
building Employers' Federation, the labor unions associated with the in-
dustry agreed to form a joint committee with employers to investigate con-
ditions in the industry to search for the precise causes why production
costs in home yards were so high in comparison with those which obtain
abroad, and to find remedies for a condition of affairs which threatens to
bring a great industry to its knees. This committee has, it is understood,
now completed that part of its inquiry which had reference to matters
relating specially to the British shipbuilding industry which need reform
and revision. The conferences have quite properly been held in private
with the object of promoting a full and frank discussion of the questions
at issue, and the bare official reports which have from time to time been
issued have stated no more than that satisfactory progress was being made
with the important work in hand. It is known, however, that while em-
ployers in the shipbuilding industry-adopting a different policy from engi-
neering employers—gave a guarantee when inviting the formation of the
committee that no proposals for reduction in rates of wages or lengthening
of the working week would be made by employers, the labor representatives
have been asked to give consideration to important changes in working
conditions, to a revision of trade union rules, and to a removal of the many
restrictions and anomalies which now exist. Employers believe, and it is
probable that many trade union leaders and workers share the belief, that
changes in working conditions could be made, which, without inflicting any
loss or hardship on a single worker, would have a material effect in reducing
the labor charges in the sum of construction costs. It is understood that,
to aid the discussions which have taken place on these points, employers
have laid their cards on the conference table and have disclosed the financial
results of work executed during a recent period, and that the facts have
come as a surprise to the representatives of the labor unions. The next
move is with the latter. They will, it is assumed, take steps to confer with
the union executives and afterwards decide at a general meeting of trade
unions on the lines of policy to be adopted regarding reforms, internal
to the industry, which can be carried out without reference to other inter-


  p. 2192 (#1148)                      

2192
Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
ests. This would be the first step in the restoration of British shipbuilding
to its old position of unassailable superiority. Wider issues are, however,
involved. It is frankly admitted that production costs in home yards can-
not be reduced to competitive level unless the crushing burden of national
and local taxation is lightened, and the many industries on which ship-
builders draw for supplies of materials and fittings are willing to accept
lower prices for their products. That is an aspect of the problem which
should occupy the next stage of the investigation by the joint committee.
The work will open up very wide issues and is closely bound up with the
important subject of the relativity of wage rates. It is a question which
affects not only shipbuilding, but most branches of engineering and many
other trades. It calls for prompt and resolute handling, but politicians ap-
pear to lack the courage to deal with it, and the man who will undertake
this essential task is not yet in sight. If the joint committee of shipbuilding
employers and labor unions could evolve a method of bringing wage rates in
different industries back to the old relativity they would be performing a
national service.
FRANCE
French Navy Notes
The Naval and Military Record, 2 September, 1925.–Of the thirty-odd
new ships due to join the fleet in the coming autumn and winter, the mine
laying submarines Callot and Chailley and the 1,500-ton submersibles of the
Requin type are giving great satisfaction; the destroyer Tigre, of 2,400 tons,
is having slight defects to her Rateau turbines dealt with at Lorient after
highly promising trials. The Breguet-turbined Leopard is ready at St. Na-
zaire, and it will be a stiff fight between the two French types of tur-
bines. Parsons turbines will have a chance next month with the 8,000-ton
Duguay-Trouin, now ready for sea. Never before did France make so
determined a bid for speed, and excitement and expectations are great in
the service.
In the human element, in its discipline, devotion to duty, and valor, re-
sides mainly the efficiency of fleets. The French Navy is only second to
the British in traditions and historical achievements; it can claim, too, to
have “for a thousand years braved the battle and the breeze," and its
Breton seamen, trained from childhood to sea pursuits in the rough waters
of the Bay of Biscay, fear no comparison. Undaunted corsaries in their
hundreds have risen from the granite rocks of Brittany, fighting “on their
own" at times when the Paris government, having its hands full on land,
could not afford to attend to sea requirements. A question observers may
now well ask is: "Are such exceptional assets wasting, decaying?" On
the morrow of the Great War an unprecedentedly shameful scandal took
place in the Black Sea. There were on board battleships a hundred mu-
tineers, whose patriotism and judgment were too weak to be proof against
the Bolshevist propaganda ; an engineer officer even was stopped just in
time when he was on the point of delivering to the enemy the destroyer
Protet. The British fleet was exposed to similar propaganda, but manfully
withstood the shock; no British heart Ainched in its devotion to King and
country.
In the series of unedifying courts-martial on board the cuirassés France,
Paris, Provence, and so forth, that were the concluding chapter to the
Black Sea rebellion, it was pointed out that the mutineers were no bona fide
seamen, but young men from great industrial centers, more or less tainted
with anarchism, and who had hurriedly enlisted in the fleet with a view to
escaping the hardships and dangers of French warfare on the western
front. In the enquète that took place the Breton député de Kergue zec,
Rapporteur du Budget de la Marine, then stated that the Marine Française
contained, through this wholesale incorporation of undesirable landlubbers,
a high proportion of recruits wholly "refractory" to naval discipline, and
that the most urgent reform was promptly to rid the fleet of that odious


  p. 2193 (#1149)                      

1925]
2193
Professional Notes
rabble. As a matter of fact, this was done under the Leygues, Landry,
and Guist'hau Ministries.
“Never again !" it was said; the lesson will never be forgotten. Better
do away altogether with the Vieille Marine Française and forego all naval
ambitions than invest so much in an instrument de combat that would prove
untrustworthy when wanted. Only bona fide seamen, men having the voca-
tion de la mer, must be allowed to enlist in the navy, that must remain a
service d'elite, with room only for the best. These were noble ambitions,
praiseworthy intentions, which every officier de vaisseau worth his salt
fervently repeated to himself in setting his teeth; but, alas, politics, that
pervade everything in that belle Republique of ours, stand in the way of any
durable reform and progress, and, for a part, reduce to nil the patriotic
endeavors of our splendid corps, of officers de marine, who are getting
deeply disgusted at the turn of things and at the utter powerlessness of the
feeble politicians in power to save the vital interest of their country by
energetically coping with the cynical Bolshevist propaganda that is rife
in the ports militaires, arsenals, and in the fleet itself.
There has been an attempt at mutiny in the Courbet, and a court-martial
has just settled the affair in condemning to years of imprisonment four
Bolshevist ringleaders who attempted to foment a rebellion with a view to
preventing the meeting of the Toulon feet with the "fascist" fleet of Mus-
solinian Italy at Naples. Bad food and not enough furlough were the pre-
texts put forward by those mauvais matelots. A similar court-martial is
next month to take place in the battleship Paris, to be presided over by
Captain Lacombe, of the Lorraine battleship. Disquieting acts of insub-
ordination of a like nature took place in several other ships, and it looks as
if every French ship had on board a cellule communist, and as if there was
on foot a cleverly engineered plot to paralyze the offensive action of the
French fleet.
Officiers de vaisseau no longer conceal their misgivings. An officer of
the flagship Michelet (a twenty-two-year-old croiseur cuirassé, roomy and
well armed) writes thus to the Paris Yacht: "Il y a beaucoup de novices
dans l'équipage et aussi quelques mauvaises tétes qú on aurait mieux fait
de laisser en France. J'ai entendu des murmures, des gens se plaignant ....
une main ferme sera nécessaire . ... Si nous voulons éviter ce qui s'est
passé à bord du Jules Ferry' où il y a eu des difficultés. . ...” (“There
are plenty of improvised seamen on board and a few bad heads it would
have been more prudent to leave behind. I heard murmurs and com-
plaints about poor food and too much work. .... A firm hand will be
necessary .... if ugly incidents like those on board the Ferry are to be
avoided.. ...") In reading between the lines the true feelings of that
patriotic officer can be gauged. The situation is unprecedented in the serv-
ice; it speaks for itself. Not that on the whole the French Navy is not
a loyal, trustworthy, and thoroughly efficient force, certain in case of need
to do honor to the glorious tricolor. Things are not quite so bad as they
look; but all the same a small minority may cause plenty of trouble and
in an underhand manner interfere with the efficiency of the finest unit. On
the eve of her departure from Toulon the old Michelet, with her over-
hauled and refitted engines, did 20.5 knots with ease. In the Red Sea she
developed engine troubles, and took ten days to crawl from Guarda fui to
Colombo, and, still more limping, crawled into Saigon, the three engines
showing strong disinclination for their work, the central one stopping
altogether.
A firm hand in the command of ships and in the management of crews
can do little if there is not also a firm hand at the head of affairs at the
Paris Admiralty. Discipline cannot rest on sentiment, on good intentions ;
it cannot be improvized; it is easily lost, but takes long to recuperate; it is
the very life of the fleet, and nothing ought to be allowed to interfere with
it. These vital truths, unfortunately, our ever changing, improvized marine
ministers totally ignore. Naval officers in the exacting fulfilment of their


  p. 2194 (#1150)                      

2194
Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
professional duties punish, and politicians forgive, oblivious of the judicious
saying of the illustrious founder of the Marine Française, Colbert, to his
son, Marquis Seignelay: "Rappels-vous toujours que l'indulgence dans les
matiéres contraires à la discipline n'est pas une qualité." ("Leniency in
matters contrary to discipline is not a quality.") But, for our fine body of
officers, under-officers, and petty officers, the sentimental comedy in the
management might degenerate into tragedy. On the rock of patriotism, not
on the shifty sands of eloquence, are strong navies founded. Such is the
crux of the matter, as French, as well as English, history will testify.
The original views expressed by Admiral Sims in his somewhat sensa-
tional book La Victorie sur mer (Payot, editor, Paris) continue to give
rise to interesting controversies in the service. The eminent American
officer, naturally enough, writes pour la plus grande gloire de la Marine
Américaine, and so enthusiastic is his plea that he may be pronounced to
have deserved well of his great country and also of all naval students, who
will ever treasure his book as being the sincere expression of a faithful ally
and born leader. In this latter respect his remarkable pages in favor of
Admiral Lewis Baily speak for themselves. He speaks in high terms of
the strategic value of Brest, le port d'Europe le mieux situé, but, unwittingly,
also he somewhat minimizes the part played in the great sea struggle by the
French Navy. Contrary to his contention, the "depth charge" was a
French idea; and not an American admiral but a French one (de Marliave)
was the first non-English admiral in direct command of a British force.
French Navy Notes
The Naval and Military Record, 16 September, 1925.—The Duguay-
Trouin at Brest has her full armament on board, and is completing her
equipment and conditioning for her preliminary sea trials. Her two 8,000-
ton sisterships are shipping their turrets and 6.1-in. guns, that look small
considering the immense length (175 meters) of those cruisers. The 2,400-
ton Tigre and Jaguar (Rateau turbines) and Léopard (Breguet turbines)
receive this month their full complement, and next month will see all three
at sea. A slight change in the internal design will anew delay for weeks
the twelve torpilleurs of 1,500 tons. Of the seven 1,500-ton submarines of
the 1925 program two have been ordered in Lorient, two in Brest, and
three are expected to be ordered of private firms for delivery in the sum-
mer, 1928.
The important artillery and ammunition in the hands of the Riffs shows
the need for a close effective blockade. Like Spain, France is gradually
reinforcing her blockading division under the Paris with 500- and 350-ton
canonnières, well armed and splendid for that kind of work.
The amazing series of aerial disasters of the last few weeks has created
among the French public an outcry against aerial pursuits: "Plus de
dirigeables, plus d'hydravions! How much safer is the dear plancher des
vaches!” The American Shenandoah disaster, repeating that of the French
Dixmude, has similar effects: it causes a new French dirigible program to
be postponed sine die, and puts a stop to the dirigible activity that had for
some time past been resumed in the French aerial stations, that count be-
sides the 25,000 cubic-meter Mediterranée (ex-Nordstern), 10,000 cubic-
meter escorteurs and 3,000 cubic-meter vedettes. Cool headed aerial ex-
perts, however, are waiting for the squall of impulsive and incompetent
criticisms to pass and preserve their faith in dirigible gasbags, not wasting
time in deploring accidents, but devoting their mental power to avoiding
them in future. The loss of the Dirmude, though that fine airship was
caught in a storm and struck by lightning, was not unavoidable; it would
have been saved to France if an air port had been prepared in Algeria, as
recommended by Commander du Plessis. Moreover, means exist, and
they are now the object of interesting experiments-of safeguarding air-
ships against lightning. In the case of the Shenandoah, lack of experience


  p. 2195 (#1151)                      

1925]
2195
Professional Notes
with helium appears to be the direct cause of the disaster, as contended by
German experts.
But, where those German specialists exaggerate is when they impudently
assert that all dirigible catastrophies within the last few years are traceable
to the stupidity of English, French, and American aeronauts, and that they
would have been avoided if the lost airships had been built and steered by
worthy sons of Deutschland über alles. In other terms, in the dirigible
line there is no salvation out of German hands! Everywhere the word
"dirigible" is pronounced, a Teuton must compulsorily be consulted, and
things remain at a standstill until his lips let fall: "Es ist erreicht!" the
fateful words which German coiffeurs used to pronounce with becoming
dignity when dressing mustachios Kaiser-fashion. Germany is a great land,
but there is no room there for the sense of ridicule and of proportion, ob-
viously; otherwise, Germans would remember those eight Zeppelins that
once started baby-killing over the open cities of England and were dis-
persed and smashed by storm, five of them coming to grief in the Rhone
valley; nor would they forget that the grand Count Zeppelin, from cavalry
officer, became dirigible constructor at the School of Colonel Renard and
of Dupuy de Lôme. In the submarine line, too, France did pioneer work,
and showed the way to the world, and in particular to Germany; yet when
accidents (and they are unavoidable) saddened the hearts of our neighbors
and rivals, the idea never came to our ingénieurs to choose that very mo-
ment to crow over their superiority in uncontrollable fits of exultation re-
sembling Schadenfreude.
The lamentable loss of the Shenandoah does not seem to have dis-
heartened American experts, now intent on ascertaining the causes of the
disaster; and the undaunted Colonel du Plessis de Grenedan, the father of
the Dixmude hero, seizes the opportunity of stating anew before the French
public the case for dirigibles in war and in peace.
In his valuable report on the 1925 Navy Estimates the eminent Senator
Cheron emphatically condemns gasbags as being too costly and vulnerable
for the problematic use they represent, and he quotes figures from the
American Army and Navy Register, that reduce the number of German
dirigibles used in the war to ninety-six, of which twenty-nine were lost
through accidents and thirty-six through enemy action. In reality, states
Colonel du Plessis, Germany constructed no fewer than 143 dirigibles, of
which twenty-two were Skülte-Lanz, and 121 Zeppelins, and a close study
of their war utilization shows that they were the means several times of
saving the German fleet from disaster. The Germans, who know best what
they were worth to them, stick to the type, and project the construction of
several giant Zeppelins. For long range aerial scouting and transportation,
as well as for convoy protection and submarine hunting, dirigibles are in-
valuable, and cannot be replaced by seaplanes that, besides, costing five times
more than dirigibles, do relatively to the weight they carry.
Lighter-than-air machines have come to stay; their present defects can
be remedied and their security increased. No great navy can afford to
leave to others, still less to Germans, whose national industry is war and
plunder, the monopoly of dirigible progress. France, the home of the
spheric and dirigible balloons, can least afford to lag behind. Hence, the
decision of the Paris Admiralty to forsake nothing of existing assets in
this direction.
French aviation is silently forging ahead, though not without losses,
these being the unavoidable ransom of progress. Training, though not
quite so intense as in the British and Italian Navies, is proceeding apace
on up-to-date lines in all ports militares, a moderate toll of minor accidents
marking every week's aerial practice, especially as flying in all weathers is
part of the training program. A standard type of hydravian, robust in con-
struction, simple in management, makes up the bulk of our escadrilles
aeriennes, being on a par with the excellent army Brequet, that combines
speed, carrying power, and handiness. Very heavy bombardment machines


  p. 2196 (#1152)                      

2196
(Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
of various types, all with good points, are ceaselessly being tried and im-
proved. The largest of these to have successfully gone through the hard
Admiralty tests is the Latham, 1,600 h.p. quadrimotor biplane, that has a
span of 110 feet, a length of 67 feet, a full load weight of eleven tons
(with over three tons of fuel and ammunition). There is room for a
crew of five. The speed exceeds 160 kilometers per hour, and twenty-one
minutes are necessary for the machine to reach 6,600 feet. It compares
well with the Short and Fairey, dreadnoughts of the air. The value of the
new Latham giant resides in the fact that it is the result of the gradual
development of the Latham type, the oldest French seaplane, and of careful
experiments both at sea and on land. The wings are light at the ends and
raised with a view to facilitating floating on heavy seas. When on the
water the central part of the wings is six feet above the waterline, and the
extremities of the wings nine feet. The hull is twelve feet wide, with an
angular shape, favoring handiness and quick rising. All great French yards
are manufacturing hydravions. Huge monoplanes, with spans of 130 feet,
will shortly be tested at St. Nazaire. Views differ as to the compared suit-
ability of biplanes and monoplanes for sea service. Biplanes offer more
handiness and robustness, but thick-winged monoplanes, very wide in the
center and narrowing to the wing ends, have many partizans. The recent
St. Raphael tests with improved naval biplanes, despite the mishaps that
happened, demonstrate to careful observers that naval aviation has become
an important factor in the war game; strategy and tactics cannot afford to
ignore it, and maneuvers without it are out of date.
AVIATION
Airplane Replacements in the Early Part of War
Aviation (Editorial), 7 September, 1925.—There are times during a lull
in controversies and advocacies when certain points become clearer and
partisanship animosities lose their warping influence. This confession is
not the result of summer heat or contrition of spirit but comes from a
realization that perhaps the actual power of aircraft in warfare is being
overestimated by its best friends. And this overstating of the case for
aviation it will be seen may have nothing to do with the inherent possibilities
of aerial fighting at all. It is exclusively concerned with the material and
personnel problem. Here there seems to be a blank wall that is almost
insurmountable. To boldly ask a very pertinent question: "Will the next
war be fought in the air ?"
If any one wants to do some very disconcerting figuring let him take the
number of combatant aircraft that will probably be available at the start of
any war and then apply the estimated figure of about 75 per cent a month
destruction or to put it more correctly, replacement need, and he will come
upon a condition that should be given much more thought in aviation dis-
cussions than has been the case in the past. The public has been pretty
well informed that the life of an airplane in peace times is three years.
But, less has been said about the tremendous difference in time of war.
With naval vessels, the great sea engagements are few and very far between,
but with aircraft, zero hour is the beginning of a depletion at the staggering
rate of almost complete annihilation every two months. If a country should
start a war with 1000 fighting airplanes of exceptional war value and struck
with the full force that we hear so much about in military and naval dis-
cussions, it is generally conceded, particularly abroad, that at the end of
the first month there would only be about 250 of the 1000 available for
the second month's air combat.
When it is remembered that it takes at least two or three months for even
a well equipped airplane factory to begin to produce replacement aircraft in
quantities, not to mention the time to make engines the difficulty becomes
apparent. Meanwhile, the land and sea forces would have to be relied on,
it may as well be granted. But, when it is further admitted that these


  p. 2197 (#1153)                      

1925]
2197
Professional Notes
forces will be blind without air services the dilemma becomes more acute.
In fact, we are discussing what may be considered one of the skeletons in
every nation's aviation closet. Of course everyone will immediately urge
that there be kept in stock a reserve stock of airplanes sufficiently large to
keep our air forces in the air until replacements can be made, but when
it is remembered that the United States will have spent since the war a
half a billion dollars and not secured an adequate air equipment, the financial
element becomes a problem of the greatest importance. When it is further
remembered that only about 5 per cent of the men in any air force are
needed for actual flying duty, the personnel problem enters. It may be
unpleasant to face these difficulties but it is better to have them discussed
before a disastrous experience than to wait and have the facts develop from
neglect.
The purpose of bringing this serious question up for consideration at this
time is a belief that some solution to the problem can be found if the
importance of the matter is discussed frankly and not avoided. To inform
the public of the possibilities of air warfare and not emphasize the replace-
ment need is a dangerous procedure. Unfortunately, the production of
aircraft during the war has rightly or wrongly left a bad impression with
the taxpayers. We hear of little being done by the War Department to
gather into its inner circles aircraft experts, as is being done in nearly all
other industries. The development of our air power is being left to those
who have fought its battles against the greatest odds, and have only succeeded
in making the older arms realize that if they do not adopt aircraft it will
supplant their special interests. In fact, it sometimes seems that the older
services recognize the disadvantageous position that aircraft will be in
shortly after the beginning of hostilities and are counting on this fact to
discount the claims of the so-called air enthusiasts.
It would seem to be a good policy for those who are trying to arouse
a greater interest in things aeronautical to stress, during the coming aircraft
discussions, the following facts: That air forces require replacements of
materiel and personnel more quickly than any other known form of war
activities; that a country that is without replacements will find its other
forces operating blindly; that replacements cannot come out of stock but
take several months to be made; that it is cheaper to make provision to have
a continuous air action than to wait and try to provide the equipment in
the feverish heat of war enthusiasm. All of which is cast on the waters
with the hope that it may receive the earnest consideration that it deserves.
-L. D. G.
Bombing Accuracy
By Major B. W. Simpson, Ordnance Department, U. S. A., Aviation,
28 September, 1925.—In Aviation for July 20, 1925, there was published a
letter from Norbert Carolin entitled “Bombing Facts,” in which Captain
Carolin makes the statement that “Any bombing team that cannot register
80 per cent hits on such an objective (a battleship) from 9,000 ft. should
be returned to school for further training." This statement was emphasized
by heavy type and was considered of sufficient importance to warrant special
editorial comment.
While it is possible, of course, to obtain as high as 80 per cent hits on a
battleship target such a performance would be remarkable to say the least
and would be beyond the realm of probability. The excellence of training
of a bombing team is more reasonably measured by its probability of hitting
the target. This has been in actual tests considerably below the eighty per
cent figure mentioned above for the altitude considered.
First, let us consider just what area constitutes a battleship target.
Various tests conducted since the World War have proven that such a
target may be damaged not only by a direct hit on the structure of the
ship but also by a hit in the water alongside the ship, the distance within


  p. 2198 (#1154)                      

2198
(Xov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
which such a hit would be effective depending upon the weight of explosive
in the bomb. This broadens out the target considerably and it is assumed
that Captain Carolin is speaking of this broader target when he speaks of
80 per cent hits. This larger target for the largest type of bomb now
standard will be considered in the following discussion.
In measuring the accuracy of gun fire or bombing the “probable error
of the fire is used. The probable error may be defined as the distance
from the center of impact or center of gravity of a group of shots within
which half of the group will probably be found. In other words, any
individual shot or bomb has a 50 per cent probability of being within the
probable error and an equal chance of being without the probable error. In
the ballistics of guns it is usual to determine the probable error in range
and the probable error in deflection and use these two errors to find the
probability of hitting the target. The same method may be employed with
bombing but as the errors in range and deflection in bombing are essentially
equal it is somewhat more convenient to use the "circular” probable error by
means of which the percentage of bombs that will probably hit within a
circle of a given diameter may be determined.
The probable error of bombing has been determined from various tests
and is found to vary with the degree of training of the bombing team, the
type of equipment used and the weather conditions under which the bombing
was conducted. For instance, the probable error of night bombing in one
test was found to be approximately twice as great as that for day bombing,
although with proper illumination of the target night bombing can probably
be conducted with almost as great a degree of accuracy as day bombing.
Likewise, the probable error of an experienced team with the best equip-
ment now available may vary considerably at times from the average
probable error.
E. J. Loring, an authority on bomb ballistics, has discussed the subject
at considerable length and after analyzing a large mass of data has proposed
the following empirical formula for the probable error of bombing :
3 V Altitude (in feet)
Probable error (in feet) —-
- in which K is a factor
te
..
...
or depending upon the degree of training of the bombing team or "figure of
merit" of the team. Loring would rate teams according to the following
table:
K
Ultimate
.........2.5
Remarkable
........2.0 or more
Excellent ......................................1.5 to 2.0
Good .............
................ 1.25 to 1.5
Average ....
............1.0 to 1.25
Knowing the probable error it may easily be determined by calculation
what percentage of hits may be expected on a given target. Loring finds
the following percentage of hits may be expected on a battleship target from
an altitude of 9000 ft.
Direct Hits and
K Rating of team Direct Hits Hits in Danger Zone
Per cent
Per cent
1.0 Average
II
1.5 Excellent
20
39
2.0 Remarkable
28
The results actually obtained in service day bombing correspond to those
obtained by teams that would be rated as average with an occasional per-
formance that would be called excellent. We have had no remarkable or
ultimate bombing so far.
23
53


  p. 2199 (#1155)                      

1925)
2199
Professional Notes
In one series of tests the board of officers conducting the tests determined
that the probability of getting a hit on a battleship of the California class
was 32 per cent from 9,000 ft. altitude but in arriving at this result the
board converted the area of the target to an equivalent square and de-
termined the probability of hitting the square. Loring takes the actual shape
of the target, approximately an ellipse and shows that the probability of
hitting is nearer 23 per cent. In one of the battleship bombing tests two
direct hits and four hits in the danger area, a total of six hits, were made
on a battleship from a height of 10,000 ft., 25 per cent hits somewhat
better than average results. This is considered very good bombing, though
Captain Carolin would send all these teams back for further training. By
all means let them have further training, the more of it the better, but do
not let us delude ourselves that further training can raise the percentage
of hits to anything like 80 per cent.
Oo oo oo
ALTITUDE kam
SCALE
What causes the bomber to miss the target? A number of things are
responsible, some of them within the control of the bomber and others he
cannot control at all. His bomb sight places the pilot on the proper course,
measures his ground speed and corrects for it and indicates the instant for
release of the bomb. Other instruments give him his altitude and air speed
which are used in setting his sight. The bomber is responsible for aligning
the pilot on the proper course, correctly setting the air speed of the plane
and terminal velocity of the bomb, and the altitude of the plane on the sight,
correctly measuring the ground speed, and releasing the bomb at the proper
instant. The pilot must fly at the proper altitude selected for bombing,
obey the signals of the bomber for direction and keep his plane on as level
a keel as possible.
Correct setting of the scales of the sight may be assumed; errors in
altitude, air speed and ground speed determination, direction of the course,


  p. 2200 (#1156)                      

2200
(Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
level of the plane, and release of the bomb are inevitable. The bomb itself
has an appreciable probable error even if dropped under identical conditions.
Some of the errors beyond the control of the bomber and their effects at
9,000 ft. are as follows:
1. The bomb has a probable error of about 45 ft.
2. The altimeter has a probable error of over 200 ft., which corresponds
to a range error of 40 ft. This error also affects the accuracy of
ground speed determination.
3. The air speed can be determined only within an error of 5 m.p.h.
This error does not have an appreciable effect on range.
4. The effect of wind is only approximately corrected for by the sight.
A 10 m.p.h. wind will move the bomb about 20 ft.
If we add to these errors the errors of the bomber and the pilot we can
see why 25 per cent hits from 9,000 ft. is not such a bad score. To claim
80 per cent hits is ridiculous and unnecessary and would only lead to
erroneous estimates as to the number of bombers and bombs required to
accomplish a given mission.
Flying Ships
By Sir Herbert Russell, The Naval and Military Record, 2 September,
1925.–At a time when the long-discussed claims of economy appear to be
taking very practical shape, it is opportune to repeat the questions: What
is being spent upon airships? What is it further definitely proposed to
spend upon airships? What is the value of airships? The last point is the
one that really matters, and, indeed, in the answer to it the economic
question may be automatically disposed of.
Harking back over the brief history of aviation we shall find marked
phases in the conflict of opinion regarding the airship. The steady progress
made by Count Zeppelin, in the days when the military preparations of
Germany were realized to hold a sinister significance for this country,
naturally suggested a policy of response. For reasons which it would serve
no useful purpose to review, British efforts in this direction were not
successful. After the fiasco of the May Fly it was understood that no
further airship construction would be undertaken, the heavier-than-air
machines being regarded as best suited to the requirements of the fighting
services. The result was that when war came the airship did not figure
amongst our weapons.
The history of the Zeppelin fleet during the Great War is well known.
It is the history of a very few successful operations, all of negligible
military value, and of such general disaster that after the catastrophic
adventure in 1917, in which seven Zeppelins of the gale-swept raid were
destroyed, the Germans finally withdrew these great, costly, and fatally
vulnerable aircraft from service. It may be true to say that they had
carried bombing attacks further than would have been possible to aeroplanes
in their then stage of development. But, to put it in homely phrase, “The
game was not worth the candle." Is it going to be worth the candle now?
In some respects we have set war fashions to the world. In others we
have shown ourselves curiously imitative. I venture to believe the only
explanation that can be given as to why we are again plunging into heavy
outlay upon airships is because the United States has "taken them up."
But, the United States has a definite strategical idea in view, right or
wrong, and I am unaware of any such incentive in our case. The United
States thinks that aerial communication with her remote Pacific bases might
prove of first-rate importance in war time. Distances are too great for
such communication to be attempted by airplanes—at present. An airship
is capable of covering the 3,300 miles between Honolulu and Guam, but an
airplane, no.


  p. 2201 (#1157)                      

1925)
2201
Professional Notes
So, as I say, right or wrong, America is building airships, prepared to
discount the self-evident risk of employing them in view of the fact that
there is no other type of flying machine that she could so employ. At any
rate, it is a practical policy. What is our policy? Can anybody tell me?
There is a lot of talk about "empire airways," linking up the red patches on
the world map, and such like. But what have these Kipling-like heroics got
to do with a military administration which I take the Air Ministry to be?
Nobody will deny the wisdom of the principle under which the Air
Ministry fosters private aviation in peace time with a view to building up
a great reserve in the event of war. There is definite military purpose here.
But when we come to costly national undertakings to demonstrate the com-
mercial possibilities of the airship we are clearly going beyond any such
justification. For the military value of the airship has been subjected to
the most thorough test conceivable, and is proven to be virtually negligible.
Even as a purely commercial proposition the airship is quite prohibitive.
Her primary cost, her maintenance, her navigation, and her very limited
weight-carrying capacity put her beyond the pale of any consideration save,
perhaps, as a millionaire's freak. Admitted that she is able to carry a very
few tons a few thousand miles. The first thing the commercial consideration
demands to know is "How much will it cost?" The answer leaves com-
mercial consideration too flabbergasted to bang the door as it goes out.
Moreover, commercial consideration, when unrelated to military reason,
is quite apart from the province of a fighting organization, even when that
organization is concerned to bolster up its challenged utility. This brings
me back to the question: What is the value of the airship? About the
only practical suggestion I have come across in this direction is that she
might prove of service in the role of an aeronautic aircraft-carrier. That
is to say, she might carry a limited number of baby planes upon her
structure and launch them at a spot where they might hope to do effective
work. The idea is feasible, but the obvious objections immediately crowd
in upon it. Such a purpose necessitates penetration of a hostile zone, and
then promptly arises the question of the colossal target. Probably the baby
planes would have their hands much too full in trying to protect their
gigantic mother to attempt anything else.
But even this presupposes that the airship is able to fulfil her mission as a
plane carrier—which I venture to think is presupposing rather a lot. A
gale of wind may well deliver her into the enemy's hands; a thunderstorm
may repeat the sublime spectacular horror of Cuffley. No structure de-
signed for human transport is—and must always remain-more at the
mercy of the elements than the airship. Any increase in motive power
means an enormous ratio of increase in dimensions; consequently a larger
area for the wind to lash and a bigger mark for the lightning to find. As
a scientific struggle it is all very interesting like the efforts to climb
Everest or to reach the North Pole. As a military proposition is it, or
can it ever be, worth while? A fleet dirigible suggests a valuable medium
for reconnaissance. I say "suggests," because it could only be valuable if
it were the sole means of accomplishing the purpose. But the navy, realiz-
ing more fully the atmospheric conditions at sea, prefers to pin its faith
to the aircraft carrier and her swift little brood, which can travel with
the speed of a train into the teeth of a gale that would send an airship
bodily to leeward. The Navy does not want to be bothered with the great
airship. It does not believe in the great airship. The army will have noth-
ing to do with it. Who wants it?
This question is not only legitimate; it is distinctly pressing at a time
when the Admiralty are saving money on wages, victualling, and marriage
allowance in order to pay for new warships, which we really do want.
A new nose is being fitted to R-33, and she is shortly to undertake further
aerodynamic tests, with a view to providing data required in connection
with the construction of the new 5,000,000 cubic feet ships. I should have
thought that her last exploit provided data enough. But what is the par-


  p. 2202 (#1158)                      

2202
[Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
ticular purpose for which these enormous airships are being built at all?
The disabilities of the type are quite as obvious to the Ministry of Air
as they are to anybody else who gives any intelligent attention to the
subject-indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that they should be rather
more so.
What, then, is the policy they represent? Are they designed as links
of commerce, to popularize the ministry in the eyes of imperialists? Or
are they really intended at war weapons? If so, what is their contem-
plated rôle? This is not a time for highbrow talk about "contrary to the
public interest" by way of answering a question which it is distinctly in the
public interest should be asked. The public interest demands a justification
for all heavy expenditure of public money these times. Aerodynamics
may be a very interesting scientific study, but are we to spend some millions
on pursuing it to the length of finally demonstrating the unsuitability of the
airship to offensive or defensive warfare? One might have thought that
point was settled by the May Fly fiasco, and clinched by the fate of the
Zeppelins during the war. We are never going to overcome the defect of a
wrong principle by experimenting with methods. The mobile balloon is a
wrong principle. Her margin of risk must always remain so high as to
confer the quality of the forlorn hope upon any military enterprise for
which she may be detailed. Beyond the one advantage of a capacity for
longer fight, how is she superior to the aeroplane? Her buoyancy declines
rapidly as she ascends. Five million cubic feet of hydrogen could lift about
170 tons at the earth's surface; at 12,000 feet of altitude it could barely
sustain 100 tons. In war time rapid ascent to the maximum possible alti-
tude may often prove vital to the salvation of such a huge target. There-
fore, "disposable weight" must be reckoned with a view to permitting of
such rapid ascent.
The aerial liner is a possibility of the future. The military airship has
already been very effectively tested and found wanting. Is the Air Ministry
simply spending public money in order to experiment in a highly specula-
tive commercial proposition? Suppose the Admiralty were to begin build-
ing ocean-going steam trawlers in order to encourage British fisheries.
It is not difficult to anticipate the verdict of the country upon such a
procedure. Of course, I do not say that the Air Ministry is doing any-
thing of the kind. I am merely asking. I want to know-like a great
many other people—why these enormous, costly, airships are being built
at all? And I should like to know what each one costs in her own struc-
ture, in aerodromes and mooring masts, in gas reservoirs, and in ground
hands to manipulate her?
ENGINEERING
“Propulseur Trompe" for Airplanes
The Engineer, 18 September, 1925.-In our issue of January 16. 1920,
reference was made to a new apparatus invented by M. H. F. Mélot for
propelling airplanes with the pressure produced by exhaust gases directed
in such a way as to create the rapid displacement of a large volume of air.
Briefly stated, paraffin was burned in a combustion chamber lined with
fire bricks, and the gases issuing from a tuyère passed through a number
of funnel shaped conduits or injectors, each one increasing in size and con-
sequently augmenting the volume of induced air until, on leaving the ap-
paratus, the volume and velocity were sufficient to create a high propulsive
effort. The original device was somewhat crude and cumbersome, neces-
sitating as it did a combustion chamber with oil burner and a large air
compressor, but it served to demonstrate that it was possible by this system
to suppress the engine and propeller and to replace petrol by crude oil
as fuel. The injectors or trompes having been proved a satisfactory ex-
pedient, it was found necessary to simplify and lighten the general arrange-
ment, and after nearly five years' experimental work M. Mélot has succeeded


  p. 2203 (#1159)                      

1925]
2203
Professional Notes
in evolving a much more practical power generating plant which suppresses
the fire brick lined combustion chamber and necessitates only a small and
light compressor for occasional working.
The new device consists of a horizontal cylinder, inside which there
are two walls forming a chamber. In each wall is a sparking plug for
starting the engine with gas injected under pressure. There are three
series of annular ports, the central orifices placing the carburetter into
communication with the chamber, and the end ports being in communica-
tion with an exhaust pipe converging to the first cone of the propulseur.
Inside the cylinder is a piston which moves freely from one end to the
other. It has concave faces and sleeves with ports corresponding with
those in the cylinder. The arrangement constitutes a simple type of two-
cycle engine working with high compression. It is started by injecting
under pressure the gas mixture, which is ignited by one of the sparking
plugs. The speed of the piston is sufficient to compress the gas to the
point of auto-ignition and the engine continues to run without the com-
pressor and the sparking plugs. The piston sleeves are arranged to open
the exhaust ports at such a point as to ensure the burnt gases entering
the exhaust pipe at the highest velocity. The average pressure in the ex-
haust pipe is equal to the average pressure of the cycle. As, moreover, the
ndo
-
-
-
TIIT PUTIN
IMPROVED FORM OF THE MELOT PROPULSEUR TROMPE
explosion takes place under the most favorable conditions, with a com-
pression to the point of auto-ignition, it is claimed that the average
pressure is higher than in an ordinary four-cycle engine.
The rest of the apparatus has undergone little change. The exhaust gases
pass from a tuyère through a succession of four injectors, each being larger
than the preceding one and therefore drawing through a larger volume of
air, which becomes considerable when the burnt gases and air pass finally
through the large fourth injector. The reaction exerted by this mass of
gas and air is declared to give to the apparatus a satisfactorily high effi-
ciency. To provide for the diminishing density of the air at high altitudes
it is proposed to employ a light compressor. Tests carried out with the
apparatus are said to have shown that the total weight is less than 1 kilo.
per horsepower. So far only laboratory tests have been carried out with the
Mélot Propulseur Trompe, and we are precluded from giving a fuller
description of the apparatus pending the completion of tests which are now
being undertaken by the Service Technique de l'Aéronautique.
The Whaley Constant Pressure Qil Engine
The Nautical Gazette, 29 August, 1925.—The Sun Shipbuilding and Dry
Dock Company of Chester, Pennsylvania, has completed the building of the
new Whaley oil engine, which was invented by Wililam B. Smith Whaley


  p. 2204 (#1160)                      

2204
(Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
and designed by Charles A. Muller of the Whaley Engine Patents, Inc.
This engine was privately shown to stockholders and interested engineers,
at which time it was operated on air only for the shop tests.
Ninth of a series built during the past several years for the purpose
of perfecting a new power cycle, this Whaley engine is described as a
single-acting four-cylinder two-cycle machine designed to develop 750 h.p.
It is a vertical reversing engine, conventional in design though following the
best steam engine practice. It is distinguished from all other heavy oil
engines in this country and abroad by the fact that the cylinder clearance,
at the time of the fuel injection, is opened by a piston valve to com-
munication with a static receiver having many times the capacity of the
cylinder clearance. This presents a condition exactly the opposite to
that in all present internal combustion engines, where the basis of opera-
tion is on a trapped charge. In the Whaley engine, the piston valve to the
static receiver is open as long as the fuel is being injected.
The Whaley engine has the usual form of port scavenging supplemented
by high-pressure scavenging and supercharging through the top of the
cylinders. The last two operations are carried out with air at a pressure
of about forty-five pounds per square inch. The air pumps for the super-
scavenging and supercharging operation are contained in the lower part
of the power cylinders. There is a supplemental scavenging air-pump
formed in the upper part of the frame in which operates a piston placed
on top of the crosshead. Two cylinders are cast in block with a valve
chest between. The air from the pumps just described is used either in
direct line or is transferred through the ports in the valve chest to the
opposite cylinder.
The air is controlled by piston valves, one working inside the other
and both being actuated by links similar to those used on locomotives and
reversing marine steam engines. By linking up, the opening of the piston
valves is made to synchronize to the period of fuel injection in such a way
that, for practical purposes, combustion takes place during the entire time
that the valve is open. The practical effect in the operation of the
engine will be that fuel will be supplied to the point of cut-off of the piston
valve, which will be open for the power necessity of the engine. The
result diagram will, therefore, be that of the steam engine so far as the
admission and point of cut-off are concerned. The main purpose of the
clearance reservoir is to maintain the maximum working pressure desired,
which, in the case of the present engine, is 350 pounds per square inch. As
this is the normal compression-pressure of each working cylinder, it is
also the normal pressure for the receiver or reservoir.
Under normal running conditions, no variation in pressure is expected
no matter what the conditions of loading and fuel injection may be. In
floating the receiver on the compression space, there will be but little
transfer of air, heat or pressure through the valves. The receiver serves as
an asorber in case of any rise in pressure in the cylinder through any
cause whatever. By an ingenious arrangement of the valves, the com-
pression-space port is made to serve successively for the introduction of
the superscavenging, and supercharging and to establish communication
with the reservoir or receiver during the combustion period.
A novel arrangement of fuel pumps and fuel admission valves is used.
The fuel pump is placed on top of the valve chest and is driven directly
from the valve stem. The pumps deliver the charge of oil for each
stroke directly into each individual fuel valve, there being no piping what-
ever employed. The pressures will be between 4,000 and 8,000 pounds per
square inch. The action of the pumps synchronizes with the action of the
valves, both being operated from the same valve-stem, thereby assuring
the maintenance of relation between fuel injection and duration of the
valve opening to cut-off. Because of this construction, there practically
will be no rise in pressure in the cylinders or in the system beyond that
due to compression.


  p. 2205 (#1161)                      

1925)
2205
Professional Notes
The fundamental action of the Whaley engine is entirely different from
that of any of the present oil or Diesel engines. All other present-day
engines operate with a trapped charge of air which is confined in closed
compression space into which the fuel is injected, and there is always a
rise in pressure after combustion takes place. In the Whaley engine, even
early timing of the fuel admission will cause no appreciable pressure-rise
above the capacity of the pressure valves into the receiver.
Maintaining the maximum pressure to a definite figure allows the carry-
out of a program for the design of relatively light weight oil engines.
It is expected that the Whaley engine will weigh less than 100 pounds per
horsepower, a figure which represents a substantial improvement over
current practice. Also, due to the maximum pressure principle, the Whaley
engines, for all sizes of power, can be built at approximately the same
weight per horsepower as is the case with the steam engines. This means
that the weight of less than 100 pounds per horsepower will apply to
Whaley engines of all sizes. This feature will make the development of the
Whaley engine much more valuable as an economic factor, the larger the
units are built, especially so as with the present Diesel and heavy oil engines
weights increase progressively as the power to be delivered increases.
The Whaley engine at the Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company's
plant is now undergoing its shop tests and it is expected that the trials
will be completed in time to present all technical details of the engine
and the results of performance before the winter meetings of the national
engineering societies.
Those who have inspected the engine have stated that it closely resembles
a vertical steam engine of sturdy design, but having four high-pressure
cylinders. They have remarked the absence of cams, rollers and gearing
associated with internal combustion engines and have complimented the
inventor and designer on the production of a new internal combustion engine
as simple in construction as a well built steam engine and one that can
apparently be operated by anyone versed in steam engine practice.
The Whaley Engine Patents Co., Inc., own the patents for the Western
Hemisphere. The International Whaley Engine Corporation own the
patent rights for the Eastern Hemisphere. The American Locomotive Com-
pany own the exclusive license for the use of the Whaley engine on rails
for the Western Hemisphere. The Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Com-
pany, Chester, Pennsylvania, has a contract for building these engines for
marine and stationary use in the United States. The engineering firm of
Parish and Tewksbury, Inc., New York, has had executive charge of this
development since February, 1924.
The Metering of Fluids
Engineering, 18 September, 1925.-One of the collateral advantages as-
sociated with the use of electricity for lighting or power is the ease and
accuracy with which it can be metered. The station engineer can easily
determine with practically laboratory precision the output of his genera-
tors, but it is far less easy to fix with corresponding rigor the steam rate
of his turbines. In the discussion on boiler trials held last winter at the
Institution of Civil Engineers, most of the speakers held to the view that
the only reliable method of determining the figure in question lay in the
use of calibrated tanks to receive the condensate from the turbines. As
we suggested at the time in commenting on the debate, this distrust of
meters was unduly pessimistic, though it cannot, of course, be denied, that
the engineer who purchases the first meter that offers and installs it at the
first convenient spot, is simply asking for trouble.
In opposition to the general view, J. L. Hodgson maintained that steam
and water meters were not merely convenient, but that properly designed
and intelligently located they might be fairly classed among instruments
of precision. In a paper entitled “The Orifice as a Basis of Flow Measure-
ment,” contributed to the “Proceedings of the Institute of Civil Engineers,"


  p. 2206 (#1162)                      

2206
Vov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
and now published, Mr. Hodgson gives particulars of the long and pains-
taking investigation into the discharge through orifices on which he based
his claims. The research extended over a period of sixteen years, and in
it was thoroughly examined, the effects on orifice flow of different ratios
of pipe diameter to orifice diameter, of the rate of flow, and of the physical
properties of the fluids. Accurate tests were made with orifices fixed on
mains ranging from 38 in. up to 44 in. in diameter, and in the case of elastic
fluids with pressure ratios ranging from nearly unity up to the critical
value. The results have been plotted as curves, the abscissæ in some cases
being Reynolds number, and in others the pressure ratio, or the ratio of pipe
diameter to orifice diameter. The complete set provides coefficients for cal-
culating discharges which cover all practical cases. In the plots made with
Reynolds number as abscissæ it is noticeable how observations made with
air fall on the same curves as results obtained with various mixtures of
water and glycerine.
Mr. Hodgson is a strong advocate of the simple square edged hole in
a fairly thick plate, as opposed to nozzles and sharp edged orifices. The
simple square edged hole can easily be reproduced with very great precision,
which is not the case with its rivals. The use of a relatively thick plate
is recommended because it has been found that when, as in some makes
of steam meter the orifice plate is only 1/32 in. thick for an 8-in. pipe, it is
very liable to buckle in service. Mr. Hodgson holds that even for a 3-in.
pipe the orifice plate should not be less than 1/16 in. to 18 in. in thickness.
On pulsating flows all orifice centers are liable to give an inaccurate read-
ing. In the case of liquids the pulsations can be damped out by the use
of air vessels or break pressure tanks, but with gases pressure waves may
travel up and down the pressure pipe and cause spurious readings. This
difficulty does not arise with steam because the pressure pipe fills with water
which damps out the pressure waves. For air metering Mr. Hodgson rec-
ommends either that the pressure be reduced to that of the atmosphere
before the fluid reaches the meter, or that sufficient receiver capacity and
throttling be introduced between the source of the pulsations and the
meter.
No matter how carefully an "orifice" meter has been designed and
calibrated, its value may be entirely discounted if it be fixed in the neigh-
borhood of a valve, or a bend or other discontinuity in the pipe line
When a fluid passes round a bend it leaves it in a very disturbed state,
and the character of the flow in the straight pipe beyond the bend is
abnormal for some considerable distance. Now, the pressure recorded by
a gauge fixed to a pipe through which fluid is moving in turbulent flow
can never be the true static head. This follows because in turbulent flow
a particle of the fluid is at one moment close to the wall, and at the next
is near the center of the pipe. Radial momentum has, therefore, been
destroyed and generated at the wall. Hence, the gauge reading must be
correspondingly greater than the true static head. In most cases the error
involved is negligible as the correction is small. Where, however, small
differences of head are to be measured, the pressure represented by the
destruction and generation of radial momentum may become of importance.
In the case of a fluid in normal flow through a straight pipe, the head due
to this momentum effect will be constant along the whole length of the
conduit, and a differential gauge will give a true value for the difference
in static head. If, however, the flow be more turbulent at one part of the
pipe than at a succeeding part, the correction for the radial-momentum
effect will no longer cancel out, and the gauge will give inaccurate read-
ings. It is the effect above described which is responsible for coefficients
of discharge in excess of unity, which have at times been recorded with
extemporized Venturi meters operated at very low rates of discharge. It
is thus important in the case of all meters of the orifice type that there shall
be a fair run of straight pipe in front of the meter.


  p. 2207 (#1163)                      

1925]
Professional Notes
2207
MERCHANT MARINE
Commissioner Haney and Admiral Palmer
The Nautical Gazette, 5 September, 1925.—The differences between the
Shipping Board and Fleet Corporation have developed into an open defiance
of President Coolidge's wishes by Commissioner Bert E. Haney, the
Pacific Coast member of the board. From the beginning of his interest
in shipping matters President Coolidge has insisted that the Fleet Corpora-
tion be given sole authority in the operation of the government's ships
and that the board content itself with acting in a regulatory capacity, and
he made recommendations accordingly in his address to Congress last fall.
How the members of the board at first objected, then partially met the
President's wishes, and later withdrew the delegation of authority only to
confer it again a few weeks ago is now a matter of history. It now
develops, however, that in all the discussions Commissioner Haney con-
sistently opposed the vesting of such authority in Admiral Palmer and even
went so far as to oppose the re-appointment of Admiral Palmer. This
attitude is in direct opposition to President Coolidge's wishes that the
Fleet Corporation be given control over the government's ships and ser-
vices, but it now appears that Commissioner Haney has endeavored to
bring about Admiral Palmer's removal. This was too flagrant a defiance
of the presidential wishes to pass unnoticed and accordingly President
Coolidge sent a telegram on Thursday of last week requesting Commis-
sioner Haney's resignation from the board. Commissioner Haney has
refused to resign, and it remains to be seen what President Coolidge's next
move will be.
The situation has some unusual features, and at least one of its effects
will be the forcing of the shipping issue sharply before the next Congress.
Commissioner Haney cannot hope to retain his seat on the board by defying
the President's request, for the President has the matter in his own hands.
Commissioner Haney is serving under a recess appointment and if he
persists in his refusal to resign President Coolidge can submit some other
name to Congress for confirmation and Commissioner Haney will be
automatically supplanted. The real issue, however, is found in the policy
involved. President Coolidge bases his request for the resignation on the
ground that Commissioner Haney has gone contrary to an understanding
that he had with the President that he support Admiral Palmer. Com-
missioner Haney, on the other hand, contends that he had no such under-
standing with the President, that the President knew of his opposition to
Admiral Palmer, and that he is responsible, not to the Executive, but only to
Congress. Sifted down, the issue really is whether the government's fleet
shall be controlled by one man or by the Shipping Board, and this is the
phase of the matter which will be presented to Congress. Undoubtedly,
Commissioner Haney will find ample backing in Congress for his policy
and a sharp fight will develop. This, however, will not alter the fact that
Commissioner Haney's days on the board are numbered.
Just why Commissioner Haney should have taken a dislike to Admiral
Palmer is not quite clear, despite the profferred explanations. In his letter
to the President, the commissioner says first that he considered Admiral
Palmer incompetent from temperament and lack of experience to carry
out the provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920; second, Admiral
Palmer seemed determined not to confer with the board upon any of the
questions which came within its province; and, third, Admiral Palmer
seemed disposed to proceed along lines independent of the Board's action.
These are feeble reasons for Commissioner Haney's opposition to Admiral
Palmer. In the first place, it is with poor grace that Commissioner
Haney can charge Admiral Palmer with incompetence, for, by no stretch
of the imagination, can the commissioner be regarded as a shipping expert.
Moreover, Admiral Palmer has clearly demonstrated his ability to run the
government's ships, for he has reduced the operating losses to a point


  p. 2208 (#1164)                      

2208
(Nov.
C. S. Vaval Institute Proceedings
lower than they have ever been before, placed the services on a mors
business-like basis, and earned the approval of private shipowners for hs
capable management of the government's shipping interests. The second
and third complaints can be dismissed by the knowledge that, in acting
independently of the board, Admiral Palmer was carrying out the wishes
of President Coolidge and, later acting under the authority vested in bar
by the board. He has taken no important action nor made any drastic
change in policy without the consent of the board to which all his report
mendations have been sent, and the fact that the board has rejected many ci
his recommendations proves that he has not usurped any of the boards
power. It is obvious that Commissioner Haney has not had the majority
of the board behind him in his attitude, for if he had it would have becs
easy to bring about the removal of Admiral Palmer. When he was ap
pointed to the presidency of the Fleet Corporation, Admiral Palmer was
compelled to hand over to the board his resignation for acceptance at any
time. That resignation still rests with the board. Had Commissioner Haney
been supported by the other commissioners it would have been a simple
matter for them to accept President Palmer's resignation. This has not been
done; Admiral Palmer is still in office; all of which proves that con-
missioner Haney could not gain the sympathy of a majority of the com-
missioners. It is to be hoped that the impending fight will clarify the situa-
tion and put an end to the continual interference of the board with the
activities of the Fleet Corporation.
Water-borne Commerce Through United States Ports in 1924
The Nautical Gazette, 26 September, 1925.-A warehouse one mile square
and thirty-eight stories high would be filled by the water borne commerce
handled at deep water ports of the United States during the year 1924, and
a train, loaded with the contents of that warehouse, traveling at a rate of
thirty miles an hour would require more than three months to pass a
given point. These facts, developed by analysis of a survey of the water
borne traffic of the United States in 1924, prepared by the Bureau of
Research, United States Shipping Board, aid in comprehension of the mag-
nitude of our water-borne commerce.
The survey referred to contains details of the volume of cargo tonnage
handled by the principal ports of the United States, as well as our non-
contiguous possessions, in foreign, intercoastal and coastwise trades, the
total movement aggregating more than 259,500,000 tons. In this connec-
tion it is noted that the freight tonnage carried by all the railroads of the
United States during 1924 was less than five times the water borne total.
The actual volume of tonnage handled at United States ports, inbound
and outbound combined, exceeded 421,400,000 tons, more than 10 per cent
of this total passing through the port of New York. Duluth, Minnesota,
ranks second with a total cargo tonnage movement 39,850,000 tons. Los
Angeles third with 20,000,000 tons, Buffalo fourth with 17,650,000 tons,
and Philadelphia fifth with 13,800,000 tons.
The following table contains a résumé of the operations of some of the
principal ports showing the number of cargo tons of water-borne
shipments handled through each during the year 1924
Noncon-
Total Foreign Intercoastal * Coastwise tiguous
Commerce Traffic Traffic Traffic Traffic
Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons
New York, N. Y... 43,478,421 21,944,018 5,598,441 15,348,731 587,231
Duluth, Minn. ..... 39,852,321 756,857
39,095,464
Los Angeles, Calif. 20,088,980 3,732,411 6,005,851 10,147,777 202.941
Buffalo, N. Y. .... 17,651,686 3,797,541
13,854,145
Philadelphia, Pa... 13,836,779 5,404,143 1,188,403 7,154,300
89.833


  p. 2209 (#1165)                      

1925)
2209
Professional Notes
Norfolk, Va. ...... 11,539,735 2,836,222 126 202 8,484,272 93,039
Boston, Mass...... 11,296,769 2,343,451 458,972 8,426,041 68,305
New Orleans, La... 10,513,401 8,160,473 246,887 2,003,680 102,361
Toledo, Ohio ..... 10,082,783 1,166,332
8,916,451
Cleveland, Ohio ... 9,558,739 1,345,851
8,212,888
Baltimore, Md. .... 9,344,075 5,424,805 1,180,989 2,546,438 191,843
San Francisco, Calif. 9,254,715 2,727,096 1,603,647 3,726,201 1,197,771
Conneaut, Ohio .... 8,770,722 160,272
8,610,450
Ashtabula, Ohio ... 8,523,610 544,113
7,979,497
Port Arthur, Tex, . 7,594,748 2,310,263 6,229 5,256,395
21,861
Seattle, Wash. ..... 7,378,773 1,144,790 544,226 5,183,075 506,682
Milwaukee, Wis... 5,653,421 101,692
5,551,729
Ashland, Wis. .... 5,521,328 195,372
5,325,956
Lorain, Ohio ....... 5,452,238 429,662
5,022,576
Galveston, Tex. .... 5,264,135 3,222,289 52,598 1,971,728 17,520
Sandusky, Ohio ..... 4,239,217 633,145
3,606,072
Newport News, Va. 4,233,334 1,309,530 7,680 2,870,320 45,804
Houston, Tex. ...... 4,086,386 1,212,605 16,269 2,840,815
16,697
Baton Rouge, La... 3,803,849 1,290,253 54,400 2,459,196
Tacoma, Wash. ... 3,798,112 925,008 324,139 2,401,382 147,583
Portland, Ore..... 3,788,707 1,380,302 500,611 1,891,732 16,062
Providence, R. I. .. 3,658,690 556,906 66,675 3,035,109
Beaumont, Tex, ... 3,439,469 728,129
2,684,717 26,623
Texas City, Tex. .. 3,419,852 902,406 9,303 2,508,143
Jacksonville, Fla... 3,072,192 561,978 55,188 2,448,741 6,285
* Coastwise figures furnished by the Board of Engineers for Rivers and
War Department.
MISCELLANEOUS
Warships of the Future
The Engineer, 11 September, 1925.—It is not a little significant that in so
many accounts of the recent launch of the Nelson this vessel, with her
consort, the Rodney, should have been referred to as probably the last
battleships that would ever be built. On what grounds the conclusion is
based we do not know, but a belief appears to be widely held that between
the present date and 1931-in which year the treaty empowers us to lay
down two more battleships-other naval weapons may so develop in power
as to render the great ship entirely obsolete. A second, and more con-
vincing argument against the survival of the battleship has been advanced.
Even the wealthiest nation may hesitate to spend seven or eight millions
on a single ship of war, when for the same outlay four or five cruisers
could be built, especially as it seems clear that cruising ships of the power-
ful type which the Washington Treaty has promoted are destined to bear
the brunt of the fighting in a future naval campaign. From 1936 onward,
the British Empire will possess only fifteen capital ships, the United States
the same number, and Japan no more than nine. When so few are available
these ships will almost inevitably be treated as assets too precious to be
risked save in the last extremity. It is certain that they will not be
hazarded so long as there are units of less value to be mustered for the
fray. In other words, the large cruiser bids fair to replace the capital
ship, at least in the earlier phases of a war, as the dominating factor, the
type which is called upon to intervene whenever the issue between lighter
forces hangs in the balance, as a rôle which has hitherto been traditional
with the battleship.
Without presuming to offer judgment on this question, which is, after
all, too speculative to lend itself to dogmatic assertion, we would merely
point out that during the seven years which have already elapsed since the
peace there has been no such advance in the development of aerial or
submarine weapons as to warrant the inference that six years hence they


  p. 2210 (#1166)                      

2210
[Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
will have gained a positive ascendancy over the battleship. On the con-
trary, we venture to maintain that progress in these directions has been
largely offset by corresponding progress in counter tactics, with the result
that the battleship of today is relatively no more vulnerable to these weapons
than it was in 1918, when they failed signally to prevent the great ship
from demonstrating its supremacy. We are inclined to think that if the
battleship is doomed, its demise will be brought about by influences un-
connected with strategy or tactics. Is not the construction of so many
cruisers of large displacement and powerful armament a tacit admission
that in naval fighting the gun, in the long run, is most decisive? The menace
of torpedo and mine can be in great measure overcome by bulges and sub-
division; in fact, if high speed were not a factor of importance ships could
now be constructed in such a manner as to be virtually proof against
underwater assault. The problem of air attack is, perhaps, more formidable,
but so long as aircraft operating from shipboard are unable to carry bombs
exceeding 300 lb. in weight-as is believed to be the case at present—it is
scarcely an urgent one. Notwithstanding the improvement of rival weapons,
of which so much is heard by the public, gunfire still remains the deadliest
and least resistible form of attack. Nothing short of massive armor
avails against the shattering blows delivered by the big gun, and in vessels
below capital rank the weight of such armor is prohibitive. To minimize
the power of the gun, while magnifying that of the torpedo, the mine, or
the bomb, only serves to confuse the issue in regard to naval design and
shipbuilding policy in general. But irrespective of treaty restrictions, the
cost of a ship mounting the heaviest ordnance and carrying stout armor
is nowadays so prodigious that there is a natural tendency to seek some
cheaper substitute. Hence, the evolution of the so-called "treaty" cruiser,
which is designed to mount the heaviest guns compatible with a displace-
ment of 10,000 tons. Convincing evidence of the respect in which the gun
is universally held by naval opinion may be found in the fact that all
cruisers of this type now building or projected are to have as many 8-in.
guns as possible. They have been designed, not as torpedo ships, mine
layers, or aircraft carriers, but primarily and essentially as gun platforms.
Assuming that the admiralties of the world know their business, the inference
is unmistakable: nothing has yet been found to take the place of the gun
as the last word in naval combat. Next month, it appears, the first of our
new County cruisers is to take the water at Portsmouth. Little is known
about her, except that she will be up to the treaty limits in size and arma-
ment. For every foreign vessel of equivalent type laid down so far, a main
battery of eight 8-in. guns is provided. Apparently, therefore, this is the
largest number of such guns that can be carried without an undue sacrifice
of other qualities. Writing of cruisers in the last issue of Brassey's Annual,
Sir George Thurston submits the design of a 10,000-ton ship with nine 8-in.
guns and a speed of 34 knots. The guns, in triple turrets, are all grouped
in the forward part of the ship, the advantages of this arrangement being
set forth with the author's customary lucidity. But upon the drawbacks,
which impress us as serious, he dwells rather lightly. We question whether
naval officers would care to take into action a cruiser which had no stern
fire from its main armament. Again, the grouping of all the guns for-
ward, though tending to simplify fire control, would increase the risk of
having the entire main armament disabled by a few lucky hits. It is
obvious that a 10,000-ton cruiser, built for very high speed and powerful
armament, can be given only the scantiest armor protection, and, indeed,
Sir George proposes a thickness of only i-in. or 2-in. plating on the bar-
bettes and decks, with no side armor at all. The vitals of the ship would
thus lie open to shell of almost any caliber, while it is quite conceivable
that a single raking hit from an 8-in. projectile would put all three bar-
bettes out of action. For these reasons we would prefer an armament of
eight guns, disposed in four turrets at bow and stern. An even wider
dispersion of the armament would be desirable if weight permitted. Since


  p. 2211 (#1167)                      

1925]
2211
Professional Notes
a cruiser of the treaty type is to be virtually bare of armor, volume of fire
will be her sole means of defense, once she is engaged with an adversary
of her own class. It is therefore of the last importance that every device
should be employed to preserve her guns from premature disablement.
Strong armor being precluded, this can only be effected by spacing the gun
positions as far apart as possible. One direct hit on a turret will probably
wreck the flimsy structure and put its pair of guns out of action. This is
all but inevitable, but the real contingency to be guarded against is that a
single hit may cripple two of the turrets if they are too close together.
From this point of view something may be said in favor of the Raleigh
class, in which each of the seven 7.5-in. guns is mounted singly, albeit
behind an open shield. But by no effort of ingenuity can a cruiser of the
treaty type be endowed with a capacity for resistance equal to that of the
old armored cruiser. As Sir George Thurston puts it: "The interior of such
a cruiser is so fully occupied by boilers, machinery, and magazines that it
is not humanly possible to provide by bulkheads, watertight compartments,
or other methods of underwater protection, immunity from torpedo or mine
attack. Therefore .... it must be recognized that the explosion of a
large mine, or a torpedo with a powerful warhead, would, in the majority
of cases, utterly wreck and destroy the vessel."
The smaller class of cruisers, designated as Type B, of which the
Admiralty proposes to build seven, are apparently to be reduced copies of
the County ships. As they are to displace only 8,000 tons, a lighter arma-
ment must be accepted. Six 7.5-in. or 8-in. guns would appear to be
indicated. Japan is already completing four ships of 7100 tons and 33 knots,
which are to carry six 8-in. guns. Judged by the British standard, these
vessels are over-gunned, although, as we have pointed out before, the rule
which for many years has seemingly governed cruiser design in this country
-that no ship below 8000 tons should mount a gun heavier than 6-in.-is
without technical justification. We do not, however, concur in the view that
because all the latest foreign ships are designed for 8-in. guns, the majority
of our cruisers, being armed with 6-in. weapons, have been thereby rendered
obsolete. The fact is that out of the twenty-five cruisers which Japan will
eventually have in service, only eight are armed with heavy guns. The
remaining seventeen have a uniform armament of 5.5-in. guns, a mark
inferior in power to our 6-in. piece. All of the ten completed cruisers of the
United States Navy carry 6-in. guns, as do most of the cruising ships in
other navies, and this state of affairs will endure for some years to come.
It is in the important qualities of speed and seaworthiness that our exist-
ing cruisers are deficient. So far as armament is concerned, they compare
quite well with foreign ships.
CURRENT NAVAL AND PROFESSIONAL PAPERS
“Description of the Goodyear Pilgrim," Aviation, August 31, 1925.
“The Way of the Wind." Journal of the Franklin Institute, September,
1925.
"Maritime Law and Economic Pressure.” The Journal of the Royal
United Service Institution, August.
“Airship Work for the Navy." The Journal of the Royal United Ser-
rice Institution, August.
"Flight Tests of the New Curtis Racer.” Aviation, September 28, 1925.
"The Franklin Institute." Army Ordnance, September October.
"Anti-aircraft Ordnance.” Army Ordnance, September-October.
"Bombing.” “U. S. Air Services,” October.
“Power Plants for U. S. Navy Aircraft.” Mechanical Engineering, Octo-
ber.
"A Review of Steam Turbine Development.” Mechanical Engineering,
October.


  p. 2212 (#1168)                      

NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
FROM SEPTEMBER 3 TO OCTOBER 3
PREPARED BY
PROFESSOR ALLAX W'ESTCOTT, C. S. VAVAL ACADEMY
DEBT FUNDING NEGOTIATIONS
FRENCH DEBT Mission IN WASHINGTON.—The French debt mission to
the United States, headed by Finance Minister Caillaux, with four sena-
tors, four deputies, and two others, arrived in New York on September 3
and proceeded on the same day to Washington, where conferences were be-
gun with Secretary of the Treasury Mellon and other members of the
American Debt Commission.
On the total debt of about $4,000,000,000, the French commission made
an initial offer of payments to begin at about $25,000,000 a year and increase
to from $80,000,000 to $90,000,000 within twenty years, the payments to
extend over sixty-two years and total a sum somewhat in excess of the
principal. The American proposals called for payments totaling about
$10,000,000,000 in the sixty-two-year period. The final French proposal,
made on October 1, was for payments of $40,000,000 for five years,
$60,000,000 for seven years, and $100,000,000 for fifty-six years, a total of
$6,220,000,000. This offer was rejected by the American Commission, who
pointed out that its present value, at the rate of interest of Liberty Bonds.
a five-year delay, during which France should pay annual installments of
$40,000,000, which would be regarded as full current interest. This offer
the French Commission will present to the French Government. It must
be approved by the French Cabinet as well as by the U. S. Congress before
going into effect.
OTHER DEBT SETTLEMENTS.—In August it was announced that Count
Volpi, Italian Finance Minister, would head a new Italian debt mission to
America. Rumania and Czechoslovakia also gave notice of their decision
to send commissions.
According to information given out by the American State Department
in September, the little Baltic nation of Latvia has funded her debt of
$5,775,000 on terms satisfactory to the United States Government. In
announcing the settlement, Secretary Mellon pointed out that Latvia
was on a sound economic basis, and that her ports would prosper as entre-
pots between Russia and the outside world.


  p. 2213 (#1169)                      

1925]
2213
Notes on International Affairs
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
WORK OF LEAGUE ASSEMBLY.—The sixth annual session of the League
of Nations Assembly met at Geneva on September 7. Senator Raoul
Dandurand of Canada was elected president. In his speech as president
pro tem, Premier Painlevé of France attempted to revive the Geneva
Protocol of last year, and also recommended that the League Council call
a disarmament conference "as soon as satisfactory conditions from the
point of view of security are established.” In a subsequent speech the
British Foreign Minister, Austen Chamberlain, reiterated Great Britain's
objections to the Geneva Protocol or any similar sweeping plan of com-
pulsory arbitration, favoring instead more gradual progress and regional
agreements. In this position, opposed to France and the smaller states in
the Assembly, Great Britain was supported by Italy and Japan.
The Assembly voted to end on January 1 League supervision of Austrian
finances, while retaining control of the resources used as guarantees for
the loan to Austria raised under the auspices of the League. Resolutions
were adopted providing that the Council make a preparatory study for a
conference on disarmament, to be convoked when progress in security nego-
tiations warranted, and also that the Council consider the creation of a
special commission to prepare for a conference on the economic difficulties
in the way of international peace and progress.
Mosul DISPUTE BEFORE Council.—Meetings of the League Council
were held at Geneva concurrently with the Assembly. Prior to the meet-
ing, a special commission appointed by the council handed in its report
regarding the dispute between Turkey and Great Britain (for its mandate
35 Tabriz
TURKEY
Urmia
KURDISTAN j w L.

BAdana
Mosul
YAleppo
MEDITERRANEAN
ERSIA
SEA
SYRMA KINGDOM OF
(French Mandate)
IRAQ
T ESOPOTAMIA A
Tripoli
((British Wandgte)!
bDamascus
'ARABIA
Bagdacac.o.co
Mosul and Its Oil-FIELDS
Showing boundaries as proposed by League Commission
Beirut
of Iraq) over the territory around Mosul. The report was advisory rather
than decisive, and recommended that, although Turkey had legal claims
to the disputed territory, it should remain a part of Iraq for the next
twenty-five years, provided the British mandate were extended for that
period.


  p. 2214 (#1170)                      

2214
[Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Great Britain before the council offered to continue its mandate over
Iraq provided the council approved. Turkey, however, insisted upon a
plebiscite in the disputed territory and refused otherwise to accept a de-
cision of the council as final. Great Britain declared Turkey false to her
pledges, and in the middle of September protested that Turkey was deport-
ing Christians from territory on the Iraq side of the provisional frontier
established at Brussels last year. In this confusion of claims, the council
called on the Hague Court for an opinion as to the council's power to adjust
the dispute, and also decided to send a commission to investigate the de-
portation of Christians.
The British Government's offer to continue its protectorate of Iraq, at
the risk of friction or even war with Turkey, met with much opposition at
home, on the ground not only of the danger but the unprofitableness of
the undertaking.
SECURITY PACT NEGOTIATIONS
SECURITY PARLEY ON OCTOBER 5.–Following the conference of experts
in London in early September, the Allied Foreign Ministers met at Geneva
and joined in a note to Germany proposing a meeting of foreign ministers
at the little Swiss town of Locarno, on October 5. This invitation Ger-
many accepted.
Commenting on the proposed security pact, which by these developments
appeared in a fair way toward actual accomplishment, E. L. James in the
New York Times of September 29 pointed out the possible significance to
Russia of such a rapprochement between Germany and France. His state-
ment, following, refers to the visit of M. Tchitcherin, Russian Foreign
Minister, to Warsaw, which was followed by a visit to Berlin at the close
of September. Russia it was believed would make large concessions not
only to Germany but to Poland and other east European states to prevent
the creation by the Security Pact of an anti-Russian bloc headed by France
and Germany.
The treaty between the Allies and Germany amounts, in effect, to Ger-
many and France agreeing to arbitrate all differences, and England, and
perhaps Italy, guaranteeing the arrangement. That is only on the face
of it. The biggest political effect of such an agreement would be to bring
Germany back into the society of the allied nations, and this inevitably either
drags her away from Russia or at least makes any move by the Reich to
link up closely with the Soviets much less likely. It brings Germany into
the League, which is fought by Moscow even more bitterly than by Wash-
ington.
Therein lies the big effect of the arrangement on contemporaneous Euro-
pean politics.
In this connection the French are watching closely the trip to Warsaw
and Berlin of M. Tchitcherin, the Russian Foreign Minister. Today he will
be engaged in conversations with officials and political leaders of Poland,
and this seems important in view of the progress Poland and Russia have
made in improvement of their relations the past year.
What has the Soviet Minister got to say about the new conference,
which in any event tends to isolate Russia in Europe even more than
before? And what pressure may M. Tchitcherin try to bring on Germany?
What may he have to say about the promises in the Treaty of Rapallo?


  p. 2215 (#1171)                      

1925]
2215
Notes on International Affairs
All in all, there are evidences that European alignments are undergoing
important modifications, and while there seems no reason to cast any doubt
on the probability of France and Germany making the Rhine treaty, yet
taking German opposition along with other indications one can wonder
what will become of the French plan to give Poland and Warsaw guarantees
of a nature to maintain French tutelage over those countries.
FRANCE AND THE RIFF
FRANCO-SPANISH OFFENSIVE.—Early in September it was reported that
the long planned concerted offensive of French and Spanish against the
Riffians was under way. Spanish forces landed at Alhucemas Bay on Sep-
tember 9 and began an advance toward Ajdir, the Riff capital. Two weeks
later the French started a movement toward Ajdir, forty miles north. On
October 1, Spanish advance forces reported Ajdir in flames, and occupied
the town the next day.
On September 28, Marshall Lyaty, for fifteen years French representa-
tive in Morocco, retired as Resident General. It was reported that the in-
tention of the French Government was to leave Marshal Petain in full
control in Morocco until the conclusion of military operations, when a
civilian resident general would be appointed.
FAR EAST
NOTES TO CHINA ON TARIFF AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY.—On September
4 the nine powers which took part in the Washington Conference replied
in identic notes to China's request of June 24 for modification of treaty
agreements relating to tariff and extraterritoriality. The notes insisted
that China show her ability to protect foreign rights now safeguarded by
the treaties, and give concrete evidence of ability to prevent destruction of
foreign property and suppress anti-foreign agitation. The notes, however,
expressed the willingness of the powers to send delegates to a tariff con-
ference, to open October 26, and also to appoint commissions to investigate
the question of relinquishing extraterritorial rights. The latter commis-
sions will begin sessions on December 18. The decision of the powers to
give immediate attention to Chinese problems is in line with the policy
advocated by the United States Government.
Regarding tariff reduction, the New York World, quoted in the Literary
Digest of September 12, writes as follows:
"Tariff revision is urgent, for upon it depends the vigor of the central
government. Since 1842 China has been restricted to a 5 per cent tariff.
The schedule has several times been revised; the rate, never. Since these
customs receipts have been mortgaged for indemnities and loans, the adminis-
tration is in foreign hands. China, in brief, lacks even the shadow of
fiscal independence; and one reason why the Peking Government is impotent
is its financial starvation. A higher tariff will strengthen the central au-
thorities, help liquidate the debt and benefit certain industries. Hand in
hand with it should go abolition of the li-kin, or provincial imposts. These
hinder all trade and give the military governors the chief revenues with
which they defy Peking and the forces of law and order.
"If there were no other reason for cooperative Western action it would
lie in the unabated chaos of Chinese affairs. The authority of the central
government has been almost destroyed, and military governors rule the
provinces to suit themselves. The Peking treasury is notoriously bank-


  p. 2216 (#1172)                      

2216
Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
rupt. Enterprise throughout much of China is stifled, and capital has
drained to the treaty ports as the only safe place of investment. River
conservation has been neglected, with the result of dangerous floods; the
weak rail system, only some 6,000 miles, is debt-burdened and deteriorating.
Banditry has filled whole provinces with a terrorism like that of the medi-
eval condottieri. The opium evil thrives unchecked."
A CONFLICT OF CULTURES.—In an article in October Current History
Professor Charles Hodges of New York University interprets the present
unrest in China as essentially the "challenge of an Oriental civilization to
Westernization. Manifesting itself on one side in the movement among
the Chinese toward nationalism, Westernization has displayed itself more
clearly in an invasion of trade and industrial development which has revo-
lutionized Chinese life. China now has several hundred newspapers with
a yearly distribution of 75,000,000 copies, and 7,000 miles of railroad.
Western machinery has invaded the most conservative of a people's
habits; it has established the beginnings of capitalistic enterprise in the
daily bread of 400,000,000 Asiatics.
Hence, the ordinary wear and tear of the industrial revolution in China
has been bitterly accentuated by the conflict of civilizations behind the
rise of factories and machine power. It is natural that Chinese nationalism
should assail the growth of alien economic domination when it is sur-
rounded with a hedge of treaty provisions tying the hands of China's
sovereignty; when this foreign business arrogates to itself privileges it
enjoys on no such scale elsewhere in the world; when for every gain to
China it raises two problems that it neither aids China's hapless govern-
ment in solving nor itself meets in its operations on Chinese soil. Naturally
trouble centers about Shanghai. Here the most complete breakdown of
Chinese society has been accomplished by Westernization in the business
world. Clustered around this New York of China, like satellites around a
planet, are half a dozen smaller cities such as Wusih and Soochow, like-
wise transforming themselves and their humanity. A similar development
centers about Tien-tsin, the metropolis of North China, whose murky horizon
is beginning to blot out the significance of a political shell like Peking in
the rise of Chinese "money joss" or millionaires of business. Then 700
miles up the Yangtze, Hankow stands out as another economic storm center,
the Chicago and Pittsburgh of tomorrow's China. These contain the main
forces of this material Westernization; but wherever rail or water com-
munication offers the means an industry here and another there mark
the extension of industrial outposts into the heart of Chinese life.
All this, of course, is inevitable. The capitalistic pattern of human
organization, with its material benefits and liabilities, is a predominant
factor in world life that no people can escape.
Let us put it this way: Thirty years ago a family of five could live in
the coast city of Foochow for $10 silver a month; today it costs them
$30 to exist. Half that number of years ago in Changsha, a central
Chinese city, eggs were sold at two for a copper; now they are two for
nine cents. Wages, in their usual laggardly way, have followed the trend
of prices. In the meantime, the circle of wants about a Chinese family
has widened. Wherein, ask the Chinese pessimists, is the gain to China
in all this upsetting of the old order, speeding up of life, the breaking
down of the family system, the very keystone of Chinese social stability?
Herein lies the real force of the present situation. Indeed, its reality
is testified to by the virtual evacuation of the interior of East Asia by the
foreigner-industrial manager, business man and missionary. Now from
within, the situation in this year of 1925 is not different from that of 1900.
In a fundamental sense, the causes of the anti-foreign Boxer troubles and


  p. 2217 (#1173)                      

1925]
2217
Notes on International Affairs
the present unrest of China's new nationalism are the same—the failure
of the West to meet the situation its presence has evoked.
Twenty-five years ago this precipitated the assault on the works of
Christianity. The cycle was clearly defined: first it was directed against
the Catholics, whose insistence on what came close to an assertion of
political interests in China's domestic affairs provoked the popular native
hatred; then it was turned against all Christian activity; and finally the
explosion hit all foreigners. Today the cycle is reversed. Young China
is challenging the material interests of the West as the root of the
present evil. It began with the Japanese cotton mills, spread to the British,
involved other nationalities, and eventually tied up all economic activity.
Finally, the outcome of a bitter local labor struggle has been the turning
of the Chinese against the spiritual side of Westernization.
Therefore Western interests in the Far East will rise and fall about
Westernization—both in its spiritual and material aspects. To the Chinese
mind the two are intertwined hopelessly in the invasions of the white man's
world life into what was yesterday the Middle Kingdom. Sitting in our easy
chairs here in the West 100 years after the industrial revolution, we can
be philosophical over the costs of progress and the pains of industrializa-
tion. The Chinese millions, however, have no such perspective of comfort
achieved. They are asking the West to bestir itself about the fruit of its
own handiwork.


  p. 2218 (#1174)                      

BOOK REVIEWS
QUR NAVAL HERITAGE. By Fitzhugh Green, U.S.N.
F.A.G.S. M.Sc. Royal 8vo, 400 pages illustrated, $4.00. Pub-
lished by the Century Company: New York and London.
REVIEWED BY CAPtain Yates STIRLING, JR., U. S. Navy
The reading of this book, Our Naval Heritage, will be both a pleasure
and an education. It stamps the author as a careful student of history, a
writer of talent, and an expert portrayer of human nature. The book was
written so delightfully as to win sympathetic attention from its readers. Its
style is unrestrained and direct, and what the author has to say flows
logically and lucidly from his pen.
In this volume of four hundred pages of excellent print, Lieutenant Com-
mander Green gives us an inspiring word picture of the American Navy,
truly a "succinct and vivid recital of our country's past afloat, and of her
newly won world leadership at sea." It is not a mere record of achieve-
ments, but a vivid, live, human portrayal of the spirit of the sea and of our
Navy which has from small beginnings grown to considerable size, despite
the handicap that the American people as a whole, in the past more par-
ticularly, have little understood what it is all about and have given it but
small encouragement. The book gives us historical proof that the Navy
has maintained its high morale during times when if it had had less faith
in itself it would have withered and died.
The author shows that the American Navy is, as it were, an off-shoot
from the parent, the British Navy. The laws and customs of that more
ancient service were the foundation adopted by the infant sea power after
the American nation had freed itself from the yoke of the British monarchy.
Lieutenant Commander Green in his introduction speaks confidentially
to the pacifists: "It is well not to let ourselves be stampeded by our loath-
ing for the frightfulness of war. Doubtless, the most fervent pacifists in
the world today, despite their silence in the market place, are those who
came closest to the horrors of the World War. The difference between
those openly opposed to war and those who invent war's dreadful engines
is usually but in point of view. One party is idealistic; the other ana-
lytical. To condition peace on the silencing of drums is in many ways no
more logical than to promise peace on a structure of power.” This appeal
is well timed, and it is hoped will be heeded by those for whom it is in-
tended. May they read it (the book] to their benefit and to ours.
The United States, situated as it is, in the very center of two great oceans,
the Atlantic and Pacific, with the rich markets of Europe, Africa, Asia,
Australasia, and South America reached only by sea, must uphold the prin-
ciple of the freedom of the seas, for our ever-growing production needs


  p. 2219 (#1175)                      

1925)
2219
Book Reviews
these outlets. But, this freedom of the seas can be obtained by us, if his-
tory is a guide, only through the existence of a navy strong enough to give
us our sea rights against those who would for gain refuse them to us.
Lieutenant Commander Green has named his creation most appropriately,
Our Naval Heritage. When we become engrossed in this tale of the sea
unfolded before us, we begin to realize how far back in antiquity the roots
of the naval calling extend. The sailorman of today can almost hear the
voices of spirit forebears, now forever still across the centuries, speaking
to him in the universal language of the sea and warning him to keep alive
those sacred heritages for which so many have laid down their lives. The
book gives us only a fleeting picture of the early discoverers-of Columbus
and other intrepid navigators—mostly from Spain and Portugal. Those
nations, in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries were the leaders of the
maritime world. Their story is not a drab narrative of achievement, but,
as if by a bold stroke of an artist's brush, we see the true character of this
handful of men who dared to set out upon a voyage into the unknown,
where dwelt, so ran tradition at that time, antediluvial monsters and revolt-
ing perils from which no man could expect to return. The powerful urge
that caused these intrepid spirits to win a continent, we know was the same
as is dominant in the human race today; the lust for gold; the lure of the
treasures of the Orient, which land they hoped to reach by a shorter, more
direct route and ahead of their fellow men.
There has always existed a wide gulf in the lives led by the landlubber
and the sailor. This has come from the fact of a language of the sea which
no one who has not sailed upon its bosom can understand. On the seas,
tradition ever has been a moving force, welding the seafaring fraternity
into a people apart from all the rest of mankind.
Discipline on one of our great dreadnaughts of today is maintained just
as rigidly as of old, yet with vaster kindliness, and the ancient traditions
of rank, ceremony, and prestige, frequently and perhaps jealously derided
by our civilian acquaintances, are yet enforced. How vaguely the land-
lubber knows of the perils of the sea and the need of iron discipline to
win a victory on its bosom, in peace against its perils and in war against
the nation's enemies !
Lieutenant Commander Green tells us of this vital requirement of dis-
cipline at sea by quoting a letter from the pen of the immortal John Paul
Jones, who thus describes the power of a ship captain : "His authority
when off shore being necessary, absolute . . . . force must be used sometimes
for the ends of discipline. . ... Whilst the ships sent forth by Congress
may and must fight for the principles of human rights and republican free-
dom, the ships themselves must be ruled and commanded at sea under a
system of absolute despotism.” There have been many attempts by the
landlubber to break down this "absolute despotism” and seeds of discord
among the crews of warships often have been sown. In some foreign navies,
this breaking down of traditional discipline has led to mutiny and turned a
fighting force into a worthless junk pile of valuable material, incapable of
battles on the sea.


  p. 2220 (#1176)                      

2220
[Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
The book tersely describes the exploits of the rugged mariners of the
Elizabethan period and after, when navies were merely swashbuckling
marauders, near pirates, yet from whom have come all those customs, usages,
and chivalries which the sea has jealously guarded and held as a standard
of conduct for those who live upon it. Of the chivalric traditions of the
sea, the one "women and children first" has ever been followed and seldom
broken. It is a tradition that the landlubber without military training in
great catastrophies is unable to follow. Without discipline and a recog-
nized leader, it is inevitable that we frequently read of the mad panic of
men on shore trampling over their women and children in an effort to
escape injury and death.
The book outlines the evolution of the warship as it emerged from out
the groups of merchant ships which clustered together for protection against
freebooters and pirates, gradually acquiring weapons more deadly and pro-
tecting itself from the effect of such weapons. In portraying the hardiness
of the seafaring race, the author says: “No chronicle of American marine
can stand forth in its true colors without at least a sketch in background of
the marvelous feats on which our seafaring ideals are founded. The tang
of danger, the spirit of adventure and of hardships of some weird voyage
still cling about them.” Some of these feats are from our own history, but
on the theory that the sea has no nationality he gives feats performed by
sailors of all climes.
Woven delightfully through his chapters "How Ships Were Built and
Sailed,” and “Where They Went and Why,” are told the beginnings of
man's victories over the sea, how he won first a grudging and dangerous
transport upon it, and finally a complete and everlasting victory over it.
Admiral Mahan has told us that a merchant marine is the cause and
justification of a navy, and the author proves it to us most conclusively
from our own history, for not until we were driven to protect our rapidly
growing merchant marine did we give thought to having a warship. The
creation of a navy is thus seen to be based upon the desire of protecting
our external trade. It might be said also that the existence of a merchant
marine to protect focuses the eyes of a nation upon the advantage of war.
ships. It would be more idealistic to believe that the cause and justification
of a navy is to secure respect to our flag on the seas. Putting it thus,
we purify the intent, taking it out of the realm of profit and loss and making
of it a point of honor.
Washington wrote: "To be prepared for war is one of the most effective
means of preserving peace. . ... To secure respect for a neutral flag re-
quires a naval force ready to vindicate it from insult and aggression. This
may even prevent the necessity of going to war by discouraging belligerent
powers from committing such violations of rights of the neutral party as
may first or last leave no option.”
The story tells us of the hardships encountered by men of iron sailing the
treacherous seas in flimsy ships of wood and the struggle of the infant
American Navy to keep itself afloat or even alive.
The author expresses the first fifty years of our country's sea-faring
life in tabular form thus :


  p. 2221 (#1177)                      

1925)
2221
Book Reviews
1775 to 1794—Mostly chaos and privateering.
1794 to 1812—Wars with France and Tripoli, bringing about the estab-
lishment of the real American Navy.
1812 to 1832—Final escape from Britain's clutches and emergence from
threats of piracy.
Speaking of conditions during our revolution, he says: “The total num-
ber of combatant vessels operating under the Continental Congress is put
at forty-two. Operating singly and in groups, this scant force had an
astonishing number of skirmishes with the world-famed British Navy.
Practically all were annihilated by 1783 when total disarmament at sea was
put into effect and our newest naval vessel presented to the King of France
who had befriended us. By 1785, we did not have a single man of war.
This state of affairs continued until 1794, when Congress began our Navy
with a special appropriation for six large frigates.” One of these frigates,
the Constitution, or “Old Ironsides,” is still in existence as an historical
relic at the Navy Yard at Boston, Massachusetts.
When we gaze upon our proud fleet of today, little do we reckon of those
dark years when the flickering candle flame, the spirit of the American
Navy, came near being snuffed out by politicians who could see no value in
such a force.
Our war with England in 1812 on the seas was not always as successful
as our histories tell us, but the frigate Constitution's achievements were
something for which the nation can always be proud.
The Navy solved the questions of piracy and slave trade, and greatly
helped to build the nation. The story reads like a romance, and the reader
is carried along the crest of a smooth-flowing tide through the development
from wood to iron and iron to steel warship construction and the develop-
ment of and the growing formidableness of naval weapons.
Apparently, but little if anything has been omitted to give us insight into
the soul of the Navy. His inspiring accounts of the deeds of our naval
heroes of years gone, whose manly attributes of self-sacrifice and devotion
to country won them the plaudits of their nation, even those who never rose
to hero fame, show that they could always be depended upon to do their
level best with whatever material an economic government would give them.
In times of piping peace and lean naval appropriations, the navy turned its
versatile hand to science, exploration, and acts of humanity, and many of
the nation's achievements in the mechanical arts are due to the Navy's help.
The Spanish War re-awakened the people to look to their Navy. The
naval race between England and Germany was on from this time while
our Navy held a position in third place. Then came the great war and
then Jutland.
The chapter on “What Happened at Jutland" is instructive. The author
blames British naval policy dictated by those ashore and not Admiral
Jellicoe for the escape of the German high sea fleet. He says: "England
failed at Jutland, not Jellicoe. Will some day America likewise fail,” and
further on he adds: "His (Jellicoe) immediate reason for not doing so
(pursue the German fleet) was the torpedo threat of the charging German
cruisers and destroyers. Putting it in another way, eleven destroyers drove


  p. 2222 (#1178)                      

2222
[Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
twenty-seven English first-class men-of-war temporarily out of action.
This is of peculiar interest when one examines the frequent campaigns that
have been waged against the building of these frail craft."
He draws from Jutland a lesson for us in these words: “Jutland was
indecisive in the sense that neither force conquered. With the immense
size of modern fleets this outcome is the more probable one in any engage-
ment of the future. Therefore, we may conclude from Jutland that what
we are to expect from our Navy is more than mere combat. The navy
must stand for an indefinable, impalpable something besides merely throw-
ing projectiles at an enemy. It must keep the country strategically secure,
and strategical security is a priceless asset in peace as well as in war."
• The Navy should have a guiding hand if not a vote in the development
of our peace strategy, preventing statesmen from bartering away the na-
tion's strategic security. Successful war on the sea is primarily dependent
upon secure strategical positions from which our naval forces may operate.
Peace strategy should provide these positions.
Had Jellicoe "damned the torpedoes” as did Farragut, what would have
been the outcome of Jutland and the World War?
The American Navy, when the United States declared war on Germany
in 1917, lacked the types of vessels needed to combat the most pressing
menace, that of the submarine. However, in the end its achievements were
in magnitude great enough to materially aid in deciding the victory. The
book tells the story of the North Sea mine barrage, the railroad battery,
and the oversea transportation services for both men and material, conceived
and accomplished' prior to the Armistice which were notable naval achieve-
ments. Our battle feet in its entirety was not needed but the navy was
represented in the grand fleet by a division of battleships and every de-
stroyer that could be made available was sent to the war zone about Great
Britain and France.
The book discusses the effects of the Limitation of Naval Armaments
Treaty upon the United States. It was, as the writer aptly puts it, an im-
mense naval and economic sacrifice which the United States was willing to
make for the sake of furthering universal peace.
After the World War the fleet goes to the Pacific Coast in order to
develop the strategy of the coming ocean. The book tells us of the good
effects this change has produced.
In the chapter on “The Place of a Naval Air Force," the writer gives
us a concise account of naval airplane development. He believes that war
at sea will still be decided by the gun for he says in part: "The battleship
is no doubt doomed; that is, the battleship in its present form. She has
been doomed for about one hundred twenty-five years, or ever since the
submarine was invented. The ram and torpedo further assured her doom.
The airplane simply drives another nail in her coffin. It looks, however,
as if the battleship type would survive a few years more at least, for had
any of the target vessels tried out by England or the United States in
recent years been able to maneuver against the attacking aircraft, to use
guns against them, to send combat planes up as a protection, to effect
emergency repairs, to resort to blisters and special bottoms and protective


  p. 2223 (#1179)                      

1925)
2223
Book Reviews
gratings, and to spread smoke screens, it is likely that a gun duel between
major ships would have settled the day just as it always has in the past.”
The book carries the reader down to the present moment and after we
have turned the last page, we cannot but feel a deeper inspiration and an
unwavering faith that the men of our nation who have served us on the
seas have left behind them a sacred heritage-a hostage in the keeping of
those of today, and when the present smoke of battle clears on Capitol Hill
and in the press, we shall see that those who have been administering our
Navy still ring true to these immortal traditions of devotion to country and
to their beloved Navy.
ANNAPOLIS—Its Colonial and Naval Story. Walter B. Nor-
ris, U. S. Naval Academy. 16 full page illustrations, 336 pages,
8vo. Thomas Y. Crowell Company: New York. $3.00.
REVIEWED BY CAPTAIN Ralph Earle, U.S.N., Ret.
During my youth, as well as during that of thousands of the boys of
today, Annapolis was a magical word. It meant the threshold to the dis-
closing of the great mystery of the sea, of the life thereon, and symbolized
the gateway through which young Americans must pass in order to embark
upon the romantic and honorable life and the profession of a naval officer.
Soon after entering the greatest engineering college in the world, the U. S.
Naval Academy, the young Americans as midshipmen appreciate in a small
measure what an appropriate spot Annapolis is in which to absorb the spirit
and traditions of the sea and the Navy, for that town itself speaks through
its buildings, streets, alleys, and waters, of the spirit of the Navy as well
as that of colonial and revolutionary times.
This book, Annapolis, by Walter B. Norris, one of the able civilian pro-
fessors of English at America's famous Naval Academy, will be read with
the greatest joy and satisfaction by everyone in our country who has the
least pride in his nation, its settlers, its patriots, or its Navy, the record of
which has ever been one of uninterrupted success and of accomplishment
to the honor and prosperity of our nation.
The book relates in easy narrative style the stories of the men who built
the great brick residences of Annapolis, and who fought for their ideals
from the Battle of the Severn in 1655, on down through the days of the
Royal, the Proprietary, the elected governors, and of the Revolution, to the
present day, such men as the Ogles, Ridouts, Chases, Pacas, Hammonds,
Harwoods, Carrolls, Lloyds, Dorseys, Dulaneys, Jennings, Brices, Scotts,
Stewarts, and Bordleys appearing in its pages. The fine tulip poplar on the
campus at St. John's College acquires new interest as one sees how under
its branches the Susquehannocks in 1652 signed the treaty that kept colonial
Maryland almost wholly free from Indian troubles. McDowell Hall, it
appears, was intended by Governor Bladen for a governor's mansion in
1744, but the legislature thinking him extravagant failed to supply sufficient
funds with which to complete the work, and so for years, until it was turned
over to the college, the structure was known as Bladen's folly. One gets


  p. 2224 (#1180)                      

2224
(Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
intimate glimpses and side lights upon the lives of revered patriots, such
as Washington, Hamilton, and the three Maryland signers of the Declara-
tion of Independence; these and many others all are here in very human
and every-day phases. The facts presented are what every visitor to Annap-
olis, not to mention all who are interested in colonial history or in the Navy
of today and yesterday, wants to know, and which cannot be found in any
other one book. The names of the streets, houses, and creeks take on a
new and charming meaning after a perusal of this volume.
In a very attractive manner Professor Norris traces the history of
Annapolis, showing its political, commercial, and social life, the relations of
the governors to the crown and people, the wealth yielded by tobacco grow.
ing, the races, the dinners, the dances, and the dress and fashions of the
times. One sees Puritans asserting themselves in a Catholic colony, next
the Annapolitans, struggling for freedom, burning the Peggy Stewart with
its hated cargo of tea, supporting the Revolution, and later entertaining
our French compatriots; and then how the spirit of the air and surroundings
was saved from oblivion by the establishment there of the Naval Academy
which brought a naval atmosphere to the old city, an atmosphere that really
restored old social forms because the Navy brought emphasis on formality
with a generally aristocratic tone.
As the author well says, the book presents a true picture of "American
achievement in war and peace, in commerce, education, politics, and the more
charming phases of social life."
The illustrations are of exceptionally high merit, being largely from
etchings by Eugene P. Metour, drawings by Vernon Howe Bailey, and
photographs of the Naval Academy.
During the World War many reserve officers received a three months'
training at Annapolis where the atmosphere of the old but grand city helped
instill in them the spirit of the traditions of the makers of our nation as
well as of the naval service itself. To these officers, also, this book will
prove especially interesting and valuable as in it they will find much that
they wished to know but which their short course at the Naval Academy
prevented.
Altogether, the book is well worth while, both for reading and for ref-
erence, and deserves to be widely read.
MAKERS OF NAVAL TRADITION. By Carroll Storrs Alden
and Ralph Earle. Ginn and Company: Boston. $1.25 net.
REVIEWED BY CAPTAIN J. J. Raby, U.S.N.
Some wiseacre has aptly said that "of the making of books there is no
end." That this well-worn adage is literally true must be quite obvious to
us all, for thousands of volumes seem to roll in rapid succession from the
press almost daily. But how many of these books are scarcely worth the
paper on which they are printed, much less the effort required to read
them? And how few stand the test of time and prove their worth?
The foregoing remarks, however, are not applicable to the little volume
under review. Indeed, Makers of Naval Tradition, written by Professor
Alden, head of the Department of English at the U. S. Naval Academy,


  p. 2225 (#1181)                      

1925)
2225
Book Reviews
and Captain Earle, U. S. Navy, is destined to occupy an important place
among the historical works of our country. We believe this because it has
to do with men who have left their names indelibly written on the pages of
history, and because it stresses that element in human life which has been
one of the most important factors in shaping the course of our beloved land.
The purposes of the authors in writing this interesting and helpful vol-
ume are clearly stated in the preface: namely, thoroughly to acquaint all
midshipmen with the makers of our naval traditions, and to point out the
debt that they really owe the heroic characters who have preceded them in
the Navy. Professor Alden and Captain Earle have, in various capacities,
been for many years vitally interested in the education of midshipmen, and
are well qualified to present the subjects treated in an authoritative and
pleasing manner.
Now in reading this book the laudable purposes of the authors may be at
once recognized, and there is not the slightest doubt that our potential
young officers should be perfectly familiar with these naval tradition makers.
Indeed, they can gather much that will be of supreme worth to them in
after years from a sympathetic study of the lives of these great naval heroes.
But why limit this valuable study to so few students? If the historical
material recorded in this volume is of vital importance in the training of
our midshipmen, would it not be equally beneficial for the entire youth of
our country? In fact, we have been so favorably impressed with the sub-
ject matter of this interesting volume, the racy style in which it is written,
the historical accuracy with which the facts are recorded, and the tremen-
dous appeal to the heroic side of life that we are persuaded to believe that
it should be used in our private and public schools. Certainly, no course of
study in history could be more interesting, none more conducive to the de-
velopment of heroic efforts on the part of our youth, and none more potent
in molding character in the right direction. We are justly proud of our
naval heroes; the youth of our land should be made perfectly familiar with
them, and no other book is so admirably fitted for this purpose as Makers
of Naval Tradition.
Then, again, the book is written not only in good, clear, vivid, poignant
English, but running through it all is that indescribable spirit that has been
a mighty power in shaping the onward course of our great nation. Indeed,
what could be more inspiring than the thrilling biographies of Jones, Deca-
tur, MacDonough, Perry, Farragut, Porter, Dewey, and Sampson? In
this little volume one may find not only the biographies of these naval
heroes, but an interesting and illuminating chapter on the part our Navy
played in the World War.
Makers of Naval Tradition should be available to every American boy.


  p. 2226 (#1182)                      

2226
[Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
LAST DAYS OF MAST AND SAIL. By Sir Alan Moore, Bt.
Illustrated by R. Morton Nance. Oxford University Press,
American Branch.
REVIEWED BY REAR ADMIRAL A. M. KNIGHT, U. S. Navy, RET.
This is one of a fairly long series of volumes published within the last
quarter century whose aim it is to preserve the features and the atmosphere
of an era, that of the sailing ship, which must regrettably be recognized as
a thing of the past: regrettably because with the disappearance of sails
has disappeared a whole world of romance and adventure and a whole race
of men, not bolder, perhaps, than the seafaring man of today, nor hardier,
but different in numberless ways—more strongly marked as a type, more
picturesque and more essentially, in every characteristic, a product of the sea.
The author, although not a seafaring man by profession-he is in fact a
well-known surgeon-has served in the British Navy and has evidently
been a lover of ships and boats throughout his life. He claims for the
present work that “it is an account of nearly every kind of craft seen be-
tween the Orkneys and Aden, during the late war, and of a few types seen
before 1914."
A much broader claim than this would have been justified by the work
itself, for, although it is essentially a record of observation rather than of
research, the author has not hesitated to go into the history of the craft
he is describing whenever the story of their evolution from earlier types
appears to him significant. The result is an interesting description of prac-
tically every type of sailing craft that could have been seen in European
waters not alone during the World War, but at any time within the last
half century.
The description is not exhaustive and is not intended to be so, for the
author bases his classification of types upon sail-plan alone, touching lightly,
where he touches at all, upon features connected with the hull or with the
purposes for which the various types were designed. It is not the vessel as
a whole with which he deals, complete from keel to truck, but the rig as
fixed by masts and sails. This limitation is brought out clearly by the chap-
ter headings, which are as follows:
Sails and Rig
Square Sails
Lateen Sails
Spritsails
Gaffsails
Lugsails
Within the limits fixed by this somewhat narrow point of view the treat-
ment could hardly be more satisfactory. The style is simple and direct
and the enthusiasm with which the author enters into description of the
minutest details of his subject is so infectious that, as a rule, it compels the
interest, if not the enthusiasm, of the reader. This is not always true. At
times the description is a little more minute than the importance of the sub-
ject justifies, and even the professional reader, with every desire to be


  p. 2227 (#1183)                      

1925)
2227
Book Reviews
informed, is likely to find his attention flagging. The author's interest in
what he calls "comparative nautical anatomy" has evidently led him to jot
down for his own enjoyment every slightest deviation from standard prac-
tice that he has observed, and it is easy to understand how difficult he finds
it to believe that not every one of these treasured notes is worthy of a
place in this record of the last days of a rapidly vanishing art.
Thus it comes about that we have here details as trilling as the lead of
vangs on a small Turkish craft encountered in the harbor of Salonika and
nearly five pages given to the rigging of this little forty-five-foot vessel, in
spite of the fact-or because of it—that no reader of this volume will ever
be likely to meet such a craft and, what is more important, that the features
so elaborately described have no apparent relation to any line of develop-
ment leading up to or growing out of them.
There would be no ground for complaining of this over-elaboration in
the treatment of details, however unimportant, if the space so utilized had
not apparently crowded out certain features of greater interest. No de-
scription is given of studding-sails, for example. Yet they persisted at
least a century after the disappearance of the spritsail as carried under the
bowsprit, a feature which is covered by full description and illustrated
with a page of cuts. They played, too, a more important part in seaman-
ship and in history, and are among the most striking features of many
historical engravings. This is an omission which may well be corrected in
the next edition.
The schooner is treated at some length in the chapter on gaffsails, where
the statement is made that the rig originated in Holland and was in use in
England in the Seventeenth Century. It is difficult to disprove a statement
of the kind but there is a mass of testimony, English as well as American,
to support the tradition that the first genuine schooner was built at Glouces-
ter, Massachusetts, in 1713, by Captain Andrew Robinson.
The defects-if such they are which have been pointed out are of
trifling significance upon the whole and detract but little from the value
and the charm of the work under review. Both value and charm are enor-
mously enhanced by the cuts, two hundred twenty-two in number, by which
the text is illustrated. To say that these are by R. Morton Nance is to
say all that need be said, or could be said, of their excellence.
To any library, public or private, in which the literature of the sea has
a place, this work is indispensable, and to all readers of such literature it
is cordially recommended.
It would be too much, perhaps, to say that the era of the sailing ship has
now been adequately covered from the descriptive side. But the descrip-
tions that we have, supplemented by the many splendid views that con-
temporary art has made available, suffice to fill the eye with a fairly
satisfactory conception of the sailing ship as it was known to past genera-
tions of seafaring men. A few of these are still left, with memories not
only of the ships, but of the men who manned them and of the spirit which
gave to the lives of these men an epic quality more characteristic of the age
than were the ships themselves.


  p. 2228 (#1184)                      

2228
(Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
It remains for some one of that fast-vanishing group to fix upon the
printed page a revelation of this spirit as a companion picture to the one
here given of the material side of The Days of Mast and Sail. Flashes
of this spirit we find here and there in poetry and story. But, in no single
volume is any effort made to fill in the outline which Thomas Fleming Day
has sketched, of “The Sailor of the Sail."
“Lord of the Bunt and Gasket
And Master of the Yard
For whom no land was distant
To whom no sea was barred."


  p. 2229 (#1185)                      

SECRETARY'S NOTES
Membership New members joining since last report:
Timmons, C. C., Lieut. (SC), U.S.N. Murphy, J. N., Midn., U.S.N.
Jordan, J. N., Comdr. (SC), U.S.N. Schwarz, A. D., Midn., U.S.N.
Cochran, w. P., Ens., U.S.N.
Russell, Herbert, Sir.
Hansen, H. J., Lieut., U.S.N.
Martin, C. O., Ensign, U.S.N.R.F.
Trimble, C. E., Ensign, U.S.N.R.F. Buehler, A. R., Lieut., U.S.N.
Lane, R. H., Brig. Gen., U.S.M.C.
The Institute desires articles of interest to all branches
Articles of the service, including the reserve force. Non-
members as well as members may submit articles, and
authors receive due compensation for articles published. Com-
pact, well digested articles are more likely to be accepted for
early publication. In accepting articles for publication, the In-
stitute reserves the right to have such articles revised or rearranged,
where necessary, in order to bring them up to the required stand-
ard of articles published in the PROCEEDINGS—the cost, if any, to
be deducted from the compensation due the author.
Contributors are requested to observe the following special in-
structions in preparing articles for the PROCEEDINGS:
(a) In writing names of ships put only the initial letters in
capitals and underscore the names. The underscoring sig-
nifies to the printer that the word is to be in italics. The
same applies to names of publications. Foreign words not
anglicized should also be italicized.
(b) In preparing tables and computations employing fractions,
sub-numbers, etc., do by hand that part which cannot be
made perfectly clear by the typewriter.
(c) In typing the script use double space between lines.
(d) When a quotation is included in an article the editor should
be assured by appropriate notation that the writer has care-
fully verified the quotation as presented.
Discussion of articles published in the PROCEED-
Discussions INGS is cordially invited. Discussions accepted
for publication are paid for at approximately
one-half the rate for original articles.


  p. 2230 (#1186)                      

2230
Nov.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Book
Reviews
As soon as practicable after the publication of books
on subjects of professional interest, the Institute
aims to publish authoritative reviews of them.
In the past, many errors have resulted from the
Address of habit of changing an officer's address as soon
Members as his transfer orders are published in the papers.
No change will be made in the future except upon
receipt of notification by the member concerned. Reliance upon
the former method may, in extreme cases, mean a delay of almost
four months. To insure the prompt delivery of the PROCEEDINGS
and other communications from the U. S. Naval Institute, it is
essential that members and subscribers notify the Secretary-
Treasurer without delay of every change of address. No responsi-
bility can be accepted for failure to receive the PROCEEDINGS,
where members fail to comply with this rule. Changes of address
should reach the Institute by the 20th of the month, to be effective
for the issue of the PROCEEDINGS of the following month.
The Institute desires to obtain a copy of
Jane's
Jane's "Fighting Ships, 1924," the edition
“Fighting Ships" of which is exhausted; and requests that
(1924)
anyone wishing to dispose of a copy com-
municate with the Naval Institute, stating
price desired and condition of book.
H. A. BALDRIDGE,
Captain, U. S. Navy, Secretary-Treasurer.