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Support -D system properties for compiler options (#275) #439

Support -D system properties for compiler options (#275)

Support -D system properties for compiler options (#275) #439

# Dependency Review Action
#
# This Action will scan dependency manifest files that change as part of a Pull Request,
# surfacing known-vulnerable versions of the packages declared or updated in the PR.
# Once installed, if the workflow run is marked as required, PRs introducing known-vulnerable
# packages will be blocked from merging.
#
# Source repository: https://github.com/actions/dependency-review-action
# Public documentation: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/supply-chain-security/understanding-your-software-supply-chain/about-dependency-review#dependency-review-enforcement
name: 'Dependency review'
on:
# Use pull_request_target so the review also works for PRs opened from forks.
# A plain `pull_request` run from a fork receives a read-only GITHUB_TOKEN, so
# `comment-summary-in-pr` cannot post its summary ("Unable to write summary to
# pull-request. Make sure you are giving this workflow the permission
# 'pull-requests: write'"). pull_request_target runs in the base-repo context
# with a read/write token, so the summary is posted on fork PRs too.
#
# This is safe here because dependency-review-action never checks out or executes
# PR-supplied code: it only compares the PR's base/head via the GitHub
# dependency-graph/advisory API. No checkout step is used, so untrusted code is
# never run with the elevated token.
pull_request_target:
branches: [ "main" ]
# Cancel superseded runs for the same PR to save runner minutes.
concurrency:
group: dependency-review-${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
# If using a dependency submission action in this workflow this permission will need to be set to:
#
# permissions:
# contents: write
#
# https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/code-security/supply-chain-security/understanding-your-software-supply-chain/using-the-dependency-submission-api
permissions:
contents: read
# Required so `comment-summary-in-pr` can post the review summary (works for
# fork PRs only because of the pull_request_target trigger above).
pull-requests: write
jobs:
dependency-review:
# Dependency review requires the dependency graph to be enabled, which is
# not the case for forks. Skipping it on fork repositories avoids failing
# checks on every fork PR (see #243).
if: github.event.repository.fork == false
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: 'Dependency Review'
uses: actions/dependency-review-action@a1d282b36b6f3519aa1f3fc636f609c47dddb294 # v5.0.0
# Commonly enabled options, see https://github.com/actions/dependency-review-action#configuration-options for all available options.
with:
# Only post/refresh the PR summary comment when the review actually
# fails (a vulnerability or denied license). This avoids spamming
# every PR with a comment whose only content is the benign
# "No snapshots were found for the head SHA" warning: for fork PRs
# GitHub has only the manifest-derived dependency graph (no submitted
# snapshot for the fork head, and one can't be produced without
# building untrusted fork code with a write token; dependency-submission.yml
# only submits snapshots for main). The check still runs and still fails
# on real issues; the warning is only visible in the Actions run log.
comment-summary-in-pr: on-failure
# Fail the PR when it introduces a vulnerability at or above this severity.
fail-on-severity: high
# Fail closed with licenses derived from the project's full dependency tree,
# replacing the deprecated deny-licenses option.
allow-licenses: MIT, Apache-2.0, BSD-2-Clause, BSD-3-Clause, EPL-1.0, EPL-2.0, CDDL-1.0, CDDL-1.1, ISC, Unlicense, CC0-1.0