12_Professional-Notes

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PROFESSIONAL NOTES
PREPARED BY
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER H. W. UNDERWOOD, U. S. Navy
FROM SEPTEMBER 3 TO OCTOBER 3
PS
............................................
2342
2356
The New Bress and Par
e........
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
SOME BRITISH VIEWS ON DIRIGIBLES AND FUTURE CONSTRUCTION OF
SURFACE SHIPS ......
FRANCE
The French Naval Renaissance.....
..... 2352
French Destroyer Trials.....
2354
French Light Cruisers and Flotilla Leaders ......
2355
GREAT BRITAIN
Navy Progress and Pacts......
The New Battleships .........
2357
The British Navy's Needs and the Mosul Issue..
2360
The Airship Controversy.........
2361
JAPAN
A Peace Protest from Tokyo.......
2362
America, Let's Reason Together.....
2365
UNITED STATES
Ships Building.
2370
The Air Board Personnel...
2370
The Mitchell Plan.........
2372
The Aeronautical Crisis. ......
2377
AVIATION
The Pulitzer Races...
2379
The Progress of Civil Aviation (British)..
2382
Anti-Aircraft Defense ...
2383
ENGINEERING
The Wing Rotor ......
2390
The Position of British Marine Engineering ......
........2391
Thornycroft Shallow-Draught Ships for China
2394
The Stability of Ships.......
2396
MERCHANT MARINE
The Shipping Board and Admiral Palmer .........
2397
The Shipping Board Controversy....
MISCELLANEOUS
The Trade and Industry of Persia...
2401
Amphibian Operations
2403
A New Industry.........
2405
CURRENT NAVAL AND PROFESSIONAL PAPERS..
2406
.......................
...............................
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SOME BRITISH VIEWS ON AIRSHIPS AND FUTURE NAVAL
CONSTRUCTION
Editor's Note: Although the following may not disclose anything new
on the subject matter which has occupied the front pages of the press the
past few months, it may be of interest to our members to know some
British viewpoints. In addition to the following the reader is advised to
refer to pages 1756-1758, Professional Notes of the September, 1925, PRO-
CEEDINGS of the Institute, and to the article in the Saturday Evening Post
for October 24, 1925. See also "Secretary's Notes," this issue.
The following correspondence sent to the Editor by Admiral Sir W. H.
Henderson, (Retired) Royal Navy, is printed with his permission.
Sept. 4, 1925
Following up my letter to you enclosing an article on "Airships," pub-
lished in the Evening Standard, I am sending cuttings of some correspond-
ence that has taken place in the Morning Post between its naval corre-
spondent and me.
By an extraordinary coincidence my last letter was published in yester-
day's issue, the day of the loss of the Shenandoah, which I regretted very
much to hear of, especially accompanied as it was by the loss of so many
good lives. Pray accept this, my expression of sympathy.
I feel sure I am on the right track on this question of airships and that
soon it will be realized in the United States that they are fair weather craft
only, and, as such, may be used in some selected positions for reconnaissance
work, but that for commercial purposes they will never be a paying propo-
sition or to be depended upon.
Please make any use of the cuttings you like.
Are Airships Futile?
Need for Charting the Upper Air; The New Navigation, Morning Post,
22 June, 1925.-Two of the sailor's greatest assets in navigating from port
to port are his compass and his charts. The first gives him a sense of
direction when there is nothing else to guide him, while the latter show him
not only the depth of the water, the configuration of the land, and rocks,
shoals, or other dangers, but also there are special charts indicating the
prevailing winds, ocean currents, and tidal streams.
The use of these navigational appliances has become second nature to the
mariner; he steers by his compass in mid-ocean with the same confidence
that a man walks a well-known track in the dark; he reads his chart as the
motorist consults his road map, but with this difference: the motorist wheels
his way on solid earth, the seaman has to be ever on the alert for being
set out of his course by winds and currents.
As an old seaman, it has occurred to Admiral Sir William Henderson
that the airship is likely to find itself in a sorry plight because it may
encounter wind currents of 100 miles an hour against which, even with a
speed of 70 m.p.h., it could make no headway at all.
Writing in an evening contemporary he has elaborated this argument and
other disabilities which he maintains are inherent in the lighter-than-air
craft. He arrives at the conclusion that the airship "disregards the first
principles of transport, which are that a ship .... must have a power of
motion of its own greatly in excess of the medium in or on which it moves."
From this he argues that airships can never be more than fine weather craft
and that the country is wasting money in producing them.
This is a serious charge, for airships are costly things, and we cannot
afford "fair weather" luxuries which cannot pay their way in peace, and
would have very limited value in war. The revival of a government policy
to build airships has been largely due to the fact that the Admiralty has


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Professional Notes
strongly emphasized their potential uses for commerce protection in war.
If airships are to be used by the navy they must be able to operate under
far more arduous conditions than those to be encountered on a set route in
favorable weather.
If there is no answer to Admiral Henderson's arguments, the future of
these aircraft would indeed seem gloomy, but he appears to have viewed
everything from the plane of the ocean's surface. He, doubtless, has in
mind the monsoons, hurricanes, gales, and storms which prevail in various
parts of the world according to the times and seasons. Moreover, he
stresses the fact that whereas the ship of the sea can generally find a
natural shelter, the airship is at the mercy of the elements until once more
safely housed in its shed.
It is natural that these influences should present themselves to the
seaman as formidable objections to this new means of transport, and no
one will appreciate better than he the need for investigating this problem
fully before being unduly optimistic about the future of airships. Unless,
however, "seasense" and "airsense" are combined, the one is liable to lack
imagination and the other experience in reviewing this matter.
If airships are to navigate safely it is essential that the upper air should
be charted in the same way that sea currents and surface winds have been.
It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this work. When we
know with reasonable accuracy the prevailing winds and air currents at each
successive strata of the world's atmosphere from 1,000 to 30,000 feet, air-
ships may be able to navigate with the same degree of security as ships of
the sea.
At 5,000 feet there may be a raging gale against which an airship would
battle in vain; at 10,000 there may be a flat calm, and at 15,000 a favorable
breeze. In fact, airship routes, out and home to the Far East, may become
established at regular altitudes corresponding with the season of the year,
just as sailing ships and, to a less degree, steamships vary the latitude of
certain of their routes.
The Meteorological Department, which is coordinated at the Air Ministry,
is known to be investigating this big problem, but the means at present at its
disposal would seem to be quite inadequate.
The subject is an international one, for it affects all civil aviation, and it
is essentially one in which the navy should assist, and in which the aid of
the mercantile marine should be enlisted. Observations of the upper air are
taken to a great extent by releasing small free balloons and observing their
behavior. Here again the seaman with his aptitude for using a sextant
must prove invaluable. The navy is vitally interested in the future of air-
ships. It is therefore to be hoped that the Admiralty will take an active
hand in charting the upper air.
For the rest one cannot but think that Admiral Henderson is unduly
pessimistic. In arriving at his conclusions he recalls many of the misfortunes
which have occurred to airships, but makes no allusion to their achievements.
The United States Naval airship Shenandoah has been out in fair weather
and foul for well over a year now. During that time it crossed the Rockies
in a gale, sailed down the Pacific coast, and returned in safety to its base
on the Atlantic side.
Our own R-34 crossed and recrossed the Atlantic safely, and R-33 made
a notable trip across the North Sea and continent. The Atlantic has more
lately been crossed by ZR-3, now the Los Angeles. These are not the
achievements of fragile craft incapable of facing the elements. Little air-
ships were out constantly in bad weather patrolling the coast during the war.
The airships now building, which Admiral Henderson regards as "un-
wieldy monsters," but mark the logical progress of events. The giant
liners of today would have seemed "unwieldly monsters" to Columbus, yet
they are the outcome of the brave endeavors of those who set forth, fear-


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ing neither winds, currents, nor uncharted seas, and with no certainty of
finding shelter.
In the same spirit pioneers of this new means of transport will launch
their craft into the blue, but, today, science makes it possible to investigate
in advance the obstacles and perils which await them, and to provide resting
places in the form of mooring masts, so situated that an airship can always
run for safety, as a ship makes for harbor.
The seaman has done battle with the elements for countless generations;
to him should be entrusted all that appertains to this new navigation.
Airship Problems
Difficulties of Navigation, Morning Post, 8 August, 1925.—To the Editor
of The Morning Post.—Sir:-Your Naval Correspondent in your issue of
June 22 makes the grave and inevitable admission that if an airship has
not a speed comparable to, or even greater than, the current in which she
happens to be immersed, and if she cannot extricate herself from this cur.
rnt by rising to a higher and possibly safer region, then air navigation by
an airship is difficult if not impossible.
To escape from this dilemma he asserts that "it is essential that the upper
air should be charted in the same way that sea currents and surface winds
have been." Sea currents, which are subject to little variation, are well
known and accurately charted. The prevailing winds, however, except in
the tropical regions of the trades and monsoons, which vary within con-
siderable limits and are subject to dislocation by hurricanes, cyclones, and
typhoons, are only given as an average of an enormous number of direct
observations, extending over a long period of time. They vary daily and
even hourly, both in speed and direction, and can only be used as possible
approximations. It would be impossible to obtain even such approxima-
tions by any known means of observation in the upper currents of the
atmosphere.
The lifting power of an airship depends upon the buoyancy of her gas
bags. This lifting power is dependent on the pressure of the atmosphere in
which the ship is immersed, and taking the extreme height mentioned by
your correspondent of 30,000 feet as an example, where the mean tempera-
ture is 50°, and no human being can exist, the pressure is less than one
third of that at the surface of the earth, and her lifting power would be
inadequate to support her own weight, it being assumed that gas has been
released to reduce the internal pressure to that of the surrounding atmos-
phere. If gas is retained the lift is still further reduced, and the gas bags
may burst.
Whatever the height at which the ship is navigated these relative condi-
tions hold good; gas, which is a valuable and expensive commodity, has
often to be released, and must be replaced as soon as possible for naviga-
tion in the lower regions, therefore, filling stations must be available.
As a matter of fact, an airship is totally incapable of rising to the heights
mentioned. The maximum possible rise of one, assuming that the weight of
her hull, machinery, and other items is only two thirds of her total lift, is
under 10,000 feet. This disregards the dynamical lift of her rudders, against
which has to be set a safe margin to be allowed for increase of weight
caused by such ordinary contingencies as a fall of snow, a shower of rain,
a heavy fall of dew, on her enormous surface. A normal fall of the
barometer, even, affects these conditions, so the height to which an airship
can attain carrying a full cargo is relatively small.
When the limitations of "lift" of an airship are understood, it will be
realized that the proposed establishment of a "network of ship stations in
the Atlantic for daily attacks on the atmosphere with pilot balloons, kites,
registering balloons, and aeroplanes" and "the investigation of the whole


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region of the atmosphere up to 30,000 feet,” would be futile, and an un-
warrantable waste of money, for in view of the impossibility of an airship
ever reaching more than a fraction of these heights, the precise value of
these expensive investigations from an airship point of view appears to be
nil. A chart of the upper air would be out of date in a short time, whereas
one of the sea holds good for centuries.
The “logical progress" of events is referred to. The history of our air
fleet cannot be regarded as logical or in any way analogous to the gradual
and continuous development of primitive seagoing craft to great ocean
liners. Our present air fleet, R-33, R-36, R-37, R-80, L-64, and L-75, have
all been in their hangars since 1921, except for the brief and checkered
career of R-33 in April last.
After this period of inertia arising presumably from incapacity for use-
ful employment, two gigantic airships with correspondingly large and ex-
pensive paraphernalia are in process of construction, notwithstanding the
fact that these ships are in every respect subject to the like conditions of
current, to the same inability to rise to the heights which your correspond-
ent has himself stated to be essential, and liable to the identical dangers
which have ended the careers of most airships since 1910.-Yours,
W. H. HENDERSON, Admiral (Retired)
3 Onslow Houses, S.W. 7.
Airships of the Future
Increased Interest; Commercial and War Requirements, Morning Post,
15 August, 1925. (By Our Naval Correspondent.)—The continued success
of the United States' naval airships, and the progress being made on the
designs of our new big lighter-than-air craft are leading to increased atten-
tion being paid in both countries to the future of airships, both for commer-
cial purposes and as units of the fleet.
Admiral Sir William Henderson, in his letter published in the Morning
Post of August ii, returns to his attack on the policy of building airships
which he started in a contemporary a couple of months ago. Referring to
an article of mine on the subject, which appeared in these pages on June
22, he entirely misconstrues my meaning when he says I make "the grave
and inevitable admission that if an airship has not a speed comparable
to .... the current in which she happens to be immersed, or if she cannot
extricate herself .... by rising to a .... safer region then airship naviga-
tion is difficult if not impossible.” This is the basis of his own contention
that in building airships we are wasting money. I do not agree that it is
necessary for an airship to have a speed comparable to any current in which
she may find herself, and his deductions as to lifting powers are misleading.
In the article referred to I was reviewing the future of airships largely
from the point of view of their utility to the navy, and I pointed out that
for such a purpose they would have to operate under far more arduous
conditions than those appertaining to a set route in favorable weather
The ideal naval airship should be able to remain several weeks in the
air in any part of the world where ships are wont to sail the seas, and to
maintain her station in any weather. This may be asking too much of such
craft, and is certainly beyond their capabilities at present, but it is quite
possible that in time we shall see war airships and commercial airships
as distinct in design as men-of-war and merchant ships of today.
At present it certainly will not pay to run commercial airships capable
of ascending to heights of 15,000 or 20,000 feet. Commercial work will
doubtless be done at well under 10,000 feet.
Commercial airships will be able to select their routes according to sea-
sons and prevailing winds. The fact that they can shape course over the
land or over the sea gives them a far wider choice of routes, especially to


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the East, than a ship has; moreover, and this is a vital matter which I
think Admiral Henderson has overlooked, their high speed will enable them
to run rapidly out of the path of a local gale or storm.
As to the general endurance of airships, this has steadily improved, and
the Shenandoah and Los Angeles have already given proof that they are
not merely fair weather craft. In the war, airships were in their babyhood,
but even so, they were stouter infants than many people realize.
Airship Problems
Some Elementary Facts, Morning Post, 3 September, 1925.—To the Editor
of The Morning Post.-Sir:-The article of your Naval Correspondent
in your issue of the fifteenth ultimo deals much in generalities, which can-
not be replied to except by a simple exposition of elementary facts for
which I could not ask space.
No improvements of design or expenditure on research can alter the laws
under which airships have to exist, relating to the currents of the air, the
lifting power of lighter than air gases, which can easily be worked out by
referring to the tables giving the density of the air at various heights, the
danger from lightning, and at mooring masts from gales, which are in-
creased by increase of size; the difficulty of maintaining their trim while
moored, and their extreme vulnerability. No airship can be made to rise
to higher regions except by reducing her own weight, which can only be
done by valving gas, discharging fuel, cargo, or ballast which may have
been taken on board in substitution of either. The difficulties of manipula.
tion have been illustrated over and over again by the history of every air-
ship that has existed, and especially so by a critical examination of the per-
formances of the Shenandoah, R-34, and the Los Angeles, which you could
not give me space to collate from the available material.
Size does not overcome nature's laws, but merely accentuates the diffi-
culties; its great disability is decrease in handiness and security. There
will be great difficulty in mooring these monsters in strong winds, and in
gales they will not be able to remain at their mooring masts.
Your correspondent states that "their high speed will enable them to run
rapidly out of the path of a local gale or storm." In some cases possibly,
yes, but I take the following from the China Sea Pilot, Vol. III, which is
authoritative:
“The area covered by typhoons is very variable, some are quite small,
twenty to thirty miles across, while others extend over a region of hundreds
of miles in diameter. The mean diameter of the dangerous part-this it
must be remembered is wind to ships, but currents to aircraft-of a typhoon
may be taken as 100 to 200 miles. With increasing north latitude typhoons
tend to increase in size and diminish in intensity. The rate of progress of
the center of the typhoon varies from five to forty miles an hour, the speed
of the wind often reaches 26 to 31 m.p.h. at 500 miles from the center, in-
creasing to as much as 75 m.p.h. at thirty miles from the center."
The above is a correct description of all revolving storms.
Your correspondent quotes from an article in the current number of the
R.U.S.I. Journal. To be of any value the number of casualties and fatalities
should be shown as a percentage of the numbers of the personnel who flew
those miles, not of miles flown. A dispassionate examination of the work
done by these small craft would now show it was wasted effort.-Yours,
W. H. HENDERSON, Admiral (Retired)
September 2.
October 10, 1925
Thank you for inserting my short article on airships in your September
number. I sent you while I was away my correspondence in the Morning


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Post on the same subject. I much regretted the loss of life entailed by the
loss of the Shenandoah, but so far as one can at present judge, her loss
supports all the conclusions which I have advanced against the practica-
bility of airships from a constructional, navigational, transport, and financial
point of view. They are fair weather craft, and their disposable lift, when
all stresses are provided for, will be exceedingly small.
I hear a small book is coming out before long which will give a history
of all the American and British airships built since 1918, and thoroughly
shows up their disabilities. If it is printed I will send you a copy. It is
just as well the public of both countries should know the facts concerning
them.
I see you have also reprinted an article from the Army, Navy and Air
Force Gazette, which in its concluding paragraph sums up opinions that
have been expressed by me over a good many years, and which are strongly
emphasized by existing conditions.
I see that one of my letters on the 2,000-ton cruisers was in The Times
of November 25, 1921.
I am enclosing a cutting from the Naval and Military Record of June 24
which gives some later views; but I think you must take in the Naval and
Military Record and will have seen, also, Sir Herbert Russell's articles
on the same subject. I enclose a cutting of one of them. Others were
"Problems of Economy," September 16, and “The New Battleships," Sep-
tember 23. I consider Sir Herbert Russell by far the most advanced and
liberal minded of our naval journalists.
Commenting on the launching of the Nelson, both the Times and the
Daily Telegraph stated that she and the Rodney would probably be the last
big ships ever built. Opinion against these unnecessary and costly monsters
-monstrosities really-is growing over here; and it only wants comprehen-
sion and united action with the United States to bring matters down to more
simple conditions and save the waste of enormous sums of money.
I am a strong advocate for simplicity generally, and of function, in par-
ticular. The complexity of a 35,000-tonner is such that every function with
which she is endowed impairs her fighting value as a gun armament vessel
which is her primary, and with its necessary concomitant, her only func-
tion. In the same way a cruiser is a gunship only, torpedoes are no use to
her for attempting to fight battleships or new cruisers. She requires guns
to fight her kind and to resist destroyer attacks, while the destroyer's
primary function is torpedoes for attack of battleships and cruisers, but
she also must have guns for fighting her own kind.
I deprecate an airplane's being carried by any fighting ship. The ship
cannot be made subservient to her planes, which she is; directly they go
off her, functions must not be interfered with, and a sporting chance must
be given to the crew of the planes for their lives.
You are, of course, quite at liberty to make use of any of my ideas.
Sincerely yours,
W. H. HENDERSON
Editor's NOTE.—See "Secretary's Notes” this issue; also pp. 2356-2359
this issue.
Capital Ship Problems
Admiral Sir W. H. Henderson's Views, The Naval and Military Record,
24 June, 1925.—To the Editor of The Naval and Military Record.—Sir:
In your issue of June 10 Sir Herbert Russell propounds and answers the
question, "Will the Battleship Pass?"
With his conclusion I have for long been in agreement, and stated in the
press during the Scott controversy that a 10,000-ton cruiser could perform


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all the functions of a battleship, provided there was an international agree-
ment that ships should not be built of greater size.
I can only hope to supplement the able reasoning by which Sir Herbert
has, I think, proved his query. I have always thought Admiral Sir Percy
Scott would have carried his case against the battleship had he only been
then able to take wider grounds. His conceptions did not go beyond the
dreadnoughts of 1914-18, built to compete with German dreadnoughts, all of
which were constructed for use in the narrow scas of Europe, with the con-
comitant weapons then brought into use.
He was naturally taken up by the advocates of the battleship, who saw
no further than he did, and who knew the naval architects said a duplica-
tion of size was possible, and that there were still available weights that
could be made use of protectively against the mine and torpedo. It was the
old battle of guns v. armor over again, and would have like results.
If it had not been for the Washington Conference we should have had
ships of 50,000 tons and over, for competition would have been open and
universal. The Conference at least limited size and the caliber of guns,
although even the signatories did not have their eyes opened to the new
strategical conditions which were the result of the war, or they would
still further have reduced the size and simplified the conditions of the agreed
capital ships.
The naval lesson of the war is that the construction and composition of
the fleets of 1914-18 was such that they could only be used in narrow
waters; that many bases of every kind were essential to them.
The powers of resistance of the new ships "have immensely increased,"
but this can only be for a period, until the powers of attack have developed
proportionately. Meanwhile, the strategic fields have shifted from the
narrow seas to the oceans, particularly the Pacific Ocean, where there are
no bases except at such distances as prohibit the use of fleets as now con-
stituted. Nothing can be altered so long as the Washington Treaty re-
mains in being. That is till 1936, and even were it abrogated before that,
and competition and rivalry reintroduced, it is impossible to conceive that
bases could be provided or maintained in sufficiency over its vast militarily
unproductive areas.
The corollary to this is that fleets must be constituted to fit the strategic
fields in which they may have to act. This, to take the question of the
battleship only, will need the elimination of the big ship, and necessitate
the use of smaller, simpler, and more mobile craft. The nation that first
takes the lead in building that of 17,500 tons for that of 35,000 tons, as it
is stated the French propose to do, will have the advantage. During the
Scott controversy I publicly stated that a 10,000-ton cruiser could perform
all the functions of a battleship, provided there was agreement that no na-
tion should have ships of greater size; it is a question of agreement only.
There is also another factor. Everything, whether it be organic or in-
oganic, and especially the productions of man, reach in their development
a point of maximum efficiency at which they become stabilized, or are super-
seded by new and more efficient forms, which eventually take their place.
There can be no question but that, judged by this standard, the 35,000-ton
battleship has long passed this point, and that in size, cost, and complexity
she is much too monstrous for the purposes for which she can be usefully
employed.
We have already begun with the 10,000-ton mobile cruiser, and I believe
we are on the verge of a reconstruction of all our ideas concerning the com-
position of fleets.
W. H. HENDERSON, Admiral (Retired)


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2349
Smaller Fighting Ships
The Reaction from Colossal Displacement, by Sir Herbert Russell, The
Naval and Military Record, 5 August, 1925.—Broadly speaking, there are
at the present day two schools of opinion regarding the value of the capital
ship. There is the school which holds that she has outlived her utility,
and there is the school which believes that she still maintains her traditional
place in the general principles of sea war. But between this broad division
of thought there is a large body of indefinite opinion which, while unpre-
pared to express any conclusion as to the future of the capital ship, would
compromise with the question by greatly reducing her size.
The Washington Conference, of course, took a specific step in this direc-
tion. The original proposal was that no ship-of-the-line laid down sub-
sequently to the signing of the treaty should exceed 30,000 tons displace-
ment. The technical experts, wedded to the idea of progressive develop-
ment, resisted this limit, and the figure was increased to 35,000 tons. At
this time we had in commission the Hood, 41,200 tons; the United States
were building the Saratoga class of battle cruisers of 43,500 tons; and
Japan had in commission the Nagato, of 40,000 tons. But the Hood is un-
questionably the biggest warship ever yet designed or laid down.
The material school was rather dismayed by the Washington limitation:
it was already talking of the 55,000-ton battleship, and the famous Hadfield
firm had built and tested a 20-inch gun which, presumably, it was proposed
that she should mount. On the other hand, the tactical school, which is only
impressed by size and power to the degree in which these conform to sheer
utility, was disappointed with the Washington limitation in that reaction
was not carried nearly far enough. Agreed that the heaviest gun, the
stoutest armor, and the greatest speed should have the best chance of vic-
tory, there still remains Nelson's dictum that "numbers alone can annihilate."
Bigger ships must necessarily mean fewer ships, and the logical issue of
such a policy would ultimately be so few ships as to reduce war to a sort of
duel between champions.
The late Sir William White laid it down that there can be no finality in
warship design, and this is obviously true. But in every product of human
invention there is a point of maximum efficiency beyond which it is im-
possible to go, and at which evolution has to seek a new direction, or else
become stabilized, and consequently cease to be evolution. The sailing ship
reached this point, and was superseded by the steamship. The reciprocat-
ing engine reached this point, and was superseded by the turbine. The
cylindrical boiler reached this point, and was superseded by the water-tube
boiler. It would not be difficult to almost indefinitely extend the list, but
these examples illustrate the truth of this principle.
The tendency in warship design—or at any rate in capital ship design,
which we are now considering—is to develop complexity during progress
toward the maximum point of efficiency. I am not referring to complexity
of detail, which is inevitable to progress, but complexity of purpose. Pri-
marily, every type of warship has a definite offensive function, but the
modern aim seems to be in the direction of rendering her capable of various
performances. The weapon of the battleship is the gun. Why, then, fit her
with torpedo tubes ? Did the Great War produce any evidence that the
battleship could be used for torpedo attack? Simplicity in any given rôle
assuredly gives the highest efficiency of result, and to multiply that rôle by
imposing other purposes upon it is to reduce efficiency by diffusing it, so to
speak. Yet we shall find that the chief factor in the great growth of dis-
placement lies in this multiplication of purpose. The Hood carries the same
main armament as the Queen Elizabeth.. Why, then, should she be 13,000
tons bigger? Because it was decided to enable her to carry out the func-
tions of the cruiser as well as of the ship-of-the-line. If such a combination


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
were practicable without involving the violation of other important prin-
ciples, the possible advantages of it would form their own justification. As
it is, we have to consider whether these possible advantages are worth the
price. In order to attempt to answer this let us consider the price.
The first point in this connection, by the natural association of ideas, is
economy. Here on the face of it the big ship appears to score. When
simplicity is departed from, and a great increase in capacity is demanded,
relative saving in cost is effected by size. To build and maintain a 40,000-
ton ship would be more economical than to build and maintain two 20,000-ton
ships, presuming the collective fighting value to be identical in both cases.
It is quite probable that the question of cost was a very prominent factor
in the general conditions of competition which forced the rapid growth in
displacement. But when we come to the heavy collateral expenditure upon
harbor accommodation, dry-docks, and the like involved in this policy, the
purely economic aspect begins to wear quite another aspect. To use a
homely metaphor, the fewer the number of baskets you use the less it will
cost you (for baskets) to distribute your eggs, but if you are presently
obliged to enlarge your shop window in order to display your baskets at
all the saving may easily vanish. The money that has been spent and still
remains to be spent, at Portsmouth, Devonport, and Malta simply as con-
sequence of the growth of battleship dimensions would probably absorb, and
possibly more than absorb, the saving effected by the constructive principle.
But while money is the chief sinew of war we cannot always reckon war
values in terms of money. So we have to consider the question as to
whether the big ship is worth her price in other aspects than the purely
economic one. Assuming that we can mount half the number of heavy
guns, employ armor of equal protective effectiveness, and attain an equal
speed in a ship of 20,000 tons, what is the advantage of the 40,000-ton ship?
She will be a better gun-platform; she can deliver heavier salvoes; and she
will possess a wider sea-keeping radius. It is a debatable point as to whether
these advantages are not rather more apparent than real. In weather con-
ditions under which a 20,000-ton battleship cannot make effective shooting
a vessel of double the displacement is not going to do very much better.
Given efficient fire control, two ships with six guns apiece shooting at an
enemy vessel should be able to do at least as much damage as one ship with
twelve guns, while the risk of suffering crippling damage is practically
halved. Since battleships are designed to operate at no great distance from
a base, and not for sea cruising purposes, the question of radius of action-
of course within reasonable limits-is really not of supreme importance.
To no other sea service is the question of numbers so important as it is
to the British Navy. It is true that battleships do not figure in our over-
seas distributions outside of European waters, but there are clear indica-
tions that they may do so at no very distant date. At any rate, Singapore
is being developed as a capital ship base. Therefore, the principle of con-
centrating the greatest degree of power in the fewest number of hulls is not
a wise one for the British Empire. Rivalry must always be a dominant in-
fluence in naval design. We could not afford to reduce the size of our
capital ships, if such reduction involved a corresponding loss of fighting
power, while other nations maintained the full permissible limit. But need
such a reduction necessarily involve anything approaching a corresponding
loss of fighting power? Need it, in fact, involve any appreciable loss at
all if we eliminate the element of complexity which is primarily responsible
for the rapid growth in tonnage, and stick to the definite function of the
definite type ?
Take, for example, the question of defense, which nowadays makes such
a heavy demand upon displacement. A great many naval men share in the
opinion of Admiral Sir Reginald Custance that the best defense is offense,
and that two more big guns would be worth very much more than their


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Professional Notes
weight in broadside protection. I believe that one result of overhead attack
and underwater attack will be a radical modification in the long-accepted
principles of armor distribution, and that, except for vital positions such
as magazines, armor will be gradually reduced to the proportions carried
by cruisers. No doubt the suggestion will be resisted, but the fact remains
that the want of armor did not prevent hard fighting during the war on the
part of the cruisers and destroyers. At least half the naval personnel is
expected to fight in vessels without any armor protection at all, and in the
case of the destroyers to fight principally against armored ships.
Reductions of the burden of armor may well prove a preliminary step
to reduction of displacement. If we arrive at international agreement to
limit the size of battleship guns, as has been done in the case of cruisers,
then we may see a reaction that will not only result in a very much smaller
capital ship, but a capital ship which will partake very much more of the
character of a big armored cruiser than of a battleship as we now under-
stand the term. It is quite conceivable that we may have reached such a
modification of constructive principles before the time arrives at which we
should resume the building of capital ships under the Washington agree-
ment. As far as it is possible to read the future, by that time we shall be
the only European power maintaining battleships at all. If the United States
and Japan continue to maintain a battle fleet, I suppose we shall have no
alternative. At the present time strategical considerations are centered in
the Pacific. Here the Washington limitations with regard to bases would
render it impracticable for the United States battle fleet to operate. Quite
a different type of ship is required for service in remote seas from that which
is designed fo narrow waters, and the 10,000-ton cruiser is a vessel which
I suggest represents perception of this fact. The bigger and more complex
a fleet, the greater the need for bases: during the last three years of the
Great War there was never a fighting unit from Scapa to Palestine operat-
ing more than 300 miles from a base.
The gigantic battleship appears to me to be of even less use to the United
States than to ourselves, for that country has to contemplate much greater
distances in her strategical outlook. Temporary bases are a poor com-
promise with the necessities of a modern fleet. America would be much
better served by a type of big ship especially adapted to ocean work. Prob-
ably she quite recognizes this herself, but finds a difficulty in consequence of
her rivalry with Japanese sea power. But as Japanese naval policy is de-
fensive, it would probably suit her very well to come into line with any
international proposal to limit displacement and gun power in her future
construction. It is certainly not improbable that the destiny of Japan may
bring her to war, but in this event she would wait to be attacked, and as
near to her own base as possible.
The tactical advantages of the smaller ship are, I believe, generally
realized. The primary cause of the result at Jutland was that, as in the
eighteenth century, we remained bound to the principle of the line-of-battle
formation. The Grand Fleet was too big for such a formation, which could
be (and actually was) rendered impotent by an unsuspected or disconcerting
maneuver. The lesson of Jutland is the necessity for greater flexibility
and more opportunity for initiative, and to this principle numbers certainly
contribute. Smaller ships imply greater numbers; they likewise mean a
“spreading out” of risk, with the result of encouraging a commander-in-
chief to follow the Nelsonian doctrine very much more effectively than was
attempted at Jutland.
The bigger weapon only calls forth the more formidable response. We
are now able to claim that the bulge makes the battleship reasonably safe
against torpedo attack. The answer will be a bigger and more devastating
torpedo. The danger of the mine is certainly not going to lessen-offense
never does. Development designed to counteract it means an unending


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
process of growth in displacement. The inevitable result is the production
of a ship too costly, and representing too large a proportion of total fighting
power, to be lightly risked. She is stultified by virtue of her superlative
qualities, and spends most of her career in a boom-closed anchorage
FRANCE
The French Naval Renaissance
The Engineer, 16 October, 1925.—The naval power of France has been
very considerably augmented during the present year by the completion of
new vessels that were laid down in 1922 and 1923, under the first section oi
the postwar building program. Delay has occurred in almost every case,
owing in part to alterations in the original designs and in part to technical
difficulties, but the Ministry of Marine is hopeful that thirty new units
will be commissioned before next spring. The most important of these ves-
sels are three cruisers-Duguay-Trouin, Lamotte-Picquet, and Primauquet,
sister ships of 7,873 tons displacement, engined for a speed of 34 knots. The
design is frankly experimental, for it is nearly a generation since the last
high-speed cruiser was built in France and the present staff of the Section
Technique-corresponding to our Royal Corps of Naval Constructors-has
had no practical experience in this branch of construction. It is, therefore,
not surprising to learn that the preliminary steam trials of the Duguar-
Trouin have failed to give complete satisfaction. Full details are not yet
to hand, but it appears that the power developed by the turbine machinery
at given pressures did not result in the speed expected. Pending further
information, we shall ignore the unofficial reports which are current in
regard to this matter. It is not only in the French Navy that recent ships,
designed for extremely high speeds, have failed to justify expectation. We
observe that two American cruisers, which were acclaimed not long since as
the swiftest vessels of their class in the world, have just been withdrawn
from service to have their turbines "modified," a euphemism which appar-
ently implies radical changes in their propelling machinery. In Japan, also,
the 33-knot cruiser Kinu broke down badly on a recent trial, and engine-
room troubles have been not infrequent in others of her class. It says much
for the courage of French constructors that they undertook to build a
cruiser with a higher legend speed than that of any existing ship of this
type. The Duguay-Trouin, of 7,873 tons, has machinery of 100,000 shaft
horsepower, while H.M.S. Emerald, of 7,600 tons, is designed for 80.000
shaft horsepower. Bearing in mind the unequalled experience of British
naval constructors in the design of very fast ships, and the admitted pre-
eminence of our engineers in the construction of steam machinery for marine
purposes, the discrepancy between these figures is significant. At the same
time, it is but fair to add that the French ship, in contrast to the Emerald
is virtually destitute of armor, and, in effect, represents an extreme ten-
dency to sacrifice every other attribute to speed. The same principle ap-
pears to have inspired the design of two later and larger ships, Duquesne
and Tourville, which were laid down during the summer. They are to dis-
place 10,000 tons and to have machinery of 130,000 shaft horsepower. The
utmost speed attainable, combined with adequate gun power and little or
no protection, would appear to be the tactical policy which now governs
French naval construction. The armament of the Duguay-Trouin class
consists of eight 6.1-inch guns paired in splinter-proof turrets at bow and
stern. These guns are a high-velocity model, with a length of 55 calibers.
The weight of the projectile is unknown, but in range and precision the net
weapon is said to surpass the 7.6-inch gun mounted in older French cruisers.
Of equal interest are the torpedo craft which are now running their
trials. Six of them are flotilla leaders, unprecedented in size and power, all
of which were laid down in private yards in 1922-23. The Jaguar and her


  p. 2353 (#1317)                      

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2353
Professional Notes
five consorts are ships of 2,359 tons displacement, with a length of nearly
400 feet, a breadth of 36 feet, and machinery of 50,000 shaft horsepower for
a speed of 35.5 knots. Drawings which have been published show the lines
of the hull to be extremely fine, and this fact, taken in conjunction with the
heavy armament carried, lends a special interest to the behavior of these
vessels at sea. As first designed, they were to have had six 5.1-inch guns,
but it soon became evident from tank experiments that the weight of this
armament would seriously prejudice their stability, and one gun was accord-
ingly deleted. They also have two 75 mm. anti-aircraft guns and six 21.7-
inch torpedo tubes on triple mountings. Two different types of turbine-
Rateau and Breguet-are represented in this group of ships. There are
five small-tube boilers, burning oil, and sufficient fuel is carried for a voyage
of 2,500 miles at 18 knots. The Jaguar, which began her trials two months
ago, has developed condenser trouble, though it is said to be of a minor
nature. The Tiger, of the same class, attained a speed of 32 knots, with
only 26,000 shaft horsepower, and subsequently worked up to full power,
maintaining 35.5 knots with ease. Bad weather was encountered on this
trial. When running at full speed the bows of the ship tended to lift out of
the water unduly, but otherwise she behaved admirably, and showed herself
a better sea boat than had been anticipated. Good reports have also been
received of the initial trials of the Leopard and Chacal. The two remain-
ing vessels, Lynx and Panthère, have not yet reached the trial stage, but
will probably do so before the end of the year. It is proposed to form the
Jaguar, Tiger, Leopard, and Chacal into a division légère rapide, which,
after a three months' course of training, will make a cruise in northern
waters, calling at ports in Great Britain and Scandinavia. Fifteen more
flotilla leaders are included in the program, for completion by 1931, and
several of them have already been ordered. They will be slightly larger
than the Jaguars, and will carry 5.5-inch guns in place of 5.1-inch. The
British Navy has no torpedo craft comparable with the Jaguar, to say noth-
ing of the latest French design. Our largest flotilla leaders are lighter by
600 tons, and are armed with five 4.7-inch guns. On the other hand, they
are at least I knot faster. It is, however, very improbable that this new
development in foreign naval construction will be overlooked when the
methodical replacement of obsolete destroyers is begun, two years hence. In
addition to the flotilla leaders described above, twelve destroyers are being
completed for the French service. Laid down in 1923, they have a dis-
placement of 1,434 tons, engines of 30,000 shaft horsepower for a speed
of 33 knots, and are armed with four 5.1-inch guns and six tubes. Six other
boats of the same class are on the stocks, and fifteen more are projected.
They are simply a smaller edition of the Jaguar type, but a lower speed has
been accepted for the sake of a heavy armament. If the current building
program is adhered to, France will eventually possess fifty-seven torpedo
vessels of post-war design, all of large dimensions and high speed, armed
with 5.1-inch and 5.5-inch guns, and carrying torpedoes more powerful than
the standard model in our navy. She will have, besides, nine fast cruisers-
including six of 10,000 tons, mounting 8-inch guns—and more than one
hundred submarines, fifty-nine of which will be of the very latest con-
struction.
In view of this formidable array of light naval craft, which could be em-
ployed with telling effect in the narrow waters of the Mediterranean, French
naval strategists do not appear to be greatly concerned about the weakness
of their battle fleet. No attempt has been made to replace the Dreadnought
France, which was wrecked three years ago, nor apparently is there any
intention of doing so. The six remaining dreadnoughts have all been thor-
oughly renovated since the war, and even the three Dantons still on the
active list have been modernized to some extent, though their fighting value
is small. It would seem therefore that French naval opinion still cherishes


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2354
(Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
a certain respect for the battleship, despite the almost supreme influence now
wielded by the Jeune Ecole, in whose philosophy of warfare the great ship
has no place. Yet it is exceedingly improbable that France will ever build
another battleship. For some months past the Ministry of Marine has had
under consideration the design of a croiseur de combat, which is highly
commended by distinguished naval critics. It is, in effect, a light battle
cruiser of 17,500 tons, capable of steaming at 34 knots. The armament of
eight 12-inch guns is disposed in two quadruple turrets, en échelon amid-
ships, thus commanding-in theory—an all-round field of fire. Vital parts
are protected by armor strong enough to resist all except the heaviest pro-
jectiles. Room is provided for eight aeroplanes, and the forecastle or the
quarterdeck is fitted with a flying-off platform. Under the Washington
Treaty, France is at liberty to utilize her allotment of capital ship tonnage
as she may consider advisable. No objection could be raised therefore if
she decided to build two of these 17,500-ton battle cruisers in lieu of one
35,000-ton battleship. Since they would, of course, completely overshadow
the 10,000-ton cruisers now building for all the major navies, their appear-
ance would introduce a novel and disturbing factor into calculations of
relative strength. For the present, however, the design remains in the paper
stage, from which it may never emerge. Ships of this type could hardly be
built for less than £4,500,000 apiece, and their value as a tactical or strategic
factor is entirely conjectural. Even without them, the revival of French
sea power is assured. When the building program now in hand has fully
matured, France will be in a position, if not absolutely to control the
Mediterranean, at least to deny the command of that sea to any rival fleet.
She may reckon with some confidence on her ability to safeguard the vital
lines of communication with northern Africa, which has become an indis-
pensable reservoir of manpower for her army, and the defense of her mari-
time frontiers will no longer cause her anxiety. A naval policy which
promises to yield such fruitful results cannot be adjudged extravagant or
unsound.
French Destroyer Trials
The Naval and Military Record, 23 September, 1925.—The destroyers
Tiger and Jaguar, of 2,400 tons, have both accomplished off Lorient highly
successful preliminary trials at 18, 20, and 32 knots, their Rateau turbines
developing more than the stipulated power and speed during their cruising
and two-third power tests. They are this week undergoing their final
official trials before hoisting the pennant for commission. Next month will
be the turn of the Leopard, completing at the Chantiers de la Loire (St.
Nazaire), which has already undergone successful stationary trials, her
Breguet turbines giving satisfaction. The Panthère (Lorient) is expected
to be ready at the end of October, the Chacal (Penhoet, St. Nazaire, that
has also Rateau turbines) is being pressed forward and ought to run her
trials next November. The Lynx, the last of the series, in hand at St.
Nazaire (Chantiers de la Loire), is only shipping her funnels and super-
structures, and is not likely to be ready before next year. She has on board
her Breguet turbines. It is to be noted that the six French super-destroyers
have only French turbines. This keen competition between French yards and
turbine makers lends additional interest to the forthcoming trials, which are
expected, besides, to demonstrate to the world that France possesses anew
the speed supremacy, the most important of all strategic assets.
Both French types of turbines, that are very different in shape, con-
ditions of working, and installation on board, have, of course, their respective
qualities, the Rateaus aiming at robustness and reliability and at simplicity
in the working and controlling, permitting easy supervision and repairing.
Up to the present, if anything, superiority has been on the side of the Rateau


  p. 2355 (#1319)                      

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2355
Professional Notes
type for speed, fuel consumption, and returns for the indicated power. In
these respects the 450-ton Voltigeur, for instance, that had Rateaus, excelled
her sister ships Tirailleur (Breguets) and Chasseur (Parsons). In the
850-ton series the Breguets gave good results in the Cimeterre and Dague,
but in the matter of speed and reliability they did not quite come up to the
Parsons turbined Boulier and Casque (that exceeded 35 knots in 1913), and
Mehl, that was reputed for her speed endurance.
The turbine fight will be keener still in the torpilleurs d'escadre series.
These so-called 1,500-ton torpedo boats, thus modestly nicknamed "cats”
on the official lists, are in reality small "tigers,” equal or superior to British
flotilla leaders in armament and all-round power for mischief. In the
Italian fleet boats of the same size and power are proclaimed to be esploratori
leggeri (light scouts). Parsons turbines have here the lion share, these
being fitted in the Simoun, Sirocco (Penhoet), Bourrasque (Dunkerque),
Cyclône, and Mistral (Normand), Tempête (Nantes), and Tornade (Bor-
deaux), while Ovage Ouragan (Caen) have Rateau turbines, and the
Tramontane (Bordeaux) has Zoelly. It will be a stiff and interesting fight,
all the more so as the Parsons turbines fitted in those overgrown torpilleurs
are partly of British make and partly of French make. The Simoun and
Siocco, for instance, though constructed by the same firm (Penhoet), have
the former French-made Parsons, and the latter English-made Parsons.
Trials alone can decide as to quality, but, curiously enough, it has been re-
marked that English-made turbines, though outwardly rougher and lacking
in polished finish, turn more smoothly and noiselessly than French-made
turbines. Appearance is nothing. “The proof of the pudding is in the
eating."
The nominal motorpower of the 1,500-ton class of torpilleurs d'escadre
is 30,000 h.p., supplied by three boilers giving 210 tons of steam per hour,
against 35,000 h.p. for the 1,600-ton British Abdiels, and 30,000 h.p. for the
1,350-ton Viscount series of English destroyers; but, although trials have
not yet commenced, higher figures are being confidently announced: namely,
34,000 h.p. in the case of the Rateau-turbined boats and 36,000 h.p. in the
case of a few Parsons vessels. Boiler trials have shown that one fifth more
power may in practice be obtained above contract stipulations; in truth,
there is nothing exaggerated in 36,000 h.p. for 1,500-ton boats. It is only
right to say that robustness, speed endurance, and fighting capabilities were
the points aimed at in the French torpilleurs.
French Light Cruisers and Flotilla Leaders
The Naval and Military Record, 30 September, 1925.—The Paris Com-
mission des Essais, under Rear-Admiral Pugliesi-Conti, has arrived at
Lorient for the purpose of passing through their official trials the 2,400-ton
destroyers Tiger, built at Chantiers de Bretagne-Nantes, and Jaguar, re-
cently completed by the Lorient arsenal. Both these fine vessels have
Rateau turbines, and their preliminary trials have been successful. They
have their armament on board and are fully ready, and their wide shields,
much more conspicuous than in British destroyers, heavy gun-mountings,
and relatively big guns give an impression of cruiser-like strength. Impor-
tance attaches to these first trials of a totally new type of torpedo vessel,
as the data collected in the course of the forthcoming program of exhaustive
tests may serve to modify the designs of the 2,650-ton boats just ordered
at Caen and at Lorient. Similarly, the data gained in the 1,455-ton Simoun
will be used in the case of the four 1,500-ton boats on the point of being
ordered.
These eighteen 2,400-ton and 1,500-ton boats, if their speed capabilities
should come up to expectations, will be a good fighting investment and go
some way toward restoring France to a position of supremacy in that im-


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
portant class of flotilla units. No rival fleet, not even the British, com-
prises destroyers quite so powerful and fast at sea. Yet some divergence
of views prevails among Paris experts as to their relative merits; it is
agreed, especially among gunnery specialists, that a 1,500-ton Simoun,
carrying four 130-millimeter guns, shows for the money a superior return to
the 2,400-ton Chacal, that mounts five 130-millimeter weapons, and has the
same number (six) of 550-millimeter torpedoes (each weighing 1,600 kilos);
and it is contended it would have been wiser, for the same amount, to con-
struct three 1,500-ton units in lieu of two 2,400-tonners, especially as the
smaller vessels are, strange to note, rather superior to the larger ones in the
matter of habitability. The five boilers and Rateau turbines of the Chacal.
for instance, occupy forty meters longer space than the three boilers and
Parsons turbines of the Simoun, which means that the quarters reserved to
the crew in the last named vessel are longer by twenty meters, and this for
sixty men less than in the Chacal. The crew of the Simoun only includes
sixty-five ordinary seamen (matelots), but fifty quartier-maitres (petty
officers), twenty-four maîtres et second maitres, and seven officers. This
large number of warrant and petty officers, most of them long-service men,
provides the means to obviate, to a certain extent, the incredible instability
of crews that are perpetually being changed from one ship to another with-
out due consideration to the interests of efficiency.
What is the ideal destroyer gun? This question has not been settled by
the advent of the 130-millimeter gun, the tests of which have been successful
in the matter of range and accuracy, the power of the 5.5-inch gun (140-
millimeter) now in the service being exceeded, which means the new gun
would have a say at over 18,000 yards, all the more so as its shell with its
special caps has a weight of 80 pounds, with a good percentage of explosives
that renders it highly effective against lightly-built ships even at extreme
range. French shells are of superior quality ; war experience showed them
to be at least equal to the excellent projectiles of the Germans; and post-war
ammunition is in several respects superior to war projectiles-a result of
the strides chemical science made in recent years. So far so good, but
many gunnery experts consider the caliber of the new French destroyers
as being rather heavy and unnecessarily powerful and robust. In destroyer
actions, so fragile will be the target that it will not matter much whether
the hit is by a 5.1-inch or by a 4.7. Results in practice will be very much
the same, and what will tell will be the volume of fire and the number of
hits. Officers professing these views favor the armament of the Italian
Leones: namely, eight 4.7-inch weapons. Still, the teachings of the war.
and especially the Emden-Sydney and auxiliary cruiser duels, by no means
justify such contentions. Victory is the apanage of the bigger gun and of
the first blows, especially when speed is combined with caliber, notwith-
standing the fact that in the eyes of younger French officers the secret of
the undoing of the Germans at British hands was more in their systematic
running away than in the inferiority of their calibers.
GREAT BRITAIN
Navy Progress and Pacts
The Army-Navy and Air Force Gazette, 10 October, 1925.—The idea of
a second Washington Conference continues to be canvassed, but the project
seems no neare realization. It is often called a Bonrerence on Nayal Dis-
armament, but misarmament would be a better description to apply to some
of the objects which it is suggested the assembly, if it ever comes about,
should aim at. One suggestion is that submarines should be declared illegal
and entirely abolished. There would seem to be two strong reasons against
such a plan being agreed to. One is that the submarine is regarded as the
weapon of the weaker powers, and practically every nation in the world


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Professional Notes
would need to be consulted about such a proposal. Even if all the nations
sent delegates to a conference, and each country had a vote, it is hardly
likely that the smaller powers would accept the view of the larger ones.
Nor are the latter in agreement on this matter, for when it was put forward
at the last Conference, France's opposition to the British proposal was
sufficient to prevent its adoption. Another point which is overlooked is that
the submarine is not only used for attacking ships, whether men-of-war
or merchantmen, but for purposes of defense, intelligence, and so on. The
wider its uses, the more is it favored by the powers, even though not always
for the same reason.
Another thing hoped for by some of the advocates of a new conference
is that a limit will be placed on the number of cruisers to be built, as well
as on their size and armament. This is by no means so easy as it sounds,
for Great Britain could not with safety consent to the cruisers needed for
the protection of her far-flung trade routes being limited to a ratio de-
termined by the strength of powers who are by no means so entirely depend-
ent upon ocean supplies. Relative strength in cruisers for commerce
protection is a different thing to comparisons of battleships. At one period
in the late war, forty allied cruisers were chasing one German raider. The
Washington Conference, too, has taught us that to limit tonnage does not
necessarily have the effect hoped for. The ingenuity of the naval architect
is at once exerted to obtain an extra gun, or an extra knot's speed, on the
standard displacement, and so the competition is merely diverted into another
channel. At the moment, far-reaching results are anticipated from the
vessel which Messrs. William Denny and Brothers are to build for Turbine
Steamers, Ltd., of Glasgow, in which the steam pressure will be double
that of any existing marine installation, the step forward being spoken of
by engineers as the greatest taken since the advent of the turbine. What-
ever may be thought of the matter politically, the proposals which have
been made for a new naval conference are not only untimely, but im-
practicable.
The New Battleships
By Sir Herbert Russell, The Naval and Military Record, 23 September,
1925.-The launch of the Nelson naturally served to attract public atten-
tion to the two new battleships, of which she is the first to take the water.
The spectators at the ceremony were left to gather as much about the
vessel as their eyes could tell them. Apart from the unfamiliar and alto-
gether symmetrical arrangement of her funnels and topworks an external
view at the present stage gives no criterion to the fighting value of the
ship. The Admiralty have confined details to the admission that the new
ships will displace 35,000 tons and are 702 feet long. Since no more battle-
ships can be laid down until 1931 by the only powers which are likely even
to think of perpetuating the capital ship, the reason for this official in-
scrutability is not very clear. It is certainly "according to custom," but
there are times when custom becomes merely ridiculous.
However, there it is, and beyond the particulars of tonnage and dimen-
sions, for which we have to thank official condescension, the rest of our
knowledge (if knowledge it can be called under the circumstances) regard-
ing these ships is pui. Neculative. Most of it, indeed, has come from the
United States. ,
I imagine it is quite reasonable to assume that the description of these two
vessels as "the most formidable fighting ships in the world" is justified.
This means that in hitting power, and the quality of resisting attack from
the sea-surface, from below, or from above, they are unequalled. Their
tactical mobility is very doubtful; if it proves true that they are only en-
gined for 21 knots (and since the United States can tell us this definitely,


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it very likely is true), then they are inferior in this respect to anything built
since the Collingwood class.
But does this matter? I observe, with some surprise, an admission from
quarters whence I least expected it that these are probably the last battle-
ships that will ever be built. I observe, with some satisfaction, a résumé of
the self-same arguments I have ventured to put forward for a very con-
siderable time past as forming a reason for this conclusion. Certain didactic
writers are now laying down, with the finality of sage discovery, the very
points they were so emphatically controverting not more than a year ago.
Good luck to their sagacity-only they need not pretend to a monopoly in it!
The Nelson and the Rodney are, in fact, in a very literal sense the “last
words” of the material school. The material school argued that since the
Washington Conference allowed the United States to keep four post-Jut-
land capital ships, and Japan two, and that since we had only got the pre-
post-Jutland Hood—why, we must obviously have two more battleships
unless the 5-5-3 ratio was to be a farce. Apparently they did not realize
the possibility that it would become a farce in any case.
The material school carried its point, for the tactical school was still
musing hard, and had not made up its mind. The late Sir Percy Scott did
much to obscure clarity of thought upon this subject. His condemnation of
the battleship was on quite wrong lines—so wrong that in rebutting his con-
tentions, people forgot all about the right lines. In fact, without in the
least meaning it, he sidetracked the whole question until after the Nelson
and Rodney had been laid down and the material school had won.
Sir Percy Scott argued that the capital ship had been completely eclipsed
by the submarine and the aircraft, and that, simply on these grounds, she
was "no damned good.” Being incorrect, this contention could not prevail.
The capital ship is quite capable of very effectively taking her own part
against the submarine and the aircraft, and distinctly more so today than
she was during the war. The issue raised brought into being a very small
Percy Scott school and a very large anti-Percy Scott school. For some
time before his death the well-known Admiral had abandoned his crusade.
We need not question the perfect sincerity of his belief; the only point with
which I am concerned is the effect of the controversy upon the whole ques-
tion of the value of the battleship. By general agreement the battleship won
in this controversy, with the result that both professional and public opinion
was misled into the view that her war value was vindicated.
This is what I mean by sidetracking the essential point. Sir Percy Scott
was much too limited in his view, and, moreover, that view was a wrong
one. If, instead of taking the line that the capital ship is hopelessly out-
classed by the submarine and the aeroplane, he had raised the much broader
question of her tactical utility, I believe he would have carried a preponder-
ance of qualified opinion with him.
The Nelson and the Rodney are the most formidable sea weapons in the
world, but what are we going to do with these stupendous sledge hammers?
Send them into the Mediterranean on completion to join the lesser sledge
hammers. Both these vessels are essentially battleships. They do not
possess the high speed of the battle cruiser. They perpetuate the tradition
of the fleet action, and the necessity for the easily accessible base.
France and Italy still possess a few pre-war battleships, but they are not
maintaining these in regular commission. They have openly renounced the
intention of building any more battleships. At the Washington Conference
they reserved the right to use their ration of capital ship tonnage in such
form as might best suit their respective policies, in building, instead, cruisers,
destroyers, or submarines. Therefore, it is true to say that we are the only
naval power which now maintains a battle fleet in European waters. I take
it that there will be general agreement in the assertion that there is no
visible possibility of our employing that battle Aeet in European waters.


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Professional Notes
Bluntly put, there is nothing for it to fight. Naval war with any European
power capable of going to war on the sea at all, would resolve itself into
purely defensive tactics on the part of the opponent, coupled with the em-
ployment of all available resources to attack our trade.
We might, and probably should, respond by attempting a close blockade.
Battleships are not a suitable type of warship for blockade service under
modern conditions, especially when there are no enemy battleships left to
blockade. The form of war I am visualizing would demand cruisers, de-
stroyers, and submarines in overwhelming numbers. It would be a form
of war without the possibility of a decisive fleet action; in fact, it would
be eminently a war of attrition. Battleships might, indeed, be used to bom-
bard enemy ports. I say "might," but I should certainly hesitate to say
"would.” Defensive tactics would foresee and provide against such an
obvious contingency. We never attempted to bombard the German ports,
not because the High Seas fleet lay within them: that fact would have been
a direct incentive to do so had it not been for other considerations which
combined to make it too risky a project altogether.
The "strategical zone" now lies in the Pacific, because it is in that ocean
that the only other two battle fleets of the world are concentrated. Ten
years hence Singapore will be completed, and then we can send our battle
fleet into the Pacific if we want to. It is true that we could send it to
Australia forthwith were there any necessity, but there is no naval repair-
ing base in Australia capable of dealing with battleship defects, and, stra-
tegically, a fleet based on any Australian port, or ports, would not be
favorably placed.
These two new battleships will have cost the nation between thirteen and
fourteen millions by the time they are finished. Of course, it is too late
now for regrets or reproaches, but do not let us be misled by heroic talk
about the magnificent addition to British sea power. These ships are a
legacy from the unreasoning progressive doctrine of the material school.
That doctrine was obscured by the mistaken controversy started by the late
Sir Percy Scott. The tactical school, not then clear as to the perspective of
the late war, did not raise its voice. It is raising is voice now, and the
material school is not pressing its answer.
To say that we were obliged to build these two ships so as to keep level
with the United States and Japan is one of those truths by which it is
often sought to justify a blunder. The Washington Conference proved
abortive of designed result because the politicians did most of the talking,
and the technical experts resented the idea of dictatorship altogether. If
the battleship is no longer of visible tactical value to ourselves, she is even
less so to the United States and Japan, which are faced with very wide
ocean distances in their every strategical outlook. I admit it is not a pleas-
ing prospect to any country to feel that a hundred million pounds' worth of
perfectly good warships have gone out of fashion, but the development of
war methods takes no account of the cost of weapons. In the Napoleonic
wars naval victories were won by fleets of the line. In the Great War the
fleets of the line only met once in four years, and then by accident. We
have been treated to a lot of academic talk about the decisive influence of
silent pressure, most of which is academic rubbish. War means fighting,
not glaring across a deserted ocean from behind boom defenses. Principles
remain, but methods change radically. In Nelson's day the ship-of-the-line
was built to fight the enemy, and was pretty sure to fight him, because he
was building a corresponding vessel for the purpose. Today the battleship
is built simply because the three great sea powers are all waiting, one for
the other, to cry halt! And since the United States is too busy debt col-
lecting to attend to the matter, we might very well call another naval con-
ference ourselves.


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British Navy's Needs and the Mosul Issue
By Hector C. Bywater, The Baltimore Sun, 30 October, 1925.—London,
October 8.—Britain's firm stand against Turkey in the Mosul dispute is
widely attributed to her interest in the oil fields of that section. Foreign
critics ridicule the suggestion that her attitude is in any way dictated by
considerations of honor or sentiment. They make light of the Colonial
Secretary's reminder that Britain has solemnly pledged her protection to
the Arab populace of Irak, who would be exposed to the vindictive fury of
the Turk if that protection were withdrawn.
It is oil and oil alone that keeps the British in Irak, these critics declare,
and the pretense that any other motive weighs with them is sheer humbug.
French journalists, in particular, appear to know so much more about
the hidden mainsprings of British policy than British statesmen do them-
selves that it would be useless to argue with them on this question. It is,
however, a curious phenomenon that France (according to French writers)
should be the only country in the world whose foreign policy is free from
sordid aims.
The Paris newspapers discovered long ago that Britain was exploiting
her mandate in Irak for the purpose of consolidating her naval supremacy.
In lengthy articles they prove, to their own satisfaction, that the future
existence of British sea power is more or less dependent on the oil fields
of Mosul. If the Turks regained possession of that territory all the British
Admiralty's plans for building up a war reserve of oil fuel would fall to
the ground, and the very integrity of the empire would be threatened.
Echoes of this argument are heard even in the American press. It may
therefore be opportune to examine the matter from a naval point of view.
Since the British feet now consists almost exclusively of oil-burning
vessels, the provision of adequate oil supplies in war has become a problem
of capital importance. At one period of the World War the oil reserve be-
came dangerously low. It was the rule that this reserve should be sufficient
for five or six months, yet in the spring of 1917 there was barely enough oil
left to supply the fleet for eight weeks, and orders had to be issued forbid-
ding ships to steam at high speed except in cases of the utmost urgency.
For a few months the situation was extremely grave, for German sub-
marines were sinking tankers by the score. Eventually the crisis was over-
come by furnishing more destroyers for escort duty through the danger
zone, and by the expedient of bringing in oil in the double bottoms of
merchantmen coming from American ports.
This lesson has not been forgotten. In 1919 the British cabinet authorized
the creation of an Admiralty oil reserve at home, to be completed in 1929.
It was further decided to establish a series of fueling stations along the
main ocean routes, at points such as Sierra Leone, the Cape of Good Hope,
the Falkland Islands, Jamaica, Gibraltar, Malta, Hongkong, Rangoon, and
Singapore. Owing, however, to recent retrenchment in the navy budget,
this work is proceeding rather slowly, and it will be years before the scheme
is complete.
But it is one thing to create a chain of navy oil depots, stretching from
England to the farthest confines of the empire, and quite another to insure
that they shall be kept filled under all circumstances. Fundamentally the
problem is one of supply rather than distribution.
Let us suppose Great Britain had to fight a strong continental adversary
whose naval power was centered in the Mediterranean. Many strategists
are convinced that in such an event the British battle fleet would be driven
out of the Mediterranean by the swarms of mosquito craft let loose against
it. Be that as it may, it is certain that British ships would be in constant
peril of attack by submarine, torpedo boat, airplane, or cruiser, while voyag-
ing from Gibraltar to the Suez Canal or vice versa.


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Professional Notes
Even for men-of-war the Mediterranean route would be highly dangerous;
for merchantmen it would be impossible. We have only to recall what
happened there during the late war to appreciate the truth of this proposi-
tion. At no time did Germany and Austria have more than eight or nine
submarines operating simultaneously in those waters, and to cope with these
marauders the Allies employed practically the entire naval strength of
France and Italy, supported by strong contingents of British and Japanese
patrol craft. Yet, to the very end of the struggle, the Mediterranean re-
mained unsafe, the losses suffered in that area being by far the heaviest
in proportion to the volume of shipping.
In the hypothetical war we are considering British merchantmen would
certainly be debarred from using the Mediterranean. This means that all
traffic to and from the East would have to be diverted to the Cape route.
Tankers bringing oil from the Persian Gulf to England would have a voyage
of some 11,500 miles, which could hardly be covered in less than six weeks.
If the British Navy had to depend on this precarious line of supply it would
be in a bad way, indeed.
In the circumstances pictured the oil wells of Irak would be a factor
of quite negligible importance. The navy would have to import most of
its oil from America, as it did in the last war.
If, on the other hand, Britain's next conflict is to be staged in the Far
East, the oil resources of Irak would naturally be of much greater value-
provided they were accessible and secure, which they would not be if Turkey
saw fit to make trouble. All things considered, however, the value of the
Mosul oil fields as a British naval asset in time of war is decidedly prob-
lematical.
The whole question of fuel supply is naturally one of paramount con-
cern to the British naval authorities. With the transition from coal to oil
the navy has become dependent upon outside sources for its very means of
movement. Ten years ago the major part of the fleet was still composed of
coal-burning ships. Today there are only five capital ships which use solid
fuel. As all the remaining vessels, from battleships to destroyers and sub-
marines, consume oil only, any failure in the supply would inevitably
paralyze the entire fleet.
For a protracted war the largest reserve that could be accumulated and
stored in time of peace would prove inadequate. It follows, therefore, that
the uninterrupted arrival of fresh supplies from abroad would be absolutely
vital to the maintenance of British sea power in a future conflict. Hence
the government's anxiety to develop every possible source of oil production,
both inside and outside the Empire.
We are, therefore, justified in concluding that the petroleum fields around
Mosul are responsible in some degree for the government's decision to hold
on to Irak, although, for the reasons outlined above, it is difficult to believe
that oil is the sole motive, or even the dominant motive, behind their policy
in that region.
The Airship Controversy
The Naval and Military Record, 30 September, 1925.—That the disaster
to the United States airship Shenandoah would result in a revival of the
airship controversy was inevitable. Thus far, however, we have come
across nothing new in the contributions to the familiar arguments. The
disciples of the dirigible are asking us not to infer too much from the loss
of the Shenandoah. They point out that she was a comparatively old craft,
that her design was not well suited to resisting any sudden stress, and that
this has been much improved upon in the latest examples. An attempt is


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made to demonstrate that she should never have been caught in the dis-
astrous storm at all, and that had the meteorologists really known their
business she might easily have avoided it. Such an argument appeals to
us as the last ditch of defense. Although the course of big storm depres-
sions may be followed with reasonable accuracy, the atmosphere is always
liable to sudden local disturbances-particularly in cyclonic parallels—which
no degree of meteorological vigilance can forestall.
The mere admission that an airship must be shepherded by meteorologists
amounts to a confession of inherent defect. If it were not for the weather
she would be a perfect form of flying machine. But the “if" is such a
tremendous and insuperable one as to defy effective answer. What happened
in the case of the Shenandoah has happened before, and will happen again
so long as the airship remains in existence. It was not wholly on account
of their military vulnerability that the Germans withdrew their zeppelins.
One of the biggest airship raids over London ever planned ended in the total
destruction of half a dozen of these craft over various parts of France in
consequence of a sudden and unexpected northerly gale. One correspondent
states that although the zeppelins were not of much use for land operations,
they proved of the "utmost value" to the German Navy. It would be inter-
esting to know on what material evidence this opinion rests. Did airships
operating with the German fleet ever do anything which aeroplanes could
not have accomplished very much more effectively?
JAPAN
A Peace Protest from Tokyo
From the Japan Times and Mail (Tokyo English-language daily).
weekly edition, August 26.—The Living Age, 17 October, 1925.—The Great
Pacific War, by Hector Bywater, will be long discussed in all parts of the
world. It, in brief, depicts Japan and America at war in 1931 ; the war
lasts for two years and results in a. drawn fight. Japan, in the book, is
awarded the role of aggressor and picks a quarrel with the greatest, richest,
most powerful, and most advanced of the nations that are making their
imprint on the civilization of today. The whole thing is purely imaginary,
and in many an instance is utter nonsense.
For example, why should this empire fight at all? If she must, why pick
on the rich and powerful United States, which has friends all over the hem
of the Pacific Ocean? Why commit economic suicide right from the start
by quarreling with Japan's best customer? There are many other ridiculous
assumptions, but to deal with them all is impossible because of the limitations
of space.
This talk of an "inevitable" conflict between the Rising Sun and the Stars
and Stripes has been permitted too much latitude; and, strange to say, this
talk has come mostly from war-torn and semiprostrate Europe, suggesting,
it would seem, that the wish is father to the thought.
Three years or so ago, The Aeroplane, a British publication, had an
article by C. G. Grey, editor of that periodical, which contained the
following:
"In the light of Japan's equipping a great army and a great navy with
adequate flying services, it is necessary to consider how and where they are
likely to be used. The enemy is the United States and there is never any
difficulty in finding cause for war if the two nations are fated to fight.
"If a fight comes at all, it must come soon. The best opinion in Great
Britain places the date of a Japanese-American war at the beginning of
1924, for by then the Japanese war forces will be ready."
That year was selected because it was supposed to be a "fighting” year,
popular superstition making out that Japan was fated to fight in every


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Professional Notes
year which contained the figure four. These self-important alarmist pub-
licists argued thus : Japan had a war in 1894; when 1904 came round she
was fighting again; then in 1914 she declared hostilities against the Central
Powers; so in 1924 she must again fight.
That year has passed; there was no fight of any sort, and the only talk
of war came from unthinking jingoes and half-baked publicists. Now the
latest date set by the great Hector Bywater is 1931. Perhaps the United
States and Japan are going to be hectored into a war by a fighter on paper
who, within the walls of a narrow newspaper office, sees, amid the dis-
coloring smoke emerging from a pipe that badly needs attention, visions
of gas, of planes, and of armadas churning the waters of the ocean into
fury and strewing the seas with the dead and the dying.
While Japan feels intensely the smart inflicted by America's recent im-
migration law, no one with any sense of reasoning or proportion thinks of
war. The East is not slow to learn, even if Europe is too old now to do
so; and while Europe, with her everlasting war mentality and barrack room
diplomacy, sees only the red of the battlefield and the "keen edge of the
sword"-Lord Birkenhead's very recent words—as the final arbitrament of
international disputes, neither Japan nor the United States cares to do so.
In April this year, Yusho Kumamoto, who had been in constant corre-
spondence with the late M. Camille Flammarion, famous French astronomer,
foretold "by the stars” that next year or the year after next some corner
of Asia Minor, probably Mesopotamia, will be the starting point of a war
that will ultimately engulf all Europe. To the man in the street, Kuma-
moto's forecast is much more probable than that of Bywater, and as one
reads the daily news, remembers the condition of Europe today and the
rivalries of the powers in the Near East, one feels that his prophecy is
far more probable than Bywater's.
There are the Mosul sore, the defiance of the Arabs, the desire of
Russia to press southward to the sea in that part of the world, the growing
distrust of the Balfour Zionist policy-to mention just a few of the acutest
sore points.
Count Michimasa Soyejima, not so very long ago, hinted that the next
war in the Far East would again see Japan engaged in a tussle with the
Russian Bear. These are all mere guesses, but these speculations command
far more respect than the devilish drivel of Hector Bywater.
Our contemporary, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, is inclined to believe that
certain British publicists and politicians would actually rejoice if the United
States and Japan could be made to come to grips. We do not believe that
this is the considered opinion of the best minds of Japan or of Great Britain,
but we do think that a law prohibiting people from writing nonsense that
might possibly cause other nations to collide, and providing for corporal
chastisement if the law be violated, should be enacted.
Sowers of racial and international discord ought to be punished with the
utmost rigor, for these are the ones that are responsible for the organized
loot, murder, rapine, and moral and material degradation that follows wars,
after the bubble of "glory" has vanished.
Mr. Bywater is a well-known anti-Japanese writer. He suffers from a
distinct anti-Japanese bias. Let us remember that while we read the book.
Let us also remember that wars today are fought largely by the powers of
economics, not merely by that of force. The economic situation of the
world is such that a large scale war is sheer nonsense; much more so a war
between the United States and Japan, which would let loose, not only
national passions, but also race hatreds that would bring fearful reper-
cussions from Peking to Port Said, from Malakka to Mombasa, and from
Bombay to Bordeaux and Buenos Aires.


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There will be no war between Japan and the United States either in 1931
or later, Bywaters and Morning Post Bathursts to the contrary notwith-
standing. These two countries, the greatest and the youngest on the
Pacific and the most advanced in the vanguard of present day civilization,
will set the world an example that sweet reasonableness is far better than
Birkenhead's "keen edge of the sword,” and can always be relied upon to
straighten the gnarled knots that every country at one time or another
experiences.
The attention of all Europe, and in a sense of the world, is now focused
on the efforts being made by Europe to struggle toward a better order of
living, and the Security Pact is regarded as the best method to reach that
goal considering the past history of Europe, her more recent history during
and since the Great War, and the hates that unfortunately teem in the
unhappy old world continent. When seriously examined, there does not
appear to be any compelling reason to think that the present effort will be
successful where previous ones have failed.
What the pact proposes to do is this. France is to be guaranteed abso-
lute security from German aggression, and, if Germany ever repeats her
performance of 1870 or 1914, Great Britain will be bound to go to France's
assistance. But Germany in her present state is absolutely powerless to
defend herself if attacked, let alone to invade the territories of the greatest
military power in Europe. So Britain, in the interests of peace, proposes
to guarantee the inviolability of the frontiers of Germany as well as those
of France. But will these arrangements permanently stop war in Europe?
Those who have considered the question carefully have little hope that
they will. Mr. Garvin, the well-known editor of the London Observer,
in a recent issue of his paper, comes to the conclusion that a pact concluded
now would be utterly valueless in a few years, owing to the development of
new forces in Europe and especially in Central Europe. The pact to be
concluded now proceeds on the assumption that Germany is disarmed, and
will be so forever. It is, however, impossible to keep any country in that
state forever. Mr. Garvin writes:
"For future purposes you cannot disarm the Germans unless you knock
out their brains. You cannot stop thought and research. You cannot pre-
vent them from making tremendous progress in civil aviation and gaining a
national faculty and aptitude which could be rapidly turned to war purposes
if their chance ever came. You cannot prevent them from knowing at
least as much about chemical warfare as any of the armed nations. If we
think out the probabilities of the next twenty years, we must recognize that
there is bound some day to exist again throughout Europe a tolerable equality
either of disarmament or rearmament."
In addition to the impossibility of securing the lasting disarmament of
Germany, there is the growth in her population. While the population of
Germany is increasing by leaps and bounds, that of France is stationary. In
another generation, Germany will have far greater man power than any
other European nation. Other causes of war are also present. The close
of the Great War saw the rise of a group of small states in eastern Europe,
known as the Little Entente. These states, armed to the teeth, are the close
allies of France, and are extremely suspicious of Germany on the one side
and of Russia on the other. They, even more than France, want to see
Germany disarmed and dismembered forever. They are against the pro-
posed union of the German population of Austria with that of Germany
proper. The movement for German consolidation is, however, very strong
and is alone sufficient, if unreasonably provoked by opposing nations, to be
the germ of a new war.
Mr. Garvin believes that the present pacts and alliances are all alike tem-
porary bridges. They will be superseded, he thinks, by larger and more


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solid things. "The League itself is as yet an inadequate and incomplete
structure," he writes, "and the full League of Nations will be achieved in
time to save Europe's future.”
The future this school of thought conceives, however, is unfortunately
only the future of Europe. Those who follow this line of thought are
anxious to consolidate the nations of Europe, because they feel certain, as
is shown by the implication of their words rather than by the direct words
themselves, that a trial of strength is bound to take place between the white
and the colored nations if things are allowed to drift in the manner which
European nations allowed before and after the Great War.
Thus it is obviously clear that the probabilities of war in Europe are far
greater than of a struggle between Japan and the United States. Bywater
would have done the continent in which he is fated to have his being a
service if he had written a book on The Next European War, pointing out
the festering sores, and enabling the peoples, if not the statesmen of Europe,
to take such measures as will avert the snuffing out of Europe if she again
forgets sense and sanity and butchers herself to pieces in a welter of fiery
hatred.
Mr. Garvin shows a comprehension of this wider aspect of the problem
of European peace when he says that "Asiatic changes by themselves may
well make it advisable for America to cooperate with the rest of white
civilization.”
But, in our opinion, no pact or league that aims at preserving only the
peace of Europe, or peace among the white nations of the world, can have
any value in preserving the real peace of the world. A real League of
Nations, if it is to achieve something substantial, must not only include the
peoples of Europe, or the stronger powers, but must be thoroughly repre-
sentative of all the peoples of the world.
America, Let's Reason Together
By Honorable Daikichiro Tagawa, from the Japan Times and Mail
(Tokyo English-language daily), weekly edition, 26 August, The Living
Age, 17 October, 1925.-[The author, who has held high official posts in
his country, is the leading Christian publicist of Japan.)
I regret for the sake of both Japan and the United States that I should
have to write this article. I do not, however, think that the consequences
of the Immigration Law so far as they have been manifested are very
profound or even grave. Commercially no serious consequences on the
whole have yet been produced by the legislation, as may be seen from the
fact that Japan's imports from the United States during the last seven
months of 1924, immediately following the enactment of that law, and
despite the recent imposition of a "luxury tax" discouraging the purchase
of foreign goods in our country, nevertheless amounted to $143,000,000, as
compared with $146,000,000 the previous year.
When the Immigration Law was enacted the Japanese people were said
to be seriously indignant, and a movement to boycott American goods was
started, but the boycott did not last long. Although later the government
imposed the 100 per cent tariff mentioned on luxuries, the imports of such
articles mainly from the United States did not decrease to any appreciable
extent as compared with the corresponding period in 1923.
These facts do not mean, however, that the Immigration Law has not
made a very unhappy impression upon the Japanese. I do not wish to say
that this impression cannot be overcome, but the truth is that the feeling
of Japan toward the Americans has certainly not improved. This statement
might be confirmed by much evidence, but it is only necessary to say that if
Japan were to consider any nation her enemy it would be the United States.


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This does not mean at all that the Japanese are ready to fight the Americans ;
there are few reckless enthusiasts who would cry for war, but it does mean
that a sentiment is entertained among many Japanese that the United States
is the only country that might turn into an enemy.
This sentiment is due not only to the Immigration Law but also to other
causes. Among these I may mention the following:
1. The Monroe Doctrine.
2. America's withdrawal from the League of Nations.
3. America's attitude toward China.
American militarism.
5. The Gentlemen's Agreement, which Japan was compelled to make.
6. The Navy Limitation Conference.
7. The feeling that Christian ideals are not as prevalent in the United
States as they are represented to be.
My observation is that all these causes work together to make the
Japanese fear that the Americans cannot be relied upon. Even before the
enactment of the Immigration Law the Japanese had long felt that the
Americans could not be trusted, because they were not real lovers of peace,
but rather selfish and arbitrary, and this sentiment has been confirmed by
the law in question.
The Immigration Law was therefore not the only cause for this un-
fortunate change of sentiment. Had it been for that reason alone, the
Japanese would hardly have been driven to such hostile feelings as were
exhibited at the time of the passing of the law. In fact, these other causes
are responsible mainly for the present hostile sentiment entertained by the
Japanese toward the Americans.
I do not mean to say that all Japanese people understand clearly the
reasons for the above mentioned prejudices. The masses of the people
do not know what the Monroe Doctrine is, nor what is the character of
the League of Nations. On the whole very little attention is paid by most
Japanese to these questions, but they have some vague ideas about them.
They understand that the Monroe Doctrine is a policy peculiar to the
United States, aiming at domination over the South American states. This
may not be given expression in so many words, but this is what they think.
At the same time that the United States does not like any other country
to encroach upon what is supposed to be her own sphere of influence through
her capitalistic power, she is constantly watching other countries with an
eye of jealousy and suspicion.
The Japanese further understand that although the United States wants
to maintain such a policy over the South American states, at the same
time she is energetically extending her influence over the Far East and the
South Seas—that is to say, over China and the Philippines. If the Monroe
Doctrine be justifiable on account of geographical conditions, a similar
doctrine ought to be applicable to the Far East and the South Seas. Other
powers might not recognize such an application, but the United States at
least should. She does not, however, recognize a Monroe Doctrine for
China, an “Asia for the Asiatics," nor does she admit of a similar right
for the Philippines, but is trying to compete with all the other powers while
at the same time insisting that the Monroe Doctrine be respected for
America.
Many Japanese think that America's withdrawal from the League of
Nations is a conclusive evidence of her selfishness. The League was first
proposed by her own President, the late Mr. Wilson. Other powers at first
hesitated, but later joined him in appreciation of his noble ideal. They did
so, not because they themselves thoroughly understood the plan, but rather
because they thought that the United States was fully prepared to uphold


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Professional Notes
and develop the League which had been proposed by her own President,
representing as they thought the nation. But quite unaccountably the
United States withdraw, and so they think that she is unreliable in inter-
national dealings. They therefore think that America is a nation that does
not respect international interests or obligations for mutual cooperation.
The Washington Conference was another instance. They think that the
United States did not propose such a conference for the peace of the
world, nor of the Pacific, but for the purpose of destroying Japan's influence
over China. She persuaded Great Britain to force a disadvantageous ratio
upon the Japanese navy. The Americans are always trying to injure
Japan's interests, and to prevent her. from increasing her national power.
Such is the prevailing sentiment among the Japanese public.
Later on, the Americans gave great assistance to Japan at the time of the
earthquake, but the favorable impressions made thereby upon the Japanese
people were largely lost by the passing of the Immigration Law with its
"exclusion clause."
I admit frankly that various misconceptions color the observations and
sentiments which we now see among the Japanese. They are ignorant of
the facts; they are not sufficiently careful. They often lack fair judgment
and sound understanding, but the real problem is, what is to be done about
it, and my answer is as follows:
1. I think that the Immigration Law which absolutely excludes the
Japanese ought to be revised at once. Even if the law is revised so as to
admit Japanese immigrants according to the same quota as the Europeans,
the number of such Japanese immigrants would be only 146 a year. Through
such a small number of Japanese immigrants, American civilization, morale,
and labor could suffer little harm. Moreover, such revision would have the
great advantage of showing the Japanese that they were treated in the
same way as Europeans, and so of mitigating their antipathy to America.
By such a revision the Americans would gain much and lose nothing.
2. I think also that the United States ought to revise her Naturalization
Law in such a manner as to give the Japanese the right to obtain American
citizenship. My own opinion is that the Naturalization Law affects the
relations between Japan and the United States more seriously than the
Immigration Law does. I sincerely hope that, by the simultaneous revision
of the Immigration and the Naturalization Laws, the Japanese who want to
live in the United States permanently will be enabled to enjoy an American
life and become truly loyal citizens of the United States. I think there
are a large number of Japanese now resident in the United States who
would apply for citizenship if the law were revised.
3. In addition to the revision of these laws, it is my opinion that the
United States ought to admit Chinese immigrants and also give them citizen-
ship. If the United States continues to exclude the Chinese and deny them
citizenship, even if she changes her policy regarding the Japanese I do not
think the Japanese will welcome the revision of the laws for themselves
alone. In my view the United States is not fair in giving a discriminative
treatment to a certain nation or race as such, and hence my belief that the
Chinese should have the same treatment as the Japanese when the laws are
revised.
I hope that the revision of the Immigration Law and the Naturalization
Law will be made at an early date. If that is done, Japanese-American
relations will improve. At the same time we must remember that the
present sentiment which the Japanese have in regard to the Americans is
not exclusively due to the Immigration Law. Apart from the law in
question, the sentiment of respect and confidence among the Japanese toward
the Americans has been cooling down for many years. So long as this
attitude continues, the Japanese may find an opportunity to blame the


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Americans for something or other independently of the Immigration Law.
They will argue:
1. The United States withdrew from the League of Nations, which her
own representative had proposed.
2. The United States, in spite of her Monroe Doctrine, is extending her
influence over China and the Philippines.
3. The United States, while severely criticizing the European states
and Japan for their folly in keeping up expensive armaments, herself ex-
pends a great deal for her own armaments.
I might mention many other reasons, but these three alone will be suffi-
cient to show how inconsistent is the American national policy. The United
States is no longer considered a country of justice. Her policy is guided
by prejudice and self interest. The Americans do not care for the interests
of other nations or races, and their attitude is often unjust and arbitrary
Such is a common charge brought against the Americans, and I do not think
this criticism is peculiar to the Japanese, but rather that it is common among
the world public. Even I myself often find it extremely difficult to defend
the Americans against these charges. Such suspicion and censure against
the Americans are now widespread among the Japanese, and that sentiment
will inevitably find expression in action sooner or later. I had such appre-
hensions even before the enactment of the Immigration Law. Apart from
that legislation, international harmony between Japan and America has
long been strained.
The Japanese are rather simple-minded. When Commodore Perry first
knocked at the doors of the country for international intercourse, followed
by a host of Christian missionaries who preached justice and love, the
Japanese had no hesitation in believing that America was a nation of peace,
justice and love. This simple belief, however, has evidently been undermined
during the last sixty years by American actions quite at variance with these
noble ideals. The Americans, they say, have acted often in opposition to
peace, justice, and love, so that the Japanese who had placed unconditional
confidence in them have been sadly disappointed, not to say angered. The
remedy for these evils must be fundamental.
1. Some Japanese regard the United States as a Christian nation, but
American politics and diplomacy often depart from Christian principles and
doctrine.
2. Everyone admits that Christian justice and ideals are very noble and
elevated, but many Christians lack Christian character and superior per-
sonality. There is often a wide gap between words and deeds. The Ameri-
cans say that they are a Christian nation, but is there not danger of seeming
to imply by this that all Americans are Christians?
I sincerely hope that my American readers will listen with patience to
these frank words of counsel. While sending them this message, I, myself
a Japanese, examine myself carefully and speak to my fellow nationals as
follows:
1. I regret that Japan has sent so many emigrants ignorant of the
English language and American customs and thoughts. This was a very
great mistake, committed at the outset carelessly by the Japanese Government.
2. In case the Immigration Law is revised in such a manner as to admit
Japanese immigrants,—146, according to quota,-I think it necessary to
train Japanese properly before allowing them to go abroad. In the old days a
Japanese mother, when sending her daughter in marriage, used to teach
her that she should try to assimilate the traditional customs and manners
of the family she was to enter and should fully determine not to return
to her old home under any circumstances. Such ought to be the principle
to guide future emigrants.


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Professional Notes
3. One might ask, did militarism originate in America to be followed by
Europe and Japan, or did it originate in Europe and Japan to be followed
by America ? I do not think it right to blame the United States alone for
her militarism. In this respect, also, the Japanese must take full respon-
sibility.
4. It cannot be doubted that the spirit and purpose of the Washington
Conference were genuine. As one result of that Conference, Japan has not
needed to increase her taxes, although neither has she reduced them. It is
foolish and shallow-minded of some Japanese to censure the United States
on account of the Washington Conference. I am extremely ashamed of
such Japanese.
5. In the fiscal year ending March, 1924, Japan decided upon a naval
budget for the construction of auxiliary warships, amounting to 368,860,000
yen, spread over a period of five years. Since the Washington Conference,
no other power which participated in it has made any such similar plan. I
sincerely regret that Japan alone should have violated the principle of the
Conference by such expansion of the navy.
6. I was very sorry that some representative Christians in Japan should
have advanced the view that American missionaries ought to go home, when
in the United States ever since the promulgation of the Immigration Law
the representatives of American Christians have consistently protested
against the law and exerted their best efforts for its revision. I was sorry
I could not stop the movement against the American missionaries.
Many Japanese, therefore, do believe that the Americans are an egoistic
nationalthough there are exceptions like former Ambassador Woods, and
numerous fair-minded and faithful Christian workers. As the Japanese
are equally egoistic, there is danger of collision between the two unless
they control and humble themselves. Such self-control will be necessary,
not only for the two countries, but also for the world at large. Japan
ought to be on her guard, and the United States, too, against egoism. For
this purpose the Christians in both countries ought to exert the utmost
efforts; the opportunity is unique in history.
The Japanese Christians are small in number as well as in influence.
Nor is the United States a Christian nation entirely. I think the relations
between the two countries will improve when Christians, both Japanese and
American, evangelize more widely among their own people and gain a
wider influence. Then the Immigration Law will lose its raison d'être as a
matter of course.
The Immigration Law may be considered to have produced one good
result if on its account the people in both countries recognize the need of
deeper introspection and of giving up egoistic prejudice; of manifesting a
true Christian spirit and of helping each other in the maintenance of peace
on the Pacific and in the world at large. The legislation in question will
then bring about good fruit instead of grave consequences. It will entirely
depend upon our own efforts whether the consequences will be bad or good.
I pray to God that He may help us to work toward this great ideal and to
accomplish what lies nearest to the heart of all sincere Christians in every
land-namely, the peace of the world.


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V. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
UNITED STATES
VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, UNITED STATES NAVY-PROGRESS AS
OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1925.-Official Bulletin.
Type
Number and
Name
Contractor
Per cent of Completion
Oct. 1, 1925
Total 1 On Ship
Probable
date of
Comple-
tion
12, 15/26
| 114 1/26
1215/26
| 4/ 1/26
AIRPLANE CARRIERS
Lexington ...... Beth. SB Corp. (Fore River). I
Saraloga....... New York S.B. Corp........ 71.2 70.6
AUXILIARIES
Holland ....... | Puget Sound Navy Yard.... 77.5 74.8
SUBMARINES
S-47.......... Elect. Boat Co. (Quincy).... Comm. 9/16/25
FLEET SUBMARINES
V-2 (SF5)...... Portsmouth Navy Yd. Comm. 9/26/25
V-3 (SF6).....
Portsmouth Navy Yd..
86. 1 84.8
V-4 (SM1)..... Portsmouth Navy Yd..
16.6 L 14.6
V-5 (SC1).....
Portsmouth Navy Yd.
V-6 (SC2). .... Mare Island Navy Yd.
2/
4
1/26
1/27
1
.
Authorized but not under construction or contract-
Authorized by Act of August 29, 1916. No funds as yet provided.
Destroyers (12) Nos. 348-359.
Transport (i) No. 2.
Fleet Submarines (3) Nos. 169-171.
Neff Submarine (1) No. 108.
Authorized by Act of December 18, 1925. Funds have been provided by
the Act of March 4, 1925, for starting construction of two of the Light
Cruisers and all six Gunboats.
Light Cruisers (8) Nos. 24-31.
River Gunboats (6) Nos. 43-48.
The Air Board Personnel
Aviation, 5 October, 1925.—The newspapers have given a large amount
of space to hearings before the President's Air Board, but they have not
told the air people what they really want to know. The question that is
invariably asked is as to the possibility of this committee's report being
reactionary or whitewashing. If an observer at the hearings with the
point of view of airmen can be relied on, the work of the committee will
be neither.
Consider the personnel of the committee first. Eight are Republicans,
one Democrat. That fact precludes any severe cross examination of mem-
bers of the administration. But by the same reasoning, it puts on the
members the responsibility of framing an air policy for the government
which the President can recommend, the public approve, and Congress
accept. Of course, such an ideal outcome is not possible, as will be seen
from other facts concerning the committee. As a political move, made at
a time when the country was aghast at Colonel Mitchell's assaults on the
War and Navy Departments it has proved to be a great success. To Sec-
retary of War Davis will go the credit.


  p. 2371 (#1335)                      

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Professional Notes
Another very important point to be noted about the committee is that all
opinions appear to be represented. So set and diverse are these at first
glance, it would appear almost a hopeless task for the members ever to
agree on any program.
There is Dwight W. Morrow of J. P. Morgan and Company, a financier
who admits that his knowledge of aviation has been limited to what he has
read and heard. There is Judge Arthur C. Denison of Grand Rapids,
Michigan, who pleads guilty to no knowledge of aviation except what he has
acquired during the hearings.
Judge Denison at first was the man of mystery. His fellow-members
waxing confidential immediately prior to the opening hearing could not
understand why the President had named the Judge as a member of their
board. They learned the reason.
Judge Denison, according to members of his profession, possesses one
of the keenest legal minds on the Federal bench. On many occasions during
the inquiry he has been able to clear up a vague or technically involved reply
from a witness by putting a simple question, usually through Chairman
Morrow.
It is Morrow's position that has lent the hearings almost the same dignity
and atmosphere of importance that would have prevailed had the President
himself taken the chair. Morrow has been the chief executive's friend since
college days. That, coupled with his recognized ability and his financial
connections, has established the entire investigation as beyond the general
run of such hearings,
Senator Bingham is the only pilot on the board. He was a trained
civilian aviator before the war, became a colonel and organized the flying
training schools, then served in France, and came home to win his present
position as one of the political figures of the country. During the last
summer, the Senator flew on a tour of inspection of the military and naval
flying fields. On his return he called upon the President.
He is looked upon as a sort of special prosecutor, representing the chief
executive and the general public. The old generals and admirals recognize
in him their best informed opponent on the board. They have read his
vitriolic attacks against them in his book, An Explorer in the Air Service.
The majority of flying men accept his idea of creating air branches having
the same status as the Marine Corps.
Another aviation expert on the board is Howard Coffin, of Detroit, presi-
dent of the National Air Transport. It was Coffin who conducted the
industrial survey in 1916 which resulted in the formation of the Council
of National Defense. He has repeatedly devoted his time and parts of his
large personal fortune to the development of Federal aviation.
Coffin was the first president and principal supporter of the National
Aeronautic Association and has sponsored many attempts to put over avia-
tion in a practical manner. He is an enthusiastic exponent of air power
as the great national asset in war or peace.
While those two members of the board are looked upon as opposing the
present system in military and naval affairs, there are two other members
of the board whose presence cheers the advocates of the present policy-
Major General James G. Harbord, retired, and Rear Admiral Frank F.
Fletcher, retired.
General Harbord, now president of the Radio Corporation of America,
exhibits a kindly attitude toward the general staff and the military system
he understands so thoroughly. When Harbord was Assistant Chief of Staff
under General Pershing he investigated Mitchell and found him not to his
liking. The Harbord-Mitchell relations have developed into one of the
many personal feuds that are bobbing up in the course of the hearings.
Admiral Fletcher is a battleship man by training and experience. He is
considered one of the best officers ever retired from the service. He was one


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(Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
of the relatively few rear admirals to win the post as commander of the
fleet. Therefore the Navy has a friend on the board whom it can trust to
preserve its interests.
Besides Chairman Morrow and Judge Denison three others may be
classified as neutrals—with reservations. Dr. William F. Durand is presi-
dent of the Society of Mechanical Engineers and a member of the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics composed of Army, Navy, and civilian
technical specialists.
The Air Service enthusiasts say that Dr. Durand has always been a
sincere believer in the big navy idea, which would place him with the
advocates of the present policy.
The same is true of the two Congressmen on the board. Representative
Carl Vinson of Georgia is a Democrat and a member of the House Naval
Affairs Committee. He was chosen so that he may guide his party col-
leagues when the findings of this board go before Congress for action. He
ranks as a thorough examiner into all questions affecting the national de-
fense. At times he betrays no little irritation at the implication of witnesses
that conditions might be better were Congress to appropriate more money.
Representative James S. Parker of Salem, New York, is chairman of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and one of the
Republican leaders. His committee will be called upon to pass on many of
the recommendations to be sumitted after the inquiry.
With this personnel, the Army and Navy will find that statements such
as have been made before congressional committees will not be acceptable.
General Hines discovered this the first day, when he was asked so many
questions that he could not answer without evasion, that his testimony was
generally considered a justification for some of the criticism that has been
made of the General Staff.
The Navy has, through the poor guidance of Secretary Wilbur, been
placed in a position that will be more difficult to maintain when verification
is asked of some of the statements made. Particularly is this true of
Admiral Strauss' attack on the British Air Force and his reports of the
British battleship Agamemnon. If someone does not challenge him it will
be surprising. The muzzling of Navy officers has been in sharp contrast
to the freedom of opinions expressed by the Army officers.
It must not be overlooked that the President's Air Board report will not
settle anything. It is merely to lay a foundation for the investigation of
the Army and Navy by Congress.
The Mitchell Plan
Aviation, 12 October, 1925.- What will the plan I propose cost and how
will it be created from what we have at the present time—in other words,
briefly, how will it be handled ?
Navy
The Air Service in the Navy can stay just the way it is. Its aeronautical
personnel, except those who desire to transfer to the Air Force, can stay
where they are. Their numbers, however, should be entirely regulated
by the number of airplanes that the Navy actually carries to sea and oper-
ates. In addition to this, there should be sufficient reserves both of per-
sonnel and equipment
On a war basis, for the airplane carriers, Saratoga and Lexington, an
estimate of 150 planes, 75 each, can be made. Added to this, 50 planes
might be carried by all other craft, or a total of 200 planes for the Navy.
With a 50 per cent reserve, the whole would amount to 300 planes. The
Navy should be made to show specifically what can be carried to sea on
seacraft, as a basis for their organization.


  p. 2373 (#1337)                      

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Professional Notes
All airships should be handled by the Air Force, carrying Army or Navy
observers when necessary. The whole airship question must be completely
overhauled and not rushed into quickly again without exact reasons for
their use and development, and then using and developing them for what is
provided.
Air Force Schools
All basic flying training and aerial combat instruction for naval aero-
nautical personnel should be conducted at Air Force Schools. When they
fight in the air, they should fight under Air Force regulations. Their
finishing training on the airplane carriers and other ships of the Navy
should be carried out by the Navy and in any manner the Navy desires.
In other words, it is distinctly up to the Navy itself to develop its aviation
for work on the high seas. The Congress would judge what kind and how
many airplanes, battleships, or other vessels are required for the Navy in
the general National Defense scheme.
The amount of aeronautical personnel necessary for these purposes would
be about 10 officers in naval headquarters at Washington; about 230 flying
officers and about 200 observers and about 10 non-navigating personnel
for every airplane, or about 2,000 men. There should be a reserve not on
duty of about 50 per cent for the pilots and 50 per cent for the ground men.
This, it would seem, is the maximum that our Navy will need, under any
ordinary conditions for work at sea, according to the present system. War
casualties in Naval aviation will not be high because they will not be
engaged in constant combats with the enemy in an air war. They will only
be in combat when hostile fleets come together, which in fact may be never,
and if they do come together and the airplane carriers are sunk, there is
no further use for them until other airplane carriers are obtained. In time
of peace all naval air units should be at 50 per cent strength.
Satisfying the Navy
This system gives the Navy no field for objections whatever, as they
would have as part of their own organization all aircraft that go to sea
in ships; on the other hand, it would stop the Navy from trying to create
a land air service, which is not only no business of theirs, but is directly
contrary to the spirit of the present law of the United States, which
specifies : "All aircraft not attached to fleets but operating from land bases
should be handled by the Army" or words to that effect. This, under the
program suggested, could be changed to the Air Force instead of the Army,
except for the Air Service which forms a part of the Army.
Army
The Army needs a certain Air Service for what might be termed its
domestic economy-that is, for reconnoitering the ground in front of it,
for regulating and adjusting the fire of its missile throwing weapons, such
as cannon, howitzers, mortars, and other firearms, and for maintaining
liaison or keeping communication between its parts when all other means
have failed.
An Air Unit for the Army
Let the Army determine just how many of these units they need and
where they need them, then take the money for them out of their own appro-
priation, get their airplanes and equipment and use them. It will amount
to about seven squadrons in the United States, one in Hawaii, one in
Panama, and one in the Philippines. Based on about 20 airplanes to the
Squadron, this will make 200 airplanes; 50 per cent reserve would make
100 airplanes additional. There should be about 230 pilots and 230 ob-
servors for the Army and jo ground men to the airplane, making a total of


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[Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
about 2,000 men. In time of peace all army air units in the United States
should be at 50 per cent strength, abroad at 100 per cent.
This contemplates that there be four complete modern infantry divisions
and one cavalry division in the United States. These divisions should
be distributed so that two of them would be available in the area Chicago-
Bangor, Maine-Chesapeake Bay; one in the middle states; one on the
Pacific Coast; one on the Mexican frontier, and one cavalry division on the
Mexican frontier.
The Harbor Defense Artillery could use one squadron on the Atlantic
and one on the Pacific. They could provide themselves with whatever
balloons they needed and operate them.
Air Force
The cadre or frame on which the Air Force in the United States should
be built should contemplate the use in a great war of a total of about
2,400 airplanes, two thirds of which should be pursuit and about one third
bombardment, in which some attack aviation is included. There should be
100 per cent reserves provided for.
This organization is necessary on account of what may be brought against
us in the future. This contemplates that one brigade of 600 ships will cover
the eastern part of the United States; one brigade of 600 ships will cover
the western part of the United States, and one air division of 1,200 ships will
be stationed so that it can be shifted either way or both ways and even to
our insular and outlying possessions instantly in case of necessity.
Supplementing this, there should be seventeen flights of six airplanes
each covering our Atlantic and Pacific Coasts. This gives a patrol and
surveillance element for every 200 miles. I wish that it be distinctly held
in mind that the stationing and distribution of air units in case of war
or even in peace does not involve the tremendous construction work that
is necessary for land forces or water forces. Fields for operations can be
prepared for occupancy within a few hours. Airplanes themselves in the
future will be constructed so that they need little or no shelter under service
conditions. The comparatively small number of men that handle them
can be easily housed and taken care of in an efficient manner. With a proper
system, unencumbered by useless red tape, the whole thing can be put into
operation with great rapidity.
Plans for Mobilization
To begin with, we can make a distribution of units in accordance with
what we have at the present time, pending the gradual development of the
plan, as follows:
In case of war, each of the following six groups would provide for the
formation of three additional groups, either at its own station or at other
points in the area assigned to it. This would make a total of twenty-four
groups, the number required for our Air Force of one division and two
separate brigades.
Langley Field, eventually to be moved near Philadelphia : 1-Bombard-
ment Group
Selfridge Field, near Detroit: 1-Pursuit Group.
Kelly Field, San Antonio, Texas, which draws on the area of Fort Worth,
Dallas, and Houston: 1-Attack Group.
Chanute Field, Champaign, Illinois, eventually to be placed near Chicago,
drawing on the Chicago area: 1-Bombardment Group.
Mather Field, Sacramento, California, drawing on the San Francisco
area and center of California : 1-Bombardment Group,


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Professional Notes
Rockwell Field, San Diego, California, drawing on Los Angeles and
Southern California area: 1-Pursuit Group.
New York (Mitchel Field): 1–Local Defense Group.
Air Force in Insular Possessions
Panama-Provision for 100 planes for local defense. Peace time, 50
per cent strength.
Hawaiian Islands—300 planes Air Force, 100 local defense. Peace time,
50 per cent strength.
Philippine Islands—no Air Force units.
Alaska-in time of peace, 50 airplanes for development work, establishing
airways and studying aeronautical needs of the country.
Schools
Langley Field Operation School, for training staff and commanding
officers of Air Force units, for offensive work against hostile air forces,
against hostile sea craft and against hostile land targets.
San Antonio, Texas-Special schools of application for pursuit, attack,
and bombardment aviation, and for Air Force surveillance, observation and
photographic work. A Primary Flying School for the training of officers
from the Army and Navy and such Air Force officers as may be designated
to take the course. The bulk of the primary training should be carried out
at the stations of the major units.
The training of mechanics and inspectors should take place in factories
where engines and aircraft are built; in civil institutions and in the en-
gineering school maintained with the Engineering and Experimental Section
at Dayton, Ohio.
The Reserve
All reserve personnel should be attached permanently to some active
unit, and required to fly an average of about four hours a month and to
turn out for maneuvers with the units for a month's training each year.
All technical specialists carried on a staff basis not eligible to command,
of course are not included in this.
Supply organization should consist of depots in the same locations as
at present : Middletown, Pennsylvania, for the eastern part of the United
States; Fairfield, Ohio, for the central states; San Antonio, Texas, for
the Southwest; temporarily, San Diego for the Pacific—to be eventually
removed to Reno, Nevada, at a later date; at Dayton, Ohio—the Engineer-
ing and Experimental Section of the Air Force.
Now, how would this system work out?
Peace
In time of peace, the Secretary of Air could handle all matters direct
with the units, or, in case he saw fit, he could create another organization
to facilitate administration.
The active air units should handle the organization and training of all
combat personnel; the schools, the preparation of the personnel. The
supply units, the organization and training of all specialists and supply
personnel, the system for the production of aircraft and accessories, their
transportation, storage, and issue, and keeping up to date supply plans
to be used in case of a great emergency, all to be prescribed and co-
ordinated from the headquarters at Washington, D.C.
War
Strategical
In time of war, the Department of Air at Washington, D.C., should
be charged with the preparation, supply, and transportation to the tactical


  p. 2376 (#1340)                      

2376
[Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Air Force of all active Air Force elements, personnel, and material.
This organization should be permanent and fixed and be the matrix on
which the Air Force is built.
It should be divided into four territorial departments, as follows:
Eastern Department, Headquarters, Philadelphia; Central Department, Head-
quarters, Chicago; Western Department, Headquarters, Sacramento, Cali-
fornia; Southern Department, Headquarters, San Antonio, Texas.
Tactical
Air Force Tactical Headquarters—Beside the commander of the armed
forces of the United States and under him responsible for the tactical
cmployment of the Air Force and its use and coordination in any given
operations. There should be an intimate liaison between him and the De-
partment of the Air. This plan will positively eliminate every bad feature
that we had in the last war. Its only disturbing element would be in
a lack of appreciation by the Department of Air for the wants of the
Tactical Air Force. This, I am convinced, with officers trained in the
Air Force, will not exist in a great emergency.
Costs
Recapitulation
Peace
Planes
I 50
NAVY
ARMY .................
Officers Men
220 1,000
250 1.000
......................
.......................
150
470
2,000
1,200
6,000
1.000
8
|
500
500
Total Army and Navy .....
300
AIR FORCE
Units in United States ....
600
New York Local Defense Unit .
Airship Installations
Lakehurst
Scott Field .....
Schools
Langley Field .
San Antonio, Texas ....
Experimental Section, Dayton, Ohio
Supply Services ........
Insular Possessions
Panama Local Defense Unit ..
50
Hawaiian Islands
200
Alaska ..................................... 50
500
!!
50
2,000
1,000
6,000
250
....
50
200
100
500
2,000
500
............... 1,000
2,200
20,500
Total Air Force ....
GRAND TOTAL ......
.................... 1,300
2,670
22,500
Assuming that $2,500 per man be taken as the cost of the Air Force per
year, which is based on the estimate for the Lassiteer Army Project
now known as Project No. 4, (incidentally the War Department Project
is for 4,000 officers and 25,000 enlisted men) the total cost of the Military
Air Service would be about $63,500,000. Add to this, $500,000 for the
maintenance of the office of the Department of Air including the Under-
Secretary of Air and the assistant Secretary of Air. It would give us
about $64,000,000.
The Army estimate for Project No. 4 is about $75,000,000. I recommend
that the Curry Bill with modifications to meet the recommendations con-


  p. 2377 (#1341)                      

1925)
2377
Professional Notes
tained above be used as the basis for legislation for a Department of the Air.
Of the above, the Air Force itself in time of peace, exclusive of the
Army and Navy, would be composed of 1,000 service planes, 2,200 officers
and 20,500 men. These planes would be ready to take the offensive and
fight and are not mere auxiliaries of some other force or paper descriptions
of what planes might be. No numbers have been put down for training
planes, as the proportionate number of one plane for twenty men is covered
in the general estimate.
Now, let us take a look at what our entire national defense scheme
would be in case we put the general plan I have suggested into operation.
First, we would have a Secretary of National Defense, charged with
coordinating the Army, Navy, and Air Force: the Army, charged with
the defense of land areas; the Navy, charged with the defense of sea
areas; the Air Force, having jurisdiction over air areas. (The Army and
Navy would have with them, as a permanent part of their own organization,
the air services necessary for their own domestic use.)
These three forces, land, sea, and air, would balance each other, something
in the way our federal legislative and judicial departments do in our civil
government under the President. There could neither be a tie vote as
between the Army and Navy or an interlocking directory against aviation.
Influences of the Scheme
The Air Force would oppose any spreading out of naval activity on the
land and would keep pushing them out to sea. It would stand for the
cutting down of Navy yards, except where actually necessary for the
maintenance of our navies, whether they be surface or sub-surface. It
would stand for the cutting down of Coast Artillery except in important
places for the defense of cities that could be fired into. It would stand
for a reasonable development of anti-aircraft artillery and appurtenances
to be used as a part of the general scheme for defense against aircraft. It
would stand for having an adequate army, a mobile army, a well equipped,
and well appointed army, which would absolutely insure holding of all land
areas in which it operates.
Coordination of Services
To sum up its influence—it would be to insure the defensive integrity
of the United States as a self contained unit.
Our country dominates in its ability to create air forces, in comparison
with any other nation in the world. Both the Army and the Navy should
subscribe to this general scheme from a standpoint of service to the
country, and the benefit of all. If they did not, the Secretary of National
Defense would act as judge in any discussions arising between them and
coordinate the services. If this was impossible each branch could state its
case with equal freedom.
Each service should freely criticize the other in every way it sees fit,
but such criticism should be constructive, giving the reason for it and
their remedies. Under these conditions, there would be an accord in a
comparatively short time-certainly in the minds of the people as to the
best means of national defense for our country.
It would hold one man, the Secretary of National Defense, responsible
under the President for the national defense of the whole country and
under him, he could hold the under-secretaries definitely responsible for the
Army, Navy, and the Air.
The Aeronautical Crisis
The Scientific American, November, 1925.-It would be fatal error to
abandon lighter-than-air navigation because of the Shenandoah tragedy.


  p. 2378 (#1342)                      

2378
(Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
To do so would be to lose all the capital, technical knowledge, and work
which the Government, through the Navy, has already put into the airship,
and abandon the development of airship travel to other nations. This
would be to put the stigma of faint-heartedness and failure upon the
American people, who have ever prided themselves upon their initiative,
mechanical genius, and courage.
In the midst of the shock, bewilderment, and grief for the dead in the
Shenandoah disaster, the nation should preserve its self-control and patience
and await the results of the broad investigation of the very able commission,
appointed by the President, and await also the technical findings of the
naval experts, who are piecing together the experiences of the survivors
and gathering the valuable lessons which can be learned from a study of
the wreck of the ship itself.
We believe that apart from its value as a naval scout, which has yet
to be fully determined, the airship has an assured future for transatlantic
and other transoceanic travel. For such service it must be built of even
greater dimensions than before. The bigger the ship, the greater, relatively,
is the amount of weight that can be spared for the hull structure. Hence,
it follows that the big ship is relatively stronger, and better able to resist
those bending and twisting stresses which broke the Shenandoah into
three separate parts. Furthermore, if the risks of inflammable hydrogen
can, by careful and preventive design, be eliminated, and both the Germans
and the British claim that they can (the British, indeed, are now building
two hydrogen-filled ships of more than double the size of the Shenandoah)
there will be from 7 to 10 per cent more lift obtained from a given volume
of gas. Here, also, there would be more weight available for insuring the
strength of the hull structure. Indeed, we shall not be surprised if in-
vestigation shows that in a hydrogen-filled ship of 5,000,000 cubic feet
capacity, it is possible to provide a double hull and thus secure a great
increase of strength, such as is given to the merchant ship by its double
bottom and to the warship by its complete double hull below the waterline.
Furthermore, there is but little risk of encountering at sea destructive
vertical line storms of the kind that occur over the land. This fact, coupled
with greater strength of the larger ships of the future and the more
complete development of weather forecasting, makes the problem of ocean
airship travel fairly sure of solution in the not far distant future.
In the Los Angeles, our Navy Department possesses a ship well suited
for testing the commercial development of airships. She has made a
successful crossing of the Atlantic; she has sailed to Bermuda and anchored
for a whole day in a 40-mile gale to the mast of the Patoka and then re-
turned to her home port at Lakehurst. The Lakehurst hangar should be
continued in service and the Navy should be permitted to continue to make
experimental voyages for the gathering of data. Furthermore, our aero-
nautical officers, both those who design and those who fly the ships, should
be granted the necessary appropriations to enable them to embody the
structural lessons taught by the loss of the Shenandoah in a larger ship
designed as a scout and suitable for commercial travel across the Atlantic.
That such travel will come we do not doubt. America has, in abundance,
the necessary wealth to develop commercial airship navigation. The question
is, does she also possess the necessary courage and persistency?
Let us be fair to the airship. We did not cease to build long-span bridges
because the Quebec Bridge fell down; we did not countermand all orders
for large steamships when an iceberg ripped open the Titanic and sent her
to the bottom; nor did we cease to lay tracks and build locomotives because
of the frequent and tragic collisions in our early railroad history. So, in
the present case, we must above all things avoid panic legislation. It was
an accident of the weather and not a defect in the Shenandoah that caused
her collapse; it was another accident of the weather which prevented the


  p. 2379 (#1343)                      

1925]
2379
Professional Notes
PN-9 from reaching Honolulu. In the one case the ship, for the want
of full radio weather forecasts, ran right into a storm of which she had
no warning, a storm, furthermore, of the kind which the designers of the
ship had warned would probably destroy her—which it did. In the other
case, the favorable trade winds which were relied upon to help the PN-9
on her long trip simply petered out—a most unusual occurrence—and
instead of blowing with her, the winds, during the later part of the course,
were contrary, and by holding the ship back caused her to run out of fuel.
It was the weather, we repeat, and not any structural fault either in the
Shenandoah or the PN-9 that defeated them.
Let us keep our heads in this matter and not be misled by the latest out-
burst of Colonel Mitchell which may be regarded as an altogether insignifi-
cant incident in the great question of the future of American aviation. The
only feature in Colonel Mitchell's attitude that is not insignificant is his
glaring indiscretion and the shameless example of insubordination which,
as high ranking military officer, he has given to the country at the very
time when resistance to authority is a growing menace among the young
people of America. It is not Colonel Mitchell's silly outburst which has
caused the President to appoint a special commission. This was done
because the loss of the Shenandoah has rendered necessary a dispassionate
inquiry such as will now be made.
AVIATION
Pulitzer Trophy Race
Aviation, 19 October, 1925.-With the finish of the John L. Mitchell
race, the crowd, which had considerably grown during the earlier part of
the afternoon, waited expectantly for the Pulitzer Race, the great event
of the whole meet. The atmosphere was clearing and the clouds, which,
during the earlier part of the day, hung like a solid blanket over the sky,
had commenced to break up. This was a very fortunate thing, for a bad
haze would have proved a great obstacle in piloting the high speed planes
entered in the speed classic event. The race was scheduled to start at
3:00 P.M., but both the Army and the Navy Curtiss racers were wheeled out
to the starting line at least half an hour before that time.
The timers, apparently realizing the care with which these planes had
to be treated, were not strict as to the exact starting time of the race. The
two Curtiss racers were each equipped with high compression Curtiss type
V1400 engines, said to be as nearly alike in performance as it was possible
to secure. These were being given a final test while the planes stood at
the starting line, with a view also to warming them up for the race.
The four planes entered, in addition to the Curtiss racers, were two
Curtiss pursuits piloted by Lieutenants Cuddihy and Norton of the Navy,
and a PW8 and Pi piloted by Captain Cook and Lieutenant Dawson, re-
spectively. Owing to the entry of six planes, and the possibility of trouble
resulting from the hazard caused by the continual overtaking of the slower
planes by the racers, it was decided by the Race Committee to divide the
contest into two heats, and thus permit the two fastest planes to fly the
course unhindered.
At shortly after 3 P.M., the first plane took off. It was Lieutenant Al
Williams, Aying the Navy Curtiss racer. His exact time was 3:14:26. He
made a very smooth take-off and flew around the field for a few minutes
warming up his engine.
Shortly afterward, at 3:16:39, the Army plane took off, piloted by
Lieutenant Cyrus Bettis. By this time, Williams had decided to start of on
the course, and, accordingly, approached the field from a far corner and,
flying on full throttle, passed the timer's stand and the home pylon, being
checked off by Otis Porter, chief timer.


  p. 2380 (#1344)                      

2380
[Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
PULITZER TROPHY RACE
200 Kilometers-4 Laps. Winner's Time, 29 Min. 56.9 Sec.
Pilot
Plane
Motor
Ist Lt. Cyrus Bettis
Lt. A. J. Williams
2d Lt. L. H. Dawson
ist Lt. H. J. Norton
Capt. H. W. Cook
Lt. G. T. Cuddihy
* Dropped out.
Curtiss Racer Army
Curtiss Racer Navy
Curtiss Pi Army
Curtiss Pursuit Navy
Curtiss PW8 Army
Curtiss Pursuit Navy
Curtiss V1400 1600
Curtiss V1400 600
Curtiss Di2
Curtiss D12
Curtiss D12
Curtiss D12
Total Time
Lap Time
1. 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. 4.
(147.8 248.6 248.7 248.975 247.8 249.4 248.7 249.97
243.7 242.9 242.4 241.695 243.7 242.I 241.4 243.66
170.3 170.1 169.9 169.9 / 170.3 170.0 169.5 169.8
169.3 169.1 167.2 168.8 169.3 168.9 163.4 173.8
167.0 165.5 167.2 167.4 167.0 167.3 167.4 167.8
165.2 165.5 165.3
165.2 165.8 165.0


  p. 2381 (#1345)                      

1925]
2381
Professional Notes
The spectators had been expecting a close and thrilling race between the
two Curtiss planes of which so much had been heard but were to be dis-
appointed on this account, for Williams and Bettis crossed the starting
line at such long intervals that all spirit of a race was entirely lost, the
two planes going around the course several miles apart. They flew at ap-
proximately 300 feet all the time. One very striking feature of the start
of each plane as it crossed the line was the absence of the customary dive
in an endeavor to gain excess speed. This, it will be recalled, was forbidden
in this race by the National Aeronautical Association after the Dayton
races last year, when steep diving over the starting line in the Pulitzer
race resulted in the collapse of Captain Burt Skeel's plane. Under the new
ruling this year the airplanes all approached the timer's stand in horizontal
Aight.
• Another very noticeable feature observed as the Curtiss racers passed over
the crowd on each lap was the considerable reduction in noise in this year's
planes, the propellers making far less noise than those of the PW8's. With
such high powered engines at the new Curtiss V 1400 and the high revolutions
at which these engines run, this silencing is quite an interesting achievement.
The first lap made by Bettis was in excess of the record general average
speed for this contest, which was 243.67 m.p.h. made at St. Louis in 1923.
Williams' speed was also greater than this average, though by only a small
margin.
The race, owing to the distance which separated the planes, had lost all
recognition as such and resolved itself into a straightforward speed trial.
As it progressed it was noticed that Bettis was beating his own speed at
each lap, whereas just the opposite was the case with Williams, whose
successive laps were getting slower with the exception of the last in which
his speed for that lap reached 243.66 m.p.h., or just under that for his first
lap. However, his total time for the course, as a whole, was still going
down, as will be seen from the table of speeds.
Lieutenant Bettis' speed at the end of three laps had reached 248.7 m.p.h.,
virtually assuring a new closed circuit record, while Williams' speed at
this lap was only 242.4 m.p.h. At the close of the race, four laps, Bettis
had reached 248.975 m.p.h. and Williams 241.695 m.p.h. Thus, not only did
Bettis win the Pulitzer Trophy for 1925, but, in doing so, he had set up a
new world's speed record for a closed circuit. On crossing the line in the
last lap, both took their planes high into the air and came around the out-
skirts of the field, landing and taxiing up to the enclosures.
At this moment, the four planes forming the second heat went off to
compete for third place in the race. There was far more of the element of
a race in the second heat, since the planes, a Pi and PW8 piloted by Lieu-
tenant Dawson and Captain Cook of the Army Air Service, and two Curtiss
pursuits flown by Lieutenants Norton and Cuddihy of the Navy, went off in
close succession and chased each other at close quarters during the entire
race.
As the planes started on their third lap, Dawson in the Pi, which was
faster than the others, was leading with Norton and Cuddihy following
closely and Cook coming up fourth. It was interesting to note that the
PW8's flown by Norton and Cuddihy were the same ones flown in the
Mitchell Trophy race earlier in the afternoon, but from the start they com-
menced making much better speed than in the earlier race. Lieutenant
Norton was piloting No. 50 at a speed 8 m.p.h. faster than the speed at
which Matthews won the Mitchell Trophy. This fact was undoubtedly due
to the difference in the length of the laps on the two races. The Mitchell
Trophy course was twelve miles around, as compared with the 31.07 miles
of the Pulitzer course. The former race, therefore, necessitated more and
sharper turns than in the latter race and the resultant speeds for the two
courses would differ accordingly.


  p. 2382 (#1346)                      

2382
[Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Lieutenant Dawson still maintained a good lead as the four pursuit planes
started on their final lap. He was followed by Norton while Cuddihy was
compelled, by engine trouble, to drop out. Captain Cook, by this time, was
at least a mile behind. The heat ended with Lieutenant Dawson finishing
first, Lieutenant Norton a close second, and Captain Cook coming in third,
a few seconds later. Lieutenant Dawson's speed was 169.9 mp.h., and
Lieutenant Norton, flying a Curtiss pursuit, made 168.8 m.p.h. The speed
differences resulting from the different lengths of the courses of the
Mitchell Trophy race and the Pulitzer race are apparent when it is recalled
that the same type of plane as that flown by Norton in the latter race made
only 161.5 m.p.h. in the former.
The somewhat disappointing speeds made by the new Curtiss racers,
in the Pulitzer Trophy race, may be attributed very largely to both the
shape of the course and the windy weather which prevailed. The haze
commenced to lift as the race drew to a conclusion and, as the two Curtiss
racers came up to the enclosures, the sun began to come out and afforded
a small army of photographers opportunity to get good pictures of the
victors.
Progress of Civil Aviation (British)
Engineering, 2 October, 1925.—The annual report on civil aviation, which
has just been issued, is of particular interest on this occasion, since it
covers the first year's working of Imperial Airways, Limited, formed, it
will be remembered, from four separate companies previously operating
aerial transport services between this country and the Continent. The
company, which is to receive a total government subsidy of $1,000,000 spread
over a period of ten years, undertook to fly a minimum of 1,000,000 miles
per annum, except in the first four years of its existence, during which the
minimum for any one year might be 800,000 miles, provided that a total of
4,000,000 miles have been flown at the end of the first four years. In
addition, the company undertook, as a minimum, to operate efficient trans-
port services between London and Paris, London and Brussels, London and
Amsterdam, and Southhampton and the Channel Islands.
Some delay occurred in opening the services in April, 1924, and the
Channel Islands service has only operated spasmodically throughout the
year covered by the report, but on the other services mentioned, with their
extensions, the total mileage flown during the year ended March 31, 1925,
amounted to 825,525, reaching a maximum of 146,820 miles in the single
month of July, 1924. The durability of British aircraft, and the care taken
in the matters of inspection and maintenance are well shown by the fact
that one Handley-Page machine and two of the De Havilland 34 type,
each completed 2,300 flying hours, representing a distance flown of 200,000
miles each, while three Napier-Lion engines each ran for an average period
of 1,350 hours. Altogether during the year, 4,677 machine flights were
made for transport purposes, and 890,000 machine-miles were flown, and
to these totals Imperial Airways, Limited, contributed 93 per cent in each
case, while of the 13,478 passengers carried, 98 per cent traveled in that
company's machines. The cargo transported by air during the year amounted
to 508 tons, all of which was carried by Imperial Airwave Limited. In
addition, 23,519 machine flights were made, 139,000 machune-miles flown,
and 43,766 passengers carried in other than transport flights, these flights
being made almost entirely for pleasure purposes.
Some idea of the present efficiency of aerial transport may be gained
from the statistics given in the report, which show that of 4,328 flights
commenced in the British subsidised air services during the year under
consideration, 4,064, or 94 per cent, were completed without interruption,
while 105 of the remainder, although interrupted, were completed on the
same day as commenced. In these flights, there were a total of 286 forced
.


  p. 2383 (#1347)                      

1925]
2383
Professional Notes
landings, of which 144 (50 per cent) were due to weather conditions, 96
(34 per cent) were caused by engine or installation failures, and 46 (16
per cent) were due to other causes. Only one fatal accident occurred
during the year, but this, unfortunately, resulted in the death of seven
passengers in addition to the pilot. It will be remembered that on December
24 last, a machine, after taking off from Croydon aerodrome and climbing
a few hundred feet, stalled and nose dived to the ground. Fire broke out
on the impact and all the occupants were killed. Three other accidents,
which did not result in personal injuries, occurred on the established air
routes, while eight more occurred in other classes of civil flying; in one
of these the pilot and passenger were injured. There were thus twelve
accidents in all, of which four were attributed to error of judgment on the
part of the pilot, two to defects in engine or installation, one to weather
conditions and three to other causes not specified. In addition, it may be
mentioned that two accidents to foreign aircraft occurred in this country
during the period covered by the report, both happening to French machines
employed on the cross-channel services. These two accidents were caused
by engine failure, but neither involved personal injuries to the occupants.
In conclusion, a brief reference may be made to the progress made in
the equipment of the London-Continental route for night flying, which
will certainly have to be carried out as soon as it can be done with safety,
if full advantage is to be taken of the aeroplane as a means of transport-
especially of mails. A considerable amount of experimental and test work
has been carried on during the year with this object in view. The emer-
gency landing grounds at Penshurst and Littlestone have been equipped
with automatic beacon lights, and the boundaries of these landing grounds,
and also the aerodromes at Croydon and Lympne, have been outlined with
automatic operated lights. In addition, improvements have been effected in
the arrangements for flood lighting the landing area at Croydon Aerodrome
in order to increase the space that can be utilized in night operations.
Fog still remains one of the chief hindrances of aerial navigation, but the
problem has been tackled by employing a captive balloon to obtain informa-
tion on the efficiency of various lighting units. A new type of beacon em-
ploying neon lamps has been installed at Croydon and has been found of
considerable assistance to pilots endeavoring to locate the aerodrome under
conditions of bad visibility. It is proposed, during the coming winter, to
attempt to produce a scheme for assisting navigation by making use of
the leader-cable principle in conjunction with neon vacuum tubes. In this
way it is hoped to enable aircraft to operate safely from aerodromes in
times of dense ground fog, provided that it is possible to see clearly when
Aying above the fog. Acoustical methods of assisting aircraft to land in
fog are also being studied, but have not yet arrived at the stage of practical
utility.
Anti-aircraft Defense
By Major J. C. Haw, C. A. C., The Coast Artillery Journal, October,
1925.-The term “Anti-aircraft Defense" comprehends all defensive meas-
ures against aerial attack. It is evident that aviation itself is infinitely the
most proficient a - important single component of this defense, for our
pursuit planes can seek out the enemy and attack him in his own element-
the air-on equal terms. However, the work of the Air Service must be
supplemented by purely ground formations. In the Civil War, the cavalry
of both sides made frequent raids in the enemy's rear; in the World War,
with the German Navy completely bottled up, we saw his submarines in
constant operation, while on the surface raider after raider went to sea and
terrorized the Allied Merchant Marine. As on land and sea, so in the air ;
no matter how numerous our planes or how efficient our aviators, it is
impossible to prevent a bold enemy from carrying out successful expeditions


  p. 2384 (#1348)                      

2384
(Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
over our territory. The delay in gathering a sufficient concentration to
meet air attacks in force may enable the enemy to reach his objective.
Further, the airplane is an offensive weapon, whose mission it is to seek
out and destroy the enemy in his territory. If the strength of the Air
Service is frittered away by scattering a great proportion of units here and
there for defense, we give up all hope of taking the initiative in the air.
However, it is necessary to assign a relatively small number of pursuit
planes to defensive work. These craft conduct constant patrols, and they
fight in the same manner as other pursuit aviation.
To defend troops, small isolated positions of importance, and large cities,
ground defense elements are necessary. Only small areas should be forced
to depend entirely on such elements, and for all large areas, pursuit
aviation and ground defense should be combined.
The protective components are divided into two classes-active and
passive. The passive elements are: kites and barrage balloons, camouflage,
searchlights, and the information service.
Large kites may carry metallic cables. Barrage balloons are small affairs
especially designed for forming a barrier of balloons. In the defense of
London, nets were used, three adjacent balloons being joined by wire cable
from which hung wires 350 yards long, with a sand bag at each end. The
balloons were about five hundred yards apart. Perhaps a more efficient
method is to place the balloons closer together and rely solely upon the
retaining cables. If two balloons are used together, one above the other,
an altitude of 11,500 feet may be attained. As an aviator cannot see the
wires, he will not attempt to fiy through the balloon barrage, but must
alter his course to right or left or climb above it. The effect is to diminish
the accuracy of bombing Balloon barrages are useful for small areas
only.
Camouflage is now tremendously important. At the front, every position
must be concealed from enemy aviators. Otherwise it is subject to accurate
artillery fire as well as bombing and aerial machine gun attack; while the
enemy's general plans of action are much more likely to be successful if
he has full knowledge of our dispositions.
In other cases, positions to the camouflaged are of two classes ; namely,
land marks and objectives. The aviator can fly by compass; but on long
journeys he is liable to need a reference point here and there to keep an
accurate course, and in all cases he must have a distinguishing landmark
at the point to be bombed.
Smoke may be used to camouflage small areas. If several patches of
smoke be generated simultaneously, the flyer does not know which one hides
the point he wishes to see. Flimsy scenery may be erected, in exact imita-
tion of structures located elsewhere.
Suppression of light is a most obvious measure of defense. Even at
night, a large city cannot be hidden, but if no lights are visible, then the
aviator cannot see it until he is almost upon it and must depend upon
compass and landmarks to reach it. When Paris was fully illuminated,
aviators at Villers-Cotteret could distinguish the glow, although the dis-
tance was approximately seventy-five kilometers. The lights in railway
yards are very conspicuous from overhead, unless carefully shielded, while
the glare from the opened door of a locomotive firebox is the aviator's
best indication of a railway line. In Paris, patrols were constantly alert
to enforce darkness, and necessary lights were made blue.
Sometimes "luminous camouflage" is used. High power lights with
reflectors are scattered about over the area containing the point to be
hidden, which is renderd invisible by the upward glare. This is obviously
a very expensive measure.
Also lights may be disposed at some suitable point in a conformation
that copies exactly some village or area with which the enemy is familiar,
so that he is deceived as to the true position.


  p. 2385 (#1349)                      

1925]
2385
Professional Notes
The British did a bit of camouflage that was almost a classic. To quote
the report of an American officer on this British dump which was located
near the front:
"Along the best line of approach, and at the usual distance from
the area actually to be defended, were placed three batteries of artillery
and three triangular lights. These guns and lights were poorly camouflaged,
so that when a high flying plane came over to photograph the dump they
would show in the pictures, and at the same time it would appear that the
British did not want them to show. Thus the enemy knew the relation
of these guns and lights to the location of the dump. However, about a
mile in advance, along the same line of approach, was the exact duplicate
of the same layout with the exception that this installation was perfectly
camouflaged. The result was that when an enemy plane came over at
night and these latter batteries and lights opened on him, he knew from
the study of the photo that very soon he must drop his bombs to hit the
dump. This he always did and the bombs therefore hit in advance of the
dump. Then before daylight the British would go out and fill in the bomb
holes and dig holes with the same relation to the inner defense that the
actual bomb holes had to the outer defense. It was in January, 1918,
that I saw this defense and it had operated successfully through the entire
war until that date without the ruse being discovered."
Searchlights are used to discover the enemy at night and keep him in
view of our guns on planes. They must be portable so that they can be
placed wherever necessary.
The standard type in our Army is the Cadillac unit. When the light
is in operation, the engine of the truck operates a generator mounted on
the truck, which in turn furnishes power to the light. The light itself is
of the open, or dishpan, type, sixty inches in diameter. It is mounted on a
very light carriage with Ford wheels, pushed by hand; a cable six hundred
feet long is provided for conveying the current from generator to light.
When a move is to be made the light is run up on the track, which thus
carries the entire unit. There is also a 30-inch light that can be placed in
trees, towers and similar points of vantage.
In addition to revealing the plane to our own forces, seachlights are
very confusing to the enemy pilot, for when the beam is upon him he can
see nothing of the ground or of other aircraft.
Evidently, it would be almost impossible for a searchlight to discover
a plane by searching at random, so listening apparatus is provided to de-
termine the direction of a plane by the sound of its engine. The problem
of following the exact course of a target by sound is no easy one, for by
the time the noise reaches the listener, the direction from which it appears
to come is no longer the true direction to the target. One reason for this
is that the plane moves some distance while the sound wave is traveling
to the listener; wind and other factors add to the difficulties encountered.
The underlying principle of practically all listening apparatus is the
detection of difference in phase of sound waves, the same principle that
enables men and animals to determine the direction of a sound. Sometimes
there are two receivers mounted on opposite ends of a rod that turns about
a pivot; tubes lead from each receiver to the listener's ears. There are
also single receiver types of parabolical or spherical shape. In either case,
the receiver collects and concentrates the sound; and the direction is read
off from the oriented "azimuth scale" (somewhat similar to the horizontal
limb of a transit). This direction is then set off on a similar scale on the
searchlight, and the target quickly located. Other types of apparatus are
more complicated but subject to various defects. The most accurate device
is said to be the Perrin Telesitemeter, with a mean error of only 0.13 of a
degree.
Now for the active elements of the anti-aircraft defense. The most
important-pursuit aviation-has been mentioned already. Machine guns
and anti-aircraft artillery complete the list.


  p. 2386 (#1350)                      

2386
(Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Anti-aircraft machine guns are used to prevent low-flying planes from
bombing and machine-gunning our positions. They are employed in the
defense of roads, trenches, strong points, artillery emplacements, anti-
aircraft guns and searchlights, and so on. The most promising machine
gun for anti-aircraft purposes seems to be the water-cooled Browning
.50-caliber, firing tracer or explosive bullets at the rate of 500 aimed shots
per minute. Its horizontal range is five miles vertical range, 8,000 to 12,000
feet.
There has just been developed another machine gun of 1.4 inches caliber,
firing explosive shell at the rate of 100 to 120 shots per minute, with a
vertical range of 14,000 feet. These shells burst on impact with the lightest
fabric.
As the targets fly low and at great speed, appear unexpectedly, and are
visible for very short periods of time, elaborate sighting is impossible, and
the only feasible way to get hits seems to be by using tracer bullets so that
their trajectory is visible.
A more complicated matter is that of anti-aircraft artillery. This class
of fire involves the greatest problems that have yet confronted the ballis-
tician, the ordnance designer, and the artilleryman. The target, whose
vulnerable parts often occupy less than two cubic yards, moves at a speed
of 80 to 200 miles per hour in three dimensions, and can change speed and
direction with startling rapidity. If the plane should travel at 180 miles
per hour and it should take the projectile 20 seconds to reach it, the gun
would have to be pointed one mile ahead of the target even if our methods
were absolutely perfect.
It is necessary to use high explosive shell or shrapnel, as these burst in
the air, endangering everything within a radius of approximately fifteen
yards. Their use entails fuse complications (mentioned later) but these
are outweighed by the gain in danger space.
The latest American gun (still in the experimental stage) is 4.7 inches
in caliber, with a muzzle velocity of 2,600 feet per second, firing a 45-
pound projectile to a vertical range of almost seven miles. With all-
round fire, elevation from minus 5° to plus 80°, automatic breech opener,
and pneumatic loading device, it is easily aimed and can be fired very
rapidly indeed. A 3-inch gun of similar model is also being tried out.
These guns are either self-propelled or towed by trucks or tractors, make
fast time on good roads, and can travel across country.
The chief ammunition difficulty has been in the fuse question. In
order to make the projectile burst at the exact instant desired, a very
accurate time fuse is a necessity. The extreme changes of air pressure
in anti-aircraft fire render powder-train fuses unreliable. One alternative
is clockwork. Imagine accurate clockwork that can withstand the shock
of discharge and the tremendous velocity of rotation of the projectile!
Such a fuse has been developed, however, and gives promise of con-
siderable accuracy. A fuse actuated by the rotation of the projectile has
also been proposed.
Several improved fuse setters have appeared of late, whose object is
to set the fuse on the very latest data, including an allowance or lead for
the time used up in setting the fuse, loading, and firing. These setters
work automatically, eliminating the errors caused by waiting for an opera-
tor to receive data and set it on the fuse-setter. Some of them work by
electricity.
However, the most intricate and perplexing difficulties are encountered
in the realm of fire control—that is, the determination of the data to be
set upon the guns in order to hit the target.
All fire at moving targets is a matter of prediction. The exact posi-
tions of the target at two or more given instants are determined ; upon this
information it is predicted that the target will arrive at a certain point at a


  p. 2387 (#1351)                      

1925)
2387
Professional Notes
certain instant in the future, and the shot is fired at this imaginary point.
The shorter the time occupied by the personnel in getting this data and
firing and by the projectile in reaching its destination, the closer the pre-
dicted point to the last known point, and hence the greater chance that the
target will actually reach the predicted point at the expected instant, instead
of changing direction, altitude, or speed. The time element becomes of
incalculable importance when the target travels from one and one-third to
three and one-third miles per minute.
To determine the position of a target at any instant, it is necessary to
know: (1) its direction from the battery, (2) its range (straight line froni
battery to target), (3) its altitude. In our service, these data are generally
determined by using instruments at both ends of a measured base line.
Obviously, it would be more satisfactory to eliminate one station and make
all the measurements from a single point near the guns. There are several
instruments for doing this, and when they are sufficiently developed, a single
station scheme will undoubtedly replace the present system.
The next step is the prediction of the future position of the target; and
finally, this data must be translated into terms of elevation, direction (or
sight setting), and fuse setting for the gunners. (The gun may be aimed
by the use of a telescopic sight or laid by an oriented scale and a quadrant,
in which case no sight is used.). All these very involved processes must be
performed in a few seconds—the fewer the better. Hence a great advantage
will be secured if a single machine can be made to perform these computa-
tions, which must be done almost instantaneously and as a continuous opera-
tion, so that there is a constant flow of data to keep up with the movements
of the target. Several such machines have been invented. Some of them
are purely mechanical, others depend upon the use of electricity, but none
have given full satisfaction. The ultimate aim is a single machine, operated
by one man, that will measure the position of the target, predict its future
position, and compute the firing data to set on the guns. Such a develop-
ment will increase tremendously the accuracy of fire.
The next consideration is the organization of anti-aircraft units. In
our Army, the basic group is the regiment, which consists of one artillery
battalion and one machine-gun battalion. The artillery battalion is com-
posed of three gun batteries of four guns each (total, 12 cannon) and one
searchlight battery of twelve lights. The anti-aircraft machine-gun battalion
consists of four companies of twelve machine guns apiece, a total of forty-
eight machine guns. There are sixty-three officers, one warrant officer and
1,450 men in an anti-aircraft regiment. To each army corps (about 83,850
men) is assigned one regiment of anti-aircraft artillery. To each army
(composed of two or more corps) is assigned one brigade of three regiments
of anti-aircraft artillery, in addition to the regiment with each corps.
Before considering the manner in which anti-aircraft elements are dis-
posed for defense, it is necessary to understand the mission of the defense.
This may be stated as follows:
(a) To prevent enemy aircraft flying at such heights over our positions
that they can observe and photograph, direct artillery fire, attack our bal-
loons, drop bombs with accuracy, or attack troops with machine guns.
(b) To prevent enemy aircraft dropping bombs on vital points behind
our lines.
(c) To compel enemy aircraft Aying in formation to lose their forma-
tion and thus render them more vulnerable to attack by our own airplanes.
Then we should know the kind of aircraft that we will be called upon to
oppose. This information is contained in the following table:


  p. 2388 (#1352)                      

2388
(Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Kind of Plane
Approximate | Speed-Miles
Altitude-feet Per Hour
Remarks
Pursuit
Reconnaissance
Very High
16,000
100-200
80—120
Day bombers
16,000
7,500
80—100
80—100
Night bombers
Purely fighters.
Photographic and
general observation.
Bombing close to their
own base.
Long distance bomb-
ing.
Machine-gun attack of
ground forces.
Long distance bomb-
ing, usually by night
Infantry or attack
Dirigibles
200—3,000
Very High
There are two cases of defense to be considered; namely, front lines
and back areas.
Front line defense is based on the anti-aircraft regiment. First, there is
the gun area. About 1,200 to 2,000 yards in rear of our front lines are
placed two rows of anti-aircraft machine guns, followed by two lines of
anti-aircraft artillery from 2,000 to 5,000 yards in rear of the infantry's
first line, each battery being accompanied by one searchlight. In rear of
the gun area comes the airplane area, extending about 25,000 yards to
the rear of the first line, provided with anti-aircraft searchlights and pa-
trolled and defended by our pursuit planes. Still further to the rear each
army is charged with the defense of all railheads, depots, parks, dumps, and
headquarters in its own area.
The civilian is naturally more interested in the defense of rear areas,
such as large cities. For such places, anti-aircraft artillery is disposed
along probable lines of approach, and also in one or more complete rings
around the area. The outer ring may be 25,000 yards from a great city,
while other batteries may be disposed within the city itself. Anti-aircraft
machine guns are placed at bridges, important factories, and so forth.
Searchlights and listening posts play an important part. Smoke screens
and painted scenery may be used. Pursuit squadrons are located at
suitable places.
All of these elements are linked up by an intricate network of wireless,
telegraph, and telephone communications, which also connect with observa-
tion and listening posts placed at intervals all the way to the theater of
operations. In future, this system may be supplemented by radio from
our own planes. Thus, when an enemy plane crosses our lines, the head-
quarters in rear are kept informed of its progress. At the anti-aircraft
defense headquarters in Paris, for example, everything centered in the
office of a general whose sole task was the command of the anti-aircraft
defense. A great map showed the location of every battery and airdrome,
and on this was traced the course of the invading planes. A light flashed
on for each unit as it went into action. Often the attack was defeated at
such a distance from the city that it was not necessary to sound the alarms
which sent citizens scurrying into cellars and subways.
So much for organization and tactics. As the difficulties of anti-air-
craft artillery and machine gun fire have been emphasized, let us pause for
a moment to examine into the actual accomplishments of these two ele-
ments. Since the vulnerable part of an airplane consists of less than two
cubic yards, relatively few direct hits can be expected. However, anti-
aircraft fire, if uncomfortably close to the pilot, forces him to change his
course or to fly considerably higher, and he is unable to photograph,
observe, bomb, or machine-gun ground formations with full efficiency.


  p. 2389 (#1353)                      

1925]
2389
Professional Notes
Moreover, if he changes course or altitude, he is liable to become sepa-
rated from the other planes in his unit, and is then easy prey for our
pursuit planes.
Many pursuit pilots forget that their own experience forms no fair
criterion, as the pursuit plane is the hardest to hit and, moreover, can do
the least damage to anything on the ground; while the primary mission
of anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns is to protect ground formations.
Our battalions in France made a splendid record, shooting down fifty-
nine planes; forty-one of these were shot down by two anti-aircraft
machine-gun battalions (total ninety-six guns) at an expenditure of 5,491
shots per plane brought down. The value of special training is shown by
the fact that during the same period there were about 1,500 other guns
of the same type along the front; these, not being manned by specially
trained personnel, brought down only two planes, as far as is known.
Our anti-aircraft artillery brought down eighteen planes at an expendi-
ture of 1,050 shots per plane.*
It is encouraging to compare these figures with the statistics of deaths
(not wounds) caused by artillery and rifle fire in terrestial combat. In
the World War, it took 395 Allied shells to kill one German. In the
Franco-Prussian War, it required 1,100 bullets to kill a man.
But the wartime records of anti-aircraft fire have since been surpassed
in the most astounding manner. In firings at Fort Monroe, where the
target was a sleeve 20 feet long and tapering from 4 feet to 21/2 feet in
diameter, towed by an airplane, the anti-aircraft machine gunners last
year made seventeen hits in 9,000 shots, or one hit for every 530 shots.
On a similar target, 6 feet shorter, the artillery made two hits out of
118 shots, or one hit for every 59 shots. Of course, the conditions were
more favorable than would be the case in war; but even so, the record is
truly remarkable. Great things may be expected when an improved fire
control system is developed.
At the same post, searchlights, working on information provided by a
paraboloid listening apparatus, were able to pick up Navy planes and Army
Martin bombers in less than twenty seconds after the lights began search-
ing.
Finally, to show the efficiency of a well-rounded defense system in
actual war, we may cite the statistics covering all night bombing raids on
Paris in the year of 1918. In this year, no less than 483 German planes
attacked the French capital; thirteen of these were shot down, and only
thirty-seven flew above the city itself, dropping a total of only 11,680
kilograms of bombs. Yet the Germans announced that 22,000 kilograms
fell on Paris in a single raid, the night of September 15-16.*
From the moment that he crossed his own lines, a German pilot was
harassed by searchlights, aircraft and artillery fire, until, discouraged, he
dropped out of his formation, released his bombs on the nearest village,
and sped for home.
If the coast artillery corps, operating anti-aircraft artillery, listening ap-
paratus, searchlights, machine guns, and the information service, and
assisted by the Air Service in patrol and pursuit work, can give as good
protection to American cities as the French gave to Paris, we shall have
reason to be proud; and if Congress will only give the Army men and
money in sufficient quantities, we can do it.
*These statistics were furnished the author by the Coast Artillery Jour-
nal, and were compiled from the records of the Chief of the Anti-aircraft
Service of the A. E. F.
*L'Illustration, March 22, 1919.


  p. 2390 (#1354)                      

2390
(Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
ENGINEERING
The Wing Rotor
The Shipbuilder, October, 1925.—Another form of wind motor utilizing
windpressure effects in a manner similar to the Flettner rotor has been
developed by Engineer-Captain Sigurd J. Savonius, of Helsingfors, Fin-
land, and designated the wing rotor. In the case of the Flettner design,
the rotor is cylindrical in section and is rotated by power supplied from
an external source. In the wing rotor, the section is formed by two half
cylinders disposed as shown in Fig. 3. By this arrangement, the inventor
states, rotary motion is produced by the wing rotor itself, as well as the
so-called Magnus-pressure effect, and no external source of power is
needed for operation. The design is the outcome of a long series of ex-
periments with models. From these experiments it was found that the
Magnus-pressure effect gave a propulsive force three times greater than
that of a sail of equal area, and it was therefore decided to test the wing
rotor on a small craft. For this purpose a small boat of 5 meters length
and 1.8 meters beam (Fig. 4) was fitted with two wing rotors made of
galvanized sheeting and having a projected area of 1.87 square meters
each. The rotors had a width of 67 centimeters and a height of 280 centi-
Fig. 3.-SECTION OF WING ROTOR
meters. The end plates were 88 centimeters in diameter. The wings were
pivoted on the end plates, and their position could thus be reversed.
The best point of sailing was found to be with the wind just abaſt the
beam. In a breeze of 7 meters per second (about 15 miles per hour) the
boat attained a speed of 5 knots. In a 10 meters per second wind the speed
averaged 6 knots, the two wing rotors developing a propulsive power
equal to 3-4 h.p. Tacking was accomplished by reversing the wings.
Going with the wind the rotors could be stopped, then acting as ordinary
sails.
The question whether the rotor will eventually find application for ship
propulsion must be left open, as the trials are only beginning. There
seem to be possibilities that the wing rotor can with advantage be used
on motorships as an additional source of power under favorable wind
conditions. When not in use, the wings of the rotors can be closed up, and
in this position offer very little resistance to the air when the ships is
inoving under motor power alone. Eventually, the wing rotor can be
lowered into a horizontal position.
Another way to use the wing rotor in a ship would be to utilize its
torsional power to drive cylinder rotors. A ship could, for instance,
have three rotors-a wing rotor amidships and cylindrical rotors in the
bow and stern. Besides supplying the power needed to turn the cylindrical


  p. 2391 (#1355)                      

1925)
2391
Professional Notes

Fig. 4.-Boat FITTED With Wing ROTORS
rotors, the Magnus force of the wing rotor would also add to the aggre-
gate driving power.
It is also possible to use a combination of a wing rotor and a cylindrical
rotor by having a smaller wing rotor directly on the top of the cylinder,
the former rotating the latter.
In comparison with the cylindrical rotor, it is claimed, the wing rotor
has two decided advantages. One is that it supplies its own rotating power,
needing no complicated and expensive power plant with motors, dynamos,
and wiring. Another is that wing rotor has quite an appreciable driv-
ing force even when sailing with the wind, and when the cylindrical rotor
has practically no effect. Against these advantages must be set the dis-
advantages of a greater size for equal power, and a more complicated
construction of the rotor proper.
The Position of British Marine Engineering*
The Engineer, 9 October, 1925.—Having in mind the condition of the
shipbuilding and engineering industry, I have decided to give a brief
running review of the present position, as compared with that immediately
preceding the Great War.
*From the presidential address to the Institution of Engineers and Ship-
builders in Scotland, October 6, 1925.


  p. 2392 (#1356)                      

2392
[Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Today there are about ninety-six shipyards in Britain, a number of
which have marine engine works associated with them. In thirty of
these yards there is not a single keel laid; in fifteen any work in hand is
rapidly nearing completion; while the remaining works are barely Oc-
cupied beyond one fourth of their capacity. The present serious condition
of the shipbuilding industry will be understood when it is known that the
number of building berths in this country today is 20 per cent more than
in the year preceding the war, and only 28 per cent of the berths are
occupied, while the percentage of unemployed workmen is between 30 and
40, which is really appalling.
The gross tonnage of merchant vessels building at the end of June last
in Great Britain and Ireland was about 1,100,000 as compared with 1,900,000
building during the twelve months preceding the war. In 1913 about
3,333,000 tons were launched, of which almost 2,000,000 were built in
Britain and her colonies, while the world's work in hand in June last was
slightly over 2,333,000 tons. Of this, 1,100,000 tons is being built in Great
Britain and Ireland. That is to say, in 1913 we built about 60 per cent
of the world's output, while at the present time we are building only 46
per cent. Our leading competitors, in order of tonnage building at the
end of June, were Germany, Italy, France, Holland, and the United States.
Various reasons are urged as accounting for the decline in home ship-
building and the increase abroad, such as rates of exchange, working hours,
subsidies, and working conditions generally. No doubt the general posi-
tion abroad is somewhat exceptional, and as these conditions tend toward
normal, the pendulum will swing back in our favor, but we are bound to
accept the conclusion that we cannot possibly regain the position in which
we were able to account for 60 per cent of the world's output.
An examination of the ownership of the world's tonnage today, as com-
pared with the ownership in 1914, will help us to realize this. The world's
tonnage in 1914 was 42,500,000 gross; today it is 58,750,000. The percen-
tage owned in Britain in 1914 was 44%2; today it is under 33. The United
States, which owned just over 4 per cent of the world's tonnage in 1914,
today owns about 20 per cent. The other leading countries, in order of
tonnage owned are Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, and Norway.
Germany now owns 2,100,000 tons less than in 1914. During the year
ending in June last the tonnage owned has increased; in Great Britain
and Ireland by 330,000 tons, in Italy by about 200,000 tons, and in Norway
by about 166,000 tons. A considerable reduction is shown in the United
States tonnage owned, which is now over 500,000 tons less than a year ago.
When the abnormal conditions arising from the war disappear, these figures
will no doubt tend towards the proposition existing in 1914, but a complete
restoration cannot be expected.
Before passing from the question of the world's supply of tonnage, it
is interesting to look for a moment at the rate of depletion of the world's
merchant tonnage. Recently Lloyd's published a statement of the number
of vessels broken up, which is tabulated as under. It will be noted that
the figures vary to an enormous extent from year to year.
Years
Minimum tons
Maximum tons
1905-1909
..120,003
.........251,900
1915-1920 .............. 87,737 ..................245,891
1915-1920 ...... In these years practically no tonnage was broken
up, the yearly average amounting only to 10,000 tons.
1921
77,500 tons
1922
315,000 tons
1923
....... 963,000 tons
1924 ......
. 1,174,005 tons
The most recent returns show a decided falling off in the amount of
tonnage being broken up. I suggest that the shipbuilder and shipowner
1923
.............................


  p. 2393 (#1357)                      

1925]
2393
Professional Notes
should jointly consider, in their common interests, what is the best method
of disposing of old and inefficient tonnage. As time goes on it becomes
more apparent that we should take a more corporate view of this and other
cognate subjects. We act too much independently and unheedingly of one
another, to our mutual disadvantage. Could old and obsolescent ships not
be offered in part payment for new ships, instead of being sold to foreign
competitors for sums, in many cases, not much more than their scrap
value? Our position among the nations as owners and builders would
thus be conserved.
There is no doubt that to a large extent the tonnage owned by foreign
countries has been swollen by the acquistion of ships from this country
which were already more or less inefficient. They can, however, success-
fully compete with British ships, as their national requirements are not
so stringent as ours, and much lower wages are paid than in Britain. As
these obsolescent ships disappear, the balance can only be maintained by
the purchase of new tonnage. Our hope is that we shall be able to establish
our old position of the most economical shipbuilding and engineering coun-
try, as the conditions presently affecting the production of foreign tonnage
disappear.
The following statement of the employment of coal and oil fuel at the
present time, as compared with 1914, is also published by Lloyd's, and is
interesting:
1914
1925
Percentage of Percentage of
total gross total gross
tonnage. tonnage.
Sailing vessels and sea-going barges ........ 8.06
3.5
Oil, &c., in internal combustion engines ...... 0.45
4.2
Oil fuel for boilers .....
.... 2.65
27.54
Coal
....... 88.84
64.76
It will thus be seen that 6434 per cent of the tonnage of the merchant
marine now depends entirely upon coal, while in 1914 the percentage was
nearly 89, and the use of fuel oil has increased from 3.1 to 31.74 per cent.
These figures give an indication of what may be looked for in the next
decade in the use of oil. The tonnage of motor vessels now building in
the world amounts to 1,125,000, while the tonnage of steam vessels under
construction is 1,100,000, that is, the tonnage of motor driven vessels is
102 per cent of the steam-driven vessels. At the end of June last in
Great Britain and Ireland the tonnage of motor vessels amounted to 58
percent of the steam tonnage under construction. In Denmark, Germany,
Holland, Italy, and Sweden the motor tonnage under construction greatly
exceeds the steam tonnage, the combined totals for these five countries
being 250,000 tons of steamers, and 625,000 tons of motor ships. The
world's figures include 115 motor ships between 5,000 and 10,000 tons, five
between 10,000 and 15,000 tons, and seven between 15,000 and 25,000 tons.
The economic side of the Diesel oil engine has never been clearly
stated. Throughout the whole history of the motor ship it has apparently
been proved on paper that, since the amount of fuel required by a motor
ship is from one third to one fifth of that required by a coal-fired ship,
the savings can be nil, as the prices of coal and oil, at any rate in home
ports, are in the same proportion. These, after all, are facts which only
the shipowner can give, and it is to be again regretted that shipowners
generally do not act corporately with us and take a greater part in the
affairs of our Institution, giving to the constructors the benefit of their
actual commercial experience. The fact remains that on a great number
of our important trading routes the motor ship is today showing enormous
economies over steamers, and whilst shipowners will not put their cards
on the table yet, the mere fact of repeated and consistent construction of


  p. 2394 (#1358)                      

2394
[Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
this type of vessel is satisfying evidence. The explanation, no doubt, is
that with the motor ship contracts for oil fuel are obtained by shipowners
at a very much lower rate per ton than is published. The savings with
motor engines in reduced stand-by losses, much more economical working
of cargo, reduced cost of personnel, and increased deadweight, have a
very marked bearing on the balance sheet of the ship.
On the other hand, quadruple-expansion reciprocating engines with high
pressure steam, and the high superheat which can be safely used with
valve gear of the poppet type, associated with intensive preheating and
feed-water heating, is a proposition well worthy of study, in which there
may be great possibilities, such as shortening the engine-room length, and
reducing the fuel consumption by an amount greater than that achieved
by the turbine when it was first introduced
Thornycroft Shallow-Draught Ship for China
The Marine Engineer and Motorship Builder, October, 1925.-Trials
were successfully carried out at Southampton on Monday, September 7,
of the Fushun, a twin-screw shallowdraught cargo and passenger boat,
designed and built by John I. Thornycroft and Company Limited, to the
order of Fung Kan Yu, of Hongkong, for service on the Upper Yangste
River of China. Very special problems are involved in the construction
of a vessel to trade on this river. The stretch between Ichang and
Chungking, some 1,400 miles inland, involves extraordinary difficulties.
GO
THD
Domeng...E
OUTLINE PROFILE OF THE SHALLOW-DRAUGHT STEAMER “FUSHUN."
The fall of the river between these two places is no less than 476 feet in
the distance of 400 miles, or an average gradient of over 14 inches a mile.
Owing to this fall and also because the river is confined in narrow gorges
or ravines, there are some 35 rapids where the current will at times exceed
6 knots, and in the most difficult of these rapids the current may attain
the extraordinary rate of 13 knots. The rapids vary very greatly with the
height of the river, some improving and others getting worse with a fall
in level. This stretch of river would probably be labelled as unnavigable
were it not such an essential artery, and the one outlet for the trade of an
immense area, for the Yangste is to China what the Mississippi and the
Amazon and the Platte are to North and South America. So important is
the traffic on this great highway that before the war it was estimated that
some 10,000 junks were trading between Ichang and Chungking. These
junks are considered to do good business if they make two trips per annum.
The upstream journey may take three months while the downstream trip
will be accomplished in from six to twelve days. Moreover, a relatively
large crew is required, the bigger junks carrying over one hundred men.
Of these probably eighty will be landed at the rapids and these will "track"
or haul the junk upstream by immense tow ropes. The remainder will


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Professional Notes
be employed in fending off from from rocks, and in working huge sweeps.
The first commercial vessel to ply unaided through the rapids was the
steamer Shu-Tung, built by Thornycroft in 1909. The success of this
vessel proved the possibility of regular services and opened the upper
river to steam navigation.
so SAN
STORE
HORNYCROFT
BOILER
U517 FAN ENGINE
W
18 & 326
STROKE
PUMP
FLCD
ENGINE
ROOM
STOKE HOLO
CONDENSER
ENGWEERS
STORE
AIR
UMP PM
VOCK
MACHINERY ARRANGEMENT
.................
High speed, shallow draught, and extreme handiness are essential fea-
tures for vessels of this type, while definite limits of length are set by
reason of the sharpness of some of the bends. In addition to the problems
imposed on builders by the physical characteristics of the river, there is
the question of providing a sufficient deadweight carrying capacity to enable
the vessel to trade profitably. The principal dimensions of the Fushun
are as follows:
Length overall ........
147 ft. 8 in.
Breadth, mld.
28 ft.
Depth, mld. ..
8 ft. 6 in.
Draught, mean F.W. .....
6 ft.
Deadweight ........
103 tons.
Deadweight on 5-ft. draught .......
210 tons.
Deadweight on 6-ſt. draught ......
23,000 cub. ft.
Measurement of cargo space about
43 officers and crew.
Complement .......
136 passengers.
Speed (oil loaded).
. 13.5 knots.
Speed (coal loaded) ....
13.5 knots.
The vessel is built of Siemens-Martin mild steel, and has a cut-away
fore-foot of a type suitable for working in the rapids of the river. The
stern protects the rudders, which pass up through the counter and are
suspended on glands with ball bearings. A pole mast is fitted to carry
headlights and for signalling purposes. The hull is divided into nine
compartments by means of eight transverse bulkheads, and a trimming
tank is placed forward of No. I hold. There are three decks, i.e., main deck,
passenger deck, and sun deck. The passenger deck is arranged for twenty-
four first and fifty-four second-class Chinese passengers, and the neces-
sary cooking arrangements and lavatories are arranged on this deck. The
vessel can also carry fifty-four third-class passengers. The accommodation
for four Europeans is arranged at the fore end of the sun deck, with a
mess room with dining table, portable chairs, sideboard, and so forth. The


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
chief compradore is accommodated in a room placed aft of the first-class
Chinese state rooms on the passenger deck, and a stewards' room is on
the opposite side. The first-class Chinese saloon is arranged in the for-
ward deck-house on the passenger deck, with five four-berth and two
two-berth first-class Chinese state rooms; aft of this are also arranged two
two-berth cabins alongside the engine casing for accommodating passengers
or the ship's staff, as may be required. Electric bells are fitted up in all
the first-class passengers' and officers' rooms and also in the saloons. A
second-class saloon is allocated aft of the engine-room casing, and eight
second-class four-berth state rooms arranged in the aft deck-house. The
cabins for the captain, chief engineer, and a bathroom are arranged at
the fore end of the sun deck. The holds are conveniently arranged for
cargo.
The Stability of Ships
The Shipbuilder, October, 1925.—The findings of recent courts of in-
quiry into the loss of certain ships and the recommendations made as to
the need for more stringent supervision of the stability of vessels, it may
be expected, will lead to the authorities in this country taking some action
in this direction. The German authorities have already provided further
safeguards in the new rules of the Seeberufsgenossenschaft. That stability
is a vital factor in the safety of ships equal in importance to reserve
buoyancy and strength, which have long been subject to definite regula-
tions with general advantage, is not open to question. A difference in the
case of stability has been and is that, unlike the other factors mentioned,
it is very difficult to devise methods of efficient control which would not
greatly hamper the practical operation of ships. This latter consideration
makes it incumbent upon the authorities to proceed with great caution in
framing any new regulations concerning stability, and to avoid any require-
ments which might result in serious delays and restrictions without any
real gain in safety. The tendency of late years to treat such problems on
academic rather than on practical lines makes this no idle warning.
A practical treatment of the subject appears to lie consecutively in three
main directions:
(a) The provision for each ship of complete stability data for the
guidance of the officers in control.
(b) The correlation of experience as to a suitable standard for stability.
(c) The practical means for ensuring that an agreed standard is com-
plied with.
The provision of stability information for ships' officers is a matter
which should receive much more attention than is often given to it. The
position of the center of gravity of the ship in light condition should be
determined by an inclining experiment when she is new, and after any
subsequent alterations. The centers of gravity of all cargo holds and
ballast tanks should be stated, in addition to the height of the metacenter
above the keel at different draughts, so that the captain may work out
the metacentric height for any desired condition, making due allowance for
any free surfaces of water or oil on board. Some typical calculations for
different loading will help him in this connection. The provision of the
information referred to does not entail any serious labor or expense, and the
Board of Trade examining authorities should see that the training of ships'
officers is such that they possess the elementary knowledge required to
make use of such data.
The dissemination of stability data will facilitate the next step, which is
to collect reliable information as to actual stability conditions on service, so
that the probabilities may be weighed and a reasonable standard deter-
mined. The task could be undertaken by an informal committee appointed
by the Board of Trade in a similar manner to that adopted in the cases


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Professional Notes
of subdivision, freeboard, and other matters; or, alternatively, the work
could be undertaken by the Institution of Naval Architects or the leading
registration societies. The time and labor involved in compiling this data
would be considerable.
The last stage, that of enforcing the agreed standard, would also present
great difficulty. The only satisfactory procedure would appear to be the
actual demonstration, by some means analogous to the determination of
reserve buoyancy by freeboard, that the required metacentric height exists
apart from calculations, the latter only being used to determine changes
which will occur during a voyage through the consumption of fuel and for
other reasons. Such a demonstration could take the form of an inclining
experiment and Messrs. Alfred Holt and Company have stated in a letter
to the press that their new ships are being provided with tanks for this
purpose at a moderate expenditure. Another method has been suggested by
C. Frodsham Holt in his paper on “Stability and Seaworthiness” read
before the last meeting of the Institution of Naval Architects. Mr. Holt
proposes to use the ship's periods of oscillation as a criterion of the meta-
centric height, these previously having been calibrated by an inclining ex-
periment, and he states that his experiments in this direction have been
very promising. In the case of most ships, however, the conducting of an
inclining experiment or a rolling experiment under the stress of depar-
ture conditions would present great practical difficulty, both in regard to
obtaining reliable results and the delay involved.
Another suggestion which has been made is that the requirement should
be confined to a calculation showing a new vessel to have a required meta-
centric height when laden with homogeneous cargo occupying all the cargo
spaces and with the ship laden to the legal freeboard. While this might be
a convenient way way of evading the real issue, it would militate unfairly
against many highly successful types of ship, which are not designed to be
loaded in such a manner, and which have proved perfectly satisfactory as
regards stability when laden under the conditions for which they are de-
signed. Moreover, such a calculation would still not show the actual meta-
centric height with which a ship went to sea, and which through improper
loading might be worse even than the assumed condition with homogeneous
cargo.
Taking into account the difficulty of enforcing a standard, it may well be
that further procedure concerning stability practice should be confined to
the first two stages, i.e., the provision on board ship of full stability data,
and the formulation of a suitable standard for stability; the matter of
compliance being left to the judgment and control of the master. After
all, what may be termed the sea sense of efficient officers has proved a
satisfactory safeguard in the past in the great majority of cases; and
reliance upon some arbitrary procedure, rather than a cultivation of the
master's judgment, may do more harm than good. All these points of
view will have to be carefully considered before any definite action is taken.
MERCHANT MARINE
The Shipping Board and Admiral Palmer
The Nautical Gazette, 12 October, 1925.—If, perchance, there has been
any doubt as to the real value of the Shipping Board as an agency for the
development of an American merchant marine, that doubt has now been
dissipated. By its latest actions the Board has shown itself in its true
light. It stands revealed as a menace to American shipping. In re-
moving Admiral Palmer from the presidency of the Fleet Corporation it
has made him a victim of the personal jealousy and political spite of the
commissioners who opposed him. There are no justifiable grounds for
Admiral Palmer's removal. Commissioner Haney has offered three reasons


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[Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
for his own opposition ; first, he considered Admiral Palmer incompetent
from temperament and lack of experience to carry out the provisions of
the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 ; second, Admiral Palmer seemed deter-
mined not to confer with the Board upon any of the questions which came
within its province; and, third, Admiral Palmer seemed disposed to proceed
along lines independent of the Board's action. Commissioner Thompson
also thinks that Admiral Palmer is incompetent. The emptiness of these
reasons is very apparent when one considers Admiral Palmer's record. He
has done more during his term of office to sell ships, save money and to
place the Government's fleet on a businesslike basis than was accomplished
by the Board in the years prior to his appointment. These proferred reasons
are merely superficial excuses to cover up the cause of the real antagonism
to Admiral Palmer. The Board is nothing if not political, and, from its
standpoint, the American merchant marine can fall to pieces as long as it
can play its own political game and the commissioners can retain their
jobs. In the eyes of the Board, Admiral Palmer had great failings and
committed one terrible sin: He was not a politician, cared nothing for
politics and devoted his whole attention to promoting the American merchant
marine. Of course, if he desired to remain in the good graces of the
Board he should not have worked on the shipping problems but played
politics. That was his failing. His sin was that he sold ships. Every
ship in the Government's feet is a link in the chain holding the com-
missioners to their jobs. When all the ships are sold there will be no
need for a Shipping Board and there will be no more jobs at salaries of
$12,000 a year. Admiral Palmer launched a ship sale campaign that
disposed of more vessels during his term of office than the Board sold
since the war. This rapid liquidation of the Government's fleet became a
menace to the existence of the Shipping Board and the commissioners had
to put a stop to it to protect their positions. Because President Palmer has
endeavored to carry out faithfully the terms of the Merchant Marine Act
of 1920 and has honestly tried to solve the Government's shipping problem
he is a dangerous man in the eyes of the Board and, therefore, has had to
be removed.
The commissioners selected the most favorable time to take this action.
President Coolidge was away from Washington, and Commissioners Hill
and Lissner, two of Admiral Palmer's supporters, were not in the city.
This was an opportune time for Commissioner Haney to present his
resolution calling for the acceptance of Admiral Palmer's resignation. Just
why Chairman O'Connor refused to vote on this resolution, but voted in
favor of the appointment of a new Fleet Corporation president is not clear,
Reports from Washington state that the commissioners were highly elated
over their ability to remove Admiral Palmer. And well they might be.
Commissioner Plummer made some slurring remark about the necessity
for hiring a bricklayer to build a wall and not a ladies' tailor. Such a
statement comes with exceedingly bad grace from any member of the
Board. Commissioner Haney's tenure of office is uncertain since, as he
is serving under a recess appointment, it is doubtful whether President
Coolidge will submit his name to Congress for confirmation. It is more
than likely that he will be relieved of his office after Congress meets and
it must be a source of some satisfaction to him to know that he has been
instrumental in effecting Admiral Palmer's removal. Admiral Palmer's
success in the management of the Government's ships, in the face of the
limited authority granted him and of the obstacles thrown in his way by
the Shipping Board, demonstrates clearly that a one-man control is
infinitely better than control by a board, and Congress will render definite
aid to the American merchant marine if it will abolish the Board completely
and place the Government's shipping affairs in the hands of one capable
man.


  p. 2399 (#1363)                      

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2399
Professional Notes
Before the board removed Admiral Palmer it took good care to see that
the Fleet Corporation was deprived of all power of independent action in
the management of the ships. All the authority which the board had con-
ferred upon the corporation at the request of President Coolidge was
withdrawn, thus leaving the Fleet Corporation merely an agency of the
Board. It is clear, therefore, that the officials of the corporation will
have no say in the management of the Government's shipping affairs but
merely will be asked to carry out orders and institute policies of the
Board. Captain Elmer E. Crowley, the new head of the Fleet Corpora-
tion, is an experienced shipping man than whom there is none more capable.
He is a master mariner in sail and steam and knows the operating prob-
lems of American ships. He has held important executive positions in
shipping companies on shore and knows the administrative problems. In
matters of shipping, Captain Crowley is highly competent and if given a
fair chance could handle the Government's shipping affairs as well as
Admiral Palmer did. But, unfortunately, the Board will not give him
that opportunity. It has seen to it that he becomes the president of an
emasculated body which will be supposed to do nothing other than carry
out the board's wishes. As long as Captain Crowley does this he will have
smooth sailing, but the minute he attempts to inject some of his own
practical ideas into the scheme of things, tries to institute some policy,
which though beneficial, is contrary to the Board's wishes, or makes re-
commendations based upon sound business sense instead of on the Board's
desires, he will become persona non grata with the Board. As long as he
is willing to merely execute the Board's orders his relations with the
commissioners will be pleasant but the minute he does what his own good
business judgment and practical experience dictate he will go the way
Admiral Palmer has gone. This will be a great pity for there are few men
in the country who can handle the Government's shipping as efficiently
as Captain Crowley can.
It is generally admitted that the present Government fleet cannot last
for a great many more years and that if it is to remain an effective com-
petitor for world trade the old ships will have to be replaced by new and
more modern vessels. Commissioner Benson of the Shipping Board has
submitted to the Board a report recommending that the Government under-
take the construction of 30,000 tons of passenger vessels and 200,000 tons
of cargo vessels each year as a replacement program. His idea is that if the
existing fleets were to be improved by the addition of new vessels they could
be sold to private owners to better advantage. The great objection to this
plan is that it would result in the Government being more firmly intrenched
in the shipping industry and in the life of the Shipping Board being in-
definitely prolonged. The Government should withdraw from the shipping
business as soon as possible and nothing be undertaken that would delay
that withdrawal. There is no reason why ships and services should not be
sold in their present condition and the question of replacements be left to
the purchasers. The only argument against this procedure is that the
owners might not be in a financial position to construct new vessels and
that when the present fleets become obsolete there will be no tonnage to
take their place. This objection could be met by an arrangement whereby
the fleet would be sold in their present condition, thus getting them out
of the hands of the Government into private hands, and then when replace-
ments become necessary the Government would help the owners to finance
the construction of new vessels. The result would be the same as that
under Commissioner Benson's plan; new vessels would be added to the
American merchant marine for which the owners could pay out of the
earnings of the ships, and the fleets would be kept up to date.


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2400
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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Shipping Board Controversy
The Nautical Gazette, 17 October, 1925.-Observers outside the shipping
field see in the Shipping Board's definace of President Coolidge signs of a
political plot to embarrass the Administration. The Board has started an
economy campaign in the Fleet Corporation, cutting some salaries and refus-
ing to fill vacancies caused by resignations of Admiral Palmer's aides,
thereby hoping to create an impression that Admiral Palmer was ex-
travagant. This hits the President right on his own ground, and with
this action he cannot take issue. It is obvious, however, that this whole
procedure is mere camouflage on the part of the Board, for a few thou-
sand dollars lopped off salaries of personnel would be only a drop in the
bucket when compared with the Board's annual heavy financial losses.
The most effective economy must come from reduced operating costs, and
it was upon this phase that Admiral Palmer worked hardest. How well he
succeeded need not be stressed; some idea of his achievements in this
connection may be gathered from the fact that when he took office in
January of last year the Board's losses were in the neighborhood of
$40,000,000 per year, but for the fiscal year 1927 he estimated that an ap-
propriation of $18,000,000 would be all that would be necessary to cover
the Board's deficit. This estimate did not take into consideration two
routes which have been sold and five others which are being negotiated for.
With these services disposed of it was possible that Admiral Palmer could
have kept the deficit within $15,000,000. This matter of appropriation was
one of the rocks upon which the relations of the Board and Fleet Corpora-
tion finally split. While Admiral Palmer contended that $18,000,000 would
be sufficient to cover the deficit for the fiscal year 1927, the Board insisted
upon asking for an appropriation of $22,000,000, and Admiral Palmer's
refusal to recommend that figure was one of the reasons for his dismissal.
In view of these facts it is clear that the Board's present gesture towards
economy is nothing more than a move to cloud the real issues, and to conceal
its own shortcomings.Its talk of economizing by reducing salaries is an
attempt to discredit Admiral Palmer and to justify its action in removing
him from the presidency of the Fleet Corporation, but those who know the
true facts will not be deceived by such blundering methods, for it is well
known that during the twenty-one months he was in office Admiral Palmer
made a saving of $2,200,000 by cutting salaries which the Board had
authorized before he entered the arena and when it was exercising full
control over the Government's shipping.
Throughout the shipping depression the ships which have suffered least
are those belonging to industrial fleets. The tanker fleets belonging to the
large oil companies have kept running and the freighters belonging to and
carrying the products of the Steel Corporation have maintained their
schedules. A fleet of ships owned by and carrying the products of a large
industry does not have to rely so much upon outside shippers as does an
independent line of freighters; therefore, from the national standpoint,
it is a good thing for any merchant marine if large industries can be induced
to own and operate their own ships. For owners of independent services
the arrangement is harmful, as their ships are deprived of the opportunity
of carrying the products of the industry which owns its own ships. There
is an increasing tendency in the United States toward the creation of
industrial fleets. Henry Ford has recently entered the shipping business
by purchasing and operating freighters to carry his automobiles. This
week, according to advices from Washington, representatives of a com-
bination of automobile manufacturers, including the Dodge, Hudson, Chrvs-
ler, and Hupp, have opened negotiations with the Shipping Board looking
to the purchase of a fleet of from fifteen to twenty vessels to carry their
automobiles to foreign markets. If such powerful financial interests placed
a fleet of freighters on the ocean there is no doubt that the ships would be


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1925]
2401
Professional Notes
there to stay. This would mean that these companies would have to open
foreign agencies to solicit and secure freight for the return voyages and
this is the phase of the business which would cut deepest into the business
of the independent shipowners. There is, however, the consolation that
these ships would make formidable competitors of foreign vessels for the
world's trade.
MISCELLANEOUS
The Trade and Industry of Persia
Engineering, 25 September, 1925.—The recent announcement that a pow-
erful American group of banking and industrial interests are negotiating
to finance the construction of a railway from Tehran to the Persian Gulf,
in return for a concession of mineral rights, is a reminder of the present
singular position of Persian railways. Persia is a country about seven times
as large as the United Kingdom, and yet, as is fairly well known, it is still
practically without railways. Roads to a limited extent the country pos-
sesses, for its trade communications in every direction are ancient; but of
many of the roads little is left that is efficient, except the levying of tolls
upon travelers and traders. The system of roads is, in fact, entirely in-
adequate to the requirements of the country, and a large part of such roads
as exist are in the worst possible condition. Of all countries of economic
importance it seems to be the most deficient in means of transport.
Nevertheless the country itself not only possesses great natural riches,
but, as a recent report shows, does a considerable export and import trade,
and in some important respects is being administered admirably. It has called
in the help of American advisers in respect to its finances, and the reorgani-
zation effected with their assistance has been helped in practice by what is de-
scribed as a long-established and extremely efficient Belgian Customs Ad-
ministration. Customs duties yield over one third of the national revenue,
other indirect taxation one sixth, and royalties, paid by the Anglo-Persian
Oil Company, which work out at 16 per cent on the net value of its pro-
duction, a tenth. This company, moreover, spends in Persia four or five
times as much as it pays in royalties and supplies, in addition, a con-
siderable amount of products for use in the country, which would otherwise
have to be imported.
Since the introduction of the American financial advisers, the revenue has
invariably been in excess of the expenditure, and, moreover, while the
revenue has increased, the expenditure has decreased. The policy of cutting
the financial coat according to the cloth actually available is reflected also
in the latest statement of loans and advances issued by the Persian treasury
general in last October. The details are of no great interest, but in sub-
stance the effect of the statement is to show that the amount of the out-
standing debt is only about equal to six months of the country's present
revenue. Nearly two thirds of this is due to the British Government.
Trade, again, has grown steadily. It was of the value of some
£20,000,000 before the war, and in 1923-24 had risen to £32,000,000. This
rise, indeed, did not mean an increase in quantity, being more than repre-
sented by an increase in prices; but as against this, the exchange has steadily
improved, having risen from fifty-five krans to the pound before the war
to forty-nine and one-half in 1923, and an average of forty-two in 1925.
The balance of trade has also moved in favor of the couuntry. In round
figures the imports before the war exceeded the exports by some £4,000,000,
but in the first nine months of the financial year 1924-25, the exports ex-
ceeded the imports by about the same amount. The distribution of trade
has been changed considerably during the war, and does not yet appear to
have reached a stable position. Before the war 60 per cent of Persian trade
was done with Russia, and only 21 per cent with the British Empire, includ-


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2402
[Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
G
ing British India. In 1922-23 trade with Russia, which doubtless had
become almost negligible during the war period, stood at 10 per cent, while
that done with the British Empire .was 53 per cent, and, in 1923-24, trade
with the British Empire had increased to 57 per cent and with Russia to
18 per cent. Having regard to the considerable and beneficial influence that
has been exercised by the American financial advisers, it is interesting to
observe that Persian trade with the United States, which before the war
had been I per cent of the total figure, amounted to only 4 per cent in
1923-24, all but 5 per cent of which consisted of Persian exports.
The details given in the report under notice, while they confirm the
belief in the considerable possibilities of the Persian market, show ground
for some apprehension as to the extent to which its benefits will be en-
joyed by British trade. The total imports from the British Empire in
1923-24 amounted to something under £10,000,000, consisting chiefly of soft
goods. In these the competition of other countries is beginning to be felt,
and unfortunately as much may be said of the small trade that is being done
at present in metal manufactures. The total imports from the British
Empire of nails, screws, rivets, tubes, and so forth, was not much over
£200,000 and no British imports of other class of metal goods even amounted
to this. This figure, however, was considerably less than in the previous
year, owing to revived competition from Russia and Germany. The trade
in motor cars, such as it is, is almost entirely in the hands of the United
States, with a little from Italy.
The position, therefore, seems to be that Persia has set its house in order
so far as concerns its finances, that at present its international commerce is
in a stage that may be called rudimentary, compared with what might be
expected from the richness of the country, and that other countries are
showing more active anxiety than Great Britain, to get their share of such
business as is to be done. No doubt can be entertained but that the back-
wardness of Persian trade is due both primarily and mainly to the absence
of transport facilities. The cost of carriage of goods is fantastically high,
or at least, the rates would be fantastic if the difficulties to be overcome by
the carriers were not as great as they are. A correlative disadvantage,
which arises from insufficient means of communication, is that delivery
takes an inordinate time; and this is a circumstance that is the more detri-
mental to trade in a country where, as in Persia, the usual rate of interest
to firms of good standing in the bazaars is 12 per cent, and, from a mini-
mum of 7 per cent, may rise to an undefined maximum.
Primarily, therefore, the most likely opening in Persia for engineering
trade is in means of locomotion. The government program for the im-
provement of the roads involves an expenditure of more than £5,000,000,
in addition to the cost of maintaining the existing roads. Improved roads
will, of course, lead to increased demand for vehicles to deal with increased
trade. For a long time to come, however, Persia will have exceptional need
of road transport suitable to the hardest condition. The government ap-
pears to be anxious to facilitate the supply of vehicles, especially for indus-
trial traffic. The duty on motor cars and bicycles stands, indeed, at 15 per
cent ad valorem, but motor lorries are by a recent law admitted free. Persia
seems, therefore, as the report says, a virgin and rapidly expanding market
for cheap and strongly built cars and lorries with a considerable reserve
of engine power, a clearance of at least 10 inches, and (owing to the hump-
backed nature of culverts or local bridges, where such exist) not too long
a wheelbase. As in reports on other countries, great stress is laid on the
need for local agencies and depots for spare parts, which some American
and Italian manufacturers are already providing. Local garages will also
be required, for, except for Ford cars and a few other makes, the nearest
depots for spare parts are at Bagdad, Bombay, or even in Europe. The
Persian chauffeur is quick at learning, but generally a rough driver, while


  p. 2403 (#1367)                      

1925]
2403
Professional Notes
the owner seems to be attracted by what, over here, is best known as "spit
and polish."
Among other products likely to be in demand when communications im-
prove, are agricultural and textile machinery. The supply of charcoal,
which is the staple domestic fuel, is diminishing, and surveys of such sources
of water power as exist, with a view to hydro-electric development, are
suggested, as likely to have good results if satisfactory water supply can
be assured.
These recommendations appear to be based on the present course of trade.
What may be the extent to which trade will grow, when the country is pro-
vided with what without offense may be called a civilized transport system,
can hardly be predicted. About a fourth of the territory of Persia is richly
fertile, and a large proportion of the remainder is said to be of a light soil
that could be readily cultivated if it were only irrigated. The legal system
is slow, and commercial manners not well developed in all districts; but
here, again, the influence of improved communications could not fail to be
felt. It must be remembered, too, that though the people do not seem to
have any particular mechanical genius, they are the successors of an ancient
civilization, and at least elementary education is widely diffused throughout
the population.
Amphibian Operations
By Sir Herbert Russell, The Naval and Military Record, 30 September,
1925.-Now that fairly full accounts have come to hand in this country
regarding the Spanish landing at Alhucemas Bay, it is possible to study
both the strategical conception and the tactical development of this phase
of the campaign against the Riffs. It is the most interesting phase of the
operations, for, although the French offensive was on a bigger scale, this
was a purely military movement from a pre-existing line of advance. But at
Alhucemas the Spaniards had to gain a foothold against strong enemy
opposition, and the fact that they were heavily repulsed on the first attempt
is pretty clear evidence as to the nature of their task.
Certain of our newspapers have described this landing as the "Spanish
Gallipoli.” Without any desire to minimize the skill and valor of the Spanish
troops, I think the comparison is altogether extravagant. I do not know
Alhucemas Bay, but the photographs of the successful landing show it to
have been carried out across a very flat foreshore, sloping very easily up
from the surf and extending back beyond rifle range-how much beyond I
cannot say. I do know Gallipoli. The land all around Cape Helles con-
sists of bluff cliffs, with very small sandy beaches at their base. In many
places these bluffs are perfectly easy to climb, but they lend themselves most
effectively to defense. They are within easy range of artillery fire from
Kum Kale on the Asiatic shore. They can be dominated by batteries on
Achi Baba, to which the broken nature of the ground offers abundant con-
cealment. I have looked upon the small square shelter trench on the spot
at which the Essex men "scratched" themselves in at the top of their bloody
trail from where the River Clyde lay, and I could only marvel how they
ever got there.
But we may admit this similarity between the two landings; they were
both what is nowadays called “amphibian.” That is to say, warships cov-
ered the debarkation of the troops, thereby making the operations combined
undertakings by naval and military forces. The first covering attack by the
Spanish warships at Alhucemas failed to "smother" the enemy sufficiently
to enable the troops to maintain their foothold. The second, in which a
number of French ships took part, was more successful. I gather that the
character of the country hereabouts is very much more favorable to direct
fire than it was in Gallipoli. Moreover, the Allied warships had plenty


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(Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
of spotting aircraft. Had we been able to loose-off a hundred airplanes
when the fleet opened its bombardment upon Cape Helles, the landing of the
Twenty-Ninth Division would have been a very different affair.
When the truth about that great heroic exploit began to be known-or
rather guessed at from the terrible magnitude of the casualty lists—there
was a good deal of criticism at the comparative inadequacy of the naval
support to the landing. Apparently the general impression was that a great
fleet should be able to so plaster a given coast defense with projectiles as to
render the debarkation of troops a comparatively simple matter. The war-
ships "did their damnedest" in this respect. Their concentrated fire prob-
ably amounted to the nearest approach to a hurricane barrage which that
stage of the war had yet produced—at any rate on our side.
But we had yet to learn how the conditions of warfare had changed since
the fleet had last covered military operations on a big scale. The bombard-
ment of fortresses in the Dardanelles during the attempt to force the Straits
a month earlier had proved tolerably successful. Immense destruction had
been wrought against large, visible, solid targets. But the direct fire from
the ships passed almost harmlessly over the honeycomb of machine-gun
nests on the Helles cliffs, and the hidden field guns ranging between Krithia
and Sed-el-Bah. When it was all over we could see the cause of failure.
We wanted howitzers for high-angle fire, and airplanes, both to spot for
the gun-layers and to bomb on top of the puffs of vapor belching forth
from vineyards and gullies.
Amphibian operations under modern conditions of warfare call for the
largest possible measure of aerial cooperation. The Queen Elizabeth blazing
away from her 15-inch guns at anything she could see, or thought she could
see, was a magnificent spectacle, but the results were not worth the cost of
the ammunition. I do not say that many men both in the Navy and the
Army had not visualized the possibilities of amphibian operations, but there
had never been any serious rehearsal. Some combined maneuvers were
carried out on the east coast a few years before the Great War. They
furnished some good films to kinematograph operators and some excellent
pictures to the illustrated papers, but of instructional value they possessed
about as much as the naval maneuvers of thirty years ago did in the way of
showing what was going to happen at Jutland.
The fact is it had long been a tradition that it is not the business of the
Navy to engage land fortifications. In the age of very limited ranges this
was undoubtedly true. Indifferently protected ships, with a fire delivery of
two or three miles, were likely to come off badly in a duel with massive
fortifications, but the extraordinary development of gun power has changed
all that. Massive fortifications are no longer built these days, because they
cannot resist high explosive. The fate of Liege demonstrated this.
The Germans taught us the value of high-elevation gun mountings for
plunging fire in naval actions, and today our ships are very much better
equipped to support a military landing than they were in 1915. Students of
war will probably regret that the long-talked-of and fully-rehearsed am-
phibian attack upon Ostend was never delivered. The idea, it will be re-
membered, was to try and land an immense number of tanks under cover
of a smashing bombardment by the Navy. It is, perhaps, idle to speculate
upon what never can be proven. Had the attempt come as a surprise it
might have succeeded. In this case the right flank of the German Army
would have been rolled up from the coast, and we should have had to keep
Ostend open as a port of communication, which, I rather suspect, would
have proved a costly business.
Coming back to the Alhucemas operation, one could form a better esti-
mate of the achievement if one knew the strength of the opposing forces
and the gun power and dispositions which had to be subdued. I am pre-
pared to believe that the Riffs fight as well as the Turks and that they are


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2405
Professional Notes
being quite as well led. But the Spanish forces had what we so totally
lacked in Gallipoli—an effective aerial reconnaissance. Even so, they were
forced to withdraw after their first landing. From this I am rather dis-
posed to infer that the airmen had not done their reconnoitering very thor-
oughly, for aerial photographs and powerful magnifying glasses put a heavy
discount upon even the most skilful camouflage.
The recent grand maneuvers by the United States Pacific fleet were in
the nature of amphibian operations, a big landing of marines being carried
out at Hawaii. The umpires declare that the attack succeeded and that
the landing was made good, but there has been rather an unkind suggestion
that propaganda was one of the purposes of the demonstration, to persuade
Congress to vote more money for the defense of Hawaii. If the bombard-
ment was leveled against the static defenses of the place, it is not difficult
to believe that it did succeed.
Why does our own navy never carry out any rehearsals of this kind ?
The "reminiscence cruise" of the Mediterranean fleet among the islands
which figured so prominently during the Gallipoli campaign has no doubt
been very interesting, but of what instructional value was it? The present
system under which senior naval officers take courses at Army schools is
excellent, but it does not go nearly far enough in the way of amphibian
training. How do these officers apply the knowledge they thus acquire?
In the old days of naval brigades the sea service got more real experience
of amphibian warfare than it does now, when the principle of landing for
military purposes is altogether ruled out-and quite properly so, I think ;
for it is not the business of the navy to do soldiers' work. But it cer-
tainly is the Navy's business to enable soldiers to do their work so far as
the element of salt water can contribute to this result.
The most effective answer to my question, of course, would be coordina-
tion of supreme command of all the fighting services, still maintaining
decentralized administration. The navy and the army worked in splendid
comradeship during the Great War, but from time to time there arose the
crippling condition of divided counsels. Sir Ian Hamilton asked Sir John
de Robeck to "go on." Sir John de Robeck said he was not "going on."
Probably both were right, but campaigning on these lines holds very poor
assurance of success. One recalls Napoleon's dictum: “Either Kellerman,
or I, but not both in conjunction.”
A New Industry
The Gazette and Daily, York, Pennsylvania, 17 October, 1925.—The York
Oil and Chemical Company, incorporated under the laws of the state of
Pennsylvania, has just completed its plant near Richland Avenue, on the
Grantley property of the York Manufacturing Company. The company is
incorporated for $100,000 and has the following officers: Joseph L. Rosen-
miller, president; Charles H. Ehrenfeld, vice president; Thomas Shipley,
treasurer; Earle W. Gardner, secretary
The incorporation of this company was the result of two years of ex-
haustive service and laboratory tests on oils made by lubricating and re-
frigerating engineers in the test plant of the York Manufacturing Company
and in commercial plants.
The plant consists of a modern one-story steel and brick building, 126 feet
8 inches long by 76 feet 8 inches wide. On the north side of the building a
loading platform 17 feet wide extends the full length of the building, and
parallel with the railroad siding. This structure is partitioned off into office
space, oil laboratories, boiler and wash rooms, and extensive floor area de-
voted to the manufacture of oils for the lubrication of refrigerating
machinery.


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[Dec
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
This is the first company in the world incorporated for the purpose of
specializing in the manufacture of oils for the lubrication of ammonia and
CO, (carbon dioxide) compressors, it is declared. The plant contains the
most modern oil blending, purifying, and filling apparatus that can be had
Five steel storage tanks each of capacity of 12,500 gallons are used for
storage of stock oils. The building also contains approximately 1,000 feet
of pipe lines leading from tanks to blending kettles and purifying and filling
apparatus. This plant has a capacity of 2,500 gallons of refined oil per
day, and is now on a production basis.
The York Oil and Chemical Company is a subsidiary of the York Vanu-
facturing Company, and will market its oils through that company's ex-
tensive chain of selling agencies.
CURRENT NAVAL AND PROFESSIONAL PAPERS
"The Need for a Government Ship Replacement Program." By Admiral
Benson. The Nautical Gazette, October 3, et seq.
"Recent Development in Light Aluminum Alloys and Their Application"
The American Metal Market, September.
"Recent Progress in Flying Boat Design." Engineering, October 2.
“The Influence of Air Power on Coast Defense.” The Coast Artillery
Journal, October.
“Anti-Aircraft Artillery.” “The Supply, Training, and Organization
of Technical Specialists." "On Ottoman Subjects." The Journal of the
Royal Artillery, October.
"The Admiralty System of Higher Education.” Engineering, October


  p. 2407 (#1371)                      

NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
FROM OCTOBER 3 TO NOVEMBER 3
PREPARED BY
PROFESSOR ALLAN WESTCOTT, U. S. NAVAL ACADEMY
EUROPEAN SECURITY AGREEMENTS SIGNED
SUCCESSFUL RESULTS AT LOCARNO.—After ten days of earnest and often
critical negotiations, from October 5 to October 16, the prime ministers
of European states assembled in the little town of Locarno, Switzerland,
reached complete agreement on a series of treaties binding Germany to
peaceful settlement of disputes with the three chief nations on her frontiers.
The protocols were signed by the British, French, German, Italian, Polish,
and Czecho-Slovakian premiers on October 16. If the treaties were ratified
by the parliaments of the nations concerned it was planned that the final
signing should take place in London on December 1. The agreements
reached were as follows:
(1) The Rhineland Treaty, basically between France, Belgium, and
Germany, and guaranteed by England and Italy. This is a joint agreement
of Germany and France, and Germany and Belgium, to arbitrate all future
disputes, the provisions of the Versailles and other existing treaties re-
maining unaffected. Germany agrees to apply at once for admission to the
League of Nations, the Council meeting to receive her application in De-
cember. The present demilitarized Rhine Zone established by the Versailles
Treaty is to be held in violate by France and Germany unless one or the
other shall break certain provisions of the Versailles Treaty or League
Covenant bearing on the question. In case of unwarranted attack, Great
Britain and Italy pledge aid to the nation attacked.
(2) A technical arbitration treaty between Germany and France.
(3) A similar treaty between Germany and Belgium.
(4) An arbitration treaty between Germany and Poland.
(5) An arbitration treaty between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia.
Subordinate to and facilitating these treaties, certain other agreements
were made: First, France and Poland, and France and Czecho-Slovakia
entered into mutual agreements which in effect guaranteed support against
Germany in case of her violation of the arbitration agreement. Second, the
Allied powers conceded to Germany: that upon her entry into the League
special regard would be given to her disarmed condition in calling upon her
to fulfill military and economic obligations; that if possible she should be
given a mandate (probably one of her former colonies) ; that the evacuation
of Cologne should be hastened and improvements made in the government
of the Saar Valley.


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2408
[Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
The agreement was generally hailed as a promise of bringing France and
Germany together, furthering peace in central Europe, strengthening the
League of Nations, and isolating Bolshevism.
EFFECT IN BERLIN.—Premier Luther and Foreign Minister Stresemann,
the German representatives at Locarno, were warmly greeted upon their
return to Berlin, but not by leaders of the Nationalist party. In token of
their opposition to the treaties, several Nationalist members withdrew
from the Luther Cabinet. Minister Stresemann gave assurance that a large
majority in the Reichstag approved the agreements and would insure their
ratification.
GREEK-BULGARIAN HOSTILITIES HALTED
European diplomacy was startled on October 20 by news of threatened
hostilities between Greece and Bulgaria arising from a clash on the frontier
between Greek and Bulgarian troops on the night of October 19-20. Fears
were left lest the intensely nationalistic military leaders who had recently
assumed power in Greece, were deliberately employing the affair to bring
on war.
Pending official investigation, the facts of the clash remained obscure.
From the conflicting reports of the two governments it appeared that a
Greek soldier was shot by a Bulgarian sentry on Bulgarian soil. Efforts
of the Greeks to secure the body led to a general fusilade by troops of both
nations. Greece then sent a 48-hour ultimatum demanding apology, punish-
ment, and a two million gold franc indemnity. Upon Bulgaria's refusal,
Greek troops occupied several Bulgarian towns.
In the meantime Bulgaria telegraphed an appeal to the League of Na-
tions. Aristide Briand, as President of the League Council, on October 23
sent messages to both Athens and Sofia inviting envoys to a session of the
Council set for October 26 and exhorting both nations to withdraw their
troops behind the frontiers pending the meeting.
At the session of the Council a resolution was adopted requesting the
Greek and Bulgarian Governments to inform the Council within twenty-
four hours that their troops had been given absolute orders to remove within
their respective frontiers, and to inform the Council within sixty hours that
all hostilities had ceased. Military officers of Great Britain, France, and
Italy were sent to the scene to see that these terms were carrid out. Both
Greece and Bulgaria acquiesced. On October 29, upon the arrival of the
military representatives of the powers, the Greek evacuation was carried out.
A special commission headed by Sir Horace Rumboldt, British ambassa-
dor to Spain, and including representatives of France, Italy, Sweden, and
the Netherlands, was appointed to leave Geneva on November 6 in order to
fix responsibility for the outbreak and make a report to the Council at its
meeting on December 12.
FORCE BEHIND League ActION.—(From New York Times of October
30.)-Success of the League effort this week cannot be charged up entirely


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1925)
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Notes on International Affairs
to the force of moral suasion. There was more involved. England and
France meant just what they said when they sent word to the Greeks to
get out of Bulgaria in sixty hours.
When Austen Chamberlain arrived in Paris on Monday he was closeted
with M. Briand for two hours. The British foreign minister is understood
to have laid down the proposition that the Council must approach the situa-
tion resolyed to go through with it. He is said to have stated the British
Government was ready, if either party resisted the League, first, to break
off diplomatic relations; second, to break off economic relations; third, to
make a fleet demonstration; fourth, to blockade the ports.
It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that the Athens government knew
this attitude of the British foreign secretary, with which the French de-
clared themselves in agreement and subsequently the whole Council approved.
It is understood that in League circles discussion of eventualities led to
a consideration of what would happen if any such League blockade inter-
fered with American shipping, even in an isolated case. It is said that
such an incident would probably be avoided, but if it arose it was the opinion
of League members that neither the American Government nor American
public opinion would wish to make a big issue out of the possible incon-
venience arising out of the League's efforts to prevent war, to which purpose
Washington could not possibly be opposed in principle.
FRANCE
CAILLAUX DROPPED FROM CABINET.–At the close of October it became
necessary for Premier Painlevé to force out of his cabinet Finance Minister
Caillaux, whose financial policies, and especially his opposition to a capital
levy, had aroused increasing dissatisfaction both in the Chamber and
within the cabinet. Upon M. Caillaux's refusal to resign alone, the entire
cabinet resigned, but was immediately reorganized by Premier Poincaré
with ten of his former colleagues and four new members, two of whom
were in the Herriot Cabinet. These additions secured at least temporary
support from the Socialists, though the fate of the ministry remained at
the mercy of any sudden combination of the extreme Right or Left. Premier
Painlevé himself took over the Ministry of Finance, but with another minis-
ter in charge of the budget. It was reported that the new government
favored some form of capital levy, as the only means of relieving the present
fiscal situation, although such a measure would probably be defeated in the
French Senate.
TROUBLE OF FRANCE IN SYRIA.—The difficulties of France in her man-
date of Syria arising from the revolt of the Druse tribesmen, were in-
creased in the latter part of October by a revolt within the capital city of
Damascus. Pan-Arab and other anti-French elements in the city, taking
advantage of the absence of French troops in the Druse campaign, created
disturbances and led the French forces on October 18-20 to bombard the
city from forts on the outskirts of the town. Although foreign residents
had been warned, the bombardment caused some loss of life and considerable
damage to property.
The alleged blundering and tactlessness of the French governor, General
Sarrail, both in this affair and the Druse uprising, led to demands at home


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2410 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings [Dec.
for his recall. On October 31 the Permanent Mandates Commission of the
League of Nations asked France for official comment on the petitions and
protests filed with the League as a result of the Damascus bombardment.
FRENCH LOSSES IN COLONIAL WARS.—According to a report by a com-
mittee of the French Chamber, France has lost 3,000,000,000 francs and
17,000 men since taking over the protectorate of Morocco and the mandate
over Syria (1920). In Morocco 2,176 were killed and 8,297 wounded, and in
Syria 6,626 killed, wounded, or missing. The cost in Morocco was about
one billion francs and in Syria two billion. The premier said he would ask
300,000,000 francs additional credits for the Morocco campaign for the
period July-December.
In Syria the losses in the Druse campaign have been 585 killed, wounded,
and missing, of which about half were French soldiers.
ITALY
PROGRESS OF FASCISMO.-(From Time, October 19.)-Last week (Octo-
ber 12-19] Fascismo took a new and overwhelming stride toward dominance
in Italian affairs. Announcements on three successive days outlined a pro-
gram of absolutism which the Fascisti have called "the third wave of the
Fascist revolution." The announcements were as follows:
One. An agreement has been made between the Italian Confederation
of Industry (representing practically all Italian employes) and the Con-
federation of Fascist Trade Unions, to the effect that in all employer-em-
ploye disputes the two confederations are to regard each other as having
the sole right to represent respectively all Italian employers and all Italian
workingmen.
By this agreement the Socialists, who for thirty years have assumed to
themselves the right to champion and defend the working class, are ruled
out of practically all labor disputes. The Fascists declare that the measure
will put an end to the Socialists' attempts to start a Marxian class war,
and will bring about the realization of the Fascist ideal of class collaboration.
Two. The Mussolini Cabinet approved a bill providing that henceforth
the Mayor of Rome and the mayors of all Italian municipalities of less than
5,000 inhabitants will be superseded by officers appointed by the Central
Government. Thus the electorates of the towns affected will have practically
no voice in the administration of their local affairs.
The Fascisti assert that this "reform" is made necessary by the fact that
Italians are frequently swayed by passion at local elections, and do not
return to office such able men as the Central Government would set over
them.
The proposed officials are likened to the "Podestas" of the early Italian
republics, who were Governors possessed of extensive powers.
Three. Several interlocking measures were likewise approved by the
Fascist Council of Ministers which are intended to alter the whole political
structure of Italy. What is proposed is that the Senate shall be gradually
transformed from a body the members of which are appointed by the King,
into an elective assembly whose members shall be representatives of various
organizations recognized by the Fascist government, chiefly agriculturalists,
industrialists, and workingmen. At the same time the power of the Senate
would be increased, so that it would eventually become the more important
of the two houses of Parliament.
Significance. Premier Mussolini undoubtedly intends to throw his whole
influence behind this program. And he will have a united Fascist party


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1925)
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Notes on International Affairs
at his back. It is considered that the "reforms” have a very good chance
of being imposed upon Italy.
ATTACKS ON MASONS.—During the same week, in Florence, Fascists
killed and wounded a number of Freemasons and plundered and burned the
houses of members of the order. Press reports stated that a Mason had
previously shot and killed a Fascist leader. The head of the Masonic Order
in Italy issued notice from Rome that meetings and activities were to cease
until "the law abolishing secret societies shall be made void.”
GREAT BRITAIN
PREMIER BALDWIN'S POLICIES.—(From Time, October 19.)–At the an-
nual convention of the British Conservative Party at Brighton, Premier
Baldwin spoke in support of the policies of his government. He was full
of calming assurances that Britain is not so badly off as alarmists declare.
A striking feature was Mr. Baldwin's assertion that "Great Britain means
to stay in Mosul and Iraq .... and will cooperate with the Iraq Govern-
ment to insure the stability and progress of that country until such time as
our help is no longer needed.'
He denied that a Turko-British crisis is impending, declaring that Britain
is still willing to arbitrate the question of whether Iraq or Turkey shall
eventually possess Mosul, indicated that he believes the League of Nations
and the Hague Court will be able to induce Turkey to fulfill the obligation
which Englishmen consider she assumed at Brussels last October.
Commenting upon European affairs he declared for “regional compacts"
and the entrance of Germany into the League as a force for World Peace.
Next he touched upon domestic affairs, admitted that he had instituted
the much criticized coal subsidy with reluctance, but defended it as better
than the alternative of subjecting England to "a crippling industrial
struggle.” He replied as follows to those Conservatives who urged that
the British Government crush British communism by Fascist tactics : "I've
been told that this country wants a Mussolini. I have great respect for the
chief minister of a great country like Italy, but I know the temperament of
my own people. The English people will never tolerate a dictator. The
English people will never tolerate being Prussianized, nor, may I add,
Russianized.”
He gave assurances, however, that "any attempt to seduce the loyalty
of the nation's armed forces” would be strongly dealt with.
UNITED STATES DEBT SETTLEMENTS
Czecho-SLOVAKIAN DEBT AGREEMENT.-On October 6-9 agreement was
quickly reached between the United States Debt Funding Commission and
the representatives sent to Washington by Czecho-Slovakia. The settlement
fixed a compromise figure of $115,000,000 (two million less than the Ameri-
can estimate) as the debt total, with payments extending over sixty-two
years and interest at 3 per cent for ten years and 372 per cent thereafter.
The amount of the payments will be $3,000,000 a year for eighteen years and
about $6,000,000 in the years following.
ITALIAN MISSION IN WASHINGTON.—The Italian Debt Commission to the
United States arrived in Washington on November 2. It was headed by
Count Volpi, and included five other members.


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2412
[Dec.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
CHINA
OPENING OF TARIFF CONFERENCE.—The Chinese Tariff Conference
opened on October 26 at the Winter Palace in Peking with many Chinese
delegates and representatives of twelve foreign powers. Minister John Van
A. MacMurray and Silas A. Strawn represented the United States. Out-
side the gates of the palace 2,000 students rioted against the Provisional
Government, killing a policeman and injuring a score more. The Chinese
proposals presented on the opening day were summarized in the press as
follows:
These ask that the powers restore tariff autonomy to China and accept
a new national Chinese tariff law, to take effect not later than January 1,
1929, setting schedules ranging between 772 and 40 per cent for most im-
ports and between 50 and 80 per cent for wines and tobacco. China would
then agree to abolish the likin, or taxes on interprovincial commerce.
The keynote of the replies of the powers was struck by Mr. MacMurray,
the American Minister, who said the United States was prepared to con-
sider openmindedly and generously any reasonable plan with a view to
realizing China's aspirations.
A statement of the rather conservative Japanese attitude was given by
Eki Hioki, who reminded the Chinese that Japan had won tariff autonomy
only after a struggle of fifty-three years, and that China could expect to
reach her goal only by successive stages. Mr. Hioki was the Japanese
Minister to Peking, who, in 1915, presented Japan's famous "twenty-one
demands" on China.
China's Civil War.—(Associated Press, October 25.)—Washington,
October 25.-The fate of the Chinese customs conference apparently turns
on the attitude of one of the three militarists who dominate China's po-
litical affairs.
For the moment, General Feng Yu-shiang, the “Christian General,"
whose revolt against Marshal Wu Pei-fu in October, 1924, sent that for-
mer Peking dictator into retirement and turned control of the Central
Government over to Chang Tso-lin, Manchurian war lord, has not disclosed
his purpose. He apparently holds the balance of power between Wu and
Chang, and plans for the customs conference are proceeding at Peking on
the assumption that he will continue his support of Chang.
The sudden reentry of Wu into the tangle of Chinese internal politics
with the support of the Yangtse Valley provincial military chiefs, however,
conceivably is based on an understanding with Feng, which has not been
revealed.
In any event, the conference delegates assembled at Peking are bystanders
in this new Chinese conflict. They can be expected to observe complete
neutrality, although the statement that Chang has maintained his hold on
Manchuria and widened it to grasp the powers of Central Government in
Peking through Japanese aid never has been denied.
Wu's adherents already have driven Chang out of the Shanghai province,
into which his control had extended, and forced him back all along the line
toward Central China, with Peking apparently the goal of the drive they
now have formally placed in Wu's hands. At one side of the direct road
to the capital stands Feng, with a busy artery of military supply stretching
from his headquarters at Kalgan into Mongolia, and thus to Russian Soviet
sources, placing him in a strategic position to seize Peking and overthrow
the Central Government should political strategy require him to revert,
even temporarily, to Wu's standard.


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Notes on International Affairs
Most Washington observers have felt that it would be impossible for
Wu and Feng to come together and act again in harmony. They have
pointed out that the defection of Feng while Wu was preparing to grapple
with Chang in an effort to carry his control into Manchuria by force of
arms hurled Wu from power overnight, and that the latter would not be
likely to trust Feng again.
THREAT TO JAPAN.-(New York Times, October 21.)-Tokio, October
20.—The fact that there may be possible seeds of a second Russo-Japanese
war in the revolt of the central provinces of China against the Peking
Government is seen as one reason why the Japanese Government is watch-
ing the civil war development with grave anxiety.
Should Feng Yu-shiang follow Wu Pei-fu and join the revolt there is a
chance that these two, backed by Chinese opposing the present Government
and supplied with Russian money and munitions, would defeat Chang
Tso-lin and include Manchuria in the semi-Bolshevist Government they
would form.
In this event Japan would either lose the South Manchuria Railway,
Port Arthur and other Manchurian holdings, or be forced to enter the con-
flict, and it is acknowledged that Japan would go to war if its Manchurian
holdings were at stake. In case Marshal Chang's position is threatened by
a pro-Soviet alliance Japan would probably go to his aid with money and
munitions, which is a situation that might lead directly to a Russian war.
Even though a Russo-Japanese war did not result, Japan's helping of
Chang would be misinterpreted as meddling in China with ulterior purposes
by other nations whose friendship might be alienated, and it would also be
extremely expensive.
It is recognized, however, that this situation is unlikely to develop as
Marshal Chang's position in Manchuria is so nearly impregnable, due to
the rough terrain and the lack of means of transportation, that an invasion
from China proper would have little chance of success. But its possibility
is strong enough to warrant the Japanese Government's grave concern.