diff --git a/k8s/bases/infrastructure/cluster-policies/best-practices/restrict-tenant-network-policies.yaml b/k8s/bases/infrastructure/cluster-policies/best-practices/restrict-tenant-network-policies.yaml index 69e3d4c0a5..35401ffc8f 100644 --- a/k8s/bases/infrastructure/cluster-policies/best-practices/restrict-tenant-network-policies.yaml +++ b/k8s/bases/infrastructure/cluster-policies/best-practices/restrict-tenant-network-policies.yaml @@ -318,9 +318,13 @@ spec: variables.toEndpoints.all(selector, selector.?matchExpressions.orValue([]).all(item, !item.?key.orValue('').matches(variables.broadSelectorKey) || item.?operator.orValue('') in ['In', 'Exists'])) + # An egress rule that is exactly {} names no destination and no port, so + # Cilium allows nothing through it; it only switches the endpoint to egress + # default deny (#3501). A rule with only toPorts still allows every peer on + # those ports and stays refused below. - name: egressRulesNameDestinations expression: >- - variables.egress.all(rule, + variables.egress.all(rule, size(rule) == 0 || ['toEndpoints', 'toCIDR', 'toCIDRSet', 'toEntities', 'toNodes', 'toGroups', 'toServices', 'toFQDNs'] .exists(field, field in rule && rule[field] != null && size(rule[field]) > 0)) - name: egressOmitsNodesAndGroups diff --git a/k8s/bases/infrastructure/cluster-policies/best-practices/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames.yaml b/k8s/bases/infrastructure/cluster-policies/best-practices/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames.yaml index df91e17d85..c43aa9ff1b 100644 --- a/k8s/bases/infrastructure/cluster-policies/best-practices/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames.yaml +++ b/k8s/bases/infrastructure/cluster-policies/best-practices/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames.yaml @@ -12,13 +12,15 @@ # hostname on the listener. # # Coverage: every namespace bound to the tenant-edit ClusterRole gets a validation. -# Two namespaces reconcile tenant-controlled manifests as a tenant -# ServiceAccount today — wedding-app and ascoachingogvaner — and each has its own -# allow-list below, because tenant hostnames are not derivable from the namespace -# name (wedding-app serves wedding.*, ascoachingogvaner serves an apex customer +# Three namespaces reconcile tenant-controlled routes today — wedding-app, +# ascoachingogvaner and business-site — and each has its own allow-list below, +# because tenant hostnames are not derivable from the namespace name +# (wedding-app serves wedding.*, ascoachingogvaner serves an apex customer # domain). Each list is that tenant's own declared set from its # deploy/httproute.yaml, covering the production hostname and the *.platform.lan -# name used on local/dev clusters where the tenant declares one. +# name used on local/dev clusters where the tenant declares one. business-site +# declares its host in deploy/webapp.yaml and has one public staging name only; +# its production hostname stays on GitHub Pages until a separate cutover. # # Fail-closed for anything NOT listed: the final validation denies every HTTPRoute in a # ksail tenant namespace that has no allow-list above, so a newly onboarded @@ -112,11 +114,21 @@ spec: ascoachingogvaner.dk, www.ascoachingogvaner.dk or ascoachingogvaner.platform.lan. Omitting hostnames claims every hostname on the shared platform Gateway listener. + # The KRO controller renders this route from the tenant-owned WebApp, so + # the allow-list applies to it exactly as to a tenant-applied route. + - expression: >- + object.metadata.namespace != 'business-site' || + (size(variables.hostnames) > 0 && + variables.hostnames.all(h, h in ['business-site.platform.devantler.tech'])) + message: >- + business-site HTTPRoutes must set spec.hostnames and may only use + business-site.platform.devantler.tech. Omitting hostnames claims every + hostname on the shared platform Gateway listener. # Catch-all: any ksail tenant namespace without an allow-list above. This is # what makes onboarding fail loudly instead of silently unrestricted, the # exact gap that once left this policy covering only wedding-app while other # tenants shared the same wildcard Gateway. - - expression: "object.metadata.namespace in ['wedding-app', 'ascoachingogvaner']" + - expression: "object.metadata.namespace in ['wedding-app', 'ascoachingogvaner', 'business-site']" message: >- This tenant namespace has no approved hostnames. Add an allow-list validation for it to the restrict-tenant-route-hostnames ValidatingPolicy diff --git a/k8s/providers/hetzner/apps/business-site/tenant.yaml b/k8s/providers/hetzner/apps/business-site/tenant.yaml index a922a9bd68..035a31939e 100644 --- a/k8s/providers/hetzner/apps/business-site/tenant.yaml +++ b/k8s/providers/hetzner/apps/business-site/tenant.yaml @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ -# Source-only staging: the signed manifest can be fetched and verified, but no -# tenant application, route or private identity configuration is reconciled. +# Public-only staging: the tenant reconciles its signed v3.0.0 package — the +# WebApp at business-site.platform.devantler.tech, its network policy, budget +# and disclosure input — while the platform-owned staging hold still denies +# gateway traffic. Portal identity, payments and devantler.tech stay off. apiVersion: kro.run/v1alpha1 kind: Tenant metadata: @@ -9,8 +11,8 @@ spec: name: business-site externalDns: false sops: false - webApp: false + webApp: true source: digest: sha256:7ec5b206635db783d8fd18789605a771cc772946f65339d3f0a2b4e08a14ebc6 publisherRevision: d8b5d0e9429cebf12907e0d4cb448433d3108e4b - reconcileApplication: false + reconcileApplication: true diff --git a/scripts/canonical-tenant-source.lib.sh b/scripts/canonical-tenant-source.lib.sh index 50d88cbbcc..a8f7a4e5d4 100644 --- a/scripts/canonical-tenant-source.lib.sh +++ b/scripts/canonical-tenant-source.lib.sh @@ -111,10 +111,12 @@ canonical_tenant_projection() ( select(.apiVersion==$record.tenantIdentity.apiVersion and .kind==$record.tenantIdentity.kind and .metadata.name==$record.tenantIdentity.name and .metadata.namespace==$record.tenantIdentity.namespace and (.spec|keys)==["externalDns","name","sops","source","webApp"] and .spec.name==$record.consumer and - .spec.webApp==false and .spec.externalDns==false and .spec.sops==false and + .spec.externalDns==false and .spec.sops==false and (.spec.source|keys)==["digest","publisherRevision","reconcileApplication"] and .spec.source.digest==$record.sourceIdentity.digest and .spec.source.publisherRevision==$pin and - .spec.source.reconcileApplication==false) | + # Source-only bootstrap, or the public staging application with its own + # WebApp. A half-enabled instance is neither reviewed shape. + (.spec.webApp|type)=="boolean" and .spec.webApp==.spec.source.reconcileApplication) | {apiVersion:"source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1",kind:"OCIRepository", metadata:{namespace:$record.sourceIdentity.namespace,name:$record.sourceIdentity.name}, spec:{url:$record.sourceIdentity.artifactURL,ref:{digest:$record.sourceIdentity.digest}, diff --git a/scripts/rgd-template-static-scan-baseline.tsv b/scripts/rgd-template-static-scan-baseline.tsv index 1c5ba57919..75964bca40 100644 --- a/scripts/rgd-template-static-scan-baseline.tsv +++ b/scripts/rgd-template-static-scan-baseline.tsv @@ -42,4 +42,4 @@ 1 k8s/bases/infrastructure/resource-graph-definitions/webapp/resource-graph-definition.yaml.resources/service.yaml KSV-0040 LOW CAUSE-SHA256:79c2597bf128e3ca530288250548c211e5e43a66a10d3c88748c6db4ac565920 1 k8s/providers/docker/apps/tenant-ascoachingogvaner.yaml INSTANCE-CONTENT SHA256 7e65481a62deb24c89dca2e5f83969e308e7604e770d97edb15e86ecc948f22c 1 k8s/providers/docker/apps/web-app-wedding-app.yaml INSTANCE-CONTENT SHA256 3d42027c7e549014cad1e717876a6eb72e0a6641f3bf181f7a0e1a70d94306d6 -1 k8s/providers/hetzner/apps/business-site/tenant.yaml INSTANCE-CONTENT SHA256 63fd7c3a83133a8debdb3d0c2cd0ade8c7cedf2ced5bb3646fd07608823545e1 +1 k8s/providers/hetzner/apps/business-site/tenant.yaml INSTANCE-CONTENT SHA256 f41cf288531722e872f273a55d0ed3d8827c642f49d37341f9e7f4a88fd75d45 diff --git a/scripts/tests/test-business-staging-hold.sh b/scripts/tests/test-business-staging-hold.sh index 39aa18bf8f..c118829f98 100755 --- a/scripts/tests/test-business-staging-hold.sh +++ b/scripts/tests/test-business-staging-hold.sh @@ -71,14 +71,15 @@ for change in \ exit 1 fi done -# Installing the hold is deliberately independent of enabling the application. +# The public staging application reconciles behind the hold; the hold, not the +# Tenant, decides whether gateway traffic reaches it. jq -e ' [.[] | select(.kind == "Tenant" and .metadata.name == "business-site")] | length == 1 and .[0].metadata.namespace == "flux-system" and - .[0].spec.webApp == false and .[0].spec.externalDns == false and - .[0].spec.source.reconcileApplication == false + .[0].spec.webApp == true and .[0].spec.externalDns == false and + .[0].spec.source.reconcileApplication == true ' "$scratch/production.json" >/dev/null kubectl kustomize "$root/k8s/providers/docker/apps" >"$scratch/local.yaml" yq -o=json -I=0 '.' "$scratch/local.yaml" | jq -es 'all(.[]; .metadata.name != "business-site-staging-hold" and .metadata.name != "business-site-customer-identity-hold")' >/dev/null -printf 'PASS: production-only staging and identity holds; 16 unsafe mutations refused; application remains disabled\n' +printf 'PASS: production-only staging and identity holds; 16 unsafe mutations refused; application reconciles behind the hold\n' diff --git a/scripts/tests/test-canonical-source-bootstrap.sh b/scripts/tests/test-canonical-source-bootstrap.sh index b1f8e0e893..4e86512ecb 100755 --- a/scripts/tests/test-canonical-source-bootstrap.sh +++ b/scripts/tests/test-canonical-source-bootstrap.sh @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Exercise the real raw discovery path with one fully qualified source-only binding. +# Exercise the real raw discovery path with one fully qualified binding: the +# source-only bootstrap shape and the enabled public staging shape. set -euo pipefail test_repo_root="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)" work="$(mktemp -d)" @@ -99,6 +100,24 @@ for mutation in '.spec.source.reconcileApplication=true' '.spec.webApp=true' '.s test ! -s "$work/rows" controls=$((controls + 1)) done +# The enabled public staging shape turns both switches on together and projects +# the same reviewed source; each switch alone was refused above. +yq '.spec.webApp=true | .spec.source.reconcileApplication=true' "$work/good-tenant.yaml" >"$tree/$source_path" +if ! discover >"$work/rows" 2>"$work/error"; then + echo 'enabled staging Tenant was omitted or refused by actual discovery' >&2 + cat "$work/error" >&2 + exit 1 +fi +test "$(wc -l <"$work/rows" | tr -d ' ')" = 1 +for mutation in '.spec.webApp="true"' '.spec.externalDns=true' '.spec.sops=true'; do + yq ".spec.webApp=true | .spec.source.reconcileApplication=true | $mutation" "$work/good-tenant.yaml" >"$tree/$source_path" + if discover >"$work/rows" 2>"$work/error"; then + echo "changed enabled instance admitted: $mutation" >&2 + exit 1 + fi + test ! -s "$work/rows" + controls=$((controls + 1)) +done cp "$work/good-tenant.yaml" "$tree/$source_path" cp "$tree/$source_path" "$tree/$(dirname "$source_path")/clone.yaml" if discover >"$work/rows" 2>"$work/error"; then diff --git a/scripts/tests/test-canonical-source-upgrade.sh b/scripts/tests/test-canonical-source-upgrade.sh index 23b1f0853a..4df3cb9817 100755 --- a/scripts/tests/test-canonical-source-upgrade.sh +++ b/scripts/tests/test-canonical-source-upgrade.sh @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ kubectl() { jq '.bindings[0].publication.workflowRunAttempt=2' "$binding_file" >"$upgrade_test_work/raced.json" mv "$upgrade_test_work/raced.json" "$binding_file" ;; - tenant) yq -i '.spec.webApp=true' "$tree/$tenant_path" ;; + tenant) yq -i '.spec.externalDns=true' "$tree/$tenant_path" ;; constructor) yq -i '.spec.schema.group="unapproved.example"' "$tree/k8s/bases/infrastructure/resource-graph-definitions/tenant/resource-graph-definition.yaml" ;; output) mkdir "$upgrade_test_work/candidate" @@ -144,7 +144,9 @@ jq -e --arg digest "$next_digest" --argjson old "$old_record" ' .previousBinding==$old and .previousObservation.generation==2 and (.previousObservation.uidSha256|test("^[0-9a-f]{64}$"))' "$candidate_record" >/dev/null test "$(yq '.spec.source.digest' "$upgrade_test_work/candidate/$tenant_path")" = "$next_digest" -test "$(yq '.spec.webApp or .spec.externalDns or .spec.sops or .spec.source.reconcileApplication' "$upgrade_test_work/candidate/$tenant_path")" = false +# A digest upgrade keeps every reviewed switch exactly as it was. +switches='[.spec.webApp, .spec.externalDns, .spec.sops, .spec.source.reconcileApplication]' +test "$(yq -o=json -I=0 "$switches" "$upgrade_test_work/candidate/$tenant_path")" = "$(yq -o=json -I=0 "$switches" "$upgrade_test_work/original-tenant.yaml")" if prepare >"$upgrade_test_work/result" 2>&1; then echo 'existing candidate directory overwritten' >&2 exit 1 diff --git a/scripts/tests/test-restrict-tenant-network-policies.sh b/scripts/tests/test-restrict-tenant-network-policies.sh index 423ae605d9..9ca3326cb9 100755 --- a/scripts/tests/test-restrict-tenant-network-policies.sh +++ b/scripts/tests/test-restrict-tenant-network-policies.sh @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ expect_summary() { # used to be refused now admits. The unmanaged namespace control is an explicit # match-condition skip; a namespaceSelector previously omitted its result. apply "${tests}/resources.yaml" "${tests}/values.yaml" "${tests}/user-info.yaml" -expect_summary "pass: 18, fail: 80, warn: 0, error: 0, skip: 1" \ +expect_summary "pass: 19, fail: 80, warn: 0, error: 0, skip: 1" \ "tenant CiliumNetworkPolicy boundary" # 2. Carve-out: kyverno's background controller owns the generated floor. These @@ -57,10 +57,11 @@ expect_summary "pass: 0, fail: 0, warn: 0, error: 0, skip: 3" \ # Besides the reserved name, allow-dns reaches CoreDNS by naming kube-system # through the namespace label and allow-cnpg-operator names cnpg-system, the # cross-namespace selector a tenant is refused (#3399, #3655). default-deny's -# one empty rule per direction names no source or destination, which is refused -# because a sourceless rule WITH toPorts allows every peer on that port. Without -# toPorts, as here, Cilium allows nothing (#3501), so the refusal is conservative, -# not a hole. The generated floor is exempt only through its applying identity. +# empty ingress rule names no source, which is refused because a sourceless rule +# WITH toPorts allows every peer on that port. Without toPorts, as here, Cilium +# allows nothing (#3501), so the refusal is conservative, not a hole; its empty +# egress rule is admitted for the same reason. The generated floor is exempt +# only through its applying identity. apply "${tests}/kyverno-author/resources.yaml" \ "${tests}/kyverno-author/values.yaml" "${tests}/user-info.yaml" expect_summary "pass: 0, fail: 3, warn: 0, error: 0, skip: 0" \ diff --git a/scripts/tests/test-tenant-controller-namespace-coverage.sh b/scripts/tests/test-tenant-controller-namespace-coverage.sh index f8f5414340..b2e8a1c614 100755 --- a/scripts/tests/test-tenant-controller-namespace-coverage.sh +++ b/scripts/tests/test-tenant-controller-namespace-coverage.sh @@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ while IFS=$'\t' read -r family passed denied skipped; do done <<'CASES' restrict-tenant-secret-stores 5 7 0 restrict-tenant-issuer-refs 4 3 0 -restrict-tenant-route-hostnames 3 13 0 -restrict-tenant-network-policies 18 80 1 +restrict-tenant-route-hostnames 4 17 0 +restrict-tenant-network-policies 19 80 1 restrict-tenant-image-repositories 7 11 0 CASES [[ "$failures" == 0 ]] || exit 1 diff --git a/scripts/validate-eks-ci-role-policy/approved-surface.txt b/scripts/validate-eks-ci-role-policy/approved-surface.txt index 083d13bbfe..4ce7e0938e 100644 --- a/scripts/validate-eks-ci-role-policy/approved-surface.txt +++ b/scripts/validate-eks-ci-role-policy/approved-surface.txt @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ iam.aws.m.upbound.io/v1beta1|Role|aws|eks-ci c40205b3f48d193e8be1a39abda738865b9 kro.run/v1alpha1|ResourceGraphDefinition||tenant.kro.run 72f3f972cecdf3ca2e315deb4224bd28c1df1244fc7973a88eb7f4fc03ac1d05 -kro.run/v1alpha1|Tenant|flux-system|business-site 5854dbac8e7f4ff52f5d858ee7e673e82cd758f0c770c3203b9409c8dc15aba2 +kro.run/v1alpha1|Tenant|flux-system|business-site 47380ca8c8781c2de6b17226e44ac7cef030e13a89c8b41dae9ddf459304b3a4 kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1|Kustomization|ascoachingogvaner|ascoachingogvaner ac00ca29c04de8d2c30a045d583570536a97fc305a1b06c4300da018ecdfb864 diff --git a/scripts/validate-eks-ci-role-policy/business_source_surface_test.go b/scripts/validate-eks-ci-role-policy/business_source_surface_test.go index 2382bd009d..9b0035d7bf 100644 --- a/scripts/validate-eks-ci-role-policy/business_source_surface_test.go +++ b/scripts/validate-eks-ci-role-policy/business_source_surface_test.go @@ -9,12 +9,13 @@ import ( "gopkg.in/yaml.v3" ) -// Approve only the exact source-only typed instance, never its future app or -// capabilities. The full ordinary validator must reject each widened intent. -func TestBusinessSourceOnlyAuthorization(t *testing.T) { +// Approve only the exact public staging instance: its own application and +// WebApp, with no DNS writer, SOPS or other source. The full ordinary +// validator must reject every other intent, including a return to source-only. +func TestBusinessStagingAuthorization(t *testing.T) { role, boundary, rendered := repositoryInputs(t) if err := validateAuthorization(role, boundary, rendered); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("reviewed source-only registration refused: %v", err) + t.Fatalf("reviewed staging registration refused: %v", err) } for _, tc := range []struct { name string @@ -22,8 +23,8 @@ func TestBusinessSourceOnlyAuthorization(t *testing.T) { mutate func(map[string]any) }{ {name: "source removed", remove: true}, - {name: "application reconciliation", mutate: func(spec map[string]any) { spec["source"].(map[string]any)["reconcileApplication"] = true }}, - {name: "webapp capability", mutate: func(spec map[string]any) { spec["webApp"] = true }}, + {name: "no application reconciliation", mutate: func(spec map[string]any) { spec["source"].(map[string]any)["reconcileApplication"] = false }}, + {name: "no webapp capability", mutate: func(spec map[string]any) { spec["webApp"] = false }}, {name: "external DNS", mutate: func(spec map[string]any) { spec["externalDns"] = true }}, {name: "SOPS", mutate: func(spec map[string]any) { spec["sops"] = true }}, {name: "different publisher", mutate: func(spec map[string]any) { @@ -58,15 +59,15 @@ func TestBusinessSourceOnlyAuthorization(t *testing.T) { t.Fatal(err) } if selected != 1 { - t.Fatalf("selected %d source-only registrations, want one", selected) + t.Fatalf("selected %d staging registrations, want one", selected) } var mismatch *surfaceMismatchError if err := validateAuthorization(role, boundary, changed.Bytes()); !errors.As(err, &mismatch) { - t.Fatalf("changed source-only authorization error = %v, want ledger mismatch", err) + t.Fatalf("changed staging authorization error = %v, want ledger mismatch", err) } for _, line := range mismatch.delta { if !strings.Contains(line, "kro.run/v1alpha1|Tenant|flux-system|business-site ") { - t.Fatalf("source-only mutation changed an unrelated authorization: %s", line) + t.Fatalf("staging mutation changed an unrelated authorization: %s", line) } } }) diff --git a/tests/restrict-tenant-network-policies/kyverno-test.yaml b/tests/restrict-tenant-network-policies/kyverno-test.yaml index 87a5f53d0c..35baa339ca 100644 --- a/tests/restrict-tenant-network-policies/kyverno-test.yaml +++ b/tests/restrict-tenant-network-policies/kyverno-test.yaml @@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ results: - tenant-ns/allow-web-egress-to-kube-apiserver-selector - tenant-ns/allow-web-ingress-from-documentation-cidr - tenant-ns/allow-web-ingress-from-gateway + - tenant-ns/allow-web-ingress-from-gateway-egress-default-deny - tenant-ns/allow-web-ingress-from-ingress-selector - policy: restrict-tenant-network-policies kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy diff --git a/tests/restrict-tenant-network-policies/resources.yaml b/tests/restrict-tenant-network-policies/resources.yaml index 025e4cac2a..06a00dfe33 100644 --- a/tests/restrict-tenant-network-policies/resources.yaml +++ b/tests/restrict-tenant-network-policies/resources.yaml @@ -1650,3 +1650,24 @@ spec: - k8sService: serviceName: db namespace: other-tenant +--- +# ALLOW case: the business-site package's own policy. Its one egress rule is +# exactly {}, which allows no destination; it only selects egress default deny. +apiVersion: cilium.io/v2 +kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy +metadata: + name: allow-web-ingress-from-gateway-egress-default-deny + namespace: tenant-ns +spec: + endpointSelector: + matchLabels: + app: web + ingress: + - fromEntities: + - ingress + toPorts: + - ports: + - port: "8080" + protocol: TCP + egress: + - {} diff --git a/tests/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames/kyverno-test.yaml b/tests/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames/kyverno-test.yaml index 0e51aa85fd..85348979fb 100644 --- a/tests/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames/kyverno-test.yaml +++ b/tests/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames/kyverno-test.yaml @@ -48,6 +48,20 @@ results: - ascoachingogvaner/approved-plus-wildcard kind: HTTPRoute result: fail + # --- business-site: one public staging hostname --- + - policy: restrict-tenant-route-hostnames + resources: + - business-site/approved-staging-hostname + kind: HTTPRoute + result: pass + - policy: restrict-tenant-route-hostnames + resources: + - business-site/production-hostname + - business-site/steals-wedding-hostname + - business-site/no-hostnames + - business-site/wildcard-covering-approved + kind: HTTPRoute + result: fail # --- fail-closed catch-all --- - policy: restrict-tenant-route-hostnames resources: diff --git a/tests/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames/resources.yaml b/tests/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames/resources.yaml index ed49910dce..6f0b492f11 100644 --- a/tests/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames/resources.yaml +++ b/tests/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames/resources.yaml @@ -252,3 +252,69 @@ spec: - backendRefs: - name: ascoachingogvaner port: 80 +--- +# business-site — the KRO-rendered route from its tenant-owned WebApp. Only the +# public staging hostname is approved. +apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 +kind: HTTPRoute +metadata: + name: approved-staging-hostname + namespace: business-site +spec: + hostnames: + - business-site.platform.devantler.tech + rules: + - backendRefs: + - name: business-site + port: 80 +--- +# The production hostname stays on GitHub Pages until a separate cutover. +apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 +kind: HTTPRoute +metadata: + name: production-hostname + namespace: business-site +spec: + hostnames: + - devantler.tech + rules: + - backendRefs: + - name: business-site + port: 80 +--- +apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 +kind: HTTPRoute +metadata: + name: steals-wedding-hostname + namespace: business-site +spec: + hostnames: + - wedding.platform.devantler.tech + rules: + - backendRefs: + - name: business-site + port: 80 +--- +apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 +kind: HTTPRoute +metadata: + name: no-hostnames + namespace: business-site +spec: + rules: + - backendRefs: + - name: business-site + port: 80 +--- +apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 +kind: HTTPRoute +metadata: + name: wildcard-covering-approved + namespace: business-site +spec: + hostnames: + - "*.platform.devantler.tech" + rules: + - backendRefs: + - name: business-site + port: 80 diff --git a/tests/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames/values.yaml b/tests/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames/values.yaml index 7768e66df3..fe6b8bad8a 100644 --- a/tests/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames/values.yaml +++ b/tests/restrict-tenant-route-hostnames/values.yaml @@ -17,3 +17,6 @@ namespaceSelector: app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: ksail - name: platform-ns labels: {} + - name: business-site + labels: + app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: kro