diff --git a/internal/handlers/egress_allowlist_defaults.yaml b/internal/handlers/egress_allowlist_defaults.yaml
index 896d368..fecfa4f 100644
--- a/internal/handlers/egress_allowlist_defaults.yaml
+++ b/internal/handlers/egress_allowlist_defaults.yaml
@@ -26,7 +26,9 @@
 # only ever allowed as an EXACT apex host (never a glob or leading-dot form) and
 # only where a public ecosystem's downloads redirect there; see its accepted-risk
 # note in go_modules. Virtual-hosted "<bucket>.storage.googleapis.com" subdomains
-# stay blocked. The other glob over unreserved shared storage retained here is
+# stay blocked as a class, and are only ever added one exact, already-registered
+# bucket at a time (see maven-central in maven), never as a glob or leading-dot
+# form. The other glob over unreserved shared storage retained here is
 # the NuGet CDN (see its entries), a known, accepted exposure documented at its
 # call site, not a pattern to copy.
 
@@ -147,6 +149,7 @@ shared_registry_domains:
   # job, via the credential-derived dynamic hosts instead.
   # Public mirrors (continued).
   - mirrors.cloud.tencent.com
+  - mirrors.huaweicloud.com
 
 # ecosystem_default_domains lists the public registry and CDN hosts each
 # Dependabot ecosystem needs. The map is kept keyed by ecosystem for provenance
@@ -191,6 +194,16 @@ ecosystem_default_domains:
     # GitHub Packages npm content host; npm.pkg.github.com 302-redirects here.
     # Exact only; listed in api.github.com/meta domains.packages.
     - npmregistryv2prod.blob.core.windows.net
+    # Node.js runtime downloads. pnpm fetches these when a lockfile pins a Node
+    # runtime (devEngines); unofficial-builds serves the musl and other
+    # non-official platform builds. Both are exact entries, so neither opens the
+    # nodejs.org namespace.
+    - nodejs.org
+    - unofficial-builds.nodejs.org
+    # Continuous-release preview packages, published per commit/PR. Shared host
+    # with the namespace in the path; unlike Cloudsmith above it exposes no
+    # per-tenant request logs, so it is listed rather than credential-derived.
+    - pkg.pr.new
   bun: *npm_registries
   pip: &python_registries
     - pypi.org
@@ -223,6 +236,16 @@ ecosystem_default_domains:
     # GitHub Packages Maven content host; maven.pkg.github.com 302-redirects here.
     # Exact only; listed in api.github.com/meta domains.packages.
     - mavenregistryv2prod.blob.core.windows.net
+    # Maven Central's Google-hosted mirror. Exact virtual-hosted buckets only;
+    # the "maven-central" bucket is already owned, so it cannot be claimed.
+    - maven-central.storage.googleapis.com
+    - maven-central.storage-download.googleapis.com
+    # Public vendor/community Maven repositories, served anonymously.
+    - repo.osgeo.org
+    - androidx.dev
+    # packages.atlassian.com 301-redirects to maven.artifacts.atlassian.com.
+    - packages.atlassian.com
+    - maven.artifacts.atlassian.com
   gradle: *jvm_registries
   sbt:
     - repo1.maven.org
@@ -246,7 +269,6 @@ ecosystem_default_domains:
     - proxy.golang.org
     - sum.golang.org
     - .googlesource.com
-    - nodejs.org
     # Public Go module vanity-import hosts (each serves a fixed "go-import"
     # host, not a user-creatable name).
     - golang.org
@@ -284,7 +306,7 @@ ecosystem_default_domains:
     # reaches every bucket, not just the Go/Dart ones — an accepted residual
     # exfiltration risk taken to keep public Go and Dart restores working. The
     # apex entry does NOT match virtual-hosted "<bucket>.storage.googleapis.com"
-    # subdomains, which stay blocked.
+    # subdomains, which stay blocked unless listed exactly (see maven-central).
     - storage.googleapis.com
   docker: &docker_registries
     - registry-1.docker.io
@@ -301,11 +323,25 @@ ecosystem_default_domains:
     - lscr.io
     - .gcr.io
     - .pkg.dev
+    # Vendor-operated public OCI registries that allow anonymous pulls.
+    # docker.getcollate.io fronts Docker Hub via Scarf, so its token service is
+    # auth.docker.io above and its blobs land on the Docker Hub CDN hosts above.
+    - docker.getcollate.io
+    # Elastic's registry, its anonymous token service, and the R2 bucket its
+    # blob downloads 307-redirect to. The bucket host embeds Elastic's own
+    # Cloudflare account hash, so it is exact only: a glob over
+    # *.r2.cloudflarestorage.com would match every Cloudflare tenant.
+    - docker.elastic.co
+    - docker-auth.elastic.co
+    - docker-registry-production.d24a988e385e0074d717b6bdaea58f0d.r2.cloudflarestorage.com
   docker_compose: *docker_registries
   nuget:
     - api.nuget.org
     - www.nuget.org
     - globalcdn.nuget.org
+    # Legacy NuGet endpoint (Microsoft-owned, Akamai-fronted) still requested by
+    # older clients. Every path 404s; allowed so restores see 404, not a block.
+    - data.nuget.org
     # Exact, provider-owned storage backend (the account name is globally unique
     # and already taken by NuGet, so it cannot be spoofed).
     - nugetregistryv2prod.blob.core.windows.net
@@ -368,6 +404,8 @@ ecosystem_default_domains:
     - pkg.julialang.org
     - us-east.pkg.julialang.org
     - us-west.pkg.julialang.org
+    # Official Julia release/artifact storage.
+    - julialang-s3.julialang.org
   rust_toolchain:
     - static.rust-lang.org
   conda:
diff --git a/internal/handlers/egress_allowlist_test.go b/internal/handlers/egress_allowlist_test.go
index 0f16861..c5c3190 100644
--- a/internal/handlers/egress_allowlist_test.go
+++ b/internal/handlers/egress_allowlist_test.go
@@ -240,6 +240,123 @@ func TestEgressAllowlist_GitHubPackagesContentHostsAllowed(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestEgressAllowlist_PublicVendorOCIRegistriesAllowed(t *testing.T) {
+	// Vendor-operated public OCI registries that serve anonymous pulls. Each
+	// needs its registry host, its token service, and whatever host its blob
+	// downloads redirect to; allowing only the registry fixes tag discovery but
+	// still fails the pull.
+	h := newEgressHandler(false, true, "docker_compose")
+
+	for _, allowed := range []string{
+		"https://docker.getcollate.io/v2/openmetadata/server/tags/list",
+		"https://auth.docker.io/token?service=registry.docker.io", // getcollate's token service
+		"https://docker.elastic.co/v2/elasticsearch/elasticsearch/tags/list",
+		"https://docker-auth.elastic.co/auth?service=token-service",
+		"https://docker-registry-production.d24a988e385e0074d717b6bdaea58f0d.r2.cloudflarestorage.com/docker/registry/v2/blobs/sha256/x/data",
+	} {
+		assert.Nil(t, egressResult(t, h, allowed), "public vendor OCI host allowed: "+allowed)
+	}
+
+	for _, blocked := range []string{
+		// Child hosts pin the exact-host semantics.
+		"https://evil.docker.elastic.co/v2/",
+		"https://evil.docker.getcollate.io/v2/",
+		"https://evil.docker-registry-production.d24a988e385e0074d717b6bdaea58f0d.r2.cloudflarestorage.com/loot",
+		// R2 is multi-tenant: only Elastic's own account hash is allowed.
+		"https://loot.deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef.r2.cloudflarestorage.com/loot",
+		"https://attacker.r2.cloudflarestorage.com/loot",
+		// getcollate fronts Docker Hub through Scarf, which is multi-tenant.
+		"https://attacker.docker.scarf.sh/v2/",
+		"https://docker.scarf.sh/v2/",
+	} {
+		resp := egressResult(t, h, blocked)
+		if assert.NotNil(t, resp, "vendor OCI entries must not widen to: "+blocked) {
+			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, resp.StatusCode)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEgressAllowlist_NodeRuntimeDownloadsAllowed(t *testing.T) {
+	// pnpm re-resolves a lockfile-pinned Node runtime (devEngines) by fetching
+	// checksums from the Node.js project's unofficial-builds host. Since pnpm
+	// 12.6 a 403 there is fatal, so blocking it fails every dependency.
+	h := newEgressHandler(false, true, "npm_and_yarn")
+
+	for _, allowed := range []string{
+		"https://unofficial-builds.nodejs.org/download/release/v24.20.0/SHASUMS256.txt",
+		"https://unofficial-builds.nodejs.org/download/release/v24.20.0/node-v24.20.0-linux-x64-musl.tar.xz",
+		"https://nodejs.org/dist/v24.20.0/SHASUMS256.txt",
+	} {
+		assert.Nil(t, egressResult(t, h, allowed), "node runtime download allowed: "+allowed)
+	}
+
+	for _, blocked := range []string{
+		// Both entries are exact; neither opens the nodejs.org namespace.
+		"https://evil.unofficial-builds.nodejs.org/payload",
+		"https://attacker.nodejs.org/payload",
+	} {
+		resp := egressResult(t, h, blocked)
+		if assert.NotNil(t, resp, "node entries must not widen to: "+blocked) {
+			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, resp.StatusCode)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// These entries live under npm_and_yarn, but every job gets the union of all
+	// ecosystem defaults, so a Go job still reaches them.
+	goJob := newEgressHandler(false, true, "go_modules")
+	assert.Nil(t, egressResult(t, goJob, "https://nodejs.org/dist/index.json"),
+		"nodejs.org must stay reachable from a go_modules job")
+}
+
+// TestEgressAllowlist_PublicEcosystemMirrorsAllowed covers the public hosts
+// recorded as blocked during the 25% enforce rollout. Each is anonymous,
+// provider-controlled package infrastructure with no attacker-choosable label.
+func TestEgressAllowlist_PublicEcosystemMirrorsAllowed(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newEgressHandler(false, true, "")
+
+	for _, allowed := range []string{
+		// Legacy NuGet host: Microsoft-owned, every path 404s. Allowed so the
+		// client sees a 404 it handles rather than a proxy block it does not.
+		"https://data.nuget.org/packages/",
+		// Maven Central's Google-hosted mirror.
+		"https://maven-central.storage.googleapis.com/maven2/org/slf4j/slf4j-api/maven-metadata.xml",
+		"https://maven-central.storage-download.googleapis.com/maven2/org/slf4j/slf4j-api/maven-metadata.xml",
+		"https://repo.osgeo.org/repository/release/org/geotools/gt-main/30.0/gt-main-30.0.pom",
+		"https://androidx.dev/snapshots/latest/artifacts/repository/androidx/core/core/maven-metadata.xml",
+		// packages.atlassian.com 301s to maven.artifacts.atlassian.com, so both
+		// ends of the chain must be allowed for a restore to complete.
+		"https://packages.atlassian.com/maven/",
+		"https://maven.artifacts.atlassian.com/",
+		"https://julialang-s3.julialang.org/bin/linux/x64/1.10/julia-1.10.0-linux-x86_64.tar.gz",
+		"https://mirrors.huaweicloud.com/repository/npm/lodash",
+		"https://pkg.pr.new/tinylibs/tinybench@a832a55",
+	} {
+		assert.Nil(t, egressResult(t, h, allowed), "public ecosystem host allowed: "+allowed)
+	}
+
+	// The maven-central entries are exact virtual-hosted buckets. Adding them
+	// must not make any other bucket reachable as a subdomain, which is the one
+	// way this change could regress the storage.googleapis.com apex exception.
+	for _, blocked := range []string{
+		"https://attacker.storage.googleapis.com/payload",
+		"https://attacker.storage-download.googleapis.com/payload",
+		"https://evil.maven-central.storage.googleapis.com/payload",
+	} {
+		resp := egressResult(t, h, blocked)
+		if assert.NotNil(t, resp, "bucket subdomains must stay blocked: "+blocked) {
+			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, resp.StatusCode)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Cloudsmith stays blocked: it is the documented precedent for a shared
+	// host whose tenant lives in the path and whose request logs are visible to
+	// the tenant. Adding public mirrors must not erode that rule.
+	resp := egressResult(t, h, "https://dl.cloudsmith.io/org/repo/npm/left-pad")
+	if assert.NotNil(t, resp, "dl.cloudsmith.io must stay blocked") {
+		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestEgressAllowlist_MultiTenantAWSNamespacesNotGloballyAllowed(t *testing.T) {
 	// A 12-digit AWS account id matches every AWS tenant, so ECR and CodeArtifact
 	// are NOT globally allowlisted (an attacker could use their own account).
@@ -521,6 +638,13 @@ func TestEgressAllowlist_NewEntriesDoNotWidenBeyondExactHosts(t *testing.T) {
 		"https://evil.codeberg.org/owner/repo",
 		"https://evil.gitlab.com/group/project",
 		"https://evil.releases.bazel.build/payload",
+		"https://evil.data.nuget.org/payload",
+		"https://evil.repo.osgeo.org/repository",
+		"https://evil.androidx.dev/snapshots",
+		"https://evil.pkg.pr.new/owner/repo",
+		"https://evil.julialang-s3.julialang.org/bin",
+		"https://evil.maven.artifacts.atlassian.com/maven",
+		"https://evil.mirrors.huaweicloud.com/repository/npm",
 	}
 
 	// Sibling hosts: names sharing a parent with an added entry. These pin the
@@ -531,6 +655,11 @@ func TestEgressAllowlist_NewEntriesDoNotWidenBeyondExactHosts(t *testing.T) {
 		"https://attacker.pkg.julialang.org/registries",
 		"https://attacker.digicert.com/payload",
 		"https://attacker.bazel.build/payload",
+		"https://attacker.nuget.org/payload",
+		"https://attacker.osgeo.org/repository",
+		"https://attacker.artifacts.atlassian.com/maven",
+		"https://attacker.huaweicloud.com/repository/npm",
+		"https://attacker.julialang.org/bin",
 		// Cloudsmith is multi-tenant with the tenant in the URL path, and the
 		// allowlist authorizes the hostname only. Neither the tenant subdomain
 		// form nor the shared download hosts may be globally allowed.
diff --git a/internal/handlers/egress_dynamic_hosts.go b/internal/handlers/egress_dynamic_hosts.go
index d7143a8..d3121ba 100644
--- a/internal/handlers/egress_dynamic_hosts.go
+++ b/internal/handlers/egress_dynamic_hosts.go
@@ -1,12 +1,43 @@
 package handlers
 
 import (
+	"fmt"
 	"net/url"
+	"regexp"
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/dependabot/proxy/internal/config"
 )
 
+// ecrHostPattern matches the canonical private ECR registry host,
+// "<account-id>.dkr.ecr.<region>.amazonaws.com", capturing the region.
+//
+// The region is interpolated into an allowlist entry, so the account is anchored
+// to 12 digits and the region to a single dot-free label: a crafted credential
+// must not be able to widen the derived host. A path.Match glob cannot serve
+// here — it has no capture group, and its "*" spans dots.
+var ecrHostPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[0-9]{12}\.dkr\.ecr\.([a-z0-9-]+)\.amazonaws\.com$`)
+
+// registryRedirectHosts returns storage backends that a configured registry
+// redirects to on download but that appear in no credential field.
+//
+// Private ECR 307-redirects layer downloads to a per-region, AWS-owned S3
+// bucket. It is derived per job rather than globbed into the static defaults
+// because "prod-<anything>-starport-layer-bucket" is a claimable S3 name, so a
+// glob would hand every job an attacker-registrable destination.
+func registryRedirectHosts(credHosts []string) []string {
+	var hosts []string
+	for _, h := range credHosts {
+		m := ecrHostPattern.FindStringSubmatch(h)
+		if m == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		region := m[1]
+		hosts = append(hosts, fmt.Sprintf("prod-%s-starport-layer-bucket.s3.%s.amazonaws.com", region, region))
+	}
+	return hosts
+}
+
 // credentialHostKeys are the credential fields that carry a registry host or
 // URL. The host of each is added to the per-job allowlist so that the private
 // registries a job is configured to use are never treated as exfiltration.
@@ -95,11 +126,19 @@ func oidcExchangeHosts(creds config.Credentials) []string {
 }
 
 // dynamicHosts returns the deduplicated per-job hosts derived from the job's
-// credentials: configured registries and OIDC token-exchange endpoints.
+// credentials: configured registries, OIDC token-exchange endpoints, and the
+// storage backends those registries redirect to for content downloads.
 func dynamicHosts(creds config.Credentials) []string {
+	credHosts := credentialHosts(creds)
+
+	all := make([]string, 0, len(credHosts))
+	all = append(all, credHosts...)
+	all = append(all, oidcExchangeHosts(creds)...)
+	all = append(all, registryRedirectHosts(credHosts)...)
+
 	seen := make(map[string]struct{})
 	var out []string
-	for _, h := range append(credentialHosts(creds), oidcExchangeHosts(creds)...) {
+	for _, h := range all {
 		if _, ok := seen[h]; ok {
 			continue
 		}
diff --git a/internal/handlers/egress_dynamic_hosts_test.go b/internal/handlers/egress_dynamic_hosts_test.go
index 82888d5..f007da7 100644
--- a/internal/handlers/egress_dynamic_hosts_test.go
+++ b/internal/handlers/egress_dynamic_hosts_test.go
@@ -98,3 +98,59 @@ func TestDynamicHosts_Deduplicates(t *testing.T) {
 	got := dynamicHosts(creds)
 	assert.Equal(t, []string{"npm.example.com"}, got)
 }
+
+func TestRegistryRedirectHosts_ECRStarportBucketDerived(t *testing.T) {
+	// Private ECR 307-redirects layer downloads to a per-region AWS-owned S3
+	// bucket that appears in no credential field, so it is derived from the
+	// region named by the job's own ECR credential.
+	creds := config.Credentials{
+		{"type": "docker_registry", "registry": "123456789012.dkr.ecr.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com"},
+	}
+	h := newEgressHandlerWithCreds(creds)
+
+	assert.Nil(t, egressResult(t, h, "https://123456789012.dkr.ecr.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/v2/chart/manifests/1.0.0"),
+		"the ECR registry itself must be allowed")
+	assert.Nil(t, egressResult(t, h, "https://prod-eu-west-1-starport-layer-bucket.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/blob?X-Amz-Signature=x"),
+		"the ECR layer bucket for the credential's region must be allowed")
+
+	for _, blocked := range []string{
+		// Only the region the job actually uses is opened.
+		"https://prod-us-east-1-starport-layer-bucket.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/loot",
+		// Dynamic hosts are matched exactly, so no child or lookalike widens it.
+		"https://evil.prod-eu-west-1-starport-layer-bucket.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/loot",
+		"https://prod-eu-west-1-starport-layer-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/loot",
+		// The shared parent namespace stays closed.
+		"https://attacker-bucket.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/loot",
+	} {
+		assert.NotNil(t, egressResult(t, h, blocked), "must remain blocked: "+blocked)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegistryRedirectHosts_OnlyCanonicalECRHosts(t *testing.T) {
+	// The region is interpolated into an allowlist entry, so the pattern must
+	// not match anything an attacker-supplied credential could bend.
+	none := []string{
+		"public.ecr.aws",                                  // public ECR has no starport backend
+		"12345.dkr.ecr.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com",           // account id must be 12 digits
+		"123456789012.dkr.ecr.amazonaws.com",              // missing region
+		"123456789012.dkr.ecr.a.b.amazonaws.com",          // region must be a single label
+		"123456789012.dkr.ecr.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com.cn", // different partition
+		"123456789012.dkr.ecr.eu-west-1.evil.com",         // suffix must be amazonaws.com
+		"evil.com",
+	}
+	for _, h := range none {
+		assert.Empty(t, registryRedirectHosts([]string{h}), "must derive nothing from %q", h)
+	}
+
+	assert.Equal(t,
+		[]string{"prod-us-east-2-starport-layer-bucket.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com"},
+		registryRedirectHosts([]string{"123456789012.dkr.ecr.us-east-2.amazonaws.com"}))
+}
+
+func TestRegistryRedirectHosts_NotAddedWithoutECRCredential(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newEgressHandlerWithCreds(config.Credentials{
+		{"type": "docker_registry", "registry": "https://registry.internal.example.com"},
+	})
+	assert.NotNil(t, egressResult(t, h, "https://prod-eu-west-1-starport-layer-bucket.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/loot"),
+		"layer bucket must not be allowed for a job with no ECR credential")
+}