diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 5caf5aa..fbc67b9 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -215,6 +215,15 @@ claims that are *already written* into the change:
   (sorted path + per-file content hash, deletions marked absent), so a
   mid-branch receipt over staged, unstaged, or untracked work — which no
   commit SHA identifies — is reproducible and comparable too.
+- **Probe details are machine-clean by a categorical rule, not a blocklist.**
+  A receipt is shareable, and runners echo arbitrary tool output (a failing
+  test's own message, a compiler error) into evidence details. Every detail
+  passes one sanitization chokepoint: the repository root becomes `.` (in-repo
+  paths stay fully readable), every OTHER absolute path collapses to
+  `…/<basename>` — closing temp paths, toolchain roots, other users' homes,
+  and sibling project names in one rule instead of enumerating known-bad
+  roots — and the machine's hostname is scrubbed. File:line actionability
+  survives the collapse (`…/testing.go:1576`); URLs pass untouched.
 - **Same-id claims merge; accept/reject pairs earn T2.** Every test named for
   one invariant becomes a probe of the same claim — all run, any can refute.
   When one of those tests is accept-polarity and another is reject-polarity
diff --git a/internal/receipt/receipt.go b/internal/receipt/receipt.go
index 610d277..bdb4252 100644
--- a/internal/receipt/receipt.go
+++ b/internal/receipt/receipt.go
@@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"os"
+	"path"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"regexp"
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/joshft/correctful/internal/gitdiff"
@@ -211,10 +213,23 @@ func exclusionNote(excl []schema.Exclusion) string {
 	return "scope excluded " + strings.Join(parts, " · ")
 }
 
-// sanitizePaths scrubs local filesystem locations from probe detail text: the
-// repository root becomes "." and the home directory "~". External tools
-// (compilers, test runners) print absolute paths freely, and a receipt that
-// echoes them leaks machine layout into a shareable artifact.
+// sanitizePaths scrubs machine details from probe detail text. Assemble is
+// the CHOKEPOINT: every Evidence.Detail passes through here regardless of
+// which runner produced it, so a runner that echoes arbitrary tool output
+// (a failing test's own message, a compiler error) cannot leak machine
+// layout into a shareable receipt.
+//
+// The rule is categorical, not an enumerated blocklist: the repository root
+// becomes "." (keeping in-repo paths fully readable, relative), and every
+// OTHER absolute path collapses to "…/<basename>". Enumerating known-bad
+// roots (the old repoRoot + $HOME pair) is incomplete by construction — it
+// left temp paths, toolchain roots, other users' homes, and sibling project
+// names (a $HOME replacement renders "~/src/<sibling>/…", which still names
+// the sibling). An absolute path outside the repo is never the receipt
+// reader's business; its basename preserves the actionable part
+// ("…/testing.go:1576"). The machine's hostname is scrubbed to "<host>".
+// URLs pass untouched: "//" never matches the path shape, and a path
+// preceded by an alphanumeric (https:…) is not token-initial.
 func sanitizePaths(detail, repoRoot string) string {
 	if detail == "" {
 		return detail
@@ -222,10 +237,36 @@ func sanitizePaths(detail, repoRoot string) string {
 	if repoRoot != "" && repoRoot != "." {
 		detail = strings.ReplaceAll(detail, repoRoot, ".")
 	}
-	if home, err := os.UserHomeDir(); err == nil && home != "" && home != "/" {
-		detail = strings.ReplaceAll(detail, home, "~")
+	return scrubHost(collapseAbsPaths(detail), hostname)
+}
+
+// absPathRe matches a token-initial absolute path of at least two
+// components. The colon is a terminator, not a path character, so
+// "/a/b/x.go:12: msg" collapses to "…/x.go:12: msg" — the file:line
+// actionability survives the redaction.
+var absPathRe = regexp.MustCompile("(^|[\\s\"'`=,;(\\[])(/[^/\\x00\\s\"'`:,;)\\]]+(?:/[^/\\x00\\s\"'`:,;)\\]]+)+)")
+
+func collapseAbsPaths(s string) string {
+	return absPathRe.ReplaceAllStringFunc(s, func(m string) string {
+		sub := absPathRe.FindStringSubmatch(m)
+		return sub[1] + "…/" + path.Base(sub[2])
+	})
+}
+
+// hostname is resolved once; the empty string (lookup failure) disables the
+// scrub rather than failing a receipt over it.
+var hostname = func() string { h, _ := os.Hostname(); return h }()
+
+// scrubHost replaces whole-word occurrences of the machine's hostname.
+// Hostnames shorter than 3 bytes are left alone — a host named "go" would
+// otherwise redact ordinary prose, and a leak needs a name distinctive
+// enough to identify anything.
+func scrubHost(s, host string) string {
+	if len(host) < 3 || !strings.Contains(s, host) {
+		return s
 	}
-	return detail
+	re := regexp.MustCompile(`\b` + regexp.QuoteMeta(host) + `\b`)
+	return re.ReplaceAllString(s, "<host>")
 }
 
 // weigh reduces a claim's evidence to a status and an effective tier.
diff --git a/internal/receipt/receipt_test.go b/internal/receipt/receipt_test.go
index e934f51..fbeed00 100644
--- a/internal/receipt/receipt_test.go
+++ b/internal/receipt/receipt_test.go
@@ -346,3 +346,43 @@ func TestReceiptSanitizesPathsAndPinsSHAs(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("text header missing SHA pins:\n%s", text.String())
 	}
 }
+
+// TestDetailSanitizationIsCategorical: the sanitizer is a categorical rule at
+// the Assemble chokepoint, not an enumerated blocklist — EVERY absolute path
+// outside the repo collapses to its basename, closing the classes a
+// root+home enumeration left open: temp paths, toolchain roots, sibling
+// project names, other users' homes. In-repo paths stay fully readable, and
+// file:line actionability survives the collapse.
+func TestDetailSanitizationIsCategorical(t *testing.T) {
+	const repo = "/home/someone/src/proj"
+	cases := []struct{ in, want string }{
+		// In-repo: full relative path preserved (the reader's business).
+		{repo + "/pkg/x_test.go:12: boom", "./pkg/x_test.go:12: boom"},
+		// Temp path.
+		{"wrote /tmp/probe-x1/out.json", "wrote …/out.json"},
+		// Sibling project beside the repo: the name must not survive.
+		{"read /home/someone/src/otherproj/secret.cs:3", "read …/secret.cs:3"},
+		// Toolchain root, file:line intact.
+		{"panic at /usr/lib/go/src/testing/testing.go:1576: died", "panic at …/testing.go:1576: died"},
+		// Flag-glued path.
+		{"-coverprofile=/tmp/cov1/prof.out", "-coverprofile=…/prof.out"},
+		// URLs are not filesystem paths and pass untouched.
+		{"GET http://example.com/a/b: refused", "GET http://example.com/a/b: refused"},
+		// Repo-relative output was never a leak.
+		{"internal/probe/gotest.go:41: ok", "internal/probe/gotest.go:41: ok"},
+		// Single-component absolute names identify nothing.
+		{"read /dev: is a directory", "read /dev: is a directory"},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		if got := sanitizePaths(c.in, repo); got != c.want {
+			t.Errorf("sanitizePaths(%q)\n got  %q\n want %q", c.in, got, c.want)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if got := scrubHost("dial tcp devbox42:8080: refused", "devbox42"); got != "dial tcp <host>:8080: refused" {
+		t.Errorf("hostname survived: %q", got)
+	}
+	if got := scrubHost("go test ok", "go"); got != "go test ok" {
+		t.Errorf("short-hostname guard failed: %q", got)
+	}
+}