-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 0
251 lines (233 loc) · 10 KB
/
dependency-audit.yml
File metadata and controls
251 lines (233 loc) · 10 KB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
# Workflow: skanowanie znanych podatnosci w zaleznosciach (uv.lock).
# Praktyka #6 z lirantal/pypi-security-best-practices.
#
# Triggers:
# - push do dev/master: kazda zmiana w lockfile sprawdza sie od razu
# - pull_request: PR-y dotykajace zaleznosci nie merguja sie z aktywnym CVE
# - weekly cron: nowo-disclosed CVE wykryte tez na "spokojnym" lockfile
#
# Tool: pip-audit (PyPA-official, autorzy pip-a). Wczesniej uzywalismy
# uv-secure ale projekt zostal zarchiwizowany 18 kwietnia 2026 (read-only
# repo, ostatnie release v0.17.2). Stale CVE database = false sense of
# security. pip-audit jest aktywnie maintained przez PyPA i czyta z tego
# samego PyPI Advisory DB co uv-secure.
#
# uv.lock -> requirements.txt przez `uv export --no-dev` (jak w multi-scanner).
#
# Polityka:
# - Vulnerability z fix-em dostepnym (fix_versions non-empty): failure.
# pip-audit nie ma natywnego severity filter, ale fix-availability juz
# jest dobrym proxy: jezeli upstream wypuscil fix, znaczy ze warto bumpnac.
# - Vuln bez fixa: warning w job summary, nie blokuje (nic nie da sie zrobic).
# - Whitelist znanych non-impact CVE przez --ignore-vuln (patrz job ponizej).
#
# Defense-in-depth: drugi job (multi-scanner) odpala OSV-Scanner, Grype
# i Trivy na SBOM-ie wygenerowanym z uv.lock. Wszystkie report-only -
# pip-audit pozostaje jedynym gate-em release-u.
name: Dependency vulnerability scan
on:
push:
branches: [dev, master]
paths:
- "uv.lock"
- "pyproject.toml"
- ".github/workflows/dependency-audit.yml"
pull_request:
paths:
- "uv.lock"
- "pyproject.toml"
schedule:
# poniedzialek 06:00 UTC - po Dependabot weekly run, wylapuje
# CVE ktore wyszly w weekend
- cron: "0 6 * * 1"
workflow_dispatch: # manualne uruchomienie z UI
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
pip-audit:
name: pip-audit scan
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Install uv
uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0
- name: Export uv.lock -> requirements.txt (prod-only)
run: |
mkdir -p /tmp/audit
uv export --no-dev --format requirements-txt --no-hashes --quiet \
-o /tmp/audit/requirements.txt
# Whitelist znanych non-impact CVE.
# ---
# CVE-2026-42304 / GHSA-grgv-6hw6-v9g4 (twisted < 26.4.0rc2):
# DoS w twisted.names.dns.Name.decode przez glebokie DNS compression
# pointer chains. BPP NIE uruchamia DNS-servera Twisted (twisted jest
# transitive zaleznoscia daphne + autobahn dla WebSocket/Channels,
# bez modulu twisted.names). Fix dostepny tylko w 26.4.0rc2 (release
# candidate) - nie wprowadzamy RC do produkcji do czasu stable release.
# Re-evaluate przy bumpie twisted do 26.x stable.
- name: Run pip-audit (gate on fixable)
run: |
uvx --from pip-audit pip-audit \
--requirement /tmp/audit/requirements.txt \
--disable-pip \
--no-deps \
--format columns \
--ignore-vuln CVE-2026-42304
- name: Run pip-audit (JSON full report - non-blocking)
if: always()
run: |
uvx --from pip-audit pip-audit \
--requirement /tmp/audit/requirements.txt \
--disable-pip \
--no-deps \
--format json \
--output /tmp/audit/full.json || true
{
echo "## pip-audit full report"
echo ""
count=$(jq '[.dependencies[]?.vulns[]?] | length' \
/tmp/audit/full.json 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
if [ "$count" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "Znaleziono **$count** vulnerabilities (vs gate-policy)."
echo ""
echo '| Pakiet | Wersja | CVE | Fix versions |'
echo '|---|---|---|---|'
jq -r '
.dependencies[]? | . as $p |
.vulns[]? |
"| \($p.name) | \($p.version) | \(.id) | \(.fix_versions | join(", ")) |"
' /tmp/audit/full.json | sort -u
else
echo "Brak findings."
fi
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
# Defense-in-depth: trzy dodatkowe skanery (OSV/Grype/Trivy) na SBOM
# wygenerowanym z uv.lock. Kazdy z innej bazy CVE - lapia rozne
# rzeczy niz uv-secure (osv.dev, anchore, aquasecurity vs PyPA-DB).
# WSZYSTKIE w trybie report-only (continue-on-error: true) - jedynym
# gate-em release-u pozostaje uv-secure powyzej. Multi-scanner ma dac
# WIDOCZNOSC, nie zablokowac merga falszywym pozytywem z roznicy baz.
multi-scanner:
name: Multi-scanner (OSV / Grype / Trivy) — report-only
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Install uv
uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0
- name: Generate SBOM (CycloneDX, prod-only)
run: |
mkdir -p /tmp/sbom
uv export --no-dev --format requirements-txt --no-hashes --quiet \
-o /tmp/sbom/requirements.txt
uvx --quiet --from cyclonedx-bom cyclonedx-py requirements \
/tmp/sbom/requirements.txt \
--output-reproducible \
--output-format JSON \
--output-file /tmp/sbom/sbom.json \
--pyproject pyproject.toml
echo "Pakietow w SBOM: $(jq '.components | length' /tmp/sbom/sbom.json)"
- name: Install scanners
run: |
# OSV-Scanner (Google) - binarka GitHub release
curl -sSL -o /usr/local/bin/osv-scanner \
https://github.com/google/osv-scanner/releases/latest/download/osv-scanner_linux_amd64
chmod +x /usr/local/bin/osv-scanner
# Grype (Anchore) - oficjalny installer
curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/grype/main/install.sh \
| sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
# Trivy (Aqua) - oficjalny installer
curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/trivy/main/contrib/install.sh \
| sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
- name: OSV-Scanner — wszystkie findings
continue-on-error: true
run: |
osv-scanner scan source --sbom=/tmp/sbom/sbom.json \
--format=json --output=/tmp/sbom/osv.json 2>/dev/null || true
{
echo "## OSV-Scanner (Google)"
echo ""
count=$(jq '[.results[]?.packages[]?.vulnerabilities[]?] | length' \
/tmp/sbom/osv.json 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
if [ "$count" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "Znaleziono **$count** vulnerabilities."
echo ""
echo '| Pakiet | CVE |'
echo '|---|---|'
jq -r '
.results[]? | .packages[]? | . as $p |
.vulnerabilities[]? |
"| \($p.package.name)@\($p.package.version) | \(.id) |"
' /tmp/sbom/osv.json | sort -u
else
echo "Brak findings."
fi
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
- name: Grype — HIGH/CRITICAL
continue-on-error: true
run: |
grype "sbom:/tmp/sbom/sbom.json" -o json --file /tmp/sbom/grype.json \
>/dev/null 2>&1 || true
{
echo "## Grype (Anchore)"
echo ""
count=$(jq '[.matches[]? | select(.vulnerability.severity | test("^(High|Critical)$"; "i"))] | length' \
/tmp/sbom/grype.json 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
if [ "$count" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "Znaleziono **$count** HIGH/CRITICAL."
echo ""
echo '| Pakiet | CVE | Severity | Fix |'
echo '|---|---|---|---|'
jq -r '
.matches[]? |
select(.vulnerability.severity | test("^(High|Critical)$"; "i")) |
"| \(.artifact.name)@\(.artifact.version) | \(.vulnerability.id) | \(.vulnerability.severity) | \(.vulnerability.fix.versions[]? // "no-fix") |"
' /tmp/sbom/grype.json | sort -u
else
echo "Brak findings (HIGH/CRITICAL)."
fi
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
- name: Trivy — HIGH/CRITICAL z fix-em
continue-on-error: true
run: |
# --ignore-unfixed: wyciszamy CVE bez dostepnego fixa (jak w
# build-docker-images.yml - nic nie mozna zrobic, samo szum).
# --severity HIGH,CRITICAL: bez tego Trivy zglasza wszystko
# ze swojej bardzo agresywnej DB - filter sprowadza to do
# realnie waznych rzeczy.
trivy sbom /tmp/sbom/sbom.json \
--severity HIGH,CRITICAL \
--ignore-unfixed \
--format json \
--output /tmp/sbom/trivy.json \
--quiet 2>/dev/null || true
{
echo "## Trivy (Aqua Security)"
echo ""
count=$(jq '[.Results[]?.Vulnerabilities[]?] | length' \
/tmp/sbom/trivy.json 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
if [ "$count" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "Znaleziono **$count** HIGH/CRITICAL z dostepnym fixem."
echo ""
echo '| Pakiet | CVE | Severity | Fix |'
echo '|---|---|---|---|'
jq -r '
.Results[]? | .Vulnerabilities[]? |
"| \(.PkgName)@\(.InstalledVersion) | \(.VulnerabilityID) | \(.Severity) | \(.FixedVersion // "no-fix") |"
' /tmp/sbom/trivy.json | sort -u
else
echo "Brak findings (HIGH/CRITICAL z fix-em)."
fi
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
- name: Upload SBOM + raporty (artifact, retention 30d)
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: dependency-scan-${{ github.run_id }}
path: /tmp/sbom/
retention-days: 30