diff --git a/devlog/_plan/260911_l7_docs/050_4200_delivery.md b/devlog/_plan/260911_l7_docs/050_4200_delivery.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0afe228e79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/devlog/_plan/260911_l7_docs/050_4200_delivery.md
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# #4200 — delivery record
+
+Commit `59d2dc48f8` on the stacked branch `codex/260911-l7-remote-hub`, based on the #4215 head.
+Closes #4200.
+
+## What shipped
+
+`docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/remote-hub.md`:
+
+- The setup block creates `hub` and `remoteGui` before setting any field, and names the exact error
+  a reader would otherwise hit. A whole-object alternative is offered for a genuinely empty config,
+  with the warning that a whole-object set replaces rather than merges, plus the two details that
+  decide whether a line is accepted at all: the value is parsed as JSON first, and both objects are
+  strict so a mistyped key is rejected at write time.
+- A new **Giving the data listener TLS** section states that opencodex terminates no TLS itself,
+  gives the macOS recipe, shows `ocx connect` with a data origin and a separate `--management-url`,
+  and documents the loopback-bind trap.
+- The troubleshooting list loses `--allow-insecure-http`, which does not exist, and gains the
+  `403 origin_rejected` symptom pointing at the new section.
+- The Docker section says why its nested sets work there, so the guide states one rule.
+
+`tests/ci-workflows/docs-remote-hub-claims.test.ts` guards all of it, registered in both layout maps.
+
+## The finding that shaped the recipe
+
+The issue asks for "a supported macOS Tailscale-extension data transport example". The obvious one
+— bind the data listener to loopback so Serve can reach it — is wrong, and wrong in a way that
+passes a health check.
+
+`isApiAuthRequired` is `!isLoopbackHostname(config.hostname)`, keyed on the **configured bind**
+address rather than the socket or the `Host` header (`src/server/auth-cors.ts:288`-`290`). A loopback
+bind therefore takes the first arm of `isAllowedRequestOrigin` (`auth-cors.ts:90`-`94`), which stops
+requiring a data credential and starts requiring the request's `Host` to be loopback too. A TLS
+frontend forwards `Host: hub-name.tailnet-name.ts.net`, so `/v1/catalog` returns
+`403 origin_rejected` (`src/server/index.ts:1303`) — while `/readyz`, which never runs that check
+(`index.ts:1222`-`1242`), still returns `200`. Nothing reads `X-Forwarded-Host`, so the frontend
+cannot repair it.
+
+So the guide keeps the tailnet bind, where credential admission stays on and the `Host` check does
+not apply, and puts a loopback forwarder in front for Serve to target. That is also what the issue
+reporter deployed successfully.
+
+| `hostname` | Serve can reach it? | `/v1/catalog` |
+|---|---|---|
+| `127.0.0.1` | yes | 403 `origin_rejected` — the trap |
+| `0.0.0.0` | yes | works; publishes on every interface |
+| tailnet IP | no, needs a forwarder | works |
+
+## Decisions this lane made
+
+- **Documentation only.** The issue's review explicitly leaves auto-creating a missing parent out
+  of scope, so `src/cli/config-command.ts` is untouched and the guide documents the CLI as it
+  behaves.
+- **Both config forms are shown**, because they are good at different things: whole-object for a
+  fresh config, `'{}'` plus nested sets when adapting an existing one without dropping siblings.
+- **The dead `--allow-insecure-http` is fixed in the same PR.** It is one line in an owned file and
+  the same class of defect the issue reports — a published command that cannot run. Leaving a
+  known-false command beside the one being corrected would be indefensible.
+- **Serve's HTTPS port set is not asserted.** The guide uses 8443 and tells the reader to confirm
+  with `tailscale serve status`, rather than publishing a port list this lane did not verify.
+- **Translations are a follow-up.** The seven locale copies still carry the dead flag and the old
+  setup block. They are outside this lane's owned paths, and the issue asks for English first.
+
+## Verification
+
+Local product suite, typecheck and build NOT RUN by operator instruction. Hosted CI on the exact
+pushed head is the proof.
+
+Two read-only reviewers stood in for the local run. One verified every assertion in the new test by
+reading, including the ordering assertion that is the actual fix — it confirmed the initializer
+precedes the first nested set, and that neither the Docker Compose lines nor the Rollback section
+steal the `indexOf` the test depends on. The other checked the recipe against the admission code,
+quoting the predicate, and confirmed the anchors, the scope, and both layout registrations. Its one
+residual finding — a backgrounded forwarder does not survive a reboot while the service does — is
+folded into the guide.
diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/remote-hub.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/remote-hub.md
index 6a2b2a33bd..60331d9746 100644
--- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/remote-hub.md
+++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/remote-hub.md
@@ -74,8 +74,14 @@ for management. The values below are examples:
 ```bash
 ocx config set runtimeRole hub
 ocx config set hostname 100.64.0.10
-ocx config set hub.managementPublicOrigin '"https://hub-name.tailnet-name.ts.net"'
 ocx config set corsAllowOrigins '["http://localhost:10100"]'
+
+# A fresh standalone config has no `hub` or `remoteGui` object, and `ocx config set` does not
+# create a missing parent: a nested set fails with `config parent path not found: hub`. Setting
+# `runtimeRole` does not create it either. Create each object first, then set its fields.
+ocx config set hub '{}'
+ocx config set remoteGui '{}'
+ocx config set hub.managementPublicOrigin '"https://hub-name.tailnet-name.ts.net"'
 ocx config set hub.managementIngress '{"enabled":true,"port":10101}'
 ocx config set remoteGui.allowedTailscaleUsers '["operator@example.com"]'
 
@@ -86,6 +92,25 @@ ocx service install
 ocx service status
 ```
 
+On a genuinely empty configuration you can set each object in one call instead:
+
+```bash
+ocx config set hub '{"managementPublicOrigin":"https://hub-name.tailnet-name.ts.net","managementIngress":{"enabled":true,"port":10101}}'
+ocx config set remoteGui '{"allowedTailscaleUsers":["operator@example.com"]}'
+```
+
+Use that form only when the object does not exist yet. A whole-object set **replaces** the object
+rather than merging into it, so running the line above against a config that already had
+`hub.managementIngress` silently drops the ingress. When you are adapting an existing
+configuration, set one field at a time — the parent is already there, so the nested form works and
+touches nothing else.
+
+Two details that decide whether a line is accepted. The value is parsed as JSON first and falls
+back to the raw string, which is why a URL is written as `'"https://…"'`: objects, arrays, booleans
+and numbers must be valid JSON. And `hub` and `remoteGui` are strict, so a mistyped key is rejected
+at write time as `schema_invalid: hub.<field>` instead of becoming a setting that never takes
+effect. `managementPublicOrigin` must be a bare origin with no path, query or fragment.
+
 `ocx service install` copies the token into the existing owner-only `service-api-token` path. The
 launchd plist and systemd user unit read that protected file when the process starts; neither embeds
 the literal token. Do not paste the value into `ocx config show`, unit/plist output, screenshots, or
@@ -129,6 +154,63 @@ The positive browser test must use a real signed-in Tailscale session; a bare `c
 identity headers needed for automatic session issuance. Pairing remains the fallback when the HTTPS
 frontend cannot provide trustworthy Tailscale identity.
 
+### Giving the data listener TLS
+
+The Serve mapping above publishes the **management** ingress only. That ingress never serves
+`/v1/*`, `/healthz` or `/readyz`, so on its own it does not give a remote client a usable data
+plane. opencodex also terminates no TLS of its own: the listener is plain HTTP and HTTPS is always
+an operator-owned frontend.
+
+Serve can be that frontend for the data plane too, on a second HTTPS port. On macOS it needs one
+extra hop, because Tailscale Serve proxies only to `127.0.0.1` — it cannot target the listener you
+bound to the node's own tailnet address, and the App Store build of the macOS client refuses a
+remote destination outright. Run a loopback forwarder on the hub and point Serve at that:
+
+```bash
+# Any loopback TCP forwarder works; socat is one. The data listener is bound to the tailnet
+# address, so 127.0.0.1:10100 is free for the forwarder to take.
+socat TCP-LISTEN:10100,bind=127.0.0.1,fork,reuseaddr TCP:100.64.0.10:10100 &
+
+tailscale serve --bg --https=8443 http://127.0.0.1:10100
+tailscale serve status   # expect both mappings: 443 -> 10101, 8443 -> 10100
+```
+
+Serve accepts a limited set of HTTPS ports; confirm the mapping was actually created with
+`tailscale serve status` rather than assuming the port was allowed.
+
+Give the forwarder the same lifetime as the hub. A backgrounded shell job dies on reboot while the
+service comes back up, which leaves a hub that is running and unreachable over TLS; run it from
+launchd or systemd alongside `ocx service install`.
+
+Then connect with the two origins stated separately. The positional URL is the **data** origin —
+it is where `/readyz` and `/v1/catalog` are fetched — and `--management-url` is the dashboard
+origin used for pairing and key issuance. They do not have to share a port:
+
+```bash
+ocx connect https://hub-name.tailnet-name.ts.net:8443 \
+  --management-url https://hub-name.tailnet-name.ts.net \
+  --admin-token-stdin
+```
+
+When `--management-url` is omitted it is taken from the `/readyz` response, which reports
+`hub.managementPublicOrigin`. Setting it explicitly is clearer when the two origins differ.
+
+**Do not shortcut this by binding the data listener to `127.0.0.1`.** A loopback bind is how
+opencodex recognizes a purely local deployment: it stops requiring a data credential, and it starts
+requiring the request's `Host` header to be loopback as well. A TLS frontend forwards
+`Host: hub-name.tailnet-name.ts.net`, so `/v1/catalog` answers `403 origin_rejected` — while
+`/readyz`, which does not run that check, still returns `200`. The deployment looks healthy and
+cannot serve a model. Nothing in the request path reads `X-Forwarded-Host`, so the frontend cannot
+repair it. Keep the listener on the tailnet address, where credential admission stays on and the
+`Host` check does not apply.
+
+Binding `0.0.0.0` also works and removes the need for a forwarder, since the listener is then
+reachable on loopback as well. It publishes the data port on every interface, so prefer it only
+where the host has no other network you care about.
+
+Re-run the acceptance checks against the HTTPS data origin once Serve is up: `/readyz`, an
+authenticated `GET /v1/catalog`, and one real routed response.
+
 ### Operator-owned ts.net certificate proxy
 
 If you operate your own TLS proxy, obtain a certificate only for the full ts.net FQDN:
@@ -269,6 +351,10 @@ docker compose run --rm hub bun run src/cli/index.ts config set remoteGui.allowe
 docker compose restart hub
 ```
 
+These nested sets work because the image seeds a first-run `hub` configuration, so the object
+already exists. On a fresh standalone install it does not, and the same lines fail until you create
+it — see [Linux systemd or macOS launchd](#linux-systemd-or-macos-launchd) above.
+
 Do not put a token in `ARG`, `ENV`, `COPY`, Compose YAML, image history, or command arguments. Do not
 mount the Docker socket, the host's home or Codex home, SSH agent, or provider-key files. A management
 ingress bound to `127.0.0.1:10101` inside the container is reachable only by a TLS/tailnet frontend
@@ -328,8 +414,11 @@ For a service rollback, stop the branch service and repair the prior release aga
   Negotiation fails before token, catalog, journal, or client-state writes.
 - **Lost or burned pairing code:** create a new short-lived code. Grants are one-use and repeated
   failures are rate-limited without revealing whether a code exists.
-- **Plain HTTP warning:** pairing over non-loopback HTTP requires the explicit
-  `--allow-insecure-http` opt-in. Admin tokens are never sent over HTTP.
+- **Plain HTTP refused:** pairing over non-loopback HTTP is refused outright, and there is no flag
+  that opts out of it. Put the management origin behind HTTPS, or pair over loopback. Admin tokens
+  are never sent over HTTP.
+- **`403 origin_rejected` from `/v1/catalog` while `/readyz` returns `200`:** the data listener is
+  bound to loopback behind a TLS frontend. See [Giving the data listener TLS](#giving-the-data-listener-tls).
 - **Remote session ended:** sign in or pair again. Logout and expiry invalidate only the browser
   session, not a client data key.
 - **Outstanding revocation after disconnect:** use the hub dashboard's **Integrations → API Keys**
diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json
index 211e1f5c07..ab3c39df6e 100644
--- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json
+++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json
@@ -615,6 +615,7 @@
     "docs-bun-source-requirement.test.ts": "ci-workflows",
     "docs-provider-billing-claims.test.ts": "ci-workflows",
     "docs-readme-translation-parity.test.ts": "ci-workflows",
+    "docs-remote-hub-claims.test.ts": "ci-workflows",
     "doctor-codex-envkey-readiness.test.ts": "service",
     "doctor-oauth.test.ts": "service",
     "doctor-provider-apikey.test.ts": "service",
diff --git a/tests/ci-workflows/docs-remote-hub-claims.test.ts b/tests/ci-workflows/docs-remote-hub-claims.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c2d73f428e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/ci-workflows/docs-remote-hub-claims.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/**
+ * The remote hub guide has to stay runnable end to end on a FRESH standalone config.
+ *
+ * It did not (#4200). The setup block told the reader to run a nested `ocx config set hub.<field>`
+ * immediately after `ocx config set runtimeRole hub`, but `runtimeRole` does not create the object
+ * and the CLI refuses to create a missing parent, so the guide's own next line died with
+ * `config parent path not found: hub`. A guide that cannot be followed verbatim is worse than a
+ * missing one: the reader assumes they broke something.
+ *
+ * The second half is the data plane. The management ingress deliberately serves no `/v1/*`,
+ * `/healthz` or `/readyz`, so publishing only that ingress through Tailscale Serve leaves a hub
+ * that pairs and then cannot answer a request. The trap is quiet, because a loopback-bound data
+ * listener still returns 200 from `/readyz` while answering 403 on `/v1/catalog`.
+ *
+ * These assertions are cheap and the guide is edited often, which is the whole reason the first
+ * defect survived to a public URL.
+ */
+import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
+import { repoPath } from "../helpers/repo-root";
+
+const GUIDE = repoPath("docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/remote-hub.md");
+
+describe("remote hub guide", () => {
+  test("no nested config set runs before its parent object exists", async () => {
+    const source = await Bun.file(GUIDE).text();
+
+    // The ordering IS the fix. Asserting only that the initializer appears somewhere would pass on
+    // a guide that still sets the field first and mentions `{}` afterwards.
+    for (const parent of ["hub", "remoteGui"] as const) {
+      const initializer = source.indexOf(`ocx config set ${parent} '{}'`);
+      const nested = source.indexOf(`ocx config set ${parent}.`);
+      expect(initializer, `the guide no longer initializes an empty ${parent} object`).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+      expect(nested, `the guide no longer sets any ${parent} field`).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+      expect(
+        initializer,
+        `the guide sets a ${parent}.<field> before creating ${parent}, which fails on a fresh config`,
+      ).toBeLessThan(nested);
+    }
+
+    // Name the error, so a reader who hit it recognizes their own terminal output.
+    expect(source).toContain("config parent path not found: hub");
+  });
+
+  test("the whole-object form carries its replace-not-merge warning", async () => {
+    // `setPath` assigns the leaf. Recommending the one-call form without this warning would tell
+    // an operator adapting an existing config to silently drop their management ingress.
+    const source = await Bun.file(GUIDE).text();
+    expect(source).toContain("replaces** the object");
+  });
+
+  test("the guide says opencodex terminates no TLS itself", async () => {
+    // There is no tls/cert/key field in OcxConfig. A reader who assumes otherwise looks for a
+    // setting that does not exist instead of standing up a frontend.
+    const source = await Bun.file(GUIDE).text();
+    expect(source).toContain("terminates no TLS of its own");
+  });
+
+  test("ocx connect is shown with a data origin and a separate management origin", async () => {
+    // The positional URL is where /readyz and /v1/catalog are fetched; --management-url is where
+    // pairing and key issuance go. They need not share a port, and the macOS recipe relies on that.
+    const source = await Bun.file(GUIDE).text();
+    expect(source).toContain("ocx connect https://hub-name.tailnet-name.ts.net:8443");
+    expect(source).toContain("--management-url https://hub-name.tailnet-name.ts.net");
+  });
+
+  test("the macOS Serve constraint and the loopback-bind trap are both documented", async () => {
+    const source = await Bun.file(GUIDE).text();
+    // Serve cannot reach a listener bound to the node's own tailnet address.
+    expect(source).toContain("Tailscale Serve proxies only to");
+    // And the obvious workaround -- bind the listener to loopback -- breaks the catalog quietly.
+    expect(source).toContain("403 origin_rejected");
+    expect(source).toContain("X-Forwarded-Host");
+  });
+
+  test("the Docker section does not contradict the standalone parent-object rule", async () => {
+    // Compose seeds a hub object, so its nested sets work. Without saying so, the two sections
+    // read as two different rules and the reader cannot tell which applies to them.
+    const source = await Bun.file(GUIDE).text();
+    expect(source).toContain("because the image seeds a first-run");
+  });
+
+  test("the retired --allow-insecure-http flag is not offered", async () => {
+    // It is absent from CONNECT_USAGE, pairing refuses non-loopback HTTP outright, and
+    // remoteGui.allowInsecureHttp is a retired no-op. Offering it sends an operator to an error.
+    const source = await Bun.file(GUIDE).text();
+    expect(source).not.toContain("--allow-insecure-http");
+  });
+});
diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json
index 02a8b205d5..8e025c4cef 100644
--- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json
+++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json
@@ -450,6 +450,7 @@
   "docs-bun-source-requirement.test.ts": "ci-workflows",
   "docs-provider-billing-claims.test.ts": "ci-workflows",
   "docs-readme-translation-parity.test.ts": "ci-workflows",
+  "docs-remote-hub-claims.test.ts": "ci-workflows",
   "doctor-codex-envkey-readiness.test.ts": "service",
   "doctor-oauth.test.ts": "service",
   "doctor-provider-apikey.test.ts": "service",