From d24ff57bc4dd53afbbb1d2c972266e6d89ea5c24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lidge-jun Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2026 17:44:26 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 001/113] release: set main channel version 2.48.0 --- package.json | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index 7d94d23cab..6547da6552 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "@bitkyc08/opencodex", - "version": "2.47.0", + "version": "2.48.0", "description": "Universal provider proxy for OpenAI Codex & Claude Code — use any LLM with Codex CLI/App/SDK and Claude Code", "type": "module", "main": "./bin/package-main.mjs", From b157f784914e2cf7f4b1cf2536158c43b41b97ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 11:05:29 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 002/113] fix(codex): bound the reset-credit consume response like every other read Both consume call sites parsed the upstream answer with resp.json(), which buffers the whole body before anything checks its size. Every neighbouring reset-credit read already goes through readResetCreditJson, which short-circuits an oversized declared length, reads through the shared 64 KiB bounded reader with fatal UTF-8, and rejects a truncated or empty answer. Only these two were left unbounded. The background auto-redeemer now treats an unreadable answer the same way its sibling availability read does and raises. The manual handler marks the operation ambiguous and answers 502, because the spend may already have landed upstream while its outcome code is unreadable, and a replay of that id must never be admitted as new work. --- src/codex/auth-api.ts | 13 +++++- structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 4 ++ .../codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts | 42 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/codex/auth-api.ts b/src/codex/auth-api.ts index 8f92f2c8c8..f67a0458da 100644 --- a/src/codex/auth-api.ts +++ b/src/codex/auth-api.ts @@ -529,7 +529,9 @@ export function createResetCreditWhamClient(config: OcxConfig, accountId: string signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000), }); if (!resp.ok) { await resp.body?.cancel().catch(() => {}); throw new Error(`upstream ${resp.status}`); } - return safeResetCreditConsumeDto(await resp.json()); + const parsed = await readResetCreditJson(resp, AbortSignal.timeout(10_000)); + if (!parsed.ok) throw new Error("invalid upstream reset-credit consume response"); + return safeResetCreditConsumeDto(parsed.value); }), }; } @@ -2701,7 +2703,14 @@ export async function handleCodexAuthAPI( if (identity) markManualResetCreditOperationAmbiguous(identity); return jsonResponse({ error: `Upstream error ${resp.status}` }, resp.status); } - const result = safeResetCreditConsumeDto(await resp.json()); + const consumed = await readResetCreditJson(resp, AbortSignal.timeout(10_000)); + if (!consumed.ok) { + // The spend may already have landed upstream and its outcome code is unreadable, + // so this id must never come back as a new operation. + if (identity) markManualResetCreditOperationAmbiguous(identity); + return jsonResponse({ error: "Invalid upstream reset-credit consume response" }, 502); + } + const result = safeResetCreditConsumeDto(consumed.value); if (identity) { // Narrow explicitly rather than casting: `safeResetCreditConsumeDto` // normalizes anything unrecognized to "unknown", and settling that diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index 527aacba6b..9d9bfe3a94 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -120,6 +120,10 @@ A confirmed manual reset-credit consumption may immediately reconcile that accou eligible pre-existing ordinary reset-derived cooldown after a complete, non-exhausted usage observation started after the reset. Paused or reauthentication-required accounts and cooldowns held by another in-flight probe remain excluded; their cooldowns are retained. +Confirmation requires a readable answer. Every reset-credit read, including the consume +response on both the manual and background paths, goes through the shared bounded-body +reader, so an upstream answer past that bound is unconfirmed rather than buffered whole. +An unconfirmed manual consume leaves its operation ambiguous and reconciles nothing. Recovery owns the specific cooldown and authenticates main and added Pool accounts through their respective credential contracts. Main usage publication keeps the latest successfully published observation authoritative. Pool recovery diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts index 34e29bf334..b0758ad220 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts @@ -2922,6 +2922,48 @@ describe("codex-auth API", () => { } }); + test("reset-credit consume refuses an upstream body past the shared bound instead of buffering it", async () => { + const config = makeConfig(); + seedPoolAccount(config, { id: "pool-oversized", email: "oversized@example.test" }); + const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch; + let usageCalls = 0; + try { + globalThis.fetch = (async (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { + const url = String(input); + if (url.includes("/backend-api/wham/rate-limit-reset-credits/consume")) { + // A 200 with an unbounded body was read whole by resp.json() before anything + // looked at its size, unlike every other reset-credit read on this path. + const padding = "x".repeat(BOUNDED_BODY_MAX_BYTES * 2); + return new Response(`{"code":"reset","padding":"${padding}"}`, { + status: 200, + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + }); + } + if (url.includes("/backend-api/wham/usage")) { + usageCalls += 1; + return Response.json({ + rate_limit: { primary_window: { used_percent: 10, reset_at: 1782000000 } }, + rate_limit_reset_credits: { available_count: 2 }, + }); + } + return originalFetch(input, init); + }) as typeof fetch; + + const req = new Request("http://localhost/api/codex-auth/reset-credits/consume", { + method: "POST", + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ accountId: "pool-oversized" }), + }); + const resp = await handleCodexAuthAPI(req, new URL(req.url), config); + expect(resp!.status).toBe(502); + expect(await resp!.json()).toEqual({ error: "Invalid upstream reset-credit consume response" }); + // The outcome is unconfirmed, so nothing downstream may treat the redeem as observed. + expect(usageCalls).toBe(0); + } finally { + globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; + } + }); + test("reset-credit already_redeemed refreshes quota and never invents a local decrement", async () => { const config = makeConfig(); seedPoolAccount(config, { id: "pool-idempotent", email: "idem@example.test" }); From a5325913c0d2ee97ce4680d7eab438174952bfeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 12:35:09 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 003/113] fix(codex): preserve provider references on late history migration --- .../docs/fr/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 + .../content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 + .../docs/ja/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 + .../docs/ko/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 + .../docs/ru/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 + .../docs/tr/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 + .../docs/zh-cn/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 + .../docs/zh-tw/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 + src/codex/inject.ts | 11 +++- structure/catalog.md | 2 +- structure/codex-home.md | 2 +- structure/config.md | 5 ++ structure/gui-and-management-api.md | 2 +- structure/ops/docs-and-release.md | 2 +- structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 2 +- structure/runtime.md | 2 +- structure/subagents.md | 2 +- .../codex-inject-integration.test.ts | 61 ++++++++++++++++++- 18 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/guides/codex-integration.md index 9a603b910a..6608ebb1d9 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -421,4 +421,6 @@ Codex. Seule l'exécution explicite de `ocx stop` ou `ocx service stop` restaure Une transition de fournisseur peut renvoyer `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` si le stockage concerné prend en charge la pagination, même pour ses lignes legacy. Cette raison ne refuse plus la configuration Codex, le profil de référence ni le catalogue de modèles. `ocx sync` et `ocx start` écrivent toujours ces fichiers et définissent `model_catalog_json`, afin que le sélecteur de modèles Codex continue d’afficher tous les modèles routés par OpenCodex. Seule cette raison interrompt le réétiquetage de l’historique des conversations, car Codex attribue les numéros d’historique paginé dans son propre processus d’écriture et aucune nouvelle tentative n’y change rien. Toute autre raison de contrôle préalable de l’historique — une base d’état illisible, un historique dont l’identité a changé, ou un contrôle préalable qui n’a pas pu s’exécuter — refuse encore toute la transition et l’annule, car ces cas peuvent réussir plus tard. Dans cet état, OpenCodex ne modifie jamais les fichiers d’historique paginé ni les lignes de conversation. Les conversations existantes conservent le fournisseur déjà associé et ne sont pas migrées ; les nouvelles conversations passent par le proxy. Lorsque le réétiquetage est interrompu, une table `[model_providers.opencodex]` déjà présente dans le répertoire d’accueil est conservée plutôt que retirée, y compris sous la forme root-override (loopback), afin que les conversations dont les lignes sont étiquetées `opencodex` gardent un identifiant de fournisseur qui existe encore. Le CLI affiche `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)`. `ocx restore` et la suppression de la configuration Codex refusent toujours sur `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`. Retirer la définition `[model_providers.opencodex]` alors que des lignes de conversation la référencent encore rendrait ces conversations irrésolubles, et le chemin de restauration n’a aucun moyen de conserver une table de fournisseur de compatibilité. Un répertoire d’accueil déjà paginé ne peut pas actuellement être désinstallé par le produit ; c’est un travail ouvert connu, et non le comportement voulu. +Exception : si la pagination est détectée pour la première fois pendant une transition qui supprimerait une table de fournisseur existante, OpenCodex refuse cette tentative et restaure la configuration, le profil de référence et le journal afin de préserver les conversations. Une détection avant la construction du candidat, ou un candidat conservant déjà la table, permet toujours la mise à jour. + Ne réécrivez pas un historique paginé actif ni une ligne de conversation pour forcer une migration. Fermez la conversation avant toute récupération et signalez l’erreur exacte et les versions sans publier de données privées. Une sauvegarde ou le succès d’un script ne prouve pas le rétablissement de l’affichage : vérifiez la conversation après réouverture de Codex. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md index edfca8ca6b..3582960f50 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -867,6 +867,8 @@ When a routed preferred model may receive V2 work from a native ChatGPT parent, When an affected history store supports paginated records, a provider transition may return `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`. That reason no longer refuses the Codex configuration, the reference profile, or the model catalog. `ocx sync` and `ocx start` still write those files and set `model_catalog_json`, so the Codex model picker keeps showing every OpenCodex-routed model. Only this one reason stands the conversation-history relabel down, because Codex allocates paginated rollout ordinals in its own writer and no retry changes that. Any other history preflight reason — an unreadable state database, a rollout whose identity changed, or a preflight that could not run — still refuses the whole transition and rolls it back, because those may succeed on a later attempt. OpenCodex never modifies paginated rollout files or thread rows in this state. Existing conversations keep whatever provider they are already tagged with and are not migrated; new conversations route through the proxy normally. When the relabel stands down, a `[model_providers.opencodex]` table that the home already had is kept rather than retired, even in the root-override (loopback) form, so conversations whose rows are tagged `opencodex` keep a provider id that still exists. This includes legacy rows in a migration-capable store. The CLI prints `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)`. +Exception: if pagination is first detected during a transition that would remove an existing provider table, OpenCodex refuses that attempt and restores the configuration, reference profile, and journal. This preserves existing conversations. Pagination detected before the candidate is built, or a candidate already retaining the provider table, still allows configuration updates. + `ocx restore` and Codex config removal still refuse on `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`. Stripping the `[model_providers.opencodex]` definition while thread rows still reference it would make those conversations unresolvable, and the restore path has no way to keep a compatibility provider table. A home that is already paginated cannot currently be uninstalled through the product; that is known open work rather than intended behaviour. Do not rewrite an active paginated rollout or thread row to migrate those conversations yourself. Close the affected conversation before any recovery, and report the exact error and versions without uploading private history. A backup or a successful script alone does not prove the conversation is visible again. Check the restored conversation in Codex after reopening. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/guides/codex-integration.md index cc44ec28c3..09a7cf3d4c 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -283,4 +283,6 @@ opencodex が管理対象 [バックグラウンドサービス](/reference/cli/ 対象の履歴ストアがページ分割をサポートする場合、プロバイダー変更は `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` を返すことがあります。この理由では、Codex の設定、参照プロファイル、モデルカタログは拒否されません。`ocx sync` と `ocx start` はこれらのファイルを書き込み、`model_catalog_json` を設定するため、Codex のモデル選択には OpenCodex 経由のモデルがすべて表示され続けます。会話履歴の再ラベル付けを控えるのはこの理由だけの場合です。ページ分割された履歴の番号は Codex 自身の書き込み処理が割り当て、再試行しても変わりません。読み取れない状態データベース、識別子が変わった履歴、実行できなかった事前検査など、それ以外の履歴事前検査の理由では、後から成功する可能性があるため、遷移全体を拒否してロールバックします。この状態では OpenCodex はページ分割された履歴ファイルやスレッド行を変更しません。既存の会話はすでに付いているプロバイダーのまま移行されず、新しい会話は通常どおりプロキシ経由でルーティングされます。再ラベル付けを控えるとき、ホームに既にある `[model_providers.opencodex]` テーブルは廃止せず残します。ルート上書き（loopback）形式でも同じで、行が `opencodex` と付いている会話は、まだ存在するプロバイダー id を保てます。移行可能なストアの legacy 行も対象です。CLI は `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)` と表示します。`ocx restore` と Codex 設定の削除は、いまも `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` で拒否されます。スレッド行がまだ参照しているのに `[model_providers.opencodex]` 定義を外すと、それらの会話は解決できなくなり、復元経路には互換プロバイダー表を残す手段がありません。すでにページ分割されているホームは、現状では製品からアンインストールできません。意図した動作ではなく、既知の未解決作業です。 +例外: 既存のプロバイダーテーブルを削除する切り替えの途中でページ形式の履歴が初めて検出された場合、OpenCodex はその試行を拒否し、設定、参照プロファイル、ジャーナルを復元して既存の会話を保護します。設定候補の作成前に検出した場合や、候補がすでにテーブルを保持する場合は、設定の更新を続行できます。 + 会話を移行しようとして使用中のページ分割履歴やスレッド行を書き換えないでください。復元前に対象の会話を閉じ、個人の履歴を公開せず正確なエラーとバージョンを報告してください。バックアップやスクリプトの成功だけでは表示の復元は証明されません。再度開いた Codex で確認してください。 diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/guides/codex-integration.md index 7e353c50f9..cc2458ae4e 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -380,4 +380,6 @@ opencodex가 managed [background service](/reference/cli/#ocx-service)로 실행 영향받는 기록 저장소가 페이지 분할을 지원하면 프로바이더 전환이 `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`를 반환할 수 있습니다. 이 이유로는 Codex 설정, 참조 프로필, 모델 카탈로그를 더 이상 거부하지 않습니다. `ocx sync`와 `ocx start`는 해당 파일과 `model_catalog_json`을 계속 쓰므로 Codex 모델 선택기에는 OpenCodex가 라우팅하는 모델이 모두 그대로 보입니다. 대화 기록의 프로바이더 재지정을 건너뛰는 것은 이 이유뿐이며, 페이지 분할 순번은 Codex 자체의 네이티브 기록 작성자가 할당하고 재시도해도 달라지지 않기 때문입니다. 읽을 수 없는 상태 데이터베이스, 식별자가 바뀐 대화 원본, 실행하지 못한 사전 검사처럼 다른 기록 사전 검사 이유는 나중에 성공할 수 있으므로 전환 전체를 거부하고 되돌립니다. 이 상태에서 OpenCodex는 페이지 분할 대화 원본이나 스레드 행을 수정하지 않습니다. 기존 대화는 이미 붙어 있는 프로바이더를 유지하고 이전되지 않으며, 새 대화는 평소처럼 프록시를 통해 라우팅됩니다. 재지정을 건너뛸 때 홈에 이미 있던 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 테이블은 폐기하지 않고 유지합니다. root-override(loopback) 형식에서도 같아서, 행이 `opencodex`로 표시된 대화는 아직 존재하는 프로바이더 id를 유지합니다. 변환 가능한 저장소의 `legacy` 행도 포함됩니다. CLI는 `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)`를 출력합니다. `ocx restore`와 Codex 설정 제거는 여전히 `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`로 거부됩니다. 스레드 행이 아직 참조하는데 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 정의를 걷어내면 그 대화를 해석할 수 없고, 복원 경로에는 호환 프로바이더 테이블을 남겨 둘 방법이 없습니다. 이미 페이지 분할된 홈은 지금은 제품으로 제거할 수 없습니다. 의도한 동작이 아니라 알려진 미해결 작업입니다. +예외: 기존 provider 테이블을 제거하는 전환 도중에 페이지형 기록이 처음 감지되면, OpenCodex는 해당 시도를 거절하고 설정·참조 프로필·저널을 복원하여 기존 대화를 보존합니다. 설정 후보를 만들기 전에 감지했거나 후보가 이미 provider 테이블을 유지하는 경우에는 설정을 계속 적용할 수 있습니다. + 대화를 강제로 이전하려고 실행 중인 페이지 분할 대화 원본이나 스레드 행을 고치지 마세요. 복구 전에 해당 대화를 닫은 뒤, 개인 대화 내용을 올리지 말고 정확한 오류와 버전을 보고하세요. 백업이나 스크립트 성공만으로 표시 복구가 증명되지는 않으므로 Codex를 다시 열어 확인하세요. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/guides/codex-integration.md index 1cca5f59fd..19c17129bf 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -415,4 +415,6 @@ ocx restore back # point plain Codex at the running proxy again Если затронутое хранилище поддерживает постраничную историю, смена провайдера может вернуть `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`, в том числе для строк legacy. По этой причине больше не отклоняются конфигурация Codex, опорный профиль и каталог моделей. `ocx sync` и `ocx start` по-прежнему записывают эти файлы и задают `model_catalog_json`, поэтому выбор модели Codex продолжает показывать все модели, маршрутизируемые через OpenCodex. Переразметку истории разговоров останавливает только эта причина: порядковые номера постраничной истории выделяет собственный процесс записи Codex, и повторная попытка этого не меняет. Любая другая причина предварительной проверки истории — нечитаемая база состояния, история со сменившейся идентификацией или проверка, которую не удалось запустить, — по-прежнему отклоняет весь переход и откатывает его, потому что такие случаи могут пройти позже. В этом состоянии OpenCodex не изменяет постраничные файлы истории и строки тредов. Существующие разговоры сохраняют уже назначенного провайдера и не мигрируют; новые разговоры идут через прокси как обычно. Когда переразметка останавливается, таблица `[model_providers.opencodex]`, уже бывшая в домашнем каталоге, сохраняется, а не снимается, в том числе в форме root-override (loopback), чтобы разговоры со строками, помеченными `opencodex`, сохраняли существующий идентификатор провайдера. CLI выводит `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)`. `ocx restore` и удаление конфигурации Codex по-прежнему отказывают по `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`. Удаление определения `[model_providers.opencodex]`, пока строки тредов на него ссылаются, сделало бы эти разговоры неразрешимыми, а путь восстановления не умеет оставлять таблицу совместимости провайдера. Домашний каталог, уже переведённый на постраничную историю, сейчас нельзя удалить средствами продукта; это известная открытая задача, а не задуманное поведение. +Исключение: если постраничная история впервые обнаружена во время перехода, который удалил бы существующую таблицу провайдера, OpenCodex отклоняет эту попытку и восстанавливает конфигурацию, справочный профиль и журнал, сохраняя существующие разговоры. Обнаружение до построения кандидата или кандидат, уже сохраняющий таблицу, по-прежнему допускает обновление конфигурации. + Не переписывайте активную постраничную историю или строку треда, чтобы самостоятельно перенести разговоры. Закройте разговор перед восстановлением и сообщите точную ошибку и версии без публикации личной истории. Наличие резервной копии или успешный скрипт не доказывает восстановление отображения: проверьте разговор после повторного открытия Codex. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/guides/codex-integration.md index 436c995bdb..988fe8d7d4 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -472,4 +472,6 @@ service stop` yerel Codex'i geri yükler. Etkilenen geçmiş deposu sayfalamayı destekliyorsa sağlayıcı değişimi `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` döndürebilir; legacy satırlar da buna dahildir. Bu neden artık Codex yapılandırmasını, başvuru profilini veya model kataloğunu reddetmez. `ocx sync` ve `ocx start` bu dosyaları yazmaya ve `model_catalog_json` yolunu ayarlamaya devam eder; böylece Codex model seçicisi OpenCodex üzerinden yönlendirilen her modeli göstermeyi sürdürür. Konuşma geçmişinin yeniden etiketlenmesini durduran yalnızca bu nedendir, çünkü sayfalanmış geçmiş sıra numaralarını Codex’in kendi yerel yazıcısı atar ve yeniden denemek bunu değiştirmez. Okunamayan bir durum veritabanı, kimliği değişmiş bir geçmiş veya çalıştırılamayan bir ön kontrol gibi diğer geçmiş ön kontrol nedenleri, daha sonra başarılı olabilecekleri için hâlâ tüm değişimi reddeder ve geri alır. Bu durumda OpenCodex sayfalanmış geçmiş dosyalarını veya iş parçacığı satırlarını değiştirmez. Mevcut konuşmalar zaten etiketlendikleri sağlayıcıda kalır ve taşınmaz; yeni konuşmalar proxy üzerinden normal şekilde yönlendirilir. Yeniden etiketleme durduğunda, ev dizininde zaten bulunan bir `[model_providers.opencodex]` tablosu kaldırılmaz, kök-override (loopback) biçimde bile tutulur; böylece satırları `opencodex` olarak etiketlenmiş konuşmalar hâlâ var olan bir sağlayıcı kimliğini korur. CLI şunu yazdırır: `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)`. `ocx restore` ve Codex yapılandırmasının kaldırılması `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` nedeniyle hâlâ reddedilir. İş parçacığı satırları hâlâ ona başvuruyken `[model_providers.opencodex]` tanımını kaldırmak o konuşmaları çözülemez yapar ve geri yükleme yolu uyumluluk sağlayıcı tablosunu tutamaz. Zaten sayfalanmış bir ev dizini şu anda ürün üzerinden kaldırılamaz; bu amaçlanan davranış değil, bilinen açık iştir. +İstisna: mevcut sağlayıcı tablosunu kaldıracak bir geçiş sırasında sayfalama ilk kez algılanırsa OpenCodex bu denemeyi reddeder; mevcut konuşmaları korumak için yapılandırmayı, başvuru profilini ve günlüğü geri yükler. Aday oluşturulmadan önce algılanması veya adayın tabloyu zaten koruması, yapılandırma güncellemelerine yine izin verir. + Konuşmaları kendiniz taşımak için etkin sayfalanmış geçmişi veya iş parçacığı satırını yeniden yazmayın. Kurtarmadan önce konuşmayı kapatın ve özel geçmişi yayımlamadan tam hatayı ve sürümleri bildirin. Yedek veya başarılı betik görüntünün düzeldiğini kanıtlamaz; Codex’i yeniden açıp konuşmayı kontrol edin. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/guides/codex-integration.md index dfdac6d98a..30150286bb 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -358,4 +358,6 @@ ocx restore back # point plain Codex at the running proxy again 如果受影响的历史存储支持分页，提供商切换可能返回 `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`。该原因不再拒绝写入 Codex 配置、参考配置档和模型目录。`ocx sync` 与 `ocx start` 仍会写入这些文件并设置 `model_catalog_json`，因此 Codex 模型选择器会继续显示所有经 OpenCodex 路由的模型。只有这一条原因会让会话历史的重新标记停手，因为分页历史序号由 Codex 自己的写入器分配，重试也不会改变。无法读取的状态数据库、身份已变的历史文件、未能运行的预检等其他历史预检原因仍会拒绝整个切换并回滚，因为那些情况以后可能成功。在此状态下，OpenCodex 不会修改分页历史文件或线程行。现有会话保留已标记的提供商，不会被迁移；新会话仍正常经代理路由。重新标记停手时，主目录里已有的 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 表会保留而不是撤下，即便是 root-override（loopback）形式也一样，这样行上标记为 `opencodex` 的会话仍能对应到还存在的提供商 id。可迁移存储中的 legacy 记录也适用。CLI 会打印 `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)`。`ocx restore` 和移除 Codex 配置仍会因 `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` 被拒绝。线程行仍在引用时撤掉 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 定义会使这些会话无法解析，而恢复路径没有办法留下兼容提供商表。已经分页的主目录目前无法通过产品卸载；这是已知的未完成工作，而非预期行为。 +例外：如果在将删除现有提供商表的切换过程中首次检测到分页历史，OpenCodex 会拒绝本次尝试并恢复配置、参考配置档和日志，以保留现有会话。在构建候选配置之前检测到分页，或候选配置已经保留提供商表时，仍可继续更新配置。 + 不要改写正在使用的分页历史文件或线程行来自行迁移这些会话。恢复前关闭相关会话，并只报告准确的错误和版本，不要公开私人历史。备份或脚本成功并不能证明显示已恢复；重新打开 Codex 后检查会话。 diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/guides/codex-integration.md index 284034b54b..f9456be72b 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -365,4 +365,6 @@ ocx restore back # 讓普通 Codex 再次指向仍在執行的 proxy 如果受影響的歷史儲存區支援分頁，提供者切換可能傳回 `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`。此原因不再拒絕寫入 Codex 設定、參考設定檔與模型目錄。`ocx sync` 與 `ocx start` 仍會寫入這些檔案並設定 `model_catalog_json`，因此 Codex 模型選擇器會繼續顯示所有經 OpenCodex 路由的模型。只有這一條原因會讓對話歷史的重新標記停手，因為分頁歷史序號由 Codex 自己的寫入器分配，重試也不會改變。無法讀取的狀態資料庫、身分已變的歷史檔案、未能執行的預檢等其他歷史預檢原因仍會拒絕整個切換並回復，因為那些情況以後可能成功。在此狀態下，OpenCodex 不會修改分頁歷史檔案或執行緒列。既有對話保留已標記的提供者，不會被遷移；新對話仍正常經代理路由。重新標記停手時，家目錄裡既有的 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 表會保留而不是撤下，即便是 root-override（loopback）形式也一樣，這樣列上標記為 `opencodex` 的對話仍能對應到還存在的提供者 id。可遷移儲存區中的 legacy 記錄也適用。CLI 會印出 `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)`。`ocx restore` 與移除 Codex 設定仍會因 `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` 被拒絕。執行緒列仍在參照時撤掉 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 定義會使這些對話無法解析，而復原路徑沒有辦法留下相容提供者表。已經分頁的家目錄目前無法透過產品解除安裝；這是已知的未完成工作，而非預期行為。 +例外：如果在將刪除既有提供者表的切換過程中首次偵測到分頁歷史，OpenCodex 會拒絕本次嘗試並還原設定、參考設定檔與日誌，以保留既有對話。在建立候選設定之前偵測到分頁，或候選設定已保留提供者表時，仍可繼續更新設定。 + 請勿改寫使用中的分頁歷史檔案或執行緒列來自行遷移這些對話。復原前關閉相關對話，只回報確切錯誤與版本，不要公開私人歷史。備份或指令碼成功不能證明顯示已復原；重新開啟 Codex 後確認對話。 diff --git a/src/codex/inject.ts b/src/codex/inject.ts index 9cbddf45fe..6cef365318 100644 --- a/src/codex/inject.ts +++ b/src/codex/inject.ts @@ -1220,14 +1220,19 @@ async function injectCodexConfigImpl( */ /* * Re-observed inside the artifact transaction. A store that migrates to paginated history - * mid-write retires the relabel unit, because the config half writes no history and rolling - * it back is what left every paginated home with no OpenCodex models. Any other reason is - * still treated as a failed transition so compensation can restore the pre-images. + * mid-write can retire the relabel unit only while its already-admitted candidate leaves + * existing provider references resolvable. A candidate that removes the old provider table + * needs compensation; adding it after witness construction would change admitted bytes. */ const observeHistoryRefusalOrThrow = (known: string | null): string | null => { if (known) return known; const observed = historyPreflight(); if (observed && observed !== HISTORY_RELABEL_STANDS_DOWN) throw new CodexHistoryPreflightRefusal(observed); + if (observed === HISTORY_RELABEL_STANDS_DOWN && hadOcxProviderTableOnDisk && !providerTableMode) { + // Pagination appeared after retention was decided. Skipping relabel while publishing + // this table-removing candidate would orphan the still-opencodex conversations. + throw new CodexHistoryPreflightRefusal(observed); + } return observed; }; const observedHistoryRefusal = historyPreflight(); diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index 47a827426b..e8e78748c5 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ Provider `showThinkingSummary` is a Responses request default; it does not rewri ## Paginated history writer boundary -`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. +`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply also compensates when late pagination would leave an existing provider table removed; candidates already retaining that table can still commit. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. Codex pool settings and their consumers follow the [reset-first ordering contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#reset-first-account-ordering), including independent-quota fallback and preserved affinity. diff --git a/structure/codex-home.md b/structure/codex-home.md index 339358ea9b..ab22c5e805 100644 --- a/structure/codex-home.md +++ b/structure/codex-home.md @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ Plan-based automatic exclusions leave native credential files untouched and pres Injection preflights affected history using the normalized config candidate before writing config/profile/journal, then checks again after the complete artifact write. Native restore also rechecks after successful journal restoration or fallback removal, while exact config/profile/journal preimages and any coordinated remove transaction remain available for compensation. -What a detected migration does depends on which refusal it is, and on direction. On apply, `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` retires the relabel unit and the config/profile/journal write stands: it is permanent, so compensating it only produced a home with no OpenCodex models at all. Any other reason there — an unreadable state database, a changed rollout identity, a preflight that could not run — may succeed on a later attempt, so it still restores all three preimages before returning a structured refusal, including on legacy-uncoordinated homes. Restore and removal compensate on every reason, because retiring a provider definition its thread rows still name would orphan them. A failed config restore stops catalog/history work; coordinated restore rolls back its published remove transition. Legacy first-line provider patches are bound to the validated file identity before and after writing. These compensating checks do not provide a native-writer lock or authorize external ordinal allocation. +What a detected migration does depends on which refusal it is, and on direction. On apply, `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` retires the relabel unit and the config/profile/journal write stands when the admitted candidate preserves any existing provider table. Retention is decided before witness construction. If pagination first appears during the artifact transaction and that candidate would remove a previously published table, apply instead refuses and compensates all three artifacts; coordinated admission also rolls back its transition. It never changes candidate bytes after admission. Candidates already using provider-table mode can still commit. Any other reason there — an unreadable state database, a changed rollout identity, a preflight that could not run — may succeed on a later attempt, so it still restores all three preimages before returning a structured refusal, including on legacy-uncoordinated homes. Restore and removal compensate on every reason, because retiring a provider definition its thread rows still name would orphan them. A failed config restore stops catalog/history work; coordinated restore rolls back its published remove transition. Legacy first-line provider patches are bound to the validated file identity before and after writing. These compensating checks do not provide a native-writer lock or authorize external ordinal allocation. The legacy external writer is now refused for affected rows in any store whose schema includes history_mode, even while their row mode is still legacy. This deliberately sacrifices automatic relabeling on migration-capable stores rather than racing native conversion. Synchronous/asynchronous restore, inline journal restore, and direct config removal preserve all artifacts on that refusal, so an already-paginated home cannot yet be uninstalled through the product; apply instead writes its config and keeps a `[model_providers.opencodex]` table the home already published, so rows naming that provider keep resolving. diff --git a/structure/config.md b/structure/config.md index a4c0b97ead..a2735ccc63 100644 --- a/structure/config.md +++ b/structure/config.md @@ -180,6 +180,11 @@ in the same pass. With the relabel stood down, a table the home already publishe write, so those conversations keep a provider id that exists. Paginated rollout bytes and thread rows are never modified in this state. +Retention is decided before the candidate witness. If pagination first appears during the +artifact transaction while a loopback candidate would remove an existing table, injection +refuses and compensates config/profile/journal instead of committing an orphaned provider +reference. A candidate already using provider-table mode can still finish without relabeling. + Treating the refusal as a veto is what made every current Codex home unusable: paginated rollouts refuse unconditionally, so `model_catalog_json` never reached config.toml and both the app and the CLI fell back to their built-in model list. `ocx sync` reported success anyway, diff --git a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md index 0496735405..9c14f20969 100644 --- a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md +++ b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md @@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ The provider editor field policy exposes `showThinkingSummary` as a boolean prov ## Paginated history writer boundary -`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. +`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply also compensates when late pagination would leave an existing provider table removed; candidates already retaining that table can still commit. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. Codex pool settings and their consumers follow the [reset-first ordering contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#reset-first-account-ordering), including independent-quota fallback and preserved affinity. Codex account DTOs and cards expose the routing-plan exclusion separately from credential health; the [plan exclusion contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#automatic-pool-plan-exclusions) also governs CLI projection. Private pool credential metadata follows the [quota-history publication identity contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#quota-history-publication-identity); credential-only and account DTO projections omit it. diff --git a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md index f4474c6419..e4279ddc58 100644 --- a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md +++ b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md @@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ Provider configuration documents distinguish actual summaries from raw reasoning ## Paginated history writer boundary -`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. See the [history writer contract](../codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. +`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply also compensates when late pagination would leave an existing provider table removed; candidates already retaining that table can still commit. See the [history writer contract](../codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. Private pool credential metadata follows the [quota-history publication identity contract](../providers/openai-tiers.md#quota-history-publication-identity); credential-only and account DTO projections omit it. diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index a1824746dc..b932ee7fa5 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ Listener startup diagnostics follow [the runtime lifecycle contract](../runtime. `src/codex/auth-api.ts` projects `selectionExcludedReason: "plan_excluded"` and `selectionExcludedPlan` from the routing config, even when a newer display-only WHAM plan could not be persisted. The dashboard and account CLI show the policy reason separately from credential health; renewal clears the derived fields. The automatic next-session action and badge are omitted for excluded rows. ## Paginated history writer boundary -`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. See the [history writer contract](../codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. +`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply also compensates when late pagination would leave an existing provider table removed; candidates already retaining that table can still commit. See the [history writer contract](../codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. The [explicit model-capability contract](../config.md#explicit-per-model-capability-declarations) preserves operator declarations through provider storage and catalog capture; it does not infer upstream capability or change this surface's routing behavior. diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index aa977c51df..aa3c691d51 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ Responses route normalization resolves provider summary defaults from the origin ## Paginated history writer boundary -`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. +`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply also compensates when late pagination would leave an existing provider table removed; candidates already retaining that table can still commit. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. Codex pool settings and their consumers follow the [reset-first ordering contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#reset-first-account-ordering), including independent-quota fallback and preserved affinity. diff --git a/structure/subagents.md b/structure/subagents.md index 69047b076b..81ca900035 100644 --- a/structure/subagents.md +++ b/structure/subagents.md @@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ Final-route summary visibility is recomputed after fallback from the original Re ## Paginated history writer boundary -`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. +`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply also compensates when late pagination would leave an existing provider table removed; candidates already retaining that table can still commit. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. Codex pool settings and their consumers follow the [reset-first ordering contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#reset-first-account-ordering), including independent-quota fallback and preserved affinity. diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts index d0dda14d01..e4a7a2e08e 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts @@ -163,6 +163,65 @@ describe("injectCodexConfig integration (Design B)", () => { }); }); + test.each([ + ["before-preflight", false, false], + ["after-preflight", false, false], + ["after-config", false, false], + ["after-artifacts", false, false], + ["after-config", true, false], + ["after-config", false, true], + ] as const)("late pagination preserves an existing provider (%s, coordinated=%s, authless=%s)", (stage, coordinated, authless) => { + const original = 'model_provider="opencodex"\n[model_providers.opencodex]\nname="OpenCodex"\nbase_url="http://127.0.0.1:10100/v1"\nwire_api="responses"\nrequires_openai_auth=true\n'; + const configPath = join(codexHome, "config.toml"); + const profilePath = join(codexHome, "opencodex.config.toml"); + writeFileSync(configPath, original); + if (!coordinated) writeFileSync(profilePath, "# original profile\n"); + if (coordinated) { + writeFileSync(configPath, 'model="test"\n'); + const seed = runInject(codexHome, ocxHome, JSON.stringify({ codexClientCompaction: true })); + expect(seed.status).toBe(0); + expect(JSON.parse(seed.stdout).success).toBe(true); + } + const journalPath = join(codexHome, "opencodex-journal.json"); + const before = [configPath, profilePath, journalPath].map(path => existsSync(path) ? readFileSync(path, "utf8") : null); + const script = ` + const {Database}=require("bun:sqlite"); + const {join}=require("node:path"); + const {injectCodexConfig,setBeforeHistoryArtifactCommitForTests,setHistoryArtifactStageForTests}=require("./src/codex/inject"); + const migrate=()=>{ + const db=new Database(join(process.env.CODEX_HOME,"state_5.sqlite")); + db.run("CREATE TABLE threads (rollout_path TEXT, model_provider TEXT, history_mode TEXT)"); + db.run("INSERT INTO threads VALUES (\'fixture\',\'opencodex\',\'paginated\')"); + db.close(); + }; + let kind; + setBeforeHistoryArtifactCommitForTests(value=>{kind=value;if(${JSON.stringify(stage)}==="before-preflight")migrate();}); + setHistoryArtifactStageForTests(value=>{if(value===${JSON.stringify(stage)})migrate();}); + const readState=${coordinated ? 'require("./src/codex/transition-state").readCodexTransitionState' : "()=>null"}; + const before=readState(); + const result=await injectCodexConfig(10100,{codexDesktopAuthless:${authless}}); + console.log(JSON.stringify({kind,result,before,after:readState()})); + `; + const child=spawnSync(process.execPath,["--eval",script],{cwd:repoRoot,env:{...process.env,CODEX_HOME:codexHome,OPENCODEX_HOME:ocxHome},encoding:"utf8",timeout:SPAWN_BUDGET_MS-5000}); + expect(child.status, child.stderr).toBe(0); + const value = JSON.parse(child.stdout); + expect(value.kind, child.stdout).toBe(coordinated ? "coordinated" : "legacy-uncoordinated"); + expect(value.result).toMatchObject({success:authless,historyPreflightFailureReason:"history_paginated_requires_native_writer"}); + if (authless) { + const config = Bun.TOML.parse(readFileSync(configPath,"utf8")) as any; + expect(config.model_provider).toBe("opencodex"); + expect(config.model_providers.opencodex.base_url).toBe("http://127.0.0.1:10100/v1"); + expect(readFileSync(profilePath,"utf8")).not.toBe(before[1]); + } else { + expect([configPath, profilePath, journalPath].map(path => existsSync(path) ? readFileSync(path, "utf8") : null)).toEqual(before); + expect(value.after).toEqual(value.before); + } + const db = new Database(join(codexHome, "state_5.sqlite"), { readonly: true }); + try { + expect(db.query("SELECT model_provider FROM threads").get()).toEqual({model_provider:"opencodex"}); + } finally { db.close(); } + }); + for (const stage of ["before-preflight", "after-preflight", "after-config", "after-artifacts"]) { test.each([false,true])(`a store that migrates mid-transaction retires the relabel unit and keeps the config (${stage}, legacy=%s)`,(legacy)=>{ const original=legacy ? DESIGN_B_BLOCK+"\n" : 'model="test"\n'; @@ -192,7 +251,7 @@ describe("injectCodexConfig integration (Design B)", () => { const value=JSON.parse(child.stdout); expect(value.kind).toBe(legacy?"legacy-uncoordinated":"coordinated"); // A migration observed at ANY point in the transaction stands the relabel unit down and - // says so. It never rolls the config back: the config half writes no history, and + // says so. With no prior provider table to retire, it need not roll the config back: // rolling it back is what left every paginated home with no OpenCodex models at all. expect(value.result).toMatchObject({success:true,historyPreflightFailureReason:"history_paginated_requires_native_writer"}); expect(value.result.message).toContain("left to Codex's native writer"); From a039fdbd3c00b31837160af3053953742769c365 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2026 13:20:15 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 004/113] fix(codex): report a deferred Windows CLI inspection instead of an absent candidate On Windows the candidate-only provenance slice performs no candidate or configuration filesystem I/O, so it never consults the persisted runtime selection. When no proof-captured CODEX_CLI_PATH candidate is present it nevertheless reported reason "candidate_unavailable", asserting that no Codex CLI candidate exists even though availability was never observed. Operators whose runtime resolves through persisted "configured" state therefore saw a missing candidate while the runtime report showed a known version. Report the deferral that actually occurred instead. The defined "windows_inspection_deferred" reason already exists but was reachable only with an environment candidate. POSIX does read persisted state, so its absent-candidate answer is exact and stays unchanged. No filesystem access is added: the Windows path still performs zero I/O, and candidateAvailable, provenance, managed, selectionAttested, versionEvidence and shim status are unchanged. This intentionally replaces the previous test statement that pinned the "candidate_unavailable" wording on Windows. --- .../content/docs/fr/reference/cli/agents.md | 2 +- .../content/docs/ja/reference/cli/agents.md | 2 +- .../content/docs/ko/reference/cli/agents.md | 2 +- .../src/content/docs/reference/cli/agents.md | 5 +++- .../content/docs/ru/reference/cli/agents.md | 2 +- .../content/docs/tr/reference/cli/agents.md | 2 +- .../docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/agents.md | 2 +- .../docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/agents.md | 2 +- src/codex/cli-install-provenance.ts | 8 ++++- .../codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts | 30 +++++++++++++++++-- 10 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/agents.md index 31dcb9ac94..b643e0f7e4 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ ocx system settings --stream-mode eager-relay ocx system codex-cli-update check --json ``` -`check` n’interroge aucun registre de paquets et inspecte, dans des limites strictes, les éléments de provenance du candidat d’installation configuré, notamment l’emplacement expurgé de l’exécutable et les preuves de propriété. Le contexte de confiance du lanceur publié authentifie uniquement cet instantané du candidat, et non l’exécution réussie de Codex. Comme cette commande ponctuelle n’exécute jamais Codex, les candidats issus de l’environnement ou de l’état persistant restent purement informatifs (`managed: false`, normalement `selection_unattested`) et `selectionAttested` reste `false`. La sortie JSON contient `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource` et `selectionAttested: false`. Une exécution directe via Bun ou depuis les sources ne fournit pas la preuve du lanceur, ignore les candidats issus de l’environnement ou de l’état persistant et peut signaler `candidate_unavailable`. Sous Windows, cette première étape n’effectue aucune E/S de système de fichiers sur les chemins du candidat ou de configuration. Seul un candidat d’environnement absolu capturé par le lanceur de confiance peut recevoir une étiquette lexicale de bundle d’application ou de gestionnaire de versions ; tous les autres candidats Windows échouent de manière fermée. La commande n’exécute ni Codex ni aucun gestionnaire de paquets, ne répare aucun shim, n’écrit ni dans la configuration ni dans le cache, n’arrête aucun processus et n’installe rien. Les candidats intégrés à une application, issus d’un gestionnaire de versions reconnu, autonomes mais non vérifiés, ou associés à un état de shim ambigu sont signalés comme non gérés ou inconnus et ne sont jamais classés comme gérés. +`check` n’interroge aucun registre de paquets et inspecte, dans des limites strictes, les éléments de provenance du candidat d’installation configuré, notamment l’emplacement expurgé de l’exécutable et les preuves de propriété. Le contexte de confiance du lanceur publié authentifie uniquement cet instantané du candidat, et non l’exécution réussie de Codex. Comme cette commande ponctuelle n’exécute jamais Codex, les candidats issus de l’environnement ou de l’état persistant restent purement informatifs (`managed: false`, normalement `selection_unattested`) et `selectionAttested` reste `false`. La sortie JSON contient `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource` et `selectionAttested: false`. Une exécution directe via Bun ou depuis les sources ne fournit pas la preuve du lanceur, ignore les candidats issus de l’environnement ou de l’état persistant et peut signaler `candidate_unavailable`. Sous Windows, cette première étape n’effectue aucune E/S de système de fichiers sur les chemins du candidat ou de configuration. Seul un candidat d’environnement absolu capturé par le lanceur de confiance peut recevoir une étiquette lexicale de bundle d’application ou de gestionnaire de versions ; tous les autres candidats Windows échouent de manière fermée. Comme cette étape ne consulte jamais l’état persistant, une exécution Windows dépourvue d’un tel candidat d’environnement signale `windows_inspection_deferred` plutôt que `candidate_unavailable` : la commande ne peut pas observer si une CLI Codex est installée, elle signale donc le report de l’inspection au lieu d’affirmer qu’aucun candidat n’existe. La commande n’exécute ni Codex ni aucun gestionnaire de paquets, ne répare aucun shim, n’écrit ni dans la configuration ni dans le cache, n’arrête aucun processus et n’installe rien. Les candidats intégrés à une application, issus d’un gestionnaire de versions reconnu, autonomes mais non vérifiés, ou associés à un état de shim ambigu sont signalés comme non gérés ou inconnus et ne sont jamais classés comme gérés. ### `ocx config ...` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/agents.md index 29dc8cd730..cb8b5ae786 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ ocx system settings --stream-mode eager-relay ocx system codex-cli-update check --json ``` -`check` はパッケージレジストリに問い合わせず、設定済みのインストール候補について、秘匿化された実行ファイルの場所や所有権を示す根拠を含む来歴情報を、範囲を限定して検査します。公開ランチャー由来の信頼済みコンテキストが真正性を裏付けるのは候補のスナップショットだけであり、Codex が正常に実行されたことではありません。この単発コマンドは Codex を一切実行しないため、環境または永続化された状態から得た候補は報告対象にとどまります（`managed: false`、通常は `selection_unattested`）。`selectionAttested` は常に `false` です。JSON 出力には `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion`、`candidateSource`、`selectionAttested: false` が含まれます。Bun またはソースから直接起動するとランチャーの証明がないため、環境由来および永続化された候補を無視し、`candidate_unavailable` を報告することがあります。Windows では、この最初のスライスは候補や構成のパスに対するファイルシステム I/O を一切行いません。信頼済みランチャーが取り込んだ絶対パスの環境候補だけを、アプリ同梱またはバージョンマネージャーとして字句的に報告でき、それ以外の Windows 候補はすべて失敗時閉鎖になります。このコマンドは Codex やパッケージマネージャーの実行、shim の修復、設定やキャッシュ状態への書き込み、プロセスの停止、インストールを行いません。アプリ同梱、認識済みのバージョンマネージャー、未検証のスタンドアロン、曖昧な shim の各候補は管理対象外または不明として報告され、管理対象と判定されることはありません。 +`check` はパッケージレジストリに問い合わせず、設定済みのインストール候補について、秘匿化された実行ファイルの場所や所有権を示す根拠を含む来歴情報を、範囲を限定して検査します。公開ランチャー由来の信頼済みコンテキストが真正性を裏付けるのは候補のスナップショットだけであり、Codex が正常に実行されたことではありません。この単発コマンドは Codex を一切実行しないため、環境または永続化された状態から得た候補は報告対象にとどまります（`managed: false`、通常は `selection_unattested`）。`selectionAttested` は常に `false` です。JSON 出力には `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion`、`candidateSource`、`selectionAttested: false` が含まれます。Bun またはソースから直接起動するとランチャーの証明がないため、環境由来および永続化された候補を無視し、`candidate_unavailable` を報告することがあります。Windows では、この最初のスライスは候補や構成のパスに対するファイルシステム I/O を一切行いません。信頼済みランチャーが取り込んだ絶対パスの環境候補だけを、アプリ同梱またはバージョンマネージャーとして字句的に報告でき、それ以外の Windows 候補はすべて失敗時閉鎖になります。このスライスは永続化された選択状態を一切読み取らないため、そのような環境候補がない Windows 実行では `candidate_unavailable` ではなく `windows_inspection_deferred` を報告します。コマンドは Codex CLI が導入されているかどうかを観測できないので、候補が存在しないと断定せず、検査が延期されたことを報告します。このコマンドは Codex やパッケージマネージャーの実行、shim の修復、設定やキャッシュ状態への書き込み、プロセスの停止、インストールを行いません。アプリ同梱、認識済みのバージョンマネージャー、未検証のスタンドアロン、曖昧な shim の各候補は管理対象外または不明として報告され、管理対象と判定されることはありません。 ### `ocx config ...` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/agents.md index be2834963a..863b57d9e2 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ ocx system settings --stream-mode eager-relay ocx system codex-cli-update check --json ``` -`check`는 패키지 레지스트리를 조회하지 않고, 설정된 설치 후보에 대해 전체 경로를 숨긴 실행 파일 위치와 소유권 근거를 포함한 provenance 정보를 제한된 범위에서 검사합니다. 신뢰할 수 있는 배포 런처 컨텍스트가 인증하는 것은 후보 스냅샷뿐이며, Codex가 성공적으로 실행되었다는 사실은 인증하지 않습니다. 이 단발성 명령은 Codex를 전혀 실행하지 않으므로 환경 또는 저장된 상태에서 얻은 후보는 보고 전용입니다(`managed: false`, 일반적으로 `selection_unattested`). `selectionAttested`는 항상 `false`입니다. JSON 출력에는 `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource`, `selectionAttested: false`가 포함됩니다. Bun이나 소스에서 직접 실행하면 런처 증거가 없으므로 환경 및 저장된 후보를 무시하고 `candidate_unavailable`을 보고할 수 있습니다. Windows에서는 이 첫 조각이 후보 또는 설정 경로의 파일시스템을 전혀 읽지 않습니다. 배포 런처가 증명한 절대 환경 후보에 한해서 앱 번들 또는 버전 관리자라는 어휘적 표지만 보고하며, 그 밖의 Windows 후보는 모두 실패 닫힘 처리합니다. 이 명령은 Codex나 패키지 관리자를 실행하거나 shim을 복구하지 않고, 설정 또는 캐시 상태를 쓰거나 프로세스를 중지하거나 어떤 것도 설치하지 않습니다. 앱에 포함된 후보, 인식된 버전 관리자의 후보, 검증되지 않은 독립 실행형 후보, shim 상태가 모호한 후보는 관리 대상이 아니거나 알 수 없는 것으로 보고되며, 관리 대상으로 분류되지 않습니다. +`check`는 패키지 레지스트리를 조회하지 않고, 설정된 설치 후보에 대해 전체 경로를 숨긴 실행 파일 위치와 소유권 근거를 포함한 provenance 정보를 제한된 범위에서 검사합니다. 신뢰할 수 있는 배포 런처 컨텍스트가 인증하는 것은 후보 스냅샷뿐이며, Codex가 성공적으로 실행되었다는 사실은 인증하지 않습니다. 이 단발성 명령은 Codex를 전혀 실행하지 않으므로 환경 또는 저장된 상태에서 얻은 후보는 보고 전용입니다(`managed: false`, 일반적으로 `selection_unattested`). `selectionAttested`는 항상 `false`입니다. JSON 출력에는 `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource`, `selectionAttested: false`가 포함됩니다. Bun이나 소스에서 직접 실행하면 런처 증거가 없으므로 환경 및 저장된 후보를 무시하고 `candidate_unavailable`을 보고할 수 있습니다. Windows에서는 이 첫 조각이 후보 또는 설정 경로의 파일시스템을 전혀 읽지 않습니다. 배포 런처가 증명한 절대 환경 후보에 한해서 앱 번들 또는 버전 관리자라는 어휘적 표지만 보고하며, 그 밖의 Windows 후보는 모두 실패 닫힘 처리합니다. 이 조각은 저장된 선택 상태를 전혀 읽지 않으므로, 그러한 환경 후보가 없는 Windows 실행은 `candidate_unavailable`이 아니라 `windows_inspection_deferred`를 보고합니다. 명령이 Codex CLI 설치 여부를 관측할 수 없으므로, 후보가 없다고 단정하는 대신 검사가 연기되었음을 보고합니다. 이 명령은 Codex나 패키지 관리자를 실행하거나 shim을 복구하지 않고, 설정 또는 캐시 상태를 쓰거나 프로세스를 중지하거나 어떤 것도 설치하지 않습니다. 앱에 포함된 후보, 인식된 버전 관리자의 후보, 검증되지 않은 독립 실행형 후보, shim 상태가 모호한 후보는 관리 대상이 아니거나 알 수 없는 것으로 보고되며, 관리 대상으로 분류되지 않습니다. ### `ocx config ...` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/agents.md index 51ada47a5b..8d60144eaa 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -371,7 +371,10 @@ and `selectionAttested`. Inspecting the configured candidate requires a trusted a direct Bun/source launch has no such proof, ignores ambient and persisted candidate state, and may report `candidate_unavailable`. On Windows this first slice performs no candidate or configuration filesystem I/O: only a proof-captured absolute environment candidate can receive lexical app-bundle or version-manager labels; -every other Windows candidate fails closed. The command does not execute Codex or a package manager, repair a shim, +every other Windows candidate fails closed. Because that slice never consults persisted state, a Windows run +without such an environment candidate reports `windows_inspection_deferred` rather than `candidate_unavailable`: +the command cannot observe whether a Codex CLI is installed, so it reports the deferral instead of asserting +that no candidate exists. The command does not execute Codex or a package manager, repair a shim, write configuration or cache state, stop a process, or install anything. App-bundled, recognized version-manager, unverified standalone, and ambiguous shim states are reported as unmanaged or unknown and are never classified as managed. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/agents.md index f2175ec154..56eb6a0891 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ ocx system settings --stream-mode eager-relay ocx system codex-cli-update check --json ``` -`check` не обращается к реестру пакетов и в строго ограниченном объёме проверяет данные о происхождении настроенного кандидата, включая замаскированный путь к исполняемому файлу и подтверждения его принадлежности. Доверенный контекст опубликованного средства запуска подтверждает только подлинность снимка данных о кандидате, но не факт успешного запуска Codex. Поскольку команда выполняет только такую проверку и никогда не запускает Codex, кандидаты из окружения и сохранённых данных отображаются только в отчёте (`managed: false`, обычно `selection_unattested`). В выводе JSON присутствуют `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource` и `selectionAttested`, причём значение `selectionAttested` всегда равно `false`. Для проверки настроенного кандидата нужен доверенный контекст опубликованного средства запуска. При прямом запуске через Bun или из исходного кода такого подтверждения нет; в этом случае команда игнорирует кандидатов из окружения и сохранённых данных и может вернуть `candidate_unavailable`. В Windows этот первый этап вообще не выполняет файловый ввод-вывод по путям кандидата или конфигурации. Только абсолютный кандидат из окружения, зафиксированный доверенным средством запуска, может получить лексическую метку комплекта приложения или менеджера версий; все остальные кандидаты Windows отклоняются по принципу fail-closed. Команда не запускает Codex или менеджер пакетов, не восстанавливает shim, ничего не записывает в конфигурацию или кеш, не останавливает процессы и ничего не устанавливает. Кандидаты, входящие в комплект приложения, найденные в распознанных путях менеджеров версий, являющиеся непроверенными автономными установками или имеющие неоднозначное состояние shim, отображаются как `unmanaged` или `unknown` и никогда не классифицируются как `managed`. +`check` не обращается к реестру пакетов и в строго ограниченном объёме проверяет данные о происхождении настроенного кандидата, включая замаскированный путь к исполняемому файлу и подтверждения его принадлежности. Доверенный контекст опубликованного средства запуска подтверждает только подлинность снимка данных о кандидате, но не факт успешного запуска Codex. Поскольку команда выполняет только такую проверку и никогда не запускает Codex, кандидаты из окружения и сохранённых данных отображаются только в отчёте (`managed: false`, обычно `selection_unattested`). В выводе JSON присутствуют `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource` и `selectionAttested`, причём значение `selectionAttested` всегда равно `false`. Для проверки настроенного кандидата нужен доверенный контекст опубликованного средства запуска. При прямом запуске через Bun или из исходного кода такого подтверждения нет; в этом случае команда игнорирует кандидатов из окружения и сохранённых данных и может вернуть `candidate_unavailable`. В Windows этот первый этап вообще не выполняет файловый ввод-вывод по путям кандидата или конфигурации. Только абсолютный кандидат из окружения, зафиксированный доверенным средством запуска, может получить лексическую метку комплекта приложения или менеджера версий; все остальные кандидаты Windows отклоняются по принципу fail-closed. Поскольку этот этап вообще не читает сохранённое состояние выбора, запуск в Windows без такого кандидата из окружения возвращает `windows_inspection_deferred`, а не `candidate_unavailable`: команда не может определить, установлен ли Codex CLI, поэтому сообщает об отложенной проверке, а не утверждает, что кандидата нет. Команда не запускает Codex или менеджер пакетов, не восстанавливает shim, ничего не записывает в конфигурацию или кеш, не останавливает процессы и ничего не устанавливает. Кандидаты, входящие в комплект приложения, найденные в распознанных путях менеджеров версий, являющиеся непроверенными автономными установками или имеющие неоднозначное состояние shim, отображаются как `unmanaged` или `unknown` и никогда не классифицируются как `managed`. ### `ocx config ...` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/agents.md index f533038cf5..ece0647748 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ ocx system settings --stream-mode eager-relay ocx system codex-cli-update check --json ``` -`check` paket kayıt defterine istek göndermez ve yapılandırmada belirtilen kurulum adayına ilişkin provenance kanıtını, maskelenmiş yürütülebilir dosya konumu ve sahiplik kanıtı dâhil, sınırlı biçimde inceler. Yayımlanmış başlatıcıdan gelen güvenilir bağlam aday anlık görüntüsünü doğrular; Codex'in başarıyla çalıştırıldığını doğrulamaz. Bu tek seferlik komut Codex'i hiçbir zaman çalıştırmadığından, ortamdan ve kalıcı kayıtlardan gelen adaylar yalnızca raporlanır (`managed: false`, genellikle `selection_unattested`). JSON çıktısında `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion` ve `candidateSource` alanları bulunur; `selectionAttested` değeri ise `false` kalır. Yapılandırmada belirtilen kurulum adayını incelemek için yayımlanmış başlatıcıdan gelen güvenilir bağlam gerekir; Bun ile veya kaynak koddan doğrudan başlatıldığında bu kanıt bulunmadığından ortamdaki ve kalıcı kayıtlardaki aday durumu yok sayılır ve `candidate_unavailable` bildirilebilir. Windows'ta bu ilk parça, aday veya yapılandırma yollarında hiçbir dosya sistemi G/Ç işlemi yapmaz. Yalnızca güvenilir başlatıcının yakaladığı mutlak bir ortam adayı sözcüksel olarak uygulama paketi ya da sürüm yöneticisi etiketi alabilir; diğer tüm Windows adayları kapalı başarısızlıkla reddedilir. Komut Codex veya bir paket yöneticisi çalıştırmaz, shim'i onarmaz, yapılandırmaya ya da önbellek durumuna yazmaz, hiçbir süreci durdurmaz ve hiçbir şey kurmaz. Uygulamayla birlikte paketlenmiş adaylar, tanınan sürüm yöneticisi yollarında bulunan adaylar, doğrulanmamış bağımsız adaylar ve belirsiz shim durumları `unmanaged` veya `unknown` olarak raporlanır; hiçbir zaman `managed` olarak sınıflandırılmaz. +`check` paket kayıt defterine istek göndermez ve yapılandırmada belirtilen kurulum adayına ilişkin provenance kanıtını, maskelenmiş yürütülebilir dosya konumu ve sahiplik kanıtı dâhil, sınırlı biçimde inceler. Yayımlanmış başlatıcıdan gelen güvenilir bağlam aday anlık görüntüsünü doğrular; Codex'in başarıyla çalıştırıldığını doğrulamaz. Bu tek seferlik komut Codex'i hiçbir zaman çalıştırmadığından, ortamdan ve kalıcı kayıtlardan gelen adaylar yalnızca raporlanır (`managed: false`, genellikle `selection_unattested`). JSON çıktısında `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion` ve `candidateSource` alanları bulunur; `selectionAttested` değeri ise `false` kalır. Yapılandırmada belirtilen kurulum adayını incelemek için yayımlanmış başlatıcıdan gelen güvenilir bağlam gerekir; Bun ile veya kaynak koddan doğrudan başlatıldığında bu kanıt bulunmadığından ortamdaki ve kalıcı kayıtlardaki aday durumu yok sayılır ve `candidate_unavailable` bildirilebilir. Windows'ta bu ilk parça, aday veya yapılandırma yollarında hiçbir dosya sistemi G/Ç işlemi yapmaz. Yalnızca güvenilir başlatıcının yakaladığı mutlak bir ortam adayı sözcüksel olarak uygulama paketi ya da sürüm yöneticisi etiketi alabilir; diğer tüm Windows adayları kapalı başarısızlıkla reddedilir. Bu parça kalıcı seçim durumunu hiç okumadığından, böyle bir ortam adayı bulunmayan Windows çalıştırmaları `candidate_unavailable` yerine `windows_inspection_deferred` bildirir: komut bir Codex CLI'nin kurulu olup olmadığını gözlemleyemez, bu yüzden aday bulunmadığını iddia etmek yerine incelemenin ertelendiğini bildirir. Komut Codex veya bir paket yöneticisi çalıştırmaz, shim'i onarmaz, yapılandırmaya ya da önbellek durumuna yazmaz, hiçbir süreci durdurmaz ve hiçbir şey kurmaz. Uygulamayla birlikte paketlenmiş adaylar, tanınan sürüm yöneticisi yollarında bulunan adaylar, doğrulanmamış bağımsız adaylar ve belirsiz shim durumları `unmanaged` veya `unknown` olarak raporlanır; hiçbir zaman `managed` olarak sınıflandırılmaz. ### `ocx config ...` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/agents.md index da81deadd6..f795869a7d 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ ocx system settings --stream-mode eager-relay ocx system codex-cli-update check --json ``` -`check` 不会向软件包注册表发起请求，只会在限定范围内检查已配置候选项的来源证据，包括经过脱敏的可执行文件位置和所有权证据。受信任的已发布启动器上下文只能验证该候选项快照，并不证明 Codex 已成功运行。由于这条一次性命令绝不会运行 Codex，来自环境变量和持久化记录的候选项仅用于报告（`managed: false`，通常为 `selection_unattested`）；JSON 输出包含 `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion` 和 `candidateSource`，且 `selectionAttested` 始终为 `false`。检查已配置候选项需要受信任的已发布启动器上下文；直接使用 Bun 启动或从源码运行时没有这项证明，因此会忽略环境变量和持久化记录中的候选项状态，并可能报告 `candidate_unavailable`。在 Windows 上，这个首个切片不会对候选路径或配置路径执行任何文件系统 I/O。只有由受信任启动器捕获的绝对环境候选项可以获得应用捆绑或版本管理器的纯词法标签；其他所有 Windows 候选项都会以失败关闭方式处理。该命令不会运行 Codex 或软件包管理器，不会修复 shim，不会写入配置或缓存，不会停止进程，也不会安装任何内容。随应用捆绑的候选项、位于已识别版本管理器路径中的候选项、未经验证的独立候选项以及 shim 状态不明确的候选项，都会报告为 `unmanaged` 或 `unknown`，绝不会归类为 `managed`。 +`check` 不会向软件包注册表发起请求，只会在限定范围内检查已配置候选项的来源证据，包括经过脱敏的可执行文件位置和所有权证据。受信任的已发布启动器上下文只能验证该候选项快照，并不证明 Codex 已成功运行。由于这条一次性命令绝不会运行 Codex，来自环境变量和持久化记录的候选项仅用于报告（`managed: false`，通常为 `selection_unattested`）；JSON 输出包含 `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion` 和 `candidateSource`，且 `selectionAttested` 始终为 `false`。检查已配置候选项需要受信任的已发布启动器上下文；直接使用 Bun 启动或从源码运行时没有这项证明，因此会忽略环境变量和持久化记录中的候选项状态，并可能报告 `candidate_unavailable`。在 Windows 上，这个首个切片不会对候选路径或配置路径执行任何文件系统 I/O。只有由受信任启动器捕获的绝对环境候选项可以获得应用捆绑或版本管理器的纯词法标签；其他所有 Windows 候选项都会以失败关闭方式处理。由于这个切片完全不读取持久化的选择状态，在没有此类环境候选项的 Windows 上运行时会报告 `windows_inspection_deferred` 而非 `candidate_unavailable`：该命令无法观测 Codex CLI 是否已安装，因此报告检查被推迟，而不是断言不存在候选项。该命令不会运行 Codex 或软件包管理器，不会修复 shim，不会写入配置或缓存，不会停止进程，也不会安装任何内容。随应用捆绑的候选项、位于已识别版本管理器路径中的候选项、未经验证的独立候选项以及 shim 状态不明确的候选项，都会报告为 `unmanaged` 或 `unknown`，绝不会归类为 `managed`。 ### `ocx config ...` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/agents.md index 7da97b61dc..5a27ef16fd 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ ocx system settings --stream-mode eager-relay ocx system codex-cli-update check --json ``` -`check` 不會向套件 registry 發出請求，只會在限定範圍內檢查設定中的安裝候選項來源證據，包括經過遮罩的可執行檔位置與所有權證據。正式發布的 launcher 所提供的可信內容只會驗證該候選項快照，並不證明 Codex 已成功執行。由於這個單次命令絕不會執行 Codex，來自環境變數與持久化記錄的候選項只供報告（`managed: false`，通常為 `selection_unattested`）；JSON 輸出包含 `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion` 與 `candidateSource`，而 `selectionAttested` 維持 `false`。檢查設定中的安裝候選項時，必須有正式發布的 launcher 所提供的可信內容；直接使用 Bun 啟動或從原始碼執行時不具備這項證明，因此會忽略來自環境與持久化記錄的候選項狀態，並可能報告 `candidate_unavailable`。在 Windows 上，這個首個切片不會對候選路徑或設定路徑執行任何檔案系統 I/O。只有由可信 launcher 擷取的絕對環境候選項可以取得應用程式封裝或版本管理工具的純詞彙標籤；其他所有 Windows 候選項都會以失敗關閉方式處理。此命令不會執行 Codex 或套件管理工具、不會修復 shim、不會寫入設定或快取、不會停止程序，也不會安裝任何內容。隨應用程式封裝的候選項、位於已識別版本管理工具路徑中的候選項、未經驗證的獨立候選項，以及 shim 狀態不明確的候選項，都會報告為 `unmanaged` 或 `unknown`，絕不會歸類為 `managed`。 +`check` 不會向套件 registry 發出請求，只會在限定範圍內檢查設定中的安裝候選項來源證據，包括經過遮罩的可執行檔位置與所有權證據。正式發布的 launcher 所提供的可信內容只會驗證該候選項快照，並不證明 Codex 已成功執行。由於這個單次命令絕不會執行 Codex，來自環境變數與持久化記錄的候選項只供報告（`managed: false`，通常為 `selection_unattested`）；JSON 輸出包含 `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion` 與 `candidateSource`，而 `selectionAttested` 維持 `false`。檢查設定中的安裝候選項時，必須有正式發布的 launcher 所提供的可信內容；直接使用 Bun 啟動或從原始碼執行時不具備這項證明，因此會忽略來自環境與持久化記錄的候選項狀態，並可能報告 `candidate_unavailable`。在 Windows 上，這個首個切片不會對候選路徑或設定路徑執行任何檔案系統 I/O。只有由可信 launcher 擷取的絕對環境候選項可以取得應用程式封裝或版本管理工具的純詞彙標籤；其他所有 Windows 候選項都會以失敗關閉方式處理。由於這個切片完全不會讀取持久化的選擇狀態，在沒有這類環境候選項的 Windows 上執行時會報告 `windows_inspection_deferred` 而非 `candidate_unavailable`：該命令無法觀測 Codex CLI 是否已安裝，因此會報告檢查被延後，而不是斷言候選項不存在。此命令不會執行 Codex 或套件管理工具、不會修復 shim、不會寫入設定或快取、不會停止程序，也不會安裝任何內容。隨應用程式封裝的候選項、位於已識別版本管理工具路徑中的候選項、未經驗證的獨立候選項，以及 shim 狀態不明確的候選項，都會報告為 `unmanaged` 或 `unknown`，絕不會歸類為 `managed`。 ### `ocx config ...` diff --git a/src/codex/cli-install-provenance.ts b/src/codex/cli-install-provenance.ts index ffca581f5f..5c253196ff 100644 --- a/src/codex/cli-install-provenance.ts +++ b/src/codex/cli-install-provenance.ts @@ -587,8 +587,14 @@ export async function inspectCodexCliInstall( const platform = deps.platform ?? process.platform; const candidate = observeCodexRuntimeCandidateReadOnly(deps); if (!candidate) { + // This slice reads no candidate or configuration file on Windows, so an + // absent proof-captured environment candidate does not establish that no + // Codex CLI exists: a persisted selection is simply never consulted there. + // Report the deferral that actually happened instead of the stronger claim + // that the candidate is unavailable. POSIX did observe persisted state, so + // its absent-candidate answer stays exact. return isWindowsPlatform(platform) - ? unknownWindowsReport("candidate_unavailable") + ? unknownWindowsReport("windows_inspection_deferred") : unknownReport("candidate_unavailable"); } diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts index 31635b2afd..a62f5c7f9f 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ describe("Codex CLI install provenance", () => { expect(calls).toBe(0); }); - test("Windows does not read persisted candidate state", async () => { + test("Windows reports a deferred inspection rather than an absent candidate", async () => { let calls = 0; const report = await inspectCodexCliInstall({ ...noFilesystemDeps(() => { calls += 1; }), @@ -116,9 +116,35 @@ describe("Codex CLI install provenance", () => { configDir: "C:\\OpenCodex", env: { PATH: "C:\\Tools" }, }); + // Persisted state is still never read on Windows, so the command cannot + // know whether a candidate exists. It must not claim that none does. + expect(report.reason).toBe("windows_inspection_deferred"); expect(report.candidateAvailable).toBe(false); - expect(report.reason).toBe("candidate_unavailable"); + expect(report.candidateSource).toBeNull(); + expect(report.candidateVersion).toBeNull(); + expect(report.location).toBeNull(); + expect(report.provenance).toBe("unknown"); + expect(report.managed).toBe(false); + expect(report.selectionAttested).toBe(false); + expect(report.versionEvidence.kind).toBe("unavailable"); expect(report.shim.status).toBe("unknown"); + expect(report.evidence).toEqual([]); + expect(calls).toBe(0); + }); + + test("a POSIX run that observed no persisted candidate still reports it as unavailable", async () => { + let calls = 0; + const report = await inspectCodexCliInstall({ + ...noFilesystemDeps(() => { calls += 1; }), + platform: "linux", + configDir: "relative-config-dir", + env: { PATH: "" }, + }); + // The deferral wording is Windows-only: POSIX actually consults persisted + // state, so an absent candidate there remains an exact answer. + expect(report.reason).toBe("candidate_unavailable"); + expect(report.candidateAvailable).toBe(false); + expect(report.shim.status).toBe("not-tracked"); expect(calls).toBe(0); }); From 9894045f6c5b9b4fb4ee8af58f701314b9e0def0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2026 13:50:11 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 005/113] test(codex): describe unobserved candidate evidence precisely --- src/codex/cli-install-provenance.ts | 4 ++-- .../codex-integration/codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/codex/cli-install-provenance.ts b/src/codex/cli-install-provenance.ts index 5c253196ff..e595205518 100644 --- a/src/codex/cli-install-provenance.ts +++ b/src/codex/cli-install-provenance.ts @@ -591,8 +591,8 @@ export async function inspectCodexCliInstall( // absent proof-captured environment candidate does not establish that no // Codex CLI exists: a persisted selection is simply never consulted there. // Report the deferral that actually happened instead of the stronger claim - // that the candidate is unavailable. POSIX did observe persisted state, so - // its absent-candidate answer stays exact. + // that the candidate is unavailable. POSIX retains its existing result + // when no candidate is observed. return isWindowsPlatform(platform) ? unknownWindowsReport("windows_inspection_deferred") : unknownReport("candidate_unavailable"); diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts index a62f5c7f9f..095ad2dc8a 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ describe("Codex CLI install provenance", () => { expect(calls).toBe(0); }); - test("a POSIX run that observed no persisted candidate still reports it as unavailable", async () => { + test("a POSIX run with no observed candidate retains candidate_unavailable", async () => { let calls = 0; const report = await inspectCodexCliInstall({ ...noFilesystemDeps(() => { calls += 1; }), @@ -140,8 +140,8 @@ describe("Codex CLI install provenance", () => { configDir: "relative-config-dir", env: { PATH: "" }, }); - // The deferral wording is Windows-only: POSIX actually consults persisted - // state, so an absent candidate there remains an exact answer. + // The relative configuration path is rejected without I/O. This control + // preserves the existing POSIX reason when no candidate is observed. expect(report.reason).toBe("candidate_unavailable"); expect(report.candidateAvailable).toBe(false); expect(report.shim.status).toBe("not-tracked"); From fd6a2ed978547f16a3da49e7e4ca3ba6301d329c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat, 12 Sep 2026 14:25:20 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 006/113] docs(codex): document deferred Windows inspection in all CLI references --- docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli.md | 2 +- docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli.md | 2 +- docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli.md | 2 +- docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli.md | 2 +- docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli.md | 2 +- docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli.md | 2 +- docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli.md | 2 +- docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli.md | 2 +- 8 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli.md index 5b333ad44a..2394bf5e42 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Exécutez `ocx help` (ou `ocx --help` / `ocx -h`) pour afficher l’aide génér Les commandes de gestion communiquent avec l’API de gestion du proxy actif. Elles s’appuient sur le port d’exécution enregistré et sur des contrôles d’identité, plutôt que sur un second chemin de configuration. Un proxy arrêté ou inaccessible est représenté par une réponse HTTP 503 et entraîne un code de sortie CLI non nul. Les commandes explicitement documentées comme des opérations de configuration hors ligne peuvent, quant à elles, valider et modifier le fichier de configuration sans proxy actif. -`ocx system codex-cli-update check` ne nécessite aucun proxy actif et n’interroge aucun registre de paquets. La commande inspecte, dans des limites strictes, les métadonnées de provenance du candidat d’installation configuré, notamment l’emplacement expurgé de l’exécutable et les preuves de propriété. Le contexte de confiance du lanceur publié authentifie uniquement cet instantané du candidat, et non l’exécution réussie de Codex. Comme cette commande ponctuelle n’exécute jamais Codex, les candidats issus de l’environnement ou de l’état persistant restent purement informatifs (`managed: false`, normalement `selection_unattested`) et `selectionAttested` reste `false`. La sortie JSON contient `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource` et `selectionAttested: false`. Une exécution directe via Bun ou depuis les sources ne fournit pas la preuve du lanceur, ignore les candidats issus de l’environnement ou de l’état persistant et peut signaler `candidate_unavailable`. Sous Windows, cette première étape n’effectue aucune E/S de système de fichiers sur les chemins du candidat ou de configuration. Seul un candidat d’environnement absolu capturé par le lanceur de confiance peut recevoir une étiquette lexicale de bundle d’application ou de gestionnaire de versions ; tous les autres candidats Windows échouent de manière fermée. La commande n’installe ni ne répare de logiciel, n’exécute ni Codex ni npm, ne contrôle aucun processus actif et n’écrit aucun état de configuration ou de cache. +`ocx system codex-cli-update check` ne nécessite aucun proxy actif et n’interroge aucun registre de paquets. La commande inspecte, dans des limites strictes, les métadonnées de provenance du candidat d’installation configuré, notamment l’emplacement expurgé de l’exécutable et les preuves de propriété. Le contexte de confiance du lanceur publié authentifie uniquement cet instantané du candidat, et non l’exécution réussie de Codex. Comme cette commande ponctuelle n’exécute jamais Codex, les candidats issus de l’environnement ou de l’état persistant restent purement informatifs (`managed: false`, normalement `selection_unattested`) et `selectionAttested` reste `false`. La sortie JSON contient `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource` et `selectionAttested: false`. Une exécution directe via Bun ou depuis les sources ne fournit pas la preuve du lanceur, ignore les candidats issus de l’environnement ou de l’état persistant et peut signaler `candidate_unavailable` sous POSIX ou `windows_inspection_deferred` sous Windows. Sous Windows, cette première étape n’effectue aucune E/S de système de fichiers sur les chemins du candidat ou de configuration. Seul un candidat d’environnement absolu capturé par le lanceur de confiance peut recevoir une étiquette lexicale de bundle d’application ou de gestionnaire de versions ; tous les autres candidats Windows échouent de manière fermée. La commande n’installe ni ne répare de logiciel, n’exécute ni Codex ni npm, ne contrôle aucun processus actif et n’écrit aucun état de configuration ou de cache. L’affichage d’une liste ou d’un état est l’action par défaut lorsqu’il n’y a aucune ambiguïté. Utilisez `--json` pour obtenir des instantanés structurés et `ocx observe logs --follow --jsonl` pour suivre un flux de journaux de requêtes. Le thème, la langue, la navigation et les autres états purement visuels du navigateur n’ont pas d’équivalent dans la CLI. La configuration de Cloudflare Tunnel ne fait pas partie de cet ensemble de commandes. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli.md index 1279a03713..4b4997acdf 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli.md @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ opencodex CLI は `ocx` です。最初のコマンド名でディスパッチ 管理コマンドは、2 番目の構成パスを維持するのではなく、記録されたランタイム ポートと ID チェックを使用して、稼働中のプロキシの管理 API をラウンドトリップします。停止したプロキシまたは到達不能なプロキシは HTTP 503 として表され、ゼロ以外の CLI 終了が生成されます。オフライン構成操作として明示的に文書化されているコマンドは、代わりに、稼働中のプロキシを使用せずに設定ファイルを検証および編集できます。 -`ocx system codex-cli-update check` は稼働中のプロキシを必要とせず、パッケージレジストリにも問い合わせません。設定済みのインストール候補について、秘匿化された実行ファイルの場所や所有権を示す根拠を含む来歴メタデータを、範囲を限定して検査します。公開ランチャー由来の信頼済みコンテキストが真正性を裏付けるのは候補のスナップショットだけであり、Codex が正常に実行されたことではありません。この単発コマンドは Codex を一切実行しないため、環境または永続化された状態から得た候補は報告対象にとどまります（`managed: false`、通常は `selection_unattested`）。`selectionAttested` は常に `false` です。JSON 出力には `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion`、`candidateSource`、`selectionAttested: false` が含まれます。Bun またはソースから直接起動するとランチャーの証明がないため、環境由来および永続化された候補を無視し、`candidate_unavailable` を報告することがあります。Windows では、この最初のスライスは候補や構成のパスに対するファイルシステム I/O を一切行いません。信頼済みランチャーが取り込んだ絶対パスの環境候補だけを、アプリ同梱またはバージョンマネージャーとして字句的に報告でき、それ以外の Windows 候補はすべて失敗時閉鎖になります。このコマンドはソフトウェアのインストールや修復、Codex または npm の実行、稼働中プロセスの制御、設定やキャッシュ状態への書き込みを行いません。 +`ocx system codex-cli-update check` は稼働中のプロキシを必要とせず、パッケージレジストリにも問い合わせません。設定済みのインストール候補について、秘匿化された実行ファイルの場所や所有権を示す根拠を含む来歴メタデータを、範囲を限定して検査します。公開ランチャー由来の信頼済みコンテキストが真正性を裏付けるのは候補のスナップショットだけであり、Codex が正常に実行されたことではありません。この単発コマンドは Codex を一切実行しないため、環境または永続化された状態から得た候補は報告対象にとどまります（`managed: false`、通常は `selection_unattested`）。`selectionAttested` は常に `false` です。JSON 出力には `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion`、`candidateSource`、`selectionAttested: false` が含まれます。Bun またはソースから直接起動するとランチャーの証明がないため、環境由来および永続化された候補を無視し、POSIX では `candidate_unavailable`、Windows では `windows_inspection_deferred` を報告することがあります。Windows では、この最初のスライスは候補や構成のパスに対するファイルシステム I/O を一切行いません。信頼済みランチャーが取り込んだ絶対パスの環境候補だけを、アプリ同梱またはバージョンマネージャーとして字句的に報告でき、それ以外の Windows 候補はすべて失敗時閉鎖になります。このコマンドはソフトウェアのインストールや修復、Codex または npm の実行、稼働中プロセスの制御、設定やキャッシュ状態への書き込みを行いません。 リストまたはステータスは、明確なデフォルトです。構造化スナップショットには `--json` を使用し、ストリーミング リクエスト ログ フィードには `ocx observe logs --follow --jsonl` を使用します。テーマ、言語、ナビゲーション、その他の純粋に視覚的なブラウザーの状態には、同等の CLI がありません。 Cloudflare Tunnel のセットアップはこのコマンド セットの外にあります。 diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli.md index 3b384c20f0..f75de642c5 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ opencodex CLI는 `ocx`입니다. 첫 번째 명령 이름으로 분기하며, `s 관리 명령은 기록된 런타임 포트와 신원 검사를 사용해 살아 있는 프록시의 management API와 왕복 통신하며, 두 번째 설정 경로를 따로 두지 않습니다. 멈췄거나 닿을 수 없는 프록시는 HTTP 503으로 표시되며 CLI는 0이 아닌 종료 코드를 반환합니다. 명시적으로 오프라인 설정 작업으로 문서화된 명령은 라이브 프록시 없이 설정 파일을 검증하고 수정할 수 있습니다. -`ocx system codex-cli-update check`는 실행 중인 프록시가 없어도 되며 패키지 레지스트리를 조회하지 않습니다. 설정된 설치 후보에 대해 전체 경로를 숨긴 실행 파일 위치와 소유권 근거를 포함한 provenance 메타데이터를 제한된 범위에서 검사합니다. 신뢰할 수 있는 배포 런처 컨텍스트가 인증하는 것은 후보 스냅샷뿐이며, Codex가 성공적으로 실행되었다는 사실은 인증하지 않습니다. 이 단발성 명령은 Codex를 전혀 실행하지 않으므로 환경 또는 저장된 상태에서 얻은 후보는 보고 전용입니다(`managed: false`, 일반적으로 `selection_unattested`). `selectionAttested`는 항상 `false`입니다. JSON 출력에는 `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource`, `selectionAttested: false`가 포함됩니다. Bun이나 소스에서 직접 실행하면 런처 증거가 없으므로 환경 및 저장된 후보를 무시하고 `candidate_unavailable`을 보고할 수 있습니다. Windows에서는 이 첫 조각이 후보 또는 설정 경로의 파일시스템을 전혀 읽지 않습니다. 배포 런처가 증명한 절대 환경 후보에 한해서 앱 번들 또는 버전 관리자라는 어휘적 표지만 보고하며, 그 밖의 Windows 후보는 모두 실패 닫힘 처리합니다. 이 명령은 소프트웨어를 설치하거나 복구하지 않고, Codex나 npm을 실행하지 않으며, 실행 중인 프로세스를 제어하거나 설정 또는 캐시 상태를 쓰지 않습니다. +`ocx system codex-cli-update check`는 실행 중인 프록시가 없어도 되며 패키지 레지스트리를 조회하지 않습니다. 설정된 설치 후보에 대해 전체 경로를 숨긴 실행 파일 위치와 소유권 근거를 포함한 provenance 메타데이터를 제한된 범위에서 검사합니다. 신뢰할 수 있는 배포 런처 컨텍스트가 인증하는 것은 후보 스냅샷뿐이며, Codex가 성공적으로 실행되었다는 사실은 인증하지 않습니다. 이 단발성 명령은 Codex를 전혀 실행하지 않으므로 환경 또는 저장된 상태에서 얻은 후보는 보고 전용입니다(`managed: false`, 일반적으로 `selection_unattested`). `selectionAttested`는 항상 `false`입니다. JSON 출력에는 `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource`, `selectionAttested: false`가 포함됩니다. Bun이나 소스에서 직접 실행하면 런처 증거가 없으므로 환경 및 저장된 후보를 무시하고 POSIX에서는 `candidate_unavailable`, Windows에서는 `windows_inspection_deferred`을 보고할 수 있습니다. Windows에서는 이 첫 조각이 후보 또는 설정 경로의 파일시스템을 전혀 읽지 않습니다. 배포 런처가 증명한 절대 환경 후보에 한해서 앱 번들 또는 버전 관리자라는 어휘적 표지만 보고하며, 그 밖의 Windows 후보는 모두 실패 닫힘 처리합니다. 이 명령은 소프트웨어를 설치하거나 복구하지 않고, Codex나 npm을 실행하지 않으며, 실행 중인 프로세스를 제어하거나 설정 또는 캐시 상태를 쓰지 않습니다. 뜻이 분명하면 `list`나 `status`가 기본입니다. 구조화된 스냅샷은 `--json`을, 스트리밍 요청 로그 피드는 `ocx observe logs --follow --jsonl`을 사용합니다. 테마, 언어, 내비게이션처럼 순수하게 시각적인 브라우저 상태에는 CLI 대응이 없습니다. Cloudflare Tunnel 설정은 이 명령 집합 밖입니다. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli.md index d91e6c1865..5497199aca 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli.md @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ remain report-only (`managed: false`, normally `selection_unattested`) and `sele The JSON report exposes `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource`, and `selectionAttested`. Inspecting the configured candidate requires a trusted published-launcher context; a direct Bun/source launch has no such proof, ignores ambient and persisted candidate state, and may report -`candidate_unavailable`. On Windows this first slice performs no candidate or configuration filesystem I/O: +`candidate_unavailable` on POSIX or `windows_inspection_deferred` on Windows. On Windows this first slice performs no candidate or configuration filesystem I/O: only a proof-captured absolute environment candidate can receive lexical app-bundle or version-manager labels; every other Windows candidate fails closed. The command does not install or repair software, execute Codex or npm, control a running process, or write configuration/cache state. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli.md index e25eff1afd..0901634ee2 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli.md @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ runtime port и проверку identity, а не поддерживая вто явно документированные как offline-операции с конфигурацией, вместо этого могут валидировать и редактировать файл конфигурации без живого прокси. -`ocx system codex-cli-update check` не требует работающего прокси и не обращается к реестру пакетов. Команда в строго ограниченном объёме проверяет метаданные происхождения настроенного кандидата, включая замаскированный путь к исполняемому файлу и подтверждения его принадлежности. Доверенный контекст опубликованного средства запуска подтверждает только подлинность снимка данных о кандидате, но не факт успешного запуска Codex. Поскольку команда выполняет только такую проверку и никогда не запускает Codex, кандидаты из окружения и сохранённых данных отображаются только в отчёте (`managed: false`, обычно `selection_unattested`). В выводе JSON присутствуют `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource` и `selectionAttested`, причём значение `selectionAttested` всегда равно `false`. Для проверки настроенного кандидата нужен доверенный контекст опубликованного средства запуска. При прямом запуске через Bun или из исходного кода такого подтверждения нет; в этом случае команда игнорирует кандидатов из окружения и сохранённых данных и может вернуть `candidate_unavailable`. В Windows этот первый этап вообще не выполняет файловый ввод-вывод по путям кандидата или конфигурации. Только абсолютный кандидат из окружения, зафиксированный доверенным средством запуска, может получить лексическую метку комплекта приложения или менеджера версий; все остальные кандидаты Windows отклоняются по принципу fail-closed. Команда не устанавливает и не восстанавливает ПО, не запускает Codex или npm, не управляет работающими процессами и ничего не записывает в конфигурацию или кеш. +`ocx system codex-cli-update check` не требует работающего прокси и не обращается к реестру пакетов. Команда в строго ограниченном объёме проверяет метаданные происхождения настроенного кандидата, включая замаскированный путь к исполняемому файлу и подтверждения его принадлежности. Доверенный контекст опубликованного средства запуска подтверждает только подлинность снимка данных о кандидате, но не факт успешного запуска Codex. Поскольку команда выполняет только такую проверку и никогда не запускает Codex, кандидаты из окружения и сохранённых данных отображаются только в отчёте (`managed: false`, обычно `selection_unattested`). В выводе JSON присутствуют `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource` и `selectionAttested`, причём значение `selectionAttested` всегда равно `false`. Для проверки настроенного кандидата нужен доверенный контекст опубликованного средства запуска. При прямом запуске через Bun или из исходного кода такого подтверждения нет; в этом случае команда игнорирует кандидатов из окружения и сохранённых данных и может вернуть `candidate_unavailable` в POSIX или `windows_inspection_deferred` в Windows. В Windows этот первый этап вообще не выполняет файловый ввод-вывод по путям кандидата или конфигурации. Только абсолютный кандидат из окружения, зафиксированный доверенным средством запуска, может получить лексическую метку комплекта приложения или менеджера версий; все остальные кандидаты Windows отклоняются по принципу fail-closed. Команда не устанавливает и не восстанавливает ПО, не запускает Codex или npm, не управляет работающими процессами и ничего не записывает в конфигурацию или кеш. Там, где это недвусмысленно, `list` или `status` являются действием по умолчанию. Для структурированных снимков используйте `--json`, а для потокового лога запросов — diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli.md index a36e60fed7..b3b79d854c 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli.md @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ yönetim API'sine gidiş-dönüş yapar. Durdurulmuş veya erişilemeyen bir pro yapılandırma işlemleri olarak açıkça belgelenen komutlar, bunun yerine canlı bir proxy olmadan yapılandırma dosyasını doğrulayabilir ve düzenleyebilir. -`ocx system codex-cli-update check` canlı proxy gerektirmez ve paket kayıt defterine istek göndermez. Yapılandırmada belirtilen kurulum adayına ilişkin provenance meta verilerini, maskelenmiş yürütülebilir dosya konumu ve sahiplik kanıtı dâhil, sınırlı biçimde inceler. Yayımlanmış başlatıcıdan gelen güvenilir bağlam aday anlık görüntüsünü doğrular; Codex'in başarıyla çalıştırıldığını doğrulamaz. Bu tek seferlik denetim Codex'i hiçbir zaman çalıştırmadığından, ortamdan ve kalıcı kayıtlardan gelen adaylar yalnızca raporlanır (`managed: false`, genellikle `selection_unattested`). JSON çıktısında `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion` ve `candidateSource` alanları bulunur; `selectionAttested` değeri ise `false` kalır. Yapılandırmada belirtilen kurulum adayını incelemek için yayımlanmış başlatıcıdan gelen güvenilir bağlam gerekir; Bun ile veya kaynak koddan doğrudan başlatıldığında bu kanıt bulunmadığından ortamdaki ve kalıcı kayıtlardaki aday durumu yok sayılır ve `candidate_unavailable` bildirilebilir. Windows'ta bu ilk parça, aday veya yapılandırma yollarında hiçbir dosya sistemi G/Ç işlemi yapmaz. Yalnızca güvenilir başlatıcının yakaladığı mutlak bir ortam adayı sözcüksel olarak uygulama paketi ya da sürüm yöneticisi etiketi alabilir; diğer tüm Windows adayları kapalı başarısızlıkla reddedilir. Komut yazılım kurmaz veya onarmaz, Codex ya da npm çalıştırmaz, çalışan bir sürece müdahale etmez ve yapılandırmaya ya da önbellek durumuna yazmaz. +`ocx system codex-cli-update check` canlı proxy gerektirmez ve paket kayıt defterine istek göndermez. Yapılandırmada belirtilen kurulum adayına ilişkin provenance meta verilerini, maskelenmiş yürütülebilir dosya konumu ve sahiplik kanıtı dâhil, sınırlı biçimde inceler. Yayımlanmış başlatıcıdan gelen güvenilir bağlam aday anlık görüntüsünü doğrular; Codex'in başarıyla çalıştırıldığını doğrulamaz. Bu tek seferlik denetim Codex'i hiçbir zaman çalıştırmadığından, ortamdan ve kalıcı kayıtlardan gelen adaylar yalnızca raporlanır (`managed: false`, genellikle `selection_unattested`). JSON çıktısında `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion` ve `candidateSource` alanları bulunur; `selectionAttested` değeri ise `false` kalır. Yapılandırmada belirtilen kurulum adayını incelemek için yayımlanmış başlatıcıdan gelen güvenilir bağlam gerekir; Bun ile veya kaynak koddan doğrudan başlatıldığında bu kanıt bulunmadığından ortamdaki ve kalıcı kayıtlardaki aday durumu yok sayılır ve POSIX'te `candidate_unavailable`, Windows'ta ise `windows_inspection_deferred` bildirilebilir. Windows'ta bu ilk parça, aday veya yapılandırma yollarında hiçbir dosya sistemi G/Ç işlemi yapmaz. Yalnızca güvenilir başlatıcının yakaladığı mutlak bir ortam adayı sözcüksel olarak uygulama paketi ya da sürüm yöneticisi etiketi alabilir; diğer tüm Windows adayları kapalı başarısızlıkla reddedilir. Komut yazılım kurmaz veya onarmaz, Codex ya da npm çalıştırmaz, çalışan bir sürece müdahale etmez ve yapılandırmaya ya da önbellek durumuna yazmaz. Belirsiz olmayan yerlerde liste veya durum varsayılandır. Yapılandırılmış anlık görüntüler için `--json` ve akışlı bir istek günlüğü akışı için `ocx observe diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli.md index e804df71af..07ba562646 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ opencodex 的 CLI 是 `ocx`。它会根据第一个命令名进行分发；文 管理命令会通过实时代理的管理 API 往返调用，使用记录下来的运行时端口和身份检查，而不是维护第二条配置路径。已停止或不可达的代理会被表示为 HTTP 503，并导致 CLI 以非零状态退出。明确标注为离线配置操作的命令，则可以在没有实时代理的情况下验证并编辑配置文件。 -`ocx system codex-cli-update check` 不需要实时代理，也不会向软件包注册表发起请求。它只会在限定范围内检查已配置候选项的来源元数据，包括经过脱敏的可执行文件位置和所有权证据。受信任的已发布启动器上下文只能验证该候选项快照，并不证明 Codex 已成功运行。由于这条一次性检查命令绝不会运行 Codex，来自环境变量和持久化记录的候选项仅用于报告（`managed: false`，通常为 `selection_unattested`）；JSON 输出包含 `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion` 和 `candidateSource`，且 `selectionAttested` 始终为 `false`。检查已配置候选项需要受信任的已发布启动器上下文；直接使用 Bun 启动或从源码运行时没有这项证明，因此会忽略环境变量和持久化记录中的候选项状态，并可能报告 `candidate_unavailable`。在 Windows 上，这个首个切片不会对候选路径或配置路径执行任何文件系统 I/O。只有由受信任启动器捕获的绝对环境候选项可以获得应用捆绑或版本管理器的纯词法标签；其他所有 Windows 候选项都会以失败关闭方式处理。该命令不会安装或修复软件，不会运行 Codex 或 npm，不会控制正在运行的进程，也不会写入配置或缓存状态。 +`ocx system codex-cli-update check` 不需要实时代理，也不会向软件包注册表发起请求。它只会在限定范围内检查已配置候选项的来源元数据，包括经过脱敏的可执行文件位置和所有权证据。受信任的已发布启动器上下文只能验证该候选项快照，并不证明 Codex 已成功运行。由于这条一次性检查命令绝不会运行 Codex，来自环境变量和持久化记录的候选项仅用于报告（`managed: false`，通常为 `selection_unattested`）；JSON 输出包含 `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion` 和 `candidateSource`，且 `selectionAttested` 始终为 `false`。检查已配置候选项需要受信任的已发布启动器上下文；直接使用 Bun 启动或从源码运行时没有这项证明，因此会忽略环境变量和持久化记录中的候选项状态，并可能报告 POSIX 下的 `candidate_unavailable` 或 Windows 下的 `windows_inspection_deferred`。在 Windows 上，这个首个切片不会对候选路径或配置路径执行任何文件系统 I/O。只有由受信任启动器捕获的绝对环境候选项可以获得应用捆绑或版本管理器的纯词法标签；其他所有 Windows 候选项都会以失败关闭方式处理。该命令不会安装或修复软件，不会运行 Codex 或 npm，不会控制正在运行的进程，也不会写入配置或缓存状态。 在语义明确时，默认操作是 `list` 或 `status`。使用 `--json` 获取结构化快照，使用 `ocx observe logs --follow --jsonl` 获取流式请求日志。主题、语言、导航以及其他纯视觉浏览器状态都没有 CLI 对应项；Cloudflare Tunnel 的设置不在这组命令之内。 diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli.md index 81121d4f51..eef78a98c9 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli.md @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ opencodex 的命令列工具是 `ocx`。它依第一個命令名稱分派，有 設定路徑。停止或無法連線的代理以 HTTP 503 呈現，並產生非零的 CLI 離開碼。明確記載為 離線設定操作的命令，可以在沒有執行中代理的情況下驗證與編輯設定檔。 -`ocx system codex-cli-update check` 不需要執行中的代理，也不會向套件 registry 發出請求。它只會在限定範圍內檢查設定中的安裝候選項來源中繼資料，包括經過遮罩的可執行檔位置與所有權證據。正式發布的 launcher 所提供的可信內容只會驗證該候選項快照，並不證明 Codex 已成功執行。由於這個單次檢查命令絕不會執行 Codex，來自環境變數與持久化記錄的候選項只供報告（`managed: false`，通常為 `selection_unattested`）；JSON 輸出包含 `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion` 與 `candidateSource`，而 `selectionAttested` 維持 `false`。檢查設定中的安裝候選項時，必須有正式發布的 launcher 所提供的可信內容；直接使用 Bun 啟動或從原始碼執行時不具備這項證明，因此會忽略來自環境與持久化記錄的候選項狀態，並可能報告 `candidate_unavailable`。在 Windows 上，這個首個切片不會對候選路徑或設定路徑執行任何檔案系統 I/O。只有由可信 launcher 擷取的絕對環境候選項可以取得應用程式封裝或版本管理工具的純詞彙標籤；其他所有 Windows 候選項都會以失敗關閉方式處理。此命令不會安裝或修復軟體、不會執行 Codex 或 npm、不會控制執行中的程序，也不會寫入設定或快取狀態。 +`ocx system codex-cli-update check` 不需要執行中的代理，也不會向套件 registry 發出請求。它只會在限定範圍內檢查設定中的安裝候選項來源中繼資料，包括經過遮罩的可執行檔位置與所有權證據。正式發布的 launcher 所提供的可信內容只會驗證該候選項快照，並不證明 Codex 已成功執行。由於這個單次檢查命令絕不會執行 Codex，來自環境變數與持久化記錄的候選項只供報告（`managed: false`，通常為 `selection_unattested`）；JSON 輸出包含 `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion` 與 `candidateSource`，而 `selectionAttested` 維持 `false`。檢查設定中的安裝候選項時，必須有正式發布的 launcher 所提供的可信內容；直接使用 Bun 啟動或從原始碼執行時不具備這項證明，因此會忽略來自環境與持久化記錄的候選項狀態，並可能報告 POSIX 下的 `candidate_unavailable` 或 Windows 下的 `windows_inspection_deferred`。在 Windows 上，這個首個切片不會對候選路徑或設定路徑執行任何檔案系統 I/O。只有由可信 launcher 擷取的絕對環境候選項可以取得應用程式封裝或版本管理工具的純詞彙標籤；其他所有 Windows 候選項都會以失敗關閉方式處理。此命令不會安裝或修復軟體、不會執行 Codex 或 npm、不會控制執行中的程序，也不會寫入設定或快取狀態。 沒有歧義時，list 或 status 是預設。使用 `--json` 取得結構化快照，並以 `ocx observe logs --follow --jsonl` 取得串流的請求 log feed。佈景主題、語言、導覽與 From b89732406007e5065c58b775e1cbd5e20b4e6da5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2026 13:07:35 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 007/113] docs(codex): distinguish missing captured candidates from unusable paths Record the Windows inspection reason distinction in structure/runtime.md, which owns src/codex/, and qualify the direct-launch candidate_unavailable outcome as POSIX-only in all eight locale agent references. --- docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/agents.md | 4 +++- docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/agents.md | 4 +++- docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/agents.md | 4 +++- docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/agents.md | 6 ++++-- docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/agents.md | 4 +++- docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/agents.md | 4 +++- docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/agents.md | 4 +++- docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/agents.md | 4 +++- structure/runtime.md | 6 +++++- .../codex-integration/codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts | 2 +- 10 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/agents.md index b643e0f7e4..837f1cdb9b 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -270,7 +270,9 @@ ocx system settings --stream-mode eager-relay ocx system codex-cli-update check --json ``` -`check` n’interroge aucun registre de paquets et inspecte, dans des limites strictes, les éléments de provenance du candidat d’installation configuré, notamment l’emplacement expurgé de l’exécutable et les preuves de propriété. Le contexte de confiance du lanceur publié authentifie uniquement cet instantané du candidat, et non l’exécution réussie de Codex. Comme cette commande ponctuelle n’exécute jamais Codex, les candidats issus de l’environnement ou de l’état persistant restent purement informatifs (`managed: false`, normalement `selection_unattested`) et `selectionAttested` reste `false`. La sortie JSON contient `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource` et `selectionAttested: false`. Une exécution directe via Bun ou depuis les sources ne fournit pas la preuve du lanceur, ignore les candidats issus de l’environnement ou de l’état persistant et peut signaler `candidate_unavailable`. Sous Windows, cette première étape n’effectue aucune E/S de système de fichiers sur les chemins du candidat ou de configuration. Seul un candidat d’environnement absolu capturé par le lanceur de confiance peut recevoir une étiquette lexicale de bundle d’application ou de gestionnaire de versions ; tous les autres candidats Windows échouent de manière fermée. Comme cette étape ne consulte jamais l’état persistant, une exécution Windows dépourvue d’un tel candidat d’environnement signale `windows_inspection_deferred` plutôt que `candidate_unavailable` : la commande ne peut pas observer si une CLI Codex est installée, elle signale donc le report de l’inspection au lieu d’affirmer qu’aucun candidat n’existe. La commande n’exécute ni Codex ni aucun gestionnaire de paquets, ne répare aucun shim, n’écrit ni dans la configuration ni dans le cache, n’arrête aucun processus et n’installe rien. Les candidats intégrés à une application, issus d’un gestionnaire de versions reconnu, autonomes mais non vérifiés, ou associés à un état de shim ambigu sont signalés comme non gérés ou inconnus et ne sont jamais classés comme gérés. +`check` n’interroge aucun registre de paquets et inspecte, dans des limites strictes, les éléments de provenance du candidat d’installation configuré, notamment l’emplacement expurgé de l’exécutable et les preuves de propriété. Le contexte de confiance du lanceur publié authentifie uniquement cet instantané du candidat, et non l’exécution réussie de Codex. Comme cette commande ponctuelle n’exécute jamais Codex, les candidats issus de l’environnement ou de l’état persistant restent purement informatifs (`managed: false`, normalement `selection_unattested`) et `selectionAttested` reste `false`. La sortie JSON contient `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource` et `selectionAttested: false`. Une exécution directe via Bun ou depuis les sources ne fournit pas la preuve du lanceur, ignore les candidats issus de l’environnement ou de l’état persistant et peut signaler `candidate_unavailable` sur les systèmes POSIX. Sous Windows, cette première étape n’effectue aucune E/S de système de fichiers sur les chemins du candidat ou de configuration. Seul un candidat d’environnement absolu capturé par le lanceur de confiance peut recevoir une étiquette lexicale de bundle d’application ou de gestionnaire de versions ; tous les autres candidats Windows échouent de manière fermée. Comme cette étape ne consulte jamais l’état persistant, une exécution Windows pour laquelle aucun candidat d’environnement n’a été capturé signale `windows_inspection_deferred` plutôt que `candidate_unavailable` : la commande ne peut pas observer si une CLI Codex est installée, elle signale donc le report de l’inspection au lieu d’affirmer qu’aucun candidat n’existe. La commande n’exécute ni Codex ni aucun gestionnaire de paquets, ne répare aucun shim, n’écrit ni dans la configuration ni dans le cache, n’arrête aucun processus et n’installe rien. Les candidats intégrés à une application, issus d’un gestionnaire de versions reconnu, autonomes mais non vérifiés, ou associés à un état de shim ambigu sont signalés comme non gérés ou inconnus et ne sont jamais classés comme gérés. + +Sous Windows, une commande simple capturée comme `CODEX_CLI_PATH=codex`, un chemin distant ou un chemin de périphérique produit plutôt `candidate_path_unavailable`. Le candidat a été capturé, mais son chemin ne convient pas à cette inspection. ### `ocx config ...` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/agents.md index cb8b5ae786..1290b65661 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -196,7 +196,9 @@ ocx system settings --stream-mode eager-relay ocx system codex-cli-update check --json ``` -`check` はパッケージレジストリに問い合わせず、設定済みのインストール候補について、秘匿化された実行ファイルの場所や所有権を示す根拠を含む来歴情報を、範囲を限定して検査します。公開ランチャー由来の信頼済みコンテキストが真正性を裏付けるのは候補のスナップショットだけであり、Codex が正常に実行されたことではありません。この単発コマンドは Codex を一切実行しないため、環境または永続化された状態から得た候補は報告対象にとどまります（`managed: false`、通常は `selection_unattested`）。`selectionAttested` は常に `false` です。JSON 出力には `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion`、`candidateSource`、`selectionAttested: false` が含まれます。Bun またはソースから直接起動するとランチャーの証明がないため、環境由来および永続化された候補を無視し、`candidate_unavailable` を報告することがあります。Windows では、この最初のスライスは候補や構成のパスに対するファイルシステム I/O を一切行いません。信頼済みランチャーが取り込んだ絶対パスの環境候補だけを、アプリ同梱またはバージョンマネージャーとして字句的に報告でき、それ以外の Windows 候補はすべて失敗時閉鎖になります。このスライスは永続化された選択状態を一切読み取らないため、そのような環境候補がない Windows 実行では `candidate_unavailable` ではなく `windows_inspection_deferred` を報告します。コマンドは Codex CLI が導入されているかどうかを観測できないので、候補が存在しないと断定せず、検査が延期されたことを報告します。このコマンドは Codex やパッケージマネージャーの実行、shim の修復、設定やキャッシュ状態への書き込み、プロセスの停止、インストールを行いません。アプリ同梱、認識済みのバージョンマネージャー、未検証のスタンドアロン、曖昧な shim の各候補は管理対象外または不明として報告され、管理対象と判定されることはありません。 +`check` はパッケージレジストリに問い合わせず、設定済みのインストール候補について、秘匿化された実行ファイルの場所や所有権を示す根拠を含む来歴情報を、範囲を限定して検査します。公開ランチャー由来の信頼済みコンテキストが真正性を裏付けるのは候補のスナップショットだけであり、Codex が正常に実行されたことではありません。この単発コマンドは Codex を一切実行しないため、環境または永続化された状態から得た候補は報告対象にとどまります（`managed: false`、通常は `selection_unattested`）。`selectionAttested` は常に `false` です。JSON 出力には `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion`、`candidateSource`、`selectionAttested: false` が含まれます。Bun またはソースから直接起動するとランチャーの証明がないため、環境由来および永続化された候補を無視し、POSIX では `candidate_unavailable` を報告することがあります。Windows では、この最初のスライスは候補や構成のパスに対するファイルシステム I/O を一切行いません。信頼済みランチャーが取り込んだ絶対パスの環境候補だけを、アプリ同梱またはバージョンマネージャーとして字句的に報告でき、それ以外の Windows 候補はすべて失敗時閉鎖になります。このスライスは永続化された選択状態を一切読み取らないため、環境候補がキャプチャされていない Windows 実行では `candidate_unavailable` ではなく `windows_inspection_deferred` を報告します。コマンドは Codex CLI が導入されているかどうかを観測できないので、候補が存在しないと断定せず、検査が延期されたことを報告します。このコマンドは Codex やパッケージマネージャーの実行、shim の修復、設定やキャッシュ状態への書き込み、プロセスの停止、インストールを行いません。アプリ同梱、認識済みのバージョンマネージャー、未検証のスタンドアロン、曖昧な shim の各候補は管理対象外または不明として報告され、管理対象と判定されることはありません。 + +Windows で `CODEX_CLI_PATH=codex` のような単純なコマンド名、リモートパス、デバイスパスが候補としてキャプチャされた場合は、`candidate_path_unavailable` を報告します。候補は取得されていますが、そのパスはこの検査の対象になりません。 ### `ocx config ...` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/agents.md index 863b57d9e2..b64ca7fc3b 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -226,7 +226,9 @@ ocx system settings --stream-mode eager-relay ocx system codex-cli-update check --json ``` -`check`는 패키지 레지스트리를 조회하지 않고, 설정된 설치 후보에 대해 전체 경로를 숨긴 실행 파일 위치와 소유권 근거를 포함한 provenance 정보를 제한된 범위에서 검사합니다. 신뢰할 수 있는 배포 런처 컨텍스트가 인증하는 것은 후보 스냅샷뿐이며, Codex가 성공적으로 실행되었다는 사실은 인증하지 않습니다. 이 단발성 명령은 Codex를 전혀 실행하지 않으므로 환경 또는 저장된 상태에서 얻은 후보는 보고 전용입니다(`managed: false`, 일반적으로 `selection_unattested`). `selectionAttested`는 항상 `false`입니다. JSON 출력에는 `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource`, `selectionAttested: false`가 포함됩니다. Bun이나 소스에서 직접 실행하면 런처 증거가 없으므로 환경 및 저장된 후보를 무시하고 `candidate_unavailable`을 보고할 수 있습니다. Windows에서는 이 첫 조각이 후보 또는 설정 경로의 파일시스템을 전혀 읽지 않습니다. 배포 런처가 증명한 절대 환경 후보에 한해서 앱 번들 또는 버전 관리자라는 어휘적 표지만 보고하며, 그 밖의 Windows 후보는 모두 실패 닫힘 처리합니다. 이 조각은 저장된 선택 상태를 전혀 읽지 않으므로, 그러한 환경 후보가 없는 Windows 실행은 `candidate_unavailable`이 아니라 `windows_inspection_deferred`를 보고합니다. 명령이 Codex CLI 설치 여부를 관측할 수 없으므로, 후보가 없다고 단정하는 대신 검사가 연기되었음을 보고합니다. 이 명령은 Codex나 패키지 관리자를 실행하거나 shim을 복구하지 않고, 설정 또는 캐시 상태를 쓰거나 프로세스를 중지하거나 어떤 것도 설치하지 않습니다. 앱에 포함된 후보, 인식된 버전 관리자의 후보, 검증되지 않은 독립 실행형 후보, shim 상태가 모호한 후보는 관리 대상이 아니거나 알 수 없는 것으로 보고되며, 관리 대상으로 분류되지 않습니다. +`check`는 패키지 레지스트리를 조회하지 않고, 설정된 설치 후보에 대해 전체 경로를 숨긴 실행 파일 위치와 소유권 근거를 포함한 provenance 정보를 제한된 범위에서 검사합니다. 신뢰할 수 있는 배포 런처 컨텍스트가 인증하는 것은 후보 스냅샷뿐이며, Codex가 성공적으로 실행되었다는 사실은 인증하지 않습니다. 이 단발성 명령은 Codex를 전혀 실행하지 않으므로 환경 또는 저장된 상태에서 얻은 후보는 보고 전용입니다(`managed: false`, 일반적으로 `selection_unattested`). `selectionAttested`는 항상 `false`입니다. JSON 출력에는 `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource`, `selectionAttested: false`가 포함됩니다. Bun이나 소스에서 직접 실행하면 런처 증거가 없으므로 환경 및 저장된 후보를 무시하고 POSIX에서는 `candidate_unavailable`을 보고할 수 있습니다. Windows에서는 이 첫 조각이 후보 또는 설정 경로의 파일시스템을 전혀 읽지 않습니다. 배포 런처가 증명한 절대 환경 후보에 한해서 앱 번들 또는 버전 관리자라는 어휘적 표지만 보고하며, 그 밖의 Windows 후보는 모두 실패 닫힘 처리합니다. 이 조각은 저장된 선택 상태를 전혀 읽지 않으므로, 환경 후보가 캡처되지 않은 Windows 실행은 `candidate_unavailable`이 아니라 `windows_inspection_deferred`를 보고합니다. 명령이 Codex CLI 설치 여부를 관측할 수 없으므로, 후보가 없다고 단정하는 대신 검사가 연기되었음을 보고합니다. 이 명령은 Codex나 패키지 관리자를 실행하거나 shim을 복구하지 않고, 설정 또는 캐시 상태를 쓰거나 프로세스를 중지하거나 어떤 것도 설치하지 않습니다. 앱에 포함된 후보, 인식된 버전 관리자의 후보, 검증되지 않은 독립 실행형 후보, shim 상태가 모호한 후보는 관리 대상이 아니거나 알 수 없는 것으로 보고되며, 관리 대상으로 분류되지 않습니다. + +Windows에서 `CODEX_CLI_PATH=codex` 같은 단순 명령 이름이나 원격 경로·장치 경로가 후보로 캡처되면 `candidate_path_unavailable`을 보고합니다. 후보는 캡처됐지만 해당 경로가 이 검사 대상에 적합하지 않은 경우입니다. ### `ocx config ...` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/agents.md index 8d60144eaa..dadd0c55b0 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -369,16 +369,18 @@ environment and persisted candidates remain report-only (`managed: false`, norma `selectionAttested` remains `false`. The JSON report exposes `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource`, and `selectionAttested`. Inspecting the configured candidate requires a trusted published-launcher context; a direct Bun/source launch has no such proof, ignores ambient and persisted candidate state, and may report -`candidate_unavailable`. On Windows this first slice performs no candidate or configuration filesystem I/O: +`candidate_unavailable` on POSIX. On Windows this first slice performs no candidate or configuration filesystem I/O: only a proof-captured absolute environment candidate can receive lexical app-bundle or version-manager labels; every other Windows candidate fails closed. Because that slice never consults persisted state, a Windows run -without such an environment candidate reports `windows_inspection_deferred` rather than `candidate_unavailable`: +with no captured environment candidate reports `windows_inspection_deferred` rather than `candidate_unavailable`: the command cannot observe whether a Codex CLI is installed, so it reports the deferral instead of asserting that no candidate exists. The command does not execute Codex or a package manager, repair a shim, write configuration or cache state, stop a process, or install anything. App-bundled, recognized version-manager, unverified standalone, and ambiguous shim states are reported as unmanaged or unknown and are never classified as managed. +On Windows, a captured bare command such as `CODEX_CLI_PATH=codex`, a remote path, or a device path reports `candidate_path_unavailable` instead. Those cases have a captured candidate; its path is not eligible for this inspection. + ### `ocx config ...` Inspect and safely modify validated OpenCodex configuration. `show` and `get` mask secrets. Import diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/agents.md index 56eb6a0891..0b81ba9d59 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -253,7 +253,9 @@ ocx system settings --stream-mode eager-relay ocx system codex-cli-update check --json ``` -`check` не обращается к реестру пакетов и в строго ограниченном объёме проверяет данные о происхождении настроенного кандидата, включая замаскированный путь к исполняемому файлу и подтверждения его принадлежности. Доверенный контекст опубликованного средства запуска подтверждает только подлинность снимка данных о кандидате, но не факт успешного запуска Codex. Поскольку команда выполняет только такую проверку и никогда не запускает Codex, кандидаты из окружения и сохранённых данных отображаются только в отчёте (`managed: false`, обычно `selection_unattested`). В выводе JSON присутствуют `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource` и `selectionAttested`, причём значение `selectionAttested` всегда равно `false`. Для проверки настроенного кандидата нужен доверенный контекст опубликованного средства запуска. При прямом запуске через Bun или из исходного кода такого подтверждения нет; в этом случае команда игнорирует кандидатов из окружения и сохранённых данных и может вернуть `candidate_unavailable`. В Windows этот первый этап вообще не выполняет файловый ввод-вывод по путям кандидата или конфигурации. Только абсолютный кандидат из окружения, зафиксированный доверенным средством запуска, может получить лексическую метку комплекта приложения или менеджера версий; все остальные кандидаты Windows отклоняются по принципу fail-closed. Поскольку этот этап вообще не читает сохранённое состояние выбора, запуск в Windows без такого кандидата из окружения возвращает `windows_inspection_deferred`, а не `candidate_unavailable`: команда не может определить, установлен ли Codex CLI, поэтому сообщает об отложенной проверке, а не утверждает, что кандидата нет. Команда не запускает Codex или менеджер пакетов, не восстанавливает shim, ничего не записывает в конфигурацию или кеш, не останавливает процессы и ничего не устанавливает. Кандидаты, входящие в комплект приложения, найденные в распознанных путях менеджеров версий, являющиеся непроверенными автономными установками или имеющие неоднозначное состояние shim, отображаются как `unmanaged` или `unknown` и никогда не классифицируются как `managed`. +`check` не обращается к реестру пакетов и в строго ограниченном объёме проверяет данные о происхождении настроенного кандидата, включая замаскированный путь к исполняемому файлу и подтверждения его принадлежности. Доверенный контекст опубликованного средства запуска подтверждает только подлинность снимка данных о кандидате, но не факт успешного запуска Codex. Поскольку команда выполняет только такую проверку и никогда не запускает Codex, кандидаты из окружения и сохранённых данных отображаются только в отчёте (`managed: false`, обычно `selection_unattested`). В выводе JSON присутствуют `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion`, `candidateSource` и `selectionAttested`, причём значение `selectionAttested` всегда равно `false`. Для проверки настроенного кандидата нужен доверенный контекст опубликованного средства запуска. При прямом запуске через Bun или из исходного кода такого подтверждения нет; в этом случае команда игнорирует кандидатов из окружения и сохранённых данных и может вернуть `candidate_unavailable` в POSIX-системах. В Windows этот первый этап вообще не выполняет файловый ввод-вывод по путям кандидата или конфигурации. Только абсолютный кандидат из окружения, зафиксированный доверенным средством запуска, может получить лексическую метку комплекта приложения или менеджера версий; все остальные кандидаты Windows отклоняются по принципу fail-closed. Поскольку этот этап вообще не читает сохранённое состояние выбора, запуск в Windows без захваченного кандидата из окружения возвращает `windows_inspection_deferred`, а не `candidate_unavailable`: команда не может определить, установлен ли Codex CLI, поэтому сообщает об отложенной проверке, а не утверждает, что кандидата нет. Команда не запускает Codex или менеджер пакетов, не восстанавливает shim, ничего не записывает в конфигурацию или кеш, не останавливает процессы и ничего не устанавливает. Кандидаты, входящие в комплект приложения, найденные в распознанных путях менеджеров версий, являющиеся непроверенными автономными установками или имеющие неоднозначное состояние shim, отображаются как `unmanaged` или `unknown` и никогда не классифицируются как `managed`. + +В Windows захваченная команда без полного пути, например `CODEX_CLI_PATH=codex`, удалённый путь или путь устройства возвращает `candidate_path_unavailable`. Кандидат захвачен, но его путь не подходит для этой проверки. ### `ocx config ...` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/agents.md index ece0647748..75a6f63bd1 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -304,7 +304,9 @@ ocx system settings --stream-mode eager-relay ocx system codex-cli-update check --json ``` -`check` paket kayıt defterine istek göndermez ve yapılandırmada belirtilen kurulum adayına ilişkin provenance kanıtını, maskelenmiş yürütülebilir dosya konumu ve sahiplik kanıtı dâhil, sınırlı biçimde inceler. Yayımlanmış başlatıcıdan gelen güvenilir bağlam aday anlık görüntüsünü doğrular; Codex'in başarıyla çalıştırıldığını doğrulamaz. Bu tek seferlik komut Codex'i hiçbir zaman çalıştırmadığından, ortamdan ve kalıcı kayıtlardan gelen adaylar yalnızca raporlanır (`managed: false`, genellikle `selection_unattested`). JSON çıktısında `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion` ve `candidateSource` alanları bulunur; `selectionAttested` değeri ise `false` kalır. Yapılandırmada belirtilen kurulum adayını incelemek için yayımlanmış başlatıcıdan gelen güvenilir bağlam gerekir; Bun ile veya kaynak koddan doğrudan başlatıldığında bu kanıt bulunmadığından ortamdaki ve kalıcı kayıtlardaki aday durumu yok sayılır ve `candidate_unavailable` bildirilebilir. Windows'ta bu ilk parça, aday veya yapılandırma yollarında hiçbir dosya sistemi G/Ç işlemi yapmaz. Yalnızca güvenilir başlatıcının yakaladığı mutlak bir ortam adayı sözcüksel olarak uygulama paketi ya da sürüm yöneticisi etiketi alabilir; diğer tüm Windows adayları kapalı başarısızlıkla reddedilir. Bu parça kalıcı seçim durumunu hiç okumadığından, böyle bir ortam adayı bulunmayan Windows çalıştırmaları `candidate_unavailable` yerine `windows_inspection_deferred` bildirir: komut bir Codex CLI'nin kurulu olup olmadığını gözlemleyemez, bu yüzden aday bulunmadığını iddia etmek yerine incelemenin ertelendiğini bildirir. Komut Codex veya bir paket yöneticisi çalıştırmaz, shim'i onarmaz, yapılandırmaya ya da önbellek durumuna yazmaz, hiçbir süreci durdurmaz ve hiçbir şey kurmaz. Uygulamayla birlikte paketlenmiş adaylar, tanınan sürüm yöneticisi yollarında bulunan adaylar, doğrulanmamış bağımsız adaylar ve belirsiz shim durumları `unmanaged` veya `unknown` olarak raporlanır; hiçbir zaman `managed` olarak sınıflandırılmaz. +`check` paket kayıt defterine istek göndermez ve yapılandırmada belirtilen kurulum adayına ilişkin provenance kanıtını, maskelenmiş yürütülebilir dosya konumu ve sahiplik kanıtı dâhil, sınırlı biçimde inceler. Yayımlanmış başlatıcıdan gelen güvenilir bağlam aday anlık görüntüsünü doğrular; Codex'in başarıyla çalıştırıldığını doğrulamaz. Bu tek seferlik komut Codex'i hiçbir zaman çalıştırmadığından, ortamdan ve kalıcı kayıtlardan gelen adaylar yalnızca raporlanır (`managed: false`, genellikle `selection_unattested`). JSON çıktısında `candidateAvailable`, `candidateVersion` ve `candidateSource` alanları bulunur; `selectionAttested` değeri ise `false` kalır. Yapılandırmada belirtilen kurulum adayını incelemek için yayımlanmış başlatıcıdan gelen güvenilir bağlam gerekir; Bun ile veya kaynak koddan doğrudan başlatıldığında bu kanıt bulunmadığından ortamdaki ve kalıcı kayıtlardaki aday durumu yok sayılır ve POSIX sistemlerinde `candidate_unavailable` bildirilebilir. Windows'ta bu ilk parça, aday veya yapılandırma yollarında hiçbir dosya sistemi G/Ç işlemi yapmaz. Yalnızca güvenilir başlatıcının yakaladığı mutlak bir ortam adayı sözcüksel olarak uygulama paketi ya da sürüm yöneticisi etiketi alabilir; diğer tüm Windows adayları kapalı başarısızlıkla reddedilir. Bu parça kalıcı seçim durumunu hiç okumadığından, ortam adayı yakalanmamış olan Windows çalıştırmaları `candidate_unavailable` yerine `windows_inspection_deferred` bildirir: komut bir Codex CLI'nin kurulu olup olmadığını gözlemleyemez, bu yüzden aday bulunmadığını iddia etmek yerine incelemenin ertelendiğini bildirir. Komut Codex veya bir paket yöneticisi çalıştırmaz, shim'i onarmaz, yapılandırmaya ya da önbellek durumuna yazmaz, hiçbir süreci durdurmaz ve hiçbir şey kurmaz. Uygulamayla birlikte paketlenmiş adaylar, tanınan sürüm yöneticisi yollarında bulunan adaylar, doğrulanmamış bağımsız adaylar ve belirsiz shim durumları `unmanaged` veya `unknown` olarak raporlanır; hiçbir zaman `managed` olarak sınıflandırılmaz. + +Windows üzerinde `CODEX_CLI_PATH=codex` gibi yalın bir komut, uzak yol veya aygıt yolu aday olarak yakalanırsa `candidate_path_unavailable` bildirilir. Aday yakalanmıştır; ancak yolu bu inceleme için uygun değildir. ### `ocx config ...` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/agents.md index f795869a7d..2dd2fc441b 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ ocx system settings --stream-mode eager-relay ocx system codex-cli-update check --json ``` -`check` 不会向软件包注册表发起请求，只会在限定范围内检查已配置候选项的来源证据，包括经过脱敏的可执行文件位置和所有权证据。受信任的已发布启动器上下文只能验证该候选项快照，并不证明 Codex 已成功运行。由于这条一次性命令绝不会运行 Codex，来自环境变量和持久化记录的候选项仅用于报告（`managed: false`，通常为 `selection_unattested`）；JSON 输出包含 `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion` 和 `candidateSource`，且 `selectionAttested` 始终为 `false`。检查已配置候选项需要受信任的已发布启动器上下文；直接使用 Bun 启动或从源码运行时没有这项证明，因此会忽略环境变量和持久化记录中的候选项状态，并可能报告 `candidate_unavailable`。在 Windows 上，这个首个切片不会对候选路径或配置路径执行任何文件系统 I/O。只有由受信任启动器捕获的绝对环境候选项可以获得应用捆绑或版本管理器的纯词法标签；其他所有 Windows 候选项都会以失败关闭方式处理。由于这个切片完全不读取持久化的选择状态，在没有此类环境候选项的 Windows 上运行时会报告 `windows_inspection_deferred` 而非 `candidate_unavailable`：该命令无法观测 Codex CLI 是否已安装，因此报告检查被推迟，而不是断言不存在候选项。该命令不会运行 Codex 或软件包管理器，不会修复 shim，不会写入配置或缓存，不会停止进程，也不会安装任何内容。随应用捆绑的候选项、位于已识别版本管理器路径中的候选项、未经验证的独立候选项以及 shim 状态不明确的候选项，都会报告为 `unmanaged` 或 `unknown`，绝不会归类为 `managed`。 +`check` 不会向软件包注册表发起请求，只会在限定范围内检查已配置候选项的来源证据，包括经过脱敏的可执行文件位置和所有权证据。受信任的已发布启动器上下文只能验证该候选项快照，并不证明 Codex 已成功运行。由于这条一次性命令绝不会运行 Codex，来自环境变量和持久化记录的候选项仅用于报告（`managed: false`，通常为 `selection_unattested`）；JSON 输出包含 `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion` 和 `candidateSource`，且 `selectionAttested` 始终为 `false`。检查已配置候选项需要受信任的已发布启动器上下文；直接使用 Bun 启动或从源码运行时没有这项证明，因此会忽略环境变量和持久化记录中的候选项状态，并可能在 POSIX 系统上报告 `candidate_unavailable`。在 Windows 上，这个首个切片不会对候选路径或配置路径执行任何文件系统 I/O。只有由受信任启动器捕获的绝对环境候选项可以获得应用捆绑或版本管理器的纯词法标签；其他所有 Windows 候选项都会以失败关闭方式处理。由于这个切片完全不读取持久化的选择状态，在未捕获任何环境候选项的 Windows 运行中会报告 `windows_inspection_deferred` 而非 `candidate_unavailable`：该命令无法观测 Codex CLI 是否已安装，因此报告检查被推迟，而不是断言不存在候选项。该命令不会运行 Codex 或软件包管理器，不会修复 shim，不会写入配置或缓存，不会停止进程，也不会安装任何内容。随应用捆绑的候选项、位于已识别版本管理器路径中的候选项、未经验证的独立候选项以及 shim 状态不明确的候选项，都会报告为 `unmanaged` 或 `unknown`，绝不会归类为 `managed`。 + +在 Windows 上，如果捕获到 `CODEX_CLI_PATH=codex` 这样的裸命令、远程路径或设备路径，则报告 `candidate_path_unavailable`。这些情况下候选项已被捕获，但其路径不适用于此检查。 ### `ocx config ...` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/agents.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/agents.md index 5a27ef16fd..eea538f483 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/agents.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/agents.md @@ -206,7 +206,9 @@ ocx system settings --stream-mode eager-relay ocx system codex-cli-update check --json ``` -`check` 不會向套件 registry 發出請求，只會在限定範圍內檢查設定中的安裝候選項來源證據，包括經過遮罩的可執行檔位置與所有權證據。正式發布的 launcher 所提供的可信內容只會驗證該候選項快照，並不證明 Codex 已成功執行。由於這個單次命令絕不會執行 Codex，來自環境變數與持久化記錄的候選項只供報告（`managed: false`，通常為 `selection_unattested`）；JSON 輸出包含 `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion` 與 `candidateSource`，而 `selectionAttested` 維持 `false`。檢查設定中的安裝候選項時，必須有正式發布的 launcher 所提供的可信內容；直接使用 Bun 啟動或從原始碼執行時不具備這項證明，因此會忽略來自環境與持久化記錄的候選項狀態，並可能報告 `candidate_unavailable`。在 Windows 上，這個首個切片不會對候選路徑或設定路徑執行任何檔案系統 I/O。只有由可信 launcher 擷取的絕對環境候選項可以取得應用程式封裝或版本管理工具的純詞彙標籤；其他所有 Windows 候選項都會以失敗關閉方式處理。由於這個切片完全不會讀取持久化的選擇狀態，在沒有這類環境候選項的 Windows 上執行時會報告 `windows_inspection_deferred` 而非 `candidate_unavailable`：該命令無法觀測 Codex CLI 是否已安裝，因此會報告檢查被延後，而不是斷言候選項不存在。此命令不會執行 Codex 或套件管理工具、不會修復 shim、不會寫入設定或快取、不會停止程序，也不會安裝任何內容。隨應用程式封裝的候選項、位於已識別版本管理工具路徑中的候選項、未經驗證的獨立候選項，以及 shim 狀態不明確的候選項，都會報告為 `unmanaged` 或 `unknown`，絕不會歸類為 `managed`。 +`check` 不會向套件 registry 發出請求，只會在限定範圍內檢查設定中的安裝候選項來源證據，包括經過遮罩的可執行檔位置與所有權證據。正式發布的 launcher 所提供的可信內容只會驗證該候選項快照，並不證明 Codex 已成功執行。由於這個單次命令絕不會執行 Codex，來自環境變數與持久化記錄的候選項只供報告（`managed: false`，通常為 `selection_unattested`）；JSON 輸出包含 `candidateAvailable`、`candidateVersion` 與 `candidateSource`，而 `selectionAttested` 維持 `false`。檢查設定中的安裝候選項時，必須有正式發布的 launcher 所提供的可信內容；直接使用 Bun 啟動或從原始碼執行時不具備這項證明，因此會忽略來自環境與持久化記錄的候選項狀態，並可能在 POSIX 系統上報告 `candidate_unavailable`。在 Windows 上，這個首個切片不會對候選路徑或設定路徑執行任何檔案系統 I/O。只有由可信 launcher 擷取的絕對環境候選項可以取得應用程式封裝或版本管理工具的純詞彙標籤；其他所有 Windows 候選項都會以失敗關閉方式處理。由於這個切片完全不會讀取持久化的選擇狀態，在未擷取任何環境候選項的 Windows 執行中會報告 `windows_inspection_deferred` 而非 `candidate_unavailable`：該命令無法觀測 Codex CLI 是否已安裝，因此會報告檢查被延後，而不是斷言候選項不存在。此命令不會執行 Codex 或套件管理工具、不會修復 shim、不會寫入設定或快取、不會停止程序，也不會安裝任何內容。隨應用程式封裝的候選項、位於已識別版本管理工具路徑中的候選項、未經驗證的獨立候選項，以及 shim 狀態不明確的候選項，都會報告為 `unmanaged` 或 `unknown`，絕不會歸類為 `managed`。 + +在 Windows 上，如果擷取到 `CODEX_CLI_PATH=codex` 這類單純命令名稱、遠端路徑或裝置路徑，則回報 `candidate_path_unavailable`。這些情況已有擷取的候選項，但其路徑不適用於此檢查。 ### `ocx config ...` diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index aa977c51df..9ad25bac1a 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -149,7 +149,11 @@ package-registry request and reads bounded provenance evidence for the configure package metadata, and shim binding. The proof-bound launcher snapshot does not attest successful Codex execution; environment and persisted candidates remain report-only and cannot produce a managed classification in this one-shot command. On Windows this first slice performs no candidate/configuration filesystem I/O: it preserves only proof-captured -absolute environment candidates for lexical app-bundle/version-manager reporting and otherwise fails closed. +absolute environment candidates for lexical app-bundle/version-manager reporting and otherwise fails closed. That +fail-closed result records which observation was missing: a run with no proof-captured environment candidate reports +`windows_inspection_deferred`, because persisted selection is never consulted there and the command cannot claim that +no Codex CLI exists; a captured candidate whose path is not lexically eligible reports `candidate_path_unavailable`. +POSIX keeps `candidate_unavailable` for an unobserved candidate. This check does not attest or admit a selected runtime. The command exposes no private mutation authority and does not query a registry, execute Codex/npm, install, repair, stop, restart, or change configuration/cache state. diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts index 095ad2dc8a..35971c389a 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-cli-install-provenance.test.ts @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ describe("Codex CLI install provenance", () => { expect(calls).toBe(0); }); - test("Windows reports a deferred inspection rather than an absent candidate", async () => { + test("Windows defers without reading persisted candidate state", async () => { let calls = 0; const report = await inspectCodexCliInstall({ ...noFilesystemDeps(() => { calls += 1; }), From bc6225324782deedb881749cebef788df4088763 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2026 21:28:54 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 008/113] docs(codex): link inspection contract from every source owner --- structure/catalog.md | 2 +- structure/codex-home.md | 2 ++ structure/config.md | 2 +- structure/gui-and-management-api.md | 2 +- structure/ops/docs-and-release.md | 2 +- structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 2 +- structure/subagents.md | 2 ++ 7 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index 47a827426b..fd32b70103 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Model Catalog The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) -is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. +is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. CLI installation inspection reason codes, including Windows deferral, follow the [runtime inspection contract](runtime.md#lifecycle). Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. diff --git a/structure/codex-home.md b/structure/codex-home.md index 339358ea9b..f7d736488c 100644 --- a/structure/codex-home.md +++ b/structure/codex-home.md @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # Codex Home +CLI installation inspection reason codes, including Windows deferral, follow the [runtime inspection contract](runtime.md#lifecycle). + ## Codex home `src/codex/paths.ts` resolves Codex state from `CODEX_HOME` when set and valid, otherwise from diff --git a/structure/config.md b/structure/config.md index a4c0b97ead..13345c984e 100644 --- a/structure/config.md +++ b/structure/config.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Config Surface The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) -is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. +is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. CLI installation inspection reason codes, including Windows deferral, follow the [runtime inspection contract](runtime.md#lifecycle). Connected-client catalog diagnostics use the [terminal rendering contract](runtime.md#cli-readiness-diagnostics) on the first connection and on every `ocx sync` refresh; stored catalog values are unchanged. diff --git a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md index 0496735405..7350b83c1e 100644 --- a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md +++ b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # GUI And Management API The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) -is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. +is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. CLI installation inspection reason codes, including Windows deferral, follow the [runtime inspection contract](runtime.md#lifecycle). ## Dashboard serving diff --git a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md index f4474c6419..4bfa730802 100644 --- a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md +++ b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Docs And Release The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](../subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) -is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. +is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. CLI installation inspection reason codes, including Windows deferral, follow the [runtime inspection contract](../runtime.md#lifecycle). Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](../transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](../transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index a1824746dc..c62bf93436 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # OpenAI Provider Account Modes The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](../subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) -is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. +is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. CLI installation inspection reason codes, including Windows deferral, follow the [runtime inspection contract](../runtime.md#lifecycle). This current contract supersedes the provider-identity and account-selection sections of `devlog/_fin/260717_openai_hardening`; that archived unit remains historical evidence for the diff --git a/structure/subagents.md b/structure/subagents.md index 69047b076b..c43e4b14d9 100644 --- a/structure/subagents.md +++ b/structure/subagents.md @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # Subagents And Multi-Agent Surface +CLI installation inspection reason codes, including Windows deferral, follow the [runtime inspection contract](runtime.md#lifecycle). + ## Plaintext V2 agent messages `src/responses/plaintext-v2-agent-messages.ts` owns the experimental, configuration-only From f79c14730986a9e63f2e51cdeeea099d13ec4ea3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 09:20:05 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 009/113] fix(codex): repair desktop restart membership and POSIX-only cases on Windows --- src/codex/desktop-app/types.ts | 13 +++++++++-- .../clients/desktop-app-restart-posix.test.ts | 23 ++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/codex/desktop-app/types.ts b/src/codex/desktop-app/types.ts index 2a4d8774b4..c90862f329 100644 --- a/src/codex/desktop-app/types.ts +++ b/src/codex/desktop-app/types.ts @@ -116,11 +116,20 @@ export interface DesktopAppAdapter { * * `root` is expected to be `realpath`-resolved by discovery already. */ +function isMembershipSeparator(character: string): boolean { + // `/` separates on every platform this runs on, and Windows accepts it wherever it + // accepts `\`. `\` is only a separator where the host says so: it is a legal + // FILENAME character on POSIX, so admitting it there would reopen the sibling hole + // this function exists to close. + return character === "/" || (sep === "\\" && character === "\\"); +} + export function isUnderRoot(executable: string, root: string): boolean { if (!executable || !root) return false; if (executable === root) return true; - const prefix = root.endsWith(sep) ? root : root + sep; - return executable.startsWith(prefix); + if (!executable.startsWith(root)) return false; + if (isMembershipSeparator(root[root.length - 1]!)) return true; + return isMembershipSeparator(executable[root.length] ?? ""); } /** diff --git a/tests/clients/desktop-app-restart-posix.test.ts b/tests/clients/desktop-app-restart-posix.test.ts index dd1bbd8ec6..585c86dcb7 100644 --- a/tests/clients/desktop-app-restart-posix.test.ts +++ b/tests/clients/desktop-app-restart-posix.test.ts @@ -97,9 +97,27 @@ describe("desktop restart membership is a path boundary, not a prefix", () => { expect(isUnderRoot("/usr/lib/chatgpt-evil/ChatGPT", "/usr/lib/chatgpt")).toBe(false); expect(isUnderRoot("/usr/lib/chatgpt/ChatGPT", "/usr/lib/chatgpt")).toBe(true); }); + + test("a forward slash separates on every host, a backslash only where the host says so", () => { + // Windows accepts `/` wherever it accepts `\`, and a probe can return either. Reading a + // forward-slash member as "outside the tree" is fail-closed but wrong: the restart the + // user asked for silently becomes a no-op. + expect(isUnderRoot("C:/Program Files/OpenAI.Codex/chatgpt.exe", "C:/Program Files/OpenAI.Codex")).toBe(true); + expect(isUnderRoot("C:/Program Files/OpenAI.Codex-evil/chatgpt.exe", "C:/Program Files/OpenAI.Codex")).toBe(false); + // The reverse is NOT symmetric. On POSIX a backslash is an ordinary filename + // character, so admitting it as a separator would reopen the sibling hole. + expect(isUnderRoot("/usr/lib/chatgpt\\evil", "/usr/lib/chatgpt")).toBe(process.platform === "win32"); + }); }); -describe("macOS desktop restart", () => { +/** + * The POSIX adapters scope enumeration to the current user through `process.getuid()`, + * which a Windows host does not provide. There the probe correctly reports that it could + * not run, so these cases cannot be driven from Windows at all - the shared ladder they + * exercise is covered by the Ubuntu and macOS shards. The membership and lock cases above + * have no such dependency and keep running everywhere. + */ +describe.skipIf(process.platform === "win32")("macOS desktop restart", () => { test("quits through the Apple event and relaunches by bundle id", () => { const calls: Call[] = []; const result = restartCodexDesktopApp(darwinIo({ calls })); @@ -196,7 +214,7 @@ describe("macOS desktop restart", () => { }); }); -describe("a stop is only ever claimed when the enumeration agrees (measured on Windows)", () => { +describe.skipIf(process.platform === "win32")("a stop is only ever claimed when the enumeration agrees (measured on Windows)", () => { // The defect this pins was invisible to ten rounds of code review and surfaced in the // first thirty seconds of running the ladder on a real Windows host: it reported // {"stopped":[27788],"surviving":[],"relaunch":"started"} while the app kept its @@ -325,4 +343,3 @@ describe("a restart already in flight does not start a second one", () => { expect(calls).toEqual([]); }); }); - From a70c3d274a963fe7fd24d15dd1d78a954c62a3ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 10:59:09 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 010/113] fix(codex): scope refresh lock acquisition and release to file identity Two windows let one Codex credential refresh delete another live refresh lock. isRefreshLockStale treated any unreadable lock as stale. The owner creates the file with openSync(path, "wx") and writes its metadata immediately after, so a live lock is briefly empty; a waiter that looked during that window deleted the lock and ran a second concurrent refresh against the same grant. The unreadable case now ages the file itself and only reports stale past the same 60s window, and a lock that has already disappeared reports not stale so the waiter simply retries the create. The release path unlinked by name. If a waiter had reclaimed the path and a second owner recreated it, the first owner deleted the second owner's live lock on its way out. Release now compares the fd identity captured before close against the current path and unlinks only its own file, falling back to the previous behavior when the identity cannot be read. Both cases are pinned in tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts and both fail before this change. --- src/codex/account-store.ts | 27 +++++++++-- structure/catalog.md | 2 + structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 4 ++ .../codex-account-store.test.ts | 46 ++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/codex/account-store.ts b/src/codex/account-store.ts index 4b151707a1..721288850b 100644 --- a/src/codex/account-store.ts +++ b/src/codex/account-store.ts @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; -import { closeSync, existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, openSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { closeSync, existsSync, fstatSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, openSync, statSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { join } from "node:path"; import { ConfigMutationLockError, @@ -612,7 +612,14 @@ function isRefreshLockStale(path: string): boolean { const parsed = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf-8")) as { acquiredAt?: unknown }; return typeof parsed.acquiredAt !== "number" || Date.now() - parsed.acquiredAt > REFRESH_LOCK_STALE_MS; } catch { - return true; + // The owner creates the file and writes its metadata in two steps, so a live lock is + // briefly unreadable. Age the file itself instead of calling that window stale, which + // let a waiter delete a lock whose owner was still inside its critical section. + try { + return Date.now() - statSync(path).mtimeMs > REFRESH_LOCK_STALE_MS; + } catch { + return false; + } } } @@ -648,9 +655,21 @@ export async function withCodexRefreshFileLock(lockKey: string, signal: Abort try { return await fn(); } finally { - if (fd != null) closeSync(fd); + // Release only the lock this call created. If a waiter reclaimed the path as stale and a + // new owner recreated it, unlinking by name would delete the live lock of that owner. + let owned: { dev: number; ino: number } | null = null; + if (fd != null) { + try { + const info = fstatSync(fd); + owned = { dev: info.dev, ino: info.ino }; + } catch { + owned = null; + } + closeSync(fd); + } try { - unlinkSync(path); + const current = statSync(path); + if (!owned || (current.dev === owned.dev && current.ino === owned.ino)) unlinkSync(path); } catch (err) { if (errCode(err) !== "ENOENT") throw err; } diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index 47a827426b..41d4b5140d 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -234,6 +234,8 @@ Pool mode routes across main plus added Codex credentials. Key rules: generation it started from still holds; a lost race raises a generation-conflict error rather than overwriting the newer credential (`src/codex/account-store.ts`). Callers handle that error; they do not assume a silent retry. + The lock itself is identity-scoped: a not-yet-readable lock counts as held until it ages out, + and a holder releases only the file it created, so a reclaimed path is not deleted twice. Warmup issues a bounded request with a fallback model so a cold account reports usability before a real turn depends on it (`src/codex/warmup.ts`). diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index a1824746dc..f2f99bd266 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -408,6 +408,10 @@ Pool mode needs stable public names and a store that survives concurrent refresh - The credential store is generation-guarded and refresh-locked (`src/codex/account-store.ts`): a refresh persists only if the generation it started from still holds, and a lost race raises a generation-conflict error instead of overwriting the newer credential. + The lock is held and released by file identity rather than by path. A lock that exists but is + not yet readable counts as held until it ages past the stale window, because its owner creates + the file and writes its metadata as two steps, and a holder deletes the lock only while the + path still resolves to the file it created. ## Sidecars, management, and UI diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts index e44ce355e0..dfa47b4dcc 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ import { describe, expect, test, beforeEach, afterEach, spyOn } from "bun:test"; import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; -import { existsSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { existsSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { join } from "node:path"; import { setAsyncIcaclsRunnerForTests, setIcaclsRunnerForTests } from "../../src/lib/windows-secret-acl"; @@ -624,6 +624,50 @@ describe("codex-account-store CRUD", () => { } }); + test("a refresh lock that is still being initialized is not reclaimed as stale", async () => { + const { getValidCodexToken, saveCodexAccountCredential } = await import("../../src/codex/account-store"); + saveCodexAccountCredential("refresh-empty-lock", { accessToken: "old", refreshToken: "empty-r", expiresAt: 0, chatgptAccountId: "acc" }); + // The owner creates the lock file and writes its metadata as two steps, so a live lock is + // briefly unreadable. Treating that window as stale let a waiter delete a lock whose owner + // was still inside its critical section, and both then ran the refresh. + const lockPath = refreshLockPathForToken("empty-r"); + writeFileSync(lockPath, ""); + let fetchCalls = 0; + const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch; + globalThis.fetch = (async () => { + fetchCalls += 1; + return new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "new", expires_in: 3600 }), { status: 200 }); + }) as typeof fetch; + + try { + const pending = getValidCodexToken("refresh-empty-lock"); + await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 200)); + expect(existsSync(lockPath)).toBe(true); + expect(fetchCalls).toBe(0); + unlinkSync(lockPath); + const result = await pending; + expect(result.accessToken).toBe("new"); + expect(fetchCalls).toBe(1); + } finally { + globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; + } + }); + + test("releasing a refresh lock leaves a lock another owner recreated in place", async () => { + const { withCodexRefreshFileLock } = await import("../../src/codex/account-store"); + const lockKey = "recreated-owner"; + const lockPath = join(TEST_DIR, `codex-refresh-${createHash("sha256").update(lockKey).digest("hex").slice(0, 32)}.lock`); + await withCodexRefreshFileLock(lockKey, new AbortController().signal, async () => { + // A waiter reclaimed this path and a second owner took it over while we held it. + renameSync(lockPath, `${lockPath}.reclaimed`); + writeFileSync(lockPath, JSON.stringify({ acquiredAt: Date.now(), pid: 999_001 }) + "\n"); + }); + expect(existsSync(lockPath)).toBe(true); + expect((JSON.parse(readFileSync(lockPath, "utf-8")) as { pid: number }).pid).toBe(999_001); + unlinkSync(lockPath); + unlinkSync(`${lockPath}.reclaimed`); + }); + test("same refresh grant joins a live flight", async () => { const { getCodexAccountCredential, From 79d579233d18ad56f5c4dd37a9fc0dd12a027298 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 11:16:42 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 011/113] fix(codex): preserve refresh locks when owner identity is unknown --- src/codex/account-store.ts | 14 +++++++---- structure/catalog.md | 3 ++- structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 4 +++- .../codex-account-store.test.ts | 23 +++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/codex/account-store.ts b/src/codex/account-store.ts index 721288850b..34620eb8fa 100644 --- a/src/codex/account-store.ts +++ b/src/codex/account-store.ts @@ -657,19 +657,23 @@ export async function withCodexRefreshFileLock(lockKey: string, signal: Abort } finally { // Release only the lock this call created. If a waiter reclaimed the path as stale and a // new owner recreated it, unlinking by name would delete the live lock of that owner. - let owned: { dev: number; ino: number } | null = null; + let owned: { dev: bigint; ino: bigint } | null = null; if (fd != null) { try { - const info = fstatSync(fd); - owned = { dev: info.dev, ino: info.ino }; + const info = fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true }); + if (info.dev >= 0n && info.ino > 0n) { + owned = { dev: info.dev, ino: info.ino }; + } } catch { owned = null; } closeSync(fd); } try { - const current = statSync(path); - if (!owned || (current.dev === owned.dev && current.ino === owned.ino)) unlinkSync(path); + const current = statSync(path, { bigint: true }); + // An unreadable or unusable identity never authorizes removing the current path. + // Leave it for stale-lock recovery instead of deleting a possible replacement owner. + if (owned && current.dev === owned.dev && current.ino === owned.ino) unlinkSync(path); } catch (err) { if (errCode(err) !== "ENOENT") throw err; } diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index 41d4b5140d..725ccde6fc 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -235,7 +235,8 @@ Pool mode routes across main plus added Codex credentials. Key rules: than overwriting the newer credential (`src/codex/account-store.ts`). Callers handle that error; they do not assume a silent retry. The lock itself is identity-scoped: a not-yet-readable lock counts as held until it ages out, - and a holder releases only the file it created, so a reclaimed path is not deleted twice. + and release requires a usable matching descriptor identity. Unknown identity leaves the path + for stale recovery; stat followed by unlink does not provide atomic compare-and-delete. Warmup issues a bounded request with a fallback model so a cold account reports usability before a real turn depends on it (`src/codex/warmup.ts`). diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index f2f99bd266..c6a4cd8749 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -411,7 +411,9 @@ Pool mode needs stable public names and a store that survives concurrent refresh The lock is held and released by file identity rather than by path. A lock that exists but is not yet readable counts as held until it ages past the stale window, because its owner creates the file and writes its metadata as two steps, and a holder deletes the lock only while the - path still resolves to the file it created. + path still resolves to the file it created. If descriptor identity is unavailable or unusable, + release leaves the path for stale-lock recovery. The stat/unlink pair is not an atomic + compare-and-delete, so this check alone does not eliminate concurrent replacement races. ## Sidecars, management, and UI diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts index dfa47b4dcc..3cdfb1a0af 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ import { describe, expect, test, beforeEach, afterEach, spyOn } from "bun:test"; import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; +import * as fs from "node:fs"; import { existsSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { join } from "node:path"; @@ -668,6 +669,28 @@ describe("codex-account-store CRUD", () => { unlinkSync(`${lockPath}.reclaimed`); }); + test("refresh release preserves the path when descriptor identity cannot be read", async () => { + const { withCodexRefreshFileLock } = await import("../../src/codex/account-store"); + const lockKey = "unknown-owner"; + const lockPath = join(TEST_DIR, `codex-refresh-${createHash("sha256").update(lockKey).digest("hex").slice(0, 32)}.lock`); + const original = fs.fstatSync; + let released = false; + const probe = spyOn(fs, "fstatSync").mockImplementation((...args: Parameters) => { + if (released) throw new Error("identity probe unavailable"); + return original(...args); + }); + try { + await withCodexRefreshFileLock(lockKey, new AbortController().signal, async () => { + renameSync(lockPath, `${lockPath}.reclaimed`); + writeFileSync(lockPath, "replacement-owner"); + released = true; + }); + expect(readFileSync(lockPath, "utf8")).toBe("replacement-owner"); + } finally { + probe.mockRestore(); + } + }); + test("same refresh grant joins a live flight", async () => { const { getCodexAccountCredential, From 3880e74f8e4c3625f8d560d22630a2549ebcf4dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 16:30:35 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 012/113] docs(codex): clarify default cache affinity --- structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index c6a4cd8749..43f1d1d789 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -546,8 +546,8 @@ consulted, and they run in `resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed` ahead of it. A with no recorded refusal is deliberately not a release path on its own — stickiness until the account actually refuses is intended — but it does surrender the binding as soon as a sibling with headroom exists. Unbound assignment is untouched and still takes the coolest eligible account, -because a fresh request has no warm prefix to lose. `pool.cacheAffinity` remains the stronger -opt-in, raising the bar from the threshold to genuine exhaustion. +because a fresh request has no warm prefix to lose. `pool.cacheAffinity` is enabled by default, +raising the bar from the threshold to genuine exhaustion. Two call sites need the rule — the live path in `reevaluateAffinityQuota` and the side-effect-free `previewReusableAffinityAccount` that subagent fallback reads — and they share one helper rather From c79ad6dc7dc51e2f1cb7f019cc46a115d61e7807 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 16:41:35 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 013/113] docs(codex): qualify paginated apply success --- structure/config.md | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/structure/config.md b/structure/config.md index a2735ccc63..f467d43a11 100644 --- a/structure/config.md +++ b/structure/config.md @@ -164,8 +164,10 @@ discovery or catalog/cache replacement. Deterministic config and ownership refus leave the existing catalog and cache untouched, and their concrete messages are emitted on stderr. Exactly one conversation-history refusal scopes the relabel unit instead of vetoing the apply transition, and only because it is permanent. Codex allocates paginated rollout ordinals inside -its own writer, so `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` is not retryable: the transition -writes config, profile, and `model_catalog_json`, the relabel job is skipped without spawning +its own writer, so `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` is not retryable: when the admitted +candidate does not remove a previously published provider table, the transition writes config, profile, +and `model_catalog_json`; otherwise late pagination triggers the compensating rollback described below. +On successful apply, the relabel job is skipped without spawning its Worker, and the reason travels in the human message and in the structured `historyPreflightFailureReason` field *alongside* `success: true`. Every other reason — an unreadable state database, a rollout whose identity changed, a preflight that could not run — From 00f4330dd7cc4bd1ab172c719b79aae3ea20eafd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 18:32:32 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 014/113] fix(cli): describe the full Codex desktop restart scope --- skills/ocx/references/01_management_surface.md | 4 ++-- src/cli/capabilities.ts | 4 ++-- src/cli/system-command.ts | 8 ++++---- structure/clients/claude-desktop.md | 2 ++ structure/config.md | 2 ++ structure/ops/docs-and-release.md | 2 ++ structure/runtime.md | 4 ++++ 7 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/skills/ocx/references/01_management_surface.md b/skills/ocx/references/01_management_surface.md index da019297d1..4cb391504a 100644 --- a/skills/ocx/references/01_management_surface.md +++ b/skills/ocx/references/01_management_surface.md @@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ JSON mode: `payload`. ### `ocx system codex-restart` -Restart the Codex app-server. +Restart the Codex desktop app and app-servers. | Method | Route | |---|---| @@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ Restart the Codex app-server. | Flag | Value | Meaning | |---|---|---| -| `--yes` | boolean | Required: restarts the operator's running Codex app-server. | +| `--yes` | boolean | Required: fully quits and relaunches the operator's Codex desktop app and restarts its app-servers. | | `--json` | boolean | Emit the restart result as JSON. | JSON mode: `payload`. diff --git a/src/cli/capabilities.ts b/src/cli/capabilities.ts index 36aa8124cc..309badbfd2 100644 --- a/src/cli/capabilities.ts +++ b/src/cli/capabilities.ts @@ -710,10 +710,10 @@ export const CAPABILITIES: readonly Capability[] = [ }, { command: ["system", "codex-restart"], - summary: "Restart the Codex app-server.", + summary: "Restart the Codex desktop app and app-servers.", routes: [{ method: "POST", path: "/api/system/codex-restart" }], flags: [ - { name: "--yes", value: "boolean", summary: "Required: restarts the operator's running Codex app-server." }, + { name: "--yes", value: "boolean", summary: "Required: fully quits and relaunches the operator's Codex desktop app and restarts its app-servers." }, { name: "--json", value: "boolean", summary: "Emit the restart result as JSON." }, ], mutates: true, diff --git a/src/cli/system-command.ts b/src/cli/system-command.ts index 03eb900887..a3b46b49d6 100644 --- a/src/cli/system-command.ts +++ b/src/cli/system-command.ts @@ -130,14 +130,14 @@ export async function handleSystemCommand(argv: string[], deps: RuntimeApiDeps = const args = [...rest]; const wantsJson = takeFlag(args, "--json"); rejectArgs(args, USAGE); printData(await runtimeRequest("/api/system/codex-app-server", {}, deps), wantsJson); } else if (sub === "codex-restart") { - // --yes required: this restarts the user's running Codex app-server, so it is exactly the - // class of action that must not happen because an agent guessed a subcommand. + // --yes required: this fully quits and relaunches the user's Codex desktop app as well as + // restarting app-servers; an agent guessing a subcommand must not interrupt that session. const args = [...rest]; const wantsJson = takeFlag(args, "--json"); const yes = takeFlag(args, "--yes"); - if (!yes) throw new CliUsageError("system codex-restart requires --yes", USAGE); + if (!yes) throw new CliUsageError("system codex-restart requires --yes: this fully quits and relaunches the Codex desktop app and restarts its app-servers", USAGE); rejectArgs(args, USAGE); - printData(await runtimeRequest("/api/system/codex-restart", { method: "POST" }, deps), wantsJson, ["Codex app-server restart requested."]); + printData(await runtimeRequest("/api/system/codex-restart", { method: "POST" }, deps), wantsJson, ["Codex desktop app and app-server restart requested."]); } else if (sub === "update") await update(rest, deps); else throw new CliUsageError(`unknown system command ${sub}`, USAGE); }); diff --git a/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md b/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md index f64a278757..987591f435 100644 --- a/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md +++ b/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ Claude-only connections keep their existing non-failing readiness policy; displa The hub-side CLI dashboard uses the [management ingress address](../runtime.md#hub-management-dashboard-address); this does not change connected Desktop profile endpoints. +The Codex restart command follows the [CLI restart scope contract](../runtime.md#cli-codex-restart-scope). + ## Connected Claude Desktop profiles The connection's local Codex readiness check follows the [selected-runtime probe contract](../runtime.md#remote-hub-hardening-ownership); general status hands its resolved command to this check instead of probing the version twice. diff --git a/structure/config.md b/structure/config.md index a4c0b97ead..12bc841b50 100644 --- a/structure/config.md +++ b/structure/config.md @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ Connected-client catalog diagnostics use the [terminal rendering contract](runti Hub management ingress also selects the [local dashboard address](runtime.md#hub-management-dashboard-address) using its configured port. +The Codex restart command follows the [CLI restart scope contract](runtime.md#cli-codex-restart-scope). + ## Config surface ### OpenCodex home and live process state diff --git a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md index f4474c6419..2924261a4b 100644 --- a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md +++ b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ Human-readable connect and sync-refresh diagnostics follow the [terminal renderi The CLI default dashboard address follows the [management ingress bind](../runtime.md#hub-management-dashboard-address), covered by `tests/cli/cli-dispatch.test.ts`. +The Codex restart command follows the [CLI restart scope contract](../runtime.md#cli-codex-restart-scope). + ## Public docs The public documentation site lives in `docs-site/` and is built with Astro + Starlight. English is diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index e4a50ba3f8..ae8c4529b6 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](transports/byte-accountin Catalog-derived reasoning-level diagnostics are escaped only at the human-output boundary, which `src/cli/runtime-api.ts` owns alongside the human/JSON print split. Every CLI path that prints a hub-supplied catalog value renders it there: the first-time refusal in `src/cli/connect.ts` and the connected `ocx sync` refusal in `src/cli/dispatch.ts`. C0/C1 controls, DEL, and Unicode line/paragraph separators print as visible hexadecimal escapes; structured status retains the exact reason, and a rendered failure keeps the domain error as its `cause`. The ready/unverified/incompatible classification and exit policy are unchanged. +## CLI Codex restart scope + +`ocx system codex-restart` requests a full Codex desktop-app restart and app-server restarts through the management endpoint. `src/cli/capabilities.ts` names that scope in its summary and `--yes` description; `src/cli/system-command.ts` explains the desktop interruption when confirmation is missing and sends no restart request. Human output says the restart was requested, while `--json` preserves the complete server result, including skipped or refused desktop outcomes. + ## Hub management dashboard address When hub management ingress is enabled, `src/cli/dispatch.ts` opens the dashboard on the literal IPv4 loopback address and configured ingress port, matching the listener in `src/server/index.ts`. Other dashboard address selection is unchanged. From 6f4e222e5c0c15f0962e321b7853790c407eff6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 18:40:24 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 015/113] test(cli): verify restart confirmation and result boundaries --- tests/cli/cli-headless-parity.test.ts | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/cli/cli-headless-parity.test.ts b/tests/cli/cli-headless-parity.test.ts index 9a11c696ac..a3d861d14a 100644 --- a/tests/cli/cli-headless-parity.test.ts +++ b/tests/cli/cli-headless-parity.test.ts @@ -20,6 +20,40 @@ import { repoPath } from "../helpers/repo-root"; type Recorded = { path: string; method: string; body: unknown }; const servers: Array> = []; +describe("ocx system codex-restart confirmation", () => { + test("names the desktop interruption before any unconfirmed request", async () => { + const { requests, deps } = fakeRuntime(); + const errors = spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {}); + try { + expect(await handleSystemCommand(["codex-restart"], deps)).toBe(2); + expect(requests).toHaveLength(0); + const warning = errors.mock.calls.flat().join(" "); + expect(warning).toContain("requires --yes"); + expect(warning).toContain("fully quits and relaunches the Codex desktop app"); + } finally { errors.mockRestore(); } + }); + + test.each([false, true])("preserves requested versus completed outcomes (json=%s)", async wantsJson => { + // A skipped Desktop outcome must survive JSON output; this fixture cannot restart processes. + const result = { success: true, code: "nothing_running", requested: [], stopped: [], + desktopApp: { attempted: false, relaunch: "skipped", reason: "self_ancestry" } }; + const { requests, deps } = fakeRuntime(() => result); + const output = spyOn(console, "log").mockImplementation(() => {}); + try { + const argv = ["codex-restart", "--yes", ...(wantsJson ? ["--json"] : [])]; + expect(await handleSystemCommand(argv, deps)).toBe(0); + expect(requests).toEqual([{ path: "/api/system/codex-restart", method: "POST", body: null }]); + const text = output.mock.calls.flat().join("\n"); + if (wantsJson) expect(JSON.parse(text)).toEqual(result); + else { + expect(text).toContain("Codex desktop app"); + expect(text).toContain("restart requested."); + expect(text).not.toContain("restarted"); + } + } finally { output.mockRestore(); } + }); +}); + describe("ocx system settings client compaction", () => { test("persists the explicit boolean through the shared settings endpoint", async () => { const { requests, deps } = fakeRuntime((_req, body) => ({ ok: true, ...body })); From 39dfcf223a91fe601ece118be573d9c275a74c6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 19:16:06 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 016/113] fix(catalog): reject loopback HTTP routed through Bun proxies --- .../docs/fr/reference/cli/lifecycle.md | 2 + .../docs/ja/reference/cli/lifecycle.md | 2 + .../docs/ko/reference/cli/lifecycle.md | 2 + .../content/docs/reference/cli/lifecycle.md | 6 +- .../docs/ru/reference/cli/lifecycle.md | 2 + .../docs/tr/reference/cli/lifecycle.md | 2 + .../docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/lifecycle.md | 2 + .../docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/lifecycle.md | 2 + src/codex/catalog/remote.ts | 30 +++ structure/catalog.md | 4 + structure/codex-home.md | 2 + structure/config.md | 2 + structure/gui-and-management-api.md | 2 +- structure/ops/docs-and-release.md | 2 + structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 2 + structure/runtime.md | 2 + structure/subagents.md | 2 + .../catalog-remote-pull.test.ts | 186 ++++++++++++++++++ 18 files changed, 252 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/lifecycle.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/lifecycle.md index 73b3c6d065..152108fd88 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/lifecycle.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/lifecycle.md @@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ redirections, les réponses trop volumineuses et les catalogues invalides sont r écriture locale. L'authentification est facultative et lue uniquement par référence à une variable d'environnement (`--auth-env`), jamais depuis argv. +Les requêtes HTTP en loopback sont refusées avant l’ajout des en-têtes d’authentification ou tout envoi si `HTTP_PROXY` ou `http_proxy` s’applique sans exception correspondante dans `NO_PROXY` ou `no_proxy`. `ALL_PROXY`/`all_proxy` et les paramètres limités à `HTTPS_PROXY`/`https_proxy` ne déclenchent pas cette restriction HTTP ; l’acquisition de catalogues en HTTPS reste autorisée. Le message de refus ne contient ni l’adresse du proxy ni le jeton d’authentification. Les valeurs non vides de `http_proxy` et `no_proxy` ont priorité sur `HTTP_PROXY` et `NO_PROXY`, respectivement. Pour des exceptions compatibles avec Bun, utilisez des noms d’hôte, des entrées `host:port` correspondantes, des adresses IPv6 entre crochets comme `[::1]`, ou `*`, sans URL, chemin ni préfixe `*.`. + Le catalogue et le cache sont écrits sous le verrou de catalogue Codex partagé ; un échec préserve les derniers fichiers valides connus. Des octets identiques constituent une non-opération qui préserve les mtimes. `--restart-codex`, `--restart-app-server-only` et l'alias déprécié diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/lifecycle.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/lifecycle.md index 74f3b3151b..ee7604688b 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/lifecycle.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/lifecycle.md @@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ Codex のローカル モデル ピッカー キャッシュを無効にし、 カタログは、ローカル書き込みの前に拒否されます。認証は任意で、環境変数参照 (`--auth-env`) から のみ読み取られ、argv からは読み取られません。 +`HTTP_PROXY` または `http_proxy` が適用され、`NO_PROXY` または `no_proxy` に一致する除外設定がない場合、ループバック HTTP リクエストは認証ヘッダーの付与や送信より前に拒否されます。`ALL_PROXY`/`all_proxy`、または `HTTPS_PROXY`/`https_proxy` だけの設定では、この HTTP 制限は適用されず、HTTPS によるカタログ取得は引き続き許可されます。拒否メッセージにプロキシのアドレスや認証トークンは含まれません。 空でない `http_proxy` と `no_proxy` は、それぞれ `HTTP_PROXY` と `NO_PROXY` より優先されます。Bun に対応する除外ルールには、ホスト名、一致する `host:port`、`[::1]` のように角括弧で囲んだ IPv6 アドレス、または `*` を使い、URL、パス、`*.` 接頭辞は使わないでください。 + カタログとキャッシュは共有の Codex カタログロックの下で書き込まれ、失敗時は last-known-good の ファイルが保持されます。バイトが同一の場合は mtime を保持する no-op です。`--restart-codex`、 `--restart-app-server-only`、非推奨エイリアス `--restart-desktop-app` は、実際の書き込みの後に diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/lifecycle.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/lifecycle.md index 66ab5f9829..2cac37ed24 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/lifecycle.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/lifecycle.md @@ -256,6 +256,8 @@ Codex의 로컬 모델 선택기 캐시를 무효화하여, 활성 opencodex 카 자격증명, 쿼리, 프래그먼트, 리다이렉트, 크기를 넘는 응답, 잘못된 카탈로그는 로컬에 쓰기 전에 거절합니다. 인증은 선택이며 환경변수 이름(`--auth-env`)으로만 읽고 argv로는 받지 않습니다. +`HTTP_PROXY` 또는 `http_proxy`가 적용되고 `NO_PROXY` 또는 `no_proxy`에 일치하는 우회 항목이 없으면 루프백 HTTP 요청은 인증 헤더를 붙이거나 요청을 보내기 전에 거부됩니다. `ALL_PROXY`/`all_proxy` 또는 `HTTPS_PROXY`/`https_proxy`만 설정한 경우에는 이 HTTP 제한에 해당하지 않으며, HTTPS 카탈로그 취득은 계속 허용됩니다. 거부 메시지에는 프록시 주소나 인증 토큰이 포함되지 않습니다. 값이 비어 있지 않은 `http_proxy`와 `no_proxy`는 각각 `HTTP_PROXY`와 `NO_PROXY`보다 우선합니다. Bun과 호환되는 우회 규칙에는 호스트 이름, 일치하는 `host:port`, `[::1]`처럼 대괄호로 감싼 IPv6 주소 또는 `*`를 사용하고, URL·경로·`*.` 접두사는 사용하지 마세요. + 카탈로그와 캐시는 공유 Codex 카탈로그 잠금 아래에서 쓰고, 실패하면 직전까지 정상이던 파일을 그대로 둡니다. 바이트가 같으면 mtime까지 건드리지 않는 no-op입니다. `--restart-codex`, `--restart-app-server-only`, 폐기 예정 별칭 `--restart-desktop-app`은 실제로 쓴 뒤에만 diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/lifecycle.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/lifecycle.md index dd1f07c711..32ff382d69 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/lifecycle.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/lifecycle.md @@ -304,7 +304,11 @@ before rebuilding the cache. It works even when the local Codex integration desi The URL must be HTTPS; loopback HTTP is accepted for local testing. Embedded URL credentials, queries, fragments, redirects, oversized responses, malformed JSON, duplicate or unsafe slugs, and -unknown `input_modalities` are refused before any local write. Authentication is optional and is +unknown `input_modalities` are refused before any local write. + +Loopback HTTP requests are refused before authentication headers are attached or any request is sent when `HTTP_PROXY` or `http_proxy` applies without a matching `NO_PROXY` or `no_proxy` bypass. `ALL_PROXY`/`all_proxy` and settings limited to `HTTPS_PROXY`/`https_proxy` do not trigger this HTTP restriction; HTTPS catalog acquisition remains allowed. The refusal message includes neither the proxy address nor the authentication token. Nonempty `http_proxy` and `no_proxy` take precedence over `HTTP_PROXY` and `NO_PROXY`, respectively. For Bun-compatible bypass rules, use hostnames, matching `host:port` entries, bracketed IPv6 addresses such as `[::1]`, or `*`; do not use URLs, paths, or `*.` prefixes. + +Authentication is optional and is read only by environment-variable reference: ```bash diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/lifecycle.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/lifecycle.md index 04315f0e2a..4de2c64624 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/lifecycle.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/lifecycle.md @@ -253,6 +253,8 @@ loopback. Учётные данные в URL, query, фрагменты, ред каталоги отклоняются до любой локальной записи. Аутентификация необязательна и читается только по имени переменной окружения (`--auth-env`), но не из argv. +HTTP-запросы к loopback отклоняются до добавления заголовков аутентификации и отправки запроса, если применяется `HTTP_PROXY` или `http_proxy`, а в `NO_PROXY` или `no_proxy` нет подходящего исключения. `ALL_PROXY`/`all_proxy` и настройки только `HTTPS_PROXY`/`https_proxy` не вызывают это ограничение для HTTP; получение каталогов по HTTPS остаётся разрешённым. Сообщение об отказе не содержит адрес прокси или токен аутентификации. Непустые значения `http_proxy` и `no_proxy` имеют приоритет над `HTTP_PROXY` и `NO_PROXY` соответственно. Для совместимых с Bun правил обхода прокси используйте имена хостов, совпадающие записи `host:port`, IPv6-адреса в квадратных скобках, например `[::1]`, или `*`; не используйте URL, пути или префикс `*.`. + Каталог и кэш пишутся под общей блокировкой каталога Codex; при сбое сохраняются last-known-good файлы. Идентичные байты — это no-op, сохраняющий mtime. `--restart-codex`, `--restart-app-server-only` и устаревший alias `--restart-desktop-app` здесь означают то же, что diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/lifecycle.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/lifecycle.md index 4e2175bb38..ca59f39db9 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/lifecycle.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/lifecycle.md @@ -266,6 +266,8 @@ yanıtlar ve geçersiz kataloglar, herhangi bir yerel yazma işleminden önce re doğrulama isteğe bağlıdır ve yalnızca ortam değişkeni adıyla (`--auth-env`) okunur, argv'den alınmaz. +`HTTP_PROXY` veya `http_proxy` geçerliyken `NO_PROXY` ya da `no_proxy` içinde eşleşen bir istisna yoksa loopback HTTP istekleri, kimlik doğrulama başlıkları eklenmeden ve herhangi bir istek gönderilmeden reddedilir. `ALL_PROXY`/`all_proxy` ve yalnızca `HTTPS_PROXY`/`https_proxy` ayarları bu HTTP kısıtlamasını tetiklemez; HTTPS üzerinden katalog alımına izin verilmeye devam edilir. Ret mesajı proxy adresini veya kimlik doğrulama belirtecini içermez. Boş olmayan `http_proxy` ve `no_proxy` değerleri sırasıyla `HTTP_PROXY` ve `NO_PROXY` değerlerinden önce gelir. Bun ile uyumlu proxy atlama kuralları için ana makine adları, eşleşen `host:port` girdileri, `[::1]` gibi köşeli parantez içindeki IPv6 adresleri veya `*` kullanın; URL, yol veya `*.` öneki kullanmayın. + Katalog ve önbellek, paylaşılan Codex katalog kilidi altında yazılır; bir hata durumunda last-known-good dosyalar korunur. Aynı baytlar, mtime değerlerini koruyan bir no-op'tur. `--restart-codex`, `--restart-app-server-only` ve kullanımdan kaldırılmış takma ad diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/lifecycle.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/lifecycle.md index 39787e18f0..2c5e3a4915 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/lifecycle.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/lifecycle.md @@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ ocx status --json 安装由另一个 OpenCodex 实例的 `/v1/catalog` 端点提供的完整目录，然后同步 `models_cache.json`。URL 必须是 HTTPS；仅回环地址允许 HTTP。URL 内嵌凭据、查询、片段、重定向、超出大小的响应以及无效目录，都会在任何本地写入之前被拒绝。认证是可选的，并且只通过环境变量名（`--auth-env`）读取，不接受 argv 传入。 +如果 `HTTP_PROXY` 或 `http_proxy` 生效，且 `NO_PROXY` 或 `no_proxy` 中没有匹配的绕过规则，回环 HTTP 请求会在添加认证标头或发送请求之前被拒绝。`ALL_PROXY`/`all_proxy` 以及仅设置 `HTTPS_PROXY`/`https_proxy` 的情况不会触发此 HTTP 限制；仍允许通过 HTTPS 获取目录。拒绝消息不会包含代理地址或认证令牌。 非空的 `http_proxy` 和 `no_proxy` 分别优先于 `HTTP_PROXY` 和 `NO_PROXY`。要设置与 Bun 兼容的代理绕过规则，请使用主机名、匹配的 `host:port`、`[::1]` 等带方括号的 IPv6 地址或 `*`，不要使用 URL、路径或 `*.` 前缀。 + 目录和缓存在共享的 Codex 目录锁下写入；失败时保留 last-known-good 文件。字节完全相同时是保留 mtime 的空操作。`--restart-codex`、`--restart-app-server-only` 以及已弃用别名 `--restart-desktop-app` 仅在发生真实写入之后生效，含义与 `ocx sync` / `ocx sync-cache` 相同。`ETag` 条件请求不属于此命令。完整的 `--json` 信封与退出码请参见[英文参考](/reference/cli/lifecycle/)。 ## 后台服务 diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/lifecycle.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/lifecycle.md index 02421b11bd..117133bc18 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/lifecycle.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/lifecycle.md @@ -158,6 +158,8 @@ ocx status --json 安裝由另一個 OpenCodex 執行個體的 `/v1/catalog` 端點提供的完整目錄，接著同步 `models_cache.json`。URL 必須是 HTTPS；僅回送位址允許 HTTP。URL 內嵌憑證、查詢、片段、重新導向、超出大小的回應以及無效目錄，都會在任何本機寫入之前遭拒。驗證為選用，且只透過環境變數名稱（`--auth-env`）讀取，不接受 argv 傳入。 +如果 `HTTP_PROXY` 或 `http_proxy` 生效，且 `NO_PROXY` 或 `no_proxy` 中沒有相符的略過規則，回送 HTTP 要求會在加入驗證標頭或送出要求之前遭拒。`ALL_PROXY`/`all_proxy` 以及僅設定 `HTTPS_PROXY`/`https_proxy` 的情況不會觸發此 HTTP 限制；仍允許透過 HTTPS 取得目錄。拒絕訊息不會包含代理位址或驗證權杖。 非空的 `http_proxy` 和 `no_proxy` 分別優先於 `HTTP_PROXY` 和 `NO_PROXY`。若要設定與 Bun 相容的代理略過規則，請使用主機名稱、相符的 `host:port`、`[::1]` 等含方括號的 IPv6 位址或 `*`，不要使用 URL、路徑或 `*.` 前綴。 + 目錄與快取在共用的 Codex 目錄鎖之下寫入；失敗時保留 last-known-good 檔案。位元組完全相同時是保留 mtime 的無操作。`--restart-codex`、`--restart-app-server-only` 以及已棄用別名 `--restart-desktop-app` 僅在實際寫入之後生效，含義與 `ocx sync` / `ocx sync-cache` 相同。`ETag` 條件式請求不屬於此命令。完整的 `--json` 信封與結束碼請參見[英文參考](/reference/cli/lifecycle/)。 ## 背景服務 diff --git a/src/codex/catalog/remote.ts b/src/codex/catalog/remote.ts index 46576b18e4..9a6b534cda 100644 --- a/src/codex/catalog/remote.ts +++ b/src/codex/catalog/remote.ts @@ -113,12 +113,42 @@ function safeTimeout(value: number | undefined): number { ? Math.min(Math.floor(value), 120_000) : DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS; } +/** Match Bun fetch's environment routing, not the broader WebSocket NO_PROXY grammar. */ +function catalogRequestUsesBunHttpProxy(url: URL): boolean { + if (url.protocol !== "http:") return false; + const proxy = process.env.http_proxy || process.env.HTTP_PROXY; + if (!proxy || proxy === '""' || proxy === "''") return false; + const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase(); + const host = url.host.toLowerCase(); + // Bun env_loader::is_no_proxy (1.4.2): lowercase wins unless empty, ASCII + // whitespace only, no scheme/path/wildcard/bracket/trailing-dot normalization. + const bypasses = process.env.no_proxy || process.env.NO_PROXY || ""; + for (let entry of bypasses.split(",")) { + entry = entry.replace(/^[ \t\n\r\v\f]+|[ \t\n\r\v\f]+$/g, "") + .replace(/[A-Z]/g, letter => letter.toLowerCase()); + if (entry === "*") return false; + if (entry.startsWith(".")) entry = entry.slice(1); + if (!entry) continue; + const hasPort = entry.startsWith("[") + ? entry.includes("]:") + : (entry.match(/:/g)?.length ?? 0) === 1; + if (hasPort ? host === entry : hostname === entry || hostname.endsWith(`.${entry}`)) return false; + } + return true; +} + export async function fetchRemoteCatalog( input: string, options: Pick = {}, ): Promise<{ document: RemoteCatalogDocument; content: string }> { const url = validateRemoteCatalogUrl(input); const token = validateToken(options.token); + if (catalogRequestUsesBunHttpProxy(url)) { + throw new RemoteCatalogError( + "insecure_http_refused", + "Loopback HTTP catalog requests must bypass outbound HTTP proxy routing", + ); + } const headers = new Headers({ Accept: "application/json" }); if (token !== undefined) headers.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`); let response: Response; diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index 47a827426b..179a32286a 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. +## Remote catalog HTTP proxy routing + +`src/codex/catalog/remote.ts` permits loopback HTTP only when Bun fetch has no effective HTTP proxy or a matching NO_PROXY bypass. Its local matcher follows [Bun fetch semantics](https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/blob/744846f844374847c902b5e7fd59b4342a51ef99/src/dotenv/env_loader.rs#L369), including non-empty lowercase-variable priority, ASCII whitespace, literal host/port comparison and bracket-preserving IPv6. It does not normalize URL-shaped bypass entries, paths, wildcard prefixes, trailing dots or Unicode whitespace, and leaves the broader WebSocket proxy grammar unchanged. It refuses before authentication headers and fetch with a content-free `insecure_http_refused` error. ALL_PROXY and HTTPS-only settings do not affect HTTP acquisition; HTTPS and existing redirect, size, validation and coordinated-installation contracts are preserved. `tests/codex-integration/catalog-remote-pull.test.ts` covers these routing and non-disclosure boundaries. + ## Shared catalog `src/codex/catalog.ts` builds a shared Codex-shaped catalog for CLI, TUI, App, and SDK. It: diff --git a/structure/codex-home.md b/structure/codex-home.md index 339358ea9b..e904a09609 100644 --- a/structure/codex-home.md +++ b/structure/codex-home.md @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # Codex Home +Catalog HTTP acquisition follows the [proxy-routing contract](catalog.md#remote-catalog-http-proxy-routing). + ## Codex home `src/codex/paths.ts` resolves Codex state from `CODEX_HOME` when set and valid, otherwise from diff --git a/structure/config.md b/structure/config.md index a4c0b97ead..ec7998efae 100644 --- a/structure/config.md +++ b/structure/config.md @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # Config Surface +Catalog HTTP acquisition follows the [proxy-routing contract](catalog.md#remote-catalog-http-proxy-routing). + The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md index 0496735405..308402a11e 100644 --- a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md +++ b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # GUI And Management API The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) -is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. +is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. Catalog HTTP acquisition follows the [proxy-routing contract](catalog.md#remote-catalog-http-proxy-routing). ## Dashboard serving diff --git a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md index f4474c6419..f12194abc0 100644 --- a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md +++ b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # Docs And Release +Catalog HTTP acquisition follows the [proxy-routing contract](../catalog.md#remote-catalog-http-proxy-routing). + The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](../subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index a1824746dc..f29c746362 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # OpenAI Provider Account Modes +Catalog HTTP acquisition follows the [proxy-routing contract](../catalog.md#remote-catalog-http-proxy-routing). + The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](../subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index e4a50ba3f8..fb70d432d8 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # Runtime +Catalog HTTP acquisition follows the [proxy-routing contract](catalog.md#remote-catalog-http-proxy-routing). + The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/subagents.md b/structure/subagents.md index 69047b076b..67a34c7d6a 100644 --- a/structure/subagents.md +++ b/structure/subagents.md @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # Subagents And Multi-Agent Surface +Catalog HTTP acquisition follows the [proxy-routing contract](catalog.md#remote-catalog-http-proxy-routing). + ## Plaintext V2 agent messages `src/responses/plaintext-v2-agent-messages.ts` owns the experimental, configuration-only diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/catalog-remote-pull.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/catalog-remote-pull.test.ts index 02a6768f22..dfa9718544 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/catalog-remote-pull.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/catalog-remote-pull.test.ts @@ -29,6 +29,25 @@ const response = (value: unknown, init: ResponseInit = {}) => new Response(JSON. headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", ...init.headers }, status: init.status, }); +const proxyEnvKeys = [ + "HTTP_PROXY", "http_proxy", "HTTPS_PROXY", "https_proxy", + "ALL_PROXY", "all_proxy", "NO_PROXY", "no_proxy", +] as const; + +async function withProxyEnv(env: Record, action: () => Promise): Promise { + const previous = proxyEnvKeys.map(key => [key, process.env[key]] as const); + try { + for (const key of proxyEnvKeys) delete process.env[key]; + for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(env)) process.env[key] = value; + await action(); + } finally { + for (const key of proxyEnvKeys) delete process.env[key]; + for (const [key, value] of previous) { + if (value !== undefined) process.env[key] = value; + } + } +} + describe("remote catalog acquisition", () => { test("accepts HTTPS and loopback HTTP but rejects credentials and insecure remote HTTP", () => { expect(validateRemoteCatalogUrl("https://hub.example.com/v1/catalog").href).toBe("https://hub.example.com/v1/catalog"); @@ -53,6 +72,173 @@ describe("remote catalog acquisition", () => { })).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "redirect_refused", message: "Remote catalog redirect was refused" }); }); + test("refuses proxied loopback HTTP before fetch without disclosing authentication or proxy details", async () => { + const proxy = "http://proxy-user:proxy-secret@127.0.0.2:8080"; + const environments: Record[] = [ + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy }, + { http_proxy: proxy }, + { HTTP_PROXY: "", http_proxy: proxy }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: "elsewhere.example" }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: "127.0.0.1:9999" }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: "http://127.0.0.1" }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: "127.0.0.1/path" }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: "*.127.0.0.1" }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: "127.0.0.1." }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: "\u00a0127.0.0.1\u00a0" }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: "127.0.0.1", no_proxy: "elsewhere.example" }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: "127.0.0.1", no_proxy: " " }, + ]; + for (const env of environments) { + await withProxyEnv(env, async () => { + const fetchImpl = mock(async () => response(catalog)) as typeof fetch; + const error: unknown = await fetchRemoteCatalog("http://127.0.0.1:10100/v1/catalog", { + token: "catalog-token-marker", fetchImpl, + }).catch((caught: unknown) => caught); + expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(RemoteCatalogError); + expect(error).toMatchObject({ code: "insecure_http_refused" }); + expect(fetchImpl).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + for (const marker of ["catalog-token-marker", "proxy-user", "proxy-secret", "127.0.0.2", "127.0.0.1"]) { + expect(String(error)).not.toContain(marker); + } + }); + } + }); + + test("permits direct loopback HTTP with matching proxy bypasses or fetch-irrelevant proxy variables", async () => { + const proxy = "http://proxy.example:8080"; + const environments: Record[] = [ + {}, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: "127.0.0.1" }, + { http_proxy: proxy, no_proxy: "127.0.0.1" }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: "127.0.0.1:10100" }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: "*" }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: ".127.0.0.1" }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: "elsewhere.example", no_proxy: "127.0.0.1" }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, NO_PROXY: "\v\f127.0.0.1\r\n" }, + { HTTP_PROXY: '""' }, + { http_proxy: "''" }, + { HTTP_PROXY: proxy, http_proxy: '""' }, + { ALL_PROXY: proxy }, + { all_proxy: proxy }, + { HTTPS_PROXY: proxy }, + { https_proxy: proxy }, + ]; + for (const env of environments) { + await withProxyEnv(env, async () => { + const fetchImpl = mock(async (_input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { + expect(new Headers(init?.headers).get("authorization")).toBe("Bearer catalog-token-marker"); + expect(init?.redirect).toBe("manual"); + return response(catalog); + }) as typeof fetch; + await expect(fetchRemoteCatalog("http://127.0.0.1:10100/v1/catalog", { + token: "catalog-token-marker", fetchImpl, + })).resolves.toMatchObject({ document: catalog }); + expect(fetchImpl).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1); + }); + } + }); + + test.each([ + ["http://127.0.0.1", false], + ["127.0.0.1", true], + ] as const)("real Bun transport respects the catalog guard for NO_PROXY=%s", async (bypass, direct) => { + let targetRequests = 0; + let proxyRequests = 0; + let authenticatedTargetRequests = 0; + const token = "synthetic-catalog-runtime-token"; + let target: ReturnType | undefined; + let proxy: ReturnType | undefined; + let child: Bun.Subprocess<"ignore", "pipe", "pipe"> | undefined; + let timer: ReturnType | undefined; + let timedOut = false; + try { + target = Bun.serve({ hostname: "127.0.0.1", port: 0, fetch(req) { + targetRequests += 1; + if (req.headers.get("authorization") === `Bearer ${token}`) authenticatedTargetRequests += 1; + return response(catalog); + } }); + proxy = Bun.serve({ hostname: "127.0.0.1", port: 0, fetch() { + proxyRequests += 1; + return response(catalog); + } }); + // Inherit process-launch necessities and test provenance only, never host credentials. + const env: Record = {}; + for (const key of ["PATH", "Path", "SystemRoot", "WINDIR", "COMSPEC", "PATHEXT", "TEMP", "TMP", + "OCX_TEST_HOME_GUARD", "OCX_TEST_RUN_ID"]) { + const value = process.env[key]; + if (value !== undefined) env[key] = value; + } + for (const key of proxyEnvKeys) delete env[key]; + env.OPENCODEX_HOME = home(); + env.CODEX_HOME = home(); + env.HOME = env.USERPROFILE = home(); + env.HTTP_PROXY = `http://127.0.0.1:${proxy.port}`; + env.NO_PROXY = bypass; + const source = new URL("../../src/codex/catalog/remote.ts", import.meta.url).href; + const script = ` + const { fetchRemoteCatalog } = await import(${JSON.stringify(source)}); + try { + const result = await fetchRemoteCatalog(${JSON.stringify(`http://127.0.0.1:${target.port}/v1/catalog`)}, + { token: ${JSON.stringify(token)} }); + console.log(JSON.stringify({ document: result.document })); + } catch (error) { + console.log(JSON.stringify({ code: error?.code ?? "unexpected_error" })); + } + `; + child = Bun.spawn([process.execPath, "--eval", script], { env, stdin: "ignore", stdout: "pipe", stderr: "pipe" }); + timer = setTimeout(() => { timedOut = true; child?.kill("SIGKILL"); }, 10_000); + const [exitCode, stdout, stderr] = await Promise.all([ + child.exited, new Response(child.stdout).text(), new Response(child.stderr).text(), + ]); + const evidence = JSON.stringify({ exitCode, timedOut, targetRequests, proxyRequests, stdout, stderr }); + expect(timedOut, evidence).toBe(false); + expect(exitCode, evidence).toBe(0); + expect(proxyRequests, evidence).toBe(0); + expect(targetRequests, evidence).toBe(direct ? 1 : 0); + expect(authenticatedTargetRequests, evidence).toBe(direct ? 1 : 0); + expect(JSON.parse(stdout)).toEqual(direct ? { document: catalog } : { code: "insecure_http_refused" }); + } finally { + if (timer !== undefined) clearTimeout(timer); + if (child && child.exitCode === null) { child.kill("SIGKILL"); await child.exited; } + await proxy?.stop(true); + await target?.stop(true); + } + }, 15_000); + + test("keeps authenticated HTTPS acquisition available with an outbound proxy", async () => { + await withProxyEnv({ HTTP_PROXY: "http://proxy.example:8080", HTTPS_PROXY: "http://proxy.example:8080" }, async () => { + const fetchImpl = mock(async (_input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { + expect(new Headers(init?.headers).get("authorization")).toBe("Bearer catalog-token-marker"); + expect(init?.redirect).toBe("manual"); + return response(catalog); + }) as typeof fetch; + await expect(fetchRemoteCatalog("https://hub.example/v1/catalog", { + token: "catalog-token-marker", fetchImpl, + })).resolves.toMatchObject({ document: catalog }); + expect(fetchImpl).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1); + }); + }); + + test.each([ + ["http://[::1]:10100/v1/catalog", "::1", false], + ["http://[::1]:10100/v1/catalog", "[::1]", true], + ["http://[::1]:10100/v1/catalog", "[::1]:10100", true], + ["http://[::1]:10100/v1/catalog", "[::1]:9999", false], + ["http://127.0.0.1/v1/catalog", "127.0.0.1:80", false], + ] as const)("uses Bun's literal host/port bypass for %s and %s", async (url, bypass, direct) => { + await withProxyEnv({ HTTP_PROXY: "http://proxy.example:8080", NO_PROXY: bypass }, async () => { + const fetchImpl = mock(async () => response(catalog)) as typeof fetch; + const result = fetchRemoteCatalog(url, { token: "catalog-token-marker", fetchImpl }); + if (direct) { + await expect(result).resolves.toMatchObject({ document: catalog }); + expect(fetchImpl).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1); + } else { + await expect(result).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "insecure_http_refused" }); + expect(fetchImpl).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + } + }); + }); + test("never reflects credentials, remote bodies, URLs, or transport causes", async () => { for (const fetchImpl of [ async () => new Response("remote-body-marker", { status: 401 }), From 58c15b819a1f9bc5611e0387ce5e62b7de82bcf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 19:47:46 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 017/113] chore(release): promote the verified 2.55.0 product tree to main Same product tree as preview 7bdd1b29b5 / 2.55.0-preview.20260914, which published successfully with its registry smoke green. Only package.json version differs. --- package.json | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index fdcec0ec5d..9e9f74ae75 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "@bitkyc08/opencodex", - "version": "2.55.0-preview.20260914", + "version": "2.55.0", "description": "Universal provider proxy for OpenAI Codex & Claude Code — use any LLM with Codex CLI/App/SDK and Claude Code", "type": "module", "main": "./bin/package-main.mjs", From 24cc758553bc4897e9d7d7433116ec0a6b20531c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 20:14:17 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 018/113] test(catalog): disable dotenv loading in transport fixtures --- tests/codex-integration/catalog-remote-pull.test.ts | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/catalog-remote-pull.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/catalog-remote-pull.test.ts index dfa9718544..e92e0ccdf6 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/catalog-remote-pull.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/catalog-remote-pull.test.ts @@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ describe("remote catalog acquisition", () => { env.OPENCODEX_HOME = home(); env.CODEX_HOME = home(); env.HOME = env.USERPROFILE = home(); + // A local dotenv must not override the explicitly supplied routing fixture. + writeFileSync(join(env.OPENCODEX_HOME, ".env"), "no_proxy=*\n"); env.HTTP_PROXY = `http://127.0.0.1:${proxy.port}`; env.NO_PROXY = bypass; const source = new URL("../../src/codex/catalog/remote.ts", import.meta.url).href; @@ -185,7 +187,7 @@ describe("remote catalog acquisition", () => { console.log(JSON.stringify({ code: error?.code ?? "unexpected_error" })); } `; - child = Bun.spawn([process.execPath, "--eval", script], { env, stdin: "ignore", stdout: "pipe", stderr: "pipe" }); + child = Bun.spawn([process.execPath, "--no-env-file", "--eval", script], { cwd: env.OPENCODEX_HOME, env, stdin: "ignore", stdout: "pipe", stderr: "pipe" }); timer = setTimeout(() => { timedOut = true; child?.kill("SIGKILL"); }, 10_000); const [exitCode, stdout, stderr] = await Promise.all([ child.exited, new Response(child.stdout).text(), new Response(child.stderr).text(), From fc260e9ce5d5dc1a1134b76e575c3aa4526d2a3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 20:53:57 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 019/113] fix(cursor): normalize localized native-shell routing claims --- src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts | 4 +- structure/adapters/registry.md | 2 +- structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md | 2 +- structure/providers/chat-compat.md | 2 +- structure/providers/cursor.md | 2 + structure/runtime.md | 2 +- structure/transports/byte-accounting.md | 2 +- structure/transports/inventory.md | 2 +- structure/transports/responses.md | 2 +- .../cursor/cursor-envelope-echo-retry.test.ts | 47 ++++++++++++++++--- 10 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts b/src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts index ffaf3df193..6848106a0b 100644 --- a/src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts +++ b/src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ export type RoutingCommentaryDecision = | { kind: "flush" } | { kind: "hallucination" }; -const ROUTING_NATIVE_TOOL_NAME = /\b(shell|read|grep|list|bash)\b/giu; +const ROUTING_NATIVE_TOOL_NAME = /\b(shell|read|grep|list|bash)\b|네이티브\s*(?:셸|쉘)/giu; const ROUTING_TOOL_HINT = /(?:\b(?:shell|read|grep|list|bash)\b|exec_command|shell_command|브리지|네이티브\s*(?:셸|쉘))/iu; const ROUTING_FAILURE_CLAIM = @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ export class CursorRoutingCommentarySniffer { private matchesHallucination(): boolean { if (!ROUTING_FAILURE_CLAIM.test(this.buffered)) return false; const nativeTools = new Set( - [...this.buffered.matchAll(ROUTING_NATIVE_TOOL_NAME)].map(match => match[1]?.toLowerCase()), + [...this.buffered.matchAll(ROUTING_NATIVE_TOOL_NAME)].map(match => match[1]?.toLowerCase() ?? "shell"), ); if (nativeTools.size === 0) return false; return ROUTING_REDIRECT_CLAIM.test(this.buffered) || nativeTools.size >= 2; diff --git a/structure/adapters/registry.md b/structure/adapters/registry.md index 908633f265..a607422084 100644 --- a/structure/adapters/registry.md +++ b/structure/adapters/registry.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Adapter Registry Authority The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](../subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) -is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. +is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. Cursor's localized native-shell names follow the [routing-commentary guard contract](../providers/cursor.md#cursor-native-exec). Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](../transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](../transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. diff --git a/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md b/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md index aa9aa15f52..9fe6ae2919 100644 --- a/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md +++ b/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Inbound Compatibility Surfaces The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](../subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) -is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. +is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. Cursor's localized native-shell names follow the [routing-commentary guard contract](../providers/cursor.md#cursor-native-exec). ## Standalone file transcription diff --git a/structure/providers/chat-compat.md b/structure/providers/chat-compat.md index 5ee17ed807..ea9630cb3b 100644 --- a/structure/providers/chat-compat.md +++ b/structure/providers/chat-compat.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Chat Provider Compatibility The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](../subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) -is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. +is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. Cursor's localized native-shell names follow the [routing-commentary guard contract](cursor.md#cursor-native-exec). Native Codex Spark-specific request exceptions are absent. General Lite and namespace repair remain shared [Responses compatibility](../transports/responses.md#responses-httpsse), including diff --git a/structure/providers/cursor.md b/structure/providers/cursor.md index 5ae38028d8..b95af45a94 100644 --- a/structure/providers/cursor.md +++ b/structure/providers/cursor.md @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ that survives the transport budget: unified Desktop `exec` as well as the legacy unified `exec` keeps its own schema and is surfaced back to Codex as a client tool. It must never fall through to the separate native-local-exec dispatcher. +In external Cursor turns using code mode or shell aliases, the bounded leading-commentary guard in `src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts` counts `Shell`, `네이티브 셸`, and `네이티브 쉘` as one `shell` identity, including spacing variants and names split across text deltas. Rejection still requires a failure claim plus either an explicit redirect or at least two distinct native-tool identities; repeated aliases alone do not count as multiple tools. + > Decision record: [ADR-0048](../decisions/ADR-0048-cursor-native-exec.md) ## Cursor parameterized models diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index e4a50ba3f8..c882249a5c 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Runtime The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) -is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. +is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. Cursor's localized native-shell names follow the [routing-commentary guard contract](providers/cursor.md#cursor-native-exec). Chat request serialization owns the destination-scoped [OpenCode Go instruction ordering](providers/chat-compat.md#opencode-go-chronological-instructions); diff --git a/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md b/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md index e758afeaf2..67c63745be 100644 --- a/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md +++ b/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ How opencodex measures request and stream bytes without allocating copies solely to count them. These contracts are shared by request parsing, SSE rewriting, the provider adapters and -the translator budget, which is why so many documents link here rather than restating them. +the translator budget, which is why so many documents link here rather than restating them. Cursor's localized native-shell names follow the [routing-commentary guard contract](../providers/cursor.md#cursor-native-exec). ## Request-copy accounting diff --git a/structure/transports/inventory.md b/structure/transports/inventory.md index 8c04f7b633..7366843bf9 100644 --- a/structure/transports/inventory.md +++ b/structure/transports/inventory.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Transport Inventory The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](../subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) -is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. +is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. Cursor's localized native-shell names follow the [routing-commentary guard contract](../providers/cursor.md#cursor-native-exec). The Chat adapter's [OpenCode Go instruction ordering](../providers/chat-compat.md#opencode-go-chronological-instructions) changes translated message placement only; endpoint selection and transport stay with their existing owners. diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 1bc2b4de0d..d56b52d168 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Responses Transport The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](../subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) -is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. +is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. Cursor's localized native-shell names follow the [routing-commentary guard contract](../providers/cursor.md#cursor-native-exec). Plaintext collaboration restoration treats a null namespace as absent, rejects non-string namespace types, and restores the native namespace/name pair before HTTP/WS delivery and continuation publication. diff --git a/tests/providers/cursor/cursor-envelope-echo-retry.test.ts b/tests/providers/cursor/cursor-envelope-echo-retry.test.ts index 0470eee8c6..112cf84ad6 100644 --- a/tests/providers/cursor/cursor-envelope-echo-retry.test.ts +++ b/tests/providers/cursor/cursor-envelope-echo-retry.test.ts @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; import { createCursorAdapter as createCursorAdapterProduction } from "../../../src/adapters/cursor"; import { CURSOR_ECHO_RETRY_CONTINUATION_TEXT, + CURSOR_ROUTING_COMMENTARY_RETRY_TEXT, CursorEnvelopeEchoSniffer, CursorMidstreamEchoObserver, CursorRoutingCommentarySniffer, @@ -210,6 +211,34 @@ describe("cursor external output quarantine + corrective retry (devlog 260826 ga expect(contextFree.finish().kind).toBe("flush"); }); + test.each(["네이티브 셸", "네이티브 쉘", "네이티브셸", "네이티브\t쉘"])( + "localized shell requires a redirect or a second distinct tool (%s)", nativeShell => { + const redirect = new CursorRoutingCommentarySniffer(); + expect(redirect.feed(`${nativeShell}이 차단되어 exec_command로 전환합니다.`).kind).toBe("hallucination"); + const distinct = new CursorRoutingCommentarySniffer(); + expect(distinct.feed(`${nativeShell}과 Read가 모두 unavailable 상태입니다.`).kind).toBe("hallucination"); + }, + ); + + test("localized shell detection spans native-name and redirect delta boundaries", () => { + const sniffer = new CursorRoutingCommentarySniffer(); + for (const fragment of ["네이", "티브 ", "쉘이 차단되어 ", "exec_"]) { + expect(sniffer.feed(fragment).kind).toBe("hold"); + } + expect(sniffer.feed("command로 전환합니다.").kind).toBe("hallucination"); + }); + + test.each([ + "네이티브 셸이 unavailable 상태입니다.", + "네이티브 셸과 네이티브 쉘이 모두 blocked 상태입니다.", + "Shell과 네이티브 셸이 모두 blocked 상태입니다.", + "SHELL과 네이티브쉘, 네이티브 셸이 모두 unavailable 상태입니다.", + ])("shell aliases alone do not fabricate two distinct tools (%s)", text => { + const sniffer = new CursorRoutingCommentarySniffer(); + expect(sniffer.feed(text).kind).toBe("hold"); + expect(sniffer.finish().kind).toBe("flush"); + }); + test("external tool-result echo retries once with the corrective action text and no leaked envelope", async () => { const { factory, runRequests, attempts } = echoingThenHealthyTransportFactory(); const adapter = createCursorAdapter({ ...provider, apiKey: "cursor-token" }, { createTransport: factory as never }); @@ -318,7 +347,11 @@ describe("cursor external output quarantine + corrective retry (devlog 260826 ga expect(runRequests[1]?.echoRetryContinuationText).toBeDefined(); }); - test("code-mode routing commentary that invents a blocked native Shell is quarantined and retried", async () => { + test.each([ + { fragments: ["`Shell` 경로는 차단됐으니 exec_command 경로로 읽겠습니다."] }, + { fragments: ["네이", "티브 셸은 차단됐으니 ", "exec_command 경로로 읽겠습니다."] }, + { fragments: ["네이티브", "쉘은 차단됐으니 ", "exec_command 경로로 읽겠습니다."] }, + ])("code-mode routing commentary is quarantined and retried once (%j)", async ({ fragments }) => { let attempt = 0; const runRequests: CursorRunRequest[] = []; const factory = () => ({ @@ -326,10 +359,9 @@ describe("cursor external output quarantine + corrective retry (devlog 260826 ga runRequests.push(request); attempt += 1; if (attempt === 1) { - yield { - type: "text", - text: "`Shell` 경로는 또 같은 문구로 차단됐으니, 통과가 확인된 `exec_command` 경로로 읽겠습니다.", - } satisfies CursorServerMessage; + for (const text of fragments) { + yield { type: "text", text } satisfies CursorServerMessage; + } } else { yield { type: "text", text: "READ_OK" } satisfies CursorServerMessage; } @@ -359,7 +391,8 @@ describe("cursor external output quarantine + corrective retry (devlog 260826 ga const text = events.filter(e => e.type === "text_delta").map(e => (e as { text: string }).text).join(""); expect(attempt).toBe(2); expect(text).toBe("READ_OK"); - expect(text).not.toContain("Shell"); - expect(runRequests[1]?.echoRetryContinuationText).toBeDefined(); + expect(text).not.toContain(fragments.join("")); + expect(runRequests).toHaveLength(2); + expect(runRequests[1]?.echoRetryContinuationText).toBe(CURSOR_ROUTING_COMMENTARY_RETRY_TEXT); }); }); From 588c33395d088ca258343ab21e365e41882fdd60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 21:05:25 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 020/113] fix(cursor): bound Korean shell aliases at token boundaries --- src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts | 2 +- structure/providers/cursor.md | 2 +- .../cursor/cursor-envelope-echo-retry.test.ts | 10 +++++++++- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts b/src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts index 6848106a0b..962d93e170 100644 --- a/src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts +++ b/src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ export type RoutingCommentaryDecision = | { kind: "flush" } | { kind: "hallucination" }; -const ROUTING_NATIVE_TOOL_NAME = /\b(shell|read|grep|list|bash)\b|네이티브\s*(?:셸|쉘)/giu; +const ROUTING_NATIVE_TOOL_NAME = /\b(shell|read|grep|list|bash)\b|(? Decision record: [ADR-0048](../decisions/ADR-0048-cursor-native-exec.md) diff --git a/tests/providers/cursor/cursor-envelope-echo-retry.test.ts b/tests/providers/cursor/cursor-envelope-echo-retry.test.ts index 112cf84ad6..abb6e9fde4 100644 --- a/tests/providers/cursor/cursor-envelope-echo-retry.test.ts +++ b/tests/providers/cursor/cursor-envelope-echo-retry.test.ts @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ describe("cursor external output quarantine + corrective retry (devlog 260826 ga expect(contextFree.finish().kind).toBe("flush"); }); - test.each(["네이티브 셸", "네이티브 쉘", "네이티브셸", "네이티브\t쉘"])( + test.each(["네이티브 셸", "네이티브 쉘", "네이티브셸", "네이티브\t쉘", "“네이티브 셸”", "(네이티브쉘)"])( "localized shell requires a redirect or a second distinct tool (%s)", nativeShell => { const redirect = new CursorRoutingCommentarySniffer(); expect(redirect.feed(`${nativeShell}이 차단되어 exec_command로 전환합니다.`).kind).toBe("hallucination"); @@ -220,6 +220,14 @@ describe("cursor external output quarantine + corrective retry (devlog 260826 ga }, ); + test.each(["비네이티브 셸", "비네이티브쉘", "x네이티브 셸", "_네이티브쉘", "1네이티브 셸", "a\u0301네이티브 셸"])( + "embedded Korean shell wording does not fabricate a second tool (%s)", nativeShell => { + const sniffer = new CursorRoutingCommentarySniffer(); + expect(sniffer.feed(`${nativeShell} 관련 Read가 unavailable 상태입니다.`).kind).toBe("hold"); + expect(sniffer.finish().kind).toBe("flush"); + }, + ); + test("localized shell detection spans native-name and redirect delta boundaries", () => { const sniffer = new CursorRoutingCommentarySniffer(); for (const fragment of ["네이", "티브 ", "쉘이 차단되어 ", "exec_"]) { From 876dc25011022823c6a6fe8a232ad7d1e1fe46eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 09:39:00 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 021/113] fix(codex): normalize both Windows membership separators --- src/codex/desktop-app/windows.ts | 10 +-- structure/catalog.md | 2 + structure/codex-home.md | 2 + structure/config.md | 2 + structure/gui-and-management-api.md | 2 +- structure/ops/docs-and-release.md | 2 + structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 2 + structure/runtime.md | 10 +++ structure/subagents.md | 2 + tests/clients/desktop-app-restart.test.ts | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/codex/desktop-app/windows.ts b/src/codex/desktop-app/windows.ts index 863a20057a..c73e067e5b 100644 --- a/src/codex/desktop-app/windows.ts +++ b/src/codex/desktop-app/windows.ts @@ -29,16 +29,16 @@ const SHELL_BASENAME = "chatgpt.exe"; const POWERSHELL_PROBE_OPTIONS = { timeout: PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS, windowsHide: true } as const; /** - * isUnderRoot prefixes with the host path.sep and is case-sensitive. Windows + * isUnderRoot checks a lexical path boundary and is case-sensitive. Windows * membership is case-insensitive, and this file is executed by Unix CI against - * backslash paths, so both sides are folded onto the host separator first. + * mixed slash paths, so both slash forms are folded onto the host separator first. * The boundary itself — sibling `OpenAI.Codex-evil` must not match root * `OpenAI.Codex` — is still isUnderRoot's, which is why the PowerShell * StartsWith is only a cheap pre-filter. */ function toHostMembershipPath(windowsPath: string): string { const lowered = windowsPath.toLowerCase(); - return sep === "\\" ? lowered : lowered.replaceAll("\\", "/"); + return lowered.replace(/[\\/]/g, sep); } function isMemberExecutable(executable: string, root: string): boolean { @@ -91,10 +91,10 @@ function listPackageProcesses(exec: DesktopExec, install: DesktopAppInstall): De const literal = install.root.replace(/'/g, "''"); const script = [ "$ErrorActionPreference='SilentlyContinue'", - `$root = '${literal}'`, + `$root = '${literal}'.Replace('/', '\\')`, "$me = ([Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()).Name", "Get-CimInstance Win32_Process -Filter \"Name='ChatGPT.exe'\" |", - " Where-Object { $_.ExecutablePath -and $_.ExecutablePath.StartsWith($root, 'OrdinalIgnoreCase') } |", + " Where-Object { $_.ExecutablePath -and $_.ExecutablePath.Replace('/', '\\').StartsWith($root, 'OrdinalIgnoreCase') } |", " ForEach-Object {", " $o = Invoke-CimMethod -InputObject $_ -MethodName GetOwner", " if ($o -and $o.ReturnValue -eq 0 -and $o.User) {", diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index 47a827426b..a6627b609d 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ removal markers. These presentation operations do not grant routing or account e ## Startup readiness +When the desktop app is explicitly restarted to reload synchronized state, [process membership](runtime.md#codex-desktop-process-membership) is determined from its installation path; catalog model selectors do not identify restart targets. + Each `startServer` invocation owns a private, one-shot readiness gate created before the listener binds. `handleStart` supplies its gate and transitions it only after the shared catalog sync and best-effort Claude Code roster reconciliation have both settled. The catalog sync remains the diff --git a/structure/codex-home.md b/structure/codex-home.md index 339358ea9b..1a391dceb9 100644 --- a/structure/codex-home.md +++ b/structure/codex-home.md @@ -232,6 +232,8 @@ to snapshot persistence instead of relying on the progress argument alone. ## Codex-home diagnostics +Desktop executable membership uses the [discovered installation root](runtime.md#codex-desktop-process-membership), independently of the Codex state directory resolved here. + Some Codex-home conditions are reported rather than repaired, because repairing them would overwrite a deliberate user choice: diff --git a/structure/config.md b/structure/config.md index a4c0b97ead..11cb59d92f 100644 --- a/structure/config.md +++ b/structure/config.md @@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ management API. Retirement does not migrate user-selected model ids or erase usa ## Config injection +An explicit desktop restart after injection uses the [runtime process-membership contract](runtime.md#codex-desktop-process-membership); mixed Windows path spelling does not change which installation the restart targets. + `src/codex/inject.ts` writes one of two forms. The choice is not cosmetic: it decides whether Codex keeps its native provider id, which decides whether existing thread history still resolves. diff --git a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md index 0496735405..328a563beb 100644 --- a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md +++ b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ unvalidated Bun builds is unchanged (`src/lib/bun-stream-caps.ts`). sidebar entry: it is entered from the dashboard's startup-state row, which links there whether the current state needs remediation or merely reports how routing is protected. Its warning state is derived from active Codex routing plus the actual service and launcher-shim installation state; the -`codexAutoStart` preference alone is never presented as proof of restart protection. The page shows +`codexAutoStart` preference alone is never presented as proof of restart protection. Desktop restart target selection follows the [runtime membership contract](runtime.md#codex-desktop-process-membership); finding an installed app does not establish background-service protection. The page shows copyable repair commands (`ocx service repair` for an installed service or `ocx service install` when none is registered, `ocx codex-shim install`, and `ocx restore`). On Windows it can also install an owned, per-user system tray. The resident tray owns only its icon, home-scoped singleton, and HKCU Run registration; fixed proxy actions delegate to the CLI so drain, diff --git a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md index f4474c6419..8f75414139 100644 --- a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md +++ b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md @@ -276,6 +276,8 @@ preview has closed that stable patch line. ## Cross-platform CI +The [desktop membership contract](../runtime.md#codex-desktop-process-membership) has adapter regressions on every host and real PowerShell prefilter regressions with synthetic CIM rows on Windows in `tests/clients/desktop-app-restart.test.ts`. A skipped Windows lane does not exercise that native filter; uid-dependent POSIX cases in `tests/clients/desktop-app-restart-posix.test.ts` are skipped on Windows. + `.github/workflows/ci.yml` is the ordinary quality gate for runtime/package changes. Linux runs the suite in four shards with a separate `gates` job, and macOS runs it in two shards. Windows runs the full suite in six shards only on manual `workflow_dispatch` with `lane=all` (or an diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index a1824746dc..c1d5fd8633 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -411,6 +411,8 @@ Pool mode needs stable public names and a store that survives concurrent refresh ## Sidecars, management, and UI +The desktop restart adapter uses [Windows process ownership and installation membership](../runtime.md#codex-desktop-process-membership), independently of Pool/Direct credential selection. + HTTP/SSE, Responses WebSocket, compact, images, search, and vision resolve the same account mode. There is one mode-aware `openai` forward sidecar candidate; `openai-apikey` is not a ChatGPT-forward sidecar candidate and cannot hide a failed Codex credential with separately billed API usage. diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index aa977c51df..c3763ab056 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -17,6 +17,16 @@ Catalog-derived reasoning-level diagnostics are escaped only at the human-output When hub management ingress is enabled, `src/cli/dispatch.ts` opens the dashboard on the literal IPv4 loopback address and configured ingress port, matching the listener in `src/server/index.ts`. Other dashboard address selection is unchanged. +## Codex desktop process membership + +`src/codex/desktop-app/windows.ts` discovers the installed package and limits process ownership to the current Windows user. +Its PowerShell prefilter normalizes both the install root and candidate executable from `/` to `\` before a case-insensitive prefix comparison. +The adapter then folds both slash forms onto the host separator before calling `isUnderRoot()` in `src/codex/desktop-app/types.ts`. +That shared lexical boundary check rejects sibling prefixes such as `OpenAI.Codex-evil`; Windows path folding stays in the Windows adapter, so a POSIX backslash remains a filename character. +The prefilter is only an optimization, not final process-membership authority. +`tests/clients/desktop-app-restart.test.ts` covers both mixed-slash directions through the adapter and runs the real PowerShell filter against synthetic CIM rows on Windows. +`tests/clients/desktop-app-restart-posix.test.ts` keeps the POSIX separator contract covered; uid-dependent macOS/Linux cases skip on Windows. + ## Entrypoints | Path | Responsibility | diff --git a/structure/subagents.md b/structure/subagents.md index 69047b076b..875d11da10 100644 --- a/structure/subagents.md +++ b/structure/subagents.md @@ -262,6 +262,8 @@ cause delegation. The TOML edit owns only marker-tagged values, preserves existi user-owned `[agents]` defaults rather than overwriting them, and rejects ambiguous table shapes without changing the file. +An explicit desktop restart to load those defaults follows the [runtime membership checks](runtime.md#codex-desktop-process-membership); selecting a delegation model does not authorize additional restart targets. + V2 proxy guidance uses `` for both built-in metadata and custom `injectionPrompt` bodies. The built-in text reports the resolved preferred model, effort, roster and fallback chain without prescribing delegation, spawn overrides or diff --git a/tests/clients/desktop-app-restart.test.ts b/tests/clients/desktop-app-restart.test.ts index 4df9c7a6e9..fd7ae597dc 100644 --- a/tests/clients/desktop-app-restart.test.ts +++ b/tests/clients/desktop-app-restart.test.ts @@ -1,8 +1,10 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdtempSync } from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { join } from "node:path"; import { restartCodexDesktopApp, type DesktopAppRestartIo } from "../../src/codex/desktop-app-restart"; +import { windowsDesktopAppAdapter } from "../../src/codex/desktop-app/windows"; import { setTrustedWindowsElevationExecutablesForTests } from "../../src/lib/windows-elevation"; /** @@ -27,6 +29,53 @@ function withTrustedExes(run: () => T): T { interface Call { file: string; args: string[] } +describe.skipIf(process.platform !== "win32")("Windows membership through the real PowerShell prefilter", () => { + for (const [label, root, executable] of [ + ["forward-slash images under a backslash root", INSTALL, INSTALL.replaceAll("\\", "/") + "/ChatGPT.exe"], + ["backslash images under a forward-slash root", INSTALL.replaceAll("\\", "/"), INSTALL + "\\ChatGPT.exe"], + ] as const) { + test(label, () => { + const sibling = executable.replace(/([\\/])ChatGPT\.exe$/, "-evil$1ChatGPT.exe"); + const psLiteral = (value: string) => "'" + value.replaceAll("'", "''") + "'"; + const fixture = [ + // These functions shadow the CIM cmdlets: the generated list-only script + // sees synthetic rows and never enumerates or controls real processes. + "function Get-CimInstance {", + " param([string]$ClassName, [string]$Filter)", + " if ($ClassName -cne 'Win32_Process' -or $Filter -cne \"Name='ChatGPT.exe'\") { throw 'Unexpected fixture query' }", + " @(", + ` [pscustomobject]@{ ProcessId = 1000; ParentProcessId = 900; CreationDate = [datetime]'2026-09-15T00:00:00Z'; ExecutablePath = ${psLiteral(executable)} }`, + ` [pscustomobject]@{ ProcessId = 2000; ParentProcessId = 900; CreationDate = [datetime]'2026-09-15T00:00:00Z'; ExecutablePath = ${psLiteral(sibling)} }`, + " )", + "}", + "function Invoke-CimMethod {", + " param($InputObject, [string]$MethodName)", + " if ($MethodName -cne 'GetOwner' -or $InputObject.ProcessId -notin @(1000, 2000)) { throw 'Unexpected fixture owner query' }", + " [pscustomobject]@{ ReturnValue = 0; Domain = ''; User = ([Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()).Name }", + "}", + ].join("\n"); + let rawListing = ""; + const listed = withTrustedExes(() => windowsDesktopAppAdapter.listProcesses((file, args) => { + expect(file).toBe(PS); + expect(args.slice(0, 3)).toEqual(["-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command"]); + const script = args[3]!; + rawListing = execFileSync(file, [...args.slice(0, 3), fixture + "\n" + script], { + encoding: "utf8", + timeout: 10_000, + windowsHide: true, + }); + return rawListing; + }, { id: AUMID.replace("!App", ""), root, relaunch: AUMID })); + // The real prefilter admits both lexical prefixes despite mixed slashes. + // The shared JS boundary check then removes the similarly named sibling. + expect(rawListing.trim().split(/\r?\n/).map(line => Number(line.split(" ")[0]))).toEqual([1000, 2000]); + expect(listed?.map(entry => ({ pid: entry.pid, executable: entry.executable }))).toEqual([ + { pid: 1000, executable }, + ]); + }, 15_000); + } +}); + /** Scripted exec seam: discovery, then process list, then whatever the branch does. */ /** * A lock path this case owns. The restart takes a singleton lock, so a case using the @@ -141,6 +190,34 @@ describe("Codex desktop app restart (#2292)", () => { expect(launch?.args.join(" ")).toContain(AUMID); }); + + for (const [label, root, executable, isMember] of [ + ["forward-slash executable under backslash root", INSTALL, INSTALL.replaceAll("\\", "/") + "/ChatGPT.exe", true], + ["backslash executable under forward-slash root", INSTALL.replaceAll("\\", "/"), INSTALL + "\\ChatGPT.exe", true], + ["forward-slash sibling outside backslash root", INSTALL, INSTALL.replaceAll("\\", "/") + "-evil/ChatGPT.exe", false], + ["backslash sibling outside forward-slash root", INSTALL.replaceAll("\\", "/"), INSTALL + "-evil\\ChatGPT.exe", false], + ] as const) { + test(label, () => { + const calls: Call[] = []; + const result = withTrustedExes(() => restartCodexDesktopApp(scriptedIo({ + discovery: [AUMID.replace("!App", ""), root, AUMID].join("\n"), + processes: `1000 900 T0 ${executable}`, + calls, + aliveFor: (_pid, poll) => poll <= 2, + }))); + if (isMember) { + expect(result).toEqual({ attempted: true, stopped: [1000], surviving: [], relaunch: "started" }); + expect(calls.some(c => c.args.join(" ").includes("CloseMainWindow"))).toBe(true); + } else { + expect(result.reason).toBe("no_targets"); + expect(result.attempted).toBe(false); + expect(calls.some(c => c.args.join(" ").includes("CloseMainWindow"))).toBe(false); + expect(calls.some(c => c.args.join(" ").includes("Start-Process"))).toBe(false); + } + expect(calls.some(c => c.file === TASKKILL)).toBe(false); + }); + } + test("forces only after the graceful window elapses", () => { const calls: Call[] = []; const result = withTrustedExes(() => restartCodexDesktopApp(scriptedIo({ From 11e343e5f877b21aa6f0b2ce52048baf0e34d788 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: agentHits <140916359+agentHits@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 20:59:59 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 022/113] fix(google): allow structured output for Gemini models on Cloud Code Assist - Lift blanket rejection on Cloud Code Assist for Gemini models (modelId starting with gemini-) - Route structured output into generationConfig.responseMimeType and responseJsonSchema inside envelope.request - Retain explicit fail-closed rejection for non-Gemini models (such as Claude) served through Cloud Code Assist - Keep existing refusals for image-capable models and schemaless json_schema - Update structure/providers/google.md and tests/adapters/google/google-structured-output.test.ts --- src/adapters/google.ts | 14 ++++----- structure/providers/google.md | 9 +++--- .../google/google-structured-output.test.ts | 29 +++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/adapters/google.ts b/src/adapters/google.ts index 9617c1ac10..8829dc0784 100644 --- a/src/adapters/google.ts +++ b/src/adapters/google.ts @@ -796,14 +796,14 @@ export function createGoogleAdapter(provider: OcxProviderConfig): ProviderAdapte // body, URL or credential. const requestedTextFormat = parsed.options.textFormat; if (requestedTextFormat) { - if (provider.googleMode === "cloud-code-assist") { - // Not implemented or verified by opencodex for the Cloud Code Assist envelope, - // including Claude models served through it. This is not a claim that the - // upstream cannot do it — silence would return unconstrained prose as success, - // which is the failure this fix exists to remove. + if (provider.googleMode === "cloud-code-assist" && !parsed.modelId.startsWith("gemini-")) { + // Not implemented by opencodex for non-Gemini models (including Claude) + // served through the Cloud Code Assist envelope. This is not a claim that + // the upstream cannot do it — silence would return unconstrained prose as success, + // which is the failure this refusal exists to prevent. throw new Error( - "google cloud-code-assist structured output is not implemented by opencodex — " - + "remove response_format or route this model through AI Studio or Vertex", + "google cloud-code-assist structured output is not implemented by opencodex for non-Gemini models — " + + "remove response_format or route this model through a direct provider", ); } if (isImageCapableModel(parsed.modelId)) { diff --git a/structure/providers/google.md b/structure/providers/google.md index a403777ee3..21d22fc15c 100644 --- a/structure/providers/google.md +++ b/structure/providers/google.md @@ -62,12 +62,13 @@ The schema is carried verbatim. `sanitizeGeminiToolParameters` narrows a schema the function-declaration subset and must never be applied to a caller-authored output schema. `compileGenerationConfig` in `google-wire-compiler.ts` is a whitelist, so both keys are listed there as well; setting them in the adapter alone would drop them -before the wire. +before the wire. On Cloud Code Assist, Gemini models carry these same keys inside +`envelope.request.generationConfig`. Three cases refuse explicitly rather than dropping the constraint silently: -cloud-code-assist, which opencodex does not implement or verify for this field -(including Claude models served through that envelope — this is not a claim about -what the upstream can do); an image-capable model, whose `responseModalities` +non-Gemini models on Cloud Code Assist (such as Claude models served through that +envelope), which opencodex does not implement or verify for this field (this is not +a claim about what the upstream can do); an image-capable model, whose `responseModalities` configuration contradicts JSON-constrained text; and a `json_schema` format carrying no schema, which would otherwise downgrade to bare JSON mode. An image-capable model with no structured-output request keeps its existing `responseModalities` behavior. diff --git a/tests/adapters/google/google-structured-output.test.ts b/tests/adapters/google/google-structured-output.test.ts index f569b0adc3..c2b845085f 100644 --- a/tests/adapters/google/google-structured-output.test.ts +++ b/tests/adapters/google/google-structured-output.test.ts @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import type { OcxParsedRequest, OcxProviderConfig } from "../../../src/types"; const aiStudio = { adapter: "google", baseUrl: "https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com", apiKey: "key" } as unknown as OcxProviderConfig; const vertex = { adapter: "google", googleMode: "vertex", baseUrl: "https://aiplatform.googleapis.com", apiKey: "key" } as unknown as OcxProviderConfig; -const cca = { adapter: "google", googleMode: "cloud-code-assist", baseUrl: "https://cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com", apiKey: "token" } as unknown as OcxProviderConfig; +const cca = { adapter: "google", googleMode: "cloud-code-assist", baseUrl: "https://cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com", apiKey: "token", project: "test-project" } as unknown as OcxProviderConfig; const SCHEMA = { type: "object", @@ -57,6 +57,27 @@ describe("F3 Google structured output reaches the generateContent wire", () => { expect(config.responseJsonSchema).toEqual(SCHEMA); }); + test("Gemini-on-CCA carries responseMimeType and responseJsonSchema inside envelope.request", async () => { + const { body } = await createGoogleAdapter(cca).buildRequest( + parsed({ type: "json_schema", name: "answer", schema: SCHEMA, strict: true }), + ); + const envelope = JSON.parse(typeof body === "string" ? body : JSON.stringify(body)) as Record; + + expect(envelope.generationConfig).toBeUndefined(); + expect(envelope.request?.generationConfig?.responseMimeType).toBe("application/json"); + expect(envelope.request?.generationConfig?.responseJsonSchema).toEqual(SCHEMA); + expect(envelope.request?.generationConfig?.responseSchema).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("json_object on Cloud Code Assist sets only responseMimeType in envelope.request", async () => { + const { body } = await createGoogleAdapter(cca).buildRequest(parsed({ type: "json_object" })); + const envelope = JSON.parse(typeof body === "string" ? body : JSON.stringify(body)) as Record; + + expect(envelope.generationConfig).toBeUndefined(); + expect(envelope.request?.generationConfig?.responseMimeType).toBe("application/json"); + expect(envelope.request?.generationConfig?.responseJsonSchema).toBeUndefined(); + }); + test("the schema survives compilation byte-for-byte, unsanitized", async () => { const nested = { type: "object", @@ -86,8 +107,10 @@ describe("F3 Google structured output reaches the generateContent wire", () => { }); describe("F3 unsupported modes refuse explicitly instead of dropping the schema", () => { - test("cloud-code-assist reports that opencodex does not implement it", async () => { - const promise = createGoogleAdapter(cca).buildRequest(parsed({ type: "json_schema", schema: SCHEMA })); + test("Claude-on-CCA with textFormat reports that opencodex does not implement it", async () => { + const promise = createGoogleAdapter(cca).buildRequest( + parsed({ type: "json_schema", schema: SCHEMA }, "claude-3-7-sonnet"), + ); await expect(promise).rejects.toThrow(/not implemented by opencodex/); }); From aa3afb5c4943f79f3f3a3c8310e21e3d2e58ffd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 10:46:49 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 023/113] docs: synchronize refresh-lock source owners --- structure/codex-home.md | 2 ++ structure/config.md | 2 ++ structure/gui-and-management-api.md | 2 +- structure/ops/docs-and-release.md | 2 ++ structure/runtime.md | 2 ++ structure/subagents.md | 2 ++ 6 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/structure/codex-home.md b/structure/codex-home.md index 339358ea9b..b1f9e7f4dd 100644 --- a/structure/codex-home.md +++ b/structure/codex-home.md @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # Codex Home +A lock in the Codex credential store is governed by [descriptor identity and age](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation), so the mere presence of its filename is neither acquisition nor release authority. + ## Codex home `src/codex/paths.ts` resolves Codex state from `CODEX_HOME` when set and valid, otherwise from diff --git a/structure/config.md b/structure/config.md index 901aa582d6..885227a422 100644 --- a/structure/config.md +++ b/structure/config.md @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # Config Surface +Configuration consumers retain the [refresh-lock ownership boundary](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation); failing to establish a usable matching lock identity does not authorize deleting its path. + The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md index 9eb9f1fa74..825ea150e4 100644 --- a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md +++ b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior ## Dashboard serving -The bundled React dashboard is built into `gui/dist` and served by the same Bun proxy. `ocx gui` starts +Account refresh actions follow the [credential refresh-lock identity contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation): a held unreadable lock is distinct from one this process may release. The bundled React dashboard is built into `gui/dist` and served by the same Bun proxy. `ocx gui` starts the proxy when needed and opens `http://localhost:`, or `http://127.0.0.1:` when `hub.managementIngress.enabled` is true — see [the hub management dashboard address](runtime.md#hub-management-dashboard-address). All ordinary HTTP responses (excluding successful WebSocket upgrades) include `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and diff --git a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md index f4474c6419..9977b54f71 100644 --- a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md +++ b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # Docs And Release +Refresh-lock validation covers fresh unreadable locks and descriptor-matched release in `tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts`; the [catalog contract](../catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation) explicitly does not promise atomic compare-and-delete. + The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](../subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index 9d97326b34..91a56aa088 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # Runtime +OAuth refresh coordination follows the [refresh-lock identity contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation): a fresh unreadable lock remains held, and release requires matching descriptor identity. + The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/subagents.md b/structure/subagents.md index 70c93a9ac5..ba4e2e227c 100644 --- a/structure/subagents.md +++ b/structure/subagents.md @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # Subagents And Multi-Agent Surface +Concurrent refreshes triggered by independent agent work share the [credential refresh-lock contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation); unknown lock identity remains available for stale recovery rather than immediate removal. + ## Plaintext V2 agent messages `src/responses/plaintext-v2-agent-messages.ts` owns the experimental, configuration-only From 52779efaac464ee972b80ebdb3ea0e5e8baaba40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 11:36:47 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 024/113] fix(codex): preserve refresh result when lock identity probe fails --- src/codex/account-store.ts | 16 ++++--- structure/catalog.md | 2 +- structure/codex-home.md | 2 +- structure/config.md | 2 +- structure/gui-and-management-api.md | 2 +- structure/ops/docs-and-release.md | 2 +- structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 2 +- structure/runtime.md | 2 +- structure/subagents.md | 2 +- .../codex-account-store.test.ts | 46 +++++++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/codex/account-store.ts b/src/codex/account-store.ts index 45d2de536c..7c3cdc6414 100644 --- a/src/codex/account-store.ts +++ b/src/codex/account-store.ts @@ -711,13 +711,17 @@ export async function withCodexRefreshFileLock(lockKey: string, signal: Abort } closeSync(fd); } + let current: { dev: bigint; ino: bigint } | null = null; try { - const current = statSync(path, { bigint: true }); - // An unreadable or unusable identity never authorizes removing the current path. - // Leave it for stale-lock recovery instead of deleting a possible replacement owner. - if (owned && current.dev === owned.dev && current.ino === owned.ino) unlinkSync(path); - } catch (err) { - if (errCode(err) !== "ENOENT") throw err; + const info = statSync(path, { bigint: true }); + if (info.dev >= 0n && info.ino > 0n) current = { dev: info.dev, ino: info.ino }; + } catch { + // Unknown path identity leaves the lock for stale recovery without masking fn(). + } + if (owned && current && current.dev === owned.dev && current.ino === owned.ino) { + try { unlinkSync(path); } catch (err) { + if (errCode(err) !== "ENOENT") throw err; + } } } } diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index cb0f370ec9..da6ef17f4c 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ Pool mode routes across main plus added Codex credentials. Key rules: they do not assume a silent retry. The lock itself is identity-scoped: a not-yet-readable lock counts as held until it ages out, and release requires a usable matching descriptor identity. Unknown identity leaves the path - for stale recovery; stat followed by unlink does not provide atomic compare-and-delete. + for stale recovery without replacing the callback outcome when the path probe fails; confirmed-owner unlink errors other than `ENOENT` still propagate. Stat followed by unlink does not provide atomic compare-and-delete. - **Authentication identity, quota domain, and cache domain are tracked separately** (`src/routing/identity-domains.ts`). `classifyCredential` returns all three with provenance: `pool.credentialGroups` supplies operator-declared quota domains, a small built-in table diff --git a/structure/codex-home.md b/structure/codex-home.md index b1f9e7f4dd..36d27420de 100644 --- a/structure/codex-home.md +++ b/structure/codex-home.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Codex Home -A lock in the Codex credential store is governed by [descriptor identity and age](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation), so the mere presence of its filename is neither acquisition nor release authority. +A lock in the Codex credential store is governed by [descriptor identity and age](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation), so the mere presence of its filename is neither acquisition nor release authority. Failed path-identity probes leave the lock for stale recovery and preserve the refresh callback outcome. ## Codex home diff --git a/structure/config.md b/structure/config.md index 885227a422..4fb8529ee6 100644 --- a/structure/config.md +++ b/structure/config.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Config Surface -Configuration consumers retain the [refresh-lock ownership boundary](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation); failing to establish a usable matching lock identity does not authorize deleting its path. +Configuration consumers retain the [refresh-lock ownership boundary](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation); failing to establish a usable matching lock identity does not authorize deleting its path or replacing the refresh callback outcome with a path-probe error. The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md index 825ea150e4..c32c2373c8 100644 --- a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md +++ b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior ## Dashboard serving -Account refresh actions follow the [credential refresh-lock identity contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation): a held unreadable lock is distinct from one this process may release. The bundled React dashboard is built into `gui/dist` and served by the same Bun proxy. `ocx gui` starts +Account refresh actions follow the [credential refresh-lock identity contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation): a held unreadable lock is distinct from one this process may release, and path-probe errors preserve the callback outcome. The bundled React dashboard is built into `gui/dist` and served by the same Bun proxy. `ocx gui` starts the proxy when needed and opens `http://localhost:`, or `http://127.0.0.1:` when `hub.managementIngress.enabled` is true — see [the hub management dashboard address](runtime.md#hub-management-dashboard-address). All ordinary HTTP responses (excluding successful WebSocket upgrades) include `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and diff --git a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md index 9977b54f71..11c8edfe66 100644 --- a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md +++ b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Docs And Release -Refresh-lock validation covers fresh unreadable locks and descriptor-matched release in `tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts`; the [catalog contract](../catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation) explicitly does not promise atomic compare-and-delete. +Refresh-lock validation covers fresh unreadable locks, descriptor-matched release, path-probe failures preserving callback outcomes, and confirmed-owner unlink error handling in `tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts`; the [catalog contract](../catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation) explicitly does not promise atomic compare-and-delete. The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](../subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index 8eb31f164c..ca2fe984ef 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ Pool mode needs stable public names and a store that survives concurrent refresh not yet readable counts as held until it ages past the stale window, because its owner creates the file and writes its metadata as two steps, and a holder deletes the lock only while the path still resolves to the file it created. If descriptor identity is unavailable or unusable, - release leaves the path for stale-lock recovery. The stat/unlink pair is not an atomic + release leaves the path for stale-lock recovery. Path-probe errors preserve the callback outcome; confirmed-owner unlink errors other than `ENOENT` still propagate. The stat/unlink pair is not an atomic compare-and-delete, so this check alone does not eliminate concurrent replacement races. ## Sidecars, management, and UI diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index 91a56aa088..6bd8b1add6 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Runtime -OAuth refresh coordination follows the [refresh-lock identity contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation): a fresh unreadable lock remains held, and release requires matching descriptor identity. +OAuth refresh coordination follows the [refresh-lock identity contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation): a fresh unreadable lock remains held, and release requires matching descriptor identity. A failed path-identity probe preserves the refresh callback outcome. The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/subagents.md b/structure/subagents.md index ba4e2e227c..8bf9f04328 100644 --- a/structure/subagents.md +++ b/structure/subagents.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Subagents And Multi-Agent Surface -Concurrent refreshes triggered by independent agent work share the [credential refresh-lock contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation); unknown lock identity remains available for stale recovery rather than immediate removal. +Concurrent refreshes triggered by independent agent work share the [credential refresh-lock contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation); unknown lock identity remains available for stale recovery rather than immediate removal, and a failed path probe cannot mask the callback outcome. ## Plaintext V2 agent messages diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts index 3cdfb1a0af..945086afc4 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts @@ -691,6 +691,52 @@ describe("codex-account-store CRUD", () => { } }); + for (const code of ["EACCES", "EIO"]) { + for (const callbackFails of [false, true]) { + test(`refresh release preserves the callback outcome after ${code} path probe failure (${callbackFails})`, async () => { + const { withCodexRefreshFileLock } = await import("../../src/codex/account-store"); + const lockKey = `path-probe-${code}-${callbackFails}`; + const lockPath = join(TEST_DIR, `codex-refresh-${createHash("sha256").update(lockKey).digest("hex").slice(0, 32)}.lock`); + const original = fs.statSync; + const callbackError = new Error("refresh failed"); + let released = false; + const probe = spyOn(fs, "statSync").mockImplementation((...args: Parameters) => { + if (released && args[0] === lockPath) throw Object.assign(new Error("path probe unavailable"), { code }); + return original(...args); + }); + try { + const pending = withCodexRefreshFileLock(lockKey, new AbortController().signal, async () => { + released = true; + if (callbackFails) throw callbackError; + return "refreshed"; + }); + if (callbackFails) await expect(pending).rejects.toBe(callbackError); + else expect(await pending).toBe("refreshed"); + expect(existsSync(lockPath)).toBe(true); + } finally { probe.mockRestore(); } + }); + } + } + + test.each(["ENOENT", "EACCES"])("refresh release preserves confirmed-owner unlink handling for %s", async (code) => { + const { withCodexRefreshFileLock } = await import("../../src/codex/account-store"); + const lockKey = `unlink-${code}`; + const lockPath = join(TEST_DIR, `codex-refresh-${createHash("sha256").update(lockKey).digest("hex").slice(0, 32)}.lock`); + const original = fs.unlinkSync; + const unlinkError = Object.assign(new Error("unlink failed"), { code }); + let attempts = 0; + const probe = spyOn(fs, "unlinkSync").mockImplementation((path) => { + if (path === lockPath) { attempts++; throw unlinkError; } + return original(path); + }); + try { + const pending = withCodexRefreshFileLock(lockKey, new AbortController().signal, async () => "refreshed"); + if (code === "ENOENT") expect(await pending).toBe("refreshed"); + else await expect(pending).rejects.toBe(unlinkError); + expect(attempts).toBe(1); + } finally { probe.mockRestore(); } + }); + test("same refresh grant joins a live flight", async () => { const { getCodexAccountCredential, From 8e14d34c3a765306fd2b3ba36cc697394b03b96d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 12:02:47 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 025/113] fix(codex): serialize refresh lock metadata and clean failed acquisition --- src/codex/account-store.ts | 95 +++++++++++-------- structure/catalog.md | 2 +- structure/codex-home.md | 2 +- structure/config.md | 2 +- structure/gui-and-management-api.md | 2 +- structure/ops/docs-and-release.md | 2 +- structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 2 +- structure/runtime.md | 2 +- structure/subagents.md | 2 +- .../codex-account-store.test.ts | 66 +++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/codex/account-store.ts b/src/codex/account-store.ts index 7c3cdc6414..7d78e998c3 100644 --- a/src/codex/account-store.ts +++ b/src/codex/account-store.ts @@ -665,6 +665,33 @@ function isRefreshLockStale(path: string): boolean { } } +function releaseCodexRefreshFileLock(path: string, fd: number): void { + let owned: { dev: bigint; ino: bigint } | null = null; + try { + const info = fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true }); + if (info.dev >= 0n && info.ino > 0n) owned = { dev: info.dev, ino: info.ino }; + } catch { /* Unknown descriptor identity never authorizes unlink. */ } + closeSync(fd); + try { + withConfigMutationLockSync(() => { + let current: { dev: bigint; ino: bigint } | null = null; + try { + const info = statSync(path, { bigint: true }); + if (info.dev >= 0n && info.ino > 0n) current = { dev: info.dev, ino: info.ino }; + } catch { /* Keep the lock and the callback outcome when the path probe fails. */ } + if (owned && current && current.dev === owned.dev && current.ino === owned.ino) { + try { unlinkSync(path); } catch (err) { + if (errCode(err) !== "ENOENT") throw err; + } + } + }); + } catch (err) { + // The descriptor is already closed. A busy/unavailable metadata transaction leaves the + // path for stale recovery rather than masking the completed refresh with cleanup failure. + if (!(err instanceof ConfigMutationLockError)) throw err; + } +} + export async function withCodexRefreshFileLock(lockKey: string, signal: AbortSignal, fn: () => Promise): Promise { hardenConfigDir(); const dir = getConfigDir(); @@ -676,53 +703,45 @@ export async function withCodexRefreshFileLock(lockKey: string, signal: Abort while (fd == null) { if (signal.aborted) throw signal.reason; try { - fd = openSync(path, "wx", 0o600); - writeFileSync(fd, JSON.stringify({ acquiredAt: Date.now(), pid: process.pid }) + "\n"); - break; - } catch (err) { - if (errCode(err) !== "EEXIST") throw err; - if (isRefreshLockStale(path)) { + // Serialize only metadata operations, never the async refresh callback. Cooperating + // contenders cannot reclaim a successor between stale observation and path mutation. + withConfigMutationLockSync(() => { try { - unlinkSync(path); - } catch (unlinkErr) { - if (errCode(unlinkErr) !== "ENOENT") throw unlinkErr; + fd = openSync(path, "wx", 0o600); + writeFileSync(fd, JSON.stringify({ acquiredAt: Date.now(), pid: process.pid }) + "\n"); + } catch (err) { + if (fd != null) { + const failedFd = fd; + fd = null; + try { releaseCodexRefreshFileLock(path, failedFd); } catch { /* Preserve write failure. */ } + throw err; + } + if (errCode(err) !== "EEXIST") throw err; + if (isRefreshLockStale(path)) { + try { unlinkSync(path); } catch (unlinkErr) { + if (errCode(unlinkErr) !== "ENOENT") throw unlinkErr; + } + } } - continue; + }); + } catch (err) { + // A failed SQLite commit can follow successful file creation; it still owns an fd. + if (fd != null) { + const failedFd = fd; + fd = null; + try { releaseCodexRefreshFileLock(path, failedFd); } catch { /* Preserve admission failure. */ } } - if (Date.now() >= deadline) throw new CodexCredentialRefreshLockTimeoutError(); - await sleep(REFRESH_LOCK_POLL_MS, signal); + if (!(err instanceof ConfigMutationLockError)) throw err; } + if (fd != null) break; + if (Date.now() >= deadline) throw new CodexCredentialRefreshLockTimeoutError(); + await sleep(REFRESH_LOCK_POLL_MS, signal); } try { return await fn(); } finally { - // Release only the lock this call created. If a waiter reclaimed the path as stale and a - // new owner recreated it, unlinking by name would delete the live lock of that owner. - let owned: { dev: bigint; ino: bigint } | null = null; - if (fd != null) { - try { - const info = fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true }); - if (info.dev >= 0n && info.ino > 0n) { - owned = { dev: info.dev, ino: info.ino }; - } - } catch { - owned = null; - } - closeSync(fd); - } - let current: { dev: bigint; ino: bigint } | null = null; - try { - const info = statSync(path, { bigint: true }); - if (info.dev >= 0n && info.ino > 0n) current = { dev: info.dev, ino: info.ino }; - } catch { - // Unknown path identity leaves the lock for stale recovery without masking fn(). - } - if (owned && current && current.dev === owned.dev && current.ino === owned.ino) { - try { unlinkSync(path); } catch (err) { - if (errCode(err) !== "ENOENT") throw err; - } - } + releaseCodexRefreshFileLock(path, fd); } } diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index da6ef17f4c..9e91c415bc 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ Pool mode routes across main plus added Codex credentials. Key rules: they do not assume a silent retry. The lock itself is identity-scoped: a not-yet-readable lock counts as held until it ages out, and release requires a usable matching descriptor identity. Unknown identity leaves the path - for stale recovery without replacing the callback outcome when the path probe fails; confirmed-owner unlink errors other than `ENOENT` still propagate. Stat followed by unlink does not provide atomic compare-and-delete. + for stale recovery without replacing the callback outcome when the path probe fails; confirmed-owner unlink errors other than `ENOENT` still propagate. Acquisition, stale reclamation and identity-checked release run inside the existing synchronous SQLite config-mutation transaction; the async refresh callback runs outside it. A failed metadata write closes its descriptor and removes only a matching owned path. Busy release coordination preserves the callback outcome and leaves the path for stale recovery. This serializes cooperating writers; stat/unlink is not atomic against non-cooperating filesystem writers. - **Authentication identity, quota domain, and cache domain are tracked separately** (`src/routing/identity-domains.ts`). `classifyCredential` returns all three with provenance: `pool.credentialGroups` supplies operator-declared quota domains, a small built-in table diff --git a/structure/codex-home.md b/structure/codex-home.md index 36d27420de..838ccc5feb 100644 --- a/structure/codex-home.md +++ b/structure/codex-home.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Codex Home -A lock in the Codex credential store is governed by [descriptor identity and age](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation), so the mere presence of its filename is neither acquisition nor release authority. Failed path-identity probes leave the lock for stale recovery and preserve the refresh callback outcome. +A lock in the Codex credential store is governed by [descriptor identity and age](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation), so the mere presence of its filename is neither acquisition nor release authority. Failed path-identity probes leave the lock for stale recovery and preserve the refresh callback outcome. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; failed metadata writes close and clean only their owned file, and async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. ## Codex home diff --git a/structure/config.md b/structure/config.md index 4fb8529ee6..abf4a1e07c 100644 --- a/structure/config.md +++ b/structure/config.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Config Surface -Configuration consumers retain the [refresh-lock ownership boundary](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation); failing to establish a usable matching lock identity does not authorize deleting its path or replacing the refresh callback outcome with a path-probe error. +Configuration consumers retain the [refresh-lock ownership boundary](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation); failing to establish a usable matching lock identity does not authorize deleting its path or replacing the refresh callback outcome with a path-probe error. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; failed metadata writes close and clean only their owned file, and async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md index c32c2373c8..0113b286c9 100644 --- a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md +++ b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior ## Dashboard serving -Account refresh actions follow the [credential refresh-lock identity contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation): a held unreadable lock is distinct from one this process may release, and path-probe errors preserve the callback outcome. The bundled React dashboard is built into `gui/dist` and served by the same Bun proxy. `ocx gui` starts +Account refresh actions follow the [credential refresh-lock identity contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation): a held unreadable lock is distinct from one this process may release, and path-probe errors preserve the callback outcome. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; failed metadata writes close and clean only their owned file, and async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. The bundled React dashboard is built into `gui/dist` and served by the same Bun proxy. `ocx gui` starts the proxy when needed and opens `http://localhost:`, or `http://127.0.0.1:` when `hub.managementIngress.enabled` is true — see [the hub management dashboard address](runtime.md#hub-management-dashboard-address). All ordinary HTTP responses (excluding successful WebSocket upgrades) include `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and diff --git a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md index 11c8edfe66..3ee5843b00 100644 --- a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md +++ b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Docs And Release -Refresh-lock validation covers fresh unreadable locks, descriptor-matched release, path-probe failures preserving callback outcomes, and confirmed-owner unlink error handling in `tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts`; the [catalog contract](../catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation) explicitly does not promise atomic compare-and-delete. +Refresh-lock validation covers fresh unreadable locks, descriptor-matched release, path-probe failures preserving callback outcomes, and confirmed-owner unlink error handling in `tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts`; the [catalog contract](../catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation) explicitly does not promise atomic compare-and-delete. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; failed metadata writes close and clean only their owned file, and async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](../subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index ca2fe984ef..7f1e9eaf23 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ Pool mode needs stable public names and a store that survives concurrent refresh the file and writes its metadata as two steps, and a holder deletes the lock only while the path still resolves to the file it created. If descriptor identity is unavailable or unusable, release leaves the path for stale-lock recovery. Path-probe errors preserve the callback outcome; confirmed-owner unlink errors other than `ENOENT` still propagate. The stat/unlink pair is not an atomic - compare-and-delete, so this check alone does not eliminate concurrent replacement races. + compare-and-delete against non-cooperating writers. Cooperating acquisition, stale reclamation and release serialize inside the synchronous config-mutation transaction, released before the async callback. Failed metadata writes close their descriptor and clean only a matching owned path. ## Sidecars, management, and UI diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index 6bd8b1add6..97cc074a09 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Runtime -OAuth refresh coordination follows the [refresh-lock identity contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation): a fresh unreadable lock remains held, and release requires matching descriptor identity. A failed path-identity probe preserves the refresh callback outcome. +OAuth refresh coordination follows the [refresh-lock identity contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation): a fresh unreadable lock remains held, and release requires matching descriptor identity. A failed path-identity probe preserves the refresh callback outcome. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; failed metadata writes close and clean only their owned file, and async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/subagents.md b/structure/subagents.md index 8bf9f04328..44fa3cd86b 100644 --- a/structure/subagents.md +++ b/structure/subagents.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Subagents And Multi-Agent Surface -Concurrent refreshes triggered by independent agent work share the [credential refresh-lock contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation); unknown lock identity remains available for stale recovery rather than immediate removal, and a failed path probe cannot mask the callback outcome. +Concurrent refreshes triggered by independent agent work share the [credential refresh-lock contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation); unknown lock identity remains available for stale recovery rather than immediate removal, and a failed path probe cannot mask the callback outcome. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; failed metadata writes close and clean only their owned file, and async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. ## Plaintext V2 agent messages diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts index 945086afc4..8407e1b597 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ import { describe, expect, test, beforeEach, afterEach, spyOn } from "bun:test"; import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; +import { Database } from "bun:sqlite"; import * as fs from "node:fs"; import { existsSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; @@ -737,6 +738,71 @@ describe("codex-account-store CRUD", () => { } finally { probe.mockRestore(); } }); + test("refresh stale reclamation excludes a second SQLite writer until acquisition finishes", async () => { + const { withCodexRefreshFileLock } = await import("../../src/codex/account-store"); + const key = "serialized-stale"; + const path = join(TEST_DIR, `codex-refresh-${createHash("sha256").update(key).digest("hex").slice(0, 32)}.lock`); + writeFileSync(path, JSON.stringify({ acquiredAt: 0 })); + const db = new Database(join(TEST_DIR, "config-mutation.sqlite"), { create: true }); + const original = fs.unlinkSync; + let blocked = false; + const probe = spyOn(fs, "unlinkSync").mockImplementation((candidate) => { + if (candidate === path && !blocked) { + try { db.exec("BEGIN IMMEDIATE"); db.exec("ROLLBACK"); } + catch (error) { blocked = (error as { code?: string }).code === "SQLITE_BUSY"; } + } + return original(candidate); + }); + try { + await withCodexRefreshFileLock(key, new AbortController().signal, async () => { + expect(blocked).toBe(true); + // The callback must not hold the metadata transaction across network/async work. + db.exec("BEGIN IMMEDIATE"); db.exec("ROLLBACK"); + }); + expect(existsSync(path)).toBe(false); + } finally { probe.mockRestore(); db.close(); } + }); + + test.each([false, true])("refresh metadata failure closes its descriptor and preserves replacement=%s", async (replacement) => { + const { withCodexRefreshFileLock } = await import("../../src/codex/account-store"); + const key = `metadata-write-${replacement}`; + const path = join(TEST_DIR, `codex-refresh-${createHash("sha256").update(key).digest("hex").slice(0, 32)}.lock`); + const original = fs.writeFileSync; + const failure = Object.assign(new Error("metadata write failed"), { code: "EIO" }); + let descriptor: number | undefined; + let called = false; + const probe = spyOn(fs, "writeFileSync").mockImplementation((...args: Parameters) => { + if (typeof args[0] === "number") { + descriptor = args[0]; + if (replacement) { renameSync(path, `${path}.reclaimed`); original(path, "successor"); } + throw failure; + } + return original(...args); + }); + try { + await expect(withCodexRefreshFileLock(key, new AbortController().signal, async () => { called = true; })).rejects.toBe(failure); + expect(called).toBe(false); + expect(descriptor).toBeDefined(); + expect(() => fs.fstatSync(descriptor!)).toThrow(); + expect(existsSync(path)).toBe(replacement); + if (replacement) expect(readFileSync(path, "utf8")).toBe("successor"); + } finally { probe.mockRestore(); } + }); + + test("refresh release keeps its result and lock when metadata coordination is busy", async () => { + const { withCodexRefreshFileLock } = await import("../../src/codex/account-store"); + const key = "release-coordination-busy"; + const path = join(TEST_DIR, `codex-refresh-${createHash("sha256").update(key).digest("hex").slice(0, 32)}.lock`); + const db = new Database(join(TEST_DIR, "config-mutation.sqlite"), { create: true }); + try { + expect(await withCodexRefreshFileLock(key, new AbortController().signal, async () => { + db.exec("BEGIN IMMEDIATE"); + return "refreshed"; + })).toBe("refreshed"); + expect(existsSync(path)).toBe(true); + } finally { db.exec("ROLLBACK"); db.close(); } + }); + test("same refresh grant joins a live flight", async () => { const { getCodexAccountCredential, From 5b8b070e0a3b0d9bcf138e5124dee1adb8792e55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 14:28:52 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 026/113] fix(codex): keep refresh lock descriptor alive through release --- src/codex/account-store.ts | 7 ++-- structure/catalog.md | 2 +- structure/codex-home.md | 2 +- structure/config.md | 2 +- structure/gui-and-management-api.md | 2 +- structure/ops/docs-and-release.md | 2 +- structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 2 +- structure/runtime.md | 2 +- structure/subagents.md | 2 +- .../codex-account-store.test.ts | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/codex/account-store.ts b/src/codex/account-store.ts index 7d78e998c3..84ad976f74 100644 --- a/src/codex/account-store.ts +++ b/src/codex/account-store.ts @@ -671,7 +671,6 @@ function releaseCodexRefreshFileLock(path: string, fd: number): void { const info = fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true }); if (info.dev >= 0n && info.ino > 0n) owned = { dev: info.dev, ino: info.ino }; } catch { /* Unknown descriptor identity never authorizes unlink. */ } - closeSync(fd); try { withConfigMutationLockSync(() => { let current: { dev: bigint; ino: bigint } | null = null; @@ -686,10 +685,10 @@ function releaseCodexRefreshFileLock(path: string, fd: number): void { } }); } catch (err) { - // The descriptor is already closed. A busy/unavailable metadata transaction leaves the - // path for stale recovery rather than masking the completed refresh with cleanup failure. + // Keep the descriptor alive through comparison/unlink so its inode cannot be recycled. + // Unavailable coordination leaves the path without masking the completed refresh. if (!(err instanceof ConfigMutationLockError)) throw err; - } + } finally { closeSync(fd); } } export async function withCodexRefreshFileLock(lockKey: string, signal: AbortSignal, fn: () => Promise): Promise { diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index 9e91c415bc..18fa416f62 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ Pool mode routes across main plus added Codex credentials. Key rules: they do not assume a silent retry. The lock itself is identity-scoped: a not-yet-readable lock counts as held until it ages out, and release requires a usable matching descriptor identity. Unknown identity leaves the path - for stale recovery without replacing the callback outcome when the path probe fails; confirmed-owner unlink errors other than `ENOENT` still propagate. Acquisition, stale reclamation and identity-checked release run inside the existing synchronous SQLite config-mutation transaction; the async refresh callback runs outside it. A failed metadata write closes its descriptor and removes only a matching owned path. Busy release coordination preserves the callback outcome and leaves the path for stale recovery. This serializes cooperating writers; stat/unlink is not atomic against non-cooperating filesystem writers. + for stale recovery without replacing the callback outcome when the path probe fails; confirmed-owner unlink errors other than `ENOENT` still propagate. Acquisition, stale reclamation and identity-checked release run inside the existing synchronous SQLite config-mutation transaction; the async refresh callback runs outside it. Release keeps the descriptor open through identity comparison and any unlink, then closes it. Failed metadata writes remove only a matching owned path after successful coordination; unknown identity, failed probes or unavailable coordination retain the path for stale recovery. Busy release coordination preserves the callback outcome and leaves the path for stale recovery. This serializes cooperating writers; stat/unlink is not atomic against non-cooperating filesystem writers. - **Authentication identity, quota domain, and cache domain are tracked separately** (`src/routing/identity-domains.ts`). `classifyCredential` returns all three with provenance: `pool.credentialGroups` supplies operator-declared quota domains, a small built-in table diff --git a/structure/codex-home.md b/structure/codex-home.md index 838ccc5feb..5a95c396b5 100644 --- a/structure/codex-home.md +++ b/structure/codex-home.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Codex Home -A lock in the Codex credential store is governed by [descriptor identity and age](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation), so the mere presence of its filename is neither acquisition nor release authority. Failed path-identity probes leave the lock for stale recovery and preserve the refresh callback outcome. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; failed metadata writes close and clean only their owned file, and async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. +A lock in the Codex credential store is governed by [descriptor identity and age](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation), so the mere presence of its filename is neither acquisition nor release authority. Failed path-identity probes leave the lock for stale recovery and preserve the refresh callback outcome. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; release keeps the descriptor open through identity comparison and any unlink, then closes it. Failed metadata writes remove only a matching owned path after successful coordination; unknown identity, failed probes or unavailable coordination retain the path for stale recovery. Async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. ## Codex home diff --git a/structure/config.md b/structure/config.md index abf4a1e07c..d704d6eb6b 100644 --- a/structure/config.md +++ b/structure/config.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Config Surface -Configuration consumers retain the [refresh-lock ownership boundary](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation); failing to establish a usable matching lock identity does not authorize deleting its path or replacing the refresh callback outcome with a path-probe error. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; failed metadata writes close and clean only their owned file, and async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. +Configuration consumers retain the [refresh-lock ownership boundary](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation); failing to establish a usable matching lock identity does not authorize deleting its path or replacing the refresh callback outcome with a path-probe error. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; release keeps the descriptor open through identity comparison and any unlink, then closes it. Failed metadata writes remove only a matching owned path after successful coordination; unknown identity, failed probes or unavailable coordination retain the path for stale recovery. Async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md index 0113b286c9..af1c588a5f 100644 --- a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md +++ b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior ## Dashboard serving -Account refresh actions follow the [credential refresh-lock identity contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation): a held unreadable lock is distinct from one this process may release, and path-probe errors preserve the callback outcome. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; failed metadata writes close and clean only their owned file, and async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. The bundled React dashboard is built into `gui/dist` and served by the same Bun proxy. `ocx gui` starts +Account refresh actions follow the [credential refresh-lock identity contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation): a held unreadable lock is distinct from one this process may release, and path-probe errors preserve the callback outcome. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; release keeps the descriptor open through identity comparison and any unlink, then closes it. Failed metadata writes remove only a matching owned path after successful coordination; unknown identity, failed probes or unavailable coordination retain the path for stale recovery. Async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. The bundled React dashboard is built into `gui/dist` and served by the same Bun proxy. `ocx gui` starts the proxy when needed and opens `http://localhost:`, or `http://127.0.0.1:` when `hub.managementIngress.enabled` is true — see [the hub management dashboard address](runtime.md#hub-management-dashboard-address). All ordinary HTTP responses (excluding successful WebSocket upgrades) include `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and diff --git a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md index 3ee5843b00..7b9ce3c91b 100644 --- a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md +++ b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Docs And Release -Refresh-lock validation covers fresh unreadable locks, descriptor-matched release, path-probe failures preserving callback outcomes, and confirmed-owner unlink error handling in `tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts`; the [catalog contract](../catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation) explicitly does not promise atomic compare-and-delete. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; failed metadata writes close and clean only their owned file, and async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. +Refresh-lock validation covers fresh unreadable locks, descriptor-matched release, path-probe failures preserving callback outcomes, and confirmed-owner unlink error handling in `tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts`; the [catalog contract](../catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation) explicitly does not promise atomic compare-and-delete. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; release keeps the descriptor open through identity comparison and any unlink, then closes it. Failed metadata writes remove only a matching owned path after successful coordination; unknown identity, failed probes or unavailable coordination retain the path for stale recovery. Async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](../subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index 7f1e9eaf23..ddc03cfcb0 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ Pool mode needs stable public names and a store that survives concurrent refresh the file and writes its metadata as two steps, and a holder deletes the lock only while the path still resolves to the file it created. If descriptor identity is unavailable or unusable, release leaves the path for stale-lock recovery. Path-probe errors preserve the callback outcome; confirmed-owner unlink errors other than `ENOENT` still propagate. The stat/unlink pair is not an atomic - compare-and-delete against non-cooperating writers. Cooperating acquisition, stale reclamation and release serialize inside the synchronous config-mutation transaction, released before the async callback. Failed metadata writes close their descriptor and clean only a matching owned path. + compare-and-delete against non-cooperating writers. Cooperating acquisition, stale reclamation and release serialize inside the synchronous config-mutation transaction, released before the async callback. Release keeps its descriptor open through identity comparison and any unlink, then closes it. Failed metadata writes remove only a matching owned path after successful coordination; unknown identity, failed probes or unavailable coordination retain the path for stale recovery. ## Sidecars, management, and UI diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index 97cc074a09..b8a3ef1b4f 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Runtime -OAuth refresh coordination follows the [refresh-lock identity contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation): a fresh unreadable lock remains held, and release requires matching descriptor identity. A failed path-identity probe preserves the refresh callback outcome. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; failed metadata writes close and clean only their owned file, and async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. +OAuth refresh coordination follows the [refresh-lock identity contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation): a fresh unreadable lock remains held, and release requires matching descriptor identity. A failed path-identity probe preserves the refresh callback outcome. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; release keeps the descriptor open through identity comparison and any unlink, then closes it. Failed metadata writes remove only a matching owned path after successful coordination; unknown identity, failed probes or unavailable coordination retain the path for stale recovery. Async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. diff --git a/structure/subagents.md b/structure/subagents.md index 44fa3cd86b..2e81e6c276 100644 --- a/structure/subagents.md +++ b/structure/subagents.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Subagents And Multi-Agent Surface -Concurrent refreshes triggered by independent agent work share the [credential refresh-lock contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation); unknown lock identity remains available for stale recovery rather than immediate removal, and a failed path probe cannot mask the callback outcome. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; failed metadata writes close and clean only their owned file, and async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. +Concurrent refreshes triggered by independent agent work share the [credential refresh-lock contract](catalog.md#accounts-namespaces-and-pool-rotation); unknown lock identity remains available for stale recovery rather than immediate removal, and a failed path probe cannot mask the callback outcome. Cooperating lock metadata changes serialize through the existing SQLite mutation transaction; release keeps the descriptor open through identity comparison and any unlink, then closes it. Failed metadata writes remove only a matching owned path after successful coordination; unknown identity, failed probes or unavailable coordination retain the path for stale recovery. Async refresh work holds no metadata transaction. ## Plaintext V2 agent messages diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts index 8407e1b597..a71db9b875 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts @@ -670,6 +670,46 @@ describe("codex-account-store CRUD", () => { unlinkSync(`${lockPath}.reclaimed`); }); + test.each([false, true])("refresh release prevents inode reuse before comparison (callback failure=%s)", async (callbackFails) => { + const { withCodexRefreshFileLock } = await import("../../src/codex/account-store"); + const key = `release-inode-reuse-${callbackFails}`; + const path = join(TEST_DIR, `codex-refresh-${createHash("sha256").update(key).digest("hex").slice(0, 32)}.lock`); + const originalFstat = fs.fstatSync; + const originalStat = fs.statSync; + let fd: number | undefined; + let owned: ReturnType | undefined; + let openDuringComparison = false; + const descriptor = spyOn(fs, "fstatSync").mockImplementation((...args: Parameters) => { + fd = args[0]; + owned = originalFstat(...args); + return owned; + }); + const probe = spyOn(fs, "statSync").mockImplementation((...args: Parameters) => { + if (args[0] === path && fd !== undefined && owned) { + try { originalFstat(fd); openDuringComparison = true; } catch { /* Descriptor closed early. */ } + // Model an allocator reusing the unlinked owner's inode only after its last fd closes. + // Holding that fd alive must prevent this ABA regardless of the host filesystem. + if (!openDuringComparison) return owned; + } + return originalStat(...args); + }); + const failure = new Error("original refresh failure"); + try { + const pending = withCodexRefreshFileLock(key, new AbortController().signal, async () => { + unlinkSync(path); + writeFileSync(path, "successor"); + if (callbackFails) throw failure; + return "refreshed"; + }); + if (callbackFails) await expect(pending).rejects.toBe(failure); + else expect(await pending).toBe("refreshed"); + expect(openDuringComparison).toBe(true); + expect(readFileSync(path, "utf8")).toBe("successor"); + expect(fd).toBeDefined(); + expect(() => originalFstat(fd!)).toThrow(); + } finally { descriptor.mockRestore(); probe.mockRestore(); } + }); + test("refresh release preserves the path when descriptor identity cannot be read", async () => { const { withCodexRefreshFileLock } = await import("../../src/codex/account-store"); const lockKey = "unknown-owner"; From 5dfea7235deb5942f9a5c657e075fed0fa388fad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "github-actions[bot]" <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 17:19:41 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 027/113] chore(release): open dev at 2.57.0 before releasing 2.56.0 (#4686) Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --- package.json | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index 6d595e1312..a856df4686 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "@bitkyc08/opencodex", - "version": "2.56.0", + "version": "2.57.0", "description": "Universal provider proxy for OpenAI Codex & Claude Code — use any LLM with Codex CLI/App/SDK and Claude Code", "type": "module", "main": "./bin/package-main.mjs", From 6428a8ecadff0bb147ef946aabf398b1eb68e012 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 17:59:28 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 028/113] test(codex): compare the injected catalog path as a decoded TOML value (#4568) * test(codex): compare the injected catalog path as a decoded TOML value The paginated-home regression test asserted that config.toml literally contains the catalog path. A Windows path is written as a TOML basic string with escaped separators, so the raw file text holds C:\\Users\\... while the assertion looked for C:\Users\... . The test failed on every Windows shard and passed everywhere else, which took the whole windows job down for unrelated pull requests. What the picker actually reads is the decoded value, so the assertion now decodes the model_catalog_json basic string and compares that. POSIX behavior is unchanged, since a path with no backslash decodes to itself. * test(codex): require root catalog path readback --------- Co-authored-by: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> --- .../codex-inject-integration.test.ts | 20 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts index d0dda14d01..5ffbc54f99 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts @@ -16,6 +16,21 @@ const repoRoot = dirname(fileURLToPath(new URL("../../package.json", import.meta setDefaultTimeout(SPAWN_BUDGET_MS); +// Reads back what a TOML consumer would see for a top-level string key. A Windows path +// is stored with escaped separators, so the raw file text never contains the unescaped path. +function readRootTomlString(toml: string, key: string): string | undefined { + const value = Bun.TOML.parse(toml)[key]; + return typeof value === "string" ? value : undefined; +} + +test("catalog readback requires a root string rather than a nested namesake", () => { + const key = "model_catalog_json"; + const catalog = String.raw`C:\Codex\catalog.json`; + expect(readRootTomlString(`${key} = ${JSON.stringify(catalog)}\n[profile]\n${key} = "nested"\n`, key)).toBe(catalog); + expect(readRootTomlString(`[profile]\n${key} = ${JSON.stringify(catalog)}\n`, key)).toBeUndefined(); + expect(readRootTomlString(`[[profiles]]\n${key} = ${JSON.stringify(catalog)}\n`, key)).toBeUndefined(); +}); + // Full injectCodexConfig runs in a subprocess with isolated CODEX_HOME/OPENCODEX_HOME so // module-level path constants bind to the temp dirs (same pattern as codex-journal.test.ts). function runInject(codexHome: string, ocxHome: string, configJson = "{}"): { stdout: string; status: number } { @@ -438,7 +453,10 @@ describe("injectCodexConfig integration (Design B)", () => { }); const written = readFileSync(configPath, "utf8"); expect(written).toContain("model_catalog_json"); - expect(written).toContain(catalogPath); + // What the picker reads is the decoded TOML value, not the raw file text. A Windows path + // is written as a basic string with escaped separators, so asserting on the raw text + // compared an unescaped path against escaped bytes and failed on Windows only. + expect(readRootTomlString(written, "model_catalog_json")).toBe(catalogPath); expect(readFileSync(rollout, "utf8")).toBe(bytes); }); From a6cc5e2cd23c5181846880936f1c1cbd4b620411 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Abhishek Sharma Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 02:03:12 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 029/113] fix(providers): Baseten routed rows must not advertise `text.verbosity` (#4660) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit * fix(providers): Baseten routed rows must not advertise text.verbosity Baseten documents its Model APIs as Chat Completions compatible. `text.verbosity` is an OpenAI Responses parameter, so there is nothing on that wire for it to become, but the Baseten registry entry carried no opt-out and every routed row serialized support_verbosity: true with default_verbosity: "low". Codex seeds its picker from that and sends text.verbosity on the turn. Provider-wide rather than per-model, matching the xAI and Ollama opt-outs: Baseten's catalog is live-discovered, so a slug that arrives later supports it no more than the seeded ones do. Closes #4630 * test(catalog): cover the live-discovered baseten slug, not just the seeded one The opt-out is provider-wide because baseten is liveModels: true — a per-model pin would leave tomorrow's discovered id advertising the control again. The original case seeded a static model, so that reasoning was a comment rather than something the suite checked. This one seeds no models and lets a stubbed /models response supply the slug. Raised in review of #4660 by @coderabbitai and @lidge-jun. --- src/providers/registry/entries-extended.ts | 7 +++ .../catalog-verbosity-default.test.ts | 54 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/providers/registry/entries-extended.ts b/src/providers/registry/entries-extended.ts index 2a92a9b832..5cea61a84f 100644 --- a/src/providers/registry/entries-extended.ts +++ b/src/providers/registry/entries-extended.ts @@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ export const PROVIDER_REGISTRY_EXTENDED: readonly ProviderRegistryEntry[] = [ // Baseten says models outside its reasoning table do not support reasoning. Keep // unknown/new live slugs conservative until an official-docs registry refresh proves it. reasoningEfforts: [], + // `text.verbosity` is an OpenAI Responses parameter. Baseten documents its Model + // APIs as Chat Completions compatible, so there is nothing on that wire for it to + // become, and a routed row must not inherit the Codex template's verbosity picker + // (#4630: Codex sent `text: { verbosity: "low" }` and the turn 400'd before any + // model output). Provider-wide rather than per-model because this catalog is live- + // discovered: a slug that arrives tomorrow supports it no more than the seeded ones. + supportsVerbosity: false, modelReasoningEfforts: BASETEN_MODEL_REASONING_EFFORTS, modelReasoningEffortMap: BASETEN_MODEL_REASONING_EFFORT_MAP, modelDefaultReasoningEfforts: BASETEN_MODEL_DEFAULT_REASONING_EFFORTS, diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/catalog-verbosity-default.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/catalog-verbosity-default.test.ts index 1ed5c8f164..a3224b5b3c 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/catalog-verbosity-default.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/catalog-verbosity-default.test.ts @@ -61,6 +61,60 @@ describe("catalog — default_verbosity is dropped when verbosity is unsupported expect(kiro?.default_verbosity).toBeUndefined(); }); + test("GREEN: a Baseten routed row opts out, defaults included", async () => { + // #4630: Baseten Model APIs are Chat Completions only, so `text.verbosity` + // — a Responses-only parameter — has nowhere to land. Advertising it made + // Codex send `text: { verbosity: "low" }` and the turn 400 before any model + // output. The opt-out is provider-wide because Baseten's catalog is live- + // discovered: a slug that arrives tomorrow supports it no more than this one. + const models = await gatherRoutedModels({ + providers: { + baseten: { + adapter: "openai-chat", + baseUrl: "https://inference.baseten.co/v1", + authMode: "key", + liveModels: false, + models: ["deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash"], + }, + }, + }); + const entries = buildCatalogEntries(null, [], models); + const baseten = entries.find(e => e.slug?.startsWith("baseten/")); + + expect(baseten?.support_verbosity).toBe(false); + expect(baseten?.default_verbosity).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("GREEN: a slug that only live discovery knows about opts out too", async () => { + // The opt-out is provider-wide precisely because baseten is `liveModels: true`: + // a pinned per-model map would leave tomorrow's discovered id advertising the + // control again. Seeding NO static models and letting discovery supply the slug + // is what makes that claim testable rather than a comment (raised in review of + // #4660 by @coderabbitai and @lidge-jun). + globalThis.fetch = (async (input: RequestInfo | URL) => { + if (!String(input).includes("/models")) return new Response(null, { status: 404 }); + return Response.json({ data: [{ id: "deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash" }] }); + }) as typeof fetch; + + const models = await gatherRoutedModels({ + providers: { + baseten: { + adapter: "openai-chat", + baseUrl: "https://inference.baseten.co/v1", + authMode: "key", + apiKey: "test-key", + liveModels: true, + }, + }, + }); + const entries = buildCatalogEntries(null, [], models); + const baseten = entries.find(e => e.slug?.startsWith("baseten/")); + + expect(baseten, "live discovery must have produced a routed baseten row").toBeDefined(); + expect(baseten?.support_verbosity).toBe(false); + expect(baseten?.default_verbosity).toBeUndefined(); + }); + test("CONTROL: rows that never declare a capability keep the permissive default", async () => { const models = await gatherRoutedModels({ providers: { From cc182a40526a1d87cf5b4b7949fdc6979e70747f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 18:06:34 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 030/113] fix(cli): keep no-wait reauth JSON parseable (#4603) Co-authored-by: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> --- .../content/docs/fr/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md | 2 ++ .../content/docs/ja/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md | 2 ++ .../content/docs/ko/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md | 2 ++ .../src/content/docs/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md | 2 ++ .../content/docs/ru/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md | 2 ++ .../content/docs/tr/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md | 2 ++ .../docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md | 2 ++ .../docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md | 2 ++ src/cli/account-main.ts | 2 +- structure/clients/claude-desktop.md | 2 ++ structure/config.md | 2 ++ structure/ops/docs-and-release.md | 2 ++ structure/runtime.md | 4 ++++ tests/cli/cli-native-profile.test.ts | 9 +++++++++ 14 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md index afa6fc19ec..b6ff94de9f 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md @@ -321,6 +321,8 @@ ocx account main switch --yes [--json] ocx account main recover [--rollback --yes] [--json] ``` +En cas de succès, `ocx account main reauth --device --no-wait --json` écrit un seul objet JSON sur stdout, sans la ligne destinée à la lecture humaine `follow up:`. Utilisez son `flowId` avec `ocx account main reauth status --flow --json` pour suivre la progression. + Chaque commande de mutation rapporte le `CODEX_HOME` effectif canonique renvoyé par le proxy en cours d'exécution. Ce chemin peut différer du `CODEX_HOME` de l'appelant ; les commandes qui prennent en charge JSON exposent le même valeur comme `effectiveCodexHome`. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md index cb4f5489e6..3f83e0aab9 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md @@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ ocx account main switch --yes [--json] ocx account main recover [--rollback --yes] [--json] ``` +`ocx account main reauth --device --no-wait --json` は成功時に単一の JSON オブジェクトを stdout に出力し、人向けの `follow up:` 行は出力しません。進行状況は、返された `flowId` を `ocx account main reauth status --flow --json` に指定して確認できます。 + 各変更コマンドは、実行中のプロキシが返す正規化済みの有効な `CODEX_HOME` を表示します。このパスは 呼び出し元の `CODEX_HOME` と異なる場合があり、JSON 対応コマンドは同じ値を `effectiveCodexHome` として返します。 diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md index 3d637dbd92..bc618edfbe 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md @@ -315,6 +315,8 @@ ocx account main switch --yes [--json] ocx account main recover [--rollback --yes] [--json] ``` +`ocx account main reauth --device --no-wait --json`은 성공 시 stdout에 JSON 객체 하나만 출력하며, 사람이 읽는 `follow up:` 안내 줄은 출력하지 않습니다. 반환된 `flowId`를 `ocx account main reauth status --flow --json`에 지정하면 진행 상태를 확인할 수 있습니다. + 각 변경 명령은 실행 중인 프록시가 반환한 정규화된 유효 `CODEX_HOME`을 표시합니다. 이 경로는 호출자의 `CODEX_HOME`과 다를 수 있으며, JSON을 지원하는 명령은 같은 값을 `effectiveCodexHome`으로 반환합니다. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md index 9033cec5f1..d75bc6a3b9 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md @@ -497,6 +497,8 @@ ocx account main switch --yes [--json] ocx account main recover [--rollback --yes] [--json] ``` +`ocx account main reauth --device --no-wait --json` writes one JSON object to stdout on success, without the human-readable `follow up:` line. Use its `flowId` with `ocx account main reauth status --flow --json` to check progress. + Each mutating command reports the canonical effective `CODEX_HOME` returned by the running proxy. This path can differ from the caller's `CODEX_HOME`; commands that support JSON expose the same value as `effectiveCodexHome`. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md index 05bce2e1e4..8b92b55ccb 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md @@ -309,6 +309,8 @@ ocx account main switch --yes [--json] ocx account main recover [--rollback --yes] [--json] ``` +При успехе `ocx account main reauth --device --no-wait --json` выводит в stdout один объект JSON без строки `follow up:`, предназначенной для чтения человеком. Чтобы проверить ход процесса, передайте полученный `flowId` в `ocx account main reauth status --flow --json`. + Каждая изменяющая команда показывает канонический эффективный `CODEX_HOME`, возвращенный работающим прокси. Этот путь может отличаться от `CODEX_HOME` вызывающего процесса; команды с поддержкой JSON возвращают то же значение в `effectiveCodexHome`. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md index bee889f6d8..11af8bb466 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md @@ -370,6 +370,8 @@ ocx account main switch --yes [--json] ocx account main recover [--rollback --yes] [--json] ``` +`ocx account main reauth --device --no-wait --json` başarılı olduğunda stdout'a tek bir JSON nesnesi yazar; insan tarafından okunabilir `follow up:` satırını yazmaz. İlerlemeyi kontrol etmek için döndürülen `flowId` değerini `ocx account main reauth status --flow --json` komutuna iletin. + Değiştiren her komut çalışan proxy tarafından döndürülen kurallı etkin `CODEX_HOME`'u bildirir. Bu yol arayanın `CODEX_HOME`'undan farklı olabilir; JSON'ı destekleyen komutlar aynı değeri `effectiveCodexHome` olarak açığa diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md index 181b2aa4e9..3ad7fac9f8 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md @@ -280,6 +280,8 @@ ocx account main switch --yes [--json] ocx account main recover [--rollback --yes] [--json] ``` +`ocx account main reauth --device --no-wait --json` 成功时只向 stdout 输出一个 JSON 对象，不输出供人阅读的 `follow up:` 提示行。将返回的 `flowId` 传给 `ocx account main reauth status --flow --json` 即可查看进度。 + 每个变更命令都会显示运行中代理返回的规范化有效 `CODEX_HOME`。该路径可能与调用进程的 `CODEX_HOME` 不同；支持 JSON 的命令会在 `effectiveCodexHome` 中返回相同的值。 diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md index 0dbe9f071d..f0cdd97ddd 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/cli/providers-accounts.md @@ -228,6 +228,8 @@ ocx account main switch --yes [--json] ocx account main recover [--rollback --yes] [--json] ``` +`ocx account main reauth --device --no-wait --json` 成功時只會向 stdout 輸出一個 JSON 物件，不會輸出供人閱讀的 `follow up:` 提示行。將回傳的 `flowId` 傳給 `ocx account main reauth status --flow --json` 即可查看進度。 + 每個會變更狀態的命令都會回報執行中代理回傳的 canonical 有效 `CODEX_HOME`。這個路徑可能與 呼叫端的 `CODEX_HOME` 不同；支援 JSON 的命令以 `effectiveCodexHome` 暴露同一個值。 diff --git a/src/cli/account-main.ts b/src/cli/account-main.ts index 9169ab824a..437981d62f 100644 --- a/src/cli/account-main.ts +++ b/src/cli/account-main.ts @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ export async function cmdNativeMainAccount(args: string[], deps: AccountDeps): P } if (noWait) { printStatus({ flowId: startFlowId, ...pending }); - console.log("follow up: ocx account main reauth status --flow " + startFlowId); + if (!wantsJson) console.log("follow up: ocx account main reauth status --flow " + startFlowId); return 0; } // Blocking wait bounded by the service flow expiry (15-minute grant + margin). diff --git a/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md b/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md index 7b93b95ffd..370aacdde0 100644 --- a/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md +++ b/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ Claude-only connections keep their existing non-failing readiness policy; displa The hub-side CLI dashboard uses the [management ingress address](../runtime.md#hub-management-dashboard-address); this does not change connected Desktop profile endpoints. +Native main reauthentication follows the [CLI JSON output contract](../runtime.md#native-main-reauth-json-output). + ## Connected Claude Desktop profiles The connection's local Codex readiness check follows the [selected-runtime probe contract](../runtime.md#remote-hub-hardening-ownership); general status hands its resolved command to this check instead of probing the version twice. diff --git a/structure/config.md b/structure/config.md index 901aa582d6..d00b36b06b 100644 --- a/structure/config.md +++ b/structure/config.md @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ Connected-client catalog diagnostics use the [terminal rendering contract](runti Hub management ingress also selects the [local dashboard address](runtime.md#hub-management-dashboard-address) using its configured port. +Native main reauthentication follows the [CLI JSON output contract](runtime.md#native-main-reauth-json-output). + ## Config surface ### OpenCodex home and live process state diff --git a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md index f4474c6419..0c0ffe38d0 100644 --- a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md +++ b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ Human-readable connect and sync-refresh diagnostics follow the [terminal renderi The CLI default dashboard address follows the [management ingress bind](../runtime.md#hub-management-dashboard-address), covered by `tests/cli/cli-dispatch.test.ts`. +Native main reauthentication follows the [CLI JSON output contract](../runtime.md#native-main-reauth-json-output). + ## Public docs The public documentation site lives in `docs-site/` and is built with Astro + Starlight. English is diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index dc592ec8bd..6ccb48de6e 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](transports/byte-accountin Catalog-derived reasoning-level diagnostics are escaped only at the human-output boundary, which `src/cli/runtime-api.ts` owns alongside the human/JSON print split. Every CLI path that prints a hub-supplied catalog value renders it there: the first-time refusal in `src/cli/connect.ts` and the connected `ocx sync` refusal in `src/cli/dispatch.ts`. C0/C1 controls, DEL, and Unicode line/paragraph separators print as visible hexadecimal escapes; structured status retains the exact reason, and a rendered failure keeps the domain error as its `cause`. The ready/unverified/incompatible classification and exit policy are unchanged. +## Native main reauth JSON output + +`src/cli/account-main.ts` emits one JSON object to stdout when `ocx account main reauth --device --no-wait --json` succeeds. The human-readable `follow up:` line is emitted only without `--json`; `flowId` remains available for status polling. `tests/cli/cli-native-profile.test.ts` parses the complete captured stdout and preserves coverage of the human follow-up. + ## Hub management dashboard address When hub management ingress is enabled, `src/cli/dispatch.ts` opens the dashboard on the literal IPv4 loopback address and configured ingress port, matching the listener in `src/server/index.ts`. Other dashboard address selection is unchanged. diff --git a/tests/cli/cli-native-profile.test.ts b/tests/cli/cli-native-profile.test.ts index bbd5b23204..024de081da 100644 --- a/tests/cli/cli-native-profile.test.ts +++ b/tests/cli/cli-native-profile.test.ts @@ -195,6 +195,15 @@ describe("ocx account main", () => { expect(output.join(" ")).toContain("auth.openai.com/codex/device"); expect(output.join(" ")).toContain("--flow flow-1"); + output.length = 0; + expect(await cmdAccount(["main", "reauth", "--device", "--no-wait", "--json"], deps)).toBe(0); + expect(JSON.parse(output.join("\n"))).toEqual({ + flowId: "flow-1", + status: "pending", + verificationUrl: "https://auth.openai.com/codex/device", + deviceCode: "ABCD-1234", + }); + expect(await cmdAccount(["main", "reauth", "status", "--flow", "flow-1"], deps)).toBe(0); expect(requests.at(-1)).toEqual({ method: "GET", path: "/api/codex-auth/main/reauth-device?flowId=flow-1" }); expect(output.join(" ")).toContain("succeeded"); From 64beb3d6bec2975f9d712c853cb0327cee51ec1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 18:18:07 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 031/113] fix(responses): finalize adopted WebSocket stage records (#4607) * fix(responses): finalize adopted WebSocket stage records * fix: finalize websocket stage before cancel usage logging --------- Co-authored-by: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> --- src/server/relay-eager.ts | 2 + src/server/responses/codex-ws-wire.ts | 5 + structure/adapters/registry.md | 2 +- structure/catalog.md | 2 +- structure/clients/claude-desktop.md | 2 +- structure/data-planes/images.md | 2 +- structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md | 2 +- structure/gui-and-management-api.md | 2 +- structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md | 2 +- structure/providers/xai-grok.md | 2 +- structure/runtime.md | 2 +- structure/subagents.md | 2 +- structure/transports/byte-accounting.md | 2 +- structure/transports/inventory.md | 2 +- structure/transports/responses.md | 2 +- structure/transports/streaming-health.md | 2 +- tests/responses/ws-failure-stage.test.ts | 155 +++++++++++++++++++++-- 17 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/server/relay-eager.ts b/src/server/relay-eager.ts index 8439aea85d..e8388cb709 100644 --- a/src/server/relay-eager.ts +++ b/src/server/relay-eager.ts @@ -466,6 +466,8 @@ export function relaySseEagerBounded( else hooks.onSynthetic(syntheticKind, syntheticReason); } if (cancelled && !hooks.sawTerminal()) { + // Finalize transport telemetry before the cancellation hook persists its usage row. + upstream.abort(); hooks.onClientCancel(); } if (cancelled || upstream.signal.aborted || syntheticKind === "failed" || deliveryFallbackSent) { diff --git a/src/server/responses/codex-ws-wire.ts b/src/server/responses/codex-ws-wire.ts index db2c6f6d30..35764c8352 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/codex-ws-wire.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/codex-ws-wire.ts @@ -108,6 +108,11 @@ export type CodexWsStageRecord = Omit & { const codexWsStageByResponse = new WeakMap(); export function markCodexWsStage(response: Response, record: CodexWsStageRecord): void { + const current = codexWsStageByResponse.get(response); + if (current) { + Object.assign(current, record); + return; + } codexWsStageByResponse.set(response, record); } diff --git a/structure/adapters/registry.md b/structure/adapters/registry.md index 3efbaa0058..83e8f4f466 100644 --- a/structure/adapters/registry.md +++ b/structure/adapters/registry.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Request-local adapter bindings are separate from registry authority in the Respo The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](../subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. -Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](../transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](../transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. +Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](../transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](../transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. Response-attached WebSocket telemetry follows the [stage record identity contract](../transports/responses.md#passthrough-sse-stream-shapes-314). ## Decision diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index cfaf9549cf..2fd03722df 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Catalog discovery remains separate from the Responses final-route The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. -Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. +Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. Response-attached WebSocket telemetry follows the [stage record identity contract](transports/responses.md#passthrough-sse-stream-shapes-314). ## Shared catalog diff --git a/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md b/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md index 370aacdde0..01a583c182 100644 --- a/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md +++ b/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior Codex-native model discovery follows the [shared retirement policy](../catalog.md#shared-catalog). That projection does not migrate existing user-selected Desktop configuration or usage history. -Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](../transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](../transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. +Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](../transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](../transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. Response-attached WebSocket telemetry follows the [stage record identity contract](../transports/responses.md#passthrough-sse-stream-shapes-314). Claude-only connections keep their existing non-failing readiness policy; displayed catalog reasons follow the [terminal rendering contract](../runtime.md#cli-readiness-diagnostics) whether they surface at connect time or on a later refresh. diff --git a/structure/data-planes/images.md b/structure/data-planes/images.md index 7d490788cf..a7420072bf 100644 --- a/structure/data-planes/images.md +++ b/structure/data-planes/images.md @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Hosted Responses image-tool eligibility uses the shared compatibility policy wit Codex Spark exception; standalone Images retain the separate relay contract below. See [Responses transport](../transports/responses.md#responses-httpsse). -Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](../transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](../transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. +Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](../transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](../transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. Response-attached WebSocket telemetry follows the [stage record identity contract](../transports/responses.md#passthrough-sse-stream-shapes-314). ## Standalone Images diff --git a/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md b/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md index d683935dd2..33ca8c76b0 100644 --- a/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md +++ b/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Translated Claude timeline reminders use the Chat adapter's on its exact supported route. This is separate from trailing-notice stabilization and from native Chat message passthrough. -Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](../transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](../transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. +Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](../transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](../transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. Response-attached WebSocket telemetry follows the [stage record identity contract](../transports/responses.md#passthrough-sse-stream-shapes-314). ## Chat Completions inbound native path diff --git a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md index 873d0eb516..4628ca5e50 100644 --- a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md +++ b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ The shared server request path follows the Responses [core module ownership](transports/responses.md#core-module-ownership). This surface retains its existing behavior. The configuration-only [plaintext V2 contract](subagents.md#plaintext-v2-agent-messages) -is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. +is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior described here is unchanged. Response-attached WebSocket telemetry follows the [stage record identity contract](transports/responses.md#passthrough-sse-stream-shapes-314). ## Dashboard serving diff --git a/structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md b/structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md index ec6cc683c8..e28575b432 100644 --- a/structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md +++ b/structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior Service startup and restore use the [catalog retirement policy](../catalog.md#shared-catalog); retirement does not itself change service registration or user-selected model configuration. -Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](../transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](../transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. +Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](../transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](../transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. Response-attached WebSocket telemetry follows the [stage record identity contract](../transports/responses.md#passthrough-sse-stream-shapes-314). ## Background service command selection diff --git a/structure/providers/xai-grok.md b/structure/providers/xai-grok.md index 7b407da354..dc982c5639 100644 --- a/structure/providers/xai-grok.md +++ b/structure/providers/xai-grok.md @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Codex-native retirement is scoped to OpenAI catalog/quota evidence. Shared Respo retains xAI provider behavior; see [the catalog boundary](../catalog.md#shared-catalog). -Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](../transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](../transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. +Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](../transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](../transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. Response-attached WebSocket telemetry follows the [stage record identity contract](../transports/responses.md#passthrough-sse-stream-shapes-314). ## xAI Grok hardening (official Grok Build contract parity) diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index 6ccb48de6e..bd9ebbd561 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Chat request serialization owns the destination-scoped [OpenCode Go instruction ordering](providers/chat-compat.md#opencode-go-chronological-instructions); it requires no runtime lifecycle change or new configuration option. -Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. +Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. Response-attached WebSocket telemetry follows the [stage record identity contract](transports/responses.md#passthrough-sse-stream-shapes-314). ## CLI readiness diagnostics diff --git a/structure/subagents.md b/structure/subagents.md index 32dfee4e60..c0c92891f7 100644 --- a/structure/subagents.md +++ b/structure/subagents.md @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Codex treats qualified names literally and defaults absent namespaces to functio declarations inherit their restored namespace container; the compiler never invents an empty encryption marker when the upstream omitted it or returned a nonempty marker. -Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. +Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](transports/byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](transports/byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. Response-attached WebSocket telemetry follows the [stage record identity contract](transports/responses.md#passthrough-sse-stream-shapes-314). ## Multi-agent surface mode (3-state) diff --git a/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md b/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md index fb2cdde470..7f01dee197 100644 --- a/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md +++ b/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Responses body-reader limits and lifetime handling follow the How opencodex measures request and stream bytes without allocating copies solely to count them. These contracts are shared by request parsing, SSE rewriting, the provider adapters and -the translator budget, which is why so many documents link here rather than restating them. +the translator budget, which is why so many documents link here rather than restating them. Response-attached WebSocket telemetry follows the [stage record identity contract](responses.md#passthrough-sse-stream-shapes-314). ## Request-copy accounting diff --git a/structure/transports/inventory.md b/structure/transports/inventory.md index 3f4bfbf689..ca80373a8e 100644 --- a/structure/transports/inventory.md +++ b/structure/transports/inventory.md @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ is scoped to canonical ChatGPT Responses forwarding; other source-area behavior The Chat adapter's [OpenCode Go instruction ordering](../providers/chat-compat.md#opencode-go-chronological-instructions) changes translated message placement only; endpoint selection and transport stay with their existing owners. -Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. +Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. Response-attached WebSocket telemetry follows the [stage record identity contract](responses.md#passthrough-sse-stream-shapes-314). ## Transport inventory diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 99156b4402..4a6a664cad 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ caller's abort signal, so a `connectTimeoutMs` shorter than 90 seconds cancels an already-sent create before the prelude timer fires. These are transport-fidelity guarantees, not a provider-billing guarantee. -Every exchange also leaves a content-free stage record (`CodexWsStageRecord`, #4191): create-frame bytes (measured on failure only — the committed-success record keeps it null so the happy path never byte-counts a megabyte replay frame), send completion, numeric close code, elapsed and first-frame durations, frame counters, liveness ping/pong counts, pool reuse, and the OCX/Bun versions. The exchange pins the record on the resolved Response (`markCodexWsStage`, the same marker seam as `markCodexWsResponse`); `handleResponses` adopts it onto the serving attempt, and usage.jsonl persists it per attempt behind a drop-guard normalizer, so hand-edited rows cannot inject strings into the DTO. The record never carries conversation text, headers, close-reason text, or account identifiers, and it is not a fallback-eligibility signal: the no-replay-after-send contract stands regardless of what it says. +Every exchange also leaves a content-free stage record (`CodexWsStageRecord`, #4191): create-frame bytes (measured on failure only — the committed-success record keeps it null so the happy path never byte-counts a megabyte replay frame), send completion, numeric close code, elapsed and first-frame durations, frame counters, liveness ping/pong counts, pool reuse, and the OCX/Bun versions. The exchange pins the record on the resolved Response (`markCodexWsStage`, the same marker seam as `markCodexWsResponse`); `handleResponses` adopts it onto the serving attempt, and usage.jsonl persists it per attempt behind a drop-guard normalizer, so hand-edited rows cannot inject strings into the DTO. Later snapshots update the same response-local record in place, so an attempt holding the committed reference observes final success or failure counters. Each exchange supplies a complete fresh snapshot; separate responses keep distinct records. On eager-relay cancel-drain expiry, upstream cancellation finalizes the transport snapshot before the cancellation hook writes the usage row; an actual terminal observed within the drain still wins over cancellation. The record never carries conversation text, headers, close-reason text, or account identifiers, and it is not a fallback-eligibility signal: the no-replay-after-send contract stands regardless of what it says. Eligible complete-input creates can retain a canonical upstream socket within one selected account, credential, thread and turn. Model/tier and immutable diff --git a/structure/transports/streaming-health.md b/structure/transports/streaming-health.md index 47f9ecbc77..682fbb2ca2 100644 --- a/structure/transports/streaming-health.md +++ b/structure/transports/streaming-health.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ removing support for non-default WebSocket quota families. Key-auth hosted-search continuations validate account selection after pacing and report a failed terminal on drift; see [continuation binding contract](../runtime.md#hosted-search-continuation-binding). -Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. +Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. Response-attached WebSocket telemetry follows the [stage record identity contract](responses.md#passthrough-sse-stream-shapes-314). ## Heartbeat and stall deadline diff --git a/tests/responses/ws-failure-stage.test.ts b/tests/responses/ws-failure-stage.test.ts index f2951938af..d4af512669 100644 --- a/tests/responses/ws-failure-stage.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/ws-failure-stage.test.ts @@ -1,4 +1,9 @@ import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, jest, test } from "bun:test"; +import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from "node:fs"; +import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; +import { join } from "node:path"; +import { relaySseEagerBounded } from "../../src/server/relay-eager"; +import { appendUsageEntry, type PersistedUsageEntry } from "../../src/usage/log"; import { classifyCodexWsFailure, closedBeforeTerminalMessage, @@ -304,29 +309,155 @@ describe("codex ws stage record marker (#4191)", () => { expect(readCodexWsStage(response)).toEqual(stage); }); - test("a committed exchange ends with the final counters on its stage record", async () => { + test("updating one response preserves its adopted record and leaves another response unchanged", () => { + const first = new Response("first"); + const second = new Response("second"); + markCodexWsStage(first, { ...stage }); + markCodexWsStage(second, { ...stage, reused: true }); + const firstAdopted = readCodexWsStage(first); + const secondAdopted = readCodexWsStage(second); + const finalStage = { ...stage, requestBytes: null, closeCode: null, upstreamFrames: 5, relayedEvents: 4 }; + + markCodexWsStage(first, finalStage); + + expect(readCodexWsStage(first)).toBe(firstAdopted); + expect(firstAdopted).toEqual(finalStage); + expect(readCodexWsStage(second)).toBe(secondAdopted); + expect(secondAdopted).not.toBe(firstAdopted); + expect(secondAdopted).toEqual({ ...stage, reused: true }); + }); + + test("a successful exchange finalizes the stage reference adopted before its terminal", async () => { installFake(ws => { ws.emit("open", {}); ws.emit("message", { data: JSON.stringify({ type: "response.created", response: { id: "r1" } }) }); - ws.emit("message", { data: JSON.stringify({ type: "response.completed", response: { id: "r1" } }) }); }); - const noFallback = async () => { - throw new Error("fallback must not run after open"); - }; const response = await codexWsUpstreamFetch( CODEX_URL, streamingInit(), noFallback as unknown as typeof fetch, BOUNDED_WS_RUNTIME, ); - expect(response.status).toBe(200); + // handleResponses keeps this reference when the Response resolves, before the body settles. + const adopted = readCodexWsStage(response); + const ws = FakeWebSocket.instances[0]!; + ws.emit("message", { data: JSON.stringify({ + type: "response.output_text.delta", delta: "hi", item_id: "m1", output_index: 0, content_index: 0, + }) }); + ws.emit("message", { data: JSON.stringify({ type: "response.completed", response: { id: "r1" } }) }); await response.text(); - const stage = readCodexWsStage(response); - expect(stage).toBeDefined(); - expect(stage?.requestBytes).toBeNull(); - expect(stage?.closeCode).toBeNull(); - expect(stage?.sent).toBe(true); - expect(stage?.relayedEvents).toBeGreaterThan(0); + + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(readCodexWsStage(response)).toBe(adopted); + expect(adopted).toBeDefined(); + expect(adopted?.requestBytes).toBeNull(); + expect(adopted?.closeCode).toBeNull(); + expect(adopted?.sent).toBe(true); + expect(adopted?.upstreamFrames).toBe(3); + expect(adopted?.relayedEvents).toBe(3); + }); + + test("a body failure finalizes the stage reference adopted before the socket closes", async () => { + installFake(ws => { + ws.emit("open", {}); + ws.emit("message", { data: JSON.stringify({ type: "response.created", response: { id: "r1" } }) }); + }); + const response = await codexWsUpstreamFetch( + CODEX_URL, + streamingInit(), + noFallback as unknown as typeof fetch, + BOUNDED_WS_RUNTIME, + ); + const adopted = readCodexWsStage(response); + const committedBytes = adopted?.requestBytes; + const committedCloseCode = adopted?.closeCode; + const ws = FakeWebSocket.instances[0]!; + const failure = failureMessageOf(response); + ws.emit("message", { data: JSON.stringify({ + type: "response.output_text.delta", delta: "hi", item_id: "m1", output_index: 0, content_index: 0, + }) }); + ws.emit("close", { code: 1006 }); + const message = await failure; + + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(committedBytes).toBeNull(); + expect(committedCloseCode).toBeNull(); + expect(message).toContain("closed before a Responses terminal event (close 1006)"); + expect(readCodexWsStage(response)).toBe(adopted); + expect(adopted?.requestBytes).toBe(Buffer.byteLength(ws.sent[0]!, "utf8")); + expect(adopted?.closeCode).toBe(1006); + expect(adopted?.upstreamFrames).toBe(2); + expect(adopted?.relayedEvents).toBe(2); + }); + + test("cancel-drain byte expiry persists the finalized WS stage in usage.jsonl", async () => { + const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-ws-stage-cancel-")); + const upstream = new AbortController(); + let finish!: () => void; + const done = new Promise(resolve => { finish = resolve; }); + let relayStarted = false; + try { + installFake(ws => { + ws.emit("open", {}); + ws.emit("message", { data: JSON.stringify({ type: "response.created", response: { id: "r1" } }) }); + }); + const response = await codexWsUpstreamFetch( + CODEX_URL, + { ...streamingInit(), signal: upstream.signal }, + noFallback as unknown as typeof fetch, + BOUNDED_WS_RUNTIME, + ); + const adopted = readCodexWsStage(response); + expect(adopted).toBeDefined(); + expect(adopted?.requestBytes).toBeNull(); + const entry: PersistedUsageEntry = { + requestId: "req-ws-stage-cancel", timestamp: 1, provider: "openai", model: "gpt-5.5", + status: 499, durationMs: 1000, usageStatus: "unreported", + attempts: [{ ordinal: 1, provider: "openai", model: "gpt-5.5", adapter: "openai-responses", + status: 499, durationMs: 1000, sendCount: 1, recoveryKinds: [], usageStatus: "unreported", + codexWsStage: adopted }], + }; + const synthetic = jest.fn(); + const onClientCancel = jest.fn(() => { + // The real writer is synchronous: keep this test-only path override in the same turn. + const previous = process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME; + process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = dir; + try { appendUsageEntry(entry); } + finally { + if (previous === undefined) delete process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME; + else process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = previous; + } + }); + const reader = relaySseEagerBounded(response.body!, upstream, { + inspectChunk: () => {}, finishInspection: () => {}, sawTerminal: () => false, + onSynthetic: synthetic, onClientCancel, onDone: finish, + }, { postCancelDrainBytes: 1 }).getReader(); + relayStarted = true; + await reader.read(); + await reader.cancel(); + const ws = FakeWebSocket.instances[0]!; + ws.emit("message", { data: JSON.stringify({ + type: "response.output_text.delta", delta: "hi", item_id: "m1", output_index: 0, content_index: 0, + }) }); + await done; + + const rows = readFileSync(join(dir, "usage.jsonl"), "utf8").trim().split("\n"); + expect(rows).toHaveLength(1); + const persisted = JSON.parse(rows[0]!) as PersistedUsageEntry; + const logged = persisted.attempts?.[0]?.codexWsStage; + expect(logged?.requestBytes).toBe(Buffer.byteLength(ws.sent[0]!, "utf8")); + expect(logged?.upstreamFrames).toBe(2); + expect(logged?.relayedEvents).toBe(2); + expect(logged?.closeCode).toBeNull(); + expect(logged).toEqual(adopted); + expect(onClientCancel).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1); + expect(synthetic).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + expect(upstream.signal.aborted).toBe(true); + } finally { + upstream.abort(); + if (relayStarted) await done; + rmSync(dir, { recursive: true }); + } }); test("the serialized record is numeric/boolean/semver only", () => { From 51d577c3fcae652f59799f2e0676c063118ad5ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 18:20:29 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 032/113] docs(devlog): record the 2.56.0 release evidence (#4700) Candidate, promotion SHAs, the exact-SHA CI and Service lifecycle runs each gate consumed, the release dispatch, and the publish acknowledgement with its provenance entry. Also records that the registry read lagged and why that is not a failed publish. --- .../040_release_decision.md | 26 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+) diff --git a/devlog/_plan/260915_2560_release_train/040_release_decision.md b/devlog/_plan/260915_2560_release_train/040_release_decision.md index 971af86c6c..6261d7d1e5 100644 --- a/devlog/_plan/260915_2560_release_train/040_release_decision.md +++ b/devlog/_plan/260915_2560_release_train/040_release_decision.md @@ -44,3 +44,29 @@ What the decision rests on, and what it does not: Recorded as each step completes. - #4690 head `0026b14e83`, the post-fix candidate. + +## What actually happened + +- Candidate: `386303af1c` on `dev` — the squash of #4690, which carried the two regression fixes. + Its pre-merge head `26b3ff244434846149b560e28f7441afae529564` passed Cross-platform CI as run + `34945255301`. +- `dev` moved to 2.57.0 through #4686 before any promotion, so `assert-ahead` could pass. +- `main`: #4694 merged as `e4a8539b957b7ae7cd278666f0364eb0f82d4ac3`, carrying 2.56.0. Its push + runs at that exact SHA: Cross-platform CI `34947608073` success, Service lifecycle `34947608122` + success. #4687, cut from the pre-fix `2702911708`, was closed as superseded. +- `preview`: #4698 merged as `b552b1db59`. The head was an `ours`-strategy merge, so its tree is + byte-identical to the candidate and to what `main` received; the merge exists to record the old + preview tip as a parent, which is the shape every earlier promotion onto that branch used. +- Release: `release.yml` run `34951392978`, dispatched from `main` with + `expected-sha=e4a8539b95…`, `version=2.56.0`, `tag=latest`, `dry-run=false`. Both jobs succeeded. + The publish step reported `+ @bitkyc08/opencodex@2.56.0` with a provenance statement written to + the sigstore transparency log, and tag `v2.56.0` plus the GitHub release exist. +- Registry metadata still read 2.55.0 immediately afterwards. The workflow says so itself and + instructs against republishing; a lagging read is not a failed publish. + +## What shipped that the audit did not clear + +Nothing. The two regressions it found were fixed before promotion, and the fix itself went through +three review rounds: the first only released in the `catch`, the second confirmed before a rebuild +that can fail without sending, and only the third confirms at the two points that reach the wire. +The accepted risks are listed in `020_regression_audit.md` and are unchanged by this release. From 4931e858031ee7696cd3340bc9cbd56aeac5b6a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "wentao.ma2" Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 11:28:35 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 033/113] fix(kiro): send native reasoning effort for the GPT-5.6 family and replay its blob on the right field MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit `gpt-5.6-luna` and `gpt-5.6-terra` were missing from `KIRO_NATIVE_EFFORT_FIELDS`, so a request asking for `low`/`medium`/`high`/`max` reached Kiro with the emulated `` prompt and no `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` at all. Both models accept the native field on the live runtime. The encrypted reasoning blob those models return also arrives on `reasoningContentEvent.signature`, not `redactedContent`, and its `.KTR~~…` value is not base64. The adapter read `redactedContent` only — a member none of the thirteen captures sent (all thirteen carried `{signature, text}`) — so the blob was dropped and the next turn had no previous reasoning to replay; sending that value on `redactedContent` instead comes back HTTP 400 `REQUEST_BODY_INVALID` ("Improperly formed request"). The blob now carries the field it arrived on (a `signature:` tag) from the adapter event through the `ocxr1:` envelope to `assistantResponseMessage.reasoningContent`, and is replayed verbatim on that member. Provider data cannot forge the tag: the other member is base64, whose alphabet has no colon. Measured on the live runtime against one fixed hard prompt, HTTP 200 throughout: - luna's reasoning blob 5,130 chars at native `low`, 16,686 at `medium`, 30,670 at `high` and 48,594 at `max`; a bare prompt with no effort signal returned 13,118, and `gpt-5.6-sol`'s native `max` cross-checked at 30,498. - The emulated tag channel that used to serve these models: 21,202 (`low`) and 28,302 (`max`) — between native `medium` and `high`, never reaching native `max`. - terra, two repetitions each: 11,758 / 17,598 bare against 34,590 / 38,106 at native `max`. - Replay A/B on one captured luna blob: `{signature: …}` 200, `{redactedContent: …}` 400 `com.amazon.kiro.runtimeservice#ValidationException / REQUEST_BODY_INVALID`. The new assertions live in `tests/providers/kiro/kiro-reasoning-roundtrip.test.ts`, next to the round-trip they belong to, because `kiro-adapter.test.ts` and `kiro-stream.test.ts` both sit at their file-size-ratchet cap and a baselined file may not grow by a single line (`tests/fixtures/file-size-baseline.json`). `kiro-adapter.test.ts` still extends its existing unsupported-effort loop to luna and terra, which rewrites one line and leaves the cap intact. Verification: - `bun run typecheck` - `bun test tests/providers/kiro` — 439 pass / 0 fail - `bun test tests/ci-workflows/file-size-ratchet.test.ts` — 6 pass / 0 fail - `bun run structure:check`, `bun run privacy:scan` --- .../src/content/docs/fr/reference/adapters.md | 2 +- .../src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md | 6 +- .../src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md | 6 +- .../src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md | 7 +- .../src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md | 4 +- .../src/content/docs/tr/reference/adapters.md | 4 +- .../content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md | 6 +- .../content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md | 6 +- src/adapters/kiro-events.ts | 34 +++-- src/adapters/kiro/payload.ts | 13 +- src/adapters/kiro/reasoning.ts | 57 ++++++- src/adapters/kiro/stream.ts | 10 +- src/adapters/kiro/wire.ts | 3 +- src/providers/kiro-models.ts | 7 +- src/responses/reasoning-envelope.ts | 9 +- src/types/request.ts | 13 +- structure/providers/kiro.md | 36 +++-- tests/providers/kiro/kiro-adapter.test.ts | 2 +- .../kiro/kiro-reasoning-roundtrip.test.ts | 142 ++++++++++++++++++ 19 files changed, 303 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/adapters.md index 04ff6ccd44..dc28832ca7 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/adapters.md @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ Si Kiro s’arrête sans appeler l’outil d’achèvement, l’adaptateur effec ### Effort de raisonnement -`gpt-5.6-sol` et `claude-opus-5` prennent en charge nativement un niveau d’effort vérifié, mais chaque famille de modèles nomme différemment le champ de la requête. La valeur sélectionnée `low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh` ou `max` est envoyée dans `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` pour `gpt-5.6-sol`, et dans `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` pour `claude-opus-5`. Les autres modèles Kiro utilisent actuellement un raisonnement émulé : opencodex convertit le niveau choisi en instructions de réflexion bornées dans le contenu utilisateur, car leur champ d’effort natif n’a pas été vérifié. La présence d’un contrôle d’effort annoncé sur ces modèles ne prouve donc pas la prise en charge native du raisonnement en amont. +La famille GPT-5.6 de Kiro (`gpt-5.6-sol`, `gpt-5.6-terra`, `gpt-5.6-luna`) et `claude-opus-5` prennent en charge nativement un niveau d’effort vérifié, mais chaque famille de modèles nomme différemment le champ de la requête. La valeur sélectionnée `low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh` ou `max` est envoyée dans `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` pour les modèles GPT-5.6, et dans `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` pour `claude-opus-5`. Les autres modèles Kiro utilisent actuellement un raisonnement émulé : opencodex convertit le niveau choisi en instructions de réflexion bornées dans le contenu utilisateur, car leur champ d’effort natif n’a pas été vérifié. La présence d’un contrôle d’effort annoncé sur ces modèles ne prouve donc pas la prise en charge native du raisonnement en amont. ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md index f1276511b1..2191cd41dd 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md @@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ filtered incomplete になります。実際のツール呼び出しを伴わな ### Reasoning effort -`gpt-5.6-sol` と `claude-opus-5` はネイティブ effort をサポートし、リクエストフィールド名が異なります。 -`low` / `medium` / `high` / `xhigh` / `max` は、前者では -`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`、後者では `output_config.effort` として送信されます。 +`gpt-5.6-sol` / `gpt-5.6-terra` / `gpt-5.6-luna` と `claude-opus-5` はネイティブ effort をサポートし、リクエストフィールド名が異なります。 +`low` / `medium` / `high` / `xhigh` / `max` は、GPT-5.6 系では +`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`、`claude-opus-5` では `output_config.effort` として送信されます。 ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md index 83aeaf2dd3..4ff2cc0b37 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md @@ -167,9 +167,9 @@ commentary로 유지하고 비공개 완료 툴을 한 번 검증합니다. ### Reasoning effort -`gpt-5.6-sol`과 `claude-opus-5`는 네이티브 effort를 지원하며 요청 필드 이름이 다릅니다. -`low` / `medium` / `high` / `xhigh` / `max` 값은 각각 -`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`와 `output_config.effort`로 전송됩니다. +`gpt-5.6-sol`, `gpt-5.6-terra`, `gpt-5.6-luna`와 `claude-opus-5`는 네이티브 effort를 지원하며 요청 필드 이름이 다릅니다. +`low` / `medium` / `high` / `xhigh` / `max` 값은 GPT-5.6 계열에서는 +`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`, `claude-opus-5`에서는 `output_config.effort`로 전송됩니다. ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md index 715555f847..f5e2310624 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md @@ -364,9 +364,10 @@ important than cosmetic de-duplication. Tool-free requests retain normal text co ### Reasoning effort -`gpt-5.6-sol` and `claude-opus-5` have verified native effort support, and each model family names -the request field differently. A selected `low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, or `max` value is sent -as `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` for `gpt-5.6-sol` and as +The Kiro GPT-5.6 family (`gpt-5.6-sol`, `gpt-5.6-terra`, `gpt-5.6-luna`) and `claude-opus-5` have +verified native effort support, and each model family names the request field differently. A +selected `low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, or `max` value is sent as +`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` for the GPT-5.6 models and as `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` for `claude-opus-5`. Other Kiro models currently use emulated reasoning: opencodex converts the selected level into bounded thinking instructions in the user content because their native effort field has not been verified. Do not interpret an diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md index d2d1f53de9..9961210917 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md @@ -189,9 +189,9 @@ incomplete. `TOOL_USE` без фактического вызова инстру ### Reasoning effort -`gpt-5.6-sol` и `claude-opus-5` поддерживают нативный effort, но называют поле запроса по-разному. +Модели семейства GPT-5.6 (`gpt-5.6-sol`, `gpt-5.6-terra`, `gpt-5.6-luna`) и `claude-opus-5` поддерживают нативный effort, но называют поле запроса по-разному. Значения `low` / `medium` / `high` / `xhigh` / `max` отправляются как -`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` и `output_config.effort` соответственно. +`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` для моделей GPT-5.6 и `output_config.effort` для `claude-opus-5`. ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/adapters.md index 6167bfe6df..876d050b04 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/adapters.md @@ -268,9 +268,9 @@ tam olarak tekrarlasa bile, çünkü aşama doğruluğu kozmetik tekilleştirmed ### Akıl yürütme çabası -`gpt-5.6-sol` ve `claude-opus-5` doğrulanmış yerel çaba desteğine sahiptir ve +Kiro'nun GPT-5.6 ailesi (`gpt-5.6-sol`, `gpt-5.6-terra`, `gpt-5.6-luna`) ve `claude-opus-5` doğrulanmış yerel çaba desteğine sahiptir ve her model ailesi istek alanını farklı şekilde adlandırır. Seçilen `low`, -`medium`, `high`, `xhigh` veya `max` değeri `gpt-5.6-sol` için +`medium`, `high`, `xhigh` veya `max` değeri GPT-5.6 modelleri için `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` olarak ve `claude-opus-5` için `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` olarak gönderilir. Diğer Kiro modelleri şu anda öykünülmüş akıl yürütme kullanır: opencodex yerel çaba diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md index e111743887..6c68bf3526 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md @@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ Kiro 的 assistant 文本本身没有可靠的回合结束标记，但终止的 ### Reasoning effort -`gpt-5.6-sol` 和 `claude-opus-5` 支持原生 effort，且请求字段名不同。`low` / `medium` / `high` / -`xhigh` / `max` 分别通过 `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` 和 -`output_config.effort` 发送。 +`gpt-5.6-sol`、`gpt-5.6-terra`、`gpt-5.6-luna` 和 `claude-opus-5` 支持原生 effort，且请求字段名不同。`low` / `medium` / `high` / +`xhigh` / `max` 在 GPT-5.6 系列中通过 `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` 发送， +在 `claude-opus-5` 上通过 `output_config.effort` 发送。 ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md index c155c8ae51..90cb9f8a3f 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md @@ -145,9 +145,9 @@ Kiro 的 assistant 文字本身沒有可靠的回合結束標記，但終止的 ### Reasoning effort -`gpt-5.6-sol` 和 `claude-opus-5` 支援原生 effort，且請求欄位名不同。`low` / `medium` / `high` / -`xhigh` / `max` 分別透過 `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` 和 -`output_config.effort` 傳送。 +`gpt-5.6-sol`、`gpt-5.6-terra`、`gpt-5.6-luna` 和 `claude-opus-5` 支援原生 effort，且請求欄位名不同。`low` / `medium` / `high` / +`xhigh` / `max` 在 GPT-5.6 系列中透過 `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` 傳送， +在 `claude-opus-5` 上透過 `output_config.effort` 傳送。 ## `cursor` diff --git a/src/adapters/kiro-events.ts b/src/adapters/kiro-events.ts index 3662d8caaa..730ad2a2c4 100644 --- a/src/adapters/kiro-events.ts +++ b/src/adapters/kiro-events.ts @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { kiroTruncationReason } from "./kiro-truncation"; export type ParsedKiroEvent = | { type: "content"; data?: string; modelId?: string } - | { type: "reasoning"; data?: string; redactedContent?: string } + | { type: "reasoning"; data?: string; signature?: string; redactedContent?: string } | { type: "context_usage"; contextUsagePercentage: number } | { type: "tool"; name?: string; toolUseId?: string; input?: string; stop?: boolean } | { type: "truncation"; data: string } @@ -138,18 +138,26 @@ export function parseKiroEvent(eventType: string, payload: Uint8Array): ParsedKi : {}), }; case "reasoningContentEvent": - // `text` is plaintext reasoning; `redactedContent` is the encrypted blob the GPT-5.6 family - // (sol/terra/luna) actually returns — they never send `text`. Keyed off the wire field, not - // the model id. Both may be absent on a bare event. - return { - type: "reasoning", - ...(optionalString(eventType, parsed, "text") !== undefined - ? { data: optionalString(eventType, parsed, "text") } - : {}), - ...(optionalString(eventType, parsed, "redactedContent") !== undefined - ? { redactedContent: optionalString(eventType, parsed, "redactedContent") } - : {}), - }; + // `text` is plaintext reasoning; the GPT-5.6 family (sol/terra/luna) instead returns an + // encrypted blob, and the field it arrives on has to be replayed unchanged (see + // kiro/reasoning.ts): `signature` carries the `.KTR~~…` value verbatim and is what every + // capture of those models sent, while `redactedContent` — the base64 shape a capture has + // never shown — stays accepted for any model that sends it. Keyed off the wire field, not the + // model id. Any of the three may be absent on a bare event. + { + const text = optionalString(eventType, parsed, "text"); + const signature = optionalString(eventType, parsed, "signature"); + const redacted = optionalString(eventType, parsed, "redactedContent"); + return { + type: "reasoning", + ...(text !== undefined ? { data: text } : {}), + ...(signature !== undefined + ? { signature } + : redacted !== undefined + ? { redactedContent: redacted } + : {}), + }; + } case "toolUseEvent": return { type: "tool", diff --git a/src/adapters/kiro/payload.ts b/src/adapters/kiro/payload.ts index 4da79a9bcc..338f525d2e 100644 --- a/src/adapters/kiro/payload.ts +++ b/src/adapters/kiro/payload.ts @@ -38,7 +38,12 @@ import { validateKiroConversationState, type KiroTurn, } from "./conversation"; -import { injectKiroThinkingTags, kiroNativeEffortField, KIRO_NATIVE_EFFORTS } from "./reasoning"; +import { + injectKiroThinkingTags, + kiroNativeEffortField, + kiroReasoningContent, + KIRO_NATIVE_EFFORTS, +} from "./reasoning"; import { kiroPayloadMessages, userContentText } from "./usage"; import { kiroToolWireNames, @@ -388,7 +393,11 @@ export function buildKiroPayload( assistantResponseMessage: { content: turn.content, ...(turn.toolUses.length > 0 ? { toolUses: turn.toolUses } : {}), - ...(turn.redactedReasoning ? { reasoningContent: { redactedContent: turn.redactedReasoning } } : {}), + // Replayed on the field it was received on: the GPT-5.6 signature is not base64 and is + // rejected when sent as `redactedContent`. + ...(turn.redactedReasoning + ? { reasoningContent: kiroReasoningContent(turn.redactedReasoning) } + : {}), }, } : { diff --git a/src/adapters/kiro/reasoning.ts b/src/adapters/kiro/reasoning.ts index c218bf1233..0441986f10 100644 --- a/src/adapters/kiro/reasoning.ts +++ b/src/adapters/kiro/reasoning.ts @@ -4,10 +4,25 @@ import type { OcxParsedRequest } from "../../types"; export type KiroReasoningMode = "native" | "emulated"; // Kiro takes a verified native effort field for these models, and each model family names it -// differently: the Sol-only `reasoning.effort` versus the Claude-specific `output_config.effort`. -// Models absent from this table fall back to emulated thinking instructions. +// differently: the GPT-5.6 family's `reasoning.effort` versus the Claude-specific +// `output_config.effort`. Models absent from this table fall back to emulated thinking +// instructions. +// +// The GPT-5.6 entries are measured against the live runtime rather than inferred from the vendor +// schema: the field is accepted (HTTP 200) and the encrypted reasoning blob that comes back grows +// with the effort. On one fixed hard prompt — a primality search plus a 20-bit recurrence count — +// luna's blob measured 5,130 chars at `low`, 16,686 at `medium`, 30,670 at `high` and 48,594 at +// `max`, against 13,118 with no effort signal at all; terra's measured 34,590 and 38,106 at native +// `max` against 11,758 and 17,598 bare, two repetitions each. The channel this replaces — the +// emulated `` tag block, which was all those models used to receive — measured +// 21,202 (`low`) and 28,302 (`max`) for luna, i.e. between that model's native `medium` and +// `high`, never reaching native `max`. `gpt-5.6-sol`'s native `max` cross-checked at 30,498 on the +// same prompt. Terra's absence from this table was therefore an omission rather than a capability +// difference: what the earlier Sol-only scope recorded was not reproducible here. export const KIRO_NATIVE_EFFORT_FIELDS: Record = { "gpt-5.6-sol": "reasoning", + "gpt-5.6-terra": "reasoning", + "gpt-5.6-luna": "reasoning", "claude-opus-5": "output_config", }; @@ -54,3 +69,41 @@ export function injectKiroThinkingTags(content: string, parsed: OcxParsedRequest content, ].join("\n"); } + +/** + * The blob from a Kiro `reasoningContentEvent` has two possible homes on a replayed assistant + * turn, and the wire validates the SHAPE of each rather than its content: `signature` takes the + * emitted string verbatim, while `redactedContent` is a base64 member. The `.KTR~~…` value every + * GPT-5.6 capture returns is NOT valid base64, which is exactly why replaying it as + * `redactedContent` — what this proxy did before the field was measured — came back as + * REQUEST_BODY_INVALID ("Improperly formed request"). + * + * The blob travels as ONE opaque string: adapter event, `ocxr1:` reasoning envelope, then + * `OcxAssistantMessage.kiroRedactedReasoning`. The field it arrived on therefore rides that same + * string, instead of a second parallel value that could drift from it. Provider data cannot forge + * the tag: the other channel is base64, whose alphabet has no colon. + */ +export const KIRO_REASONING_SIGNATURE_TAG = "signature:"; + +export function tagKiroReasoningBlob(field: "signature" | "redactedContent", data: string): string { + return field === "signature" ? KIRO_REASONING_SIGNATURE_TAG + data : data; +} + +/** The wire field a stored blob arrived on, and its untagged value. */ +export function splitKiroReasoningBlob(value: string): { field: "signature" | "redactedContent"; data: string } { + return value.startsWith(KIRO_REASONING_SIGNATURE_TAG) + ? { field: "signature", data: value.slice(KIRO_REASONING_SIGNATURE_TAG.length) } + : { field: "redactedContent", data: value }; +} + +/** + * The `reasoningContent` object on an `assistantResponseMessage`. Exactly one member is set: the + * wire validates the shape, so the two cannot be substituted for each other. + */ +export type KiroReasoningContent = { signature: string } | { redactedContent: string }; + +/** `reasoningContent` for a replayed `assistantResponseMessage`, carrying the blob verbatim. */ +export function kiroReasoningContent(value: string): KiroReasoningContent { + const { field, data } = splitKiroReasoningBlob(value); + return field === "signature" ? { signature: data } : { redactedContent: data }; +} diff --git a/src/adapters/kiro/stream.ts b/src/adapters/kiro/stream.ts index 1740cf8d64..d10ab1105c 100644 --- a/src/adapters/kiro/stream.ts +++ b/src/adapters/kiro/stream.ts @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import { noteKiroTransientThrottle } from "../kiro-retry"; import { KiroThinkingParser } from "../kiro-thinking"; import { isCompleteKiroToolInput, kiroTruncationErrorMessage } from "../kiro-truncation"; import { isValidKiroConversationId } from "../kiro-wire"; +import { tagKiroReasoningBlob } from "./reasoning"; import { estimateKiroTokens, kiroUpstreamContextWindow } from "./usage"; // Stream parsing (shared by parseStream + parseResponse) @@ -633,8 +634,13 @@ async function* parseKiroAttemptEvents( if (ev.data) { yield* emitRetained(stage({ type: "reasoning_raw_delta", text: ev.data })); } - if (ev.redactedContent) { - yield* emitRetained(stage({ type: "kiro_redacted_reasoning", data: ev.redactedContent })); + // The blob is replayed on the field it arrived on, so remember that field here — this is + // the only place that still knows it. See kiro/reasoning.ts for why the distinction is + // load-bearing rather than cosmetic. + if (ev.signature) { + yield* emitRetained(stage({ type: "kiro_redacted_reasoning", data: tagKiroReasoningBlob("signature", ev.signature) })); + } else if (ev.redactedContent) { + yield* emitRetained(stage({ type: "kiro_redacted_reasoning", data: tagKiroReasoningBlob("redactedContent", ev.redactedContent) })); } break; case "context_usage": diff --git a/src/adapters/kiro/wire.ts b/src/adapters/kiro/wire.ts index ec8c32272d..7bf91d9db5 100644 --- a/src/adapters/kiro/wire.ts +++ b/src/adapters/kiro/wire.ts @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ import type { OcxProviderConfig } from "../../types"; import type { KiroImage } from "../kiro-images"; +import type { KiroReasoningContent } from "./reasoning"; export const AMZ_TARGET = "AmazonCodeWhispererStreamingService.GenerateAssistantResponse"; export const SDK_VERSION = "1.0.27"; @@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ export interface KiroHistoryEntry { assistantResponseMessage?: { content: string; toolUses?: KiroToolUse[]; - reasoningContent?: { redactedContent: string }; + reasoningContent?: KiroReasoningContent; }; } diff --git a/src/providers/kiro-models.ts b/src/providers/kiro-models.ts index 72063fde9b..2f8e015976 100644 --- a/src/providers/kiro-models.ts +++ b/src/providers/kiro-models.ts @@ -47,9 +47,10 @@ export const KIRO_MODEL_CONTEXT_WINDOWS: Record = { const KIRO_REASONING_EFFORTS = ["low", "medium", "high", "xhigh", "max"]; -// gpt-5.6-sol and claude-opus-5 send these values through Kiro's verified native effort fields -// (`reasoning.effort` and `output_config.effort` respectively). Other models map them to bounded -// thinking instructions until their native effort support is verified. +// The GPT-5.6 family (sol/terra/luna) and claude-opus-5 send these values through Kiro's verified +// native effort fields (`reasoning.effort` for the GPT-5.6 models, `output_config.effort` for +// claude-opus-5). Other models map them to bounded thinking instructions until their native +// effort support is verified. export const KIRO_MODEL_REASONING_EFFORTS: Record = Object.fromEntries( KIRO_MODELS.map(id => [id, KIRO_REASONING_EFFORTS]), ); diff --git a/src/responses/reasoning-envelope.ts b/src/responses/reasoning-envelope.ts index ba20e800ed..9b97dd060a 100644 --- a/src/responses/reasoning-envelope.ts +++ b/src/responses/reasoning-envelope.ts @@ -28,9 +28,12 @@ export interface ReasoningEnvelope { */ txt?: string; /** - * Kiro `reasoningContentEvent.redactedContent`: a KMS-encrypted reasoning blob that is opaque to - * the proxy. Kiro's own CLI replays it on the matching `assistantResponseMessage` to preserve - * model reasoning across turns, so it round-trips here the same way a signature does. + * Kiro's reasoning blob from `reasoningContentEvent`: a KMS-encrypted value that is opaque to the + * proxy (the GPT-5.6 family sends it as `signature`, other models as the base64 + * `redactedContent`, and the value carries a tag naming which one — see + * src/adapters/kiro/reasoning.ts). Kiro's own CLI replays it on the matching + * `assistantResponseMessage` to preserve model reasoning across turns, so it round-trips here the + * same way a signature does. */ krc?: string; } diff --git a/src/types/request.ts b/src/types/request.ts index cec8294a50..3ac5e2cbde 100644 --- a/src/types/request.ts +++ b/src/types/request.ts @@ -154,9 +154,11 @@ export interface OcxAssistantMessage { model?: string; timestamp: number; /** - * Kiro `reasoningContent.redactedContent` for THIS assistant turn — an opaque encrypted blob - * Kiro replays to preserve model reasoning across turns. Provider-specific and unrenderable, so - * it rides the message rather than a content part: any other adapter simply ignores it. + * Kiro's encrypted reasoning blob for THIS assistant turn — the opaque value from the turn's + * `reasoningContentEvent` (`signature` for the GPT-5.6 family, `redactedContent` for the base64 + * shape), tagged with the wire field it must be replayed on (see kiro/reasoning.ts). Kiro + * replays it to preserve model reasoning across turns. Provider-specific and unrenderable, so it + * rides the message rather than a content part: any other adapter simply ignores it. */ kiroRedactedReasoning?: string; } @@ -317,8 +319,9 @@ export type AdapterEvent = // opaque redacted_thinking blocks. Both must be replayed verbatim or tool-use turns 400. | { type: "thinking_signature"; signature: string } | { type: "redacted_thinking"; data: string } - // Kiro reasoning round-trip: the encrypted `redactedContent` blob for the CURRENT assistant turn. - // Never rendered — it only rides the reasoning item's envelope so the next request can replay it. + // Kiro reasoning round-trip: the encrypted reasoning blob for the CURRENT assistant turn, tagged + // with the wire field it arrived on. Never rendered — it only rides the reasoning item's envelope + // so the next request can replay it verbatim. | { type: "kiro_redacted_reasoning"; data: string } | { type: "reasoning_raw_delta"; text: string } | { type: "tool_call_start"; id: string; name: string; providerMetadata?: OcxProviderOpaqueToolCallMetadata } diff --git a/structure/providers/kiro.md b/structure/providers/kiro.md index 80f765adae..39494ed80e 100644 --- a/structure/providers/kiro.md +++ b/structure/providers/kiro.md @@ -31,26 +31,38 @@ raw body. > Decision record: [ADR-0061](../decisions/ADR-0061-kiro-responses-text-controls.md) -## Kiro reasoning round-trip (`redactedContent`) +## Kiro reasoning round-trip (`signature`) Kiro never returns plaintext reasoning for its **GPT-5.6 family** (`gpt-5.6-sol`, `-terra`, -`-luna`): `reasoningContentEvent` carries a KMS-encrypted `redactedContent` blob, never `text`. -Their `additionalModelRequestFieldsSchema` (`ListAvailableModels`) accepts only `reasoning.effort` -with `additionalProperties: false` — there is no display/summary opt-in, so this is the only -reasoning these models can return. Kiro's own CLI replays the blob on the matching -`assistantResponseMessage.reasoningContent` to preserve model reasoning across turns; dropping it -makes every turn restart without the previous turn's reasoning. Verified on kiro-cli 2.14.1 and -2.16.0, all three models. +`-luna`): `reasoningContentEvent` carries a KMS-encrypted blob, never `text`. It arrives on +`signature`, holding the `.KTR~~…` value verbatim, which is what every capture of those models +sent. Their `additionalModelRequestFieldsSchema` (`ListAvailableModels`) accepts only +`reasoning.effort` with `additionalProperties: false` — there is no display/summary opt-in, so this +is the only reasoning these models can return, and all three select that native field +(`KIRO_NATIVE_EFFORT_FIELDS` in `src/adapters/kiro/reasoning.ts`). Kiro's own CLI replays the blob +on the matching `assistantResponseMessage.reasoningContent` to preserve model reasoning across +turns; dropping it makes every turn restart without the previous turn's reasoning. Verified on +kiro-cli 2.14.1 and 2.16.0, all three models. + +The two members of `reasoningContent` are not interchangeable. The wire validates the shape of the +member rather than its content, and the signature is not base64 — its alphabet contains `.` and +`~` — so a blob replayed as `redactedContent` is rejected with `REQUEST_BODY_INVALID` +("Improperly formed request"). `signature` therefore takes the verbatim value and +`redactedContent` remains the home for the base64 shape another model may send. Which field a blob +arrived on is carried by the blob itself, one opaque string with a `signature:` tag, rather than by +a second value that could drift from it; provider data cannot forge the tag, because base64 has no +colon. The Claude 4.6+/5 entries advertise a different, richer contract (`thinking.type` adaptive/disabled, `thinking.display` summarized/omitted, `output_config.effort`, `max_tokens`) and are not covered by that measurement; older Claude, deepseek, minimax, glm, and qwen entries advertise no additional fields at all. The handling below keys off the wire field, not the model id, so any model that -sends `redactedContent` round-trips. +sends either member round-trips. -- The blob rides the existing `ocxr1:` envelope as `krc` (`src/responses/reasoning-envelope.ts`) on - an envelope-only reasoning item — `summary: []`, no text deltas — so it stays invisible in the - Codex app while round-tripping, exactly like the hidden-thinking path. +- The tagged blob rides the existing `ocxr1:` envelope as `krc` + (`src/responses/reasoning-envelope.ts`) on an envelope-only reasoning item — `summary: []`, no + text deltas — so it stays invisible in the Codex app while round-tripping, exactly like the + hidden-thinking path. - **Pairing is backwards.** Kiro emits `reasoningContentEvent` at the END of an assistant turn, after content AND tool calls. A `krc`-only item therefore belongs to the turn that already closed, so the parser attaches it to the PRECEDING assistant message rather than folding it into diff --git a/tests/providers/kiro/kiro-adapter.test.ts b/tests/providers/kiro/kiro-adapter.test.ts index 947d6ad740..d068f905b2 100644 --- a/tests/providers/kiro/kiro-adapter.test.ts +++ b/tests/providers/kiro/kiro-adapter.test.ts @@ -1741,7 +1741,7 @@ describe("kiro adapter — native and emulated reasoning effort", () => { }); test("native-effort models reject efforts Kiro does not accept", async () => { - for (const modelId of ["gpt-5.6-sol", "claude-opus-5"]) { + for (const modelId of ["gpt-5.6-sol", "gpt-5.6-terra", "gpt-5.6-luna", "claude-opus-5"]) { await expect(createKiroAdapter(provider).buildRequest({ ...parsedWith([{ role: "user", content: "solve" }], undefined, modelId), options: { reasoning: "minimal" }, diff --git a/tests/providers/kiro/kiro-reasoning-roundtrip.test.ts b/tests/providers/kiro/kiro-reasoning-roundtrip.test.ts index 9cf598f372..8c1dc5cd37 100644 --- a/tests/providers/kiro/kiro-reasoning-roundtrip.test.ts +++ b/tests/providers/kiro/kiro-reasoning-roundtrip.test.ts @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { buildKiroPayload } from "../../../src/adapters/kiro/payload"; import { bridgeToResponsesSSE, buildResponseJSON } from "../../../src/bridge"; import { parseRequest } from "../../../src/responses/parser"; import { decodeReasoningEnvelope } from "../../../src/responses/reasoning-envelope"; import type { AdapterEvent } from "../../../src/types"; +import type { OcxProviderConfig } from "../../../src/types"; +import { createKiroAdapter as createKiroAdapterProduction } from "../../../src/adapters/kiro"; +import { encodeMessage } from "../../../src/lib/eventstream-decoder"; import { createTranslatorBudget } from "../../../src/lib/translator-budget"; +import { withTestTranslatorBudget } from "../../helpers/translator-budget"; const BLOB = "LktUUn5+ZXlKbGJtTnllWEIwYVc5dVVtVm5hVzl1SWpvaQ=="; @@ -135,3 +140,140 @@ describe("kiro redacted-reasoning round-trip (bridge → parse)", () => { expect((assistant as { kiroRedactedReasoning?: string }).kiroRedactedReasoning).toBe(BLOB); }); }); + +// The blob has two possible homes on a replayed `assistantResponseMessage`, and the wire validates +// the SHAPE of each: `signature` takes the emitted string verbatim, while `redactedContent` is a +// base64 member. The ".KTR~~…" value the GPT-5.6 family returns is not base64, which is why +// replaying it as `redactedContent` — what the proxy did before the field was measured — came back +// as REQUEST_BODY_INVALID. Which field a blob arrived on therefore has to survive the whole +// round-trip, not just the parse. +describe("kiro reasoning blob — the wire field it replays on", () => { + const SIGNATURE = ".KTR~~eyJlbmNyeXB0aW9uUmVnaW9uIjoidXMtZWFzdC0xIiwic2xvdHMiOltdfQ=="; + + interface HistoryEntry { + assistantResponseMessage?: { reasoningContent?: unknown }; + } + + /** Round-trip one blob the way Codex does — bridge, history replay, then the next Kiro body. */ + function replayedReasoningContent(blob: string): unknown { + const response = buildResponseJSON([ + { type: "text_delta", text: "the answer" }, + { type: "kiro_redacted_reasoning", data: blob }, + { type: "done", usage: { inputTokens: 1, outputTokens: 2 }, endTurn: true }, + ], "kiro/gpt-5.6-luna"); + const items = (response.output as Record[]).map(({ status: _status, ...item }) => item); + // Kiro requires the request to end with a user turn, so the replayed turn is followed by one. + const parsed = parseRequest({ + model: "kiro/gpt-5.6-luna", + input: [ + { type: "message", role: "user", content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "hi" }] }, + ...items, + { type: "message", role: "user", content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "again" }] }, + ], + }); + const { payload } = buildKiroPayload(parsed, undefined, "disabled", "ide"); + const history = (payload.conversationState as { history?: HistoryEntry[] }).history ?? []; + return history.find(entry => entry.assistantResponseMessage?.reasoningContent) + ?.assistantResponseMessage?.reasoningContent; + } + + test("a signature blob is replayed verbatim on `signature`", () => { + expect(replayedReasoningContent(`signature:${SIGNATURE}`)).toEqual({ signature: SIGNATURE }); + }); + + test("an untagged blob keeps the base64 `redactedContent` shape", () => { + expect(replayedReasoningContent(BLOB)).toEqual({ redactedContent: BLOB }); + }); + + test("the tag never reaches the wire as part of the blob", () => { + const replayed = replayedReasoningContent(`signature:${SIGNATURE}`) as { signature?: string }; + expect(replayed.signature).toBe(SIGNATURE); + expect(JSON.stringify(replayed)).not.toContain("signature:"); + }); +}); + +// The parse side is where the tag is minted, so it is pinned here rather than in +// tests/providers/kiro/kiro-stream.test.ts: that file sits at its file-size-ratchet cap +// (tests/fixtures/file-size-baseline.json), and a baselined file may not grow by one line. +// An event carrying only the signature still has to emit the blob — the GPT-5.6 family can finish +// a turn with the encrypted blob and no assistant text at all. +describe("kiro reasoning blob — the stream records the field it arrived on", () => { + const provider = { + adapter: "kiro", + baseUrl: "https://runtime.us-east-1.kiro.dev", + authMode: "oauth", + apiKey: "tok-123", + } as unknown as OcxProviderConfig; + const enc = new TextEncoder(); + const signatureFrame = (obj: unknown) => encodeMessage( + { ":message-type": "event", ":event-type": "reasoningContentEvent" }, + enc.encode(JSON.stringify(obj)), + ); + + function streamOf(...frames: Uint8Array[]): ReadableStream { + let i = 0; + return new ReadableStream({ + pull(c) { + if (i < frames.length) c.enqueue(frames[i++]); + else c.close(); + }, + }); + } + + async function parse(frame: Uint8Array): Promise { + const adapter = withTestTranslatorBudget(createKiroAdapterProduction(provider)); + const out: AdapterEvent[] = []; + for await (const event of adapter.parseStream(new Response(streamOf(frame)))) out.push(event); + return out; + } + + test("a signature blob is tagged with the field it must be replayed on", async () => { + // Every capture of the GPT-5.6 family put the blob on `signature` and left `text` as a "..." + // placeholder. That value starts with ".KTR~~", which is NOT base64, so replaying it as + // `redactedContent` — what the proxy used to send — is rejected as REQUEST_BODY_INVALID. A + // `redactedContent` event stays untagged; the untagged shape is covered above. + const signature = ".KTR~~eyJ2IjoxfQ=="; + expect(await parse(signatureFrame({ signature, text: "..." }))).toEqual([ + { type: "reasoning_raw_delta", text: "..." }, + { type: "kiro_redacted_reasoning", data: `signature:${signature}` }, + expect.objectContaining({ type: "done" }), + ]); + }); + + test("a signature-only event still yields the tagged blob", async () => { + // No assistant text means no terminal either: the blob is the whole turn, which is why the tag + // must not be conditioned on `text`. + expect((await parse(signatureFrame({ signature: ".KTR~~only" })))[0]).toEqual( + { type: "kiro_redacted_reasoning", data: "signature:.KTR~~only" }, + ); + }); +}); + +// The request side of the same story. luna and terra used to fall through to the emulated +// block, a strictly weaker signal: on one fixed hard prompt that channel landed +// between the model's native medium and high (21,202 / 28,302 chars) and never reached native max +// (48,594), while the native ladder itself ran 5,130 -> 48,594 from low to max. The whole GPT-5.6 +// family shares the field name, so all three are native now. +describe("kiro native reasoning effort — the GPT-5.6 family", () => { + function wireBody(modelId: string): Record { + const parsed = { + modelId, + stream: true, + options: { reasoning: "max", maxOutputTokens: 1000 }, + context: { messages: [{ role: "user", content: "solve" }] }, + } as unknown as Parameters[0]; + return buildKiroPayload(parsed, undefined, "disabled", "ide").payload; + } + + test("luna and terra send the native reasoning field instead of thinking tags", () => { + for (const modelId of ["gpt-5.6-luna", "gpt-5.6-terra"]) { + const body = wireBody(modelId); + expect(body.additionalModelRequestFields).toEqual({ reasoning: { effort: "max" } }); + // Native effort replaces the emulated thinking-tag prompt entirely. + const current = (body.conversationState as { + currentMessage: { userInputMessage: { content: string } }; + }).currentMessage.userInputMessage.content; + expect(current).toBe("solve"); + } + }); +}); From c68682d0c2ed89ed4e79c39b725211ebb8e95215 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "wentao.ma2" Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 15:28:33 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 034/113] docs(kiro): spell the full claude-opus-5 effort field in translated pages CodeRabbit flagged the ja/ko/ru adapter pages for dropping the `additionalModelRequestFields` prefix on the claude-opus-5 effort field, which documents a different request shape than the English source. zh-cn and zh-tw carried the same truncation, so all five locales now name `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` exactly as the canonical page does. tr and fr were already complete. --- docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md | 2 +- docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md | 2 +- docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md | 2 +- docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md | 2 +- docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md | 2 +- 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md index 2191cd41dd..d9dd6fdd0b 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ filtered incomplete になります。実際のツール呼び出しを伴わな `gpt-5.6-sol` / `gpt-5.6-terra` / `gpt-5.6-luna` と `claude-opus-5` はネイティブ effort をサポートし、リクエストフィールド名が異なります。 `low` / `medium` / `high` / `xhigh` / `max` は、GPT-5.6 系では -`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`、`claude-opus-5` では `output_config.effort` として送信されます。 +`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`、`claude-opus-5` では `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` として送信されます。 ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md index 4ff2cc0b37..548977d38c 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ commentary로 유지하고 비공개 완료 툴을 한 번 검증합니다. `gpt-5.6-sol`, `gpt-5.6-terra`, `gpt-5.6-luna`와 `claude-opus-5`는 네이티브 effort를 지원하며 요청 필드 이름이 다릅니다. `low` / `medium` / `high` / `xhigh` / `max` 값은 GPT-5.6 계열에서는 -`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`, `claude-opus-5`에서는 `output_config.effort`로 전송됩니다. +`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`, `claude-opus-5`에서는 `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort`로 전송됩니다. ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md index 9961210917..62416d5671 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ incomplete. `TOOL_USE` без фактического вызова инстру Модели семейства GPT-5.6 (`gpt-5.6-sol`, `gpt-5.6-terra`, `gpt-5.6-luna`) и `claude-opus-5` поддерживают нативный effort, но называют поле запроса по-разному. Значения `low` / `medium` / `high` / `xhigh` / `max` отправляются как -`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` для моделей GPT-5.6 и `output_config.effort` для `claude-opus-5`. +`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` для моделей GPT-5.6 и `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` для `claude-opus-5`. ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md index 6c68bf3526..e7f96a93e4 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ Kiro 的 assistant 文本本身没有可靠的回合结束标记，但终止的 `gpt-5.6-sol`、`gpt-5.6-terra`、`gpt-5.6-luna` 和 `claude-opus-5` 支持原生 effort，且请求字段名不同。`low` / `medium` / `high` / `xhigh` / `max` 在 GPT-5.6 系列中通过 `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` 发送， -在 `claude-opus-5` 上通过 `output_config.effort` 发送。 +在 `claude-opus-5` 上通过 `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` 发送。 ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md index 90cb9f8a3f..4708e2e6b1 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ Kiro 的 assistant 文字本身沒有可靠的回合結束標記，但終止的 `gpt-5.6-sol`、`gpt-5.6-terra`、`gpt-5.6-luna` 和 `claude-opus-5` 支援原生 effort，且請求欄位名不同。`low` / `medium` / `high` / `xhigh` / `max` 在 GPT-5.6 系列中透過 `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` 傳送， -在 `claude-opus-5` 上透過 `output_config.effort` 傳送。 +在 `claude-opus-5` 上透過 `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` 傳送。 ## `cursor` From 6c8f5d181b8aeaca47d0769f95fa61111fddccb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: agentHits <140916359+agentHits@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 20:59:59 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 035/113] fix(google): allow structured output for Gemini models on Cloud Code Assist - Lift blanket rejection on Cloud Code Assist for Gemini models (modelId starting with gemini-) - Route structured output into generationConfig.responseMimeType and responseJsonSchema inside envelope.request - Retain explicit fail-closed rejection for non-Gemini models (such as Claude) served through Cloud Code Assist - Keep existing refusals for image-capable models and schemaless json_schema - Update structure/providers/google.md and tests/adapters/google/google-structured-output.test.ts --- src/adapters/google.ts | 14 ++++----- structure/providers/google.md | 9 +++--- .../google/google-structured-output.test.ts | 29 +++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/adapters/google.ts b/src/adapters/google.ts index 9617c1ac10..8829dc0784 100644 --- a/src/adapters/google.ts +++ b/src/adapters/google.ts @@ -796,14 +796,14 @@ export function createGoogleAdapter(provider: OcxProviderConfig): ProviderAdapte // body, URL or credential. const requestedTextFormat = parsed.options.textFormat; if (requestedTextFormat) { - if (provider.googleMode === "cloud-code-assist") { - // Not implemented or verified by opencodex for the Cloud Code Assist envelope, - // including Claude models served through it. This is not a claim that the - // upstream cannot do it — silence would return unconstrained prose as success, - // which is the failure this fix exists to remove. + if (provider.googleMode === "cloud-code-assist" && !parsed.modelId.startsWith("gemini-")) { + // Not implemented by opencodex for non-Gemini models (including Claude) + // served through the Cloud Code Assist envelope. This is not a claim that + // the upstream cannot do it — silence would return unconstrained prose as success, + // which is the failure this refusal exists to prevent. throw new Error( - "google cloud-code-assist structured output is not implemented by opencodex — " - + "remove response_format or route this model through AI Studio or Vertex", + "google cloud-code-assist structured output is not implemented by opencodex for non-Gemini models — " + + "remove response_format or route this model through a direct provider", ); } if (isImageCapableModel(parsed.modelId)) { diff --git a/structure/providers/google.md b/structure/providers/google.md index a403777ee3..21d22fc15c 100644 --- a/structure/providers/google.md +++ b/structure/providers/google.md @@ -62,12 +62,13 @@ The schema is carried verbatim. `sanitizeGeminiToolParameters` narrows a schema the function-declaration subset and must never be applied to a caller-authored output schema. `compileGenerationConfig` in `google-wire-compiler.ts` is a whitelist, so both keys are listed there as well; setting them in the adapter alone would drop them -before the wire. +before the wire. On Cloud Code Assist, Gemini models carry these same keys inside +`envelope.request.generationConfig`. Three cases refuse explicitly rather than dropping the constraint silently: -cloud-code-assist, which opencodex does not implement or verify for this field -(including Claude models served through that envelope — this is not a claim about -what the upstream can do); an image-capable model, whose `responseModalities` +non-Gemini models on Cloud Code Assist (such as Claude models served through that +envelope), which opencodex does not implement or verify for this field (this is not +a claim about what the upstream can do); an image-capable model, whose `responseModalities` configuration contradicts JSON-constrained text; and a `json_schema` format carrying no schema, which would otherwise downgrade to bare JSON mode. An image-capable model with no structured-output request keeps its existing `responseModalities` behavior. diff --git a/tests/adapters/google/google-structured-output.test.ts b/tests/adapters/google/google-structured-output.test.ts index f569b0adc3..c2b845085f 100644 --- a/tests/adapters/google/google-structured-output.test.ts +++ b/tests/adapters/google/google-structured-output.test.ts @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import type { OcxParsedRequest, OcxProviderConfig } from "../../../src/types"; const aiStudio = { adapter: "google", baseUrl: "https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com", apiKey: "key" } as unknown as OcxProviderConfig; const vertex = { adapter: "google", googleMode: "vertex", baseUrl: "https://aiplatform.googleapis.com", apiKey: "key" } as unknown as OcxProviderConfig; -const cca = { adapter: "google", googleMode: "cloud-code-assist", baseUrl: "https://cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com", apiKey: "token" } as unknown as OcxProviderConfig; +const cca = { adapter: "google", googleMode: "cloud-code-assist", baseUrl: "https://cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com", apiKey: "token", project: "test-project" } as unknown as OcxProviderConfig; const SCHEMA = { type: "object", @@ -57,6 +57,27 @@ describe("F3 Google structured output reaches the generateContent wire", () => { expect(config.responseJsonSchema).toEqual(SCHEMA); }); + test("Gemini-on-CCA carries responseMimeType and responseJsonSchema inside envelope.request", async () => { + const { body } = await createGoogleAdapter(cca).buildRequest( + parsed({ type: "json_schema", name: "answer", schema: SCHEMA, strict: true }), + ); + const envelope = JSON.parse(typeof body === "string" ? body : JSON.stringify(body)) as Record; + + expect(envelope.generationConfig).toBeUndefined(); + expect(envelope.request?.generationConfig?.responseMimeType).toBe("application/json"); + expect(envelope.request?.generationConfig?.responseJsonSchema).toEqual(SCHEMA); + expect(envelope.request?.generationConfig?.responseSchema).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("json_object on Cloud Code Assist sets only responseMimeType in envelope.request", async () => { + const { body } = await createGoogleAdapter(cca).buildRequest(parsed({ type: "json_object" })); + const envelope = JSON.parse(typeof body === "string" ? body : JSON.stringify(body)) as Record; + + expect(envelope.generationConfig).toBeUndefined(); + expect(envelope.request?.generationConfig?.responseMimeType).toBe("application/json"); + expect(envelope.request?.generationConfig?.responseJsonSchema).toBeUndefined(); + }); + test("the schema survives compilation byte-for-byte, unsanitized", async () => { const nested = { type: "object", @@ -86,8 +107,10 @@ describe("F3 Google structured output reaches the generateContent wire", () => { }); describe("F3 unsupported modes refuse explicitly instead of dropping the schema", () => { - test("cloud-code-assist reports that opencodex does not implement it", async () => { - const promise = createGoogleAdapter(cca).buildRequest(parsed({ type: "json_schema", schema: SCHEMA })); + test("Claude-on-CCA with textFormat reports that opencodex does not implement it", async () => { + const promise = createGoogleAdapter(cca).buildRequest( + parsed({ type: "json_schema", schema: SCHEMA }, "claude-3-7-sonnet"), + ); await expect(promise).rejects.toThrow(/not implemented by opencodex/); }); From ed9f0b9fefec7630337956e2a7507d717ef2c2ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theo / Taeyoon Kang Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 09:00:59 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 036/113] fix(providers): declare Anthropic image input capabilities Missing modelInputModalities on both Anthropic registry entries caused Aside, Pi and GJC exports to fall back to text-only input. Seed the known Claude models once and preserve explicit operator overrides through existing enrichment. Add registry and production catalog-to-client regression coverage for both auth flows. Update provider documentation and mapped architecture notes. Refs #4667 --- .../src/content/docs/guides/providers.md | 8 +++++ src/providers/registry/entries-core.ts | 3 ++ src/providers/registry/model-seeds.ts | 4 +++ structure/providers/xai-grok.md | 2 ++ structure/runtime.md | 6 ++++ structure/subagents.md | 2 ++ structure/transports/inventory.md | 2 ++ .../provider-registry-parity.test.ts | 21 +++++++++++ .../management-client-config-route.test.ts | 35 +++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 83 insertions(+) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/providers.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/providers.md index f45f653c39..7883fc4b59 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/providers.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/providers.md @@ -64,6 +64,14 @@ Shipped v1 configs migrate automatically to marker 2 and one option-aware row. T is retained once at `~/.opencodex/config.json.pre-openai-tiers-v2.bak`; restore it with `cp ~/.opencodex/config.json.pre-openai-tiers-v2.bak ~/.opencodex/config.json`. +## Anthropic image input + +The built-in Claude model seeds advertise text and image input for both `anthropic` (OAuth) and +`anthropic-apikey`, consistent with [Anthropic's model overview](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/models/overview). +Explicit per-model input-modality overrides remain authoritative; unknown models are not assumed +image-capable. After updating opencodex, regenerate or refresh the client configuration managed by +opencodex so clients receive the updated image capability metadata. + ## Auth modes Provider configs accept three `authMode` values (`key` is the default). The built-in registry also diff --git a/src/providers/registry/entries-core.ts b/src/providers/registry/entries-core.ts index 32e5cc2d95..07689dfdcb 100644 --- a/src/providers/registry/entries-core.ts +++ b/src/providers/registry/entries-core.ts @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import type { ProviderRegistryEntry } from "./types"; import { ANTHROPIC_MODELS, ANTHROPIC_MODEL_CONTEXT_WINDOWS, + ANTHROPIC_MODEL_INPUT_MODALITIES, ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS, ANTHROPIC_MODEL_REASONING_EFFORTS, ZAI_GLM_52_REASONING_EFFORTS, @@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ export const PROVIDER_REGISTRY_CORE: readonly ProviderRegistryEntry[] = [ note: "Log in with your Claude account", models: [...ANTHROPIC_MODELS], modelContextWindows: { ...ANTHROPIC_MODEL_CONTEXT_WINDOWS }, + modelInputModalities: { ...ANTHROPIC_MODEL_INPUT_MODALITIES }, modelReasoningEfforts: { ...ANTHROPIC_MODEL_REASONING_EFFORTS }, // Codex omits max_output_tokens; without a provider budget the Anthropic adapter // falls back to 8192, which truncates long answers with stop_reason=max_tokens. @@ -403,6 +405,7 @@ export const PROVIDER_REGISTRY_CORE: readonly ProviderRegistryEntry[] = [ models: [...ANTHROPIC_MODELS], liveModels: true, modelContextWindows: { ...ANTHROPIC_MODEL_CONTEXT_WINDOWS }, + modelInputModalities: { ...ANTHROPIC_MODEL_INPUT_MODALITIES }, modelReasoningEfforts: { ...ANTHROPIC_MODEL_REASONING_EFFORTS }, defaultMaxOutputTokens: ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS, defaultModel: "claude-sonnet-5", diff --git a/src/providers/registry/model-seeds.ts b/src/providers/registry/model-seeds.ts index bcc0ae6932..94e34b803a 100644 --- a/src/providers/registry/model-seeds.ts +++ b/src/providers/registry/model-seeds.ts @@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ import type { ProviderModelDiscoverySpec } from "./types"; // always on, per the official models overview and pricing page (platform.claude.com). export const ANTHROPIC_MODELS = ["claude-fable-5-1", "claude-fable-5", "claude-sonnet-5", "claude-opus-5", "claude-opus-4-8", "claude-opus-4-7", "claude-opus-4-6", "claude-sonnet-4-6", "claude-haiku-4-5"]; export const ANTHROPIC_MODEL_CONTEXT_WINDOWS: Record = { "claude-fable-5-1": 1_000_000, "claude-sonnet-5": 1_000_000, "claude-fable-5": 1_000_000, "claude-opus-5": 1_000_000, "claude-opus-4-8": 1_000_000, "claude-opus-4-7": 1_000_000, "claude-opus-4-6": 1_000_000, "claude-sonnet-4-6": 1_000_000, "claude-haiku-4-5": 200_000 }; +// All seeded Claude models support vision: https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/models/overview +export const ANTHROPIC_MODEL_INPUT_MODALITIES: Record = Object.fromEntries( + ANTHROPIC_MODELS.map(id => [id, ["text", "image"]]), +); // Every current Claude family accepts at least 64k output tokens (Haiku 4.5 / Sonnet 4.x // through Opus 5 and Fable 5). Anthropic caps max_tokens per model server-side, so a // larger request never over-allocates; it only stops the 8192 truncation. diff --git a/structure/providers/xai-grok.md b/structure/providers/xai-grok.md index dc982c5639..2d98e7860d 100644 --- a/structure/providers/xai-grok.md +++ b/structure/providers/xai-grok.md @@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ privately to final dispatch; preliminary route selection does not inject Go-only Devin CLI credential path composition in `src/oauth/devin/cli-import.ts` follows the selected platform: Windows uses Win32 APPDATA paths, other platforms use POSIX XDG-data paths. The explicit absolute override remains verbatim; credential parsing and login behavior are unchanged. +[Anthropic seed image metadata](../runtime.md#capability-aware-image-admission) is provider-scoped; xAI model metadata and transport behavior remain unchanged. + Provider-scoped catalog hints remain isolated by provider in `src/providers/registry/entries-core.ts`. The OpenCode Go `deepseek-v4.1-flash` 1,048,576-token context hint does not change xAI model metadata or transport behavior. diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index bd9ebbd561..f1aa3aeae9 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -408,6 +408,12 @@ The [explicit model-capability contract](config.md#explicit-per-model-capability ## Capability-aware image admission +The `anthropic` OAuth and `anthropic-apikey` presets in `src/providers/registry/entries-core.ts` +declare `modelInputModalities: ["text", "image"]` per model for the nine Claude seeds in +`src/providers/registry/model-seeds.ts`. Existing enrichment fills missing entries while preserving +explicit operator overrides; unknown models receive no new declaration. Client eligibility filters +and Anthropic image wire handling remain unchanged. + `src/vision/plan.ts` prevents raw image bytes from reaching any target whose effective capability is positively known to exclude image input. Evidence from the resolved runtime provider and explicit operator declarations takes precedence, followed by backend-specific/registry/vendor metadata. A proven text-only target is preprocessed through the configured Vision Sidecar; a positively image-capable target receives the image directly. Genuinely unknown custom models retain the existing compatibility path rather than being guessed text-only. Canonical ChatGPT Codex forwarding uses the generated `openai-codex` capability bundle rather than the public `openai` bundle. This matters when the two backends differ: for example, the vendored metadata records `gpt-5.3-codex-spark` as text-only on `openai-codex` while the public OpenAI row lists image input. The native Chat fast path and web-search image verbalization consume the same effective-capability decision. diff --git a/structure/subagents.md b/structure/subagents.md index c0c92891f7..fa5b540acd 100644 --- a/structure/subagents.md +++ b/structure/subagents.md @@ -371,6 +371,8 @@ The [explicit model-capability contract](config.md#explicit-per-model-capability Exact [model input declarations](config.md#explicit-per-model-capability-declarations) now feed text-only eligibility and catalog hints; existing image-description/omission handling consumes them before the main upstream send. +[Anthropic seed image metadata](runtime.md#capability-aware-image-admission) supplies missing capability evidence; subagent selection and eligibility rules remain unchanged. + Provider-scoped approval reviewer settings are projected by the [catalog owner](catalog.md#provider-scoped-approval-reviewer); this surface retains its existing routing, transport and account-selection behavior. Renamed fixed-key providers receive [missing reasoning metadata](catalog.md#renamed-destination-reasoning-metadata) during derivation; explicit per-model entries and provider defaults retain precedence. diff --git a/structure/transports/inventory.md b/structure/transports/inventory.md index ca80373a8e..e2294daed6 100644 --- a/structure/transports/inventory.md +++ b/structure/transports/inventory.md @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ changes translated message placement only; endpoint selection and transport stay Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](byte-accounting.md#request-copy-accounting) and [stream-buffer accounting](byte-accounting.md#stream-buffer-accounting) contracts. Response-attached WebSocket telemetry follows the [stage record identity contract](responses.md#passthrough-sse-stream-shapes-314). +[Anthropic seed image metadata](../runtime.md#capability-aware-image-admission) supplies missing capability evidence; transport selection and image wire handling remain unchanged. + ## Transport inventory The sections above cover the transports with load-bearing invariants. The rest of the transport diff --git a/tests/providers/provider-registry-parity.test.ts b/tests/providers/provider-registry-parity.test.ts index 46579009ce..0582bd5072 100644 --- a/tests/providers/provider-registry-parity.test.ts +++ b/tests/providers/provider-registry-parity.test.ts @@ -752,6 +752,27 @@ describe("provider registry parity", () => { expect(KEY_LOGIN_PROVIDERS["anthropic-apikey"].modelContextWindows).toEqual(anthropicOauth?.modelContextWindows); }); + test("Anthropic providers seed image input while preserving explicit model overrides", () => { + for (const id of ["anthropic", "anthropic-apikey"]) { + const entry = PROVIDER_REGISTRY.find(entry => entry.id === id)!; + const seed = providerConfigSeed(entry); + expect(entry.models!.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + for (const model of entry.models!) { + expect(seed.modelInputModalities?.[model]).toEqual(["text", "image"]); + } + + const provider: OcxProviderConfig = { + adapter: "anthropic", + baseUrl: "https://api.anthropic.com", + modelInputModalities: { "claude-sonnet-5": ["text"] }, + }; + enrichProviderFromRegistry(id, provider); + expect(provider.modelInputModalities?.["claude-sonnet-5"]).toEqual(["text"]); + expect(provider.modelInputModalities?.["claude-fable-5-1"]).toEqual(["text", "image"]); + expect(provider.modelInputModalities?.["unknown-model"]).toBeUndefined(); + } + }); + test("Anthropic providers advertise an effort ladder for every model on both auth flows", () => { const anthropicOauth = PROVIDER_REGISTRY.find(entry => entry.id === "anthropic"); const apiKey = KEY_LOGIN_PROVIDERS["anthropic-apikey"]; diff --git a/tests/server/management-client-config-route.test.ts b/tests/server/management-client-config-route.test.ts index 45514c9754..9c024a02a7 100644 --- a/tests/server/management-client-config-route.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/management-client-config-route.test.ts @@ -162,6 +162,41 @@ function toExportModel(row: ModelRow): ExportModel { } +describe("native Anthropic image input reaches client documents", () => { + for (const client of ["aside", "pi", "gajae"] as const) { + test.each(["anthropic", "anthropic-apikey"])(`${client} advertises image input for %s`, async (provider) => { + const config = { + port: 10100, + hostname: "127.0.0.1", + defaultProvider: provider, + providers: { + [provider]: { + adapter: "anthropic", + baseUrl: "https://api.anthropic.com", + authMode: provider === "anthropic" ? "oauth" : "key", + liveModels: false, + }, + }, + } as unknown as OcxConfig; + + const models = await loadExportModels(config); + const document = buildClientConfig(client, { + baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:10100/v1", + config, + models, + }) as PiGeneratedConfig; + const rows = document.providers[OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID]!.models + .filter(model => model.id.startsWith(`${provider}/claude-`)); + expect(rows.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + for (const row of rows) { + expect({ id: row.id, input: row.input }).toEqual({ + id: row.id, input: ["text", "image"], + }); + } + }); + } +}); + describe("native Anthropic effort ladder reaches the Aside document", () => { /** * The end-to-end guard for the defect: native Anthropic rows used to reach Aside with no From 179aa98b090ba86ff8ee88e08c58edeef1d54b4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: RHODIZ IT Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 13:25:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 037/113] fix(claude): forward done-only tool arguments Co-authored-by: RHODIZ IT --- src/claude/outbound.ts | 18 +++++++++++ .../claude-outbound.test.ts | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/claude/outbound.ts b/src/claude/outbound.ts index d4e7758ee0..f281b632b7 100644 --- a/src/claude/outbound.ts +++ b/src/claude/outbound.ts @@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ interface OpenBlock { argsBuf?: string; argsBufBytes?: number; webSearchArgsEmitted?: boolean; + /** True once ordinary function-call arguments were emitted to Anthropic SSE. */ + toolArgsEmitted?: boolean; callId?: string; /** Last fixed-size reasoning identity (item + summary/content index) seen by this block. */ reasoningPartKey?: string; @@ -488,6 +490,7 @@ export function responsesSseToAnthropicSse( argsBuf: "", argsBufBytes: 0, webSearchArgsEmitted: false, + toolArgsEmitted: false, }; break; } @@ -518,6 +521,14 @@ export function responsesSseToAnthropicSse( type: "content_block_delta", index: open.index, delta: { type: "input_json_delta", partial_json: data.delta }, }); + open.toolArgsEmitted = true; + break; + } + case "response.function_call_arguments.done": { + if (!open || open.kind !== "tool_use" || open.bufferWebSearchArgs || open.toolArgsEmitted) break; + if (typeof data.arguments !== "string" || data.arguments.length === 0) break; + emit("content_block_delta", { type: "content_block_delta", index: open.index, delta: { type: "input_json_delta", partial_json: data.arguments } }); + open.toolArgsEmitted = true; break; } case "response.output_item.done": { @@ -565,6 +576,13 @@ export function responsesSseToAnthropicSse( delta: { type: "input_json_delta", partial_json: JSON.stringify(sanitizeWebSearchInput(parsed)) }, }); open.webSearchArgsEmitted = true; + } else if (!open.bufferWebSearchArgs && !open.toolArgsEmitted + && typeof item.arguments === "string" && item.arguments.length > 0) { + emit("content_block_delta", { + type: "content_block_delta", index: open.index, + delta: { type: "input_json_delta", partial_json: item.arguments }, + }); + open.toolArgsEmitted = true; } closeOpenBlock(); } diff --git a/tests/claude-integration/claude-outbound.test.ts b/tests/claude-integration/claude-outbound.test.ts index 72f7a22bdf..375fac9155 100644 --- a/tests/claude-integration/claude-outbound.test.ts +++ b/tests/claude-integration/claude-outbound.test.ts @@ -197,6 +197,21 @@ describe("claude outbound SSE", () => { expect(unspacedBudget.snapshot().currentBytes).toBe(spacedBudget.snapshot().currentBytes); }); + test("done-only function arguments reach Claude tool input", async () => { + const upstream = [ + sse("response.created", { response: { id: "resp_done", status: "in_progress" } }), + sse("response.output_item.added", { output_index: 0, item: { type: "function_call", id: "fc_done", call_id: "toolu_done", name: "Bash", arguments: "", status: "in_progress" } }), + sse("response.function_call_arguments.done", { item_id: "fc_done", output_index: 0, arguments: "{\"command\":\"printf RHODIZ_TOOL_OK\"}" }), + sse("response.output_item.done", { output_index: 0, item: { type: "function_call", id: "fc_done", call_id: "toolu_done", name: "Bash", arguments: "{\"command\":\"printf RHODIZ_TOOL_OK\"}" } }), + sse("response.completed", { response: { status: "completed", usage: { input_tokens: 10, output_tokens: 5 } } }), + ].join(""); + const events = await collectEvents(responsesSseToAnthropicSse(streamFrom(upstream), "claude-ocx-test")); + const argDeltas = events.filter(e => e.name === "content_block_delta" && e.data.delta?.type === "input_json_delta"); + expect(argDeltas).toHaveLength(1); + expect(argDeltas[0].data.delta.partial_json).toBe("{\"command\":\"printf RHODIZ_TOOL_OK\"}"); + expect(events.find(e => e.name === "content_block_start")?.data.content_block).toMatchObject({ type: "tool_use", name: "Bash", input: {} }); + }); + test("text + thinking + tool call + completed w/ usage -> exact Anthropic sequence", async () => { const upstream = [ sse("response.created", { response: { id: "resp_1", status: "in_progress" } }), @@ -255,6 +270,21 @@ describe("claude outbound SSE", () => { expect(startIndexes).toEqual([0, 1, 2]); }); + test("done-only function-call arguments reach Claude tool input", async () => { + const args = JSON.stringify({ command: "printf RHODIZ_TOOL_OK" }); + const upstream = [ + sse("response.created", { response: { id: "resp_done_args", status: "in_progress" } }), + sse("response.output_item.added", { output_index: 0, item: { type: "function_call", id: "fc_done", call_id: "toolu_done", name: "Bash", arguments: "", status: "in_progress" } }), + sse("response.function_call_arguments.done", { item_id: "fc_done", output_index: 0, arguments: args }), + sse("response.output_item.done", { output_index: 0, item: { type: "function_call", id: "fc_done", call_id: "toolu_done", name: "Bash", arguments: args, status: "completed" } }), + sse("response.completed", { response: { status: "completed", usage: { input_tokens: 1, output_tokens: 1 } } }), + ].join(""); + const events = await collectEvents(responsesSseToAnthropicSse(streamFrom(upstream), "claude-ocx-test")); + const deltas = events.filter(e => e.name === "content_block_delta" && e.data.delta?.type === "input_json_delta"); + expect(deltas).toHaveLength(1); + expect(deltas[0].data.delta.partial_json).toBe(args); + }); + test("multi-part reasoning summaries keep the JSON path's part separator", async () => { const upstream = [ sse("response.created", { response: { id: "resp_1", status: "in_progress" } }), From 1a2b4154fc9bbfcefe4133b19159658bb3f4364e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: AD PAO Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 01:22:46 +0700 Subject: [PATCH 038/113] fix(claude-desktop): expand synthetic date alias slots from 365 to 3652 Co-authored-by: AD PAO --- src/claude/desktop-profile.ts | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- tests/clients/desktop-3p.test.ts | 2 +- tests/clients/desktop-profile.test.ts | 21 ++++++-- 3 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/claude/desktop-profile.ts b/src/claude/desktop-profile.ts index 20652cf34b..e35b74cb46 100644 --- a/src/claude/desktop-profile.ts +++ b/src/claude/desktop-profile.ts @@ -22,8 +22,34 @@ export interface RenderedDesktopModel extends DesktopProfileModel { supports1m: boolean; } -const DATE_ALIAS = /^claude-opus-4-8-(2026\d{4})$/; -const DAY_COUNT_2026 = 365; +// Managed-namespace date aliases run 2026-2035. The original 2026-only +// (365 slots) design failed with "all 365 encoded date slots are occupied" +// once a catalog exceeded 365 routes (stale assignments are retained by +// design, so the set only grows). Years before 2026 stay rejected: dated +// ids like `claude-opus-4-8-20250201` are real model snapshot ids, not +// managed aliases, and the inbound decoder relies on that distinction. +// Every emitted suffix stays 8 digits so modelMap date-stripping keeps +// working. +const DATE_ALIAS = /^claude-opus-4-8-(202[6-9]\d{4}|203[0-5]\d{4})$/; +const LEGACY_YEAR = 2026; +const LEGACY_DAY_COUNT = 365; +const ALIAS_FIRST_YEAR = 2026; +const ALIAS_LAST_YEAR = 2035; + +function isLeapYear(year: number): boolean { + return year % 4 === 0 && (year % 100 !== 0 || year % 400 === 0); +} + +function daysInAliasYear(year: number): number { + return isLeapYear(year) ? 366 : 365; +} + +export const TOTAL_ALIAS_SLOTS = (() => { + let total = 0; + for (let year = ALIAS_FIRST_YEAR; year <= ALIAS_LAST_YEAR; year += 1) total += daysInAliasYear(year); + return total; +})(); +export const ALIAS_YEAR_RANGE = { first: ALIAS_FIRST_YEAR, last: ALIAS_LAST_YEAR } as const; export class DesktopProfileError extends Error { constructor(message: string, readonly path = "profile") { @@ -119,7 +145,7 @@ export function parseDesktopProfile(value: unknown): DesktopProfile { if (isRealAnthropicRoute(route)) { if (raw.alias !== routeModelId(route)) throw new DesktopProfileError("real Anthropic routes must keep their exact model id", `profile.assignments.${route}.alias`); } else if (!validDateAlias(raw.alias)) { - throw new DesktopProfileError("must be a valid claude-opus-4-8-2026MMDD alias", `profile.assignments.${route}.alias`); + throw new DesktopProfileError("must be a valid claude-opus-4-8-YYYYMMDD alias", `profile.assignments.${route}.alias`); } if (aliases.has(raw.alias)) throw new DesktopProfileError(`duplicate alias "${raw.alias}"`, `profile.assignments.${route}.alias`); aliases.add(raw.alias); @@ -144,26 +170,57 @@ export function parseDesktopProfile(value: unknown): DesktopProfile { return { version: 1, assignments, defaults, ...appliedMarkers(value) }; } -function dayOfYearAlias(dayIndex: number): string { - const date = new Date(Date.UTC(2026, 0, dayIndex + 1)); +function formatSlotDate(year: number, dayOfYear: number): string { + const date = new Date(Date.UTC(year, 0, dayOfYear)); const y = date.getUTCFullYear(); const m = String(date.getUTCMonth() + 1).padStart(2, "0"); const d = String(date.getUTCDate()).padStart(2, "0"); return `claude-opus-4-8-${y}${m}${d}`; } +// Legacy 2026 ring, byte-identical to the original allocator: the same route +// must keep resolving to the same 2026 alias it always had, and a probe over +// a nearly-full 2026 set must land on the same free date as before. +function legacyDayAlias(dayIndex: number): string { + return formatSlotDate(LEGACY_YEAR, dayIndex + 1); +} + +// Overflow ring for catalogs past 365 routes (2027-2035). Probed only after +// every legacy slot is taken, so existing profiles never shift into it. +const OVERFLOW_FIRST_YEAR = LEGACY_YEAR + 1; +const OVERFLOW_SLOT_COUNT = TOTAL_ALIAS_SLOTS - LEGACY_DAY_COUNT; + +function overflowSlotAlias(slotIndex: number): string { + let remaining = ((slotIndex % OVERFLOW_SLOT_COUNT) + OVERFLOW_SLOT_COUNT) % OVERFLOW_SLOT_COUNT; + for (let year = OVERFLOW_FIRST_YEAR; year <= ALIAS_LAST_YEAR; year += 1) { + const days = daysInAliasYear(year); + if (remaining < days) return formatSlotDate(year, remaining + 1); + remaining -= days; + } + throw new DesktopProfileError("slot index out of range", "profile.assignments"); +} + function routeStartDay(route: string): number { - return createHash("sha256").update(route).digest().readUInt32BE(0) % DAY_COUNT_2026; + return createHash("sha256").update(route).digest().readUInt32BE(0) % LEGACY_DAY_COUNT; +} + +function routeOverflowStart(route: string): number { + return createHash("sha256").update(route).digest().readUInt32BE(4) % OVERFLOW_SLOT_COUNT; } function allocateAlias(route: string, used: Set): string { if (isRealAnthropicRoute(route)) return routeModelId(route); const start = routeStartDay(route); - for (let offset = 0; offset < DAY_COUNT_2026; offset += 1) { - const alias = dayOfYearAlias((start + offset) % DAY_COUNT_2026); + for (let offset = 0; offset < LEGACY_DAY_COUNT; offset += 1) { + const alias = legacyDayAlias((start + offset) % LEGACY_DAY_COUNT); + if (!used.has(alias)) return alias; + } + const overflowStart = routeOverflowStart(route); + for (let offset = 0; offset < OVERFLOW_SLOT_COUNT; offset += 1) { + const alias = overflowSlotAlias((overflowStart + offset) % OVERFLOW_SLOT_COUNT); if (!used.has(alias)) return alias; } - throw new DesktopProfileError("all 365 encoded date slots are occupied", `profile.assignments.${route}.alias`); + throw new DesktopProfileError(`all ${TOTAL_ALIAS_SLOTS} encoded date slots are occupied`, `profile.assignments.${route}.alias`); } export function reconcileDesktopProfile( diff --git a/tests/clients/desktop-3p.test.ts b/tests/clients/desktop-3p.test.ts index cc116cb837..411d44b805 100644 --- a/tests/clients/desktop-3p.test.ts +++ b/tests/clients/desktop-3p.test.ts @@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ describe("Claude Desktop 3P models", () => { const models = generateDesktop3pModels(["gpt-5.6-sol"], routed, profile); const luna = models.find(model => model.labelOverride.includes("Luna")); expect(luna).toMatchObject({ anthropicFamilyTier: "haiku", isFamilyDefault: true, supports1m: true }); - expect(luna?.name).toMatch(/^claude-opus-4-8-2026\d{4}$/); + expect(luna?.name).toMatch(/^claude-opus-4-8-20\d{6}$/); expect(resolveDesktop3pAlias(luna!.name)).toBe("cursor/gpt-5.6-luna"); }); diff --git a/tests/clients/desktop-profile.test.ts b/tests/clients/desktop-profile.test.ts index 0aae60dc93..7aa7cdda7e 100644 --- a/tests/clients/desktop-profile.test.ts +++ b/tests/clients/desktop-profile.test.ts @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; import { DesktopProfileError, + TOTAL_ALIAS_SLOTS, emptyDesktopProfile, moveDesktopRoute, parseDesktopProfile, @@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ describe("Claude Desktop profile", () => { expect(second).toEqual(first); expect(first.defaults.opus).toBe("anthropic/claude-fable-5"); expect(first.assignments["anthropic/claude-fable-5"]?.alias).toBe("claude-fable-5"); - expect(first.assignments["native/gpt-5.6-sol"]?.alias).toMatch(/^claude-opus-4-8-2026\d{4}$/); + expect(first.assignments["native/gpt-5.6-sol"]?.alias).toMatch(/^claude-opus-4-8-20\d{6}$/); expect(new Set(Object.values(first.assignments).map(value => value.alias)).size).toBe(3); }); @@ -96,18 +97,28 @@ describe("Claude Desktop profile", () => { expect(() => parseDesktopProfile(wrongDefault)).toThrow("empty family"); }); - test("fills all 365 encoded slots then fails without mutating the saved profile", () => { - const encoded = Array.from({ length: 365 }, (_, index) => ({ + test("fills all encoded slots then fails without mutating the saved profile", () => { + const encoded = Array.from({ length: TOTAL_ALIAS_SLOTS }, (_, index) => ({ route: `test/model-${index}`, label: `Model ${index}`, })); const full = reconcileDesktopProfile(emptyDesktopProfile(), encoded); const snapshot = structuredClone(full); - expect(Object.keys(full.assignments)).toHaveLength(365); - expect(() => reconcileDesktopProfile(full, [...encoded, { route: "test/overflow", label: "Overflow" }])).toThrow("365 encoded date slots"); + expect(Object.keys(full.assignments)).toHaveLength(TOTAL_ALIAS_SLOTS); + expect(() => reconcileDesktopProfile(full, [...encoded, { route: "test/overflow", label: "Overflow" }])).toThrow("encoded date slots"); expect(full).toEqual(snapshot); }); + test("a 366-route catalog no longer exhausts the first-year slots (regression: 365 overflow)", () => { + const encoded = Array.from({ length: 366 }, (_, index) => ({ + route: `test/model-${index}`, + label: `Model ${index}`, + })); + const profile = reconcileDesktopProfile(emptyDesktopProfile(), encoded); + expect(Object.keys(profile.assignments)).toHaveLength(366); + expect(new Set(Object.values(profile.assignments).map(value => value.alias)).size).toBe(366); + }); + // The apply route writes `appliedFingerprint`/`appliedAt` back onto the stored profile so the // GUI can show applied-vs-saved state. Every rebuild in this module must accept AND carry them: // rejecting them broke the Desktop tab outright after the first apply, and silently dropping From d7128a5101d623a2c05a7509fc6a37ec8571f458 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 11:03:19 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 039/113] fix(codex): retain provider definitions across background history migration Co-authored-by: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> --- .../docs/fr/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 +- .../content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 +- .../docs/ja/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 +- .../docs/ko/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 +- .../docs/ru/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 +- .../docs/tr/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 +- .../docs/zh-cn/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 +- .../docs/zh-tw/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 +- src/codex/inject.ts | 24 +++---- structure/catalog.md | 2 +- structure/codex-home.md | 2 +- structure/config.md | 23 +++--- structure/gui-and-management-api.md | 2 +- structure/ops/docs-and-release.md | 2 +- structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 2 +- structure/runtime.md | 2 +- structure/subagents.md | 2 +- .../codex-inject-integration.test.ts | 70 ++++++++++++++----- 18 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/guides/codex-integration.md index 6608ebb1d9..8fff31edaf 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -421,6 +421,6 @@ Codex. Seule l'exécution explicite de `ocx stop` ou `ocx service stop` restaure Une transition de fournisseur peut renvoyer `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` si le stockage concerné prend en charge la pagination, même pour ses lignes legacy. Cette raison ne refuse plus la configuration Codex, le profil de référence ni le catalogue de modèles. `ocx sync` et `ocx start` écrivent toujours ces fichiers et définissent `model_catalog_json`, afin que le sélecteur de modèles Codex continue d’afficher tous les modèles routés par OpenCodex. Seule cette raison interrompt le réétiquetage de l’historique des conversations, car Codex attribue les numéros d’historique paginé dans son propre processus d’écriture et aucune nouvelle tentative n’y change rien. Toute autre raison de contrôle préalable de l’historique — une base d’état illisible, un historique dont l’identité a changé, ou un contrôle préalable qui n’a pas pu s’exécuter — refuse encore toute la transition et l’annule, car ces cas peuvent réussir plus tard. Dans cet état, OpenCodex ne modifie jamais les fichiers d’historique paginé ni les lignes de conversation. Les conversations existantes conservent le fournisseur déjà associé et ne sont pas migrées ; les nouvelles conversations passent par le proxy. Lorsque le réétiquetage est interrompu, une table `[model_providers.opencodex]` déjà présente dans le répertoire d’accueil est conservée plutôt que retirée, y compris sous la forme root-override (loopback), afin que les conversations dont les lignes sont étiquetées `opencodex` gardent un identifiant de fournisseur qui existe encore. Le CLI affiche `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)`. `ocx restore` et la suppression de la configuration Codex refusent toujours sur `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`. Retirer la définition `[model_providers.opencodex]` alors que des lignes de conversation la référencent encore rendrait ces conversations irrésolubles, et le chemin de restauration n’a aucun moyen de conserver une table de fournisseur de compatibilité. Un répertoire d’accueil déjà paginé ne peut pas actuellement être désinstallé par le produit ; c’est un travail ouvert connu, et non le comportement voulu. -Exception : si la pagination est détectée pour la première fois pendant une transition qui supprimerait une table de fournisseur existante, OpenCodex refuse cette tentative et restaure la configuration, le profil de référence et le journal afin de préserver les conversations. Une détection avant la construction du candidat, ou un candidat conservant déjà la table, permet toujours la mise à jour. +Lors du retour au mode de remplacement de l’URL racine, OpenCodex conserve la définition `[model_providers.opencodex]` existante avant de valider la configuration, même si la vérification préalable de l’historique réussit. Les anciennes conversations `opencodex` peuvent ainsi toujours retrouver leur fournisseur si Codex migre l’historique après cette validation ou pendant le démarrage du traitement en arrière-plan. Les nouvelles conversations utilisent le fournisseur racine sélectionné ; la restauration explicite conserve ses contrôles de suppression distincts. Ne réécrivez pas un historique paginé actif ni une ligne de conversation pour forcer une migration. Fermez la conversation avant toute récupération et signalez l’erreur exacte et les versions sans publier de données privées. Une sauvegarde ou le succès d’un script ne prouve pas le rétablissement de l’affichage : vérifiez la conversation après réouverture de Codex. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md index 6c6ab291a8..386775f561 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ When a routed preferred model may receive V2 work from a native ChatGPT parent, When an affected history store supports paginated records, a provider transition may return `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`. That reason no longer refuses the Codex configuration, the reference profile, or the model catalog. `ocx sync` and `ocx start` still write those files and set `model_catalog_json`, so the Codex model picker keeps showing every OpenCodex-routed model. Only this one reason stands the conversation-history relabel down, because Codex allocates paginated rollout ordinals in its own writer and no retry changes that. Any other history preflight reason — an unreadable state database, a rollout whose identity changed, or a preflight that could not run — still refuses the whole transition and rolls it back, because those may succeed on a later attempt. OpenCodex never modifies paginated rollout files or thread rows in this state. Existing conversations keep whatever provider they are already tagged with and are not migrated; new conversations route through the proxy normally. When the relabel stands down, a `[model_providers.opencodex]` table that the home already had is kept rather than retired, even in the root-override (loopback) form, so conversations whose rows are tagged `opencodex` keep a provider id that still exists. This includes legacy rows in a migration-capable store. The CLI prints `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)`. -Exception: if pagination is first detected during a transition that would remove an existing provider table, OpenCodex refuses that attempt and restores the configuration, reference profile, and journal. This preserves existing conversations. Pagination detected before the candidate is built, or a candidate already retaining the provider table, still allows configuration updates. +When returning to the root-override form, OpenCodex retains an existing `[model_providers.opencodex]` definition before committing the configuration, even if history preflight currently passes. This keeps older `opencodex` conversations resolvable if Codex migrates history after that commit or while the background worker starts. New conversations still use the selected root provider; explicit restore keeps its separate removal guards. `ocx restore` and Codex config removal still refuse on `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`. Stripping the `[model_providers.opencodex]` definition while thread rows still reference it would make those conversations unresolvable, and the restore path has no way to keep a compatibility provider table. A home that is already paginated cannot currently be uninstalled through the product; that is known open work rather than intended behaviour. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/guides/codex-integration.md index 09a7cf3d4c..4f6afdb37e 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -283,6 +283,6 @@ opencodex が管理対象 [バックグラウンドサービス](/reference/cli/ 対象の履歴ストアがページ分割をサポートする場合、プロバイダー変更は `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` を返すことがあります。この理由では、Codex の設定、参照プロファイル、モデルカタログは拒否されません。`ocx sync` と `ocx start` はこれらのファイルを書き込み、`model_catalog_json` を設定するため、Codex のモデル選択には OpenCodex 経由のモデルがすべて表示され続けます。会話履歴の再ラベル付けを控えるのはこの理由だけの場合です。ページ分割された履歴の番号は Codex 自身の書き込み処理が割り当て、再試行しても変わりません。読み取れない状態データベース、識別子が変わった履歴、実行できなかった事前検査など、それ以外の履歴事前検査の理由では、後から成功する可能性があるため、遷移全体を拒否してロールバックします。この状態では OpenCodex はページ分割された履歴ファイルやスレッド行を変更しません。既存の会話はすでに付いているプロバイダーのまま移行されず、新しい会話は通常どおりプロキシ経由でルーティングされます。再ラベル付けを控えるとき、ホームに既にある `[model_providers.opencodex]` テーブルは廃止せず残します。ルート上書き（loopback）形式でも同じで、行が `opencodex` と付いている会話は、まだ存在するプロバイダー id を保てます。移行可能なストアの legacy 行も対象です。CLI は `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)` と表示します。`ocx restore` と Codex 設定の削除は、いまも `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` で拒否されます。スレッド行がまだ参照しているのに `[model_providers.opencodex]` 定義を外すと、それらの会話は解決できなくなり、復元経路には互換プロバイダー表を残す手段がありません。すでにページ分割されているホームは、現状では製品からアンインストールできません。意図した動作ではなく、既知の未解決作業です。 -例外: 既存のプロバイダーテーブルを削除する切り替えの途中でページ形式の履歴が初めて検出された場合、OpenCodex はその試行を拒否し、設定、参照プロファイル、ジャーナルを復元して既存の会話を保護します。設定候補の作成前に検出した場合や、候補がすでにテーブルを保持する場合は、設定の更新を続行できます。 +ルート URL 上書き方式に戻すとき、履歴の事前確認が成功していても、OpenCodex は設定を確定する前に既存の `[model_providers.opencodex]` 定義を保持します。確定後やバックグラウンドの履歴処理開始中に Codex が履歴形式を移行しても、以前の `opencodex` 会話はプロバイダーを引き続き解決できます。新しい会話は選択されたルートプロバイダーを使い、明示的な復元には従来の個別の削除チェックが適用されます。 会話を移行しようとして使用中のページ分割履歴やスレッド行を書き換えないでください。復元前に対象の会話を閉じ、個人の履歴を公開せず正確なエラーとバージョンを報告してください。バックアップやスクリプトの成功だけでは表示の復元は証明されません。再度開いた Codex で確認してください。 diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/guides/codex-integration.md index b77de5939a..0d92b524e5 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -387,6 +387,6 @@ opencodex가 managed [background service](/reference/cli/#ocx-service)로 실행 영향받는 기록 저장소가 페이지 분할을 지원하면 프로바이더 전환이 `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`를 반환할 수 있습니다. 이 이유로는 Codex 설정, 참조 프로필, 모델 카탈로그를 더 이상 거부하지 않습니다. `ocx sync`와 `ocx start`는 해당 파일과 `model_catalog_json`을 계속 쓰므로 Codex 모델 선택기에는 OpenCodex가 라우팅하는 모델이 모두 그대로 보입니다. 대화 기록의 프로바이더 재지정을 건너뛰는 것은 이 이유뿐이며, 페이지 분할 순번은 Codex 자체의 네이티브 기록 작성자가 할당하고 재시도해도 달라지지 않기 때문입니다. 읽을 수 없는 상태 데이터베이스, 식별자가 바뀐 대화 원본, 실행하지 못한 사전 검사처럼 다른 기록 사전 검사 이유는 나중에 성공할 수 있으므로 전환 전체를 거부하고 되돌립니다. 이 상태에서 OpenCodex는 페이지 분할 대화 원본이나 스레드 행을 수정하지 않습니다. 기존 대화는 이미 붙어 있는 프로바이더를 유지하고 이전되지 않으며, 새 대화는 평소처럼 프록시를 통해 라우팅됩니다. 재지정을 건너뛸 때 홈에 이미 있던 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 테이블은 폐기하지 않고 유지합니다. root-override(loopback) 형식에서도 같아서, 행이 `opencodex`로 표시된 대화는 아직 존재하는 프로바이더 id를 유지합니다. 변환 가능한 저장소의 `legacy` 행도 포함됩니다. CLI는 `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)`를 출력합니다. `ocx restore`와 Codex 설정 제거는 여전히 `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`로 거부됩니다. 스레드 행이 아직 참조하는데 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 정의를 걷어내면 그 대화를 해석할 수 없고, 복원 경로에는 호환 프로바이더 테이블을 남겨 둘 방법이 없습니다. 이미 페이지 분할된 홈은 지금은 제품으로 제거할 수 없습니다. 의도한 동작이 아니라 알려진 미해결 작업입니다. -예외: 기존 provider 테이블을 제거하는 전환 도중에 페이지형 기록이 처음 감지되면, OpenCodex는 해당 시도를 거절하고 설정·참조 프로필·저널을 복원하여 기존 대화를 보존합니다. 설정 후보를 만들기 전에 감지했거나 후보가 이미 provider 테이블을 유지하는 경우에는 설정을 계속 적용할 수 있습니다. +루트 URL 재정의 방식으로 돌아갈 때 OpenCodex는 기록 사전 점검이 통과하더라도 기존 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 정의를 설정 적용 전에 유지합니다. 설정 적용 후나 백그라운드 기록 작업 시작 중에 Codex가 기록 형식을 전환해도 이전 `opencodex` 대화가 제공자를 계속 찾을 수 있습니다. 새 대화는 선택된 루트 제공자를 사용하며, 명시적 복원에는 기존의 별도 제거 검사가 적용됩니다. 대화를 강제로 이전하려고 실행 중인 페이지 분할 대화 원본이나 스레드 행을 고치지 마세요. 복구 전에 해당 대화를 닫은 뒤, 개인 대화 내용을 올리지 말고 정확한 오류와 버전을 보고하세요. 백업이나 스크립트 성공만으로 표시 복구가 증명되지는 않으므로 Codex를 다시 열어 확인하세요. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/guides/codex-integration.md index 19c17129bf..1394091fe9 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -415,6 +415,6 @@ ocx restore back # point plain Codex at the running proxy again Если затронутое хранилище поддерживает постраничную историю, смена провайдера может вернуть `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`, в том числе для строк legacy. По этой причине больше не отклоняются конфигурация Codex, опорный профиль и каталог моделей. `ocx sync` и `ocx start` по-прежнему записывают эти файлы и задают `model_catalog_json`, поэтому выбор модели Codex продолжает показывать все модели, маршрутизируемые через OpenCodex. Переразметку истории разговоров останавливает только эта причина: порядковые номера постраничной истории выделяет собственный процесс записи Codex, и повторная попытка этого не меняет. Любая другая причина предварительной проверки истории — нечитаемая база состояния, история со сменившейся идентификацией или проверка, которую не удалось запустить, — по-прежнему отклоняет весь переход и откатывает его, потому что такие случаи могут пройти позже. В этом состоянии OpenCodex не изменяет постраничные файлы истории и строки тредов. Существующие разговоры сохраняют уже назначенного провайдера и не мигрируют; новые разговоры идут через прокси как обычно. Когда переразметка останавливается, таблица `[model_providers.opencodex]`, уже бывшая в домашнем каталоге, сохраняется, а не снимается, в том числе в форме root-override (loopback), чтобы разговоры со строками, помеченными `opencodex`, сохраняли существующий идентификатор провайдера. CLI выводит `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)`. `ocx restore` и удаление конфигурации Codex по-прежнему отказывают по `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`. Удаление определения `[model_providers.opencodex]`, пока строки тредов на него ссылаются, сделало бы эти разговоры неразрешимыми, а путь восстановления не умеет оставлять таблицу совместимости провайдера. Домашний каталог, уже переведённый на постраничную историю, сейчас нельзя удалить средствами продукта; это известная открытая задача, а не задуманное поведение. -Исключение: если постраничная история впервые обнаружена во время перехода, который удалил бы существующую таблицу провайдера, OpenCodex отклоняет эту попытку и восстанавливает конфигурацию, справочный профиль и журнал, сохраняя существующие разговоры. Обнаружение до построения кандидата или кандидат, уже сохраняющий таблицу, по-прежнему допускает обновление конфигурации. +При возврате к режиму переопределения корневого URL OpenCodex сохраняет существующее определение `[model_providers.opencodex]` до фиксации конфигурации, даже если предварительная проверка истории успешна. Поэтому старые разговоры `opencodex` сохраняют доступ к своему провайдеру, если Codex преобразует историю после фиксации или во время запуска фоновой обработки. Новые разговоры используют выбранный корневой провайдер; явное восстановление по-прежнему выполняет отдельные проверки удаления. Не переписывайте активную постраничную историю или строку треда, чтобы самостоятельно перенести разговоры. Закройте разговор перед восстановлением и сообщите точную ошибку и версии без публикации личной истории. Наличие резервной копии или успешный скрипт не доказывает восстановление отображения: проверьте разговор после повторного открытия Codex. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/guides/codex-integration.md index 988fe8d7d4..17a8630c21 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -472,6 +472,6 @@ service stop` yerel Codex'i geri yükler. Etkilenen geçmiş deposu sayfalamayı destekliyorsa sağlayıcı değişimi `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` döndürebilir; legacy satırlar da buna dahildir. Bu neden artık Codex yapılandırmasını, başvuru profilini veya model kataloğunu reddetmez. `ocx sync` ve `ocx start` bu dosyaları yazmaya ve `model_catalog_json` yolunu ayarlamaya devam eder; böylece Codex model seçicisi OpenCodex üzerinden yönlendirilen her modeli göstermeyi sürdürür. Konuşma geçmişinin yeniden etiketlenmesini durduran yalnızca bu nedendir, çünkü sayfalanmış geçmiş sıra numaralarını Codex’in kendi yerel yazıcısı atar ve yeniden denemek bunu değiştirmez. Okunamayan bir durum veritabanı, kimliği değişmiş bir geçmiş veya çalıştırılamayan bir ön kontrol gibi diğer geçmiş ön kontrol nedenleri, daha sonra başarılı olabilecekleri için hâlâ tüm değişimi reddeder ve geri alır. Bu durumda OpenCodex sayfalanmış geçmiş dosyalarını veya iş parçacığı satırlarını değiştirmez. Mevcut konuşmalar zaten etiketlendikleri sağlayıcıda kalır ve taşınmaz; yeni konuşmalar proxy üzerinden normal şekilde yönlendirilir. Yeniden etiketleme durduğunda, ev dizininde zaten bulunan bir `[model_providers.opencodex]` tablosu kaldırılmaz, kök-override (loopback) biçimde bile tutulur; böylece satırları `opencodex` olarak etiketlenmiş konuşmalar hâlâ var olan bir sağlayıcı kimliğini korur. CLI şunu yazdırır: `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)`. `ocx restore` ve Codex yapılandırmasının kaldırılması `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` nedeniyle hâlâ reddedilir. İş parçacığı satırları hâlâ ona başvuruyken `[model_providers.opencodex]` tanımını kaldırmak o konuşmaları çözülemez yapar ve geri yükleme yolu uyumluluk sağlayıcı tablosunu tutamaz. Zaten sayfalanmış bir ev dizini şu anda ürün üzerinden kaldırılamaz; bu amaçlanan davranış değil, bilinen açık iştir. -İstisna: mevcut sağlayıcı tablosunu kaldıracak bir geçiş sırasında sayfalama ilk kez algılanırsa OpenCodex bu denemeyi reddeder; mevcut konuşmaları korumak için yapılandırmayı, başvuru profilini ve günlüğü geri yükler. Aday oluşturulmadan önce algılanması veya adayın tabloyu zaten koruması, yapılandırma güncellemelerine yine izin verir. +Kök URL geçersiz kılma biçimine dönülürken OpenCodex, geçmiş ön kontrolü başarılı olsa bile yapılandırmayı kaydetmeden önce mevcut `[model_providers.opencodex]` tanımını korur. Böylece Codex, kayıttan sonra veya arka plan geçmiş işlemi başlarken geçmiş biçimini değiştirirse eski `opencodex` konuşmaları sağlayıcılarını bulmaya devam eder. Yeni konuşmalar seçili kök sağlayıcıyı kullanır; açıkça istenen geri yükleme, mevcut ayrı kaldırma kontrollerini korur. Konuşmaları kendiniz taşımak için etkin sayfalanmış geçmişi veya iş parçacığı satırını yeniden yazmayın. Kurtarmadan önce konuşmayı kapatın ve özel geçmişi yayımlamadan tam hatayı ve sürümleri bildirin. Yedek veya başarılı betik görüntünün düzeldiğini kanıtlamaz; Codex’i yeniden açıp konuşmayı kontrol edin. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/guides/codex-integration.md index 30150286bb..13612608e9 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -358,6 +358,6 @@ ocx restore back # point plain Codex at the running proxy again 如果受影响的历史存储支持分页，提供商切换可能返回 `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`。该原因不再拒绝写入 Codex 配置、参考配置档和模型目录。`ocx sync` 与 `ocx start` 仍会写入这些文件并设置 `model_catalog_json`，因此 Codex 模型选择器会继续显示所有经 OpenCodex 路由的模型。只有这一条原因会让会话历史的重新标记停手，因为分页历史序号由 Codex 自己的写入器分配，重试也不会改变。无法读取的状态数据库、身份已变的历史文件、未能运行的预检等其他历史预检原因仍会拒绝整个切换并回滚，因为那些情况以后可能成功。在此状态下，OpenCodex 不会修改分页历史文件或线程行。现有会话保留已标记的提供商，不会被迁移；新会话仍正常经代理路由。重新标记停手时，主目录里已有的 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 表会保留而不是撤下，即便是 root-override（loopback）形式也一样，这样行上标记为 `opencodex` 的会话仍能对应到还存在的提供商 id。可迁移存储中的 legacy 记录也适用。CLI 会打印 `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)`。`ocx restore` 和移除 Codex 配置仍会因 `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` 被拒绝。线程行仍在引用时撤掉 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 定义会使这些会话无法解析，而恢复路径没有办法留下兼容提供商表。已经分页的主目录目前无法通过产品卸载；这是已知的未完成工作，而非预期行为。 -例外：如果在将删除现有提供商表的切换过程中首次检测到分页历史，OpenCodex 会拒绝本次尝试并恢复配置、参考配置档和日志，以保留现有会话。在构建候选配置之前检测到分页，或候选配置已经保留提供商表时，仍可继续更新配置。 +返回根 URL 覆盖模式时，即使历史预检通过，OpenCodex 也会在提交配置前保留已有的 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 定义。这样，即使 Codex 在提交后或后台历史任务启动时迁移历史格式，旧的 `opencodex` 对话仍能找到其提供商。新对话继续使用所选的根提供商；显式恢复仍执行原有的独立删除检查。 不要改写正在使用的分页历史文件或线程行来自行迁移这些会话。恢复前关闭相关会话，并只报告准确的错误和版本，不要公开私人历史。备份或脚本成功并不能证明显示已恢复；重新打开 Codex 后检查会话。 diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/guides/codex-integration.md index f9456be72b..f7bfefac13 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -365,6 +365,6 @@ ocx restore back # 讓普通 Codex 再次指向仍在執行的 proxy 如果受影響的歷史儲存區支援分頁，提供者切換可能傳回 `history_paginated_requires_native_writer`。此原因不再拒絕寫入 Codex 設定、參考設定檔與模型目錄。`ocx sync` 與 `ocx start` 仍會寫入這些檔案並設定 `model_catalog_json`，因此 Codex 模型選擇器會繼續顯示所有經 OpenCodex 路由的模型。只有這一條原因會讓對話歷史的重新標記停手，因為分頁歷史序號由 Codex 自己的寫入器分配，重試也不會改變。無法讀取的狀態資料庫、身分已變的歷史檔案、未能執行的預檢等其他歷史預檢原因仍會拒絕整個切換並回復，因為那些情況以後可能成功。在此狀態下，OpenCodex 不會修改分頁歷史檔案或執行緒列。既有對話保留已標記的提供者，不會被遷移；新對話仍正常經代理路由。重新標記停手時，家目錄裡既有的 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 表會保留而不是撤下，即便是 root-override（loopback）形式也一樣，這樣列上標記為 `opencodex` 的對話仍能對應到還存在的提供者 id。可遷移儲存區中的 legacy 記錄也適用。CLI 會印出 `Codex resume history: left to Codex's native writer (history_paginated_requires_native_writer)`。`ocx restore` 與移除 Codex 設定仍會因 `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` 被拒絕。執行緒列仍在參照時撤掉 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 定義會使這些對話無法解析，而復原路徑沒有辦法留下相容提供者表。已經分頁的家目錄目前無法透過產品解除安裝；這是已知的未完成工作，而非預期行為。 -例外：如果在將刪除既有提供者表的切換過程中首次偵測到分頁歷史，OpenCodex 會拒絕本次嘗試並還原設定、參考設定檔與日誌，以保留既有對話。在建立候選設定之前偵測到分頁，或候選設定已保留提供者表時，仍可繼續更新設定。 +返回根 URL 覆寫模式時，即使歷史預檢通過，OpenCodex 也會在提交設定前保留既有的 `[model_providers.opencodex]` 定義。如此一來，即使 Codex 在提交後或背景歷史工作啟動時遷移歷史格式，舊的 `opencodex` 對話仍能找到其提供者。新對話繼續使用所選的根提供者；明確要求的還原仍執行原有的獨立刪除檢查。 請勿改寫使用中的分頁歷史檔案或執行緒列來自行遷移這些對話。復原前關閉相關對話，只回報確切錯誤與版本，不要公開私人歷史。備份或指令碼成功不能證明顯示已復原；重新開啟 Codex 後確認對話。 diff --git a/src/codex/inject.ts b/src/codex/inject.ts index 69e6276248..8861efef97 100644 --- a/src/codex/inject.ts +++ b/src/codex/inject.ts @@ -465,19 +465,14 @@ async function injectCodexConfigImpl( */ /* * Re-observed inside the artifact transaction. A store that migrates to paginated history - * mid-write can retire the relabel unit only while its already-admitted candidate leaves - * existing provider references resolvable. A candidate that removes the old provider table - * needs compensation; adding it after witness construction would change admitted bytes. + * mid-write can retire the relabel unit while its already-admitted candidate leaves + * existing provider references resolvable. Existing provider definitions are retained + * before the witness; no post-commit compensation may overwrite a newer native write. */ const observeHistoryRefusalOrThrow = (known: string | null): string | null => { if (known) return known; const observed = historyPreflight(); if (observed && observed !== HISTORY_RELABEL_STANDS_DOWN) throw new CodexHistoryPreflightRefusal(observed); - if (observed === HISTORY_RELABEL_STANDS_DOWN && hadOcxProviderTableOnDisk && !providerTableMode) { - // Pagination appeared after retention was decided. Skipping relabel while publishing - // this table-removing candidate would orphan the still-opencodex conversations. - throw new CodexHistoryPreflightRefusal(observed); - } return observed; }; const observedHistoryRefusal = historyPreflight(); @@ -494,12 +489,13 @@ async function injectCodexConfigImpl( /* * Rows this home may have tagged `opencodex` resolve only through a provider table. Design B - * normally retires that table because the relabel migrates those rows back to `openai` in - * the same pass; with the relabel stood down, stripping it anyway would leave every such - * conversation pointing at a provider id that no longer exists. Keep what was already - * published, and keep it BEFORE the witness so the lock admits the bytes actually written. + * selects the built-in `openai` provider for new work, but its background relabel is not + * atomic with native artifact publication. Codex can paginate immediately after the final + * check or while that worker starts. Keep an existing definition regardless of the current + * preflight result, BEFORE the witness, so those old references remain resolvable even if + * the worker fails. Explicit restoration retains its separate removal and history guards. */ - if (historyRelabelRefusal && hadOcxProviderTableOnDisk && !providerTableMode) { + if (hadOcxProviderTableOnDisk && !providerTableMode) { content = applyEol( content.trimEnd() + "\n" + buildProviderTableBlockForTarget(routingTarget, websocketsEnabled(config ?? {})), eol, @@ -792,6 +788,7 @@ async function injectCodexConfigImpl( // handed down fixed; the Worker never takes a direction from its caller. // A stood-down relabel unit spawns no Worker: the preflight it would run first has // already refused, and the config half is committed either way. + historyArtifactStageForTests?.("before-history-worker"); const historyOutcome: CodexHistoryJobOutcome = historyRelabelRefusal ? { kind: "skipped" } : await runCodexHistoryJob({ @@ -989,4 +986,3 @@ export { setBeforeRestoreConfigForTests, skippedRestoreEnvelope, } from "./inject/restore"; - diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index b32ede3cbe..8307137ce2 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ Provider `showThinkingSummary` is a Responses request default; it does not rewri ## Paginated history writer boundary -`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply also compensates when late pagination would leave an existing provider table removed; candidates already retaining that table can still commit. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. +`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates refused restore/removal transitions. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply retains an existing provider definition before candidate admission even when history preflight passes, so migration after artifact commit or during worker startup cannot leave earlier conversations without their provider. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. Codex pool settings and their consumers follow the [reset-first ordering contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#reset-first-account-ordering), including independent-quota fallback and preserved affinity. diff --git a/structure/codex-home.md b/structure/codex-home.md index ab22c5e805..aa6b0bb5b3 100644 --- a/structure/codex-home.md +++ b/structure/codex-home.md @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ Plan-based automatic exclusions leave native credential files untouched and pres Injection preflights affected history using the normalized config candidate before writing config/profile/journal, then checks again after the complete artifact write. Native restore also rechecks after successful journal restoration or fallback removal, while exact config/profile/journal preimages and any coordinated remove transaction remain available for compensation. -What a detected migration does depends on which refusal it is, and on direction. On apply, `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` retires the relabel unit and the config/profile/journal write stands when the admitted candidate preserves any existing provider table. Retention is decided before witness construction. If pagination first appears during the artifact transaction and that candidate would remove a previously published table, apply instead refuses and compensates all three artifacts; coordinated admission also rolls back its transition. It never changes candidate bytes after admission. Candidates already using provider-table mode can still commit. Any other reason there — an unreadable state database, a changed rollout identity, a preflight that could not run — may succeed on a later attempt, so it still restores all three preimages before returning a structured refusal, including on legacy-uncoordinated homes. Restore and removal compensate on every reason, because retiring a provider definition its thread rows still name would orphan them. A failed config restore stops catalog/history work; coordinated restore rolls back its published remove transition. Legacy first-line provider patches are bound to the validated file identity before and after writing. These compensating checks do not provide a native-writer lock or authorize external ordinal allocation. +What a detected migration does depends on which refusal it is, and on direction. On apply, `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` retires the relabel unit and the config/profile/journal write stands when the admitted candidate preserves any existing provider table. Retention is decided before witness construction and does not depend on history preflight passing: apply keeps any existing provider definition while selecting the requested root provider. This also protects references when native migration begins after artifact commit or during worker startup, without compensating over newer native writes. Background worker failures remain reported, and candidate bytes never change after admission. Any other reason there — an unreadable state database, a changed rollout identity, a preflight that could not run — may succeed on a later attempt, so it still restores all three preimages before returning a structured refusal, including on legacy-uncoordinated homes. Restore and removal compensate on every reason, because retiring a provider definition its thread rows still name would orphan them. A failed config restore stops catalog/history work; coordinated restore rolls back its published remove transition. Legacy first-line provider patches are bound to the validated file identity before and after writing. These compensating checks do not provide a native-writer lock or authorize external ordinal allocation. The legacy external writer is now refused for affected rows in any store whose schema includes history_mode, even while their row mode is still legacy. This deliberately sacrifices automatic relabeling on migration-capable stores rather than racing native conversion. Synchronous/asynchronous restore, inline journal restore, and direct config removal preserve all artifacts on that refusal, so an already-paginated home cannot yet be uninstalled through the product; apply instead writes its config and keeps a `[model_providers.opencodex]` table the home already published, so rows naming that provider keep resolving. diff --git a/structure/config.md b/structure/config.md index d77e161193..780b67275b 100644 --- a/structure/config.md +++ b/structure/config.md @@ -167,8 +167,8 @@ leave the existing catalog and cache untouched, and their concrete messages are Exactly one conversation-history refusal scopes the relabel unit instead of vetoing the apply transition, and only because it is permanent. Codex allocates paginated rollout ordinals inside its own writer, so `history_paginated_requires_native_writer` is not retryable: when the admitted -candidate does not remove a previously published provider table, the transition writes config, profile, -and `model_catalog_json`; otherwise late pagination triggers the compensating rollback described below. +candidate preserves any existing provider table, the transition writes config, profile, +and `model_catalog_json`. On successful apply, the relabel job is skipped without spawning its Worker, and the reason travels in the human message and in the structured `historyPreflightFailureReason` field *alongside* `success: true`. Every other reason — an @@ -177,17 +177,14 @@ describes a store that may be relabelable on the next attempt, so those keep the and the compensating rollback. Recording them as a stand-down would mark the transition converged and suppress the relabel permanently. -Standing the relabel down changes what the routing form may retire. Rows this home tagged -`opencodex` resolve only through a `[model_providers.opencodex]` table; the loopback form -normally retires that table precisely because the relabel migrates those rows back to `openai` -in the same pass. With the relabel stood down, a table the home already published survives the -write, so those conversations keep a provider id that exists. Paginated rollout bytes and thread -rows are never modified in this state. - -Retention is decided before the candidate witness. If pagination first appears during the -artifact transaction while a loopback candidate would remove an existing table, injection -refuses and compensates config/profile/journal instead of committing an orphaned provider -reference. A candidate already using provider-table mode can still finish without relabeling. +Rows this home tagged `opencodex` resolve through a `[model_providers.opencodex]` table. +Apply retains that existing definition before building the candidate witness, even when +history preflight passes. The root-override form still selects the built-in provider for new +conversations. Background history work is not atomic with config publication, so its future +success cannot authorize retiring the old definition first. If native pagination begins after +artifact commit or while the worker starts, the old references still resolve and any worker +failure is reported. Paginated rollout bytes and thread rows remain untouched. Explicit +restore and removal retain their separate guards below. Treating the refusal as a veto is what made every current Codex home unusable: paginated rollouts refuse unconditionally, so `model_catalog_json` never reached config.toml and both the diff --git a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md index 288c9438ac..b9da54b46f 100644 --- a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md +++ b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md @@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ The provider editor field policy exposes `showThinkingSummary` as a boolean prov ## Paginated history writer boundary -`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply also compensates when late pagination would leave an existing provider table removed; candidates already retaining that table can still commit. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. +`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates refused restore/removal transitions. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply retains an existing provider definition before candidate admission even when history preflight passes, so migration after artifact commit or during worker startup cannot leave earlier conversations without their provider. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. Codex pool settings and their consumers follow the [reset-first ordering contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#reset-first-account-ordering), including independent-quota fallback and preserved affinity. Codex account DTOs and cards expose the routing-plan exclusion separately from credential health; the [plan exclusion contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#automatic-pool-plan-exclusions) also governs CLI projection. Private pool credential metadata follows the [quota-history publication identity contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#quota-history-publication-identity); credential-only and account DTO projections omit it. diff --git a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md index 0350912666..4c3293155c 100644 --- a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md +++ b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ Provider configuration documents distinguish actual summaries from raw reasoning ## Paginated history writer boundary -`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply also compensates when late pagination would leave an existing provider table removed; candidates already retaining that table can still commit. See the [history writer contract](../codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. +`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates refused restore/removal transitions. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply retains an existing provider definition before candidate admission even when history preflight passes, so migration after artifact commit or during worker startup cannot leave earlier conversations without their provider. See the [history writer contract](../codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. Private pool credential metadata follows the [quota-history publication identity contract](../providers/openai-tiers.md#quota-history-publication-identity); credential-only and account DTO projections omit it. diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index 93892165b1..dcb8d42de7 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ Listener startup diagnostics follow [the runtime lifecycle contract](../runtime. `src/codex/auth-api/account-list.ts` projects `selectionExcludedReason: "plan_excluded"` and `selectionExcludedPlan` from the routing config, even when a newer display-only WHAM plan could not be persisted. The dashboard and account CLI show the policy reason separately from credential health; renewal clears the derived fields. The automatic next-session action and badge are omitted for excluded rows. ## Paginated history writer boundary -`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply also compensates when late pagination would leave an existing provider table removed; candidates already retaining that table can still commit. See the [history writer contract](../codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. +`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates refused restore/removal transitions. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply retains an existing provider definition before candidate admission even when history preflight passes, so migration after artifact commit or during worker startup cannot leave earlier conversations without their provider. See the [history writer contract](../codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. The [explicit model-capability contract](../config.md#explicit-per-model-capability-declarations) preserves operator declarations through provider storage and catalog capture; it does not infer upstream capability or change this surface's routing behavior. diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index 310ba62997..193b06c71c 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ Responses route normalization resolves provider summary defaults from the origin ## Paginated history writer boundary -`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply also compensates when late pagination would leave an existing provider table removed; candidates already retaining that table can still commit. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. +`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates refused restore/removal transitions. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply retains an existing provider definition before candidate admission even when history preflight passes, so migration after artifact commit or during worker startup cannot leave earlier conversations without their provider. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. Codex pool settings and their consumers follow the [reset-first ordering contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#reset-first-account-ordering), including independent-quota fallback and preserved affinity. diff --git a/structure/subagents.md b/structure/subagents.md index 908ebe20a0..cfa7eb29df 100644 --- a/structure/subagents.md +++ b/structure/subagents.md @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ Final-route summary visibility is recomputed after fallback from the original Re ## Paginated history writer boundary -`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates detected migration. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply also compensates when late pagination would leave an existing provider table removed; candidates already retaining that table can still commit. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. +`src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates refused restore/removal transitions. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply retains an existing provider definition before candidate admission even when history preflight passes, so migration after artifact commit or during worker startup cannot leave earlier conversations without their provider. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. Codex pool settings and their consumers follow the [reset-first ordering contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#reset-first-account-ordering), including independent-quota fallback and preserved affinity. diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts index 065814d356..1b2d65a1ba 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts @@ -221,22 +221,59 @@ describe("injectCodexConfig integration (Design B)", () => { expect(child.status, child.stderr).toBe(0); const value = JSON.parse(child.stdout); expect(value.kind, child.stdout).toBe(coordinated ? "coordinated" : "legacy-uncoordinated"); - expect(value.result).toMatchObject({success:authless,historyPreflightFailureReason:"history_paginated_requires_native_writer"}); - if (authless) { - const config = Bun.TOML.parse(readFileSync(configPath,"utf8")) as any; - expect(config.model_provider).toBe("opencodex"); - expect(config.model_providers.opencodex.base_url).toBe("http://127.0.0.1:10100/v1"); - expect(readFileSync(profilePath,"utf8")).not.toBe(before[1]); - } else { - expect([configPath, profilePath, journalPath].map(path => existsSync(path) ? readFileSync(path, "utf8") : null)).toEqual(before); - expect(value.after).toEqual(value.before); - } + expect(value.result).toMatchObject({success:true,historyPreflightFailureReason:"history_paginated_requires_native_writer"}); + const config = Bun.TOML.parse(readFileSync(configPath,"utf8")) as any; + expect(config.model_provider).toBe(authless ? "opencodex" : undefined); + expect(config.model_providers.opencodex.base_url).toBe("http://127.0.0.1:10100/v1"); + expect(readFileSync(profilePath,"utf8")).not.toBe(before[1]); + if (coordinated) expect(value.after).not.toEqual(value.before); const db = new Database(join(codexHome, "state_5.sqlite"), { readonly: true }); try { expect(db.query("SELECT model_provider FROM threads").get()).toEqual({model_provider:"opencodex"}); } finally { db.close(); } }); + test.each([false, true])("pagination after artifact commit keeps the existing provider (coordinated=%s)", coordinated => { + const configPath = join(codexHome, "config.toml"); + writeFileSync(configPath, coordinated ? 'model="test"\n' : DESIGN_B_BLOCK + "\n"); + if (coordinated) { + const seed = runInject(codexHome, ocxHome, JSON.stringify({ codexClientCompaction: true })); + expect(seed.status, seed.stderr).toBe(0); + expect(JSON.parse(seed.stdout).success).toBe(true); + } else { + writeFileSync(configPath, 'model_provider="opencodex"\n[model_providers.opencodex]\nname="OpenCodex"\nbase_url="http://127.0.0.1:10100/v1"\nwire_api="responses"\n'); + writeFileSync(join(codexHome, "opencodex.config.toml"), "# legacy profile\n"); + } + const script = ` + const {Database}=require("bun:sqlite"); + const {join}=require("node:path"); + const {injectCodexConfig,setHistoryArtifactStageForTests}=require("./src/codex/inject"); + let migrated=false; + setHistoryArtifactStageForTests(stage=>{ + if(stage!=="before-history-worker") return; + const db=new Database(join(process.env.CODEX_HOME,"state_5.sqlite")); + db.run("CREATE TABLE threads (rollout_path TEXT, model_provider TEXT, history_mode TEXT)"); + db.run("INSERT INTO threads VALUES ('fixture','opencodex','paginated')"); + db.close();migrated=true; + }); + const result=await injectCodexConfig(10100,{}); + console.log(JSON.stringify({migrated,result})); + `; + const child = spawnSync(process.execPath, ["--eval", script], { + cwd: repoRoot, env: { ...process.env, CODEX_HOME: codexHome, OPENCODEX_HOME: ocxHome }, + encoding: "utf8", timeout: SPAWN_BUDGET_MS - 5_000, + }); + expect(child.status, child.stderr).toBe(0); + const value = JSON.parse(child.stdout); + expect(value.migrated).toBe(true); + const parsed = Bun.TOML.parse(readFileSync(configPath, "utf8")) as any; + expect(parsed.model_providers?.opencodex?.base_url).toBe("http://127.0.0.1:10100/v1"); + expect(value.result.success).toBe(true); + const db = new Database(join(codexHome, "state_5.sqlite"), { readonly: true }); + try { expect(db.query("SELECT model_provider FROM threads").get()).toEqual({ model_provider: "opencodex" }); } + finally { db.close(); } + }); + for (const stage of ["before-preflight", "after-preflight", "after-config", "after-artifacts"]) { test.each([false,true])(`a store that migrates mid-transaction retires the relabel unit and keeps the config (${stage}, legacy=%s)`,(legacy)=>{ const original=legacy ? DESIGN_B_BLOCK+"\n" : 'model="test"\n'; @@ -592,11 +629,11 @@ describe("injectCodexConfig integration (Design B)", () => { const config = readFileSync(join(codexHome, "config.toml"), "utf8"); expect(config).toContain('openai_base_url = "http://127.0.0.1:10100/v1"'); expect(config).toContain("# Auto-injected by opencodex"); - expect(config).not.toContain("[model_providers.opencodex]"); + expect(config).toContain("[model_providers.opencodex]"); expect(config).not.toContain('model_provider = "opencodex"'); expect(config).toContain('model = "gpt-5.5"'); - // Exactly the Design B markers survive (routing + realtime sideband) — no accumulation. - expect(config.match(/Auto-injected by opencodex/g)?.length).toBe(2); + // Routing, realtime sideband and the retained compatibility provider each have one marker. + expect(config.match(/Auto-injected by opencodex/g)?.length).toBe(3); expect(config).toContain(DESIGN_B_BLOCK); }); @@ -1320,9 +1357,10 @@ describe("injectCodexConfig integration (Design B)", () => { expect(runInject(codexHome, ocxHome).status).toBe(0); const back = readFileSync(join(codexHome, "config.toml"), "utf8"); expect(back).toContain('openai_base_url = "http://127.0.0.1:10100/v1"'); - expect(back).not.toContain("[model_providers.opencodex]"); + expect(back).toContain("[model_providers.opencodex]"); + expect(back).toContain("requires_openai_auth = true"); expect(back).not.toContain('model_provider = "opencodex"'); - expect(back.match(/Auto-injected by opencodex/g)?.length).toBe(2); + expect(back.match(/Auto-injected by opencodex/g)?.length).toBe(3); expect(back).toContain(DESIGN_B_BLOCK); expect(runInject(codexHome, ocxHome, JSON.stringify({ codexDesktopAuthless: true })).status).toBe(0); @@ -1350,7 +1388,7 @@ describe("injectCodexConfig integration (Design B)", () => { expect(runInject(codexHome, ocxHome).status).toBe(0); const designB = readFileSync(join(codexHome, "config.toml"), "utf8"); expect(designB).toContain(DESIGN_B_BLOCK); - expect(designB).not.toContain("[model_providers.opencodex]"); + expect(designB).toContain("[model_providers.opencodex]"); expect(designB).not.toContain('model_provider = "opencodex"'); // Disabling leaves exactly one root override, not the table form's copy plus a new one. expect(designB.match(/openai_base_url/g)?.length).toBe(1); From 6dcb69051f0b0961111759a139fa70320f06a6aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 10:39:59 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 040/113] docs: describe desktop regression coverage precisely Co-authored-by: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> --- structure/ops/docs-and-release.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md index 30c5f8e1cd..f7b5acd0ae 100644 --- a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md +++ b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ preview has closed that stable patch line. ## Cross-platform CI -The [desktop membership contract](../runtime.md#codex-desktop-process-membership) has adapter regressions on every host and real PowerShell prefilter regressions with synthetic CIM rows on Windows in `tests/clients/desktop-app-restart.test.ts`. A skipped Windows lane does not exercise that native filter; uid-dependent POSIX cases in `tests/clients/desktop-app-restart-posix.test.ts` are skipped on Windows. +The [desktop membership contract](../runtime.md#codex-desktop-process-membership) has adapter regression coverage on every host and real PowerShell prefilter regression coverage with synthetic CIM rows on Windows in `tests/clients/desktop-app-restart.test.ts`. A skipped Windows lane does not exercise that native filter; uid-dependent POSIX cases in `tests/clients/desktop-app-restart-posix.test.ts` are skipped on Windows. `.github/workflows/ci.yml` is the ordinary quality gate for runtime/package changes. Linux runs the suite in four shards with a separate `gates` job, and macOS runs it in two shards. Windows From 24adf125bd9132c155df4e6d869a3bf0e31ba345 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theo / Taeyoon Kang Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 09:15:46 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 041/113] fix(clients): propagate image capabilities across integrations Preserve declared OpenClaw input modalities and emit Kimi image_in capabilities instead of losing catalog-backed vision support. Keep unknown-model defaults and schemas without an established capability field unchanged. Cover all 14 capability-aware config exporters and the Codex/Claude catalog surfaces from both Anthropic auth-provider seeds. Record the complete integration scope in the docs. Refs #4667 Co-authored-by: Theo / Taeyoon Kang --- .../src/content/docs/guides/providers.md | 8 +- src/clients/config-export.ts | 10 ++- structure/clients/integrations.md | 18 ++++ .../claude-model-info.test.ts | 27 +++++- .../catalog-input-modality-enum.test.ts | 23 +++++ .../client-config-export-new-clients.test.ts | 35 +++++++- .../config/client-config-new-clients.test.ts | 7 +- .../management-client-config-route.test.ts | 86 ++++++++++++------- 8 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/providers.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/providers.md index 7883fc4b59..901c75b242 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/providers.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/providers.md @@ -69,8 +69,12 @@ is retained once at `~/.opencodex/config.json.pre-openai-tiers-v2.bak`; restore The built-in Claude model seeds advertise text and image input for both `anthropic` (OAuth) and `anthropic-apikey`, consistent with [Anthropic's model overview](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/models/overview). Explicit per-model input-modality overrides remain authoritative; unknown models are not assumed -image-capable. After updating opencodex, regenerate or refresh the client configuration managed by -opencodex so clients receive the updated image capability metadata. +image-capable. This applies across integrations wherever the client's configuration supports image +capability metadata: OpenClaw exports a declared `input` array, and Kimi Code exports +`capabilities: ["image_in"]` only for image-capable models. OpenClaw omits `input` when no supported +modalities are declared; Kimi omits `capabilities` for unknown or text-only models. Clients without +a supported capability field keep their existing configuration shape. After updating opencodex, +regenerate or refresh the client configuration managed by opencodex to receive the updated metadata. ## Auth modes diff --git a/src/clients/config-export.ts b/src/clients/config-export.ts index 21f0858179..0f6c756a25 100644 --- a/src/clients/config-export.ts +++ b/src/clients/config-export.ts @@ -812,6 +812,7 @@ export interface OpenclawModelEntry { id: string; name: string; contextWindow?: number; + input?: string[]; } export interface OpenclawProviderBlock { @@ -839,15 +840,15 @@ export interface KimiProviderBlock { /** * `max_context_size` is mandatory and must be positive, so a model with no * authoritative context window is omitted from the document entirely rather - * than guessed at. `capabilities` is never emitted: our catalog does not - * assert them, and Kimi's own inference works off OpenAI-style name prefixes - * that a routed selector will not match. + * than guessed at. Catalog image input becomes `image_in`; other capabilities + * are not inferred from routed model names. */ export interface KimiModelBlock { provider: string; model: string; max_context_size: number; display_name?: string; + capabilities?: ["image_in"]; } export interface KimiGeneratedConfig { @@ -974,10 +975,12 @@ function buildHermesClientConfig(ctx: ExportContext): HermesGeneratedConfig { function buildOpenclawClientConfig(ctx: ExportContext): OpenclawGeneratedConfig { const models: OpenclawModelEntry[] = normalizeExportModels(ctx.models).map(model => { const context = authoritativeContextWindow(model.contextWindow); + const input = [...new Set(model.inputModalities?.filter(value => ["text", "image", "video", "audio"].includes(value)))]; return { id: model.namespaced, name: exportModelLabel(model), ...(context !== undefined ? { contextWindow: context } : {}), + ...(input.length > 0 ? { input } : {}), }; }); const headers = proxyAdmissionHeaders(ctx.config, OPENCLAW_API_KEY_ENV_REF); @@ -1015,6 +1018,7 @@ function buildKimiClientConfig(ctx: ExportContext): KimiGeneratedConfig { model: model.namespaced, max_context_size: context, ...(model.displayName ? { display_name: model.displayName } : {}), + ...(model.inputModalities?.includes("image") ? { capabilities: ["image_in"] as ["image_in"] } : {}), }; } return { diff --git a/structure/clients/integrations.md b/structure/clients/integrations.md index eb4ace5975..3f2d3bf103 100644 --- a/structure/clients/integrations.md +++ b/structure/clients/integrations.md @@ -68,6 +68,24 @@ selector, preserving the underlying provider, model ID, modalities, limits, and False or missing metadata never causes local inference, so old or disabled remote hubs remain authoritative. Existing client configs receive the entries on export or managed refresh. +## Model input capability exports + +All registered integrations consume the shared catalog, including [Anthropic seed image metadata](../runtime.md#capability-aware-image-admission), through their existing schema-specific exports: + +| Client | Per-model output | +| --- | --- | +| OpenCode | `attachment`, `modalities.input` | +| Pi, OMP, Prime, Aside, omo, Gajae, DSH | `input` (text/image only) | +| ZCode | `modalities.input` (text/image only) | +| Cline | `modalities.input`, `supportsVision` | +| Hermes | `supports_vision` (see below) | +| OpenClaw | `input`, filtered to declared text/image/video/audio; omitted when none remain | +| Kimi Code | `capabilities: ["image_in"]` only for declared image input; omitted for unknown/text-only models | +| MiniMax Code | No per-model image capability field emitted | +| Raycast | `abilities.vision.supported` | + +No exporter infers image support from a model name. Existing client eligibility filters and ownership/refresh rules remain unchanged; exports do not add fields to schemas without a supported mapping. + ## Hermes Model Capabilities Hermes cannot infer custom-provider capabilities from its built-in registry. The OpenCodex diff --git a/tests/claude-integration/claude-model-info.test.ts b/tests/claude-integration/claude-model-info.test.ts index abff0b4db2..7794a73029 100644 --- a/tests/claude-integration/claude-model-info.test.ts +++ b/tests/claude-integration/claude-model-info.test.ts @@ -1,8 +1,33 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; import { buildAnthropicModelInfos, nativeEffectiveLadder } from "../../src/claude/model-info"; -import { nativeEffortClamp } from "../../src/codex/catalog"; +import { gatherRoutedModels, nativeEffortClamp } from "../../src/codex/catalog"; describe("anthropic-flavor ModelInfo discovery entries (devlog 130 B4b)", () => { + test.each(["anthropic", "anthropic-apikey"])("%s registry image inputs reach Claude discovery aliases", async (provider) => { + const models = await gatherRoutedModels({ + port: 10100, + defaultProvider: provider, + providers: { + [provider]: { + adapter: "anthropic", + baseUrl: "https://api.anthropic.com", + authMode: provider === "anthropic" ? "oauth" : "key", + liveModels: false, + }, + }, + }); + const routed = models.filter(model => model.provider === provider); + expect(routed.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + for (const idStyle of ["readable", "desktop3p"] as const) { + const infos = buildAnthropicModelInfos([], routed, undefined, idStyle); + expect(infos.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(routed.length); + expect(infos.some(info => info.id.endsWith("[1m]"))).toBe(true); + for (const info of infos) { + expect(info.capabilities.image_input.supported).toBe(true); + } + } + }); + test("routed model with adapter-reported ladder advertises exactly those rungs", () => { const [info] = buildAnthropicModelInfos([], [{ provider: "cursor", id: "gpt-5.6-luna", diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/catalog-input-modality-enum.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/catalog-input-modality-enum.test.ts index 4d9342eba4..532f77af6b 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/catalog-input-modality-enum.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/catalog-input-modality-enum.test.ts @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ import { beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; import { ensureStrictCatalogFields } from "../../src/codex/catalog/parsing"; import { catalogHintsFromModelsApiItem } from "../../src/codex/catalog/provider-fetch"; +import { buildCatalogEntries, gatherRoutedModels } from "../../src/codex/catalog"; import type { OcxConfig } from "../../src/types"; /** @@ -12,6 +13,28 @@ import type { OcxConfig } from "../../src/types"; * verbatim and the Codex app reported `unknown variant 'video'` while showing zero apps. */ describe("catalog input_modalities stay inside the enum Codex accepts", () => { + test.each(["anthropic", "anthropic-apikey"])("%s registry image inputs reach the Codex catalog", async (provider) => { + const models = await gatherRoutedModels({ + port: 10100, + defaultProvider: provider, + providers: { + [provider]: { + adapter: "anthropic", + baseUrl: "https://api.anthropic.com", + authMode: provider === "anthropic" ? "oauth" : "key", + liveModels: false, + }, + }, + }); + const routed = models.filter(model => model.provider === provider); + expect(routed.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + const entries = buildCatalogEntries(null, [], routed); + expect(entries).toHaveLength(routed.length); + for (const entry of entries) { + expect(entry.input_modalities).toEqual(["text", "image"]); + } + }); + test("an out-of-enum modality is dropped rather than written through", () => { const entry = ensureStrictCatalogFields( { slug: "zenmux/meta-muse-spark-1.1", input_modalities: ["text", "image", "audio", "video"] }, diff --git a/tests/config/client-config-export-new-clients.test.ts b/tests/config/client-config-export-new-clients.test.ts index 3a9c171238..2721520de1 100644 --- a/tests/config/client-config-export-new-clients.test.ts +++ b/tests/config/client-config-export-new-clients.test.ts @@ -133,6 +133,29 @@ describe("hermes", () => { }); describe("openclaw", () => { + test("declares image input only from catalog capabilities", () => { + const doc = buildClientConfig("openclaw", ctx()) as OpenclawGeneratedConfig; + const models = doc.models.providers[OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID]!.models; + expect(models.find(model => model.id === "anthropic/claude-opus-4-8")).toHaveProperty("input", ["text", "image"]); + expect(models.find(model => model.id === "gpt-5.5")).toHaveProperty("input", ["text"]); + expect(models.find(model => model.id === "local/no-window")).not.toHaveProperty("input"); + }); + + test("filters unsupported modalities without inventing image input", () => { + const doc = buildClientConfig("openclaw", { + ...ctx(), + models: [ + { namespaced: "p/mixed", provider: "p", id: "mixed", inputModalities: ["text", "image", "image", "audio", "video", "pdf"] }, + { namespaced: "p/unknown", provider: "p", id: "unknown", inputModalities: [] }, + { namespaced: "p/foreign", provider: "p", id: "foreign", inputModalities: ["pdf"] }, + ], + }) as OpenclawGeneratedConfig; + const models = doc.models.providers[OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID]!.models; + expect(models.find(model => model.id === "p/mixed")?.input).toEqual(["text", "image", "audio", "video"]); + expect(models.find(model => model.id === "p/unknown")).not.toHaveProperty("input"); + expect(models.find(model => model.id === "p/foreign")).not.toHaveProperty("input"); + }); + test("merges with the bundled catalog and omits a window it cannot assert", () => { const doc = buildClientConfig("openclaw", ctx()) as OpenclawGeneratedConfig; expect(doc.models.mode).toBe("merge"); @@ -252,9 +275,15 @@ describe("kimi", () => { expect(doc.providers[OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID]!.api_key).toBe(LOOPBACK_API_KEY_PLACEHOLDER); }); - test("never emits capabilities it cannot assert", () => { - const { text } = buildClientConfigText("kimi", ctx()); - expect(text).not.toContain("capabilities"); + test("declares image_in only for catalog-backed image models", () => { + const doc = buildClientConfig("kimi", ctx()) as KimiGeneratedConfig; + expect(doc.models[`${OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID}/anthropic/claude-opus-4-8`]) + .toHaveProperty("capabilities", ["image_in"]); + expect(doc.models[`${OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID}/gpt-5.5`]).not.toHaveProperty("capabilities"); + const unknown = buildClientConfig("kimi", { + ...ctx(), models: [{ namespaced: "local/unknown", provider: "local", id: "unknown", contextWindow: 32_000 }], + }) as KimiGeneratedConfig; + expect(unknown.models[`${OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID}/local/unknown`]).not.toHaveProperty("capabilities"); }); test("KIMI_CODE_HOME wins over the default", () => { diff --git a/tests/config/client-config-new-clients.test.ts b/tests/config/client-config-new-clients.test.ts index 7deb7fdb36..9e0ec710b2 100644 --- a/tests/config/client-config-new-clients.test.ts +++ b/tests/config/client-config-new-clients.test.ts @@ -121,11 +121,10 @@ describe("kimi", () => { expect(doc.providers[OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID]!.type).toBe("openai"); }); - test("never asserts capabilities it cannot know", () => { + test("asserts image input only when the catalog declares it", () => { const doc = buildClientConfig("kimi", ctx()) as KimiGeneratedConfig; - for (const model of Object.values(doc.models)) { - expect(model).not.toHaveProperty("capabilities"); - } + expect(doc.models[kimiModelAlias("anthropic/claude-opus-4-8")]?.capabilities).toEqual(["image_in"]); + expect(doc.models[kimiModelAlias("gpt-5.5")]).not.toHaveProperty("capabilities"); }); test("its document round-trips through the TOML parser", () => { diff --git a/tests/server/management-client-config-route.test.ts b/tests/server/management-client-config-route.test.ts index 9c024a02a7..21912afd0d 100644 --- a/tests/server/management-client-config-route.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/management-client-config-route.test.ts @@ -21,10 +21,14 @@ import { type ExportModel, type HermesGeneratedConfig, type McodeGeneratedConfig, + type KimiGeneratedConfig, + type OpenclawGeneratedConfig, type OpencodeGeneratedConfig, type PiGeneratedConfig, type RaycastGeneratedConfig, + type ZcodeGeneratedConfig, } from "../../src/clients/config-export"; +import type { ClineGeneratedConfig } from "../../src/clients/config-export/cline"; import type { OcxConfig } from "../../src/types"; import { catalogConvergenceFactory } from "../helpers/catalog-convergence"; import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; @@ -163,38 +167,60 @@ function toExportModel(row: ModelRow): ExportModel { describe("native Anthropic image input reaches client documents", () => { - for (const client of ["aside", "pi", "gajae"] as const) { - test.each(["anthropic", "anthropic-apikey"])(`${client} advertises image input for %s`, async (provider) => { - const config = { - port: 10100, - hostname: "127.0.0.1", - defaultProvider: provider, - providers: { - [provider]: { - adapter: "anthropic", - baseUrl: "https://api.anthropic.com", - authMode: provider === "anthropic" ? "oauth" : "key", - liveModels: false, - }, + test.each(["anthropic", "anthropic-apikey"])("all capability-aware exports advertise image input for %s", async (provider) => { + const config = { + port: 10100, + hostname: "127.0.0.1", + defaultProvider: provider, + providers: { + [provider]: { + adapter: "anthropic", + baseUrl: "https://api.anthropic.com", + authMode: provider === "anthropic" ? "oauth" : "key", + liveModels: false, }, - } as unknown as OcxConfig; - - const models = await loadExportModels(config); - const document = buildClientConfig(client, { - baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:10100/v1", - config, - models, - }) as PiGeneratedConfig; - const rows = document.providers[OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID]!.models - .filter(model => model.id.startsWith(`${provider}/claude-`)); - expect(rows.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); - for (const row of rows) { - expect({ id: row.id, input: row.input }).toEqual({ - id: row.id, input: ["text", "image"], - }); + }, + } as unknown as OcxConfig; + // Use the production catalog, not hand-authored ExportModels that would conceal missing seeds. + const models = (await loadExportModels(config)) + .filter(model => model.provider === provider); + expect(models.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + const context = { baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:10100/v1", config, models }; + const expectedInputs = models.map(model => ({ id: model.namespaced, input: ["text", "image"] })); + + for (const client of ["aside", "pi", "gajae", "prime", "omo", "omp"] as const) { + const document = buildClientConfig(client, context) as PiGeneratedConfig; + const rows = document.providers[OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID]!.models; + expect({ client, inputs: rows.map(({ id, input }) => ({ id, input })) }) + .toEqual({ client, inputs: expectedInputs }); + } + const dsh = buildClientConfig("dsh", context) as DshGeneratedConfig; + expect(dsh["llm-pi-ai"].providers[OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID]!.models.map(({ id, input }) => ({ id, input }))) + .toEqual(expectedInputs); + + const openclaw = buildClientConfig("openclaw", context) as OpenclawGeneratedConfig; + expect(openclaw.models.providers[OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID]!.models.map(({ id, input }) => ({ id, input }))) + .toEqual(expectedInputs); + const kimi = buildClientConfig("kimi", context) as KimiGeneratedConfig; + const opencode = buildClientConfig("opencode", context) as OpencodeGeneratedConfig; + const zcode = buildClientConfig("zcode", context) as ZcodeGeneratedConfig; + const cline = buildClientConfig("cline", context) as ClineGeneratedConfig; + const hermes = buildClientConfig("hermes", context) as HermesGeneratedConfig; + const raycast = buildClientConfig("raycast", context) as RaycastGeneratedConfig; + for (const model of models) { + expect(kimi.models[`${OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID}/${model.namespaced}`]?.capabilities).toEqual(["image_in"]); + for (const block of [opencode.provider, opencode.providers]) { + expect(block[OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID]!.models[model.namespaced]?.modalities?.input).toEqual(["text", "image"]); + expect(block[OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID]!.models[model.namespaced]?.attachment).toBe(true); } - }); - } + expect(zcode.provider[OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID]!.models[model.namespaced]?.modalities.input).toEqual(["text", "image"]); + const clineModel = cline.catalog.providers[OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID]!.models[model.namespaced]; + expect(clineModel?.modalities?.input).toEqual(["text", "image"]); + expect(clineModel?.supportsVision).toBe(true); + expect(hermes.providers[OPENCODE_PROVIDER_ID]!.models[model.namespaced]?.supports_vision).toBe(true); + expect(raycast.providers[0]!.models.find(row => row.id === model.namespaced)?.abilities.vision.supported).toBe(true); + } + }); }); describe("native Anthropic effort ladder reaches the Aside document", () => { From b5c313edac2fa1d6eb55027bf4a94a8ab5a88c69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 10:33:43 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 042/113] refactor: split changed contracts to respect the file-size ratchet Co-authored-by: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> --- .../codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts | 54 +--------------- .../reset-credit-consume-validation.ts | 63 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/helpers/reset-credit-consume-validation.ts diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts index 73f700834b..7f49b31cb6 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +import { registerResetCreditConsumeValidationTests } from "../helpers/reset-credit-consume-validation"; import * as usageHistoryModule from "../../src/usage/log"; import { getAccountQuotaHistory } from "../../src/codex/quota"; import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, spyOn, test } from "bun:test"; @@ -2871,16 +2872,7 @@ describe("codex-auth API", () => { }); }); - test("reset-credit consume rejects invalid account ids before credential lookup", async () => { - const req = new Request("http://localhost/api/codex-auth/reset-credits/consume", { - method: "POST", - headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, - body: JSON.stringify({ accountId: "../bad" }), - }); - const resp = await handleCodexAuthAPI(req, new URL(req.url), makeConfig()); - expect(resp!.status).toBe(400); - expect(await resp!.json()).toMatchObject({ error: "Invalid account id format" }); - }); + registerResetCreditConsumeValidationTests(makeConfig, seedPoolAccount); test("reset-credit consume returns remaining from refreshed quota, not the consume payload", async () => { const config = makeConfig(); @@ -2922,48 +2914,6 @@ describe("codex-auth API", () => { } }); - test("reset-credit consume refuses an upstream body past the shared bound instead of buffering it", async () => { - const config = makeConfig(); - seedPoolAccount(config, { id: "pool-oversized", email: "oversized@example.test" }); - const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch; - let usageCalls = 0; - try { - globalThis.fetch = (async (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { - const url = String(input); - if (url.includes("/backend-api/wham/rate-limit-reset-credits/consume")) { - // A 200 with an unbounded body was read whole by resp.json() before anything - // looked at its size, unlike every other reset-credit read on this path. - const padding = "x".repeat(BOUNDED_BODY_MAX_BYTES * 2); - return new Response(`{"code":"reset","padding":"${padding}"}`, { - status: 200, - headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, - }); - } - if (url.includes("/backend-api/wham/usage")) { - usageCalls += 1; - return Response.json({ - rate_limit: { primary_window: { used_percent: 10, reset_at: 1782000000 } }, - rate_limit_reset_credits: { available_count: 2 }, - }); - } - return originalFetch(input, init); - }) as typeof fetch; - - const req = new Request("http://localhost/api/codex-auth/reset-credits/consume", { - method: "POST", - headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, - body: JSON.stringify({ accountId: "pool-oversized" }), - }); - const resp = await handleCodexAuthAPI(req, new URL(req.url), config); - expect(resp!.status).toBe(502); - expect(await resp!.json()).toEqual({ error: "Invalid upstream reset-credit consume response" }); - // The outcome is unconfirmed, so nothing downstream may treat the redeem as observed. - expect(usageCalls).toBe(0); - } finally { - globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; - } - }); - test("reset-credit already_redeemed refreshes quota and never invents a local decrement", async () => { const config = makeConfig(); seedPoolAccount(config, { id: "pool-idempotent", email: "idem@example.test" }); diff --git a/tests/helpers/reset-credit-consume-validation.ts b/tests/helpers/reset-credit-consume-validation.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3f06e08dc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/helpers/reset-credit-consume-validation.ts @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +import { expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { handleCodexAuthAPI } from "../../src/codex/auth-api"; +import { BOUNDED_BODY_MAX_BYTES } from "../../src/lib/bounded-body"; +import type { OcxConfig } from "../../src/types"; + +export function registerResetCreditConsumeValidationTests( + makeConfig: () => OcxConfig, + seedPoolAccount: (config: OcxConfig, options: { id: string; email: string }) => unknown, +): void { + test("reset-credit consume rejects invalid account ids before credential lookup", async () => { + const req = new Request("http://localhost/api/codex-auth/reset-credits/consume", { + method: "POST", + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ accountId: "../bad" }), + }); + const resp = await handleCodexAuthAPI(req, new URL(req.url), makeConfig()); + expect(resp!.status).toBe(400); + expect(await resp!.json()).toMatchObject({ error: "Invalid account id format" }); + }); + + test("reset-credit consume refuses an upstream body past the shared bound instead of buffering it", async () => { + const config = makeConfig(); + seedPoolAccount(config, { id: "pool-oversized", email: "oversized@example.test" }); + const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch; + let usageCalls = 0; + try { + globalThis.fetch = (async (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { + const url = String(input); + if (url.includes("/backend-api/wham/rate-limit-reset-credits/consume")) { + // A 200 with an unbounded body was read whole by resp.json() before anything + // looked at its size, unlike every other reset-credit read on this path. + const padding = "x".repeat(BOUNDED_BODY_MAX_BYTES * 2); + return new Response(`{"code":"reset","padding":"${padding}"}`, { + status: 200, + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + }); + } + if (url.includes("/backend-api/wham/usage")) { + usageCalls += 1; + return Response.json({ + rate_limit: { primary_window: { used_percent: 10, reset_at: 1782000000 } }, + rate_limit_reset_credits: { available_count: 2 }, + }); + } + return originalFetch(input, init); + }) as typeof fetch; + + const req = new Request("http://localhost/api/codex-auth/reset-credits/consume", { + method: "POST", + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ accountId: "pool-oversized" }), + }); + const resp = await handleCodexAuthAPI(req, new URL(req.url), config); + expect(resp!.status).toBe(502); + expect(await resp!.json()).toEqual({ error: "Invalid upstream reset-credit consume response" }); + // The outcome is unconfirmed, so nothing downstream may treat the redeem as observed. + expect(usageCalls).toBe(0); + } finally { + globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; + } + }); + +} From 22965dc2d3303217a6da25042997c41ca026c8c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 19:47:41 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 043/113] test(google): pin CCA image refusal and typed schema envelope Add the branch-specific image-output refusal regression and replace the two untyped envelope casts. Static inspection only; product tests and CI remain operator-owned. Co-authored-by: agentHits <140916359+agentHits@users.noreply.github.com> --- .../google/google-structured-output.test.ts | 22 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/adapters/google/google-structured-output.test.ts b/tests/adapters/google/google-structured-output.test.ts index c2b845085f..b23bbcabc2 100644 --- a/tests/adapters/google/google-structured-output.test.ts +++ b/tests/adapters/google/google-structured-output.test.ts @@ -19,6 +19,17 @@ const aiStudio = { adapter: "google", baseUrl: "https://generativelanguage.googl const vertex = { adapter: "google", googleMode: "vertex", baseUrl: "https://aiplatform.googleapis.com", apiKey: "key" } as unknown as OcxProviderConfig; const cca = { adapter: "google", googleMode: "cloud-code-assist", baseUrl: "https://cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com", apiKey: "token", project: "test-project" } as unknown as OcxProviderConfig; +type CloudCodeAssistEnvelope = { + generationConfig?: unknown; + request?: { + generationConfig?: { + responseMimeType?: unknown; + responseJsonSchema?: unknown; + responseSchema?: unknown; + }; + }; +}; + const SCHEMA = { type: "object", properties: { answer: { type: "string" } }, @@ -61,7 +72,7 @@ describe("F3 Google structured output reaches the generateContent wire", () => { const { body } = await createGoogleAdapter(cca).buildRequest( parsed({ type: "json_schema", name: "answer", schema: SCHEMA, strict: true }), ); - const envelope = JSON.parse(typeof body === "string" ? body : JSON.stringify(body)) as Record; + const envelope = JSON.parse(typeof body === "string" ? body : JSON.stringify(body)) as CloudCodeAssistEnvelope; expect(envelope.generationConfig).toBeUndefined(); expect(envelope.request?.generationConfig?.responseMimeType).toBe("application/json"); @@ -71,7 +82,7 @@ describe("F3 Google structured output reaches the generateContent wire", () => { test("json_object on Cloud Code Assist sets only responseMimeType in envelope.request", async () => { const { body } = await createGoogleAdapter(cca).buildRequest(parsed({ type: "json_object" })); - const envelope = JSON.parse(typeof body === "string" ? body : JSON.stringify(body)) as Record; + const envelope = JSON.parse(typeof body === "string" ? body : JSON.stringify(body)) as CloudCodeAssistEnvelope; expect(envelope.generationConfig).toBeUndefined(); expect(envelope.request?.generationConfig?.responseMimeType).toBe("application/json"); @@ -121,6 +132,13 @@ describe("F3 unsupported modes refuse explicitly instead of dropping the schema" await expect(promise).rejects.toThrow(/cannot combine image output with structured output/); }); + test("an image-capable Cloud Code Assist model refuses the structured-output conflict", async () => { + const promise = createGoogleAdapter(cca).buildRequest( + parsed({ type: "json_schema", schema: SCHEMA }, "gemini-3-pro-image-preview"), + ); + await expect(promise).rejects.toThrow("cannot combine image output with structured output"); + }); + test("an image-capable model with NO schema keeps its image behavior", async () => { const config = await generationConfig(aiStudio, parsed(undefined, "gemini-3-pro-image-preview")); From 7b88d001f69bdb7ab1c11cd3f390d3265aaca574 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: leon80900 <80900400+leon80900@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2026 20:33:05 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 044/113] fix(catalog): hide custom models when provider is disabled Agent-Generated-By: Codex Co-authored-by: leon80900 <80900400+leon80900@users.noreply.github.com> --- src/codex/catalog/model-visibility.ts | 1 + src/codex/catalog/routed-gather.ts | 3 ++- structure/catalog.md | 2 ++ .../codex-integration/selected-models.test.ts | 25 +++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/codex/catalog/model-visibility.ts b/src/codex/catalog/model-visibility.ts index 0273a19052..8f62879384 100644 --- a/src/codex/catalog/model-visibility.ts +++ b/src/codex/catalog/model-visibility.ts @@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ export function filterCatalogVisibleModels( } return models.filter(m => { if (initialModelSelectionPending(config.providers[m.provider])) return false; + if (config.providers[m.provider]?.disabled === true) return false; const nativeAlias = m.provider === COMBO_NAMESPACE && m.nativeAlias === true; // disabledModels may be stored raw (canonical) or encoded (legacy UI writes). for (const stored of disabled) { diff --git a/src/codex/catalog/routed-gather.ts b/src/codex/catalog/routed-gather.ts index 68dd1cc376..199f2521d4 100644 --- a/src/codex/catalog/routed-gather.ts +++ b/src/codex/catalog/routed-gather.ts @@ -480,7 +480,8 @@ async function gatherRoutedModelsUncached( // with the same slug below, so that row's provider capability metadata is the inheritance source. const replacedByRoutedSlug = new Map(all.map(model => [routedSlug(model.provider, model.id), model])); const customModels = (config.customModels ?? []).map(cm => { - const rawProvider = config.providers[cm.provider]; + const rawProvider = config.providers[cm.provider]?.disabled !== true + ? config.providers[cm.provider] : undefined; const effectiveProvider = enrichedByName.get(cm.provider) ?? rawProvider; // Registry routing backfills an omitted authMode on the built-in OpenAI provider to // forward. Keep the catalog projection on the same contract while still failing closed diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index 2fd03722df..2d1b1884c9 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ Shared parsing and streaming follow the [request-copy](transports/byte-accountin native rows from the output without rewriting the pristine backup or unrelated snapshots; - invalidates `$CODEX_HOME/models_cache.json` when model visibility changes. +`src/codex/catalog/model-visibility.ts` also excludes models owned by disabled providers, including custom rows. `src/codex/catalog/routed-gather.ts` does not inherit provider configuration into custom rows while that provider is disabled. + On the default `opencodex-catalog.json` path, sync deliberately uses two catalog sources: Codex's bundled catalog supplies a current native entry template, while the actual on-disk catalog supplies the rows being merged. This split is required because empty or partial provider discovery must diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/selected-models.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/selected-models.test.ts index df6aa22586..26a53e8c2b 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/selected-models.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/selected-models.test.ts @@ -120,4 +120,29 @@ describe("filterCatalogVisibleModels — slash-bearing ids", () => { const visible = filterCatalogVisibleModels(nested, cfg({ p: { selectedModels: ["x-y-z"] } })); expect(visible.map(v => v.id)).toEqual(["x/y/z"]); }); + + test("models belonging to a disabled provider are filtered out", () => { + const models = [m("active", "m1"), m("disabled_p", "m2"), m("active", "m3")]; + const config = cfg({ + active: { disabled: false }, + disabled_p: { disabled: true }, + }); + const visible = filterCatalogVisibleModels(models, config); + expect(visible.map(v => v.id)).toEqual(["m1", "m3"]); + }); + + test("custom models of a disabled provider are omitted by filterCatalogVisibleModels", () => { + const customModel: CatalogModel = { + id: "custom-1", + provider: "ark", + catalogKind: "custom-model-v1", + }; + const activeModel = m("openai", "gpt-5.6-sol"); + const config = cfg({ + ark: { disabled: true }, + openai: { disabled: false }, + }); + const visible = filterCatalogVisibleModels([customModel, activeModel], config); + expect(visible.map(v => v.id)).toEqual(["gpt-5.6-sol"]); + }); }); From 46e5f55ca70dc8cab0433a05f07229d48435e2a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 19:51:32 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 045/113] fix(kiro): keep unverified luna and terra effort rungs emulated Use the proven native effort allowlist for newly enabled models, retain existing Sol/Opus behavior, and add boundary fixtures. No live provider requests or product tests were run on the connected machine. Co-authored-by: wentao.ma2 --- .../src/content/docs/fr/reference/adapters.md | 7 +++- .../src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md | 10 +++-- .../src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md | 10 +++-- .../src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md | 15 ++++---- .../src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md | 10 +++-- .../src/content/docs/tr/reference/adapters.md | 15 +++----- .../content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md | 10 +++-- .../content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md | 10 +++-- src/adapters/kiro/payload.ts | 7 +++- src/adapters/kiro/reasoning.ts | 20 +++++++--- structure/providers/kiro.md | 5 +++ .../kiro/kiro-reasoning-roundtrip.test.ts | 37 +++++++++++++++---- 12 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/adapters.md index dc28832ca7..9535fe02f4 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/adapters.md @@ -131,7 +131,12 @@ Si Kiro s’arrête sans appeler l’outil d’achèvement, l’adaptateur effec ### Effort de raisonnement -La famille GPT-5.6 de Kiro (`gpt-5.6-sol`, `gpt-5.6-terra`, `gpt-5.6-luna`) et `claude-opus-5` prennent en charge nativement un niveau d’effort vérifié, mais chaque famille de modèles nomme différemment le champ de la requête. La valeur sélectionnée `low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh` ou `max` est envoyée dans `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` pour les modèles GPT-5.6, et dans `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` pour `claude-opus-5`. Les autres modèles Kiro utilisent actuellement un raisonnement émulé : opencodex convertit le niveau choisi en instructions de réflexion bornées dans le contenu utilisateur, car leur champ d’effort natif n’a pas été vérifié. La présence d’un contrôle d’effort annoncé sur ces modèles ne prouve donc pas la prise en charge native du raisonnement en amont. +Les modèles GPT-5.6 utilisent `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`, et `claude-opus-5` +utilise `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort`. Pour `gpt-5.6-luna` et `gpt-5.6-terra`, +seuls `low`, `medium`, `high` et `max` empruntent le chemin natif vérifié. Leur niveau `xhigh` +conserve les instructions de réflexion bornées existantes, car ce niveau natif n’a pas été vérifié. +`gpt-5.6-sol` et `claude-opus-5` conservent leurs niveaux natifs existants : `low`, `medium`, `high`, +`xhigh` et `max`. Les autres modèles Kiro utilisent une émulation ; un réglage d’effort ne prouve pas une prise en charge native. ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md index d9dd6fdd0b..1565770c95 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/adapters.md @@ -154,10 +154,12 @@ filtered incomplete になります。実際のツール呼び出しを伴わな ### Reasoning effort -`gpt-5.6-sol` / `gpt-5.6-terra` / `gpt-5.6-luna` と `claude-opus-5` はネイティブ effort をサポートし、リクエストフィールド名が異なります。 -`low` / `medium` / `high` / `xhigh` / `max` は、GPT-5.6 系では -`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`、`claude-opus-5` では `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` として送信されます。 - +GPT-5.6 系は `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`、`claude-opus-5` は +`additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` を使用します。`gpt-5.6-luna` と +`gpt-5.6-terra` では、検証済みの `low`、`medium`、`high`、`max` だけをネイティブフィールドで送信します。 +両モデルの `xhigh` は未検証のため、従来の上限付き thinking 指示によるエミュレーションを維持します。 +`gpt-5.6-sol` と `claude-opus-5` の既存のネイティブ段階（`low`、`medium`、`high`、`xhigh`、`max`）は変更しません。 +その他の Kiro モデルはエミュレーションを使用し、effort の選択肢だけではネイティブ対応を意味しません。 ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md index 548977d38c..64193b4232 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/adapters.md @@ -167,10 +167,12 @@ commentary로 유지하고 비공개 완료 툴을 한 번 검증합니다. ### Reasoning effort -`gpt-5.6-sol`, `gpt-5.6-terra`, `gpt-5.6-luna`와 `claude-opus-5`는 네이티브 effort를 지원하며 요청 필드 이름이 다릅니다. -`low` / `medium` / `high` / `xhigh` / `max` 값은 GPT-5.6 계열에서는 -`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`, `claude-opus-5`에서는 `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort`로 전송됩니다. - +GPT-5.6 계열은 `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`를, `claude-opus-5`는 +`additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort`를 사용합니다. `gpt-5.6-luna`와 +`gpt-5.6-terra`는 검증된 `low`, `medium`, `high`, `max`만 네이티브 필드로 전송합니다. +두 모델의 `xhigh`는 네이티브 동작이 검증되지 않아 기존의 제한된 thinking 지시문 방식을 유지합니다. +`gpt-5.6-sol`과 `claude-opus-5`의 기존 네이티브 단계(`low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, `max`)는 +바뀌지 않습니다. 다른 Kiro 모델의 effort는 에뮬레이션이며, 조절 항목이 있다고 네이티브 지원을 뜻하지는 않습니다. ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md index f5e2310624..70180417f1 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md @@ -364,14 +364,13 @@ important than cosmetic de-duplication. Tool-free requests retain normal text co ### Reasoning effort -The Kiro GPT-5.6 family (`gpt-5.6-sol`, `gpt-5.6-terra`, `gpt-5.6-luna`) and `claude-opus-5` have -verified native effort support, and each model family names the request field differently. A -selected `low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, or `max` value is sent as -`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` for the GPT-5.6 models and as -`additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` for `claude-opus-5`. Other Kiro models currently -use emulated reasoning: opencodex converts the selected level into bounded thinking instructions in -the user content because their native effort field has not been verified. Do not interpret an -advertised effort control on those models as proof of upstream-native reasoning support. +The GPT-5.6 family uses `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`; `claude-opus-5` +uses `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort`. For `gpt-5.6-luna` and +`gpt-5.6-terra`, only `low`, `medium`, `high`, and `max` use the verified native path. +Their `xhigh` selection retains the previous bounded thinking instructions in user content +because that native rung has not been verified. `gpt-5.6-sol` and `claude-opus-5` keep +their existing native `low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, and `max` behavior. Other Kiro +models use emulated reasoning; an advertised effort control is not proof of native support. ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md index 62416d5671..1d81b039e2 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/adapters.md @@ -189,10 +189,12 @@ incomplete. `TOOL_USE` без фактического вызова инстру ### Reasoning effort -Модели семейства GPT-5.6 (`gpt-5.6-sol`, `gpt-5.6-terra`, `gpt-5.6-luna`) и `claude-opus-5` поддерживают нативный effort, но называют поле запроса по-разному. -Значения `low` / `medium` / `high` / `xhigh` / `max` отправляются как -`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` для моделей GPT-5.6 и `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` для `claude-opus-5`. - +Семейство GPT-5.6 использует `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`, а `claude-opus-5` — +`additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort`. Для `gpt-5.6-luna` и `gpt-5.6-terra` нативный +путь проверен только для `low`, `medium`, `high` и `max`. Их `xhigh` сохраняет прежнюю эмуляцию +через ограниченные инструкции thinking, поскольку нативный уровень не проверен. +Существующие нативные уровни `gpt-5.6-sol` и `claude-opus-5` (`low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, `max`) +не меняются. Остальные модели Kiro используют эмуляцию; наличие настройки effort не доказывает нативную поддержку. ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/adapters.md index 876d050b04..090be99061 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/adapters.md @@ -268,15 +268,12 @@ tam olarak tekrarlasa bile, çünkü aşama doğruluğu kozmetik tekilleştirmed ### Akıl yürütme çabası -Kiro'nun GPT-5.6 ailesi (`gpt-5.6-sol`, `gpt-5.6-terra`, `gpt-5.6-luna`) ve `claude-opus-5` doğrulanmış yerel çaba desteğine sahiptir ve -her model ailesi istek alanını farklı şekilde adlandırır. Seçilen `low`, -`medium`, `high`, `xhigh` veya `max` değeri GPT-5.6 modelleri için -`additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` olarak ve `claude-opus-5` için -`additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` olarak gönderilir. Diğer -Kiro modelleri şu anda öykünülmüş akıl yürütme kullanır: opencodex yerel çaba -alanları doğrulanmadığı için seçilen seviyeyi kullanıcı içeriğinde sınırlı -düşünme talimatlarına dönüştürür. Bu modellerde bildirilen bir çaba denetimini -yukarı akış yerel akıl yürütme desteğinin kanıtı olarak yorumlamayın. +GPT-5.6 ailesi `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`, `claude-opus-5` ise +`additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` alanını kullanır. `gpt-5.6-luna` ve +`gpt-5.6-terra` için yalnızca doğrulanmış `low`, `medium`, `high` ve `max` seviyeleri yerel alandan +gönderilir. Bu iki modelin yerel `xhigh` seviyesi doğrulanmadığı için mevcut sınırlı düşünme +talimatlarıyla öykünme korunur. `gpt-5.6-sol` ve `claude-opus-5` için mevcut yerel `low`, `medium`, +`high`, `xhigh` ve `max` davranışı değişmez. Diğer Kiro modelleri öykünme kullanır; çaba seçeneği yerel desteğin kanıtı değildir. ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md index e7f96a93e4..a970fd1d6c 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/adapters.md @@ -154,10 +154,12 @@ Kiro 的 assistant 文本本身没有可靠的回合结束标记，但终止的 ### Reasoning effort -`gpt-5.6-sol`、`gpt-5.6-terra`、`gpt-5.6-luna` 和 `claude-opus-5` 支持原生 effort，且请求字段名不同。`low` / `medium` / `high` / -`xhigh` / `max` 在 GPT-5.6 系列中通过 `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` 发送， -在 `claude-opus-5` 上通过 `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` 发送。 - +GPT-5.6 系列使用 `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`，`claude-opus-5` 使用 +`additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort`。`gpt-5.6-luna` 和 `gpt-5.6-terra` +仅通过原生字段发送已验证的 `low`、`medium`、`high` 和 `max`。 +这两个模型的原生 `xhigh` 尚未验证，因此仍使用原有的有界 thinking 指令模拟。 +`gpt-5.6-sol` 和 `claude-opus-5` 保留现有原生档位（`low`、`medium`、`high`、`xhigh`、`max`）。 +其他 Kiro 模型使用模拟推理；提供 effort 选项并不代表原生支持。 ## `cursor` diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md index 4708e2e6b1..2b314cd299 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/adapters.md @@ -145,10 +145,12 @@ Kiro 的 assistant 文字本身沒有可靠的回合結束標記，但終止的 ### Reasoning effort -`gpt-5.6-sol`、`gpt-5.6-terra`、`gpt-5.6-luna` 和 `claude-opus-5` 支援原生 effort，且請求欄位名不同。`low` / `medium` / `high` / -`xhigh` / `max` 在 GPT-5.6 系列中透過 `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort` 傳送， -在 `claude-opus-5` 上透過 `additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort` 傳送。 - +GPT-5.6 系列使用 `additionalModelRequestFields.reasoning.effort`，`claude-opus-5` 使用 +`additionalModelRequestFields.output_config.effort`。`gpt-5.6-luna` 和 `gpt-5.6-terra` +只透過原生欄位傳送已驗證的 `low`、`medium`、`high` 和 `max`。 +這兩個模型的原生 `xhigh` 尚未驗證，因此仍使用原有的有界 thinking 指令模擬。 +`gpt-5.6-sol` 和 `claude-opus-5` 保留現有原生檔位（`low`、`medium`、`high`、`xhigh`、`max`）。 +其他 Kiro 模型使用模擬推理；提供 effort 選項不代表原生支援。 ## `cursor` diff --git a/src/adapters/kiro/payload.ts b/src/adapters/kiro/payload.ts index 338f525d2e..1fbd3bcbfd 100644 --- a/src/adapters/kiro/payload.ts +++ b/src/adapters/kiro/payload.ts @@ -456,7 +456,12 @@ export function buildKiroPayload( if (!KIRO_NATIVE_EFFORTS.includes(effort)) { throw new Error(`Kiro ${normalizeKiroModelId(parsed.modelId)} does not support reasoning effort ${JSON.stringify(effort)}`); } - payload.additionalModelRequestFields = { [effortField]: { effort } }; + // Model eligibility still owns unsupported-effort validation above; wire eligibility + // is narrower for luna/terra, whose unverified rungs retain the thinking-tag path. + const verifiedEffortField = kiroNativeEffortField(parsed.modelId, effort); + if (verifiedEffortField) { + payload.additionalModelRequestFields = { [verifiedEffortField]: { effort } }; + } } if (profileArn) payload.profileArn = profileArn; return { payload, nameMap, conversationId, completionMode }; diff --git a/src/adapters/kiro/reasoning.ts b/src/adapters/kiro/reasoning.ts index 0441986f10..d12c95654c 100644 --- a/src/adapters/kiro/reasoning.ts +++ b/src/adapters/kiro/reasoning.ts @@ -28,12 +28,22 @@ export const KIRO_NATIVE_EFFORT_FIELDS: Record block, a strictly weaker signal: on one fixed hard prompt that channel landed // between the model's native medium and high (21,202 / 28,302 chars) and never reached native max // (48,594), while the native ladder itself ran 5,130 -> 48,594 from low to max. The whole GPT-5.6 -// family shares the field name, so all three are native now. +// family shares the field name, but luna/terra keep xhigh emulated until verified. describe("kiro native reasoning effort — the GPT-5.6 family", () => { - function wireBody(modelId: string): Record { + function wireBody(modelId: string, effort = "max"): Record { const parsed = { modelId, stream: true, - options: { reasoning: "max", maxOutputTokens: 1000 }, + options: { reasoning: effort, maxOutputTokens: 1000 }, context: { messages: [{ role: "user", content: "solve" }] }, } as unknown as Parameters[0]; return buildKiroPayload(parsed, undefined, "disabled", "ide").payload; @@ -267,13 +268,35 @@ describe("kiro native reasoning effort — the GPT-5.6 family", () => { test("luna and terra send the native reasoning field instead of thinking tags", () => { for (const modelId of ["gpt-5.6-luna", "gpt-5.6-terra"]) { - const body = wireBody(modelId); - expect(body.additionalModelRequestFields).toEqual({ reasoning: { effort: "max" } }); - // Native effort replaces the emulated thinking-tag prompt entirely. + for (const effort of ["low", "medium", "high", "max"]) { + const body = wireBody(modelId, effort); + expect(body.additionalModelRequestFields).toEqual({ reasoning: { effort } }); + // Native effort replaces the emulated thinking-tag prompt entirely. + const current = (body.conversationState as { + currentMessage: { userInputMessage: { content: string } }; + }).currentMessage.userInputMessage.content; + expect(current).toBe("solve"); + } + } + }); + + test("luna and terra keep unverified xhigh on the emulated path", () => { + for (const modelId of ["gpt-5.6-luna", "gpt-5.6-terra"]) { + const body = wireBody(modelId, "xhigh"); + expect(body.additionalModelRequestFields).toBeUndefined(); const current = (body.conversationState as { currentMessage: { userInputMessage: { content: string } }; }).currentMessage.userInputMessage.content; - expect(current).toBe("solve"); + expect(current).toContain("enabled"); + expect(current).toContain("900"); + expect(kiroNativeEffortField(modelId, "future-effort")).toBeUndefined(); } }); + + test("existing Sol and Opus native xhigh fields stay unchanged", () => { + expect(wireBody("gpt-5.6-sol", "xhigh").additionalModelRequestFields) + .toEqual({ reasoning: { effort: "xhigh" } }); + expect(wireBody("claude-opus-5", "xhigh").additionalModelRequestFields) + .toEqual({ output_config: { effort: "xhigh" } }); + }); }); From 36356a667e41c5fa2dbe05c677fb41c5d53e33d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: remorser58 <96581633+remorser58@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2026 00:34:43 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 046/113] fix(codex): avoid reauthentication advice for rate-limited warmup Classify HTTP 429 warmup failures separately and carry the machine-readable failure code into OAuth login status so clients can distinguish rate limits. Preserve a received 429 even when bounded error-body cleanup times out. Constraint: Keep failed warmup from persisting or validating an account. Rejected: Change quota-exhausted registration policy | Separate work in PR #3848. Confidence: high Scope-risk: narrow Directive: Never expose raw upstream warmup error bodies. Tested: 355 focused tests; TypeScript typecheck; privacy scan; 425-page docs build. Not-tested: Full repository suite and Windows/Linux execution. Co-authored-by: remorser58 <96581633+remorser58@users.noreply.github.com> --- .../content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md | 2 + src/codex/auth-api/login-flow.ts | 16 ++- src/codex/warmup.ts | 2 +- structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 2 + .../codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts | 23 +--- tests/codex-integration/codex-warmup.test.ts | 46 ++++++- tests/helpers/codex-warmup-rate-limit.ts | 126 ++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 192 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/helpers/codex-warmup-rate-limit.ts diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md index 877117babe..990f46fe0d 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/codex-integration.md @@ -807,6 +807,8 @@ Catalog sync makes the selected sub-agent models available to Codex; see [Codex When a ChatGPT account is added or reauthenticated, OpenCodex normally verifies it before saving with a small streaming request to the Codex Responses backend. It waits for `response.completed`, defaults to `gpt-5.6-luna`, and retries with `gpt-5.5` on HTTP 400 or HTTP 404. Public errors contain fixed failure categories rather than raw upstream response bodies. +An HTTP 429 from an attempted warmup is reported as `codex_warmup_rate_limited`. Retry after the temporary restriction clears or the usage limit resets; signing in again does not reset these limits. A failed attempted warmup does not add a new account or replace existing credentials. This differs from quota-confirmed deferred registration below, which can save a restricted account without a model request. HTTP 401/403 failures retain the authentication guidance. + If the new OAuth credential's authenticated usage lookup confirms an exhausted 5-hour, weekly, or monthly quota, the account is saved without this model request and shows **Validation pending**. It cannot serve pool requests, even after a restart or token refresh. Once quota recovers, **Refresh quotas** finishes validation: a fresh, complete usage reading with headroom permits one small model request, and only a completed response enables the account. Failed or incomplete readings and failed validation preserve the restriction. Passive account polling does not trigger deferred validation. Unknown usage during initial registration retains the normal warmup gate. `ocx account refresh openai` and `ocx account list openai --quota --refresh` only read usage. Model validation spends quota and requires a human dashboard session: open `ocx gui` and click **Refresh quotas** after recovery. For a headless host, access its dashboard from your browser; an admin token alone does not authorize validation. Validation can complete while an account is paused without resuming or selecting it. Model authorization failures remain visible until successful validation or reauthentication clears them. diff --git a/src/codex/auth-api/login-flow.ts b/src/codex/auth-api/login-flow.ts index ad384e9539..fa6d1c6fbf 100644 --- a/src/codex/auth-api/login-flow.ts +++ b/src/codex/auth-api/login-flow.ts @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import { clearAccountNeedsReauth, isAccountNeedsReauth, markAccountNeedsReauth } import { clearCodexPoolRefreshFailure } from "../pool-refresh-backoff"; import { reconcileLiveStateStores } from "../../lib/state-store-registrations"; import { emailMaskingEnabled, projectEmail } from "../../lib/privacy"; -import { codexWarmupFailureReason, isCodexWarmupProvisioningFailure, warmCodexAccount } from "../warmup"; +import { CodexWarmupError, codexWarmupFailureReason, isCodexWarmupProvisioningFailure, warmCodexAccount } from "../warmup"; import type { CodexAccount, CodexAccountCredentials, OcxConfig } from "../../types"; import type { CatalogDisposition } from "../convergence-types"; import { isValidCodexAccountId } from "../account-id"; @@ -51,6 +51,17 @@ export async function verifyCodexAccountWarmup( return { ok: true, validatedAt: Date.now() }; } catch (err) { const reason = codexWarmupFailureReason(err); + if (err instanceof CodexWarmupError && err.code === "http_status" && err.status === 429) { + return { + ok: false, + response: jsonResponse({ + error: "Codex account warmup was rate limited. Retry later or after the account's usage limit resets.", + code: "codex_warmup_rate_limited", + reason, + accountId, + }, 429), + }; + } return { ok: false, response: jsonResponse({ @@ -322,10 +333,11 @@ export async function handleCodexAuthLoginStart(req: Request, config: OcxConfig, ? { ok: true as const, validatedAt: undefined } : await verifyCodexAccountWarmup(accountId, cred.access, oauthAccountId); if (!warmup.ok) { - const body = await warmup.response.json().catch(() => ({})) as { error?: string; reason?: string }; + const body = await warmup.response.json().catch(() => ({})) as { error?: string; code?: string; reason?: string }; setCodexLoginState(flowId, { status: "error", error: body.reason ? `${body.error ?? "Codex account warmup failed"} (${body.reason})` : body.error ?? "Codex account warmup failed", + code: body.code, doneAt: Date.now(), }); completed = true; diff --git a/src/codex/warmup.ts b/src/codex/warmup.ts index 7be16980c6..a8ae8c7af5 100644 --- a/src/codex/warmup.ts +++ b/src/codex/warmup.ts @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ async function drainErrorBody(res: Response, signal: AbortSignal): Promise fatalUtf8: true, }); } catch (error) { - if (signal.aborted) { + if (signal.aborted && res.status !== 429) { throw new CodexWarmupError("transport", "Codex warmup request failed", { cause: error, }); diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index ab7511c3b0..9982006c37 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -567,3 +567,5 @@ Two call sites need the rule — the live path in `reevaluateAffinityQuota` and `previewReusableAffinityAccount` that subagent fallback reads — and they share one helper rather than restating it, because the suite asserts the two answer identically and a preview that disagreed would hand fallback a different account than the request actually uses. + +`src/codex/auth-api/login-flow.ts` distinguishes HTTP 429 from an attempted warmup as `codex_warmup_rate_limited` and preserves that code in OAuth status. Failed attempted warmup does not persist replacement credentials; quota-confirmed deferred registration and HTTP 401/403 handling remain separate. `src/codex/warmup.ts` retains a known 429 when bounded error-body draining times out. diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts index bd30621448..456373bb8e 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +import { registerWarmupRateLimitCases } from "../helpers/codex-warmup-rate-limit"; import * as usageHistoryModule from "../../src/usage/log"; import { getAccountQuotaHistory } from "../../src/codex/quota"; import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, spyOn, test } from "bun:test"; @@ -5530,27 +5531,7 @@ describe("codex-auth API", () => { expect(getCodexAccountCredential("quota-unknown")).toBeNull(); }); - test("OAuth creation rejects a namespace claimed during warmup without persisting", async () => { - const config = makeConfig(); - const result = await completeMockCodexOAuth({ - config, - requestBody: { id: "oauth-race" }, - oauthAccountId: "acct-oauth-race", - email: "oauth-race@example.test", - onWarmup: () => { - config.codexAccountNamespaces = { "oauth-race": "pool-a" }; - }, - }); - - expect(result.startStatus).toBe(200); - expect(result.state).toMatchObject({ - status: "error", - error: "account id must not collide with a configured Codex account namespace", - }); - expect(config.codexAccounts).toEqual([]); - expect(config.codexAccountNamespaces).toEqual({ "oauth-race": "pool-a" }); - expect(getCodexAccountCredential("oauth-race")).toBeNull(); - }); + registerWarmupRateLimitCases(makeConfig, completeMockCodexOAuth); test("OAuth creation reports a durable add when catalog convergence is pending", async () => { const accountId = "oauth-picker-pending"; diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-warmup.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-warmup.test.ts index 9339920918..200894e713 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-warmup.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-warmup.test.ts @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -import { afterEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { afterEach, describe, expect, spyOn, test } from "bun:test"; import { CodexWarmupError, warmCodexAccount } from "../../src/codex/warmup"; const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch; @@ -152,6 +152,50 @@ describe("codex warmup", () => { expect(performance.now() - startedAt).toBeLessThan(1_000); }); + test("preserves HTTP 429 classification when the error body stalls until the deadline", async () => { + let fetchCalls = 0; + let cancellations = 0; + const privateBody = "private upstream quota details"; + const fetchSpy = spyOn(globalThis, "fetch").mockImplementation(async () => { + fetchCalls += 1; + const stalledBody = new ReadableStream({ + start(controller) { + controller.enqueue(new TextEncoder().encode(privateBody)); + }, + cancel() { + cancellations += 1; + return new Promise(() => {}); + }, + }); + return new Response(stalledBody, { status: 429 }); + }); + + const startedAt = performance.now(); + try { + let failure: unknown; + try { + await warmCodexAccount({ + accessToken: "a", + chatgptAccountId: "c", + timeoutMs: 20, + }); + } catch (error) { + failure = error; + } + + expect(failure).toBeInstanceOf(CodexWarmupError); + if (!(failure instanceof CodexWarmupError)) throw new Error("expected CodexWarmupError"); + expect(failure.code).toBe("http_status"); + expect(failure.status).toBe(429); + expect(failure.message).not.toContain(privateBody); + expect(fetchCalls).toBe(1); + expect(cancellations).toBe(1); + expect(performance.now() - startedAt).toBeLessThan(1_000); + } finally { + fetchSpy.mockRestore(); + } + }); + test("accepts a completed SSE stream at the exact byte limit", async () => { const encoder = new TextEncoder(); const terminal = 'data: {"type":"response.completed"}\n\n'; diff --git a/tests/helpers/codex-warmup-rate-limit.ts b/tests/helpers/codex-warmup-rate-limit.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bc063058a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/helpers/codex-warmup-rate-limit.ts @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +import { expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import type { OcxConfig } from "../../src/types"; +import { getCodexAccountCredential, readCodexAccountRecord, saveCodexAccountCredential } from "../../src/codex/account-store"; + +interface WarmupOAuthOptions { + config: OcxConfig; + requestBody: { id: string; reauth?: boolean }; + oauthAccountId: string; + email: string; + onWarmup: () => void; + warmupResponse?: () => Response; +} + +/** Registers under the calling suite's isolated home and OAuth cleanup hooks. */ +export function registerWarmupRateLimitCases( + makeConfig: (overrides?: Partial) => OcxConfig, + completeMockCodexOAuth: (options: WarmupOAuthOptions) => Promise<{ + startStatus: number; + state: { status: string; error?: string; code?: string }; + }>, +): void { + test("OAuth creation reports a rate-limited warmup without persisting the account", async () => { + const accountId = "warmup-rate-limited"; + const config = makeConfig(); + let warmupRequests = 0; + + const result = await completeMockCodexOAuth({ + config, + requestBody: { id: accountId }, + oauthAccountId: "acct-warmup-rate-limited", + email: "warmup-rate-limited@example.test", + onWarmup: () => { warmupRequests += 1; }, + warmupResponse: () => new Response("private upstream quota details", { status: 429 }), + }); + + expect(result.startStatus).toBe(200); + expect(result.state).toMatchObject({ + status: "error", + code: "codex_warmup_rate_limited", + }); + expect(result.state.error).toContain("usage limit"); + expect(result.state.error).toContain("Retry"); + expect(JSON.stringify(result.state)).not.toContain("private upstream quota details"); + expect(warmupRequests).toBe(1); + expect(config.codexAccounts).toEqual([]); + expect(getCodexAccountCredential(accountId)).toBeNull(); + expect(readCodexAccountRecord(accountId)).toBeNull(); + }); + + test.each([401, 403])("OAuth creation keeps HTTP %s warmup failures on the authentication path", async status => { + const accountId = `warmup-auth-${status}`; + const config = makeConfig(); + + const result = await completeMockCodexOAuth({ + config, + requestBody: { id: accountId }, + oauthAccountId: `acct-warmup-auth-${status}`, + email: `warmup-auth-${status}@example.test`, + onWarmup: () => {}, + warmupResponse: () => new Response("private upstream auth details", { status }), + }); + + expect(result.state).toMatchObject({ + status: "error", + code: "codex_warmup_failed", + }); + expect(result.state.error).toContain("Reauthenticate"); + expect(JSON.stringify(result.state)).not.toContain("private upstream auth details"); + expect(config.codexAccounts).toEqual([]); + expect(getCodexAccountCredential(accountId)).toBeNull(); + }); + + test("OAuth reauth keeps the existing credential when warmup is rate limited", async () => { + const accountId = "warmup-rate-limited-reauth"; + const config = makeConfig({ + codexAccounts: [{ id: accountId, email: "existing@example.test", isMain: false }], + }); + const existingCredential = { + accessToken: "existing-access", + refreshToken: "existing-refresh", + expiresAt: Date.now() + 60_000, + chatgptAccountId: "acct-warmup-rate-limited-reauth", + }; + saveCodexAccountCredential(accountId, existingCredential); + + const result = await completeMockCodexOAuth({ + config, + requestBody: { id: accountId, reauth: true }, + oauthAccountId: existingCredential.chatgptAccountId, + email: "existing@example.test", + onWarmup: () => {}, + warmupResponse: () => new Response("private upstream quota details", { status: 429 }), + }); + + expect(result.state).toMatchObject({ + status: "error", + code: "codex_warmup_rate_limited", + }); + expect(getCodexAccountCredential(accountId)).toEqual(existingCredential); + expect(config.codexAccounts).toEqual([ + { id: accountId, email: "existing@example.test", isMain: false }, + ]); + }); + + test("OAuth creation rejects a namespace claimed during warmup without persisting", async () => { + const config = makeConfig(); + const result = await completeMockCodexOAuth({ + config, + requestBody: { id: "oauth-race" }, + oauthAccountId: "acct-oauth-race", + email: "oauth-race@example.test", + onWarmup: () => { + config.codexAccountNamespaces = { "oauth-race": "pool-a" }; + }, + }); + + expect(result.startStatus).toBe(200); + expect(result.state).toMatchObject({ + status: "error", + error: "account id must not collide with a configured Codex account namespace", + }); + expect(config.codexAccounts).toEqual([]); + expect(config.codexAccountNamespaces).toEqual({ "oauth-race": "pool-a" }); + expect(getCodexAccountCredential("oauth-race")).toBeNull(); + }); +} From 18ce1eb9eea30f071159ade7af2a906f974a249c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 20:08:12 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 047/113] docs(codex): tighten provider-retention contract comment within facade cap Co-authored-by: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> --- src/codex/inject.ts | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/codex/inject.ts b/src/codex/inject.ts index 8861efef97..a01909a9c7 100644 --- a/src/codex/inject.ts +++ b/src/codex/inject.ts @@ -489,11 +489,10 @@ async function injectCodexConfigImpl( /* * Rows this home may have tagged `opencodex` resolve only through a provider table. Design B - * selects the built-in `openai` provider for new work, but its background relabel is not - * atomic with native artifact publication. Codex can paginate immediately after the final - * check or while that worker starts. Keep an existing definition regardless of the current - * preflight result, BEFORE the witness, so those old references remain resolvable even if - * the worker fails. Explicit restoration retains its separate removal and history guards. + * selects built-in `openai` for new work, but background relabel and native publication are + * not atomic. Codex can paginate after the final check or when the worker starts. Retain + * an existing definition BEFORE the witness regardless of preflight, so worker failure + * cannot orphan old references. Explicit restoration keeps its removal and history guards. */ if (hadOcxProviderTableOnDisk && !providerTableMode) { content = applyEol( From 53ceeec8ec012e47a73e134e0d833761d96af2a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ingwannu Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 20:56:39 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 048/113] fix(codex): fence bulk refresh resets (#4695) Co-authored-by: Ingwannu --- src/codex/pool-refresh-backoff.ts | 15 ++++++++-- structure/transports/responses.md | 4 +++ .../codex-pool-refresh-backoff.test.ts | 29 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/codex/pool-refresh-backoff.ts b/src/codex/pool-refresh-backoff.ts index d9474ceb21..acbe213389 100644 --- a/src/codex/pool-refresh-backoff.ts +++ b/src/codex/pool-refresh-backoff.ts @@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ const backoffByAccount = new Map(); * must not re-quarantine the credential that replaced it. */ const fenceByAccount = new Map(); +/** + * Invalidates every account fence without having to know which refresh flights are currently in + * progress. A bulk routing-state reset can race a first failure for an account that has no map + * entry yet, so iterating either map cannot close this boundary. + */ +let globalFence = 0; let nowOverride: number | undefined; export function setCodexPoolRefreshFailureNowForTests(now?: number): void { @@ -52,12 +58,13 @@ export function setCodexPoolRefreshFailureNowForTests(now?: number): void { export function resetCodexPoolRefreshFailureBackoffForTests(): void { backoffByAccount.clear(); fenceByAccount.clear(); + globalFence = 0; nowOverride = undefined; } /** The value a refresh flight captures before it starts, to be handed back on failure. */ -export function codexPoolRefreshFence(accountId: string): number { - return fenceByAccount.get(accountId) ?? 0; +export function codexPoolRefreshFence(accountId: string): string { + return `${globalFence}:${fenceByAccount.get(accountId) ?? 0}`; } export function clearCodexPoolRefreshFailure(accountId: string): void { @@ -72,6 +79,8 @@ export function clearCodexPoolRefreshFailure(accountId: string): void { */ export function clearAllCodexPoolRefreshFailures(): void { backoffByAccount.clear(); + fenceByAccount.clear(); + globalFence += 1; } function currentNow(now?: number): number { @@ -115,7 +124,7 @@ export function noteCodexPoolRefreshFailure( accountId: string, reason: string, now = currentNow(), - fence?: number, + fence?: string, ): { consecutiveFailures: number; cooldownUntil: number; openedWindow: boolean } { const existing = backoffByAccount.get(accountId); // A flight that started before the account's failures were cleared is speaking for a grant diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 4a6a664cad..575372f173 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -234,6 +234,10 @@ Native Responses participates in the same pre-stream OAuth HTTP-429 account rota bridge. It uses the existing account quorum, cooldown and three-rotation request cap, refreshes the complete credential/transport/replay identity, and attributes usage to the serving account. Single-account installs do not retry; a missing alternate credential preserves the original error. +Credential-refresh failures are fenced by both the account generation and a global routing-state +generation. Reauthentication advances the account fence; replacing the whole routing roster +advances the global fence. A late failure from either obsolete state is ignored, while failures +captured after the reset still contribute to the bounded cooldown. Startup removes legacy Grok 4.5/4.6 Chat overrides once and persists the provider-owned `xaiResponsesDefaultVersion` marker. Later explicit Chat choices survive restarts. The migration diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-pool-refresh-backoff.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-pool-refresh-backoff.test.ts index 1b13db292b..4f71f50535 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-pool-refresh-backoff.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-pool-refresh-backoff.test.ts @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { CODEX_POOL_REFRESH_COOLDOWN_AFTER_FAILURES, CODEX_POOL_REFRESH_FAILURE_BACKOFF_MS, CodexPoolRefreshCooldownError, + clearAllCodexPoolRefreshFailures, clearCodexPoolRefreshFailure, codexPoolRefreshFence, getCodexPoolRefreshCooldownUntil, @@ -220,3 +221,31 @@ describe("a late failure from the replaced credential cannot re-cool the new one expect(source.slice(reported, reported + 200)).toContain("refreshFence"); }); }); + +/** + * The routing layer bulk-clears account state when its roster is replaced. A refresh that began + * before that reset may not have recorded any failure yet, so it is absent from both state maps. + * The global fence generation is what makes that unknown in-flight attempt stale. + */ +describe("a bulk routing reset fences every in-flight refresh", () => { + test("a pre-reset failure is ignored while a post-reset failure still counts", () => { + const now = 4_000_000; + setCodexPoolRefreshFailureNowForTests(now); + const staleFence = codexPoolRefreshFence("acct-bulk-fenced"); + + clearAllCodexPoolRefreshFailures(); + expect(isCodexPoolRefreshCooling("acct-bulk-fenced")).toBe(false); + + for (let attempt = 0; attempt < CODEX_POOL_REFRESH_COOLDOWN_AFTER_FAILURES; attempt += 1) { + noteCodexPoolRefreshFailure("acct-bulk-fenced", "unknown", undefined, staleFence); + } + expect(isCodexPoolRefreshCooling("acct-bulk-fenced")).toBe(false); + + const freshFence = codexPoolRefreshFence("acct-bulk-fenced"); + expect(freshFence).not.toBe(staleFence); + for (let attempt = 0; attempt < CODEX_POOL_REFRESH_COOLDOWN_AFTER_FAILURES; attempt += 1) { + noteCodexPoolRefreshFailure("acct-bulk-fenced", "unknown", undefined, freshFence); + } + expect(isCodexPoolRefreshCooling("acct-bulk-fenced")).toBe(true); + }); +}); From 384df7c6c5c3f3516168d12ace71115eec4f49eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ingwannu Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 20:56:43 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 049/113] fix(catalog): apply custom-model capabilities before combo derivation (#4697) * fix(catalog): apply custom capabilities to combos * test(catalog): keep custom combo regression scoped * fix(catalog): preserve native combo inheritance * test(catalog): pin native combo compaction Co-authored-by: Ingwannu --------- Co-authored-by: Ingwannu --- src/codex/catalog/routed-gather.ts | 36 ++++++ structure/catalog.md | 5 + .../flash-route-image-modalities.test.ts | 107 +++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/codex/catalog/routed-gather.ts b/src/codex/catalog/routed-gather.ts index 68dd1cc376..c2da1f84f4 100644 --- a/src/codex/catalog/routed-gather.ts +++ b/src/codex/catalog/routed-gather.ts @@ -420,6 +420,42 @@ async function gatherRoutedModelsUncached( if (!memberByKey.has(key)) memberByKey.set(key, synthetic); } } + // [Decision Log] + // - 목적과 의도: combo derivation must see the same explicit custom-model capabilities that the + // final Models inventory publishes. Previously customModels were materialized only after this + // map had already derived every combo, so one row could say image while its combo said text. + // - 기존 구현 및 제약 조건: provider/discovery rows remain the inheritance source, and native + // OpenAI synthesis must run first so a sparse custom row cannot hide native hard limits. + // - 검토한 주요 대안: move the full custom-row materializer ahead of combos, or overlay only the + // explicit custom fields onto this private derivation map after provider/native inheritance. + // - 선택한 방식: use the scoped post-inheritance overlay; the existing final materializer stays + // the single owner of public custom-row construction and deduplication. + // - 다른 대안 대신 이 방식을 선택한 이유: moving the large materializer would reorder public + // catalog production and warning behavior, while this map is already private to combo input. + // - 장점, 단점 및 영향: custom context/modality/reasoning/tool-mode declarations now constrain + // their combos without widening unrelated rows; omitted fields retain provider/native limits. + for (const custom of config.customModels ?? []) { + const key = `${custom.provider}/${custom.modelId}`; + const inherited = memberByKey.get(key) ?? { + provider: custom.provider, + id: custom.modelId, + owned_by: custom.provider, + }; + memberByKey.set(key, { + ...inherited, + catalogKind: CODEX_CUSTOM_MODEL_CATALOG_KIND, + ...(typeof custom.contextWindow === "number" && custom.contextWindow > 0 + ? { contextWindow: custom.contextWindow } + : {}), + ...(Array.isArray(custom.inputModalities) + ? { inputModalities: [...custom.inputModalities] } + : {}), + ...(Array.isArray(custom.reasoningEfforts) + ? { reasoningEfforts: [...custom.reasoningEfforts] } + : {}), + ...(custom.codexToolMode !== undefined ? { codexToolMode: custom.codexToolMode } : {}), + }); + } // Enriched (registry-hydrated) provider clones — shared by combo member synthesis and // custom-model vision-sidecar inheritance so both see the same merged registry view. const enrichedByName = new Map(activeProviders.map(provider => [provider.name, provider.provider])); diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index 2fd03722df..bf9d6e3751 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -66,6 +66,11 @@ ordinary retained provider rows still receive the existing mock-tier policy. A p marker alone never grants this exemption. Both gather entry points, retained sync, management convergence and direct Codex model discovery use the same producer. The legacy runtime effort union clamp remains separate; it is not a per-model or per-client-version grammar oracle. +Before combo derivation, an explicit custom-model context, modality, reasoning, or +tool-mode declaration overlays the matching provider member in the private combo input map. This +keeps a combo's advertised intersection aligned with the final custom row without changing the +provider-native row or inventing capabilities for other models. Public custom-row materialization +and routed-slug deduplication remain the final catalog owner's responsibility. Codex's native `ultra` mode is preserved and is not a literal API wire promise. When account selectors are enabled, the sync path may also observe exact, visible, API-supported OpenAI-family ids from Codex's user-owned catalog/cache. Only rows with native catalog provenance diff --git a/tests/providers/flash-route-image-modalities.test.ts b/tests/providers/flash-route-image-modalities.test.ts index 83b79d245f..e115cd9724 100644 --- a/tests/providers/flash-route-image-modalities.test.ts +++ b/tests/providers/flash-route-image-modalities.test.ts @@ -17,11 +17,19 @@ * and the combo intersection they feed. */ import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; -import { applyProviderConfigHints, deriveComboCatalogModel } from "../../src/codex/catalog"; +import { + applyProviderConfigHints, + deriveComboCatalogModel, + gatherRoutedModels, + nativeContextLimits, + nativeOpenAiContextWindow, + nativeOpenAiMaxInputTokens, +} from "../../src/codex/catalog"; import { getProviderRegistryEntry, PROVIDER_REGISTRY } from "../../src/providers/registry"; import { providerConfigSeed } from "../../src/providers/derive"; import { isModelVisionSidecarConsumer } from "../../src/vision/eligibility"; -import type { CatalogModel, OcxProviderConfig } from "../../src/types"; +import { nativeOpenAiAutoCompactTokenLimit } from "../../src/codex/catalog/metadata"; +import type { CatalogModel, OcxConfig, OcxProviderConfig } from "../../src/types"; const OPENCODE_GO_NATIVE = "glm-5.3-flash"; const OPENCODE_GO_SIDECAR = "deepseek-v4.1-flash"; @@ -147,3 +155,98 @@ describe("flash-route combo intersection (#4505)", () => { expect(derived?.inputModalities).toEqual(["text"]); }); }); + +describe("custom-model combo capability alignment (#4689)", () => { + test("combo derivation sees the explicit custom row before intersecting members", async () => { + const config: OcxConfig = { + port: 10100, + defaultProvider: "issue-4689-custom", + providers: { + "issue-4689-custom": { + adapter: "openai-chat", + baseUrl: "https://custom.example/v1", + liveModels: false, + models: ["manually-added-image-model"], + modelContextWindows: { "manually-added-image-model": 256_000 }, + }, + "issue-4689-image": { + adapter: "openai-chat", + baseUrl: "https://image.example/v1", + liveModels: false, + models: ["image-model"], + modelContextWindows: { "image-model": 128_000 }, + modelInputModalities: { "image-model": ["text", "image"] }, + modelReasoningEfforts: { "image-model": ["low", "high"] }, + codexToolMode: "shell", + }, + }, + customModels: [{ + id: "custom-image-row", + provider: "issue-4689-custom", + modelId: "manually-added-image-model", + contextWindow: 96_000, + inputModalities: ["text", "image"], + reasoningEfforts: ["low", "high"], + codexToolMode: "shell", + }], + combos: { + image_failover: { + strategy: "failover", + targets: [ + { provider: "issue-4689-custom", model: "manually-added-image-model" }, + { provider: "issue-4689-image", model: "image-model" }, + ], + }, + }, + }; + + const models = await gatherRoutedModels(config); + expect(models.find(model => ( + model.provider === "issue-4689-custom" && model.id === "manually-added-image-model" + ))?.inputModalities).toEqual(["text", "image"]); + expect(models.find(model => ( + model.provider === "combo" && model.id === "image_failover" + ))).toMatchObject({ + contextWindow: 96_000, + inputModalities: ["text", "image"], + reasoningEfforts: ["low", "high"], + codexToolMode: "shell", + }); + }); + + test("a sparse custom native row retains native limits in an ordinary combo", async () => { + const slug = "gpt-5.6-luna"; + const config: OcxConfig = { + port: 10100, + defaultProvider: "openai", + providers: { + openai: { + adapter: "openai-responses", + baseUrl: "https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex", + authMode: "forward", + }, + }, + customModels: [{ id: "sparse-native-row", provider: "openai", modelId: slug }], + combos: { + luna_failover: { + strategy: "failover", + targets: [{ provider: "openai", model: slug }], + }, + }, + }; + const limits = nativeContextLimits(config); + const expectedContext = nativeOpenAiContextWindow(slug, limits); + const expectedMaxInput = nativeOpenAiMaxInputTokens(slug, limits); + const expectedAutoCompact = nativeOpenAiAutoCompactTokenLimit(slug, limits); + + const models = await gatherRoutedModels(config); + expect(models.find(model => ( + model.provider === "combo" && model.id === "luna_failover" + ))).toMatchObject({ + contextWindow: expectedContext, + maxInputTokens: expectedMaxInput, + autoCompactTokenLimit: expectedAutoCompact, + inputModalities: ["text", "image"], + }); + }); +}); From 45cfb04e9757a5a257ab6290d9f24d2ea0bc7573 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ingwannu Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 20:56:48 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 050/113] fix(responses): preserve caller user agent (#4702) Co-authored-by: Ingwannu --- .../src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md | 6 ++ src/adapters/openai-responses/passthrough.ts | 14 ++++ structure/transports/responses.md | 5 ++ .../codex-metadata-integrity.test.ts | 72 +++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 97 insertions(+) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md index 715555f847..2b82254895 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/adapters.md @@ -123,6 +123,12 @@ body and response, with narrow compatibility rewrites for routed gateways. `forward` uses configured static headers without relaying caller authorization; `key` uses the configured provider key. +The adapter preserves the incoming client's `User-Agent` as a fallback in both auth modes because +some Responses-compatible providers use the Codex client fingerprint for compatibility behavior. +An explicitly configured provider `User-Agent` remains authoritative regardless of header casing; +if the caller sends none, OpenCodex does not invent one. No other caller header is widened by this +exception. + Adapter selection does not select the upstream transport. Eligible requests can use the [upstream WebSocket proxy route](/reference/proxy-formats/#json-and-sse-output); invalid or unsupported WebSocket proxy settings fall back to HTTP/SSE. HTTP fetch-based Responses handling uses Bun's diff --git a/src/adapters/openai-responses/passthrough.ts b/src/adapters/openai-responses/passthrough.ts index 4cde7b8d3c..7bdfd123b6 100644 --- a/src/adapters/openai-responses/passthrough.ts +++ b/src/adapters/openai-responses/passthrough.ts @@ -64,6 +64,16 @@ export const FORWARD_HEADERS = [ CODEX_RESPONSES_LITE_HEADER, ]; +/** Preserve the caller fingerprint unless the provider explicitly owns that header. */ +function applyCallerUserAgentFallback( + headers: Record, + incoming: IncomingMeta, +): void { + if (Object.keys(headers).some(name => name.toLowerCase() === "user-agent")) return; + const userAgent = incoming.headers.get("user-agent"); + if (userAgent) headers["User-Agent"] = userAgent; +} + /** Replace every `input_image` part under a routed-compaction body with a short marker. */ function stripInputImagesDeep(value: unknown): unknown { if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(stripInputImagesDeep); @@ -221,6 +231,10 @@ export function createResponsesPassthroughAdapter(provider: OcxProviderConfig): if (provider.apiKey) headers["Authorization"] = `Bearer ${provider.apiKey}`; if (provider.headers) Object.assign(headers, provider.headers); } + // Some Responses-compatible gateways select their Codex compatibility path from the real + // client fingerprint. This is a single non-credential fallback, not broader caller-header + // forwarding. Static provider headers remain authoritative in either auth mode. + applyCallerUserAgentFallback(headers, incoming); const forward = provider.authMode === "forward"; let convertedRoutedCustomToolNames: Set | undefined; diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 575372f173..9af5e63100 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -11,6 +11,11 @@ Plaintext collaboration restoration treats a null namespace as absent, rejects n provider, lets the selected adapter speak the upstream protocol, then bridges adapter events back to Responses-compatible streaming output. For an opted-in key-auth provider, a hosted-search continuation stays bound to the API-key selection that served the first leg; the contract is the [hosted-search continuation binding](../runtime.md#hosted-search-continuation-binding). +The `openai-responses` adapter preserves the incoming `User-Agent` as a non-credential fallback in +both key and forward modes. A configured provider header with that name wins case-insensitively; +when the caller omits it, the adapter invents no client identity. This does not widen the canonical +forward credential/metadata allowlist or copy any other caller header. + Retired Codex Spark has no model-specific tool or Responses Lite override; general Lite handling and namespace scrubbing remain shared compatibility behavior. Codex quota/reset evidence follows the [shared/Reserve policy](../providers/openai-tiers.md#public-provider-contract), including suppression of retired model-derived evidence before shared recovery. diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-metadata-integrity.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-metadata-integrity.test.ts index a9dc25ed4a..d6f21f87e8 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-metadata-integrity.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-metadata-integrity.test.ts @@ -160,6 +160,78 @@ describe("Codex metadata integrity", () => { expect(sync.headers.session_id).toBe("sess-real-2"); expect(sync.headers["thread-id"]).toBe("thread-real-2"); }); + + test("Responses preserves caller User-Agent as a fallback in key and forward modes", async () => { + for (const provider of [ + { + adapter: "openai-responses", + baseUrl: "https://gateway.example/v1", + authMode: "key", + apiKey: "test-key", + }, + { + adapter: "openai-responses", + baseUrl: "https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex", + authMode: "forward", + }, + ] satisfies OcxProviderConfig[]) { + const request = await createResponsesPassthroughAdapter(provider).buildRequest(minimalParsed(), { + headers: new Headers({ "User-Agent": "codex_cli_rs/0.154.0" }), + }); + expect(new Headers(request.headers).get("user-agent")).toBe("codex_cli_rs/0.154.0"); + } + }); + + test("configured User-Agent wins case-insensitively and a missing caller value stays absent", async () => { + const configured = await createResponsesPassthroughAdapter({ + adapter: "openai-responses", + baseUrl: "https://gateway.example/v1", + authMode: "key", + headers: { "uSeR-aGeNt": "operator-agent/1" }, + }).buildRequest(minimalParsed(), { + headers: new Headers({ "User-Agent": "caller-agent/1" }), + }); + expect(new Headers(configured.headers).get("user-agent")).toBe("operator-agent/1"); + expect(Object.keys(configured.headers).filter(name => name.toLowerCase() === "user-agent")) + .toHaveLength(1); + + const absent = await createResponsesPassthroughAdapter({ + adapter: "openai-responses", + baseUrl: "https://gateway.example/v1", + authMode: "key", + }).buildRequest(minimalParsed(), { headers: new Headers() }); + expect(new Headers(absent.headers).has("user-agent")).toBe(false); + }); + + test("the preserved User-Agent is the value received by the HTTP upstream", async () => { + let resolveObserved!: (value: string | null) => void; + const observed = new Promise(resolve => { resolveObserved = resolve; }); + const upstream = Bun.serve({ + hostname: "127.0.0.1", + port: 0, + fetch(request) { + resolveObserved(request.headers.get("user-agent")); + return Response.json({ id: "response-fixture", output: [] }); + }, + }); + try { + const built = await createResponsesPassthroughAdapter({ + adapter: "openai-responses", + baseUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${upstream.port}/v1`, + authMode: "key", + }).buildRequest(minimalParsed(), { + headers: new Headers({ "User-Agent": "codex_cli_rs/receiver-proof" }), + }); + await fetch(built.url, { + method: built.method, + headers: built.headers, + body: built.body, + }); + expect(await observed).toBe("codex_cli_rs/receiver-proof"); + } finally { + upstream.stop(true); + } + }); }); describe("Codex request transport metadata", () => { From 08c90defe002ca5655a387fab33ea6e463288ad8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 01:18:25 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 051/113] docs: clarify the logical request cost description --- structure/gui-and-management-api.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md index 6725d3baa8..23fadc5b8b 100644 --- a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md +++ b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md @@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ estimated` split exists for, and why coverage is reported alongside totals. The main Dashboard surfaces a 30d token / coverage summary. The in-memory `requestLog` is capped at 200 entries and is **not** the source of truth for aggregation — the JSONL on disk is. -A row also carries what its logical request cost upstream. `logicalRequestId` names the turn +A row also records the upstream cost of its logical request. `logicalRequestId` names the turn that a retry leg, a repair refetch and a combo child all belong to, and `spend` aggregates their physical sends: `sends` totals every attempt on the row, `settled` counts the sends whose attempt reached a terminal status, and `unresolved` holds the rest — an attempt abandoned in flight, or a From 7ac626dff3cbd62b282ced0a3d567ba87024a995 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 10:34:59 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 052/113] feat(gui): carry usage chart accessibility from archived PR #3982 (#4713) Carry the keyboard- and touch-accessible Usage chart details from #3982 onto dev. The source fork yansigit/opencodex is archived and a maintainer push to it was rejected, so the change was carried here instead of pushed to the original branch. Supersedes #3982. Co-authored-by: SB Yoon <44089734+yansigit@users.noreply.github.com> --- assets/pr-screenshots/usage-chart-review.png | Bin 0 -> 45642 bytes .../src/content/docs/guides/web-dashboard.md | 4 + gui/src/i18n/de.ts | 2 + gui/src/i18n/en.ts | 2 + gui/src/i18n/fr.ts | 2 + gui/src/i18n/ja.ts | 2 + gui/src/i18n/ko.ts | 2 + gui/src/i18n/ru.ts | 2 + gui/src/i18n/tr.ts | 2 + gui/src/i18n/zh-TW.ts | 2 + gui/src/i18n/zh.ts | 2 + gui/src/main.tsx | 1 + gui/src/pages/Usage.tsx | 185 +++++++++++++---- gui/src/styles.css | 8 +- gui/src/styles/usage-chart-accessibility.css | 4 + gui/tests/usage-chart-interactions.test.tsx | 187 ++++++++++++++++++ gui/tests/usage-custom-range.test.tsx | 10 +- 17 files changed, 370 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) create mode 100644 assets/pr-screenshots/usage-chart-review.png create mode 100644 gui/src/styles/usage-chart-accessibility.css create mode 100644 gui/tests/usage-chart-interactions.test.tsx diff --git a/assets/pr-screenshots/usage-chart-review.png 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-352,3 +352,7 @@ is gated correctly without manual classification. Machine enrollment and browser authentication are separate. The pairing panel names the hub and displays an `ocx gui pair --origin` command for the exact origin currently open in your browser. Run that command on the hub, or send it to the hub operator and request a one-time pairing code. Paste that code into the panel; a data API key or admin token is not a pairing code. While browser authentication is pending, the dashboard does not recommend restarting a healthy connected client. Completing pairing refreshes the dashboard data immediately, including a previously cached authentication failure. Session expiry returns to pairing; permission denial keeps its own access-settings guidance. Other failed refreshes may show the last received data with a stale-data notice and retry action. + +### Usage chart keyboard and touch controls + +Usage heatmap days have one Tab entry point. Use Up/Down for adjacent days and Left/Right for adjacent weeks. Weekly bars expose the same day details on keyboard focus, pointer hover, or touch. Day labels include the date, request count, and token count; tooltip overlays stay within the viewport. diff --git a/gui/src/i18n/de.ts b/gui/src/i18n/de.ts index 70b62515d9..dd5ca2633c 100644 --- a/gui/src/i18n/de.ts +++ b/gui/src/i18n/de.ts @@ -1822,6 +1822,8 @@ export const de: Record = { "usage.dayWed": "Mi", "usage.dayFri": "Fr", "usage.heatmap.tooltipTokens": "{tokens} Tokens", + "usage.chart.dayDetail": "{date}: {requests} Anfragen, {tokens} Token", + "usage.heatmap.keyboardLabel": "Mit Hoch und Runter tageweise, mit Links und Rechts wochenweise navigieren.", "usage.heatmap.tooltipRequests": "{requests} Anfragen", "nav.storage": "Speicher", diff --git a/gui/src/i18n/en.ts b/gui/src/i18n/en.ts index de2b8906f8..6723d74b81 100644 --- a/gui/src/i18n/en.ts +++ b/gui/src/i18n/en.ts @@ -1004,6 +1004,8 @@ export const en = { "usage.dayWed": "Wed", "usage.dayFri": "Fri", "usage.heatmap.tooltipTokens": "{tokens} tokens", + "usage.chart.dayDetail": "{date}: {requests} requests, {tokens} tokens", + "usage.heatmap.keyboardLabel": "Use Up and Down to move by day; Left and Right to move by week.", "usage.heatmap.tooltipRequests": "{requests} requests", "nav.storage": "Storage", diff --git a/gui/src/i18n/fr.ts b/gui/src/i18n/fr.ts index 5b9a38a588..43d956906f 100644 --- a/gui/src/i18n/fr.ts +++ b/gui/src/i18n/fr.ts @@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ export const fr: Record = { "usage.dayWed": "Mer", "usage.dayFri": "Ven", "usage.heatmap.tooltipTokens": "{tokens} jetons", + "usage.chart.dayDetail": "{date} : {requests} requêtes, {tokens} jetons", + "usage.heatmap.keyboardLabel": "Utilisez Haut et Bas pour changer de jour ; Gauche et Droite pour changer de semaine.", "usage.heatmap.tooltipRequests": "{requests} requêtes", "nav.storage": "Stockage", "storage.title": "Stockage", diff --git a/gui/src/i18n/ja.ts b/gui/src/i18n/ja.ts index b21d4d59b7..d60148bb60 100644 --- a/gui/src/i18n/ja.ts +++ b/gui/src/i18n/ja.ts @@ -917,6 +917,8 @@ export const ja: Record = { "usage.dayWed": "水", "usage.dayFri": "金", "usage.heatmap.tooltipTokens": "{tokens} トークン", + "usage.chart.dayDetail": "{date}: {requests} リクエスト、{tokens} トークン", + "usage.heatmap.keyboardLabel": "上下キーで日単位、左右キーで週単位に移動します。", "usage.heatmap.tooltipRequests": "{requests} リクエスト", "nav.storage": "ストレージ", diff --git a/gui/src/i18n/ko.ts b/gui/src/i18n/ko.ts index a6e76eb7b1..be26daf40e 100644 --- a/gui/src/i18n/ko.ts +++ b/gui/src/i18n/ko.ts @@ -1861,6 +1861,8 @@ export const ko: Record = { "usage.dayWed": "수", "usage.dayFri": "금", "usage.heatmap.tooltipTokens": "{tokens} 토큰", + "usage.chart.dayDetail": "{date}: 요청 {requests}개, 토큰 {tokens}개", + "usage.heatmap.keyboardLabel": "위아래 화살표로 하루씩, 좌우 화살표로 일주일씩 이동합니다.", "usage.heatmap.tooltipRequests": "{requests} 요청", "nav.storage": "저장소", diff --git a/gui/src/i18n/ru.ts b/gui/src/i18n/ru.ts index c28f4464c3..9691f8a49f 100644 --- a/gui/src/i18n/ru.ts +++ b/gui/src/i18n/ru.ts @@ -972,6 +972,8 @@ export const ru: Record = { "usage.dayWed": "Ср", "usage.dayFri": "Пт", "usage.heatmap.tooltipTokens": "{tokens} токенов", + "usage.chart.dayDetail": "{date}: {requests} запросов, {tokens} токенов", + "usage.heatmap.keyboardLabel": "Стрелки вверх и вниз перемещают по дням, влево и вправо — по неделям.", "usage.heatmap.tooltipRequests": "{requests} запросов", "nav.storage": "Хранилище", diff --git a/gui/src/i18n/tr.ts b/gui/src/i18n/tr.ts index c6671c3e28..95336fa32f 100644 --- a/gui/src/i18n/tr.ts +++ b/gui/src/i18n/tr.ts @@ -991,6 +991,8 @@ export const tr: Record = { "usage.dayWed": "Çar", "usage.dayFri": "Cum", "usage.heatmap.tooltipTokens": "{tokens} jeton", + "usage.chart.dayDetail": "{date}: {requests} istek, {tokens} jeton", + "usage.heatmap.keyboardLabel": "Gün gün ilerlemek için Yukarı ve Aşağı, hafta hafta ilerlemek için Sol ve Sağ tuşlarını kullanın.", "usage.heatmap.tooltipRequests": "{requests} istek", "nav.storage": "Depolama", diff --git a/gui/src/i18n/zh-TW.ts b/gui/src/i18n/zh-TW.ts index 9e154fa1b2..19f1e50ce2 100644 --- a/gui/src/i18n/zh-TW.ts +++ b/gui/src/i18n/zh-TW.ts @@ -791,6 +791,8 @@ export const zhTW: Record = { "usage.dayWed": "三", "usage.dayFri": "五", "usage.heatmap.tooltipTokens": "{tokens} Token", + "usage.chart.dayDetail": "{date}：{requests} 個請求，{tokens} 個 Token", + "usage.heatmap.keyboardLabel": "使用上下方向鍵按天移動，使用左右方向鍵按週移動。", "usage.heatmap.tooltipRequests": "{requests} 請求", "nav.storage": "儲存", "storage.title": "儲存", diff --git a/gui/src/i18n/zh.ts b/gui/src/i18n/zh.ts index 018f6e251b..e081d027f3 100644 --- a/gui/src/i18n/zh.ts +++ b/gui/src/i18n/zh.ts @@ -1842,6 +1842,8 @@ export const zh: Record = { "usage.dayWed": "三", "usage.dayFri": "五", "usage.heatmap.tooltipTokens": "{tokens} 令牌", + "usage.chart.dayDetail": "{date}：{requests} 个请求，{tokens} 个 Token", + "usage.heatmap.keyboardLabel": "使用上下方向键按天移动，使用左右方向键按周移动。", "usage.heatmap.tooltipRequests": "{requests} 请求", "nav.storage": "存储", diff --git a/gui/src/main.tsx b/gui/src/main.tsx index 024e29626e..2f3c68dd2c 100644 --- a/gui/src/main.tsx +++ b/gui/src/main.tsx @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import ReactDOM from "react-dom/client"; import App from "./App"; import { LanguageProvider } from "./i18n/provider"; import "./styles.css"; +import "./styles/usage-chart-accessibility.css"; ReactDOM.createRoot(document.getElementById("root")!).render( diff --git a/gui/src/pages/Usage.tsx b/gui/src/pages/Usage.tsx index 900ab6eac0..1b655f8cc9 100644 --- a/gui/src/pages/Usage.tsx +++ b/gui/src/pages/Usage.tsx @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ -import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useRef, useState, type ReactNode } from "react"; +import { createPortal } from "react-dom"; +import { useCallback, useEffect, useId, useMemo, useRef, useState, type CSSProperties, type ReactNode } from "react"; import { useI18n, type TFn, type Locale } from "../i18n/shared"; import type { UsageReadMetadata } from "../usage-summary-resource"; import { UsageIncompleteNotice } from "../components/usage-incomplete-notice"; @@ -141,6 +142,52 @@ function lastSevenDays(days: UsageDay[]): UsageDay[] { return out; } +function formatCalendarDate(date: string, locale: Locale): string { + return new Intl.DateTimeFormat(locale, { dateStyle: "medium" }).format(new Date(`${date}T12:00:00`)); +} + +function chartTipPosition(rect: DOMRect): CSSProperties { + const gutter = 8; + const viewportWidth = window.innerWidth; + const viewportHeight = window.innerHeight; + const maxWidth = Math.min(240, Math.max(0, viewportWidth - gutter * 2)); + const left = Math.max(gutter, Math.min(rect.left + rect.width / 2 - maxWidth / 2, viewportWidth - gutter - maxWidth)); + const above = rect.top - gutter > viewportHeight - rect.bottom - gutter; + const vertical = above + ? (() => { + const bottom = Math.max(gutter, Math.min(viewportHeight - gutter, viewportHeight - rect.top + gutter)); + return { bottom, maxHeight: Math.max(0, viewportHeight - bottom - gutter) }; + })() + : (() => { + const top = Math.max(gutter, Math.min(viewportHeight - gutter, rect.bottom + gutter)); + return { top, maxHeight: Math.max(0, viewportHeight - top - gutter) }; + })(); + return { left, maxWidth, ...vertical }; +} + +function UsageChartOverlay({ + anchor, + className, + children, +}: { + anchor: DOMRect; + className: string; + children: ReactNode; +}) { + return createPortal( +
{children}
, + document.body, + ); +} + +function dayDetail(day: Pick, locale: Locale, t: TFn): string { + return t("usage.chart.dayDetail", { + date: formatCalendarDate(day.date, locale), + requests: day.requests, + tokens: formatTokens(day.totalTokens, locale), + }); +} + function quantileBuckets(values: number[]): number[] { const positive = values.filter(v => v > 0).sort((a, b) => a - b); if (positive.length === 0) return [0, 0, 0, 0]; @@ -360,20 +407,33 @@ function UsageSummaryCards({ } function WeekDayBars({ weekBars, locale, t }: { weekBars: UsageDay[]; locale: Locale; t: TFn }) { - const [hoverDay, setHoverDay] = useState(null); + const [active, setActive] = useState<{ date: string; anchor: DOMRect } | null>(null); const max = Math.max(1, ...weekBars.map(day => day.totalTokens)); + const activeDay = weekBars.find(day => day.date === active?.date); + const show = (day: UsageDay, element: HTMLElement) => { + setActive({ date: day.date, anchor: element.getBoundingClientRect() }); + }; return ( -
+
{weekBars.map(day => { const percentage = Math.round((day.totalTokens / max) * 100); - const label = day.date.slice(5); + const label = new Intl.DateTimeFormat(locale, { weekday: "short" }).format(new Date(`${day.date}T12:00:00`)); return ( -
setHoverDay(day.date)} - onMouseLeave={() => setHoverDay(current => (current === day.date ? null : current))} + aria-label={dayDetail(day, locale, t)} + onFocus={event => show(day, event.currentTarget)} + onBlur={() => setActive(current => current?.date === day.date ? null : current)} + onPointerEnter={event => show(day, event.currentTarget)} + onPointerDown={event => show(day, event.currentTarget)} + onPointerLeave={event => { + if (event.pointerType !== "touch" && document.activeElement !== event.currentTarget) { + setActive(current => current?.date === day.date ? null : current); + } + }} >
- {hoverDay === day.date && day.totalTokens > 0 && ( -
-
{day.date}
- {day.models.slice(0, 8).map(model => ( -
- - {modelLabel(model.model)} - {formatTokens(model.totalTokens, locale)} -
- ))} -
- )} {formatTokens(day.totalTokens, locale)} {label} -
+ ); })} + {active && activeDay && ( + +
{formatCalendarDate(activeDay.date, locale)}
+
+ {t("usage.heatmap.tooltipRequests", { requests: activeDay.requests })} + {t("usage.heatmap.tooltipTokens", { tokens: formatTokens(activeDay.totalTokens, locale) })} +
+ {activeDay.models.slice(0, 8).map(model => ( +
+ + {modelLabel(model.model)} + {formatTokens(model.totalTokens, locale)} +
+ ))} + + )}
); } @@ -427,7 +491,34 @@ function UsageHeatmapPanel({ t: TFn; }) { const heatmapRef = useRef(null); - const [hoverCell, setHoverCell] = useState<{ weekIndex: number; dayIndex: number; x: number; y: number } | null>(null); + const cells = useMemo(() => heatmap.weeks.flat().filter(cell => cell.date), [heatmap]); + const [selectedDate, setSelectedDate] = useState(() => cells.at(-1)?.date ?? ""); + const [tip, setTip] = useState<{ date: string; anchor: DOMRect } | null>(null); + const hintId = useId(); + const rovingDate = cells.some(cell => cell.date === selectedDate) ? selectedDate : (cells.at(-1)?.date ?? ""); + + const selectCell = (cell: HeatmapCell, element: HTMLElement) => { + setSelectedDate(cell.date); + setTip({ date: cell.date, anchor: element.getBoundingClientRect() }); + }; + + const onCellKeyDown = (event: React.KeyboardEvent, cell: HeatmapCell) => { + const index = cells.findIndex(candidate => candidate.date === cell.date); + const offset = event.key === "ArrowUp" ? -1 + : event.key === "ArrowDown" ? 1 + : event.key === "ArrowLeft" ? -7 + : event.key === "ArrowRight" ? 7 + : 0; + if (!offset || index < 0) return; + event.preventDefault(); + const next = cells[Math.max(0, Math.min(cells.length - 1, index + offset))]!; + setSelectedDate(next.date); + const element = heatmapRef.current?.querySelector(`[data-date="${next.date}"]`); + if (element) { + element.focus(); + setTip({ date: next.date, anchor: element.getBoundingClientRect() }); + } + }; useEffect(() => { const element = heatmapRef.current; @@ -445,7 +536,7 @@ function UsageHeatmapPanel({ {range === "7d" ? ( ) : ( -
+
{heatmap.months.map(month => ( @@ -456,36 +547,54 @@ function UsageHeatmapPanel({
{t("usage.dayMon")}{t("usage.dayWed")}{t("usage.dayFri")}
-
+
{heatmap.weeks.map((week, weekIndex) => (
- {week.map((cell, dayIndex) => ( -
cell.date ? ( +
))}
- {hoverCell && (() => { - const cell = heatmap.weeks[hoverCell.weekIndex]?.[hoverCell.dayIndex]; + {t("usage.heatmap.keyboardLabel")} + + {cells.find(cell => cell.date === rovingDate) ? dayDetail(cells.find(cell => cell.date === rovingDate)!, locale, t) : ""} + + {tip && (() => { + const cell = cells.find(candidate => candidate.date === tip.date); if (!cell?.date) return null; return ( -
-
{cell.date}
+ +
{formatCalendarDate(cell.date, locale)}
{t("usage.heatmap.tooltipTokens", { tokens: formatTokens(cell.totalTokens, locale) })}
{t("usage.heatmap.tooltipRequests", { requests: cell.requests })}
-
+ ); })()}
diff --git a/gui/src/styles.css b/gui/src/styles.css index 352d1c53a2..28c9277c1e 100644 --- a/gui/src/styles.css +++ b/gui/src/styles.css @@ -2592,7 +2592,7 @@ button.prov-account-row.active { cursor: default; } .heatmap-cell-4 { background: var(--green); } .heatmap-legend { display: inline-flex; align-items: center; gap: 4px; font-size: var(--text-label); align-self: flex-end; position: sticky; right: 0; } .heatmap-legend .heatmap-cell { width: 10px; height: 10px; } -.heatmap-tip { position: fixed; z-index: 10; transform: translate(-50%, -100%) translateY(-8px); pointer-events: none; +.heatmap-tip { position: fixed; z-index: var(--z-popover); pointer-events: none; background: var(--surface); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: var(--radius-sm); padding: 6px 10px; box-shadow: var(--shadow-sm); white-space: nowrap; font-size: var(--text-label); } .heatmap-tip-date { font-weight: var(--weight-semibold); color: var(--text); margin-bottom: 2px; } @@ -2603,7 +2603,7 @@ button.prov-account-row.active { cursor: default; } /* 7d view: per-day request bar chart (replaces the year heatmap on the 7d toggle). */ .daybars { display: grid; grid-template-columns: repeat(7, 1fr); gap: 10px; align-items: end; height: 180px; padding-top: 8px; } -.daybar { position: relative; display: flex; flex-direction: column; align-items: center; gap: 6px; height: 100%; justify-content: flex-end; } +.daybar { appearance: none; padding: 0; border: 0; background: transparent; color: inherit; font: inherit; cursor: pointer; position: relative; display: flex; flex-direction: column; align-items: center; gap: 6px; height: 100%; justify-content: flex-end; } .daybar-track { width: 100%; max-width: 48px; flex: 1; display: flex; align-items: flex-end; background: var(--border); border-radius: var(--radius-xs); overflow: hidden; } /* Full-height stack scaled on Y — avoids layout thrash from animating height. */ .daybar-stack { @@ -2622,9 +2622,9 @@ button.prov-account-row.active { cursor: default; } .daybar-count { font-size: var(--text-label); font-weight: var(--weight-semibold); color: var(--text); } .daybar-label { font-size: var(--text-caption); white-space: nowrap; } .daybar:hover .daybar-track { outline: 1px solid var(--border); } -.daybar-tip { position: absolute; bottom: calc(100% + 6px); left: 50%; transform: translateX(-50%); z-index: 5; +.daybar-tip { position: fixed; z-index: var(--z-popover); background: var(--surface); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: var(--radius-sm); padding: 8px 10px; - min-width: 160px; box-shadow: var(--shadow-sm); pointer-events: none; } + min-width: min(160px, calc(100vw - 16px)); box-shadow: var(--shadow-sm); pointer-events: none; } .daybar-tip-date { font-size: var(--text-label); font-weight: var(--weight-semibold); color: var(--text); margin-bottom: 6px; white-space: nowrap; } .daybar-tip-row { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 8px; font-size: var(--text-label); line-height: var(--leading-relaxed); } .daybar-tip-swatch { width: 10px; height: 10px; border-radius: var(--radius-2xs); flex-shrink: 0; } diff --git a/gui/src/styles/usage-chart-accessibility.css b/gui/src/styles/usage-chart-accessibility.css new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..caa86736e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/gui/src/styles/usage-chart-accessibility.css @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +/* Usage chart controls retain chart styling while exposing keyboard focus. */ +.heatmap-grid button.heatmap-cell { appearance: none; border: 0; padding: 0; cursor: pointer; } +.heatmap-grid button.heatmap-cell:focus-visible, .daybar:focus-visible { outline: 2px solid var(--accent-ring); outline-offset: 2px; } +.chart-overlay { box-sizing: border-box; overflow: hidden; white-space: normal; overflow-wrap: anywhere; } diff --git a/gui/tests/usage-chart-interactions.test.tsx b/gui/tests/usage-chart-interactions.test.tsx new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..02f7392fe1 --- /dev/null +++ b/gui/tests/usage-chart-interactions.test.tsx @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +import { afterEach, beforeEach, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { Window } from "happy-dom"; +import { act } from "react"; +import type { Root } from "react-dom/client"; +import { clearClientResourceStoresForTests } from "../src/client-resource"; +import { LanguageProvider } from "../src/i18n/provider"; +import Usage from "../src/pages/Usage"; + +const globals = [ + "document", "window", "navigator", "localStorage", "sessionStorage", "fetch", + "ResizeObserver", "IS_REACT_ACT_ENVIRONMENT", +] as const; + +let previous: Record<(typeof globals)[number], PropertyDescriptor | undefined>; +let win: Window; +let root: Root | null = null; + +function isoDay(offset = 0): string { + const day = new Date(); + day.setHours(0, 0, 0, 0); + day.setDate(day.getDate() + offset); + return `${day.getFullYear()}-${String(day.getMonth() + 1).padStart(2, "0")}-${String(day.getDate()).padStart(2, "0")}`; +} + +beforeEach(() => { + previous = Object.fromEntries(globals.map(key => [key, Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(globalThis, key)])) as typeof previous; + win = new Window({ url: "http://localhost/#dashboard" }); + class TestResizeObserver { + observe() {} + disconnect() {} + } + Object.defineProperties(globalThis, { + document: { configurable: true, value: win.document }, + window: { configurable: true, value: win }, + navigator: { configurable: true, value: win.navigator }, + localStorage: { configurable: true, value: win.localStorage }, + sessionStorage: { configurable: true, value: win.sessionStorage }, + ResizeObserver: { configurable: true, value: TestResizeObserver }, + IS_REACT_ACT_ENVIRONMENT: { configurable: true, value: true }, + }); + clearClientResourceStoresForTests(); +}); + +afterEach(async () => { + if (root) await act(async () => root?.unmount()); + root = null; + clearClientResourceStoresForTests(); + win.close(); + for (const key of globals) { + const descriptor = previous[key]; + if (descriptor) Object.defineProperty(globalThis, key, descriptor); + else Reflect.deleteProperty(globalThis, key); + } +}); + +async function waitFor(predicate: () => boolean): Promise { + const deadline = Date.now() + 1_000; + while (!predicate()) { + if (Date.now() >= deadline) throw new Error(`timed out: ${document.body.innerHTML}`); + await act(async () => { await new Promise(resolve => win.setTimeout(resolve, 10)); }); + } +} + +async function mount(node: React.ReactNode): Promise { + const container = document.createElement("div"); + document.body.append(container); + const { createRoot } = await import("react-dom/client"); + root = createRoot(container); + await act(async () => { root!.render({node}); }); + return container; +} + +function usagePayload(models: Array<{ provider: string; model: string; requests: number; totalTokens: number }> = []) { + const yesterday = isoDay(-1); + const today = isoDay(); + return { + range: "all", + surface: "all", + since: null, + generatedAt: Date.now(), + summary: { + requests: 7, measuredRequests: 7, reportedRequests: 7, unreportedRequests: 0, + unsupportedRequests: 0, estimatedRequests: 0, inputTokens: 70, outputTokens: 30, + cachedInputTokens: 0, reasoningOutputTokens: 0, totalTokens: 100, coverageRatio: 1, + }, + days: [ + { date: yesterday, requests: 2, measuredRequests: 2, reportedRequests: 2, totalTokens: 25, models: [] }, + { date: today, requests: 5, measuredRequests: 5, reportedRequests: 5, totalTokens: 75, models }, + ], + models: [], providers: [], historyTruncated: false, truncatedPrefixBytes: 0, + entriesTruncated: false, entriesDropped: 0, + }; +} + +test("Usage heatmap exposes one roving entry and day/week keyboard movement", async () => { + globalThis.fetch = (async () => Response.json(usagePayload())) as typeof fetch; + const container = await mount(); + await waitFor(() => container.querySelector(".heatmap-grid") !== null); + + expect(container.querySelector(".heatmap-grid")?.getAttribute("role")).toBe("group"); + expect(container.querySelectorAll(".heatmap-grid [role='gridcell']")).toHaveLength(0); + expect(container.querySelectorAll(".heatmap-grid [tabindex='0']")).toHaveLength(1); + const initial = container.querySelector(".heatmap-grid [tabindex='0']")!; + expect(initial.tagName).toBe("BUTTON"); + const initialDate = initial.dataset.date!; + await act(async () => { initial.focus(); }); + const heatmapTip = document.querySelector(".heatmap-tip"); + expect(heatmapTip?.textContent).toContain("requests"); + expect(heatmapTip?.parentNode === document.body).toBe(true); + expect(container.contains(heatmapTip)).toBe(false); + + await act(async () => { + initial.dispatchEvent(new win.KeyboardEvent("keydown", { key: "ArrowUp", bubbles: true, cancelable: true })); + await new Promise(resolve => win.setTimeout(resolve, 0)); + }); + const previousDay = container.querySelector(".heatmap-grid [tabindex='0']")!; + expect(previousDay.dataset.date).not.toBe(initialDate); + expect(document.activeElement).toBe(previousDay); + + await act(async () => { + previousDay.dispatchEvent(new win.KeyboardEvent("keydown", { key: "ArrowLeft", bubbles: true, cancelable: true })); + await new Promise(resolve => win.setTimeout(resolve, 0)); + }); + expect(container.querySelector(".heatmap-grid [tabindex='0']")?.dataset.date).not.toBe(previousDay.dataset.date); +}); + +test("seven-day bars expose the same detail on focus and touch", async () => { + globalThis.fetch = (async () => Response.json(usagePayload())) as typeof fetch; + const container = await mount(); + await waitFor(() => container.querySelector(".heatmap-grid") !== null); + const sevenDay = Array.from(container.querySelectorAll(".usage-segmented-btn")) + .find(button => button.textContent === "7d")!; + await act(async () => { sevenDay.click(); }); + await waitFor(() => container.querySelectorAll(".daybar").length === 7); + + const bars = container.querySelectorAll(".daybar"); + expect(bars).toHaveLength(7); + expect(Array.from(bars).every(bar => bar.tabIndex === 0)).toBe(true); + + const today = bars[6]!; + await act(async () => { today.focus(); }); + const focused = document.querySelector(".daybar-tip")?.textContent; + expect(focused).toContain("5 requests"); + expect(focused).toContain("75 tokens"); + + await act(async () => { today.blur(); }); + await act(async () => { + today.dispatchEvent(new win.PointerEvent("pointerdown", { bubbles: true, pointerType: "touch" })); + }); + expect(document.querySelector(".daybar-tip")?.textContent).toBe(focused); +}); + +test("Usage tooltip portals stay inside viewport gutters at the lower-right edge", async () => { + Object.defineProperties(win, { + innerWidth: { configurable: true, value: 320 }, + innerHeight: { configurable: true, value: 240 }, + }); + const models = Array.from({ length: 8 }, (_, index) => ({ + provider: "openai", + model: `model-${index}`, + requests: 1, + totalTokens: index + 1, + })); + globalThis.fetch = (async () => Response.json(usagePayload(models))) as typeof fetch; + const container = await mount(); + await waitFor(() => container.querySelector(".heatmap-grid") !== null); + const sevenDay = Array.from(container.querySelectorAll(".usage-segmented-btn")) + .find(button => button.textContent === "7d")!; + await act(async () => { sevenDay.click(); }); + await waitFor(() => container.querySelectorAll(".daybar").length === 7); + + const today = container.querySelectorAll(".daybar")[6]!; + Object.defineProperty(today, "getBoundingClientRect", { + configurable: true, + value: () => ({ top: 220, right: 320, bottom: 240, left: 300, width: 20, height: 20, x: 300, y: 220, toJSON() {} }), + }); + await act(async () => { today.focus(); }); + + const tooltip = document.querySelector(".daybar-tip")!; + expect(tooltip.parentNode === document.body).toBe(true); + expect(container.contains(tooltip)).toBe(false); + expect(tooltip.querySelectorAll(".daybar-tip-row")).toHaveLength(9); + expect(parseFloat(tooltip.style.left)).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(8); + expect(parseFloat(tooltip.style.left) + parseFloat(tooltip.style.maxWidth)).toBeLessThanOrEqual(312); + expect(parseFloat(tooltip.style.bottom)).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(8); + expect(parseFloat(tooltip.style.maxHeight) + parseFloat(tooltip.style.bottom)).toBeLessThanOrEqual(232); +}); diff --git a/gui/tests/usage-custom-range.test.tsx b/gui/tests/usage-custom-range.test.tsx index 78a3e9b165..3ef6373ccf 100644 --- a/gui/tests/usage-custom-range.test.tsx +++ b/gui/tests/usage-custom-range.test.tsx @@ -221,9 +221,9 @@ test("America/Santiago midnight DST retains final-day activity and tooltip", asy await act(async () => gate.resolve(Response.json(data))); const active = container.querySelector('.heatmap-grid .heatmap-cell:not(.heatmap-cell-0)'); expect(active).not.toBeNull(); - await act(async () => active!.dispatchEvent(new testWindow.MouseEvent("mouseover", { bubbles: true }))); - expect(container.querySelector(".heatmap-tip-date")?.textContent).toBe("2026-09-07"); - expect(container.querySelector(".heatmap-tip")?.textContent).toContain("700"); + await act(async () => active!.dispatchEvent(new testWindow.PointerEvent("pointerover", { bubbles: true }))); + expect(document.querySelector(".heatmap-tip-date")?.textContent).toBe("Sep 7, 2026"); + expect(document.querySelector(".heatmap-tip")?.textContent).toContain("700"); if (process.env.OCX_USAGE_SANTIAGO_CHILD === "1") console.log("OCX_SANTIAGO_CASE_COMPLETED"); }, process.env.OCX_USAGE_SANTIAGO_CHILD === "1" ? 10000 : 15000); @@ -254,8 +254,8 @@ test("Apply submits inclusive bounds once; Clear restores the held preset withou // A one-day historical window must not produce a year grid anchored to today's date. expect(container.querySelectorAll(".heatmap-grid .heatmap-cell")).toHaveLength(7); const activeCell = container.querySelector(".heatmap-grid .heatmap-cell-1")!; - await act(async () => { activeCell.dispatchEvent(new testWindow.MouseEvent("mouseover", { bubbles: true })); }); - expect(container.querySelector('[role="tooltip"]')?.textContent).toContain("2020-09-15"); + await act(async () => { activeCell.dispatchEvent(new testWindow.PointerEvent("pointerover", { bubbles: true })); }); + expect(document.querySelector('[role="tooltip"]')?.textContent).toContain("Sep 15, 2020"); await enter("2020-09-16T10:20", "2020-09-16T10:21"); expect(interval()).toBe(appliedInterval); expect(requests).toHaveLength(2); From 3070d64d8822c6d8c62989665f82ab665e4d164c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 10:35:08 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 053/113] feat(combos): carry forced default effort from PR #4054 (#4714) Carry the forced default reasoning effort combo option from #4054 onto dev. Keeps the strict/adaptive capability policy, adds fallback/force precedence, ports per-attempt requested-effort telemetry into core-combo.ts, and stays fail-closed on a malformed forced default. Supersedes #4054. Co-authored-by: Elginux Agent --- docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/combos.md | 8 +- .../docs/reference/configuration/routing.md | 3 +- src/cli/combo.ts | 11 +- src/combos/request.ts | 27 ++-- src/combos/types.ts | 25 +++- src/server/chat-completions.ts | 4 +- src/server/management/combo-routes.ts | 11 +- src/server/responses/core-combo.ts | 28 ++++ src/types.ts | 1 + src/types/config.ts | 5 +- structure/runtime.md | 12 ++ tests/cli/cli-headless-parity.test.ts | 42 ++++++ tests/codex-integration/combos.test.ts | 63 ++++++++- tests/helpers/combo-forced-effort-cases.ts | 123 ++++++++++++++++++ tests/routing/combo-management-api.test.ts | 41 ++++++ .../server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts | 16 +-- 16 files changed, 386 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/helpers/combo-forced-effort-cases.ts diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/combos.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/combos.md index 6018d7e1bd..6f51870ad3 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/combos.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/combos.md @@ -263,10 +263,11 @@ A combo can also advance after an intact HTTP 400 `invalid_request_error` that s ## Default reasoning effort -`defaultEffort` fills an absent `reasoning.effort` when the combo has a non-null default and the selected target has a known, nonempty supported ladder. If the target supports the configured value, it is retained; otherwise the highest supported rung at or below it is used, or the lowest supported rung when none is lower. Unknown or empty ladders omit the default. +`defaultEffort` supplies a configured effort when the selected target has a known, nonempty supported ladder. With the default `defaultEffortMode: "fallback"`, an explicit caller effort keeps precedence. `defaultEffortMode: "force"` overrides a valid caller effort with the configured default; it requires a valid, non-null `defaultEffort` and can increase cost and latency. Force mode is an explicit operator choice through combo configuration or management. -The default-injection step preserves existing effort and other reasoning fields. Capability normalization can separately remove unsupported effort/thinking controls as described below. Supported defaults are `low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, `max`, and `ultra`; omit the field or use `null` to disable default injection. +The target's advertised ladder remains authoritative. An exact supported value is retained; otherwise the highest supported rung at or below it is selected, or the lowest supported rung when none is lower. Unknown or empty ladders never cause default injection. Force mode does not repair malformed caller effort into a valid expensive request. Other reasoning fields, including `reasoning.summary`, are preserved. +`reasoningEffortMode` remains independent of `defaultEffortMode`: explicit empty ladders remove unsupported effort/thinking controls, and adaptive unknown ladders do so as well, as described below. Strict unknown ladders preserve the caller's request without forcing a default. Supported defaults are `low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, `max`, and `ultra`; omit `defaultEffort` or set it to `null` to disable default injection in fallback mode. ### Mixed-capability groups (`reasoningEffortMode`) @@ -413,7 +414,8 @@ Combos are stored in the top-level `combos` object, keyed by combo id: | `stickyLimit` | No | `1` | Integer from 1 to 100 successful requests per round-robin selection. Applies only to round-robin. | | `cooldownMs` | No | unset → upstream fallback (5 s for request-rate 429 codes `1302`/`1305`, otherwise 60 s) | Integer from 1 to 600000. When set, applies as the per-target cooldown whenever no usable upstream `Retry-After` or Codex reset signal exists, including request-rate 429s; when unset, uses the upstream fallback. | | `waitForCooldownMs` | No | `0` | Integer from 0 to 600000. Maximum time to wait for the earliest eligible cooling target before returning `combo_unavailable`; abort cancels the wait. | -| `defaultEffort` | No | `null` | `low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, `max`, or `ultra`; applied only when the caller omits effort and the target advertises support. | +| `defaultEffort` | No | `null` | `low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, `max`, or `ultra`; resolved against each target's advertised ladder. | +| `defaultEffortMode` | No | `"fallback"` | `"fallback"` preserves explicit caller effort. `"force"` overrides valid caller effort, requires a valid non-null default, and can increase cost and latency. | | `reasoningEffortMode` | No | `"strict"` | `"strict"` intersects every known target ladder, so one target advertising no effort control empties the combo's picker. `"adaptive"` excludes those empty ladders from the published intersection. At dispatch, explicit empty or adaptive unknown ladders remove unsupported effort/thinking controls while preserving supported non-effort reasoning fields such as `reasoning.summary`; known non-empty targets keep existing effort resolution. | | `imageInput` | No | `"auto"` | `"auto"` or `"disabled"`. `"auto"` publishes image support only when every target supports images; `"disabled"` forces text-only (drops image from published modalities and rejects image-bearing requests before dispatch). | | `alias` | No | none | Optional trimmed public model id; use the alias rules above. An empty value is stored as no alias. | diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/routing.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/routing.md index 2934c337a6..d830faafae 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/routing.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/routing.md @@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ namespace, and cannot use reserved bare native families such as `gpt-*`, `o1-*`, | `stickyLimit?` | `number` | `1` | Successful requests retained in one round-robin batch. Range 1–100. Applies only to round-robin. | | `cooldownMs?` | `number` | unset → upstream fallback (5 s for request-rate 429 codes `1302`/`1305`, otherwise 60 s) | Range 1–600000. When set, applies whenever no usable upstream `Retry-After` or Codex reset signal exists, including request-rate 429s; when unset, uses the upstream fallback. Upstream signals take precedence and all cooldowns are capped at 10 minutes. | | `waitForCooldownMs?` | `number` | `0` | Maximum wait for the earliest eligible cooling target on each selection attempt before returning `combo_unavailable`. Range 0–600000; an abort cancels the wait. | -| `defaultEffort?` | `"low" \| "medium" \| "high" \| "xhigh" \| "max" \| "ultra" \| null` | unset | `defaultEffort` fills an absent `reasoning.effort` when the combo has a non-null default and the selected target has a known, nonempty supported ladder. If the target supports the configured value, it is retained; otherwise the highest supported rung at or below it is used, or the lowest supported rung when none is lower. Unknown or empty ladders omit the default. | +| `defaultEffort?` | `"low" \| "medium" \| "high" \| "xhigh" \| "max" \| "ultra" \| null` | unset | `defaultEffort` fills an absent `reasoning.effort` in fallback mode, or overrides valid caller effort in explicit force mode when the combo has a non-null default and the selected target has a known, nonempty supported ladder. If the target supports the configured value, it is retained; otherwise the highest supported rung at or below it is used, or the lowest supported rung when none is lower. Unknown or empty ladders omit the default. | +| `defaultEffortMode?` | `"fallback" \| "force"` | `"fallback"` | Preserves caller precedence by default. Explicit force requires a valid non-null default, respects target capability and can increase cost and latency. `reasoningEffortMode` remains independent. | | `reasoningEffortMode?` | `"strict" \| "adaptive"` | `"strict"` | `"strict"` intersects all known target ladders, including empty ones; `"adaptive"` excludes empty ladders. Unknown ladders are catalog wildcards in both modes. At dispatch, explicit empty ladders remove effort/thinking controls in both modes; unknown ladders do so only in adaptive. `reasoning.summary` is preserved. Known nonempty targets retain their effort resolution, and target selection/order is unchanged. | | `imageInput?` | `"auto" \| "disabled"` | `"auto"` | `"auto"` publishes image only when every target supports images; `"disabled"` forces text-only (drops image from published modalities and rejects image-bearing requests before dispatch). | | `alias?` | `string` | — | Optional public model id in place of the canonical picker slug. | diff --git a/src/cli/combo.ts b/src/cli/combo.ts index 3e0aa0d0bf..380bcd36ff 100644 --- a/src/cli/combo.ts +++ b/src/cli/combo.ts @@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ const USAGE = `Usage: ocx combo show [--json] ocx combo set --targets [--strategy ] [--sticky <1-100>] - [--effort ] [--alias ] + [--effort ] [--effort-mode ] + (force overrides valid client effort and can increase cost/latency) [--alias ] [--native-alias] [--display-name ] [--rename-from ] [--json] ocx combo remove --yes [--json]`; @@ -80,6 +81,10 @@ async function set(argv: string[], deps: RuntimeApiDeps): Promise { if (strategy !== "round-robin") throw new CliUsageError("--sticky applies only to round-robin", USAGE); } const effort = takeOption(args, "--effort"); + const effortMode = takeOption(args, "--effort-mode"); + if (effortMode !== undefined && effortMode !== "fallback" && effortMode !== "force") { + throw new CliUsageError("--effort-mode must be fallback or force", USAGE); + } const alias = takeOption(args, "--alias"); const nativeAlias = takeFlag(args, "--native-alias"); const displayName = takeOption(args, "--display-name"); @@ -91,12 +96,16 @@ async function set(argv: string[], deps: RuntimeApiDeps): Promise { targets: parseTargets(targetsRaw), }; if (effort !== undefined) combo.defaultEffort = effort === "-" ? null : effort; + if (effortMode !== undefined) combo.defaultEffortMode = effortMode; if (alias !== undefined) combo.alias = alias === "-" ? "" : alias; if (nativeAlias) combo.nativeAlias = true; if (displayName !== undefined) combo.displayName = displayName === "-" ? "" : displayName; const current = await runtimeRequest<{ combos?: ComboRow[] }>("/api/combos", {}, deps); const existing = (current.combos ?? []).find(row => row.id === (renameFrom ?? id)); if (existing?.imageInput === "disabled") combo.imageInput = "disabled"; + if (effortMode === undefined && existing?.defaultEffortMode === "force") { + combo.defaultEffortMode = effort === "-" ? "fallback" : "force"; + } const result = await runtimeRequest("/api/combos", { method: "PUT", body: JSON.stringify({ id, combo, ...(renameFrom ? { renameFrom } : {}) }), diff --git a/src/combos/request.ts b/src/combos/request.ts index 63c5ba7fca..e0fa642608 100644 --- a/src/combos/request.ts +++ b/src/combos/request.ts @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -import type { OcxComboDefaultEffort, OcxComboReasoningEffortMode, OcxComboTarget, OcxConfig } from "../types"; -import { resolveEffortAtOrBelow } from "../reasoning-effort"; +import type { OcxComboDefaultEffort, OcxComboDefaultEffortMode, OcxComboReasoningEffortMode, OcxComboTarget, OcxConfig } from "../types"; +import { isCodexReasoningEffort, resolveEffortAtOrBelow } from "../reasoning-effort"; import { resolveComboId } from "./types"; const warnedUnsupportedDefaults = new Set(); @@ -60,22 +60,29 @@ export function concreteComboRequestBody( defaultEffort: OcxComboDefaultEffort | null, targetReasoningEfforts: readonly string[] | undefined, reasoningEffortMode: OcxComboReasoningEffortMode = "strict", + defaultEffortMode: OcxComboDefaultEffortMode = "fallback", ): Record { const clone = structuredClone(body) as Record; clone.model = `${target.provider}/${target.model}`; + if (defaultEffortMode === "force" && (!defaultEffort || !isCodexReasoningEffort(defaultEffort))) { + throw new Error("force combo default effort requires a valid defaultEffort"); + } if (targetReasoningEfforts?.length === 0 || (reasoningEffortMode === "adaptive" && targetReasoningEfforts === undefined)) { stripUnsupportedReasoningControls(clone); } - if (!defaultEffort) return clone; + if (!defaultEffort || !isCodexReasoningEffort(defaultEffort)) return clone; const reasoning = clone.reasoning; - const needsDefault = reasoning === undefined || ( - reasoning - && typeof reasoning === "object" - && !Array.isArray(reasoning) - && !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(reasoning, "effort") - ); - if (!needsDefault) return clone; + const reasoningRecord = reasoning && typeof reasoning === "object" && !Array.isArray(reasoning) + ? reasoning as Record + : undefined; + const hasEffort = reasoningRecord !== undefined + && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(reasoningRecord, "effort"); + const callerEffort = reasoningRecord?.effort; + const validCallerEffort = typeof callerEffort === "string" && isCodexReasoningEffort(callerEffort); + const needsDefault = reasoning === undefined || (reasoningRecord !== undefined && !hasEffort); + const shouldForce = defaultEffortMode === "force" && validCallerEffort; + if (!needsDefault && !shouldForce) return clone; // Picker availability treats an unknown ladder as a wildcard, but runtime // injection stays fail-closed until this concrete target advertises support. // diff --git a/src/combos/types.ts b/src/combos/types.ts index b5c5bf697c..f4b3e26b2f 100644 --- a/src/combos/types.ts +++ b/src/combos/types.ts @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ import { isCodexReasoningEffort } from "../reasoning-effort"; import { SUPPORTED_NATIVE_OPENAI_SLUGS } from "../codex/catalog/native-models"; -import type { OcxComboConfig, OcxComboDefaultEffort, OcxComboReasoningEffortMode, OcxComboStrategy, OcxComboTarget, OcxProviderConfig } from "../types"; +import type { OcxComboConfig, OcxComboDefaultEffort, OcxComboDefaultEffortMode, OcxComboReasoningEffortMode, OcxComboStrategy, OcxComboTarget, OcxProviderConfig } from "../types"; import { COMBO_NAMESPACE, isValidComboId, targetKey } from "./identifiers"; export const COMBO_DEFAULT_WAIT_FOR_COOLDOWN_MS = 0; @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ export interface NormalizedComboConfig { cooldownMs?: number; waitForCooldownMs: number; defaultEffort: OcxComboDefaultEffort | null; + /** Client-precedence policy; `fallback` preserves legacy behavior. */ + defaultEffortMode: OcxComboDefaultEffortMode; /** Picker-ladder derivation policy; `strict` preserves the legacy intersection rule. */ reasoningEffortMode: OcxComboReasoningEffortMode; /** Disable image input; `auto` preserves the intersection derived from all targets. */ @@ -167,6 +169,21 @@ export function comboConfigIssues( message: "defaultEffort must be one of: low, medium, high, xhigh, max, ultra", }); } + if (body.defaultEffortMode !== undefined + && body.defaultEffortMode !== "fallback" + && body.defaultEffortMode !== "force") { + issues.push({ + path: ["defaultEffortMode"], + message: 'defaultEffortMode must be "fallback" or "force"', + }); + } + if (body.defaultEffortMode === "force" + && (typeof body.defaultEffort !== "string" || !isCodexReasoningEffort(body.defaultEffort))) { + issues.push({ + path: ["defaultEffort"], + message: "defaultEffort is required when defaultEffortMode is force", + }); + } if (body.imageInput !== undefined && body.imageInput !== "auto" && body.imageInput !== "disabled") { issues.push({ path: ["imageInput"], message: 'imageInput must be "auto" or "disabled"' }); } @@ -293,12 +310,16 @@ export function comboConfigError( export function normalizeComboConfig(raw: OcxComboConfig): NormalizedComboConfig { const alias = typeof raw.alias === "string" ? raw.alias.trim() : ""; const displayName = typeof raw.displayName === "string" ? raw.displayName.trim() : ""; + const defaultEffort = typeof raw.defaultEffort === "string" && isCodexReasoningEffort(raw.defaultEffort) + ? raw.defaultEffort + : null; return { strategy: raw.strategy ?? "failover", stickyLimit: raw.stickyLimit ?? 1, cooldownMs: raw.cooldownMs, waitForCooldownMs: raw.waitForCooldownMs ?? COMBO_DEFAULT_WAIT_FOR_COOLDOWN_MS, - defaultEffort: raw.defaultEffort ?? null, + defaultEffort, + defaultEffortMode: raw.defaultEffortMode === "force" && defaultEffort !== null ? "force" : "fallback", reasoningEffortMode: raw.reasoningEffortMode === "adaptive" ? "adaptive" : "strict", imageInput: raw.imageInput === "disabled" ? "disabled" : "auto", alias: alias || null, diff --git a/src/server/chat-completions.ts b/src/server/chat-completions.ts index d44ac60c74..2d268289e3 100644 --- a/src/server/chat-completions.ts +++ b/src/server/chat-completions.ts @@ -170,7 +170,9 @@ async function handleChatCompletionsWithBudget( if (chatBody.tools !== undefined) parts.push(JSON.stringify(chatBody.tools)); logCtx.usageLogInputTokens = Math.max(1, estimateTokens(parts.join("\n"), requestedModel)); } - if (!effortRow && isNativeChatRouteEligible(route, chatBody, config)) chatNativeRoute = route; + // Combos must enter the Responses routing path so child selection, forced default + // effort, failover, and per-attempt telemetry run before any native Chat send. + if (!route.combo && !effortRow && isNativeChatRouteEligible(route, chatBody, config)) chatNativeRoute = route; } catch (err) { if (err instanceof UnknownRoutingPolicyError) { logCtx.requestedModel = requestedModel; diff --git a/src/server/management/combo-routes.ts b/src/server/management/combo-routes.ts index 475e72db41..cdc567a6eb 100644 --- a/src/server/management/combo-routes.ts +++ b/src/server/management/combo-routes.ts @@ -80,17 +80,20 @@ function sparseComboConfig(combo: T): Omit & { + defaultEffortMode?: "fallback" | "force"; +}>(combo: T): Omit & { cooldownMs?: number; waitForCooldownMs?: number; imageInput?: "disabled"; reasoningEffortMode?: "adaptive"; + defaultEffortMode?: "force"; } { const { cooldownMs, waitForCooldownMs, imageInput, reasoningEffortMode, + defaultEffortMode, ...rest } = combo; return { @@ -101,6 +104,7 @@ function sparseComboConfig { + if (originalRequestedEffort === undefined) return; + const normalizedRequestedEffort = childLog.requestedEffort; + const transitionIndex = normalizedRequestedEffort?.indexOf("->") ?? -1; + childLog.requestedEffort = transitionIndex >= 0 + ? `${originalRequestedEffort}${normalizedRequestedEffort!.slice(transitionIndex)}` + : originalRequestedEffort; + recordAttemptRequestedEffort(childLog); + }; + let lastFailure: Response | null = null; // Dispatched targets, not attempted picks: it indexes the declared target list so the clamp // below can tell how many targets are still entitled to a send. @@ -407,6 +429,7 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( comboDefaultEffort(config, comboId), supportedLadderFor({ provider: targetRoute.provider, modelId: targetRoute.modelId }), combo.reasoningEffortMode, + combo.defaultEffortMode, ); const childHeaders = buildComboChildHeaders(req.headers); const childRequest = new Request(req.url, { @@ -425,6 +448,10 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( config.providers[pick.target.provider]!.adapter, ); childLog.activeAttempt = attempt; + if (originalRequestedEffort !== undefined) { + childLog.requestedEffort = originalRequestedEffort; + recordAttemptRequestedEffort(childLog); + } let attemptRetained = false; const retainCancelledAttempt = (): void => { if (attemptRetained) return; @@ -499,6 +526,7 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( onNativePassthroughCancel: callbackGate.onCancel, onResponseComplete: callbackGate.onResponseComplete, }); + restoreOriginalRequestedEffort(childLog); } catch (error) { callbackGate.discard(); if (options.abortSignal?.aborted) { diff --git a/src/types.ts b/src/types.ts index 234dbdc0d5..c2104f9d41 100644 --- a/src/types.ts +++ b/src/types.ts @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ export type { OcxAccountPoolQuotaWindow, OcxComboStrategy, OcxComboDefaultEffort, + OcxComboDefaultEffortMode, OcxComboReasoningEffortMode, OcxComboTarget, OcxComboConfig, diff --git a/src/types/config.ts b/src/types/config.ts index bcc21c825d..17bf93218b 100644 --- a/src/types/config.ts +++ b/src/types/config.ts @@ -1011,6 +1011,7 @@ export type OcxAccountPoolQuotaWindow = "five-hour" | "weekly" | "max-utilizatio export type OcxComboStrategy = "failover" | "round-robin" | "random" | "least-used" | "reset-window"; export type OcxComboDefaultEffort = "low" | "medium" | "high" | "xhigh" | "max" | "ultra"; +export type OcxComboDefaultEffortMode = "fallback" | "force"; /** * How a combo derives the reasoning ladder it publishes to the picker. @@ -1046,8 +1047,10 @@ export interface OcxComboConfig { cooldownMs?: number; /** Maximum wait for an eligible target cooldown to expire before failing closed. Default 0; range 0..600000, per selection attempt. */ waitForCooldownMs?: number; - /** Used when the client omits reasoning.effort. null/omitted leaves the target default unchanged. */ + /** Used as a fallback when the client omits reasoning.effort, or as an override in `force` mode. null/omitted leaves the target default unchanged. */ defaultEffort?: OcxComboDefaultEffort | null; + /** `force` makes the combo default override a valid client effort. Omitted / `fallback` preserves client precedence. */ + defaultEffortMode?: OcxComboDefaultEffortMode; /** * Picker-ladder derivation policy. Omitted / `"strict"` keeps the legacy rule where an * explicitly empty target ladder suppresses the whole combo's effort control. diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index bd9ebbd561..248c3011c6 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -430,3 +430,15 @@ Translated audio/file admission follows the [final-adapter input contract](adapt The combo may advance to its next eligible unattempted target before output commitment. It records no target/provider cooldown for these request-local mismatches and does not silently drop reasoning controls or raise `none` to a supported rung. Cancellation, origin/cyber-policy rejection, non-replayable post-send errors and the existing streaming commit boundary stay authoritative. Other invalid requests remain terminal. Regression coverage: `tests/responses/responses-forward-prompt-envelope.test.ts`, `tests/routing/router-combo-failover-classification.test.ts`, and `tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts`. + +## Combo default effort precedence + +`src/combos/request.ts` keeps `reasoningEffortMode` and `defaultEffortMode` independent. +The existing fifth argument remains the strict/adaptive capability-normalization policy; +the optional sixth argument enables fallback/force precedence. Force requires a valid +non-null default, overrides only valid caller effort on a known supported ladder, and +retains the existing unsupported-control stripping. It does not add a caller opt-in or +change target selection. `src/server/responses/core-combo.ts` applies the policy per child +and preserves the original requested effort separately from effective wire telemetry. +`src/server/chat-completions.ts` routes combos through that same child pipeline while +retaining the current config-aware native-Chat eligibility check for non-combo routes. diff --git a/tests/cli/cli-headless-parity.test.ts b/tests/cli/cli-headless-parity.test.ts index 9a11c696ac..ea02e12b29 100644 --- a/tests/cli/cli-headless-parity.test.ts +++ b/tests/cli/cli-headless-parity.test.ts @@ -526,6 +526,48 @@ describe("headless GUI parity CLI", () => { }); }); + test("combo set exposes the opt-in force-default policy", async () => { + const runtime = fakeRuntime(); + expect(await handleComboCommand([ + "set", "deep", "--targets", "ark/model-a", "--effort", "max", "--effort-mode", "force", "--json", + ], runtime.deps)).toBe(0); + expect(runtime.requests.find(request => request.method === "PUT")?.body).toMatchObject({ + id: "deep", + combo: { defaultEffort: "max", defaultEffortMode: "force" }, + }); + }); + + test("combo set sends fallback when clearing an existing forced default effort", async () => { + const runtime = fakeRuntime(req => req.method === "GET" ? { + combos: [{ + id: "deep", + defaultEffort: "max", + defaultEffortMode: "force", + targets: [{ provider: "ark", model: "old-model" }], + }], + } : undefined); + expect(await handleComboCommand([ + "set", "deep", "--targets", "ark/model-a", "--effort", "-", "--json", + ], runtime.deps)).toBe(0); + expect(runtime.requests).toEqual([ + { path: "/api/combos", method: "GET", body: null }, + { + path: "/api/combos", + method: "PUT", + body: { + id: "deep", + combo: { + strategy: "failover", + stickyLimit: 1, + targets: [{ provider: "ark", model: "model-a" }], + defaultEffort: null, + defaultEffortMode: "fallback", + }, + }, + }, + ]); + }); + test("combo set rejects --sticky outside round-robin instead of dropping it", async () => { const runtime = fakeRuntime(); const errorSpy = spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {}); diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/combos.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/combos.test.ts index 0bc1230e0f..2f7efb91d0 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/combos.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/combos.test.ts @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ import { getConfigPath, readConfigDiagnostics, saveConfig } from "../../src/conf import { routeModel } from "../../src/router"; import { handleManagementAPI } from "../../src/server/management-api"; import { handleResponses } from "../../src/server/responses"; -import type { OcxConfig } from "../../src/types"; +import type { OcxComboConfig, OcxComboDefaultEffort, OcxConfig } from "../../src/types"; import { syncCatalogModels } from "../../src/codex/catalog"; import { injectClaudeAgentDefs } from "../../src/claude/agents-inject"; import { reconcileComboRotationState } from "../../src/combos/resolve"; @@ -392,6 +392,35 @@ describe("combo request cloning", () => { expect(concreteComboRequestBody({ model: "combo/x" }, target, "high", undefined).reasoning).toBeUndefined(); }); + test("force mode overrides only valid caller effort and resolves independently per target", () => { + const raw = { model: "combo/x", reasoning: { effort: "medium", summary: "concise" } }; + expect(concreteComboRequestBody(raw, target, "max", ["low", "high", "max"], "strict", "force").reasoning) + .toEqual({ effort: "max", summary: "concise" }); + expect(concreteComboRequestBody(raw, target, "max", ["low", "high"], "strict", "force").reasoning) + .toEqual({ effort: "high", summary: "concise" }); + expect(raw.reasoning).toEqual({ effort: "medium", summary: "concise" }); + }); + + test("force mode rejects missing or invalid direct default efforts", () => { + const raw = { model: "combo/x", reasoning: { effort: "medium", summary: "concise" } }; + for (const defaultEffort of [null, "turbo" as OcxComboDefaultEffort]) { + expect(() => concreteComboRequestBody(raw, target, defaultEffort, ["low", "high"], "strict", "force")) + .toThrow("force combo default effort requires a valid defaultEffort"); + } + }); + + test("force mode fails closed for malformed and unknown capabilities and strips unsupported effort", () => { + expect(concreteComboRequestBody( + { model: "combo/x", reasoning: { effort: "banana" } }, target, "max", ["max"], "strict", "force", + ).reasoning).toEqual({ effort: "banana" }); + expect(concreteComboRequestBody( + { model: "combo/x", reasoning: { effort: "medium" } }, target, "max", undefined, "strict", "force", + ).reasoning).toEqual({ effort: "medium" }); + expect(concreteComboRequestBody( + { model: "combo/x" }, target, "max", [], "strict", "force", + ).reasoning).toBeUndefined(); + }); + /** * #3108: a combo configured for `max` routed to a target whose ladder tops out lower * sent NO effort at all, so the provider default applied and the turn ran at `none` — @@ -420,6 +449,22 @@ describe("combo request cloning", () => { ).reasoning).toEqual({ summary: "concise", effort: "high" }); }); + test("forced default effort composes with existing strict and adaptive capability modes", () => { + const raw = { model: "combo/x", reasoning: { effort: "medium", summary: "concise" }, thinking_budget: 8192 }; + for (const mode of ["strict", "adaptive"] as const) { + expect(concreteComboRequestBody(raw, target, "max", ["low", "high"], mode, "force").reasoning) + .toEqual({ effort: "high", summary: "concise" }); + const unsupported = concreteComboRequestBody(raw, target, "max", [], mode, "force"); + expect(unsupported.reasoning).toEqual({ summary: "concise" }); + expect(unsupported.thinking_budget).toBeUndefined(); + } + expect(concreteComboRequestBody(raw, target, "max", undefined, "adaptive", "force").reasoning) + .toEqual({ summary: "concise" }); + expect(concreteComboRequestBody(raw, target, "max", undefined, "strict", "force").reasoning) + .toEqual({ effort: "medium", summary: "concise" }); + expect(raw.reasoning).toEqual({ effort: "medium", summary: "concise" }); + }); + test("debug-warns once per unsupported or unknown combo default", () => { const debug = spyOn(console, "debug").mockImplementation(() => {}); concreteComboRequestBody({ model: "combo/x" }, target, "high", []); @@ -1495,8 +1540,10 @@ describe("combo validation and normalization", () => { })).toEqual({ strategy: "failover", stickyLimit: 1, + cooldownMs: undefined, waitForCooldownMs: 0, defaultEffort: "high", + defaultEffortMode: "fallback", reasoningEffortMode: "strict", imageInput: "auto", alias: null, @@ -1530,6 +1577,20 @@ describe("combo validation and normalization", () => { expect(comboDefaultEffort(corrupt, "free")).toBeNull(); }); + test("direct normalization rejects force mode without a valid default effort", () => { + const corruptConfigs = [ + { defaultEffortMode: "force", targets: [{ provider: "a", model: "m1" }] }, + { defaultEffort: null, defaultEffortMode: "force", targets: [{ provider: "a", model: "m1" }] }, + { defaultEffort: "turbo", defaultEffortMode: "force", targets: [{ provider: "a", model: "m1" }] }, + ] as unknown as OcxComboConfig[]; + for (const corrupt of corruptConfigs) { + expect(normalizeComboConfig(corrupt)).toMatchObject({ + defaultEffort: null, + defaultEffortMode: "fallback", + }); + } + }); + test("inherited combo names are unknown across getters, effort, and routing", () => { const config = baseConfig(); for (const id of ["constructor", "toString"]) { diff --git a/tests/helpers/combo-forced-effort-cases.ts b/tests/helpers/combo-forced-effort-cases.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c99e9394d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/helpers/combo-forced-effort-cases.ts @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +import { expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { managementFetch as fetch } from "./management-auth"; +import { saveConfig } from "../../src/config"; +import { startServer } from "../../src/server"; +import type { OcxConfig, OcxProviderConfig } from "../../src/types"; + +interface Harness { + serve(handler: (request: Request) => Response | Promise): Server; + baseUrl(server: Server): string; + chatSuccess(text: string, model?: string): Response; + chatStream(text: string): Response; + provider(adapter: string, url: string, apiKey: string, extra?: Partial): OcxProviderConfig; + comboConfig(providers: OcxConfig["providers"], targets?: Array<{ provider: string; model: string }>, + extra?: Partial[string]>): OcxConfig; + post(config: OcxConfig, raw?: Record): Promise; + latestAttemptReceipts(config: OcxConfig): Promise<{ log: unknown; usage: unknown }>; +} + +/** Register inside the parent describe: its isolated homes, mocks and cleanup still apply. */ +export function registerComboForcedEffortCases({ + serve, baseUrl, chatSuccess, chatStream, provider, comboConfig, post, latestAttemptReceipts, +}: Harness): void { + test("force-default raises Hermes-like medium to max while fallback keeps medium", async () => { + const efforts: unknown[] = []; + const upstream = serve(async request => { + const body = await request.json() as Record; + efforts.push(body.reasoning_effort); + return chatSuccess("forced", "m1"); + }); + const providers = { + a: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(upstream), "key-a", { + reasoningEfforts: ["low", "medium", "high", "max"], + }), + }; + const forced = comboConfig(providers, undefined, { + defaultEffort: "max", + defaultEffortMode: "force", + }); + expect((await post(forced, { reasoning: { effort: "medium" } })).status).toBe(200); + const fallback = comboConfig(providers, undefined, { defaultEffort: "max" }); + expect((await post(fallback, { reasoning: { effort: "medium" } })).status).toBe(200); + expect(efforts).toEqual(["max", "medium"]); + }); + + for (const chatEffort of [ + { name: "reasoning_effort", body: { reasoning_effort: "medium" } }, + { name: "reasoning.effort", body: { reasoning: { effort: "medium" } } }, + ] as const) { + test(`Chat ${chatEffort.name} force-default routes through the combo and records normalized wire telemetry`, async () => { + const upstreamBodies: Array<{ provider: string; body: Record }> = []; + const a = serve(async request => { + upstreamBodies.push({ provider: "a", body: await request.json() as Record }); + return chatStream("forced chat"); + }); + const config = comboConfig({ + a: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(a), "key-a", { + reasoningEfforts: ["low", "medium", "high", "max"], + }), + }, undefined, { + defaultEffort: "max", + defaultEffortMode: "force", + }); + saveConfig(config); + const server = startServer(0); + try { + const response = await fetch(new URL("/v1/chat/completions", server.url), { + method: "POST", + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ + model: "combo/free", + messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hello" }], + stream: false, + ...chatEffort.body, + }), + }); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(await response.text()).toContain("forced chat"); + expect(upstreamBodies).toEqual([ + { provider: "a", body: expect.objectContaining({ model: "m1", reasoning_effort: "max" }) }, + ]); + + const { log, usage } = await latestAttemptReceipts(config); + for (const receipt of [log, usage]) { + expect(receipt).toMatchObject({ + provider: "combo", + model: "combo/free", + requestedEffort: "medium", + effectiveEffort: "max", + reasoningWireField: "reasoning_effort", + reasoningWireValue: "max", + routeDecision: { routeKind: "combo" }, + attempts: [{ + provider: "a", + model: "m1", + requestedEffort: "medium", + effectiveEffort: "max", + reasoningWireField: "reasoning_effort", + reasoningWireValue: "max", + }], + }); + } + } finally { + await server.stop(true); + } + }); + } + + test("backup noReasoningModels removes the fresh combo default", async () => { + const a = serve(() => Response.json({ error: { message: "retry" } }, { status: 503 })); + let backupBody: Record | undefined; + const b = serve(async request => { + backupBody = await request.json() as Record; + return chatSuccess("no reasoning", "m2"); + }); + const config = comboConfig({ + a: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(a), "key-a"), + b: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(b), "key-b", { noReasoningModels: ["m2"] }), + }, undefined, { defaultEffort: "high" }); + expect((await post(config)).status).toBe(200); + expect(backupBody).not.toHaveProperty("reasoning_effort"); + }); + +} diff --git a/tests/routing/combo-management-api.test.ts b/tests/routing/combo-management-api.test.ts index 85f6be0ff6..ba6bd7e2d0 100644 --- a/tests/routing/combo-management-api.test.ts +++ b/tests/routing/combo-management-api.test.ts @@ -488,6 +488,47 @@ describe("combo management API", () => { }); }); + test("defaultEffortMode force round-trips sparsely and invalid policy never mutates config", async () => { + await withTempHome(async () => { + const config = baseConfig({ combos: undefined }); + saveConfig(config); + const forced = await comboApi(config, "PUT", "/api/combos", { + id: "forced", + combo: { ...VALID_COMBO, defaultEffort: "max", defaultEffortMode: "force" }, + }); + expect(forced?.status).toBe(200); + expect(await responseJson(forced)).toMatchObject({ + combo: { defaultEffort: "max", defaultEffortMode: "force" }, + }); + expect(config.combos?.forced).toMatchObject({ defaultEffort: "max", defaultEffortMode: "force" }); + + const missingDefault = await comboApi(config, "PUT", "/api/combos", { + id: "bad", combo: { ...VALID_COMBO, defaultEffortMode: "force" }, + }); + expect(missingDefault?.status).toBe(400); + expect(config.combos?.bad).toBeUndefined(); + + const fallback = await comboApi(config, "PUT", "/api/combos", { + id: "forced", + combo: { ...VALID_COMBO, defaultEffort: "max", defaultEffortMode: "fallback" }, + }); + expect(fallback?.status).toBe(200); + expect(config.combos?.forced).not.toHaveProperty("defaultEffortMode"); + + const restoreForce = await comboApi(config, "PUT", "/api/combos", { + id: "forced", + combo: { ...VALID_COMBO, defaultEffort: "max", defaultEffortMode: "force" }, + }); + expect(restoreForce?.status).toBe(200); + const guiRoundTrip = await comboApi(config, "PUT", "/api/combos", { + id: "forced", + combo: { ...VALID_COMBO, defaultEffort: "high" }, + }); + expect(guiRoundTrip?.status).toBe(200); + expect(config.combos?.forced).toMatchObject({ defaultEffort: "high", defaultEffortMode: "force" }); + }); + }); + test("PUT stores aliases and GET exposes the public model", async () => { await withTempHome(async () => { const config = baseConfig({ combos: undefined }); diff --git a/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts b/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts index 041ed847c0..bea04074a4 100644 --- a/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +import { registerComboForcedEffortCases } from "../helpers/combo-forced-effort-cases"; import { sessionLaneIdFromRequest } from "../../src/server/request-log-conversation"; import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, mock, setDefaultTimeout, test } from "bun:test"; import { logsFromApiBody } from "../helpers/logs-api"; @@ -3059,19 +3060,8 @@ describe("server combo failover 030 activation matrix", () => { expect(bodies.map(row => row.body.reasoning_effort)).toEqual(["low", "low"]); }); - test("backup noReasoningModels removes the fresh combo default", async () => { - const a = serve(() => Response.json({ error: { message: "retry" } }, { status: 503 })); - let backupBody: Record | undefined; - const b = serve(async request => { - backupBody = await request.json() as Record; - return chatSuccess("no reasoning", "m2"); - }); - const config = comboConfig({ - a: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(a), "key-a"), - b: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(b), "key-b", { noReasoningModels: ["m2"] }), - }, undefined, { defaultEffort: "high" }); - expect((await post(config)).status).toBe(200); - expect(backupBody).not.toHaveProperty("reasoning_effort"); + registerComboForcedEffortCases({ + serve, baseUrl, chatSuccess, chatStream, provider, comboConfig, post, latestAttemptReceipts, }); test("bare third-party defaultModel keeps max off the native clamp path", async () => { From 834e86ab89b8689a4f7a85aa387c9f6bd42c1846 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:05:12 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 054/113] fix(combos): hop on a definite zero-output context overflow (#4659) [skip ci] A heterogeneous combo mixes context windows, so a refusal that says "this turn does not fit THIS model" is not evidence the turn is impossible. The chain stopped at the first undersized target anyway, and a native transport made it worse by reporting a zero-output overflow as a generic upstream_server_error carrying precise context-window prose, which never looked like a context verdict at all. Classify that case from the innermost provider message. classifyError remaps any occurrence of "context window", "context length", "maximum context" or "too many tokens" found anywhere in the blob; inheriting that looseness would let a context_length_exceeded token sitting in a code field beside "Unsupported parameter: user" authorize a replay. The new classifier unwraps only the exact proxy wrapper, within four envelopes and 16,384 characters, and reads the leaf. Three bounds keep the widening honest: - A JSON-shaped body that does not parse fails closed. normalizeUpstreamErrorText caps classificationText at 500 characters, so a long envelope reaches the classifier as a prefix, and reading that prefix as prose would let whichever field landed in the first 500 bytes authorize a hop. - Only statuses that speak about the request are admitted: 400, 413, 422 and 5xx. A 401/403 body that merely quotes context prose keeps its provider-wide cooldown instead of being rescored as request-shaped. - Structured origin_rejected now stops explicitly. The existing test only matched that token in the message, so an origin reporting it out of band could have been overridden by context prose. Cooldown treats a definite overflow as request-shaped, so an oversized turn no longer cools a healthy target. This cannot duplicate visible output. A streaming child reaches combo classification only through preflightComboStreamResponse, which commits the child on any text, tool call or unknown event and synthesizes a failure envelope only for a zero-output terminal, so a turn whose text the client already saw is never reclassified as a hop. tests/helpers/combo-context-overflow-cases.ts pins that directly. Closes #4659 Co-authored-by: RHODIZ IT --- src/combos/failover.ts | 85 ++++++++++++ structure/runtime.md | 8 +- tests/codex-integration/combos.test.ts | 13 +- tests/helpers/combo-context-overflow-cases.ts | 123 ++++++++++++++++++ ...uter-combo-failover-classification.test.ts | 54 ++++++++ tests/routing/routing-policy-fallback.test.ts | 22 ++-- .../server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts | 34 +---- 7 files changed, 293 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/helpers/combo-context-overflow-cases.ts diff --git a/src/combos/failover.ts b/src/combos/failover.ts index e60fe83dee..f5715da9ba 100644 --- a/src/combos/failover.ts +++ b/src/combos/failover.ts @@ -401,11 +401,15 @@ export function comboFailureCooldownScope( ): ComboFailureCooldownScope { const code = normalizedFailureCode(options?.code); // Request-shape refusals first: an oversized request must not cool a healthy target. + // A native transport can surface a zero-output model overflow as a generic + // upstream_server_error carrying precise context-window prose, so consult the bounded + // message classifier too: that target is healthy, the turn was simply too large for it. if ( status === 413 || REQUEST_SHAPE_FAILURE_CODES.has(code) || isRequestLocalFreePromptCap(status, message, options?.code) || isProviderTargetContextOverflow(status, message, options?.code) + || isDefiniteContextOverflow(status, message) || isRequestLocalTargetIncompatibility(status, message, options?.code) ) return "none"; if (isProviderScopedQuotaCap(status, message, options?.code)) return "provider"; @@ -451,6 +455,74 @@ function isProviderTargetContextOverflow( && /\bprompt\s+\d+\s*>\s*\d+\s+maximum context length\b/i.test(message); } +/** A status can carry a verdict about the REQUEST; 401/403/429 speak about the credential. */ +const CONTEXT_VERDICT_STATUSES: ReadonlySet = new Set([400, 413, 422]); + +/** + * Phrases a provider emits when the INPUT does not fit this model's context window. Matched + * against the innermost provider message only, so an unrelated refusal that merely quotes one + * of these tokens in a code field cannot authorize a replay. + */ +const DEFINITE_CONTEXT_OVERFLOW_PHRASES = [ + "exceeds the context window", + "exceed the context window", + "context window exceeded", + "context length exceeded", + "maximum context length", + "maximum context window", + "too many tokens", +]; + +/** Wrapper envelopes unwrapped before the leaf message is read. */ +const MAX_CONTEXT_OVERFLOW_ENVELOPES = 4; + +function isDefiniteContextOverflowMessage(text: string): boolean { + const normalized = text.toLowerCase(); + return normalized === "context_length_exceeded" + || DEFINITE_CONTEXT_OVERFLOW_PHRASES.some(phrase => normalized.includes(phrase)); +} + +/** + * Confirm a context overflow from the provider MESSAGE rather than from a code token that + * merely appears somewhere in the envelope. An upstream controls both fields and can emit a + * contradictory pair -- `context_length_exceeded` beside `Unsupported parameter: user` -- and + * that is not evidence the turn is too large for this model. `classifyError` reads the whole + * blob, which is exactly the looseness this must not inherit. + * + * A JSON-shaped body that fails to parse is truncated or corrupt, not prose: `classificationText` + * is capped at 500 characters by `normalizeUpstreamErrorText` before it reaches this function, so + * a long envelope arrives here as a JSON prefix. Reading that prefix as plain text would let an + * arbitrary field that happens to sit in the first 500 bytes authorize a hop, so it fails closed. + * + * Only the exact proxy wrapper is unwrapped, within a fixed envelope budget and 16,384 characters. + */ +function isDefiniteContextOverflow(status: number, message: string): boolean { + if (!CONTEXT_VERDICT_STATUSES.has(status) && status < 500) return false; + if (message.length > 16_384) return false; + let text = message.trim(); + // One pass per unwrapped envelope, plus one for the leaf the last envelope yields. + for (let unwrapped = 0; unwrapped <= MAX_CONTEXT_OVERFLOW_ENVELOPES; unwrapped += 1) { + const providerPrefix = /^Provider error \d{3}:\s*/.exec(text); + if (providerPrefix) text = text.slice(providerPrefix[0].length).trim(); + if (!text.startsWith("{")) return isDefiniteContextOverflowMessage(text); + if (unwrapped === MAX_CONTEXT_OVERFLOW_ENVELOPES) return false; + let payload: unknown; + try { payload = JSON.parse(text); } catch { return false; } + if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) return false; + const record = payload as Record; + const response = record.response && typeof record.response === "object" && !Array.isArray(record.response) + ? record.response as Record + : undefined; + const source = [record.error, response?.error, response?.last_error, record.last_error, record] + .find((candidate): candidate is Record => + !!candidate && typeof candidate === "object" && !Array.isArray(candidate) + && typeof (candidate as Record).message === "string"); + if (!source) return false; + text = (source.message as string).trim(); + } + return false; +} + export function comboFailureDecision( status: number, message: string, @@ -458,6 +530,10 @@ export function comboFailureDecision( ): ComboFailureDecision { if (status === 499) return "stop"; if (message.toLowerCase().includes("origin_rejected")) return "stop"; + // Structured form of the same hard refusal. The prose test above misses it when the origin + // reports the code out of band, and every hop rule below -- including the context-overflow + // one -- must stay subordinate to it. + if (normalizedFailureCode(options?.code) === "origin_rejected") return "stop"; // The origin may already be executing this turn (the Codex WebSocket relay sent the create // frame and never saw a response event). Hopping would send the same request to a second // target while the first may still be generating; the honest status goes to the client. @@ -476,6 +552,15 @@ export function comboFailureDecision( // (for example 5059 + invalid_request_prompt_too_long). That is evidence that this // target is too small, not that every later combo target is incapable of serving it. if (isProviderTargetContextOverflow(status, message, options?.code)) return "hop"; + // A definite context-window refusal is target-local inside a heterogeneous combo: this model + // cannot hold the turn, but a later target may have a larger window. Two boundaries keep this + // safe. It is reached only after cancellation, structured origin/cyber refusals and + // non-replayable post-send codes have already stopped. And it only ever classifies a failure + // the combo stream preflight already proved emitted no output: `comboStreamPayloadCommitsOutput` + // commits the child on any text, tool call or unknown event, and only a zero-output terminal + // becomes a failure response at all, so a turn whose text the client already saw is never + // reclassified here. + if (isDefiniteContextOverflow(status, message)) return "hop"; // A local input-admission refusal (#1524) says "this candidate cannot fit the request", // not "the request is impossible": the next candidate may have a larger context window. // diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index 248c3011c6..61ae0f711a 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -427,9 +427,13 @@ Translated audio/file admission follows the [final-adapter input contract](adapt `src/combos/failover.ts` treats three intact HTTP 400 invalid-request envelopes as request-local incompatibilities: exactly `Unsupported parameter: user`; `unsupported_value` naming `reasoning.effort` or `reasoning_effort` with an explicit unsupported-value message; and `param: input` with a bounded model-scoped `does not support image inputs` message. A null provider code is accepted only for that observed image envelope. Only the exact proxy wrapper is unwrapped, within three envelopes and 16,384 characters; conflicting codes, malformed/truncated envelopes and reflected JSON do not gain hop permission. -The combo may advance to its next eligible unattempted target before output commitment. It records no target/provider cooldown for these request-local mismatches and does not silently drop reasoning controls or raise `none` to a supported rung. Cancellation, origin/cyber-policy rejection, non-replayable post-send errors and the existing streaming commit boundary stay authoritative. Other invalid requests remain terminal. +The combo may advance to its next eligible unattempted target before output commitment. It records no target/provider cooldown for these request-local mismatches and does not silently drop reasoning controls or raise `none` to a supported rung. Cancellation, origin/cyber-policy rejection, non-replayable post-send errors and the existing streaming commit boundary stay authoritative. Apart from the definite context overflow below, other invalid requests remain terminal. -Regression coverage: `tests/responses/responses-forward-prompt-envelope.test.ts`, `tests/routing/router-combo-failover-classification.test.ts`, and `tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts`. +A definite context-window overflow is the fourth request-local verdict. A heterogeneous combo mixes windows, so "this turn does not fit THIS model" is not "this turn is impossible", and stopping at the first undersized target burned the ladder on turns a later target could hold. Evidence must come from the innermost provider message: `classifyError` remaps any occurrence of `context window`, `context length`, `maximum context` or `too many tokens` anywhere in the blob, and inheriting that looseness would let a `context_length_exceeded` token sitting in a `code` field beside `Unsupported parameter: user` authorize a replay. `src/combos/failover.ts` therefore unwraps only the exact proxy wrapper, within four envelopes and 16,384 characters, and reads the leaf message. A JSON-shaped body that does not parse fails closed, because `normalizeUpstreamErrorText` caps `classificationText` at 500 characters and a long envelope arrives here as a prefix. The verdict is admitted only for statuses that speak about the request — 400, 413, 422 and 5xx — so a 401/403 body that merely quotes context prose keeps its provider-wide cooldown instead of being rescored as request-shaped. Structured `origin_rejected`, cyber policy and the non-replayable post-send codes are all tested before it. + +This is also why the classifier cannot duplicate visible output. A streaming child reaches combo classification only through `preflightComboStreamResponse`, which commits the child on any text, tool call or unknown event and synthesizes a failure envelope only for a zero-output terminal, so a turn whose text or tool call the client already saw is never reclassified as a hop. + +Regression coverage: `tests/responses/responses-forward-prompt-envelope.test.ts`, `tests/routing/router-combo-failover-classification.test.ts`, `tests/routing/routing-policy-fallback.test.ts`, `tests/helpers/combo-context-overflow-cases.ts`, and `tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts`. ## Combo default effort precedence diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/combos.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/combos.test.ts index 2f7efb91d0..b2fc6d3876 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/combos.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/combos.test.ts @@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ describe("combo failure policy and advancement", () => { for (const status of [401, 403, 404, 408, 429, 500, 503]) { expect(comboFailureDecision(status, "provider failure")).toBe("hop"); } - expect(comboFailureDecision(400, "context_length_exceeded")).toBe("stop"); + expect(comboFailureDecision(400, "context_length_exceeded")).toBe("hop"); expect(comboFailureDecision(403, '{"code":"origin_rejected"}')).toBe("stop"); expect(comboFailureDecision(413, "request too large")).toBe("stop"); expect(comboFailureDecision(409, "conflict")).toBe("stop"); @@ -919,9 +919,14 @@ describe("combo failure policy and advancement", () => { // verdict by echoing the token, so that shape must NOT hop. expect(comboFailureDecision(413, 'refused', { code: 'input_admission_refused' })).toBe('hop'); expect(comboFailureDecision(400, 'upstream mentions input_admission_refused in prose')).toBe('stop'); - // An UPSTREAM context verdict still stops: retrying that elsewhere is guesswork, and a - // generic 413 with no structured code keeps its existing conservative handling. - expect(comboFailureDecision(400, "context_length_exceeded")).toBe("stop"); + // An UPSTREAM context verdict is target-local in a heterogeneous combo: this model cannot + // hold the turn, but a later one may have a larger window. The whole message being the bare + // token is unambiguous evidence; a generic 413 with no context signal stays conservative. + expect(comboFailureDecision(400, "context_length_exceeded")).toBe("hop"); + // Evidence has to come from the MESSAGE. A context code beside an unrelated refusal is a + // contradictory envelope, and a hard structured refusal outranks the context verdict. + expect(comboFailureDecision(400, "ordinary invalid request", { code: "context_length_exceeded" })).toBe("stop"); + expect(comboFailureDecision(502, "context window exceeded", { code: "origin_rejected" })).toBe("stop"); const providerHardCap = JSON.stringify({ error: { message: "Prompt 346030 > 262144 maximum context length", type: "invalid_request_prompt_too_long", diff --git a/tests/helpers/combo-context-overflow-cases.ts b/tests/helpers/combo-context-overflow-cases.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c490717dfe --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/helpers/combo-context-overflow-cases.ts @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +import { expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import type { OcxConfig, OcxProviderConfig } from "../../src/types"; + +interface ComboHarness { + serve(handler: () => Response | Promise): Server; + baseUrl(server: Server): string; + chatSuccess(text: string, model?: string): Response; + chatStream(text: string): Response; + provider(adapter: string, url: string, apiKey: string, extra?: Partial): OcxProviderConfig; + comboConfig(providers: OcxConfig["providers"]): OcxConfig; + post(config: OcxConfig, raw?: Record): Promise; + collectSse(response: Response): Promise; +} + +const OVERFLOW_PROSE = + "Your input exceeds the context window of this model. Please adjust your input and try again."; + +function sse(frames: Array<[string, Record]>): Response { + const body = frames + .map(([event, data]) => `event: ${event}\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(data)}\n\n`) + .join(""); + return new Response(body, { headers: { "content-type": "text/event-stream" } }); +} + +/** Register under the caller's isolated homes, mock state and server cleanup hooks. */ +export function registerComboContextOverflowCases({ + serve, baseUrl, chatSuccess, chatStream, provider, comboConfig, post, collectSse, +}: ComboHarness): void { + test("context overflow advances while exhausted retryable targets return the sanitized last status", async () => { + let backupHits = 0; + const context = serve(() => Response.json( + { error: { code: "context_length_exceeded", message: "too many tokens" } }, + { status: 400 }, + )); + const larger = serve(() => { + backupHits += 1; + return chatSuccess("larger context fallback"); + }); + const advanced = await post(comboConfig({ + a: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(context), "key-a"), + b: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(larger), "key-b"), + })); + expect(advanced.status).toBe(200); + expect(backupHits).toBe(1); + expect(await advanced.text()).toContain("larger context fallback"); + + const order: string[] = []; + const first = serve(() => { + order.push("a"); + return new Response("secret sk-a-should-redact", { status: 503 }); + }); + const last = serve(() => { + order.push("b"); + return Response.json({ error: { message: "missing model" } }, { status: 404 }); + }); + const exhausted = await post(comboConfig({ + a: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(first), "key-a"), + b: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(last), "key-b"), + })); + expect(exhausted.status).toBe(404); + expect(order).toEqual(["a", "b"]); + expect(await exhausted.text()).not.toContain("sk-a-should-redact"); + }); + + test("zero-output context overflow 502 hops to a healthy combo target", async () => { + let backupHits = 0; + const capped = serve(() => sse([ + ["response.created", { type: "response.created", response: { id: "resp_context", status: "in_progress" } }], + ["response.failed", { type: "response.failed", response: { + id: "resp_context", + status: "failed", + error: { type: "server_error", code: "upstream_server_error", message: OVERFLOW_PROSE }, + } }], + ])); + const backup = serve(() => { + backupHits += 1; + return chatStream("larger context backup"); + }); + const response = await post(comboConfig({ + a: provider("openai-responses", baseUrl(capped), "key-a"), + b: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(backup), "key-b"), + }), { stream: true }); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(backupHits).toBe(1); + expect(JSON.stringify(await collectSse(response))).toContain("larger context backup"); + }); + + test("context overflow after committed output never replays on another target", async () => { + // The boundary the hop verdict depends on. Once any text or tool call has reached the + // client, the stream preflight commits the child and the failure never becomes a combo + // classification at all -- so the same context prose that hops above must not hop here. + let backupHits = 0; + const committed = serve(() => sse([ + ["response.created", { type: "response.created", response: { id: "resp_committed", status: "in_progress" } }], + ["response.output_item.added", { type: "response.output_item.added", output_index: 0, item: { + id: "msg_committed", type: "message", role: "assistant", status: "in_progress", content: [], + } }], + ["response.output_text.delta", { + type: "response.output_text.delta", item_id: "msg_committed", output_index: 0, content_index: 0, + delta: "already visible", + }], + ["response.failed", { type: "response.failed", response: { + id: "resp_committed", + status: "failed", + error: { type: "server_error", code: "upstream_server_error", message: OVERFLOW_PROSE }, + } }], + ])); + const backup = serve(() => { + backupHits += 1; + return chatStream("must not run"); + }); + const response = await post(comboConfig({ + a: provider("openai-responses", baseUrl(committed), "key-a"), + b: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(backup), "key-b"), + }), { stream: true }); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + const frames = JSON.stringify(await collectSse(response)); + expect(backupHits).toBe(0); + expect(frames).toContain("already visible"); + expect(frames).not.toContain("must not run"); + }); +} + diff --git a/tests/routing/router-combo-failover-classification.test.ts b/tests/routing/router-combo-failover-classification.test.ts index cb5d765459..46616ca5ac 100644 --- a/tests/routing/router-combo-failover-classification.test.ts +++ b/tests/routing/router-combo-failover-classification.test.ts @@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ describe("combo failure cooldown scope", () => { } // Hyphenated spellings normalize to the same codes. expect(comboFailureCooldownScope(400, "refused", { code: "input-admission-refused" })).toBe("none"); + // A native transport reports a zero-output model overflow as a generic upstream error with + // precise context prose. That target is healthy; only the turn was too large for it. + expect(comboFailureCooldownScope(502, + "Your input exceeds the context window of this model. Please adjust your input and try again.", + { code: "upstream_server_error" })).toBe("none"); + // A credential verdict keeps its provider scope even when the body quotes context prose. + expect(comboFailureCooldownScope(401, "invalid key for the 200k context window tier")).toBe("provider"); // A provider's own per-target hard cap (vendor code 5059) is equally request-shaped. expect(comboFailureCooldownScope( 400, @@ -256,6 +263,53 @@ describe("request-local optional control incompatibility", () => { }); }); +describe("definite upstream context overflow", () => { + const prose = "Your input exceeds the context window of this model. Please adjust your input and try again."; + const failedTerminal = (message: string) => JSON.stringify({ + error: { type: "server_error", code: "upstream_server_error", message }, + response: { error: { type: "server_error", code: "upstream_server_error", message } }, + }); + + test("a zero-output context overflow is target-local and may hop", () => { + // The combo stream preflight only synthesizes this envelope for a terminal that committed + // no output, so the hop can never duplicate text the client already saw. + expect(comboFailureDecision(502, failedTerminal(prose), { code: "upstream_server_error" })).toBe("hop"); + expect(comboFailureDecision(400, "context length exceeded", { code: "context_length_exceeded" })).toBe("hop"); + expect(comboFailureDecision(400, `Provider error 400: ${prose}`)).toBe("hop"); + }); + + test("evidence must come from the innermost message, not a stray code token", () => { + const unrelated = JSON.stringify({ error: { ...unsupportedUser, code: "context_length_exceeded" } }); + expect(comboFailureDecision(400, unrelated)).toBe("stop"); + expect(comboFailureDecision(400, "ordinary invalid request", { code: "context_length_exceeded" })).toBe("stop"); + // Reflected prose inside an unrelated body is not the provider's own verdict. + expect(comboFailureDecision(400, JSON.stringify({ error: { ...unsupportedUser, param: "tools", note: prose } }))) + .toBe("stop"); + }); + + test("truncated envelopes and hard refusals do not acquire hop permission", () => { + // classificationText is capped at 500 characters upstream, so a long envelope reaches the + // classifier as a JSON prefix. Reading that prefix as prose would let any field authorize + // a replay, so a JSON-shaped body that does not parse fails closed. + expect(comboFailureDecision(400, failedTerminal(prose).slice(0, -1))).toBe("stop"); + expect(comboFailureDecision(502, prose, { code: "origin_rejected" })).toBe("stop"); + expect(comboFailureDecision(502, prose, { code: "upstream_no_response" })).toBe("stop"); + expect(comboFailureDecision(499, prose)).toBe("stop"); + // A status that speaks about the CREDENTIAL keeps its own verdict and its provider-wide + // cooldown, even when the body quotes context prose. Without that gate this envelope would + // be reclassified as request-shaped and a rejected key would stop cooling its provider. + expect(comboFailureDecision(403, prose)).toBe("stop"); + expect(comboFailureCooldownScope(403, prose)).toBe("provider"); + }); + + test("the envelope budget is bounded and oversized bodies stay terminal", () => { + const wrap = (inner: string) => JSON.stringify({ error: { type: "server_error", message: inner } }); + expect(comboFailureDecision(400, wrap(wrap(wrap(prose))))).toBe("hop"); + expect(comboFailureDecision(400, wrap(wrap(wrap(wrap(wrap(prose))))))).toBe("stop"); + expect(comboFailureDecision(400, `${prose} ${"x".repeat(16_384)}`)).toBe("stop"); + }); +}); + describe("bounded optional-control error envelopes", () => { const wrapped = (message: string, code = "invalid_request_error") => JSON.stringify({ error: { type: "invalid_request_error", code, message: `Provider error 400: ${message}` }, diff --git a/tests/routing/routing-policy-fallback.test.ts b/tests/routing/routing-policy-fallback.test.ts index 1883c1277d..bb52481b3f 100644 --- a/tests/routing/routing-policy-fallback.test.ts +++ b/tests/routing/routing-policy-fallback.test.ts @@ -142,9 +142,10 @@ describe("policy candidate fallback", () => { expect(response.status).toBe(400); expect(seenModels).toEqual(["policy/daily"]); }); - test("an upstream context_length_exceeded still stops the chain (#1524)", async () => { - // The mirror-image contract. An upstream verdict is about the REQUEST, so retrying it - // elsewhere is guesswork -- and hopping would burn every candidate on a doomed request. + test("an upstream context_length_exceeded advances to the next policy candidate", async () => { + // A context verdict is about THIS model's window, not about the request in the abstract: + // the next candidate may be able to hold the same turn. Traversal stays finite because + // `tried` admits each candidate once, and nothing has been sent to the client yet. const trace = policyTrace(); const logCtx = { requestedModel: "policy/daily", routeDecision: trace, attempts: [] } as unknown as RequestLogContext; const seenModels: string[] = []; @@ -153,16 +154,19 @@ describe("policy candidate fallback", () => { seenModels.push(String(body.model)); ctx.routeDecision = trace; seedAttempt(ctx, "provider", String(body.model)); - return Response.json( - { error: { message: "context length exceeded", type: "invalid_request_error", code: "context_length_exceeded" } }, - { status: 400 }, - ); + if (seenModels.length === 1) { + return Response.json( + { error: { message: "context length exceeded", type: "invalid_request_error", code: "context_length_exceeded" } }, + { status: 400 }, + ); + } + return Response.json({ id: "resp", object: "response", status: "completed", output: [] }); }; const response = await handleResponsesWithPolicyFallback(request(), {} as OcxConfig, logCtx, {}, { runCore }); - expect(response.status).toBe(400); - expect(seenModels).toEqual(["policy/daily"]); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(seenModels).toEqual(["policy/daily", "provider-b/model-b"]); }); test("retries the next policy candidate and keeps distinct physical attempts", async () => { const trace = policyTrace(); diff --git a/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts b/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts index bea04074a4..78d288f069 100644 --- a/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ import { registerComboForcedEffortCases } from "../helpers/combo-forced-effort-cases"; +import { registerComboContextOverflowCases } from "../helpers/combo-context-overflow-cases"; import { sessionLaneIdFromRequest } from "../../src/server/request-log-conversation"; import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, mock, setDefaultTimeout, test } from "bun:test"; import { logsFromApiBody } from "../helpers/logs-api"; @@ -2086,37 +2087,8 @@ describe("server combo failover 030 activation matrix", () => { expect(primaryHits.every(hit => hit.webTool === valid)).toBe(true); }); - test("context 400 stops while exhausted retryable targets return the sanitized last status", async () => { - let stopBackupHits = 0; - const context = serve(() => Response.json({ error: { code: "context_length_exceeded", message: "too many tokens" } }, { status: 400 })); - const unused = serve(() => { - stopBackupHits += 1; - return chatSuccess("must not run"); - }); - const stopConfig = comboConfig({ - a: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(context), "key-a"), - b: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(unused), "key-b"), - }); - const stopped = await post(stopConfig); - expect(stopped.status).toBe(400); - expect(stopBackupHits).toBe(0); - - const order: string[] = []; - const first = serve(() => { - order.push("a"); - return new Response("secret sk-a-should-redact", { status: 503 }); - }); - const last = serve(() => { - order.push("b"); - return Response.json({ error: { message: "missing model" } }, { status: 404 }); - }); - const exhausted = await post(comboConfig({ - a: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(first), "key-a"), - b: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(last), "key-b"), - })); - expect(exhausted.status).toBe(404); - expect(order).toEqual(["a", "b"]); - expect(await exhausted.text()).not.toContain("sk-a-should-redact"); + registerComboContextOverflowCases({ + serve, baseUrl, chatSuccess, chatStream, provider, comboConfig, post, collectSse, }); test("provider-specific prompt-too-long 400 hops to a larger-context combo target", async () => { From 5c7ee456bd6456d6e2d0dcb662d627b24416887f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:05:40 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 055/113] fix(responses): settle a credential hop where the replay is dispatched (#4709) [skip ci] A credential hop books the replay it is about to make, and the reservation is the charge. The layer that then dispatches that replay has accounting of its own, so the same physical send was charged twice. Two shapes produced it. A retry-helper replay reports every physical send back through onSendsConsumed, and the adapter hop sites did not mark the reservation countedExternally, so the reporter added a second charge. An adapter that owns its transport -- Kiro's reset ladder, Cursor's transport ladder -- reserves once per physical send against the same budget, so it charged the hop's replay again no matter what the hop did. The visible effect is worse than a miscount. Once the base allowance is spent, a recovery class may still draw the single shared final-recovery reserve; a doubled charge spends it early, and the ladder answers a provider 429 with a synthetic error instead of the rate limit it was recovering from. The settlement now follows the dispatcher rather than the ladder: - A helper-routed replay reserves with countedExternally, so the reporter's first send settles the booking instead of adding to it. - An adapter-owned ladder receives adapterDispatchBudget, a live delegating view of the same budget that spends a permit handed down through pendingHopPermit on the adapter's first reservation. Every later send in that ladder is a new physical send and is charged normally. - SingleUseDispatchPermit.assumeCharge() is what closes an externally counted booking when the holder is the layer that sends. Leaving it open is not harmless: the next report of the request would settle against it and one real send would go uncharged. adapter-dispatch.ts keeps confirming at the dispatch boundary, and skips that confirmation when the adapter owns dispatch -- settling first would hand the adapter a dead permit, which it reads as an exhausted request and stops sending on. adapter-continuation.ts still never confirms, because its replay is the next loop iteration. run-turn-execution.ts always hands the reservation down, because a runTurn adapter is by definition the layer that sends. The view delegates through getters rather than copying. A spread would freeze used, reserveSpent and the target counters at construction time and hand the adapter a budget that can never read as exhausted. Closes #4709 Co-authored-by: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> --- src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts | 24 +++++ src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts | 18 +++- src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts | 45 +++++++-- src/server/responses/request-send-budget.ts | 97 ++++++++++++++++++- src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts | 42 +++++--- structure/transports/responses.md | 29 ++++-- tests/lib/execution-budget-permits.test.ts | 84 +++++++++++++++- .../responses/responses-core-modules.test.ts | 34 +++++++ 8 files changed, 338 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts b/src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts index 80654b0a94..7c75b27637 100644 --- a/src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts +++ b/src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts @@ -94,6 +94,19 @@ export interface SingleUseDispatchPermit { * once an external send reporter already settled it. */ release(): void; + /** + * Take over an externally counted booking, because the layer holding this permit is the one + * that physically sends. + * + * `countedExternally` promises that a retry helper will name this send through + * `onSendsConsumed`. An adapter that owns its own dispatch ladder -- Kiro's reset loop, + * Cursor's transport loop -- reserves per physical send instead, so no reporter ever arrives + * and the pending booking would sit there until it silently swallowed an unrelated later + * report. Confirming through this method settles the permit AND closes the booking, so the + * send stays charged exactly once (#4709). Returns false once the permit is settled, which is + * what keeps one permit from admitting two sends. + */ + assumeCharge(): boolean; } export type DispatchDecision = @@ -222,6 +235,17 @@ export function createRequestExecutionBudget( settled = "used"; return true; }, + assumeCharge(): boolean { + if (settled !== "open") return false; + settled = "used"; + // The booking this reservation made for an external reporter is now owned by the + // caller. Leaving it pending is not harmless: the next `used` report of this request + // would settle against it and one real send would go uncharged. + if (intent.countedExternally === true && pendingExternalSends > 0) { + pendingExternalSends -= 1; + } + return true; + }, release(): void { if (settled !== "open") return; settled = "released"; diff --git a/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts b/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts index a1db9398d5..33b0221751 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts @@ -82,11 +82,12 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( sidecarState: Pick, sendBudgetState: Pick< ResponsesSendBudget, - | "adapterSendBudget" + | "adapterDispatchBudget" | "noteAdapterPhysicalSend" | "remainingTransientSendBudget" | "noteTransientSends" | "reserveCredentialHop" + | "pendingHopPermit" >, adapterExchange: Pick< AdapterExchange, @@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( const { routedCompaction } = sidecarState; const { upstream, connectMs, rateLimitPolicy, stallTimeoutMs } = adapterExchange; const { - adapterSendBudget, + adapterDispatchBudget, noteAdapterPhysicalSend, remainingTransientSendBudget, noteTransientSends, @@ -187,7 +188,7 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( return await transportState.activeAdapter.fetchResponse(builtContinuationRequest, { abortSignal: upstream.signal, timeoutMs: connectMs, - sendBudget: adapterSendBudget, + sendBudget: adapterDispatchBudget, onPhysicalSend: send => noteAdapterPhysicalSend(continuationEstimate, send), stream: nextParsed.stream, executor: providerFetch(route.provider, options.codexWsRuntimeIdentity, { @@ -385,9 +386,15 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( // Intersection with the shared request budget. The continuation loop re-sends the // turn, so without this the per-request bound could be re-armed simply by reaching a // different loop -- which is the divergence the comment above already warns about. + // + // Who settles the reservation depends on who sends the replay (#4709). An adapter that + // owns its ladder reserves once per physical send and would charge this replay twice; + // the helper path reports it back instead, which is what `countedExternally` names. + const adapterOwnsDispatch = transportState.activeAdapter.fetchResponse !== undefined; const hop = reserveCredentialHop( "auth-recovery", `${route.providerName}|${route.modelId}|continuation-oauth-429`, + !adapterOwnsDispatch && transientRetryPolicyFor(route.provider) !== null, ); const nextAccountId = hop.allowed ? rotateGenericOAuthAccountOn429( @@ -417,6 +424,11 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( ); sealRequestAttemptIdentity(logCtx.activeAttempt, logCtx.provider, transportState.activeAdapter.name, logCtx.accountLogLabel); recordAttemptCredentialSource(logCtx.activeAttempt, route.providerName, route.provider, transportState.activeAdapter.name); + // The replay goes out on the next iteration. An adapter that owns its ladder + // reserves for that send itself, so hand this reservation down rather than let it + // take a second one for the same replay. A helper-routed replay needs no handoff: + // its reporter settles the booking made above. + if (adapterOwnsDispatch) sendBudgetState.pendingHopPermit = hop.permit; nextContinuationRecoveryKind = "oauth-account-429"; continue; } diff --git a/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts b/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts index 57eadf6a28..37b9356965 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( responseEffects: Pick, sendBudgetState: Pick< ResponsesSendBudget, - | "adapterSendBudget" + | "adapterDispatchBudget" | "noteAdapterPhysicalSend" | "remainingTransientSendBudget" | "noteTransientSends" @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( | "recoveryClassFor" | "sendBudgetExhausted" | "reserveCredentialHop" + | "pendingHopPermit" >, ) { const { options, config, logCtx, req } = requestContext; @@ -151,7 +152,7 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( } = requestState; const { cancelResponseCompletion, notifyResponseComplete, refreshRequestToolAliases } = responseEffects; const { - adapterSendBudget, + adapterDispatchBudget, noteAdapterPhysicalSend, remainingTransientSendBudget, noteTransientSends, @@ -277,7 +278,7 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( upstreamResponse = await transportState.activeAdapter.fetchResponse(builtInitialRequest, { abortSignal: upstream.signal, timeoutMs: connectMs, - sendBudget: adapterSendBudget, + sendBudget: adapterDispatchBudget, onPhysicalSend: send => noteAdapterPhysicalSend(inputTokenEstimate, send), stream: parsed.stream, executor: providerFetch(route.provider, options.codexWsRuntimeIdentity, { @@ -425,7 +426,7 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( return await transportState.activeAdapter.fetchResponse(retryRequest, { abortSignal: upstream.signal, timeoutMs: connectMs, - sendBudget: adapterSendBudget, + sendBudget: adapterDispatchBudget, onPhysicalSend: send => noteAdapterPhysicalSend(retryEstimate, send), stream: parsed.stream, executor: providerFetch(route.provider, options.codexWsRuntimeIdentity, { @@ -722,9 +723,23 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( // rebuildAndRefetch, so the roster cap alone would let one request walk the roster on // an allowance the rest of the request cannot see. A refusal ends the ladder with the // real 429 already in hand, which is the decided exhaustion contract. + // + // Who settles this reservation depends on who dispatches the replay (#4709). An + // adapter that owns its ladder -- Kiro's reset loop, Cursor's transport loop -- + // reserves once per physical send and would charge the same replay again; the helper + // path reports it again through `onSendsConsumed`. Both turned one physical send into + // two charges, and once the allowance was spent, into a synthetic error in place of + // the 429 this hop was recovering from. The wire protocol is resolved from the + // provider and model, not from the account, so an account rotation cannot move the + // replay between these two shapes. + const adapterOwnsDispatch = transportState.activeAdapter.fetchResponse !== undefined; const hop = reserveCredentialHop( "auth-recovery", `${route.providerName}|${route.modelId}|adapter-recovery-oauth-429`, + // Only a helper-routed replay reports this send back. A reset-only refetch reports + // nothing and an adapter ladder settles the booking itself, so promising an external + // report on either would leave a booking pending until it swallowed a later charge. + !adapterOwnsDispatch && transientRetryPolicyFor(route.provider) !== null, ); if (!hop.allowed) break; const nextAccountId = rotateGenericOAuthAccountOn429( @@ -755,10 +770,24 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( ); sealRequestAttemptIdentity(logCtx.activeAttempt, logCtx.provider, transportState.activeAdapter.name, logCtx.accountLogLabel); recordAttemptCredentialSource(logCtx.activeAttempt, route.providerName, route.provider, transportState.activeAdapter.name); - // Confirm at the dispatch boundary, not here: a rebuild can fail while shaping the - // request and return `{ failed }` without reaching the wire, and a permit confirmed - // before that would hold the charge for a send that never happened. - const result = await rebuildAndRefetch("oauth-account-429", () => { hop.permit?.use(); }); + // The replay IS this hop's send, so hand the reservation down and let the layer that + // dispatches settle it: `adapterDispatchBudget` spends it on the adapter's first + // reservation, and the retry helper's reporter settles the external booking. + sendBudgetState.pendingHopPermit = hop.permit; + let result: Response | { failed: Response }; + try { + // Confirm at the dispatch boundary, not here: a rebuild can fail while shaping the + // request and return `{ failed }` without reaching the wire, and a permit confirmed + // before that would hold the charge for a send that never happened. An + // adapter-owned ladder is the exception -- its own reservation is the confirmation, + // and settling here first would hand it a dead permit, which it reads as an + // exhausted request and stops sending on. + result = await rebuildAndRefetch("oauth-account-429", () => { + if (!adapterOwnsDispatch) hop.permit?.use(); + }); + } finally { + sendBudgetState.pendingHopPermit = undefined; + } if ("failed" in result) { // A no-op if the boundary was reached; a refund if the rebuild died before it. hop.permit?.release(); diff --git a/src/server/responses/request-send-budget.ts b/src/server/responses/request-send-budget.ts index c5879e106f..41bf5d64d6 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/request-send-budget.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/request-send-budget.ts @@ -5,7 +5,13 @@ import { workflowRefusalResponse } from "../workflow-refusal"; import type { AttemptRecoveryKind } from "../../usage/log"; import { noteAttemptSend } from "../request-log"; import { TRANSIENT_RETRY_MAX_ATTEMPTS } from "../../lib/upstream-retry"; -import type { SingleUseDispatchPermit, SendClass } from "../../lib/request-execution-budget"; +import type { + DispatchDecision, + DispatchIntent, + RequestExecutionBudget, + SendClass, + SingleUseDispatchPermit, +} from "../../lib/request-execution-budget"; /** Owns the shared request send counter and recovery permits. */ export function createResponsesSendBudget( @@ -75,6 +81,32 @@ export function createResponsesSendBudget( * was recovering from. */ let pendingHopPermit: SingleUseDispatchPermit | undefined; + /** + * The budget an adapter's OWN dispatch ladder reserves against. + * + * Kiro and Cursor reserve once per physical send, and that is right: their ladders are the + * layer that actually sends, and counting one adapter call as one send hid up to eighteen + * upstream requests. But a credential hop has already booked the replay it is about to make, + * and a reservation IS the charge, so an adapter that reserves again turns one physical send + * into two charges -- and once the base allowance is spent, into a refusal that answers with + * a synthetic error in place of the 429 the hop was recovering from (#4709). + * + * The hop hands its reservation down through `pendingHopPermit`, the same seam the + * passthrough ladder already uses, and this view spends it on the adapter's FIRST + * reservation. Every later send in that ladder is a new physical send and is charged + * normally. A permit the adapter takes but never sends under is released through the same + * call it would have used for a reservation of its own, so an abandoned replay is refunded + * rather than left charged. + */ + const adapterDispatchBudget: RequestExecutionBudget | undefined = adapterSendBudget === undefined + ? undefined + : adapterDispatchBudgetView(adapterSendBudget, { + claimHopPermit: () => { + const permit = pendingHopPermit; + pendingHopPermit = undefined; + return permit; + }, + }); /** * How many sends a recovery leg may make, and the permit that authorises the last one. * @@ -147,6 +179,7 @@ export function createResponsesSendBudget( noteTransientSends, remainingTransientSendBudget, adapterSendBudget, + adapterDispatchBudget, noteAdapterPhysicalSend, sendBudgetExhausted, get pendingHopPermit(): SingleUseDispatchPermit | undefined { @@ -162,3 +195,65 @@ export function createResponsesSendBudget( } export type ResponsesSendBudget = Exclude, Response>; + +/** + * A LIVE delegating view of one request's execution budget, with a credential hop's + * reservation spendable through it. + * + * Every member forwards rather than copying. A spread of the budget would freeze `used`, + * `reserveSpent` and the target counters at construction time, handing the adapter a budget + * that can never read as exhausted -- the same class of defect as the fresh per-layer + * allowances #4546 removed. + */ +function adapterDispatchBudgetView( + budget: RequestExecutionBudget, + hop: { claimHopPermit: () => SingleUseDispatchPermit | undefined }, +): RequestExecutionBudget { + return { + get used(): number { return budget.used; }, + set used(next: number) { budget.used = next; }, + logicalRequestId: budget.logicalRequestId, + policyVersion: budget.policyVersion, + policy: budget.policy, + get reserveSpent(): boolean { return budget.reserveSpent; }, + get alternateTargetSends(): number { return budget.alternateTargetSends; }, + get targetTransitions(): number { return budget.targetTransitions; }, + get lastTargetKey(): string | undefined { return budget.lastTargetKey; }, + remainingBaseSends: (cap: number): number => budget.remainingBaseSends(cap), + reserveDispatch(intent: DispatchIntent): DispatchDecision { + // A dispatch whose upstream state is unknown is refused on its own merits. A hop that + // already paid does not make an unsafe replay safe, so that check stays with the budget. + if (intent.replaySafe !== false) { + const hopPermit = hop.claimHopPermit(); + // Confirmed here rather than in `use()`: the adapter reserves immediately before it + // opens the transport, which is the same boundary the hop's own confirmation uses. + // A permit some other leg already settled returns false, and this falls through to a + // real reservation rather than handing the adapter a dead permit -- an adapter whose + // `use()` fails treats the request as exhausted and stops sending entirely. + if (hopPermit !== undefined && hopPermit.assumeCharge()) { + let spent = false; + return { + allowed: true, + permit: { + sendClass: hopPermit.sendClass, + use: (): boolean => { + if (spent) return false; + spent = true; + return true; + }, + assumeCharge: (): boolean => { + if (spent) return false; + spent = true; + return true; + }, + // The hop's charge is already settled and belongs to the leg that asked for it, + // so there is nothing here to refund. + release: (): void => {}, + }, + }; + } + } + return budget.reserveDispatch(intent); + }, + }; +} diff --git a/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts b/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts index 24e96802fb..0f3b813177 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts @@ -74,7 +74,10 @@ export async function executeResponsesRunTurn( | "continuationStateForResponse" | "notifyResponseComplete" >, - sendBudgetState: Pick, + sendBudgetState: Pick< + ResponsesSendBudget, + "adapterDispatchBudget" | "reserveCredentialHop" | "pendingHopPermit" + >, completionPolicy: Pick, ): Promise { const { options, logCtx, config } = requestContext; @@ -94,7 +97,7 @@ export async function executeResponsesRunTurn( rememberKiroDeliveredFinalAnswer, responseStateOptions, } = requestState; - const { adapterSendBudget, reserveCredentialHop } = sendBudgetState; + const { adapterDispatchBudget, reserveCredentialHop } = sendBudgetState; const { emptyCompletionGuardEnabled } = completionPolicy; const { cancelResponseCompletion, @@ -162,7 +165,7 @@ export async function executeResponsesRunTurn( providerFetch: runTurnProviderFetch, // The only way the request budget reaches a transport the adapter owns. Without it // a Cursor turn's inner ladder was three physical sends the cap read as one. - ...(adapterSendBudget ? { sendBudget: adapterSendBudget } : {}), + ...(adapterDispatchBudget ? { sendBudget: adapterDispatchBudget } : {}), }, targetQueue.push, ); @@ -258,8 +261,11 @@ export async function executeResponsesRunTurn( }); sealRequestAttemptIdentity(logCtx.activeAttempt, logCtx.provider, rotatedAdapter.name, logCtx.accountLogLabel); recordAttemptCredentialSource(logCtx.activeAttempt, route.providerName, route.provider, rotatedAdapter.name); - // The caller replays the turn on this rotation, so the reservation is now confirmed. - hop.permit?.use(); + // The caller replays the turn on this rotation, and a runTurn adapter dispatches through + // its own reservation ladder -- Cursor reserves once per physical send. Confirming here + // would leave that ladder to charge the same replay a second time (#4709), so hand the + // reservation down and let the send that actually happens spend it. + sendBudgetState.pendingHopPermit = hop.permit; return true; } catch { hop.permit?.release(); @@ -270,16 +276,24 @@ export async function executeResponsesRunTurn( firstSource: AsyncIterable, ): Promise> => { let source = firstSource; - while (true) { - const preflight = await preflightAdapterEvents(source); - if (!preflight.error || !(await rotateRunTurnAdapterOnPreflight429(preflight.error))) { - return preflight.stream; + try { + while (true) { + const preflight = await preflightAdapterEvents(source); + if (!preflight.error || !(await rotateRunTurnAdapterOnPreflight429(preflight.error))) { + return preflight.stream; + } + const retryQueue = createAdapterEventQueue({ + onBacklogExceeded: () => runTurnAbort.abort(), + }); + void runTurnAttempt(retryQueue, "oauth-account-429"); + source = retryQueue.stream(); } - const retryQueue = createAdapterEventQueue({ - onBacklogExceeded: () => runTurnAbort.abort(), - }); - void runTurnAttempt(retryQueue, "oauth-account-429"); - source = retryQueue.stream(); + } finally { + // A handed-down hop reservation belongs to the replay this loop dispatched, and the + // loop only leaves after that replay's first event has arrived -- so the adapter has + // already reserved if it was ever going to. Dropping the reference here keeps an + // adapter that reserves nothing from leaving a free send for an unrelated later leg. + sendBudgetState.pendingHopPermit = undefined; } }; // The empty-completion retry re-runs the turn against a fresh queue: the diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 9af5e63100..648d78afe5 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -690,15 +690,28 @@ budget before it knows whether a rotation is even possible, because the reservat `reserveDispatch` spends, `permit.use()` only confirms which leg sent, and `permit.release()` is idempotent and a no-op once used. Every ladder therefore owes the budget an answer on every exit. -Two shapes are correct and both are in the tree. Where the ladder dispatches inside its own `try` -— `adapter-dispatch.ts`, `run-turn-execution.ts` — it confirms with `use()` immediately before the -send and releases in its `catch`, so one catch covers a pre-dispatch throw and a throw from the -send alike. Where the replay happens after the loop continues — `adapter-continuation.ts` — it must -not confirm, because the send has not happened yet; it only releases. The passthrough ladder is a -third shape: it reserves with `countedExternally: true` and hands the permit to the rebuild through -`pendingHopPermit`, because there the retry helper reports the same physical send. +The hop pays for a replay that some *other* layer dispatches, so which layer settles the +reservation follows the dispatcher, not the ladder. A helper-routed replay reports the same +physical send back through `onSendsConsumed`; that is what `countedExternally: true` names, and the +reporter's first send settles the pending booking instead of adding a second charge. An adapter +that owns its transport — Kiro's reset ladder, Cursor's transport ladder — reserves once per +physical send instead, so no reporter ever arrives. Those ladders are handed +`adapterDispatchBudget`, a live delegating view of the same budget that spends a permit passed down +through `pendingHopPermit` on the adapter's first reservation and closes the booking through +`permit.assumeCharge()`. Letting both charge is how one physical send became two charges, and how a +spent allowance answered a 429 with a synthetic error instead of the rate limit it was recovering +from (#4709). + +Confirmation happens at the dispatch boundary rather than at the rotation. `adapter-dispatch.ts` +passes an `onDispatch` callback that the rebuild invokes immediately before the wire, and skips it +when the adapter owns dispatch: settling there first would hand that adapter a dead permit, which +it reads as an exhausted request and stops sending on. `adapter-continuation.ts` never confirms, +because its replay is the next loop iteration. `run-turn-execution.ts` always hands the reservation +down, because a runTurn adapter is by definition the layer that sends. The passthrough ladder keeps +the shape it already had: reserve with `countedExternally: true` and pass the permit to the rebuild. What must not happen is a ladder that charges and then returns through a path that neither confirms nor releases. That is not a lost send; it is a send the request never made, spending an allowance a later recovery in the same request then cannot have. `tests/lib/execution-budget-permits.test.ts` -pins both ladder shapes against exactly that. +pins the settlement rule and every ladder shape against exactly that, and +`tests/responses/responses-core-modules.test.ts` pins the adapter view's live delegation. diff --git a/tests/lib/execution-budget-permits.test.ts b/tests/lib/execution-budget-permits.test.ts index 6aff76df69..687597e241 100644 --- a/tests/lib/execution-budget-permits.test.ts +++ b/tests/lib/execution-budget-permits.test.ts @@ -249,7 +249,12 @@ describe("generic-OAuth hop reservations are handed back when no send happens", "adapter-recovery-oauth-429", "attemptOpaqueBlobRecovery", ); - expect(block).toContain('rebuildAndRefetch("oauth-account-429", () => { hop.permit?.use(); })'); + expect(block).toContain('rebuildAndRefetch("oauth-account-429", () => {'); + // ...except on an adapter-owned ladder, which confirms through its own reservation. Settling + // here as well would close the permit before `adapterDispatchBudget` could hand it over, and + // an adapter whose `use()` fails reads the request as exhausted and stops sending (#4709). + expect(block).toContain("if (!adapterOwnsDispatch) hop.permit?.use();"); + expect(block).toContain("sendBudgetState.pendingHopPermit = hop.permit;"); expect(block).toMatch(/if \("failed" in result\) \{[^}]*hop\.permit\?\.release\(\)/); expect(block).toMatch(refundsOnThrow); }); @@ -266,3 +271,80 @@ describe("generic-OAuth hop reservations are handed back when no send happens", expect(block).toMatch(refundsOnThrow); }); }); + +/** + * One physical send, one charge -- whichever layer actually dispatches it (#4709). + * + * A credential hop books the replay it is about to make, and the reservation IS the charge. The + * layer that then sends that replay has its own accounting: the retry helper reports every + * physical send back through `onSendsConsumed`, while Kiro and Cursor reserve once per send + * against the same budget. Either one charged the hop's replay a SECOND time, so a four-send + * ceiling admitted two sends -- and once the allowance was gone the request answered with a + * synthetic error instead of the 429 the hop was recovering from. + * + * `countedExternally` already covered the reporter. `assumeCharge()` is the other half: the + * dispatching layer takes the booking over, so the send stays charged exactly once and no later + * report settles against a send that was already paid for. + */ +describe("a credential hop is settled by whichever layer dispatches its replay", () => { + test("a retry helper's report settles the booking instead of charging again", () => { + const budget = createRequestExecutionBudget(CODEX_TEXT_GUARDED_BUDGET_POLICY); + const hop = budget.reserveDispatch({ + sendClass: "auth-recovery", targetKey: "p|m", countedExternally: true, + }); + expect(hop.allowed).toBe(true); + expect(budget.used).toBe(1); + + // The helper names the same physical send the hop already booked. + budget.used += 1; + expect(budget.used).toBe(1); + // A genuinely second send is charged in full. + budget.used += 1; + expect(budget.used).toBe(2); + }); + + test("an adapter that reserves for itself takes the booking over rather than adding to it", () => { + const budget = createRequestExecutionBudget(CODEX_TEXT_GUARDED_BUDGET_POLICY); + const hop = budget.reserveDispatch({ + sendClass: "auth-recovery", targetKey: "p|m", countedExternally: true, + }); + if (!hop.allowed) throw new Error("unreachable"); + expect(budget.used).toBe(1); + + // No reporter will ever name this send: the adapter's own ladder is dispatching it. + expect(hop.permit.assumeCharge()).toBe(true); + expect(budget.used).toBe(1); + // The booking is closed, so the next leg's report is charged in full. Leaving it open is + // how one real send would have gone uncounted. + budget.used += 1; + expect(budget.used).toBe(2); + + // One reservation still admits exactly one send, and a settled permit cannot be refunded. + expect(hop.permit.assumeCharge()).toBe(false); + expect(hop.permit.use()).toBe(false); + hop.permit.release(); + expect(budget.used).toBe(2); + }); + + test("the three adapter hop sites hand their reservation down instead of double-charging", () => { + const responses = (name: string): string => + readFileSync(new URL("../../src/server/responses/" + name, import.meta.url), "utf8"); + // The adapter recovery loop and the continuation loop both pick their settlement from the + // shape of the dispatcher, so neither promises an external report an adapter would never make. + for (const name of ["adapter-dispatch.ts", "adapter-continuation.ts"]) { + const source = responses(name); + expect(source).toContain("const adapterOwnsDispatch = transportState.activeAdapter.fetchResponse !== undefined;"); + expect(source).toContain("!adapterOwnsDispatch && transientRetryPolicyFor(route.provider) !== null,"); + } + // runTurn has only one shape: the adapter owns the transport, so it never reports and the + // reservation is always handed down rather than confirmed here. + const runTurn = responses("run-turn-execution.ts"); + expect(runTurn).toContain("sendBudgetState.pendingHopPermit = hop.permit;"); + expect(runTurn).not.toContain("hop.permit?.use();"); + // Every adapter-owned transport now reserves against the view, which is what spends the + // handed-down permit. Passing the bare holder is the regression this pins. + for (const name of ["adapter-dispatch.ts", "adapter-continuation.ts", "run-turn-execution.ts"]) { + expect(responses(name)).not.toContain("sendBudget: adapterSendBudget"); + } + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-core-modules.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-core-modules.test.ts index 2d94f02f98..1d9ff1f7aa 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-core-modules.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-core-modules.test.ts @@ -174,4 +174,38 @@ describe("Responses request-owned send budget after extraction", () => { expect(owner.remainingTransientSendBudget(3)).toBe(0); } finally { dispose(); } }); + + test("an adapter reservation spends the handed-down hop instead of buying a second send", () => { + const holder = createRequestExecutionBudget(); + const { owner, dispose } = budgetOwner(holder); + try { + const hop = owner.reserveCredentialHop("auth-recovery", "test|model", true); + expect(hop.allowed).toBe(true); + if (!hop.permit) throw new Error("Expected a recovery permit"); + // The reservation is the charge, before anything dispatched. + expect(holder.used).toBe(1); + owner.pendingHopPermit = hop.permit; + const adapterBudget = owner.adapterDispatchBudget; + if (!adapterBudget) throw new Error("Expected an adapter dispatch budget"); + + // Kiro and Cursor reserve once per physical send. Their FIRST reservation in this leg is + // the hop's own replay, so it spends the permit rather than charging again (#4709). + const first = adapterBudget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "transient", targetKey: "url" }); + expect(first.allowed).toBe(true); + if (!first.allowed) throw new Error("unreachable"); + expect(first.permit.use()).toBe(true); + expect(first.permit.use()).toBe(false); + expect(holder.used).toBe(1); + expect(owner.pendingHopPermit).toBeUndefined(); + + // Every later send in the same ladder is a new physical send and is charged. + const second = adapterBudget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "transient", targetKey: "url" }); + expect(second.allowed).toBe(true); + expect(holder.used).toBe(2); + // The view delegates live rather than snapshotting: a frozen copy would read as a budget + // that can never be exhausted. + expect(adapterBudget.used).toBe(2); + expect(adapterBudget.remainingBaseSends(3)).toBe(1); + } finally { dispose(); } + }); }); From fb2ce7d20a0225b1698305f51e9c0e5844b8bb32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:05:58 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 056/113] fix(update): keep a history-preflight refusal from aborting the update (#4718) [skip ci] On Windows, "ocx update" stopped the service, entered the pending shared teardown path, printed "Native restore refused: history_paginated_requires_native_writer", and then aborted with "could not stop the running proxy". The service was down, no listener was left, and the old package was still installed. Installing the same target by hand worked. The refusal itself is correct and stays. The Codex history preflight runs before the config half of the restore, so it returns an envelope whose config, catalog and history artifacts are all "skipped" -- nothing was attempted. restoreSharedClientStateAfterStop classified only two shapes, a later history failure and everything else, so the refusal fell through to "everything else", ocx stop exited 1, and decidePostStopUpdate read 1 as a proxy that would not die. The reported lane is bin/ocx.mjs; the Bun updater shares the same decision module and had the same defect. The obligation really is outstanding here: config and catalog were never restored, so the client still points at the proxy that just stopped. Treating the refusal as the existing history-only case would have discharged the receipt and lost that. So this adds a third outcome rather than widening the second. - CodexNativeRestoreResult.historyPreflightRefusal carries the refusal as a structured reason. The artifact states cannot carry it: an ownership refusal and a desired-state skip produce the same three "skipped" values, and matching the message would put a safety decision on prose. - ocx stop keeps the receipt, says so, and exits 80. Eighty is not 79: seventy-nine means the teardown ran and only history metadata is pending, and a caller reading it discharges the obligation. - Eighty is only emitted when pendingTeardownsAreExactly confirms the obligations left in the home are exactly the ones this run chose to keep. A quarantined receipt or a concurrent stop's claim falls back to exit 1, which is the pre-existing behaviour, so the fallback loses nothing. - decidePostStopUpdate lets 80 past the teardown gate and nothing else. Runtime records, a live proxy and an unreadable probe abort exactly as before, because a history refusal is evidence about history and says nothing about whether the proxy is gone. - Both updater lanes report the deferral as its own outcome instead of reusing the manifest warning, which would imply config and catalog came back. Closes #4718 --- bin/ocx.mjs | 10 ++ src/cli/index.ts | 53 +++++++++- src/codex/inject/restore.ts | 31 +++++- src/config/pending-teardown.ts | 31 ++++++ src/update/index.ts | 10 ++ src/update/stop-contract.d.mts | 1 + src/update/stop-contract.mjs | 19 ++++ src/update/stop-decision.d.mts | 2 +- src/update/stop-decision.mjs | 15 ++- .../codex-inject-integration.test.ts | 9 ++ tests/providers/xai/grok-lifecycle.test.ts | 6 +- tests/service/stop-deferred-teardown.test.ts | 98 ++++++++++++++++++- .../update/update-stop-classification.test.ts | 80 ++++++++++++++- 13 files changed, 349 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/bin/ocx.mjs b/bin/ocx.mjs index ef3aa80cd8..7b3a54eaa2 100755 --- a/bin/ocx.mjs +++ b/bin/ocx.mjs @@ -522,6 +522,16 @@ function runPackageManagerSelfUpdate(manager) { " After the update: close the Codex app, run 'ocx doctor', then run 'ocx stop' once to retry.", ); } + if (decision.reason === "history-deferred") { + // The reported #4718 path is this lane. Nothing was restored, so this is a different + // sentence from the manifest warning above: an operator told "history metadata is + // incomplete" would assume config and catalog already came back. + console.warn( + "opencodex: WARNING — the shared teardown was refused by the Codex history preflight and restored nothing.\n" + + " Config, catalog, history and provenance were preserved, and the teardown receipt was kept.\n" + + " The proxy is down, so the update continues; close the Codex app and run 'ocx stop' once afterwards to finish the restore.", + ); + } } // npm keeps the existing stage -> verify -> swap -> rollback flow. pnpm owns a diff --git a/src/cli/index.ts b/src/cli/index.ts index 9d37cb5c21..9df96b3fad 100755 --- a/src/cli/index.ts +++ b/src/cli/index.ts @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ try { } import { currentExternalCodexModelProvider, restoreNativeCodex, restoreNativeCodexAsync, shouldInjectApiAuthHeader } from "../codex/inject"; import { stripGrokConfig } from "../grok/inject"; -import { STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE } from "../update/stop-contract.mjs"; +import { STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE, STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE } from "../update/stop-contract.mjs"; import { describeHistoryJobFailure, resolveCodexHistoryJobTarget, @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ import { isPendingTeardownAbandoned, listPendingTeardowns, pendingTeardownPathFor, + pendingTeardownsAreExactly, quarantinePendingTeardown, } from "../config/pending-teardown"; import { collectStatus, hubStatusLines, remoteHubBannerLine, remoteHubStatusLines, unusedProxyWarningLines } from "./status"; @@ -785,9 +786,16 @@ async function handleRestartStartWhenStopped(): Promise { * * The distinction exists because `ocx update` must proceed for the first and abort for the * second, and it can only see an exit code (#3008). + * + * `historyDeferred` is the third kind (#4718). The Codex history preflight refuses BEFORE + * the config half runs, so nothing was restored at all: config, catalog, history and + * provenance are untouched and the client is still routed at the proxy that just stopped. + * Like `historyOnly` the proxy is genuinely down, so an update may replace package files. + * Unlike `historyOnly` the obligation was not performed, so the receipt must survive. */ -async function restoreSharedClientStateAfterStop(): Promise<{ historyOnly: boolean; other: boolean }> { +async function restoreSharedClientStateAfterStop(): Promise<{ historyOnly: boolean; historyDeferred: boolean; other: boolean }> { let historyOnly = false; + let historyDeferred = false; let other = false; try { const result = await restoreNativeCodexAsync(); @@ -798,7 +806,16 @@ async function restoreSharedClientStateAfterStop(): Promise<{ historyOnly: boole // not — a client reads those, so their failure is a real teardown failure. const artifacts = result.artifacts; const configOrCatalogFailed = artifacts.config.state === "failed" || artifacts.catalog.state === "failed"; - if (!configOrCatalogFailed && artifacts.history.state === "failed") historyOnly = true; + // A preflight refusal reports every artifact as `skipped` because none of them were + // attempted. Reading the states alone cannot tell that apart from an ownership + // refusal, so the structured reason carries it and the states are still required to + // agree — a refusal that somehow reports a failed artifact is not this case. + const preflightRefused = result.historyPreflightRefusal !== undefined + && artifacts.config.state === "skipped" + && artifacts.catalog.state === "skipped" + && artifacts.history.state === "skipped"; + if (preflightRefused) historyDeferred = true; + else if (!configOrCatalogFailed && artifacts.history.state === "failed") historyOnly = true; else other = true; console.error(`⚠️ ${result.message}`); } @@ -816,7 +833,7 @@ async function restoreSharedClientStateAfterStop(): Promise<{ historyOnly: boole other = true; console.error(`⚠️ Grok config restore failed: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`); } - return { historyOnly, other }; + return { historyOnly, historyDeferred, other }; } async function handleStop() { @@ -860,6 +877,11 @@ async function handleStop() { }; let stopFailed = false; let historyOnlyFailure = false; + /** + * Obligations this run deliberately kept because the Codex history preflight refused + * before restoring anything (#4718). Non-null selects the deferred exit code. + */ + let historyDeferredNonces: string[] | null = null; // Only Task Scheduler respawns after a successful stop (#764), so only it earns the // restart-window wait; launchd, systemd and WinSW are down when they say so. let schedulerCanRespawn = false; @@ -1138,6 +1160,7 @@ async function handleStop() { } const restore = await restoreSharedClientStateAfterStop(); if (restore.other) stopFailed = true; + else if (restore.historyDeferred) historyDeferredNonces = teardownNonce ? [teardownNonce, ...recoveredNonces] : recoveredNonces; else if (restore.historyOnly) historyOnlyFailure = true; // The obligation is discharged whether or not history metadata finalized: config and // catalog are what a client reads, and `restore.other` already fails the stop. @@ -1145,7 +1168,16 @@ async function handleStop() { // Each nonce names its own file, so a clear can only ever remove the obligation it // names — never one a concurrent stop wrote. Both this run's claim and every inherited // receipt it proved discharged are released together. - if (!restore.other) { + // + // A history-preflight refusal is the exception: it restored nothing, so there is + // nothing to discharge. Clearing here would drop a real obligation on the floor and + // leave the client config pointing at a proxy that is gone, with nothing on disk + // saying so — which is the whole failure the receipt exists to prevent (#4718). + if (restore.historyDeferred) { + console.error(" The shared teardown was refused before it changed anything, so it is still owed."); + console.error(" Its receipt is preserved; run 'ocx stop' again once Codex is closed to retry the restore."); + } + if (!restore.other && !restore.historyDeferred) { const discharged = teardownNonce ? [teardownNonce, ...recoveredNonces] : recoveredNonces; for (const nonce of discharged) { // A receipt that survives its discharge re-triggers recovery forever, so a failed @@ -1185,6 +1217,17 @@ async function handleStop() { // still wins: it is the stronger signal. if (stopFailed) process.exitCode = 1; else if (historyOnlyFailure) process.exitCode = STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE; + // The deferred code says "the only obligations left are the ones I just decided to + // keep". It is read across a process boundary by an updater that will replace package + // files on the strength of it, so this run has to be able to prove the claim: if any + // other obligation is sitting in the home — quarantined, or a concurrent stop's — the + // claim is false and the ordinary failure code is the honest answer. That is also the + // behaviour before #4718, so the fallback loses nothing that used to work. + else if (historyDeferredNonces) { + process.exitCode = pendingTeardownsAreExactly(historyDeferredNonces) + ? STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE + : 1; + } return !stopFailed; } diff --git a/src/codex/inject/restore.ts b/src/codex/inject/restore.ts index 15282ea771..5e273173ec 100644 --- a/src/codex/inject/restore.ts +++ b/src/codex/inject/restore.ts @@ -89,6 +89,18 @@ export interface CodexNativeRestoreResult { success: boolean; message: string; externalProvider?: string; + /** + * Set when the restore refused at the Codex history preflight (#4718). + * + * The preflight runs before the config half, so a refusal leaves config, catalog, + * history and provenance exactly as they were. That is a different outcome from a + * restore that ran and failed, and callers that decide whether an obligation was + * discharged need to tell them apart. Reading the artifact states alone cannot: a + * refusal reports every artifact as `skipped`, which is also what an ownership refusal + * and a desired-state skip report. Matching the human-readable message instead would + * make a safety decision depend on prose. + */ + historyPreflightRefusal?: string; artifacts: { config: CodexRestoreConfigResult; catalog: CodexRestoreCatalogResult; @@ -216,6 +228,21 @@ function failedConfigRestoreEnvelope(config: CodexRestoreConfigResult): CodexNat return result; } +/** + * The history preflight refused, so nothing was attempted at all (#4718). + * + * The message is unchanged from what this path has always printed; the structured reason + * is added beside it so a caller can act on the refusal without reading the prose. + */ +function historyPreflightRefusalEnvelope(historyError: string): CodexNativeRestoreResult { + const result = skippedRestoreEnvelope( + false, + `Native restore refused: ${historyError}. Config, catalog, history and provenance were preserved.`, + ); + result.historyPreflightRefusal = historyError; + return result; +} + /** The config/profile half of a native restore, reported as one artifact. */ function restoreCodexConfigInline(kind = "sync"): CodexRestoreConfigResult { const preImages = captureCodexPreImages(); @@ -342,7 +369,7 @@ async function restoreNativeCodexAsyncImpl( } const historyError = preflightCodexHistoryInjection(false, false); - if (historyError) return skippedRestoreEnvelope(false, `Native restore refused: ${historyError}. Config, catalog, history and provenance were preserved.`); + if (historyError) return historyPreflightRefusalEnvelope(historyError); const eligibility = codexWriteCoordinationEligibility({ coordinatorPath: () => @@ -490,7 +517,7 @@ export function restoreNativeCodex(options: { skipHistory?: boolean; revalidateD return desiredEnabledRestoreSkip(); } const historyError = preflightCodexHistoryInjection(false, false); - if (historyError) return skippedRestoreEnvelope(false, `Native restore refused: ${historyError}. Config, catalog, history and provenance were preserved.`); + if (historyError) return historyPreflightRefusalEnvelope(historyError); // Captured before the config half: a successful journal restore DELETES the journal, and // restoring the config can drop `model_catalog_json`. Either one would hide the routed // catalog we actually wrote (#1798). diff --git a/src/config/pending-teardown.ts b/src/config/pending-teardown.ts index bfab1cf757..9b1f5e97a2 100644 --- a/src/config/pending-teardown.ts +++ b/src/config/pending-teardown.ts @@ -202,6 +202,37 @@ export function pendingTeardownOutstanding(): boolean { } } +/** + * Are the outstanding obligations EXACTLY the ones this stop chose to keep? + * + * `ocx stop` can preserve its own obligations deliberately — the Codex history preflight + * refuses before anything is restored, so the receipt has to survive for a later stop + * (#4718). That is safe for an update to continue past, because the stop knows those + * receipts describe a proxy it just proved down. + * + * Nothing else is. A quarantined receipt is waiting on a human, and a receipt belonging + * to a live owner means another stop is in flight; letting either ride along would turn + * "we deliberately kept ours" into "we ignored everyone's". So membership is the test, + * not a count of ours: an unrecognized obligation of any kind answers false and the + * caller falls back to the ordinary failure code. + * + * Quarantined names are included in the scan on purpose. They do not correspond to any + * nonce this run preserved, so their presence always answers false. + */ +export function pendingTeardownsAreExactly(nonces: readonly string[]): boolean { + const expected = new Set(nonces.map(nonce => `${PREFIX}${nonce}${SUFFIX}`)); + let names: string[]; + try { + names = readdirSync(getConfigDir()); + } catch (error) { + // A home that does not exist holds nothing, which matches only an empty expectation. + // Any other scan failure may be hiding an obligation and must not answer "exactly". + return (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ENOENT" && expected.size === 0; + } + const found = names.filter(isAnyTeardownObligationFileName); + return found.length === expected.size && found.every(name => expected.has(name)); +} + /** Paths of quarantined obligations awaiting a human. */ export function listQuarantinedTeardowns(): string[] { try { diff --git a/src/update/index.ts b/src/update/index.ts index dccc63a288..2197ef0f34 100644 --- a/src/update/index.ts +++ b/src/update/index.ts @@ -481,6 +481,16 @@ export async function runUpdate(): Promise { " After the update: close the Codex app, run 'ocx doctor', then run 'ocx stop' once to retry.", ); } + if (decision.reason === "history-deferred") { + // Not the same warning: nothing was restored here. Saying "history metadata is + // incomplete" would imply config and catalog came back, and an operator who + // believed that would not know a teardown is still owed. + console.warn( + "⚠️ The shared teardown was refused by the Codex history preflight and restored nothing.\n" + + " Config, catalog, history and provenance were preserved, and the teardown receipt was kept.\n" + + " The proxy is down, so the update continues; close the Codex app and run 'ocx stop' once afterwards to finish the restore.", + ); + } } console.log(`Updating${latest ? ` to v${latest}` : ""}…\n$ ${bin} ${cmdArgs.join(" ")}`); diff --git a/src/update/stop-contract.d.mts b/src/update/stop-contract.d.mts index b077eb21b3..1efb77c42d 100644 --- a/src/update/stop-contract.d.mts +++ b/src/update/stop-contract.d.mts @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ /** Declaration for the plain-ESM stop contract shared with `bin/ocx.mjs`. */ export declare const STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE: 79; +export declare const STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE: 80; diff --git a/src/update/stop-contract.mjs b/src/update/stop-contract.mjs index c72548b777..b86018ea0d 100644 --- a/src/update/stop-contract.mjs +++ b/src/update/stop-contract.mjs @@ -13,3 +13,22 @@ * the child's code faithfully enough to propagate the confusion. */ export const STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE = 79; + +/** + * The exit code `ocx stop` uses to say "the proxy is down and the shared teardown was + * refused before it changed anything" (#4718). + * + * This is NOT 79. Seventy-nine means the teardown ran: config and catalog came back to + * their native values and only the Codex history metadata could not be finalized, so the + * receipt is discharged. Eighty means the Codex history preflight refused FIRST, so + * config, catalog, history and provenance are all untouched, the client is still routed + * at the proxy that just stopped, and the receipt stays outstanding for a later stop. + * + * Collapsing the two would be a data-loss bug in the quiet direction: a caller reading 79 + * discharges an obligation that was never performed. + * + * Eighty sits in the same unoccupied window as 79 — above `sysexits.h` (64-78), below + * `128 + signal`, and outside 0, 1, 2, 4, 64 and 130, which are the codes this CLI and its + * dispatcher already emit. + */ +export const STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE = 80; diff --git a/src/update/stop-decision.d.mts b/src/update/stop-decision.d.mts index f773e786e6..13f1cd93ca 100644 --- a/src/update/stop-decision.d.mts +++ b/src/update/stop-decision.d.mts @@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ export declare function decidePostStopUpdate(input: { teardownOutstanding?: boolean; }): { proceed: boolean; - reason: "stop-failed" | "runtime-state" | "teardown-outstanding" | "proxy-live" | "proxy-unknown" | "history-only" | "ok"; + reason: "stop-failed" | "runtime-state" | "teardown-outstanding" | "proxy-live" | "proxy-unknown" | "history-only" | "history-deferred" | "ok"; }; diff --git a/src/update/stop-decision.mjs b/src/update/stop-decision.mjs index e96c11ae17..0cc1a71a59 100644 --- a/src/update/stop-decision.mjs +++ b/src/update/stop-decision.mjs @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -import { STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE } from "./stop-contract.mjs"; +import { STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE, STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE } from "./stop-contract.mjs"; /** * May an update replace package files after `ocx stop` returned? @@ -22,13 +22,22 @@ import { STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE } from "./stop-contract.mjs"; * absence, and replacing files under a live server leaves it running a mix of old and * new modules. * - `ok` / `history-only` — proceed; the second also prints the manifest warning. + * - `history-deferred` — proceed; the stop is down but restored nothing, because the + * Codex history preflight refused first (#4718). The receipts it kept are the ONLY + * obligations it left, which the child proved before choosing this status, so + * `teardownOutstanding` seeing them is expected rather than disqualifying. Every other + * gate still applies: runtime records and a live or unreadable endpoint abort exactly + * as they do for a clean stop, because package replacement under a live server is the + * danger this function exists to prevent, and a history refusal says nothing about it. */ export function decidePostStopUpdate({ status, hasRuntimeState, liveness, teardownOutstanding = false }) { const historyOnly = status === STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE; - if (status !== 0 && !historyOnly) return { proceed: false, reason: "stop-failed" }; + const historyDeferred = status === STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE; + if (status !== 0 && !historyOnly && !historyDeferred) return { proceed: false, reason: "stop-failed" }; if (hasRuntimeState) return { proceed: false, reason: "runtime-state" }; - if (teardownOutstanding) return { proceed: false, reason: "teardown-outstanding" }; + if (teardownOutstanding && !historyDeferred) return { proceed: false, reason: "teardown-outstanding" }; if (liveness === "live") return { proceed: false, reason: "proxy-live" }; if (liveness !== "dead") return { proceed: false, reason: "proxy-unknown" }; + if (historyDeferred) return { proceed: true, reason: "history-deferred" }; return { proceed: true, reason: historyOnly ? "history-only" : "ok" }; } diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts index 5ffbc54f99..7fbc1e4a7f 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts @@ -123,6 +123,15 @@ describe("injectCodexConfig integration (Design B)", () => { expect(result.defaultEntries).toBe(1); expect(result.result.success).toBe(false); expect(result.result.message).toContain("history_paginated_requires_native_writer"); + // #4718: the refusal also has to be legible without reading the message. `ocx stop` + // decides whether an obligation was discharged from this envelope, and every artifact + // comes back "skipped" here — the same shape an ownership refusal and a desired-state + // skip produce. Without the structured reason the caller could only match prose, and + // the stop misread this as a generic teardown failure and aborted the update. + expect(result.result.historyPreflightRefusal).toBe("history_paginated_requires_native_writer"); + expect(result.result.artifacts.config.state).toBe("skipped"); + expect(result.result.artifacts.catalog.state).toBe("skipped"); + expect(result.result.artifacts.history.state).toBe("skipped"); expect(result.preserved).toBe(true); }); diff --git a/tests/providers/xai/grok-lifecycle.test.ts b/tests/providers/xai/grok-lifecycle.test.ts index 9602770978..49d5929a10 100644 --- a/tests/providers/xai/grok-lifecycle.test.ts +++ b/tests/providers/xai/grok-lifecycle.test.ts @@ -315,7 +315,11 @@ describe("Grok fence lifecycle wiring", () => { const updateSource2 = readFileSync(repoPath("src", "update", "index.ts"), "utf8"); expect(updateSource2).toContain("teardownOutstanding: pendingTeardownOutstanding()"); const decisionSource = readFileSync(repoPath("src", "update", "stop-decision.mjs"), "utf8"); - expect(decisionSource).toContain('if (teardownOutstanding) return { proceed: false, reason: "teardown-outstanding" };'); + // The gate has exactly one exemption, and it is the child saying it kept those + // receipts on purpose after the Codex history preflight refused (#4718). Anything + // else — including a stop that merely exited 0 — still aborts the install. + expect(decisionSource).toContain('if (teardownOutstanding && !historyDeferred) return { proceed: false, reason: "teardown-outstanding" };'); + expect(decisionSource).toContain("const historyDeferred = status === STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE;"); const receiptSource = readFileSync(repoPath("src", "config", "pending-teardown.ts"), "utf8"); expect(receiptSource).toContain('from "./pending-teardown-names.mjs"'); expect(receiptSource).toContain("isPendingTeardownFileName(name)"); diff --git a/tests/service/stop-deferred-teardown.test.ts b/tests/service/stop-deferred-teardown.test.ts index e9d116cfcb..680a11bf07 100644 --- a/tests/service/stop-deferred-teardown.test.ts +++ b/tests/service/stop-deferred-teardown.test.ts @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import { join } from "node:path"; import { stopProxyGracefully } from "../../src/lib/process-control"; import { performStopTeardown } from "../../src/server/stop-teardown"; import type { CodexNativeRestoreResult } from "../../src/codex/inject"; -import { STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE } from "../../src/update/stop-contract.mjs"; +import { STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE, STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE } from "../../src/update/stop-contract.mjs"; import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; import { fixturePath, repoPath } from "../helpers/repo-root"; @@ -115,6 +115,65 @@ describe("parent CLI shared teardown completion", () => { expect(outcome.receiptExists).toBe(false); }); + /** + * #4718: a refusal that happens BEFORE anything is restored. + * + * A paginated Codex history store makes the preflight refuse ahead of the config half, + * so every artifact comes back untouched rather than failed. `handleStop` had no branch + * for that shape and fell through to the generic failure, which exited 1 — and the + * updater reads 1 as "the proxy would not stop" and aborts with the service already + * down. The obligation really is still owed, so the receipt has to stay; what was wrong + * was calling it a stop failure. + */ + test("a history-preflight refusal keeps its receipt and reports the deferred code", async () => { + const restore = { + success: false, + message: "Native restore refused: history_paginated_requires_native_writer. Config, catalog, history and provenance were preserved.", + historyPreflightRefusal: "history_paginated_requires_native_writer", + artifacts: { config: { state: "skipped" }, catalog: { state: "skipped" }, history: { state: "skipped" } }, + } as unknown as CodexNativeRestoreResult; + const outcome = await runParentStop({ receipt: true, + response: { success: true, sharedTeardown: "deferred" }, restore }); + // Both halves were attempted; neither was discharged, because neither ran. + expect(outcome.calls).toMatchObject({ killed: 0, native: 1, grok: 1, cleared: 0 }); + expect(outcome.exitCode).toBe(STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE); + // The receipt is the whole point: the client config still points at a proxy that is + // gone, and only this file says so. Discharging it here loses that permanently. + expect(outcome.receiptExists).toBe(true); + }); + + test("an all-skipped restore without the structured refusal stays an ordinary failure", async () => { + // The artifact states alone cannot carry this decision: an ownership refusal and a + // desired-state skip produce the same three "skipped" values. Treating the shape as + // benign would let an update proceed past a teardown nobody classified. + const restore = { + success: false, + message: "Native restore skipped for an unrelated reason.", + artifacts: { config: { state: "skipped" }, catalog: { state: "skipped" }, history: { state: "skipped" } }, + } as unknown as CodexNativeRestoreResult; + const outcome = await runParentStop({ receipt: true, + response: { success: true, sharedTeardown: "deferred" }, restore }); + expect(outcome.exitCode).toBe(1); + expect(outcome.calls).toMatchObject({ native: 1, grok: 1, cleared: 0 }); + expect(outcome.receiptExists).toBe(true); + }); + + test("a refusal that also failed config is a real teardown failure, not a deferral", async () => { + // The structured reason is not a licence on its own. Config is state a client reads, + // so a run that damaged it must keep failing the stop however it got there. + const restore = { + success: false, + message: "Native restore refused: history_paginated_requires_native_writer.", + historyPreflightRefusal: "history_paginated_requires_native_writer", + artifacts: { config: { state: "failed" }, catalog: { state: "skipped" }, history: { state: "skipped" } }, + } as unknown as CodexNativeRestoreResult; + const outcome = await runParentStop({ receipt: true, + response: { success: true, sharedTeardown: "deferred" }, restore }); + expect(outcome.exitCode).toBe(1); + expect(outcome.calls).toMatchObject({ cleared: 0 }); + expect(outcome.receiptExists).toBe(true); + }); + test("a refused stop keeps the parent from restoring or discharging its receipt", async () => { const outcome = await runParentStop({ receipt: true, status: 409, response: { success: false, message: "Run the stop outside the installed service." }, restore: restoreResult(true) }); @@ -473,6 +532,43 @@ describe("pending teardown receipts", () => { expect(readdirSync(home).some(n => n.endsWith(".unreadable.json"))).toBe(true); }); + /** + * #4718: "the only obligations left are the ones I chose to keep". + * + * `ocx stop` makes that claim across a process boundary, and an updater replaces + * package files on the strength of it. Membership is the test rather than a count: + * anything the stop did not name — a quarantined receipt waiting on a human, a + * concurrent stop's claim — has to answer false, or a deliberate deferral turns into a + * blanket exemption for every obligation in the home. + */ + test("an exact-obligation check accepts only the receipts it was given", async () => { + const mod = await import("../../src/config/pending-teardown"); + // Nothing owed matches nothing expected. + expect(mod.pendingTeardownsAreExactly([])).toBe(true); + + const kept = mod.claimPendingTeardown(ENDPOINT, "exact", 1234); + expect(mod.pendingTeardownsAreExactly([kept.nonce])).toBe(true); + // The same receipt, unnamed, is an obligation nobody classified. + expect(mod.pendingTeardownsAreExactly([])).toBe(false); + // A nonce with no file behind it is not proof of anything either. + expect(mod.pendingTeardownsAreExactly([FOREIGN_NONCE])).toBe(false); + + // A second claim this stop never saw — another stop in flight — disqualifies it. + const other = mod.claimPendingTeardown(ENDPOINT, "exact", 1235); + expect(mod.pendingTeardownsAreExactly([kept.nonce])).toBe(false); + expect(mod.pendingTeardownsAreExactly([kept.nonce, other.nonce])).toBe(true); + expect(mod.clearPendingTeardown(other.nonce)).toBe(true); + + // A quarantined receipt is still outstanding and still counts here, which is the + // whole reason this cannot be built on listPendingTeardowns: that listing skips it. + const filed = mod.claimPendingTeardown(ENDPOINT, "exact", 1236); + writeFileSync(mod.pendingTeardownPathFor(filed.nonce), "{not json"); + expect(mod.quarantinePendingTeardown(filed.nonce)).toBeTruthy(); + expect(mod.listPendingTeardowns().map(read => read.state)).not.toContain("invalid"); + expect(mod.pendingTeardownOutstanding()).toBe(true); + expect(mod.pendingTeardownsAreExactly([kept.nonce])).toBe(false); + }); + test("a directory where a receipt belongs is invalid, not missing", async () => { const mod = await import("../../src/config/pending-teardown"); const claimed = mod.claimPendingTeardown(ENDPOINT, "exact", 1234); diff --git a/tests/update/update-stop-classification.test.ts b/tests/update/update-stop-classification.test.ts index 722bf584fe..f14334dff5 100644 --- a/tests/update/update-stop-classification.test.ts +++ b/tests/update/update-stop-classification.test.ts @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { join } from "node:path"; -import { STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE } from "../../src/update/stop-contract.mjs"; +import { STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE, STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE } from "../../src/update/stop-contract.mjs"; import { probeProxyLiveness } from "../../src/update/proxy-liveness-probe.mjs"; import { decidePostStopUpdate } from "../../src/update/stop-decision.mjs"; import { repoRoot as resolveRepoRoot } from "../helpers/repo-root"; @@ -38,6 +38,17 @@ describe("stop failure classification (#3008)", () => { .map(match => Number(match[1])); expect(cliCodes).not.toContain(STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE); expect(dispatchCodes).not.toContain(STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE); + + // #4718 adds a second code, and it has to be distinct from the first as well as from + // everything else. Reusing 79 would tell a caller "teardown ran, only history metadata + // is outstanding" about a stop that restored nothing, and that caller discharges the + // receipt on the strength of it. + expect(STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE).toBe(80); + expect(STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE).not.toBe(STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE); + expect(STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE).toBeGreaterThan(78); + expect(STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE).toBeLessThan(128); + expect(cliCodes).not.toContain(STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE); + expect(dispatchCodes).not.toContain(STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE); }); test("the shared contract is plain ESM so the Node launcher can import it", () => { @@ -45,6 +56,7 @@ describe("stop failure classification (#3008)", () => { // places is how the two ends drift. const contract = read("src/update/stop-contract.mjs"); expect(contract).toContain("export const STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE"); + expect(contract).toContain("export const STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE"); expect(read("bin/ocx.mjs")).toContain("stop-contract.mjs"); expect(read("src/update/index.ts")).toContain("stop-contract.mjs"); }); @@ -229,6 +241,63 @@ describe("stop failure classification (#3008)", () => { .toEqual({ proceed: false, reason: "proxy-unknown" }); }); + /** + * #4718: the same abort, from the opposite direction. + * + * A paginated Codex history store makes the shared teardown refuse before it changes + * anything, so `ocx stop` restores nothing and keeps its receipt. Under #3008 that came + * out as exit 1 and a surviving obligation, which reads identically to a proxy that + * refused to die — so the update aborted with the service already stopped and the old + * package still installed, exactly the shape #3008 was opened about. + * + * The receipt genuinely IS outstanding here, so the fix cannot be "ignore the receipt". + * It is the child saying which obligations it deliberately kept, and that claim only + * buys past the teardown gate — never past runtime records or a proxy that might live. + */ + test("a history-deferred stop proceeds past its own receipt and nothing else", () => { + const dead = { hasRuntimeState: false, liveness: "dead" } as const; + + // The reported case: receipt outstanding because the stop chose to keep it. + expect(decidePostStopUpdate({ status: STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE, teardownOutstanding: true, ...dead })) + .toEqual({ proceed: true, reason: "history-deferred" }); + // And with no receipt at all, which is the same decision for the same reason. + expect(decidePostStopUpdate({ status: STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE, ...dead })) + .toEqual({ proceed: true, reason: "history-deferred" }); + + // It is a distinct reason, not a second spelling of history-only: the two mean + // different things about whether the obligation was discharged. + expect(decidePostStopUpdate({ status: STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE, teardownOutstanding: true, ...dead })) + .toEqual({ proceed: false, reason: "teardown-outstanding" }); + + // Every other gate still stands. Replacing package files under a server that may be + // live is the danger this function exists to prevent, and a history refusal is + // evidence about history — it says nothing about whether the proxy is gone. + expect(decidePostStopUpdate({ status: STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE, hasRuntimeState: true, liveness: "dead" })) + .toEqual({ proceed: false, reason: "runtime-state" }); + expect(decidePostStopUpdate({ status: STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE, hasRuntimeState: false, liveness: "live" })) + .toEqual({ proceed: false, reason: "proxy-live" }); + expect(decidePostStopUpdate({ status: STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE, hasRuntimeState: false, liveness: "unknown" })) + .toEqual({ proceed: false, reason: "proxy-unknown" }); + + // And no neighbouring status inherits the exemption. + for (const status of [1, 2, 4, 64, 78, 81, 130, null]) { + expect(decidePostStopUpdate({ status, teardownOutstanding: true, ...dead })) + .toEqual({ proceed: false, reason: "stop-failed" }); + } + }); + + test("both updater lanes report the deferred teardown as its own outcome", () => { + // The reported #4718 path is the npm launcher. A lane that proceeded without saying + // the teardown is still owed would leave the operator believing the restore happened. + for (const lane of ["src/update/index.ts", "bin/ocx.mjs"]) { + const source = read(lane); + expect(source).toContain('decision.reason === "history-deferred"'); + // Not folded into the manifest warning: that one says history metadata is + // incomplete, which implies config and catalog already came back. + expect(source).toMatch(/restored nothing/); + } + }); + test("both updater lanes call the shared decision", () => { // The reported path is a dashboard npm update through the plain-Node launcher. Fixing // only the Bun updater would leave that lane broken while every focused test went @@ -246,8 +315,13 @@ describe("stop failure classification (#3008)", () => { // Ordinary failure wins: it is the stronger signal. expect(cli).toMatch(/if \(stopFailed\) process\.exitCode = 1;\s*\n\s*else if \(historyOnlyFailure\) process\.exitCode = STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE;/); // The code is set rather than exited inline so the dispatcher still receives the - // return value and decides what happens next. - expect(cli).toMatch(/process\.exitCode = STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE;\s*\n\s*return !stopFailed;/); + // return value and decides what happens next. The deferred code (#4718) sits between + // them and obeys the same rule, so the function still ends by returning. + expect(cli).toMatch(/process\.exitCode = STOP_HISTORY_INCOMPLETE_EXIT_CODE;[\s\S]*?\n\s*return !stopFailed;\n\}/); + // The deferred code never outranks an ordinary failure, and it is only reachable when + // this run can still prove the obligations left behind are the ones it chose to keep. + expect(cli).toMatch(/else if \(historyDeferredNonces\) \{/); + expect(cli).toMatch(/pendingTeardownsAreExactly\(historyDeferredNonces\)\s*\n?\s*\? STOP_HISTORY_DEFERRED_EXIT_CODE\s*\n?\s*: 1;/); // Config and catalog failures are real teardown failures: a client reads those. expect(cli).toMatch(/artifacts\.config\.state === "failed" \|\| artifacts\.catalog\.state === "failed"/); }); From dc6bcdaec78202b6d3bab86dc1c0612d7d002dfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:09:02 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 057/113] fix(tests): refuse removals that reach a protected home (#4705) [skip ci] The destructive-home guard recognised one shape: a single-line rmSync(getConfigDir()) or a const bound from it on one line. A multiline call, a let alias, a helper wrapper, a namespaced fs.rmSync and the sibling resolvers getConfigPath() and usageLogPath() all passed it, so a test could reintroduce the 2026-09-15 incident while CI stayed green. Three parts now hold it shut, because each covers what the others cannot see. src/lib/test-home-guard gains an unconditional removal refusal. It is not gated on the arming variable: Bun resolves bunfig.toml, and with it the preload, from the current working directory, so the run that caused the incident armed nothing. It refuses a protected tree, any path inside one and any ancestor of one, judged on both the canonical and the lexical form -- the canonical form defeats a symlink alias, the lexical one still names the target when the protected path is itself a link. tests/helpers/temp-home is the shared fixture. It pins OPENCODEX_HOME and CODEX_HOME at a directory it created and hands back a handle that owns it, so removeOwnedTree() can refuse a path nobody handed out. Provenance becomes a property rather than a convention each fixture re-implements. tests/helpers/home-destruction-scan replaces the line matcher. It blanks comments and string bodies while keeping template interpolations visible, propagates taint to a fixpoint through bindings and helper returns, and derives its resolver set from src/ so a resolver added tomorrow is covered the day it lands. Two tiers: removing the home root is refused outright, removing a path inside the home is allowed only in a file that created the home it pinned, which is what the seventeen existing fixtures already do. The guard's own tests feed the scanner twenty-one adversarial sources, so an empty offender list is evidence rather than a broken regex. Closes #4705 --- src/lib/test-home-guard.ts | 86 ++++++- tests/ci-workflows/test-home-guard.test.ts | 218 +++++++++++++--- tests/helpers/home-destruction-scan.ts | 283 +++++++++++++++++++++ tests/helpers/remove-tree.ts | 12 +- tests/helpers/temp-home.ts | 123 +++++++++ 5 files changed, 681 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/helpers/home-destruction-scan.ts create mode 100644 tests/helpers/temp-home.ts diff --git a/src/lib/test-home-guard.ts b/src/lib/test-home-guard.ts index 0c1a0ad715..63537742d0 100644 --- a/src/lib/test-home-guard.ts +++ b/src/lib/test-home-guard.ts @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ * how this incident happened. */ import { homedir } from "node:os"; -import { dirname, join, relative, resolve } from "node:path"; +import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from "node:path"; import { realpathSync } from "node:fs"; const GUARD_ENV = "OCX_TEST_HOME_GUARD"; @@ -152,3 +152,87 @@ export function assertNotRealCodexHomeUnderTest(dir: string): void { + "Point CODEX_HOME at a temp directory for this test before writing native auth.json.", ); } + +/** + * The trees a removal must never reach, and the reason each one is named. + * + * The writer guard above cannot help here. `rmSync` is plain `node:fs`: it calls no writer of + * ours, so no assertion of ours runs, and by the time anything could observe the damage the + * directory is already gone. On 2026-09-15 that is exactly what happened — a test resolved the + * process-global config directory and removed it, taking every OAuth login, the Codex account + * store, the service tokens and a 372MB usage ledger with it. + */ +const PROTECTED_TREES: ReadonlyArray<{ path: string; lexical: string; label: string }> = [ + { path: PROTECTED_HOME, lexical: resolve(join(REAL_HOME, ".opencodex")), label: "the real OpenCodex home" }, + { path: PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME, lexical: resolve(join(REAL_HOME, ".codex")), label: "the real Codex home" }, + { + path: PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS, + lexical: resolve(join(REAL_HOME, "Library", "LaunchAgents")), + label: "the real LaunchAgents directory", + }, +]; +const PROTECTED_REAL_HOME = canonicalize(REAL_HOME); +const LEXICAL_REAL_HOME = resolve(REAL_HOME); + +/** Canonical paths whose removal is refused. Exported so the guard's tests cannot drift off them. */ +export function protectedRemovalTreesForTests(): readonly string[] { + return [PROTECTED_REAL_HOME, ...PROTECTED_TREES.map(tree => tree.path)]; +} + +/** Whether `child` sits strictly below `parent`, both already canonicalized. */ +function isInside(parent: string, child: string): boolean { + const rel = relative(parent, child); + return rel !== "" && !rel.startsWith("..") && !isAbsolute(rel); +} + +/** + * Why removing `target` is refused, or `null` when it is not a protected location. + * + * Three relations are refused, not one. Equality alone would still permit + * `rmSync(getConfigPath())` against a live `config.json`, and it would permit + * `rmSync(homedir())`, which takes the protected tree with it. So a target is refused when it + * IS a protected tree, when it sits INSIDE one, or when it is an ANCESTOR of one. + * + * Canonicalization is what makes a symlink useless as a bypass: a temp path that merely points + * at the real home resolves to the real home before any comparison happens. + */ +export function protectedRemovalReason(target: string): string | null { + // Both spellings are judged, not just the canonical one. Canonicalization is what defeats a + // symlink alias, but it also resolves the target away: if `~/.opencodex` is itself a link, + // the literal path a caller passed is the thing that gets unlinked, and only the lexical + // form still names it. Upstream Codex makes the same distinction in its writable-root + // handling, keeping logical and resolved forms side by side rather than collapsing to one. + for (const candidate of [canonicalize(target), resolve(target)]) { + if (candidate === PROTECTED_REAL_HOME || candidate === LEXICAL_REAL_HOME) { + return `the real home directory (${PROTECTED_REAL_HOME})`; + } + for (const tree of PROTECTED_TREES) { + for (const protectedPath of [tree.path, tree.lexical]) { + if (candidate === protectedPath) return `${tree.label} (${protectedPath})`; + if (isInside(protectedPath, candidate)) return `a path inside ${tree.label} (${protectedPath})`; + if (isInside(candidate, protectedPath)) return `an ancestor of ${tree.label} (${protectedPath})`; + } + } + } + return null; +} + +/** + * Throw before a removal that would reach a protected tree. + * + * Deliberately NOT gated on {@link isTestHomeGuardArmed}. Arming happens in `tests/preload.ts`, + * which Bun loads from the `bunfig.toml` it finds in the CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY — so a run + * started outside the repository arms nothing, leaves OPENCODEX_HOME unset, and resolves the + * developer's real home. That unarmed run is precisely the one that caused the incident, so the + * refusal has to hold without it. Nothing in production calls this; the callers are test + * helpers, where the only cost of an unconditional check is a path comparison. + */ +export function assertRemovalOutsideProtectedTrees(target: string): void { + const reason = protectedRemovalReason(target); + if (reason === null) return; + throw new Error( + `refusing to remove ${reason} from a test process: "${target}" resolves there. ` + + "Create the directory this test owns with createTempHome() from tests/helpers/temp-home " + + "and remove that handle instead (see devlog 260730_codex_rs_upstream_v2_live_handoff/070).", + ); +} diff --git a/tests/ci-workflows/test-home-guard.test.ts b/tests/ci-workflows/test-home-guard.test.ts index acc8661c54..aa89f907e7 100644 --- a/tests/ci-workflows/test-home-guard.test.ts +++ b/tests/ci-workflows/test-home-guard.test.ts @@ -12,12 +12,21 @@ import { describe, expect, spyOn, test } from "bun:test"; import { existsSync, mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, statSync, symlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { homedir, tmpdir } from "node:os"; -import { join } from "node:path"; +import { dirname, join } from "node:path"; import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from "node:url"; -import { assertNotRealHomeUnderTest, isTestHomeGuardArmed, protectedHomeForTests } from "../../src/lib/test-home-guard"; +import { + assertNotRealHomeUnderTest, + assertRemovalOutsideProtectedTrees, + isTestHomeGuardArmed, + protectedHomeForTests, + protectedRemovalReason, + protectedRemovalTreesForTests, +} from "../../src/lib/test-home-guard"; import { getConfigDir } from "../../src/config"; +import { findHomeRemovalViolations, homePathResolvers } from "../helpers/home-destruction-scan"; +import { createTempHome, ownedTempRootsForTests, removeOwnedTree } from "../helpers/temp-home"; import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; -import { repoRoot } from "../helpers/repo-root"; +import { repoPath, repoRoot } from "../helpers/repo-root"; import { watchdogMs } from "../helpers/ci-watchdog"; import { captureTestOutput } from "../../scripts/test"; @@ -544,47 +553,178 @@ const canSymlink = (() => { * real ~/.opencodex. On 2026-09-15 a test did exactly that and deleted a live home: every * OAuth login, the Codex account store, the service tokens and a 372MB usage ledger. * - * Nothing runtime can be asserted here — the directory is gone before any guarded call runs - * — so the invariant is asserted on the test sources. A test that needs a config directory - * pins its own OPENCODEX_HOME and names that directory; none may hand the process-global one - * to a destructive fs call. + * Two things hold it shut now, because either alone leaves a hole. The removal refusal in + * src/lib/test-home-guard is unconditional, so it survives the unarmed run above — but it + * only sees removals routed through a helper of ours. The scan below covers the rest: a + * bare rmSync in a test file reaches no code of ours at all, and the directory is gone + * before anything could observe it. */ - test("no test file hands the process-global config directory to a destructive fs call", async () => { - const DESTRUCTIVE = "rmSync|rmdirSync|unlinkSync|renameSync|cpSync"; - const direct = new RegExp("\\b(?:" + DESTRUCTIVE + ")\\(\\s*getConfigDir\\(\\)"); - const bound = new RegExp("\\bconst\\s+([A-Za-z_$][\\w$]*)\\s*=\\s*getConfigDir\\(\\)"); - - // A line that merely NAMES the pattern is not a call: tests/cli/uninstall.test.ts asserts - // the CLI does not contain it, and the oracle at the end of this test is a literal. Both - // carry a quote on the line; a destructive call on a directory variable does not. - const isCode = (line: string): boolean => { - const trimmed = line.trim(); - if (trimmed.startsWith("//") || trimmed.startsWith("*") || trimmed.startsWith("/*")) return false; - return !trimmed.includes('"') && !trimmed.includes("'"); - }; - - const offenders = new Set(); + test("no test file removes a home it did not create", async () => { + // Derived from src/, not listed here. The predecessor scan knew getConfigDir() and nothing + // else, so unlinkSync(getConfigPath()) and rmSync(usageLogPath()) sat outside the guard + // while it reported green. A resolver added tomorrow is covered the day it lands. + const resolvers = homePathResolvers(repoPath("src")); + for (const expected of ["getConfigDir", "getCodexHome", "getConfigPath", "usageLogPath", "getAuthStorePath"]) { + expect(resolvers).toContain(expected); + } + + const offenders: string[] = []; const testsDir = join(repoRoot(), "tests"); for await (const relative of new Bun.Glob("**/*.test.ts").scan({ cwd: testsDir })) { - const lines = (await Bun.file(join(testsDir, relative)).text()).split("\n"); - const names = new Set(); - for (const line of lines) { - const found = bound.exec(line); - if (found) names.add(found[1]); - } - for (const line of lines) { - if (!isCode(line)) continue; - if (direct.test(line)) offenders.add(relative + ": getConfigDir() passed directly"); - for (const name of names) { - const viaName = new RegExp("\\b(?:" + DESTRUCTIVE + ")\\(\\s*" + name + "\\b"); - if (viaName.test(line)) offenders.add(relative + ": config dir removed via " + name); - } + const source = readFileSync(join(testsDir, relative), "utf8"); + for (const site of findHomeRemovalViolations(source, resolvers)) { + offenders.push(relative + ":" + site.line + " " + site.call + "(" + site.argument + ") [" + site.tier + "]"); } } - // The matcher must be able to see the shape it looks for, so an empty result is evidence - // rather than a silently broken regex. - expect(direct.test("rmSync(getConfigDir(), { recursive: true })")).toBe(true); - expect([...offenders].sort()).toEqual([]); + expect(offenders.sort()).toEqual([]); + }); + + /* + * A detector with no adversarial input is indistinguishable from a broken regex, and the + * predecessor was closer to the second than a green suite could show. Every case below is a + * shape it did NOT flag, written the way a test would plausibly spell it. + */ + test("the scan flags the shapes a line matcher misses", () => { + const resolvers = ["getConfigDir", "getCodexHome", "getConfigPath", "usageLogPath"]; + const tiers = (source: string): string[] => + findHomeRemovalViolations(source, resolvers).map(site => site.tier); + + // The one form the predecessor did catch, kept so a rewrite cannot lose it. + expect(tiers("rmSync(getConfigDir(), { recursive: true });")).toEqual(["home-root"]); + // Split across lines: a line-at-a-time matcher returns nothing here. + expect(tiers("rmSync(\n getConfigDir(),\n { recursive: true },\n);")).toEqual(["home-root"]); + // A let alias, which the const-only binding pattern never saw. + expect(tiers("let dir = getConfigDir();\nrmSync(dir);")).toEqual(["home-root"]); + // Routed through a helper, in both the declaration and the arrow spelling. + expect(tiers("function home() { return getConfigDir(); }\nrmSync(home());")).toEqual(["home-root"]); + expect(tiers("const authPath = () => join(getConfigDir(), \"auth.json\");\nunlinkSync(authPath());")).toEqual(["inside-home"]); + // Namespaced, and via the promise API rather than the Sync one. + expect(tiers("fs.rmSync(getConfigDir());")).toEqual(["home-root"]); + expect(tiers("await fsp.rm(getConfigDir(), { recursive: true });")).toEqual(["home-root"]); + // Sibling resolvers: config.json and the usage ledger were both lost in the incident. + expect(tiers("unlinkSync(getConfigPath());")).toEqual(["inside-home"]); + expect(tiers("rmSync(usageLogPath(), { force: true });")).toEqual(["inside-home"]); + // A derived child path, including the template spelling. + expect(tiers("rmSync(join(getConfigDir(), \"auth.json\"));")).toEqual(["inside-home"]); + expect(tiers("rmSync(`${getConfigDir()}/auth.json`);")).toEqual(["inside-home"]); + // A rename is a removal of whatever sat at the source. + expect(tiers("renameSync(usageLogPath(), usageLogPath() + \".old\");")).toEqual(["inside-home"]); + + // The two tiers must stay distinguishable through a binding, because only the root tier + // has no escape hatch. Classifying a bound child path as the root would refuse a pinned + // fixture that legitimately removes one file inside its own temp home. + expect(tiers("const p = join(getConfigDir(), \"auth.json\");\nrmSync(p);")).toEqual(["inside-home"]); + expect(tiers("const p = getConfigDir();\nrmSync(p);")).toEqual(["home-root"]); + expect(tiers("const home = () => getConfigDir();\nrmSync(home());")).toEqual(["home-root"]); + }); + + test("the scan does not flag a mention, a comment, or a fixture that owns its home", () => { + const resolvers = ["getConfigDir", "getConfigPath", "usageLogPath"]; + const violations = (source: string): unknown[] => findHomeRemovalViolations(source, resolvers); + + // tests/cli/uninstall.test.ts asserts the CLI does NOT contain this shape, and the + // adversarial cases above are literals in this very file. Neither is a call. + expect(violations("expect(cli).not.toContain(\"rmSync(getConfigDir()\");")).toEqual([]); + expect(violations("// rmSync(getConfigDir()) would delete the real home\n")).toEqual([]); + expect(violations("/* rmSync(getConfigDir()); */\n")).toEqual([]); + + // A file that creates the home it pins may remove paths inside it: that is ordinary + // fixture hygiene, and seventeen files in this tree do exactly it. + const pinned = "const home = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), \"p-\"));\nprocess.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = home;\nunlinkSync(getConfigPath());"; + expect(violations(pinned)).toEqual([]); + // But not the home ROOT itself, pinned or not: the fixture already holds that handle, so a + // removal routed through the resolver is a removal of whatever home is current. + const pinnedRoot = "const home = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), \"p-\"));\nprocess.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = home;\nrmSync(getConfigDir(), { recursive: true });"; + expect(findHomeRemovalViolations(pinnedRoot, resolvers).map(site => site.tier)).toEqual(["home-root"]); + // Restoring a saved value is not ownership. + const restoring = "process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = previousHome;\nunlinkSync(getConfigPath());"; + expect(findHomeRemovalViolations(restoring, resolvers).map(site => site.tier)).toEqual(["inside-home"]); + }); + + /* + * The runtime half. Every assertion here only produces a string or a throw — nothing in it + * can remove anything — so it is free to name the real protected paths of this process. + */ + test("a removal that reaches a protected tree is refused", () => { + const trees = protectedRemovalTreesForTests(); + expect(trees).toContain(protectedHomeForTests()); + expect(trees.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(4); + + for (const tree of trees) { + // The tree itself. + expect(protectedRemovalReason(tree)).not.toBeNull(); + // An ancestor: removing it takes the protected tree with it. + expect(protectedRemovalReason(dirname(tree))).not.toBeNull(); + } + // A path INSIDE the protected home: config.json and the usage ledger both live there. + expect(protectedRemovalReason(join(protectedHomeForTests(), "config.json"))).not.toBeNull(); + expect(protectedRemovalReason(join(protectedHomeForTests(), "usage", "ledger.jsonl"))).not.toBeNull(); + // And the refusal is not armed-gated: the run that caused the incident armed nothing. + expect(() => assertRemovalOutsideProtectedTrees(protectedHomeForTests())).toThrow("refusing to remove"); + + const ordinary = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-removal-allowed-")); + try { + expect(protectedRemovalReason(ordinary)).toBeNull(); + expect(() => assertRemovalOutsideProtectedTrees(ordinary)).not.toThrow(); + } finally { + removeTreeWithRetry(ordinary); + } + }); + + test.skipIf(!canSymlink)("a symlink pointing at a protected tree is refused through its target", async () => { + const probeId = beginProbe("13-symlink-removal"); + const { realHome, opencodexHome } = sentinelHome(); + const probe = await runProbe(probeId, ` + import { symlinkSync, mkdtempSync } from "node:fs"; + import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; + import { join } from "node:path"; + import { protectedRemovalReason } from "${REPO_ROOT_URL}src/lib/test-home-guard"; + const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-removal-symlink-")); + const alias = join(dir, "looks-harmless"); + symlinkSync(${JSON.stringify(opencodexHome)}, alias); + console.log(JSON.stringify({ + alias: protectedRemovalReason(alias) !== null, + plain: protectedRemovalReason(dir) === null, + })); + `, { OCX_REAL_HOME: realHome, OCX_TEST_HOME_GUARD: "1" }); + + expect(JSON.parse(probe.stdout.trim())).toEqual({ alias: true, plain: true }); + }); + + test("removeTreeWithRetry refuses a protected tree before it calls through", () => { + const attempted: string[] = []; + expect(() => removeTreeWithRetry(protectedHomeForTests(), { remove: path => { attempted.push(path); } })) + .toThrow("refusing to remove"); + // The injected remover proves the refusal happens BEFORE the filesystem call, which is the + // only ordering that helps: a check after the fact has nothing left to protect. + expect(attempted).toEqual([]); + }); + + test("the temp-home fixture owns exactly what it removes", () => { + const before = ownedTempRootsForTests().length; + const home = createTempHome("ocx-guard-fixture-"); + try { + expect(process.env["OPENCODEX_HOME"]).toBe(home.root); + expect(getConfigDir()).toBe(home.root); + expect(getConfigDir()).not.toBe(protectedHomeForTests()); + expect(ownedTempRootsForTests()).toContain(home.root); + + writeFileSync(home.path("owned.json"), "{}", "utf8"); + expect(() => removeOwnedTree(home.path("owned.json"))).not.toThrow(); + + // A path nobody handed out is refused, which is the whole point of the handle: a bare + // path carries no record of who created it, and that is what the call site got wrong. + const foreign = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-guard-foreign-")); + try { + expect(() => removeOwnedTree(foreign)).toThrow("no temp home owns it"); + } finally { + removeTreeWithRetry(foreign); + } + } finally { + home.remove(); + } + expect(ownedTempRootsForTests().length).toBe(before); + expect(getConfigDir()).not.toBe(protectedHomeForTests()); }); }); diff --git a/tests/helpers/home-destruction-scan.ts b/tests/helpers/home-destruction-scan.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3c17fdbb72 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/helpers/home-destruction-scan.ts @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +/** + * The source oracle behind "no test removes a path it did not create". + * + * The runtime refusal in `src/lib/test-home-guard` only sees removals that reach a helper of + * ours. A bare `rmSync` in a test file reaches nothing, and by the time the damage is + * observable the directory is gone — which is how a live home, every OAuth login and a 372MB + * usage ledger were lost on 2026-09-15. So the second half of the guard is a scan of the test + * SOURCES, and this module is that scan. + * + * It is a helper rather than a block inside the guard test for one reason: a detector with no + * adversarial inputs is indistinguishable from a broken regex. Exporting a pure function over + * source TEXT lets the guard feed it the shapes the previous line-matcher missed — multiline + * calls, `let` aliases, helper wrappers, namespaced `fs.rmSync` — and prove each one is caught. + */ +import { readdirSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { join } from "node:path"; + +/** + * The resolvers that hand out the HOME ITSELF. Removing one of these is never a test's + * business: the fixture that created a directory already holds its own handle to it, so a + * removal routed through a resolver is by construction a removal of whatever home the + * process happens to be pointed at. + */ +export const HOME_ROOT_RESOLVERS = ["getConfigDir", "getCodexHome"] as const; + +/** Removals, renames and overwrites. A rename is a removal of whatever sat at the source. */ +export const DESTRUCTIVE_CALLS = [ + "rmSync", "rmdirSync", "unlinkSync", "renameSync", "cpSync", "truncateSync", + "rm", "rmdir", "unlink", "rename", "cp", "truncate", + "removeTreeWithRetry", +] as const; + +export type HomeRemovalTier = "home-root" | "inside-home"; + +export type HomeRemovalSite = Readonly<{ + line: number; + call: string; + argument: string; + tier: HomeRemovalTier; +}>; + +/** + * Blank comments and string BODIES while preserving offsets, newlines and interpolated code. + * + * The predecessor scan approximated this by discarding any line containing a quote. That is + * why `rmSync(join(home, "config.json"))` was invisible to it, and why a name mentioned in a + * comment could still seed its alias set. Template interpolations stay visible on purpose: the + * code inside `${...}` is code, and a removal spelled with one must not become a blind spot. + */ +export function blankCommentsAndStrings(source: string): string { + const out: string[] = []; + const modes: Array<"code" | "template"> = ["code"]; + const braces: number[] = [0]; + const blank = (ch: string): void => { out.push(ch === "\n" ? "\n" : " "); }; + let i = 0; + while (i < source.length) { + const ch = source[i]!; + const next = source[i + 1]; + if (modes[modes.length - 1] === "template") { + if (ch === "\\") { blank(ch); blank(next ?? " "); i += 2; continue; } + if (ch === "`") { modes.pop(); braces.pop(); out.push(ch); i += 1; continue; } + if (ch === "$" && next === "{") { modes.push("code"); braces.push(0); out.push(ch); out.push(next); i += 2; continue; } + blank(ch); i += 1; continue; + } + if (ch === "/" && next === "/") { while (i < source.length && source[i] !== "\n") { blank(source[i]!); i += 1; } continue; } + if (ch === "/" && next === "*") { + blank(ch); blank(next); i += 2; + while (i < source.length && !(source[i] === "*" && source[i + 1] === "/")) { blank(source[i]!); i += 1; } + if (i < source.length) { blank("*"); blank("/"); i += 2; } + continue; + } + if (ch === "\"" || ch === "'") { + out.push(ch); i += 1; + while (i < source.length) { + if (source[i] === "\\") { blank(source[i]!); blank(source[i + 1] ?? " "); i += 2; continue; } + if (source[i] === ch) { out.push(source[i]!); i += 1; break; } + blank(source[i]!); i += 1; + } + continue; + } + if (ch === "`") { modes.push("template"); braces.push(0); out.push(ch); i += 1; continue; } + if (ch === "{") { braces[braces.length - 1]! += 1; out.push(ch); i += 1; continue; } + if (ch === "}") { + if (braces[braces.length - 1] === 0 && modes.length > 1) { modes.pop(); braces.pop(); out.push(ch); i += 1; continue; } + braces[braces.length - 1]! -= 1; out.push(ch); i += 1; continue; + } + out.push(ch); i += 1; + } + return out.join(""); +} + +/** + * Every exported resolver that hands out a path inside the process-global home. + * + * Derived from `src/` rather than listed here, because a hand-written list is exactly what + * went stale: the predecessor knew about `getConfigDir()` and nothing else, so + * `unlinkSync(getConfigPath())` and `rmSync(usageLogPath())` were outside the guard while the + * suite reported it green. A resolver added tomorrow is covered the day it lands. + * + * Only ZERO-ARGUMENT invocations are treated as home-derived at the call sites below. A + * resolver that takes a path — `historyBackupPathFor(dbPath)`, `pendingTeardownPathFor(nonce)` + * — derives from its argument, and a test that passes it a temp path is removing a temp path. + */ +export function homePathResolvers(srcDir: string): string[] { + const found = new Set(HOME_ROOT_RESOLVERS); + const declaration = /export function ([A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)\s*\([^)]*\)\s*:\s*string\s*\{/g; + for (const file of typescriptFiles(srcDir)) { + const source = blankCommentsAndStrings(readFileSync(file, "utf8")); + declaration.lastIndex = 0; + let match: RegExpExecArray | null; + while ((match = declaration.exec(source)) !== null) { + const body = braceBody(source, source.indexOf("{", match.index + match[0].length - 1)); + if (derivesFromHome(body)) found.add(match[1]!); + } + } + return [...found].sort(); +} + +function derivesFromHome(body: string): boolean { + return /join\(\s*get(?:ConfigDir|CodexHome)\(\)/.test(body) + || /return\s+get(?:ConfigDir|CodexHome)\(\)/.test(body) + || /\?\?\s*get(?:ConfigDir|CodexHome)\(\)/.test(body); +} + +function braceBody(source: string, open: number): string { + if (open < 0) return ""; + let depth = 0; + for (let i = open; i < source.length; i += 1) { + if (source[i] === "{") depth += 1; + else if (source[i] === "}") { depth -= 1; if (depth === 0) return source.slice(open, i); } + } + return source.slice(open); +} + +function typescriptFiles(dir: string, out: string[] = []): string[] { + for (const entry of readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) { + const full = join(dir, entry.name); + if (entry.isDirectory()) { if (entry.name !== "node_modules") typescriptFiles(full, out); } + else if (entry.name.endsWith(".ts")) out.push(full); + } + return out; +} + +/** + * Whether this source creates the home it pins. + * + * Not "does it mention OPENCODEX_HOME": restoring a saved value is not ownership. The pin has + * to receive a directory the file itself made, which is the property that makes a later + * removal safe under the unpinned, unarmed invocation that caused the incident. + */ +export function pinsItsOwnHome(source: string): boolean { + const code = blankCommentsAndStrings(source); + const created = new Set(); + collect(code, /(?:const|let|var)?\s*([A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)\s*(?::[^=;\n]+)?=\s*mkdtempSync\s*\(/g, created); + collect(code, /mkdirSync\s*\(\s*([A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)\b/g, created); + const assignment = /process\.env\s*(?:\.\s*|\[\s*["']\s*)(?:OPENCODEX_HOME|CODEX_HOME)\s*["']?\s*\]?\s*=\s*([^;\n]+)/g; + let match: RegExpExecArray | null; + while ((match = assignment.exec(code)) !== null) { + const value = match[1]!; + if (/mkdtempSync|createTempHome/.test(value)) return true; + if ([...created].some(name => new RegExp("\\b" + name + "\\b").test(value))) return true; + } + return /createTempHome\s*\(/.test(code); +} + +function collect(code: string, pattern: RegExp, into: Set): void { + let match: RegExpExecArray | null; + while ((match = pattern.exec(code)) !== null) into.add(match[1]!); +} + +/** + * Destructive call sites whose target derives from a home resolver. + * + * Taint propagates to a fixpoint through `const`/`let`/`var` bindings, reassignments, and + * named functions that return a tainted expression — so an alias, a `join(dir, "x")` and a + * one-line `authPath()` helper are all reachable, which they were not before. The type + * annotation in a binding is bounded to its own LINE on purpose: an unbounded `[^=;]+` walks + * past the newline and binds the wrong identifier, which silently hid a real call site while + * this scan was being written. + */ +export function findHomeRemovalSites(source: string, resolvers: readonly string[]): HomeRemovalSite[] { + const code = blankCommentsAndStrings(source); + const anyResolver = zeroArgCall(resolvers); + const rootResolver = zeroArgCall(HOME_ROOT_RESOLVERS); + const tainted = new Set(); + const rootTainted = new Set(); + for (let pass = 0; pass < 6; pass += 1) { + const before = tainted.size + rootTainted.size; + const binding = /(?:const|let|var)\s+([A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)\s*(?::[^=;\n]+)?=\s*([^;\n]+)/g; + let match: RegExpExecArray | null; + while ((match = binding.exec(code)) !== null) { + const name = match[1]!; + const value = match[2]!; + if (anyResolver.test(value) || namesAnyOf(value, tainted)) tainted.add(name); + // Root taint needs the value to BE the root, not merely to contain it. A + // `join(getConfigDir(), "auth.json")` binding is a path inside the home, and treating it + // as the home itself would refuse a pinned fixture that legitimately removes one file. + if (isBareHomeRoot(value) || isExactly(value, rootTainted)) rootTainted.add(name); + } + const declaration = /function\s+([A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)\s*\(/g; + while ((match = declaration.exec(code)) !== null) { + const body = braceBody(code, code.indexOf("{", match.index)); + if (!body.includes("return")) continue; + if (anyResolver.test(body) || namesAnyOf(body, tainted)) tainted.add(match[1]!); + if (returnsBareHomeRoot(body)) rootTainted.add(match[1]!); + } + if (tainted.size + rootTainted.size === before) break; + } + const sites: HomeRemovalSite[] = []; + const call = new RegExp("(?:\\b|\\.)(" + DESTRUCTIVE_CALLS.join("|") + ")\\s*\\(", "g"); + let match: RegExpExecArray | null; + while ((match = call.exec(code)) !== null) { + const argument = firstArgument(code, match.index + match[0].length - 1); + if (!anyResolver.test(argument) && !namesAnyOf(argument, tainted)) continue; + const tier: HomeRemovalTier = rootResolver.test(argument.trim()) && isBareCall(argument) + ? "home-root" + : isExactly(argument, rootTainted) || callsAnyOf(argument, rootTainted) ? "home-root" : "inside-home"; + sites.push({ + line: code.slice(0, match.index).split("\n").length, + call: match[1]!, + argument: argument.trim(), + tier, + }); + } + return sites; +} + +/** + * The sites a test file may not contain. + * + * Two tiers, because they fail differently. Removing the home ROOT is refused outright: no + * pin makes `rmSync(getConfigDir())` a reasonable thing for a test to contain, and the + * fixture hands back its own root for exactly that case. Removing a path INSIDE the home is + * ordinary fixture hygiene — 17 files do it today — but only in a file that created the home + * it is pointed at, which is the difference between a temp file and the user's config.json. + */ +export function findHomeRemovalViolations(source: string, resolvers: readonly string[]): HomeRemovalSite[] { + const owns = pinsItsOwnHome(source); + return findHomeRemovalSites(source, resolvers).filter(site => site.tier === "home-root" || !owns); +} + +function zeroArgCall(names: readonly string[]): RegExp { + return new RegExp("\\b(?:" + names.join("|") + ")\\s*\\(\\s*\\)"); +} + +function isBareCall(argument: string): boolean { + return new RegExp("^\\s*(?:" + HOME_ROOT_RESOLVERS.join("|") + ")\\s*\\(\\s*\\)\\s*$").test(argument); +} + +/** A value that IS the home root: the bare resolver call, or a thunk returning nothing else. */ +function isBareHomeRoot(value: string): boolean { + const root = HOME_ROOT_RESOLVERS.join("|"); + return new RegExp("^\\s*(?:\\([^)]*\\)\\s*(?::[^=]+)?=>\\s*)?(?:" + root + ")\\s*\\(\\s*\\)\\s*;?\\s*$").test(value); +} + +function returnsBareHomeRoot(body: string): boolean { + return new RegExp("return\\s+(?:" + HOME_ROOT_RESOLVERS.join("|") + ")\\s*\\(\\s*\\)\\s*;").test(body); +} + +function callsAnyOf(text: string, names: ReadonlySet): boolean { + return [...names].some(name => new RegExp("^\\s*" + name + "\\s*\\(\\s*\\)\\s*$").test(text)); +} + +function namesAnyOf(text: string, names: ReadonlySet): boolean { + return [...names].some(name => new RegExp("\\b" + name + "\\b").test(text)); +} + +function isExactly(text: string, names: ReadonlySet): boolean { + return [...names].some(name => new RegExp("^\\s*" + name + "\\s*$").test(text)); +} + +/** The first argument of a call, brace/paren balanced so a multiline expression stays whole. */ +function firstArgument(code: string, openParen: number): string { + let depth = 0; + let start = -1; + for (let i = openParen; i < code.length; i += 1) { + const ch = code[i]!; + if (ch === "(" || ch === "[" || ch === "{") { depth += 1; if (depth === 1 && ch === "(") start = i + 1; continue; } + if (ch === ")" || ch === "]" || ch === "}") { depth -= 1; if (depth === 0) return code.slice(start, i); continue; } + if (depth === 1 && ch === ",") return code.slice(start, i); + } + return ""; +} diff --git a/tests/helpers/remove-tree.ts b/tests/helpers/remove-tree.ts index 53e36a584c..ae0068a15f 100644 --- a/tests/helpers/remove-tree.ts +++ b/tests/helpers/remove-tree.ts @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ import { rmSync } from "node:fs"; +import { assertRemovalOutsideProtectedTrees } from "../../src/lib/test-home-guard"; const TRANSIENT_REMOVE_CODES = new Set(["EPERM", "EBUSY", "ENOTEMPTY"]); const REMOVE_ATTEMPTS = 50; @@ -9,11 +10,20 @@ type RemoveTreeWithRetryOptions = Readonly<{ sleep?: (milliseconds: number) => void; }>; -/** Retry only Windows filesystem-release races; preserve every other cleanup failure. */ +/** + * Retry only Windows filesystem-release races; preserve every other cleanup failure. + * + * The refusal comes FIRST, before the injected `remove` can run, because this helper is the + * one removal path the whole suite shares: a fixture that resolves the process-global config + * directory and hands it here would otherwise delete the developer's real home on any run that + * never pinned OPENCODEX_HOME. The check is a path comparison against three canonical trees, + * so it costs nothing for the temp directories every caller actually passes. + */ export function removeTreeWithRetry( path: string, options: RemoveTreeWithRetryOptions = {}, ): void { + assertRemovalOutsideProtectedTrees(path); const remove = options.remove ?? (target => rmSync(target, { recursive: true, force: true })); const sleep = options.sleep ?? Bun.sleepSync; diff --git a/tests/helpers/temp-home.ts b/tests/helpers/temp-home.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6f1118ac8d --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/helpers/temp-home.ts @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +/** + * The one place a test gets a home directory it is allowed to destroy. + * + * Every destructive fixture in this suite used to open-code the same four steps: save the + * previous OPENCODEX_HOME, mkdtemp a directory, point the environment at it, and remove it + * again in `afterEach`. Open-coding is how the step that matters goes missing — a test that + * skipped the pin resolved the developer's real `~/.opencodex` and removed it, taking every + * OAuth login, the Codex account store, the service tokens and a 372MB usage ledger + * (devlog `_fin/260730_codex_rs_upstream_v2_live_handoff/070`). + * + * So the handle this returns carries OWNERSHIP, not just a path. {@link removeOwnedTree} + * refuses anything this module did not hand out, which makes "delete only what you created" + * a checkable property rather than a convention each fixture re-implements. + */ +import { mkdtempSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs"; +import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; +import { isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from "node:path"; +import { assertRemovalOutsideProtectedTrees } from "../../src/lib/test-home-guard"; +import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "./remove-tree"; + +/** Canonical roots this module created and has not yet released. */ +const ownedRoots = new Set(); + +export type TempHome = Readonly<{ + /** The directory this fixture created. The only tree it is allowed to remove. */ + root: string; + /** The value OPENCODEX_HOME was pinned to. Identical to {@link TempHome.root}. */ + configDir: string; + /** The value CODEX_HOME was pinned to, for tests that touch native Codex state. */ + codexHome: string; + /** An owned path under the fixture root, for files a test wants to create and remove. */ + path: (...segments: string[]) => string; + /** Remove the owned tree and restore both environment variables. Idempotent. */ + remove: () => void; +}>; + +/** The live owned roots, so the guard's own tests can assert registration rather than infer it. */ +export function ownedTempRootsForTests(): readonly string[] { + return [...ownedRoots]; +} + +/** + * Remove a path this module handed out. + * + * The ownership check is the point. A bare `rmSync(someDirectory)` is correct or catastrophic + * depending only on where `someDirectory` came from, and nothing at the call site records that. + * Routing removals through here makes the provenance explicit: an unowned path is refused + * before any filesystem call, and a protected tree is refused twice over. + */ +export function removeOwnedTree(target: string): void { + assertRemovalOutsideProtectedTrees(target); + const canonical = canonicalizeExisting(target); + const owner = [...ownedRoots].find(root => root === canonical || isInside(root, canonical)); + if (owner === undefined) { + throw new Error( + `refusing to remove "${target}": no temp home owns it. Create the directory with ` + + "createTempHome() from tests/helpers/temp-home and remove the handle it returns.", + ); + } + removeTreeWithRetry(target); +} + +/** + * Create a temp home, pin OPENCODEX_HOME and CODEX_HOME at it, and return an owned handle. + * + * Both variables are pinned, not one. A test that pins only OPENCODEX_HOME still resolves + * `~/.codex` for native credential paths, and the writer guard would then be the only thing + * standing between that test and the user's real Codex home. + */ +export function createTempHome(prefix = "ocx-temp-home-"): TempHome { + const root = realpathSync.native(mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), prefix))); + // Refuse before anything is registered: a `TMPDIR` pointed inside the real home would + // otherwise produce an "owned" root whose removal walks into protected state. + assertRemovalOutsideProtectedTrees(root); + ownedRoots.add(root); + + const previousConfigHome = process.env["OPENCODEX_HOME"]; + const previousCodexHome = process.env["CODEX_HOME"]; + const codexHome = join(root, ".codex"); + process.env["OPENCODEX_HOME"] = root; + process.env["CODEX_HOME"] = codexHome; + + let removed = false; + return { + root, + configDir: root, + codexHome, + path: (...segments: string[]) => join(root, ...segments), + remove: () => { + if (removed) return; + removed = true; + try { + removeTreeWithRetry(root); + } finally { + ownedRoots.delete(root); + restore("OPENCODEX_HOME", previousConfigHome); + restore("CODEX_HOME", previousCodexHome); + } + }, + }; +} + +function restore(name: string, previous: string | undefined): void { + if (previous === undefined) delete process.env[name]; + else process.env[name] = previous; +} + +/** Resolve symlinks through the nearest existing ancestor, matching the removal guard. */ +function canonicalizeExisting(target: string): string { + const absolute = resolve(target); + try { + return realpathSync.native(absolute); + } catch { + const parent = resolve(absolute, ".."); + if (parent === absolute) return absolute; + return join(canonicalizeExisting(parent), absolute.slice(parent.length + 1)); + } +} + +function isInside(parent: string, child: string): boolean { + const rel = relative(parent, child); + return rel !== "" && !rel.startsWith("..") && !isAbsolute(rel); +} From af708f462801a2428c05be6e71f054b711ef9728 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:09:46 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 058/113] test(combos): pin the upstream context_length_exceeded terminal shape [skip ci] Upstream Codex classifies a streamed context overflow on one exact token: `is_context_window_error` matches `error.code == "context_length_exceeded"` on a `response.failed` event, and its own fixture pairs that code with the message the other assertions here already use. The proxy relays the nested terminal error verbatim, so the same overflow reaches the classifier either with that structured code or, when a transport rewrites the envelope, as a generic upstream_server_error. Pin both to the same verdict so a future narrowing cannot quietly drop the shape the real upstream sends. Co-authored-by: RHODIZ IT --- tests/routing/router-combo-failover-classification.test.ts | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/routing/router-combo-failover-classification.test.ts b/tests/routing/router-combo-failover-classification.test.ts index 46616ca5ac..0704dc30f2 100644 --- a/tests/routing/router-combo-failover-classification.test.ts +++ b/tests/routing/router-combo-failover-classification.test.ts @@ -274,6 +274,10 @@ describe("definite upstream context overflow", () => { // The combo stream preflight only synthesizes this envelope for a terminal that committed // no output, so the hop can never duplicate text the client already saw. expect(comboFailureDecision(502, failedTerminal(prose), { code: "upstream_server_error" })).toBe("hop"); + // The shape upstream Codex actually emits: a `response.failed` whose error carries the exact + // `context_length_exceeded` code alongside this message. The proxy relays the nested error + // verbatim, so both the structured and the generic-wrapper form must reach the same verdict. + expect(comboFailureDecision(502, failedTerminal(prose), { code: "context_length_exceeded" })).toBe("hop"); expect(comboFailureDecision(400, "context length exceeded", { code: "context_length_exceeded" })).toBe("hop"); expect(comboFailureDecision(400, `Provider error 400: ${prose}`)).toBe("hop"); }); From 52ec0a5e76a751769095589d78f157bbd2dd7d1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:13:30 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 059/113] fix(service): decode schtasks output with the Windows text decoder (#4691) [skip ci] On a zh-CN host (ACP/OEMCP 936) with a CJK account name, "ocx service repair" and the dashboard repair/install buttons failed against a registration OpenCodex had created itself: Service repair failed: Task Scheduler registration is not a recognized legacy OpenCodex definition; it was preserved for manual review. Redirected "schtasks /query /xml" output follows the console output code page of the spawning process tree, not the XML document encoding. In any 936 context -- including the no-console background service on a zh-CN host -- the bytes are GBK. decodeSchtasksOutput probed UTF-16 and then fell back to a plain UTF-8 decode, so the CJK account name inside became U+FFFD. The correctly resolved expected identity [SID, MACHINE\] then never matched the trigger scope, windowsTaskRegistrationHealthy returned false, and repair aborted at its recognition gate. The same mojibake rolled back fresh installs at post-create verification. The fix is entirely in byte decoding, before any XML is parsed. decodeSchtasksOutput now delegates to decodeWindowsTextBytes, the decoder this project already built for exactly this class (UTF-16, then strict UTF-8, then the locale's legacy code page). It already fixed the sibling whoami/PowerShell decode in src/lib/windows-user-principal.ts (#2914, and #722 for CP949); this call site was the last one still ending in a lossy UTF-8 decode. Task ownership is deliberately untouched. windowsTaskTriggerScopeAcceptable still requires an exact identity match, and the tests assert that a different account and the mojibake spelling are both still rejected. Forgiving a replacement character there would let two different non-ASCII accounts collapse to the same value, which is worse than the refusal it replaces. Delegating also fixes a latent UTF-16BE edge: the old local copy allocated buffer.length - 2 bytes for an odd-length payload and left a trailing uninitialized byte. The shared decoder rounds the payload down instead. Closes #4691 --- src/service/windows-scheduler.ts | 49 ++++++------ ...ows-scheduler-install-verification.test.ts | 74 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/service/windows-scheduler.ts b/src/service/windows-scheduler.ts index 0f1719aa63..5e460d1857 100644 --- a/src/service/windows-scheduler.ts +++ b/src/service/windows-scheduler.ts @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { join, resolve } from "node:path"; import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; import { ELEVATION_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS, OCX_ELEVATED_PROTOCOL_FAILED, raceWithTimeout, resolveTrustedWindowsSchtasksExe, startElevatedSchtasksCreateAndRun, runWindowsElevated, toWindowsSchtasksError, WindowsElevationError, type ElevatedSchedulerOutcome, type ElevatedSchtasksCreateAndRunExecution, type ElevatedSchtasksCreateAndRunResult } from "../lib/windows-elevation"; import { statusWinswRaw } from "../lib/winsw"; +import { decodeWindowsTextBytes, type WindowsTextDecodeOptions } from "../lib/windows-text"; import { isTestHomeGuardArmed } from "../lib/test-home-guard"; import { TASK, windowsServiceScriptPath, windowsLauncherVbsPath, windowsTaskXmlPath, writeServiceInstallState } from "./state"; import { buildWindowsSchtasksCreateArgs, windowsTaskRegistrationOwnedByAttempt, windowsTaskRegistrationHealthy } from "./windows-taskxml"; @@ -16,28 +17,34 @@ import { WINSW_SERVICE_ID } from "../lib/winsw"; * Decode schtasks stdout. `/query /xml` emits UTF-16LE (often with BOM) because the * registered task document is UTF-16; reading that as UTF-8 makes every health check * fail ("registration present but unhealthy") and rolls back a successful elevated create. + * + * Redirected output is NOT always UTF-16. Its encoding follows the console output code + * page of the spawning process tree rather than the XML declaration, so on a zh-CN host + * (ACP/OEMCP 936) the bytes are GBK — including inside a no-console background service. +* Decoding those as UTF-8 turned a CJK account name in + * `` into U+FFFD, the trigger scope then failed to + * match the correctly resolved `[SID, MACHINE\]`, and `ocx service repair` +* aborted at its recognition gate on a registration OpenCodex had itself created. The + * same mojibake rolled back fresh installs at post-create verification (#4691). + * + * The fix is entirely in byte decoding, before any XML is parsed. The trigger scope stays + * an exact identity comparison: forgiving a replacement character there would let two + * different non-ASCII accounts collapse to the same value, which is a worse failure than + * the refusal it replaces. + * + * `decodeWindowsTextBytes` is the decoder this project already built for this class + * (UTF-16 -> strict UTF-8 -> the locale's legacy code page), and it already fixed the + * sibling `whoami`/PowerShell decode in `src/lib/windows-user-principal.ts` (#2914, and + * #722 for CP949). This call site was the last one still ending in a lossy UTF-8 decode. */ -export function decodeSchtasksOutput(buffer: Buffer): string { - if (buffer.length === 0) return ""; - const bomUtf16Le = buffer.length >= 2 && buffer[0] === 0xff && buffer[1] === 0xfe; - const bomUtf16Be = buffer.length >= 2 && buffer[0] === 0xfe && buffer[1] === 0xff; - const looksUtf16Le = buffer.length >= 4 - && buffer[1] === 0x00 - && buffer[3] === 0x00 - && buffer[0] !== 0x00; - if (bomUtf16Le || looksUtf16Le) { - return buffer.toString("utf16le").replace(/^\uFEFF/, "").trim(); - } - if (bomUtf16Be) { - // Swap pairs then decode as utf16le. - const swapped = Buffer.alloc(buffer.length - 2); - for (let i = 2; i + 1 < buffer.length; i += 2) { - swapped[i - 2] = buffer[i + 1]!; - swapped[i - 1] = buffer[i]!; - } - return swapped.toString("utf16le").trim(); - } - return buffer.toString("utf8").replace(/^\uFEFF/, "").trim(); +export function decodeSchtasksOutput( + buffer: Buffer, + options: WindowsTextDecodeOptions = {}, +): string { + // `options` exists so a test can pin the code page; every production call passes the + // buffer alone and uses the active Intl locale, which is available to a service with no + // console because the selection reads the process locale rather than a console handle. + return decodeWindowsTextBytes(buffer, options); } function runFile(file: string, args: string[]): string { diff --git a/tests/windows/windows-scheduler-install-verification.test.ts b/tests/windows/windows-scheduler-install-verification.test.ts index cc27196211..8b8e5440de 100644 --- a/tests/windows/windows-scheduler-install-verification.test.ts +++ b/tests/windows/windows-scheduler-install-verification.test.ts @@ -49,6 +49,80 @@ describe("decodeSchtasksOutput", () => { const text = "Folder: \\\nTaskName: opencodex-proxy"; expect(decodeSchtasksOutput(Buffer.from(text, "utf8"))).toBe(text); }); + + /** + * #4691: redirected "schtasks /query /xml" follows the console output code page of the + * spawning process tree, not the XML declaration. On a zh-CN host (ACP/OEMCP 936) those + * bytes are GBK, and the old UTF-8 fallback turned a CJK account name into U+FFFD. The + * trigger scope then stopped matching the correctly resolved [SID, MACHINE\], so + * "ocx service repair" refused a registration OpenCodex had created itself, and fresh + * installs rolled back at post-create verification. + */ + test("decodes GBK schtasks XML so a CJK account name still matches its trigger scope", () => { + const wscript = "C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\wscript.exe"; + const launcher = "C:\\Users\\x\\.opencodex\\opencodex-service-launcher.vbs"; + // Task Scheduler canonicalizes a SID-scoped trigger back to the account name on + // export, which is why the identity reaching the decoder is non-ASCII at all. + const account = "MACHINE\\张三"; + const xml = buildWindowsTaskXml( + "C:\\Users\\x\\.opencodex\\opencodex-service.cmd", + launcher, + undefined, + account, + ).replace(/.*?<\/Command>/, "" + wscript + ""); + + // Literal CP936 bytes, for the same reason tests/windows/windows-text-decoding.test.ts + // uses literal hex: encoding the fixture with the decoder under test would assert + // nothing. 0xD5C5 0xC8FD is the account name on code page 936, and it is not valid + // UTF-8 — which is why the old fallback was lossy rather than merely wrong. + const cp936 = new Map([["张", [0xd5, 0xc5]], ["三", [0xc8, 0xfd]]]); + const bytes = Buffer.concat([...xml].map(ch => { + const legacy = cp936.get(ch); + if (legacy) return Buffer.from(legacy); + if (ch.codePointAt(0)! > 0x7f) throw new Error("fixture has no CP936 bytes for " + ch); + return Buffer.from(ch, "ascii"); + })); + + const decoded = decodeSchtasksOutput(bytes, { locale: "zh-CN" }); + expect(decoded).toContain("" + account + ""); + expect(decoded).not.toContain("\uFFFD"); + expect(windowsTaskRegistrationHealthy(decoded, wscript, launcher, [TEST_WINDOWS_TASK_SID, account])).toBe(true); + + // The regression itself: the historical decode mangles the name, and the scope check + // then fails — the "not a recognized legacy OpenCodex definition" refusal. + const mojibake = bytes.toString("utf8"); + expect(mojibake).toContain("\uFFFD"); + expect(windowsTaskRegistrationHealthy(mojibake, wscript, launcher, [TEST_WINDOWS_TASK_SID, account])).toBe(false); + + // Decoding correctly does not relax ownership. A different account is still rejected, + // and the mojibake spelling is not accepted as an identity of its own — forgiving it + // would let two different non-ASCII accounts collapse to the same value. + expect(windowsTaskRegistrationHealthy(decoded, wscript, launcher, [TEST_WINDOWS_TASK_SID, "MACHINE\\someone-else"])).toBe(false); + expect(windowsTaskRegistrationHealthy(decoded, wscript, launcher, ["MACHINE\\\uFFFD\uFFFD"])).toBe(false); + }); + + test("a UTF-8 task document is not mistaken for the legacy code page", () => { + // The strict UTF-8 attempt runs before any code-page guess, so a CP 65001 console on + // the same zh-CN host still decodes correctly. #4106 was closed as not-planned because + // that reporter's console was 65001; this pins that the fix leaves that case alone. + const utf8Xml = "MACHINE\\张三"; + expect(decodeSchtasksOutput(Buffer.from(utf8Xml, "utf8"), { locale: "zh-CN" })).toBe(utf8Xml); + }); + + test("delegating the decode leaves the UTF-16 paths intact", () => { + const text = "Folder: \\\nTaskName: opencodex-proxy"; + // UTF-16LE with and without a BOM, and UTF-16BE, all still round-trip: that is what + // "schtasks /query /xml" emits on an ordinary host and the reason this decoder exists. + expect(decodeSchtasksOutput(Buffer.from("\uFEFF" + text, "utf16le"))).toBe(text); + expect(decodeSchtasksOutput(Buffer.from(text, "utf16le"))).toBe(text); + const be = Buffer.from("\uFEFF" + text, "utf16le"); + for (let i = 0; i + 1 < be.length; i += 2) { + const low = be[i]!; + be[i] = be[i + 1]!; + be[i + 1] = low; + } + expect(decodeSchtasksOutput(be)).toBe(text); + }); }); describe("windowsSchedulerCsvIncludesTask", () => { From bc648a2f848ec9d6a55e5f8b16d5d3e36b1e0b35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:14:02 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 060/113] fix(combos): reserve output headroom before a combo fallback (#4664) [skip ci] A combo could route a large turn onto a fallback whose total context window cannot hold the input plus the output allowance the caller asked for. That target answers 200, emits a few hundred tokens and stops on finish_reason: length, which the Anthropic surface renders as "response exceeded the output token maximum" naming a limit the model never approached. Raising CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS only changes the number in that message. By the time it happens, output has committed and no later target may be tried. Admit a combo child against both budgets before dispatch. When the caller declared max_output_tokens, require estimated input <= input ceiling AND estimated input + min(declared output, target output ceiling) <= context window, and refuse locally with 413 input_admission_refused before any upstream bytes are sent. Combo policy already treats that local code as a safe hop, so the ladder selects a larger-context target without replaying committed output. The two budgets are checked separately on purpose. resolveInputCeiling already answers "how much input may this target take", and modelMaxInputTokens can tighten it below the window; charging the output reserve against that tightened number would count the reserve twice and skip a target that fits. The window is what input and output actually share, so the reserve belongs there. Reserving min(declared, target ceiling) rather than a fixed slice is what makes this catch the reported case: the common industry reservation of min(max_output, 20k) leaves 100k + 20k inside a 128k window, so the turn is admitted and fails upstream anyway. Canonical native slugs that the narrower pinned table does not carry now resolve their window from the generated in-tree bundle. That table gap is why the gate was completely inert on the route where this was observed. The bundle is compiled in, not a catalog read, so this adds no I/O, and explicit provider and operator caps may only narrow the result. It deliberately covers slugs retired from the picker, because a retired slug is still dispatchable when an operator names it explicitly in a combo target, which is exactly that configuration. Scope stays narrow. Direct and single-target requests keep the deliberately loose 2.5x pathological-input gate, because they have nowhere to hop. Compaction turns stay exempt. Unknown context and a caller that declared no output allowance both remain fail-open, so no limits are invented for custom providers. Closes #4664 Co-authored-by: RHODIZ IT --- src/server/responses/input-admission.ts | 122 +++++++++++++++++- src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts | 19 ++- structure/transports/responses.md | 27 ++++ tests/helpers/combo-context-headroom-cases.ts | 91 +++++++++++++ tests/server/input-admission.test.ts | 74 +++++++++++ .../server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts | 22 +--- 6 files changed, 324 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/helpers/combo-context-headroom-cases.ts diff --git a/src/server/responses/input-admission.ts b/src/server/responses/input-admission.ts index ef8b81265e..d3baa2124d 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/input-admission.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/input-admission.ts @@ -10,7 +10,13 @@ * catches the pathological case and stays out of the way otherwise. Every uncertainty * resolves toward admitting. */ -import { nativeOpenAiContextWindow, nativeOpenAiMaxInputTokens, type NativeContextLimitsInput } from "../../codex/catalog/metadata"; +import { + nativeOpenAiContextWindow, + nativeOpenAiMaxInputTokens, + nativeOpenAiMaxOutputTokens, + type NativeContextLimitsInput, +} from "../../codex/catalog/metadata"; +import { getModelMetadata } from "../../generated/model-metadata"; import { estimateTokens } from "../../lib/token-estimate"; import { isCanonicalOpenAiForwardProvider, OPENAI_CODEX_PROVIDER_ID } from "../../providers/openai-tiers"; import { modelRecordValue } from "../../reasoning-effort"; @@ -54,6 +60,8 @@ export interface InputAdmissionResult { estimatedTokens: number; /** Resolved ceiling, or null when nothing could be resolved (=> always admitted). */ ceiling: number | null; + /** Output space reserved by the combo preflight; absent on the loose direct gate. */ + requiredOutputHeadroom?: number; } function positive(value: unknown): number | null { @@ -135,14 +143,19 @@ export function estimateInputTokens(parsed: OcxParsedRequest, modelId: string): * reject a user-defined provider that merely shares a built-in name using limits that * belong to a different service. */ -export function resolveInputCeiling( +interface ResolvedContextLimits { + /** The target's total context window: input and output share it. */ + window: number | null; + /** Largest admissible input, which input-only caps may tighten below the window. */ + ceiling: number | null; +} + +function resolveContextLimits( provider: OcxProviderConfig, providerName: string, modelId: string, - // Operator cap for the canonical native provider. Passed in rather than read from a - // config here so this stays pure: no filesystem, no catalog, no registry scan. nativeContextCap?: NativeContextLimitsInput, -): number | null { +): ResolvedContextLimits { // `modelRecordValue`, not a bare lookup: the catalog resolves these same two maps that // way, so a `gpt-oss` entry covers `gpt-oss:120b`. Reading raw here made the gate fall // back to the provider-wide window and refuse turns the model can plainly hold. @@ -168,13 +181,110 @@ export function resolveInputCeiling( : null; const nativeMaxInput = canonicalNativeBare ? positive(nativeOpenAiMaxInputTokens(modelId, nativeLimits)) : null; - const window = canonicalNativeBare ? native : configured; + const window = canonicalNativeBare ? (native ?? generatedNativeWindow(modelId, configured, nativeContextCap)) : configured; // modelMaxInputTokens is an input-only cap, so it can only tighten the window. const configuredMaxInput = positive(modelRecordValue(provider.modelMaxInputTokens, modelId)); const limits = [window, configuredMaxInput, nativeMaxInput].filter((v): v is number => v !== null); + return { window, ceiling: limits.length === 0 ? null : Math.min(...limits) }; +} + +/** + * Static in-tree metadata for a canonical native slug the narrower override and pinned-native + * tables do not carry. Falling through to null made input admission completely blind for + * exactly those models, which is how a 128k target accepted a turn it could not finish. + * + * This deliberately covers slugs that are no longer offered in the picker: a retired slug is + * still dispatchable when an operator names it explicitly in a combo target, and that is the + * configuration where the gate was inert. This is a generated bundle compiled into the binary, + * not a live catalog read, so it adds no I/O. Explicit provider and operator caps may only + * narrow the result, never widen it. + */ +function generatedNativeWindow( + modelId: string, + configured: number | null, + nativeContextCap: NativeContextLimitsInput | undefined, +): number | null { + const generated = positive(getModelMetadata(OPENAI_CODEX_PROVIDER_ID, modelId)?.contextWindow) + ?? positive(getModelMetadata("openai", modelId)?.contextWindow); + if (generated === null) return null; + const cap = typeof nativeContextCap === "number" + ? positive(nativeContextCap) + : positive(nativeContextCap?.cap); + return Math.min(generated, configured ?? generated, cap ?? generated); +} + +export function resolveInputCeiling( + provider: OcxProviderConfig, + providerName: string, + modelId: string, + // Operator cap for the canonical native provider. Passed in rather than read from a + // config here so this stays pure: no filesystem, no catalog, no registry scan. + nativeContextCap?: NativeContextLimitsInput, +): number | null { + return resolveContextLimits(provider, providerName, modelId, nativeContextCap).ceiling; +} + +/** + * Largest output the concrete target can emit. Used only to avoid reserving MORE than the + * target could ever produce when a client asks for a bigger allowance than the model has. + * Unknown stays unknown rather than inventing a capability. + */ +export function resolveOutputCeiling( + provider: OcxProviderConfig, + providerName: string, + modelId: string, +): number | null { + const configured = positive(modelRecordValue(provider.modelMaxOutputTokens, modelId)) + ?? positive(provider.defaultMaxOutputTokens); + const canonicalNativeBare = providerName === OPENAI_CODEX_PROVIDER_ID + && isCanonicalOpenAiForwardProvider(provider) + && !modelId.includes("/"); + const native = canonicalNativeBare ? positive(nativeOpenAiMaxOutputTokens(modelId)) : null; + const limits = [configured, native].filter((v): v is number => v !== null); return limits.length === 0 ? null : Math.min(...limits); } +/** + * Combo-only admission. A fallback must be able to satisfy the caller's declared output + * allowance inside its OWN context window. Otherwise it returns 200, emits a few hundred + * tokens, and terminates on `finish_reason: length` — which the Anthropic surface renders as + * "response exceeded the output token maximum" even though the real cause was the total + * window. By then the next target cannot be tried, because output has already committed. + * + * Two budgets are checked separately so the reserve is counted exactly once. `ceiling` is an + * input-only budget once `modelMaxInputTokens` tightens it below the window, so the output + * reserve belongs against `window`, not against `ceiling`. + * + * Direct and single-target requests keep the deliberately loose 2.5x pathological-input gate. + * This stricter rule applies only to synthetic combo children, where skipping one known-small + * target is safe and the ladder continues before any upstream bytes are sent. Unknown context + * stays fail-open, and a caller that declared no output allowance is unaffected. + */ +export function checkComboTargetInputAdmission( + parsed: OcxParsedRequest, + provider: OcxProviderConfig, + providerName: string, + modelId: string, + nativeContextCap?: NativeContextLimitsInput, +): InputAdmissionResult { + const { window, ceiling } = resolveContextLimits(provider, providerName, modelId, nativeContextCap); + const requestedOutput = positive(parsed.options.maxOutputTokens); + if (window === null || ceiling === null || requestedOutput === null) { + return checkInputAdmission(parsed, provider, providerName, modelId, nativeContextCap); + } + const targetOutput = resolveOutputCeiling(provider, providerName, modelId); + const requiredOutputHeadroom = targetOutput === null + ? requestedOutput + : Math.min(requestedOutput, targetOutput); + const estimatedTokens = estimateInputTokens(parsed, modelId); + return { + admitted: estimatedTokens <= ceiling && estimatedTokens + requiredOutputHeadroom <= window, + estimatedTokens, + ceiling, + requiredOutputHeadroom, + }; +} + /** * Fail-open when no ceiling is known; refuse only past `ceiling * ADMISSION_TOLERANCE`. * diff --git a/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts b/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts index 81ffeb013f..b655d8f16d 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ import { isCodexReserveHelperUnsupported, CODEX_RESERVE_HELPER_UNSUPPORTED_MESSAGE, } from "../../codex/loopback-target"; -import { checkInputAdmission } from "./input-admission"; +import { checkComboTargetInputAdmission, checkInputAdmission } from "./input-admission"; import { nativeContextLimits } from "../../codex/catalog"; import { streamingContextOverflowResponse } from "./context-overflow"; import { @@ -860,7 +860,12 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( // refusing the turn that shrinks the context would deadlock the client against the very // limit this gate reports — it would be told to compact and then denied the compaction. if (parsed._compactionRequest !== true) { - const inputAdmission = checkInputAdmission(parsed, route.provider, route.providerName, parsed.modelId, nativeContextLimits(config)); + // A combo child is the one caller that can afford a strict gate: skipping a target it + // cannot fit is safe before any upstream bytes are sent, and the ladder continues. A + // direct request has nowhere to go, so it keeps the loose pathological-input gate. + const inputAdmission = options.comboAttempt + ? checkComboTargetInputAdmission(parsed, route.provider, route.providerName, parsed.modelId, nativeContextLimits(config)) + : checkInputAdmission(parsed, route.provider, route.providerName, parsed.modelId, nativeContextLimits(config)); if (!inputAdmission.admitted) { // #1524: this is a LOCAL preflight refusal, not an upstream verdict. A policy or combo // fallback must be able to skip this candidate and try one whose context window fits, @@ -876,9 +881,13 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( return formatErrorResponse( 413, "input_admission_refused", - `Estimated input (~${inputAdmission.estimatedTokens} tokens) is far past the context window ` - + `of ${parsed.modelId} (${inputAdmission.ceiling} tokens). Start a new session or choose a ` - + `model with a larger context window.`, + inputAdmission.requiredOutputHeadroom !== undefined + ? `Estimated input (~${inputAdmission.estimatedTokens} tokens) plus ${inputAdmission.requiredOutputHeadroom} ` + + `tokens of requested output headroom cannot fit the context window of ${parsed.modelId} ` + + `(${inputAdmission.ceiling} tokens).` + : `Estimated input (~${inputAdmission.estimatedTokens} tokens) is far past the context window ` + + `of ${parsed.modelId} (${inputAdmission.ceiling} tokens). Start a new session or choose a ` + + `model with a larger context window.`, ); } } diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 9af5e63100..54ece4ec41 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -702,3 +702,30 @@ What must not happen is a ladder that charges and then returns through a path th nor releases. That is not a lost send; it is a send the request never made, spending an allowance a later recovery in the same request then cannot have. `tests/lib/execution-budget-permits.test.ts` pins both ladder shapes against exactly that. + +## Combo output headroom + +A combo child is admitted against two budgets, not one. `resolveInputCeiling` in +`src/server/responses/input-admission.ts` answers "how much input may this target take", which +`modelMaxInputTokens` can tighten below the window. The context window itself is what input and +output actually share. When the caller declared `max_output_tokens`, +`checkComboTargetInputAdmission` requires both `estimated input <= ceiling` and +`estimated input + min(declared output, target output ceiling) <= window`, so the output reserve +is counted once rather than charged twice against an already-tightened input budget. + +The refusal is local: HTTP 413 `input_admission_refused` before any upstream bytes are sent, which +existing combo policy already treats as a safe hop. That ordering is the whole point. A target whose +total window cannot hold the turn plus the caller's allowance answers 200, emits a few hundred +tokens and stops on `finish_reason: length`, which the Anthropic surface renders as an output-token +error naming a limit the model never approached — and by then output has committed and no later +target may be tried. + +Scope is deliberately narrow. Direct and single-target requests keep the loose 2.5x +pathological-input gate, because they have nowhere to hop. Compaction turns stay exempt. Unknown +context and a caller that declared no output allowance both remain fail-open, so this invents no +limits for custom providers. Canonical native slugs that the narrower pinned table does not carry +resolve their window from the generated in-tree bundle, which is what made the gate inert on the +route where this was first observed; explicit provider and operator caps may only narrow it. + +Regression coverage: `tests/server/input-admission.test.ts` and +`tests/helpers/combo-context-headroom-cases.ts`. diff --git a/tests/helpers/combo-context-headroom-cases.ts b/tests/helpers/combo-context-headroom-cases.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2d8769bee7 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/helpers/combo-context-headroom-cases.ts @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +import { expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import type { OcxConfig, OcxProviderConfig } from "../../src/types"; + +interface ComboHarness { + serve(handler: () => Response | Promise): Server; + baseUrl(server: Server): string; + chatSuccess(text: string, model?: string): Response; + provider(adapter: string, url: string, apiKey: string, extra?: Partial): OcxProviderConfig; + comboConfig(providers: OcxConfig["providers"]): OcxConfig; + post(config: OcxConfig, raw?: Record): Promise; +} + +/** Roughly `tokens` worth of plain ASCII at the default 4 chars/token ratio. */ +function asciiTokens(tokens: number): string { + return "a".repeat(tokens * 4); +} + +/** Register under the caller's isolated homes, mock state and server cleanup hooks. */ +export function registerComboContextHeadroomCases({ + serve, baseUrl, chatSuccess, provider, comboConfig, post, +}: ComboHarness): void { + test("a target that cannot hold input plus requested output is skipped before any bytes commit", async () => { + let smallHits = 0; + let largeHits = 0; + const small = serve(() => { + smallHits += 1; + return chatSuccess("MUST NOT RUN", "m1"); + }); + const large = serve(() => { + largeHits += 1; + return chatSuccess("large context target", "m2"); + }); + // ~10k input, and m1 can reach 3,200 output inside a 12,800 window, so the turn cannot + // finish there. m2 holds the same turn with the caller's full 6,400 allowance. + const response = await post(comboConfig({ + a: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(small), "key-a", { + modelContextWindows: { m1: 12_800 }, + modelMaxOutputTokens: { m1: 3_200 }, + }), + b: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(large), "key-b", { + modelContextWindows: { m2: 100_000 }, + modelMaxOutputTokens: { m2: 32_000 }, + }), + }), { input: asciiTokens(10_000), max_output_tokens: 6_400 }); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(smallHits).toBe(0); + expect(largeHits).toBe(1); + expect(await response.text()).toContain("large context target"); + }); + + test("the same undersized target still serves a turn that declares no output allowance", async () => { + // The strict reserve is opt-in on the caller's declared allowance. Without one, the + // deliberately loose pathological-input gate still applies and nothing is skipped. + let smallHits = 0; + const small = serve(() => { + smallHits += 1; + return chatSuccess("small context target", "m1"); + }); + const response = await post(comboConfig({ + a: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(small), "key-a", { + modelContextWindows: { m1: 12_800 }, + modelMaxOutputTokens: { m1: 3_200 }, + }), + }), { input: asciiTokens(10_000) }); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(smallHits).toBe(1); + expect(await response.text()).toContain("small context target"); + }); + + test("provider-specific prompt-too-long 400 hops to a larger-context combo target", async () => { + let backupHits = 0; + const capped = serve(() => Response.json({ error: { + message: "Prompt 346030 > 262144 maximum context length", + type: "invalid_request_prompt_too_long", + code: "5059", + raw_status_code: 400, + } }, { status: 400 })); + const backup = serve(() => { + backupHits += 1; + return chatSuccess("larger context backup", "m2"); + }); + const response = await post(comboConfig({ + a: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(capped), "key-a"), + b: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(backup), "key-b"), + })); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(backupHits).toBe(1); + expect(await response.text()).toContain("larger context backup"); + }); +} + diff --git a/tests/server/input-admission.test.ts b/tests/server/input-admission.test.ts index 9b8ac9c978..e96f15e6b6 100644 --- a/tests/server/input-admission.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/input-admission.test.ts @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; import { ADMISSION_TOLERANCE, + checkComboTargetInputAdmission, checkInputAdmission, estimateInputTokens, resolveInputCeiling, + resolveOutputCeiling, } from "../../src/server/responses/input-admission"; import { modelRecordValue } from "../../src/reasoning-effort"; import type { OcxMessage, OcxParsedRequest, OcxProviderConfig, OcxTool } from "../../src/types"; @@ -257,3 +259,75 @@ describe("checkInputAdmission", () => { expect(calls).toBe(0); }); }); + +describe("combo target input admission", () => { + const capped: OcxProviderConfig = { + adapter: "openai-chat", + baseUrl: "https://example.test/v1", + modelContextWindows: { m: 128_000 }, + modelMaxOutputTokens: { m: 32_000 }, + }; + + const withMaxOutput = (inputTokens: number, maxOutputTokens: number | undefined = 64_000): OcxParsedRequest => ({ + ...request([userText(asciiTokens(inputTokens))]), + modelId: "m", + options: maxOutputTokens === undefined ? {} : { maxOutputTokens }, + }); + + test("skips a target that cannot hold the turn plus its own output ceiling", () => { + // 100k input + 32k of reachable output does not fit 128k, so this target would have + // answered 200, emitted a few hundred tokens and stopped on finish_reason: length. + const result = checkComboTargetInputAdmission(withMaxOutput(100_000), capped, "custom", "m"); + expect(result.admitted).toBe(false); + expect(result.ceiling).toBe(128_000); + expect(result.requiredOutputHeadroom).toBe(32_000); + }); + + test("reserves no more than the target can actually emit", () => { + // The caller asked for 64k, but this model tops out at 32k, so reserving the caller's + // number would skip a target that fits. + const result = checkComboTargetInputAdmission(withMaxOutput(90_000), capped, "custom", "m"); + expect(result.admitted).toBe(true); + expect(result.requiredOutputHeadroom).toBe(32_000); + }); + + test("an input-only cap is not charged the output reserve twice", () => { + // modelMaxInputTokens tightens the admissible INPUT; the output reserve belongs against + // the window. Charging both against the tightened number would refuse a turn that fits. + const inputCapped: OcxProviderConfig = { ...capped, modelMaxInputTokens: { m: 90_000 } }; + const fits = checkComboTargetInputAdmission(withMaxOutput(85_000), inputCapped, "custom", "m"); + expect(fits.admitted).toBe(true); + expect(fits.ceiling).toBe(90_000); + // The input cap itself still refuses on its own terms. + expect(checkComboTargetInputAdmission(withMaxOutput(95_000), inputCapped, "custom", "m").admitted).toBe(false); + }); + + test("unknown context stays fail-open", () => { + const unknown: OcxProviderConfig = { adapter: "openai-chat", baseUrl: "https://example.test/v1" }; + const result = checkComboTargetInputAdmission(withMaxOutput(2_000_000), unknown, "custom", "m"); + expect(result.admitted).toBe(true); + expect(result.ceiling).toBeNull(); + }); + + test("no declared output allowance keeps the loose direct contract", () => { + const result = checkComboTargetInputAdmission(withMaxOutput(150_000, undefined), capped, "custom", "m"); + expect(result.admitted).toBe(true); // still inside the existing 2.5x pathological gate + expect(result.requiredOutputHeadroom).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("a canonical native slug missing from the override table resolves from generated metadata", () => { + // Spark carries 128k/32k in the generated bundle but is absent from the narrower pinned + // native table, which left the gate completely blind on exactly this route. It is retired + // from the picker and still dispatchable when an operator names it in a combo target. + expect(resolveInputCeiling(CANONICAL_NATIVE, "openai", "gpt-5.3-codex-spark")).toBe(128_000); + expect(resolveOutputCeiling(CANONICAL_NATIVE, "openai", "gpt-5.3-codex-spark")).toBe(32_000); + // A slug the override table does know keeps its own pinned window. + expect(resolveInputCeiling(CANONICAL_NATIVE, "openai", "gpt-5.6-sol")).toBe(272_000); + // An operator cap may only narrow the generated value, never widen it. + expect(resolveInputCeiling(CANONICAL_NATIVE, "openai", "gpt-5.3-codex-spark", 64_000)).toBe(64_000); + // A provider merely named openai still inherits nothing. + const impostor: OcxProviderConfig = { adapter: "openai-chat", baseUrl: "https://impostor.test/v1", authMode: "key" }; + expect(resolveInputCeiling(impostor, "openai", "gpt-5.3-codex-spark")).toBeNull(); + expect(resolveOutputCeiling(impostor, "openai", "gpt-5.3-codex-spark")).toBeNull(); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts b/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts index 78d288f069..f636e3480f 100644 --- a/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ import { registerComboForcedEffortCases } from "../helpers/combo-forced-effort-cases"; import { registerComboContextOverflowCases } from "../helpers/combo-context-overflow-cases"; +import { registerComboContextHeadroomCases } from "../helpers/combo-context-headroom-cases"; import { sessionLaneIdFromRequest } from "../../src/server/request-log-conversation"; import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, mock, setDefaultTimeout, test } from "bun:test"; import { logsFromApiBody } from "../helpers/logs-api"; @@ -2091,26 +2092,7 @@ describe("server combo failover 030 activation matrix", () => { serve, baseUrl, chatSuccess, chatStream, provider, comboConfig, post, collectSse, }); - test("provider-specific prompt-too-long 400 hops to a larger-context combo target", async () => { - let backupHits = 0; - const capped = serve(() => Response.json({ error: { - message: "Prompt 346030 > 262144 maximum context length", - type: "invalid_request_prompt_too_long", - code: "5059", - raw_status_code: 400, - } }, { status: 400 })); - const backup = serve(() => { - backupHits += 1; - return chatSuccess("larger context backup", "m2"); - }); - const response = await post(comboConfig({ - a: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(capped), "key-a"), - b: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(backup), "key-b"), - })); - expect(response.status).toBe(200); - expect(backupHits).toBe(1); - expect(await response.text()).toContain("larger context backup"); - }); + registerComboContextHeadroomCases({ serve, baseUrl, chatSuccess, provider, comboConfig, post }); test("429 Retry-After 120 keeps A cooling at 60 seconds and restores it at 120", async () => { const t0 = Date.parse("2026-07-18T00:00:00.000Z"); From 9bf30f3f0ae9f6ce71384a2102fb7de3bf50426b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:16:15 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 061/113] fix(vision): fail closed on truncated sidecar captions (#4727) [skip ci] parseSidecarSSE bounded the raw SSE wire at 64 KiB. Responses framing spends far more wire on JSON envelopes than on model output, so an ordinary 1,488 character caption cost ~139 KB and was cut mid-stream. The parser returned the prefix with no error, describeImage adopted it as a successful description, and the vision path rendered and cached a silently incomplete caption. Separate the two bounds the single raw cap was conflating. MAX_SIDECAR_STREAM_BYTES (16x) is the hostile-upstream wire ceiling; MAX_SIDECAR_DECODED_CHARS bounds the decoded text actually retained. Completion is now proven by a terminal event (response.completed, response.done, or [DONE]) rather than assumed from EOF, so a bound hit, a terminal failure, or EOF before a terminal event all surface as an explicit error even when partial text was decoded. describeImage rejects any parser error, so an incomplete caption can no longer be rendered or cached. MAX_SIDECAR_RESPONSE_BYTES keeps its value and export for the non-Responses sidecar executors and bounded error bodies. DESC_MAX_CHARS is untouched: it is a display clamp, not a completeness signal. --- src/vision/describe.ts | 8 +- src/web-search/parse.ts | 81 ++++++++++++++++---- tests/vision/vision-fail-closed.test.ts | 56 +++++++++++++- tests/web-search/web-search-parse.test.ts | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vision/describe.ts b/src/vision/describe.ts index 83c51afaeb..0cf61a1775 100644 --- a/src/vision/describe.ts +++ b/src/vision/describe.ts @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ export async function describeImage( input: [{ type: "message", role: "user", content }], reasoning: { effort: settings.reasoning }, // The ChatGPT (codex) backend rejects `max_output_tokens` ("Unsupported parameter"); the shared - // SSE parser bounds raw response bytes before DESC_MAX_CHARS applies its display clamp. + // SSE parser bounds wire and decoded payload before DESC_MAX_CHARS applies its display clamp. store: false, stream: true, }; @@ -121,9 +121,9 @@ export async function describeImage( const parsed = await parseSidecarSSE(res); if (linkedSignal.signal.aborted) throw linkedSignal.signal.reason; recordOutcome?.(res.status); - // The backend can return HTTP 200 then stream a `response.failed`/`error` event with no text; - // surface that as a describe error instead of an empty (silently-blank) description. - if (!parsed.text.trim() && parsed.error) return { text: "", error: parsed.error }; + // Any parser error invalidates decoded text: it may be a prefix from a bounded or incomplete + // stream and must never be rendered or cached as a complete image description. + if (parsed.error) return { text: "", error: parsed.error }; return { text: parsed.text }; } finally { detachBodyGuard(); diff --git a/src/web-search/parse.ts b/src/web-search/parse.ts index 7ba5d2607c..8e0c6e8a71 100644 --- a/src/web-search/parse.ts +++ b/src/web-search/parse.ts @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ export type WebSearchSource = SafeWebSearchSource; export interface WebSearchResult { text: string; sources: WebSearchSource[]; - /** Set only when the stream surfaced an error AND produced no usable answer text. */ + /** Set when the stream failed, including when partial text was decoded before failure. */ error?: string; } @@ -31,9 +31,12 @@ interface OutputItem { content?: OutputTextBlock[]; } -// ChatGPT's Codex backend does not accept `max_output_tokens` on sidecar requests. Bound the raw -// streamed response here, before decoded text and authoritative/delta copies can accumulate. +// Keep this compatibility export for non-Responses sidecar executors and bounded error bodies. export const MAX_SIDECAR_RESPONSE_BYTES = 64 * 1024; +// Responses SSE can spend far more wire bytes on JSON framing than on useful model output. Keep a +// larger finite wire ceiling while separately bounding the decoded text copies accumulated below. +export const MAX_SIDECAR_STREAM_BYTES = MAX_SIDECAR_RESPONSE_BYTES * 16; +export const MAX_SIDECAR_DECODED_CHARS = 64 * 1024; /** Push a `url_citation` annotation as a source, de-duplicated by URL. */ function collectAnnotation(ann: AnnotationLike | undefined, sources: WebSearchSource[], seen: Set): void { @@ -208,10 +211,11 @@ export function cancelReaderWithoutWaiting( * `response.output_text.done` text; falls back to accumulated `response.output_text.delta`. Sources are * collected from EVERY shape they arrive in — `response.output_text.annotation.added` events (the * streaming path, which earlier testing missed → empty citations), `done`-block `annotations[]`, and - * the final output[]. `response.failed`/`error` events surface as `error` when no answer text was produced. + * the final output[]. A terminal failure, a safety bound, or EOF before a terminal event surfaces as + * `error` even when partial answer text was decoded. */ export async function parseSidecarSSE(response: Response): Promise { - if (!response.body) return { text: "", sources: [] }; + if (!response.body) return { text: "", sources: [], error: "sidecar stream returned no response body" }; const reader = response.body.getReader(); const decoder = new TextDecoder(); let buffer = ""; @@ -224,10 +228,37 @@ export async function parseSidecarSSE(response: Response): Promise { + if (count > MAX_SIDECAR_DECODED_CHARS - acc.decodedChars) { + acc.error = "sidecar response decoded text limit reached"; + acc.limitReached = true; + return false; + } + acc.decodedChars += count; + return true; + }; const handle = (payload: string): void => { - if (!payload || payload === "[DONE]") return; + if (!payload) return; + if (payload === "[DONE]") { + acc.terminalEvent = true; + return; + } + if (acc.limitReached) return; // Neither warning below copies the frame's content. An upstream SSE payload can carry model // output or credential material, and a malformed frame is exactly the case where the content // is least trustworthy. Length plus a classification separates the two failure modes in a log @@ -247,19 +278,27 @@ export async function parseSidecarSSE(response: Response): Promise; const type = data.type as string | undefined; if (type === "response.output_text.delta" && typeof data.delta === "string") { - acc.deltaText += data.delta; + if (acceptDecodedChars(data.delta.length)) acc.deltaText += data.delta; } else if (type === "response.output_text.done" && typeof data.text === "string") { // The `done` event carries the full, authoritative text for one content part. - acc.doneText += data.text; + if (acceptDecodedChars(data.text.length)) acc.doneText += data.text; } else if (type === "response.completed" || type === "response.done") { + acc.terminalEvent = true; const resp = data.response as { output?: OutputItem[] } | undefined; - if (resp?.output) acc.final = fromOutputArray(resp.output, seen); + if (resp?.output) { + const final = fromOutputArray(resp.output, seen); + if (acceptDecodedChars(final.text.length)) acc.final = final; + } } else if (type === "response.failed" || type === "response.incomplete" || type === "error") { + acc.terminalEvent = true; const resp = data.response as { error?: { message?: string } } | undefined; const msg = resp?.error?.message ?? (data.error as { message?: string } | undefined)?.message ?? (typeof data.message === "string" ? data.message : undefined); - if (msg) acc.error = msg; + acc.error = msg ?? `sidecar stream ended with ${type}`; + } else if (type?.includes("reasoning") && typeof data.delta === "string") { + // Reasoning is not returned, but it is still decoded payload retained transiently by JSON.parse. + acceptDecodedChars(data.delta.length); } // Citations stream as a dedicated `response.output_text.annotation.added` event (singular // `annotation`); capture it regardless of the exact event name so they aren't lost. @@ -270,7 +309,7 @@ export async function parseSidecarSSE(response: Response): Promise= MAX_SIDECAR_RESPONSE_BYTES) { + if (acc.limitReached) { + cancelReaderWithoutWaiting(reader, "sidecar response decoded text limit reached"); + buffer = ""; + break; + } + if (acc.terminalEvent) { + cancelReaderWithoutWaiting(reader, "sidecar terminal event received"); + buffer = ""; + break; + } + if (responseBytes >= MAX_SIDECAR_STREAM_BYTES) { // Preserve complete events accepted up to the cap, but discard any unterminated line and // TextDecoder carry. Do not let a rejecting/hung cancel turn bounded partial output into // an error or keep this parser waiting on upstream teardown. cancelReaderWithoutWaiting(reader, "sidecar response byte limit reached"); + acc.error = "sidecar response byte limit reached before terminal event"; + acc.limitReached = true; + buffer = ""; break; } } @@ -310,6 +362,7 @@ export async function parseSidecarSSE(response: Response): Promise { + globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; + setVisionDescriptionCache(); +}); + function parsedWithImage() { return parseRequest({ model: "opencode-go/glm-5.2", @@ -35,4 +48,43 @@ describe("vision fail-closed strip", () => { expect(stripImagesInPlace(parsed)).toBe(false); expect(JSON.stringify(parsed.context.messages)).toBe(before); }); + + test("does not render or cache an incomplete sidecar description", async () => { + const writes: Array<[string, string]> = []; + const cache: VisionDescriptionCache = { + get: () => undefined, + set: (key, value) => { writes.push([key, value]); }, + clear: () => undefined, + }; + setVisionDescriptionCache(cache); + globalThis.fetch = (async () => new Response( + `data: ${JSON.stringify({ type: "response.output_text.delta", delta: "partial caption" })}\n\n`, + { headers: { "content-type": "text/event-stream" } }, + )) as typeof fetch; + const parsed = parsedWithImage(); + const plan: VisionPlan = { + backend: "openai", + forwardSidecar: { + providerName: "openai", + provider: { adapter: "openai-responses", authMode: "forward", baseUrl: "https://vision.test/v1" }, + accountMode: "direct", + authContext: { kind: "main", accountId: null }, + headers: new Headers({ Authorization: "Bearer test" }), + }, + settings: { model: "vision-model", reasoning: "low", timeoutMs: 5_000 }, + maxDescriptionsPerTurn: 8, + }; + + await describeImagesInPlace(parsed, plan, new Headers({ Authorization: "Bearer test" })); + + const user = parsed.context.messages.find(message => message.role === "user"); + const rendered = (user?.content as { type: string; text?: string }[]) + .filter(part => part.type === "text") + .map(part => part.text ?? "") + .join("\n"); + expect(rendered).toContain("could not be processed"); + expect(rendered).toContain("before terminal event"); + expect(rendered).not.toContain("partial caption"); + expect(writes).toEqual([]); + }); }); diff --git a/tests/web-search/web-search-parse.test.ts b/tests/web-search/web-search-parse.test.ts index 8ea42f583d..e1bb48424e 100644 --- a/tests/web-search/web-search-parse.test.ts +++ b/tests/web-search/web-search-parse.test.ts @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; -import { MAX_SIDECAR_RESPONSE_BYTES, parseSidecarSSE } from "../../src/web-search/parse"; +import { + MAX_SIDECAR_DECODED_CHARS, + MAX_SIDECAR_RESPONSE_BYTES, + MAX_SIDECAR_STREAM_BYTES, + parseSidecarSSE, +} from "../../src/web-search/parse"; function sse(events: { type: string; [k: string]: unknown }[]): Response { const body = events.map(e => `event: ${e.type}\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(e)}\n\n`).join(""); @@ -30,10 +35,10 @@ describe("parseSidecarSSE trailing Sources block", () => { type: "response.output_text.delta", delta: "A", })}\n\n`); - const paddingBytes = MAX_SIDECAR_RESPONSE_BYTES - event.byteLength; + const paddingBytes = MAX_SIDECAR_STREAM_BYTES - event.byteLength; const padding = encoder.encode(`:${"x".repeat(paddingBytes - 2)}\n`); const bytes = joinBytes(event, padding); - expect(bytes.byteLength).toBe(MAX_SIDECAR_RESPONSE_BYTES); + expect(bytes.byteLength).toBe(MAX_SIDECAR_STREAM_BYTES); const chunks = [bytes.subarray(0, 12_345), bytes.subarray(12_345)]; let reads = 0; @@ -50,6 +55,7 @@ describe("parseSidecarSSE trailing Sources block", () => { const out = await parseSidecarSSE(new Response(body)); expect(out.text).toBe("A"); + expect(out.error).toContain("byte limit reached before terminal event"); expect(reads).toBe(2); expect(cancels).toBe(1); }); @@ -61,7 +67,7 @@ describe("parseSidecarSSE trailing Sources block", () => { delta: "A", })}\n\n`); const partial = encoder.encode('data:{"type":"response.output_text.delta","delta":"B'); - const oversized = new Uint8Array(MAX_SIDECAR_RESPONSE_BYTES + 32); + const oversized = new Uint8Array(MAX_SIDECAR_STREAM_BYTES + 32); oversized.set(complete); oversized.set(partial, complete.byteLength); oversized.fill(0x78, complete.byteLength + partial.byteLength); @@ -73,6 +79,7 @@ describe("parseSidecarSSE trailing Sources block", () => { const out = await parseSidecarSSE(new Response(body)); expect(out.text).toBe("A"); + expect(out.error).toContain("byte limit reached before terminal event"); expect(cancels).toBe(1); }); @@ -84,16 +91,20 @@ describe("parseSidecarSSE trailing Sources block", () => { })}\n\n`); const partialPrefix = encoder.encode('data:{"type":"response.output_text.delta","delta":"'); const filler = new Uint8Array( - MAX_SIDECAR_RESPONSE_BYTES - complete.byteLength - partialPrefix.byteLength - 1, + MAX_SIDECAR_STREAM_BYTES - complete.byteLength - partialPrefix.byteLength - 1, ).fill(0x78); const oversized = joinBytes(complete, partialPrefix, filler, encoder.encode("😀\"}\n\n")); - + let cancels = 0; const body = new ReadableStream({ start(controller) { controller.enqueue(oversized); }, + cancel() { cancels += 1; }, }); + const out = await parseSidecarSSE(new Response(body)); expect(out.text).toBe("A"); expect(out.text).not.toContain("�"); + expect(out.error).toContain("byte limit reached before terminal event"); + expect(cancels).toBe(1); }); test("returns bounded partial output when body cancellation rejects", async () => { @@ -102,15 +113,79 @@ describe("parseSidecarSSE trailing Sources block", () => { type: "response.output_text.delta", delta: "A", })}\n\n`); - const oversized = new Uint8Array(MAX_SIDECAR_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1).fill(0x78); + const oversized = new Uint8Array(MAX_SIDECAR_STREAM_BYTES + 1).fill(0x78); oversized.set(event); + let cancels = 0; const body = new ReadableStream({ start(controller) { controller.enqueue(oversized); }, - cancel() { return Promise.reject(new Error("cancel failed")); }, + cancel() { + cancels += 1; + return Promise.reject(new Error("cancel failed")); + }, }); const out = await parseSidecarSSE(new Response(body)); expect(out.text).toBe("A"); + expect(out.error).toContain("byte limit reached before terminal event"); + expect(cancels).toBe(1); + }); + + test("parses a 75 KB tiny-delta caption through response.completed", async () => { + const text = "Readable screenshot text. ".repeat(60); + const frame = (data: unknown) => `data: ${JSON.stringify(data)}\n\n`; + let wire = ""; + for (let i = 0; i < text.length; i += 3) { + wire += frame({ + type: "response.output_text.delta", + item_id: "msg_synthetic", + output_index: 0, + content_index: 0, + sequence_number: i / 3, + delta: text.slice(i, i + 3), + }); + } + wire += frame({ + type: "response.completed", + response: { status: "completed", output: [{ type: "message", content: [{ type: "output_text", text }] }] }, + }); + + expect(new TextEncoder().encode(wire).byteLength).toBe(75_436); + expect(new TextEncoder().encode(wire).byteLength).toBeGreaterThan(MAX_SIDECAR_RESPONSE_BYTES); + const out = await parseSidecarSSE(new Response(wire)); + expect(out).toEqual({ text, sources: [] }); + }); + + test("returns an explicit error when decoded payload limit is exceeded", async () => { + const oversizedText = "x".repeat(MAX_SIDECAR_DECODED_CHARS + 1); + const out = await parseSidecarSSE(sse([ + { type: "response.output_text.delta", delta: oversizedText }, + { type: "response.completed", response: { output: [] } }, + ])); + + expect(out.text).toBe(""); + expect(out.error).toContain("decoded text limit reached"); + }); + + test("returns an explicit error when stream ends without a terminal event", async () => { + const out = await parseSidecarSSE(sse([ + { type: "response.output_text.delta", delta: "incomplete prefix" }, + ])); + + expect(out.text).toBe("incomplete prefix"); + expect(out.error).toContain("before terminal event"); + }); + + test("stops a runaway raw stream at the bounded wire ceiling", async () => { + const chunk = new Uint8Array(MAX_SIDECAR_STREAM_BYTES + 1).fill(0x78); + let cancelled = false; + const body = new ReadableStream({ + start(controller) { controller.enqueue(chunk); }, + cancel() { cancelled = true; }, + }); + + const out = await parseSidecarSSE(new Response(body)); + expect(cancelled).toBe(true); + expect(out.error).toContain("byte limit reached before terminal event"); }); test("extracts sources from a markdown Sources block when annotations are empty", async () => { From 21a3f18acee57d22216e30dc90821ded90b1b941 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:17:21 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 062/113] fix(tests): walk the Lab activation chain instead of its first hop (#4704) [skip ci] The synchrony guard followed the direct callees of startServer. That catches activateLab becoming async, but activateLab calls installLabAutomationRuntime and startAutomationIfEnabled without awaiting them, so making either async with an await before its registration call left activateLab parsing as perfectly synchronous. Every assertion stayed green while startServer returned before Lab was registered, which is the one ordering the window exists to protect. walkActivationChain now follows the chain from activateLab to a bounded depth, failing on any node that is declared async or carries a body-level await. What keeps a recursive walk from becoming the false-positive machine the depth-one comment warned about is what it refuses to follow. Nested functions are already skipped by collectBodyLevelCalls, so timer callbacks, shutdown hooks, promise continuations and the deferred route executor are not activation edges. Receiver calls are not followed: a method that turns async cannot suspend its caller unless the caller awaits it, and that await is reported on the caller's own body. Names imported from outside this repository are classified automatically, so the six names that need human judgement are not buried under every join and readFileSync in the chain. inspectActivationDeclaration extends inspection to const arrows. The function-only inspector reported activationKey as missing, and a walk that read missing as fine would skip every const-arrow node. That needed its own return-type skipper: the existing one treats a top-level => as part of a function-type annotation and keeps scanning for a body brace a concise arrow never has. Four mutation cases run against the real sources through an injected loader: a nested callee declared async, an await added inside that callee, a suspension three hops down in startLabAutomationScheduler, and the arrow forms the previous inspector could not see. The async case also asserts what the depth-one scan reports on the same mutated source -- still green, which is the defect. Closes #4704 --- tests/lab/core-lab-boundary.test.ts | 361 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 361 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/lab/core-lab-boundary.test.ts b/tests/lab/core-lab-boundary.test.ts index b39a0afbf0..82c97190bf 100644 --- a/tests/lab/core-lab-boundary.test.ts +++ b/tests/lab/core-lab-boundary.test.ts @@ -701,6 +701,215 @@ function resolveDeclarationFollowingReexports(file: string, name: string): Resol } +/** + * A declaration the activation walk can inspect: a named `function` OR a const arrow. + * + * inspectFunctionDeclaration knows only the first form, which is enough for the window's + * direct callees but not for the chain below it: activationKey and every returned cleanup + * receipt in the Lab activation path are const arrows, and a walk that cannot see them would + * report the most interesting nodes as "declaration not found". + */ +export type ActivationDeclaration = { + found: boolean; + async: boolean; + awaitLines: number[]; + body: string | null; +}; + +export function inspectActivationDeclaration(source: string, name: string): ActivationDeclaration { + const code = blankCommentsAndStrings(source); + const ident = escapeRegExp(name); + const fn = new RegExp("(export\\s+)?(async\\s+)?function\\s+" + ident + "\\b").exec(code); + if (fn && fn.index !== undefined) { + const body = extractFunctionBody(code, fn.index + fn[0].length); + return { found: true, async: Boolean(fn[2]), awaitLines: body === null ? [] : bodyLevelAwaitLines(body), body }; + } + const arrow = new RegExp("(?:export\\s+)?(?:const|let|var)\\s+" + ident + "\\s*(?::[^=\\n]+)?=\\s*(async\\s+)?").exec(code); + if (!arrow || arrow.index === undefined) return { found: false, async: false, awaitLines: [], body: null }; + const body = extractArrowBody(code, arrow.index + arrow[0].length); + if (body === null) return { found: false, async: false, awaitLines: [], body: null }; + return { found: true, async: Boolean(arrow[1]), awaitLines: bodyLevelAwaitLines(body), body }; +} + +/** The body of an arrow at `afterEquals`, brace form or concise form. */ +function extractArrowBody(code: string, afterEquals: number): string | null { + let i = skipWsFwd(code, afterEquals); + if (code[i] === "(") { + const afterParams = skipParamList(code, i); + if (afterParams < 0) return null; + i = skipWsFwd(code, afterParams); + if (code[i] === ":") { + i = skipArrowReturnType(code, i); + if (i < 0) return null; + i = skipWsFwd(code, i); + } + } else { + while (i < code.length && /[\w$]/.test(code[i]!)) i += 1; + i = skipWsFwd(code, i); + } + if (code[i] !== "=" || code[i + 1] !== ">") return null; + const afterArrow = i + 2; + const concise = skipConciseArrowBody(code, afterArrow); + if (concise !== afterArrow) return code.slice(afterArrow, concise); + const brace = skipWsFwd(code, afterArrow); + if (code[brace] !== "{") return null; + const end = matchPair(code, brace, "{", "}"); + return end < 0 ? null : code.slice(brace, end); +} + +/** + * Skip an arrow's return-type annotation, stopping at the arrow itself. + * + * skipReturnType cannot be reused: it treats a top-level `=>` as part of a function-TYPE + * annotation and keeps scanning for the body brace, which a concise arrow never has. Feeding + * it `activationKey` returned -1, and the most interesting nodes in the chain are const arrows. + */ +function skipArrowReturnType(code: string, colonIndex: number): number { + let i = colonIndex + 1; + let paren = 0; + let bracket = 0; + let brace = 0; + let angle = 0; + while (i < code.length) { + const ch = code[i]!; + const atTop = paren === 0 && bracket === 0 && brace === 0 && angle === 0; + if (atTop && ch === "=" && code[i + 1] === ">") return i; + if (ch === "(") paren++; + else if (ch === ")") { if (paren === 0) return -1; paren--; } + else if (ch === "[") bracket++; + else if (ch === "]") { if (bracket === 0) return -1; bracket--; } + else if (ch === "{") brace++; + else if (ch === "}") { if (brace === 0) return -1; brace--; } + else if (ch === "<") angle++; + else if (ch === ">") { if (angle > 0) angle--; } + i++; + } + return -1; +} + +export type ActivationNode = { + name: string; + file: string; + async: boolean; + awaitLines: number[]; + callees: string[]; +}; + +export type ActivationWalk = { + nodes: Map; + failures: string[]; + /** Free names deliberately not followed, as actually encountered. */ + skipped: Set; + /** Free names resolved to a module outside this repository. */ + external: Set; +}; + +type ActivationResolution = + | { kind: "declared"; file: string; source: string; declaration: ActivationDeclaration } + | { kind: "external"; spec: string } + | { kind: "missing" }; + +function resolveActivationCallee( + name: string, + fromFile: string, + fromSource: string, + load: (file: string) => string, +): ActivationResolution { + const imported = namedImportsOf(fromSource).get(name); + if (!imported) { + const local = inspectActivationDeclaration(fromSource, name); + return local.found ? { kind: "declared", file: fromFile, source: fromSource, declaration: local } : { kind: "missing" }; + } + // A non-relative specifier leaves this repository: node: builtins and packages. Their + // synchrony is not ours to assert, and pinning every join/readFileSync by hand would turn + // the classification list into noise that hides the two or three names worth reviewing. + if (!imported.spec.startsWith(".")) return { kind: "external", spec: imported.spec }; + let file = resolveSpec(imported.spec, fromFile); + if (!file) return { kind: "missing" }; + let exported = imported.exported; + for (let hop = 0; hop < 8; hop++) { + if (!existsSync(file)) return { kind: "missing" }; + const source = load(file); + const declaration = inspectActivationDeclaration(source, exported); + if (declaration.found) return { kind: "declared", file, source, declaration }; + const next = reexportOf(source, exported); + if (!next) return { kind: "missing" }; + const resolved = resolveSpec(next.spec, file); + if (!resolved) return { kind: "missing" }; + file = resolved; + exported = next.exported; + } + return { kind: "missing" }; +} + +/** + * Walk the activation call graph from `activateLab` and report every node that could suspend it. + * + * Depth one was the defect. `activateLab` calls installLabAutomationRuntime and + * startAutomationIfEnabled without awaiting them, so making either async with an await before + * its registration call left `activateLab` parsing as synchronous and the guard green while the + * window it protects was already broken. + * + * Two things make a recursive walk usable here rather than a source of false positives. + * Nested functions are skipped by collectBodyLevelCalls, so a timer callback, a shutdown hook, + * a promise continuation and the deferred route executor are not treated as activation edges — + * they run later by construction. And receiver calls are not followed: a method that becomes + * async cannot suspend its caller unless the caller awaits it, and an await is exactly what + * bodyLevelAwaitLines reports on the caller's own body. + */ +export function walkActivationChain(options: { + root: string; + entryFile: string; + entrySource: string; + notWalked: ReadonlySet; + loadSource?: (file: string) => string; + maxNodes?: number; +}): ActivationWalk { + const load = options.loadSource ?? ((file: string) => readFileSync(file, "utf8")); + const maxNodes = options.maxNodes ?? 200; + const nodes = new Map(); + const failures: string[] = []; + const skipped = new Set(); + const external = new Set(); + const queue: Array<{ name: string; fromFile: string; fromSource: string }> = [ + { name: options.root, fromFile: options.entryFile, fromSource: options.entrySource }, + ]; + while (queue.length > 0) { + const item = queue.shift()!; + if (nodes.has(item.name)) continue; + if (nodes.size >= maxNodes) { + failures.push("activation chain exceeded " + maxNodes + " nodes; the walk is no longer bounded"); + break; + } + const resolved = resolveActivationCallee(item.name, item.fromFile, item.fromSource, load); + if (resolved.kind === "external") { external.add(item.name); continue; } + if (resolved.kind === "missing") { + failures.push(item.name + ": declaration not found from " + repoRel(item.fromFile)); + continue; + } + const { declaration } = resolved; + const where = item.name + " in " + repoRel(resolved.file); + if (declaration.async) failures.push(where + ": declared async"); + if (declaration.awaitLines.length > 0) { + failures.push(where + ": body-level await at relative line " + declaration.awaitLines.join(",")); + } + const callees = declaration.body === null ? [] : collectBodyLevelCalls(declaration.body).free; + nodes.set(item.name, { + name: item.name, + file: repoRel(resolved.file), + async: declaration.async, + awaitLines: declaration.awaitLines, + callees: [...callees].sort(), + }); + for (const callee of callees) { + if (options.notWalked.has(callee)) { skipped.add(callee); continue; } + if (nodes.has(callee)) continue; + queue.push({ name: callee, fromFile: resolved.file, fromSource: resolved.source }); + } + } + return { nodes, failures, skipped, external }; +} + describe("core / Compatibility Lab boundary", () => { // Guard 1: the obvious case, a direct import. test.each(PROTECTED)("%s has no direct src/lab import", file => { @@ -990,3 +1199,155 @@ describe("activation window stays synchronous", () => { }); }); + +/** + * Depth one was the whole defect, and #4704 is the report of it. + * + * The guard above follows the direct callees of `startServer`. That catches `activateLab` becoming + * async, but `activateLab` calls installLabAutomationRuntime and startAutomationIfEnabled + * without awaiting them. Making either of those async with an await before its registration + * call leaves `activateLab` parsing as perfectly synchronous, so every assertion above stays + * green while `startServer` returns before Lab is registered — and a policy route can then be + * evaluated before its evidence provider exists, which is the one thing the window exists to + * prevent. + * + * So this block walks the chain instead of sampling its first hop. What keeps a recursive walk + * from becoming the false-positive machine the depth-one comment warned about is what it + * refuses to follow: nested functions are already skipped by collectBodyLevelCalls, so timer + * callbacks, shutdown hooks, promise continuations and the deferred route executor are not + * treated as activation edges; receiver calls are not followed, because a method that turns + * async cannot suspend its caller unless the caller awaits it, and that await is reported on + * the caller's own body; and names imported from outside this repository are classified + * automatically rather than hand-listed. + */ +describe("Lab activation stays synchronous past the first hop", () => { + const indexPath = resolve(repoRoot, "src/server/index.ts"); + const indexSource = readFileSync(indexPath, "utf8"); + const labActivationPath = resolve(repoRoot, "src/lib/lab-activation.ts"); + const orchestratorPath = resolve(repoRoot, "src/lab/automation/orchestrator.ts"); + + /** + * Free identifiers in the chain that are not repository functions. Each one is listed with + * why following it is meaningless rather than skipped silently, which is the same contract + * UNRESOLVED_CALLEES holds for the window: a name that disappears from this list without + * disappearing from the chain fails the equality assertion below. + */ + const ACTIVATION_NOT_WALKED: Record = { + String: "Language builtin. Not a repository function and not suspendable.", + Symbol: "Language builtin, used for the automation runtime owner token.", + setInterval: "Host timer. Registers the scheduler tick and returns immediately; the callback is a nested function this walk does not treat as an activation edge.", + action: "The callback parameter of withConfigLock. It is invoked synchronously, but its body is the arrow written at the call site, which is a nested function inspected there rather than here.", + mutate: "The callback parameter of mutateLabAutomationState. Same shape as action.", + release: "A lock receipt returned by acquireConfigLock/acquireStateLock. A returned closure has no declaration to resolve from the call site.", + }; + + /** + * Nodes the walk must reach. Without this the whole block could pass by walking nothing: + * a resolver regression that stopped finding `activateLab` would produce an empty graph, zero + * failures and a green suite, which is precisely the failure mode being fixed. + */ + const REQUIRED_NODES = [ + "activateLab", + "installLabAutomationRuntime", + "startAutomationIfEnabled", + "registerLabPassiveRouteLinker", + "setCompatibilityEvidenceProvider", + "createProductionLabRouteExecutor", + "setLabAutomationDispatchDeps", + "labAutomationEnabledOnDisk", + "startLabAutomationScheduler", + "loadLabAutomationConfig", + "mutateLabAutomationState", + ]; + + function walk(loadSource?: (file: string) => string, entrySource = indexSource): ActivationWalk { + return walkActivationChain({ + root: "activateLab", + entryFile: indexPath, + entrySource, + notWalked: new Set(Object.keys(ACTIVATION_NOT_WALKED)), + loadSource, + }); + } + + test("every function the activation chain calls is synchronous", () => { + const result = walk(); + + expect(result.failures).toEqual([]); + for (const name of REQUIRED_NODES) expect([...result.nodes.keys()]).toContain(name); + // A floor, not an exact count: the chain is allowed to grow, and pinning its size would + // turn an ordinary Lab refactor into a failure of this guard. + expect(result.nodes.size).toBeGreaterThan(20); + // Every classified name must still be reachable, so the list cannot accumulate entries + // that no longer describe anything. + expect([...result.skipped].sort()).toEqual(Object.keys(ACTIVATION_NOT_WALKED).sort()); + // And the chain must actually leave this repository somewhere, which is the evidence that + // the external-import classification is doing work rather than matching nothing. + expect(result.external.size).toBeGreaterThan(0); + }); + + test("a nested callee turning async is reported, and depth one cannot see it", () => { + const mutated = readFileSync(labActivationPath, "utf8") + .replace("function installLabAutomationRuntime(", "async function installLabAutomationRuntime("); + expect(mutated).toContain("async function installLabAutomationRuntime("); + + const result = walk(file => (file === labActivationPath ? mutated : readFileSync(file, "utf8"))); + expect(result.failures).toContain("installLabAutomationRuntime in src/lib/lab-activation.ts: declared async"); + + // The same mutated source, read the way the depth-one scan reads it: activateLab is still + // a plain synchronous function with no body-level await. That is the green the guard used + // to report while the window was already broken. + expect(inspectFunctionDeclaration(mutated, "activateLab")).toEqual({ + found: true, + async: false, + awaitLines: [], + }); + }); + + test("an await added inside a nested callee is reported", () => { + const mutated = readFileSync(labActivationPath, "utf8") + .replace("const previous = record.runtime;", "const previous = await record.runtime;"); + expect(mutated).toContain("await record.runtime;"); + + const result = walk(file => (file === labActivationPath ? mutated : readFileSync(file, "utf8"))); + expect(result.failures.some(failure => + failure.startsWith("installLabAutomationRuntime in src/lib/lab-activation.ts: body-level await"), + )).toBe(true); + }); + + test("a suspension three hops down is reported", () => { + // startLabAutomationScheduler sits under startAutomationIfEnabled, which sits under + // activateLab. Nothing between them awaits, so this is the shape the previous guard was + // furthest from seeing. + const mutated = readFileSync(orchestratorPath, "utf8") + .replace("export function startLabAutomationScheduler(", "export async function startLabAutomationScheduler("); + expect(mutated).toContain("export async function startLabAutomationScheduler("); + + const result = walk(file => (file === orchestratorPath ? mutated : readFileSync(file, "utf8"))); + expect(result.failures).toContain( + "startLabAutomationScheduler in src/lab/automation/orchestrator.ts: declared async", + ); + }); + + test("the arrow inspector sees what the function-only inspector cannot", () => { + // activationKey is a const arrow with a return-type annotation. The function-only + // inspector reports it missing, and a walk that treated "missing" as "fine" would skip + // every const-arrow node in the chain. + expect(inspectFunctionDeclaration("const f = (a: string): string => a;", "f").found).toBe(false); + expect(inspectActivationDeclaration("const f = (a: string): string => a;", "f")).toEqual({ + found: true, + async: false, + awaitLines: [], + body: " a", + }); + expect(inspectActivationDeclaration("const f = async (): Promise => { await g(); };", "f")).toMatchObject({ + found: true, + async: true, + }); + expect(inspectActivationDeclaration("const f = (): void => { const x = 1; };", "f")).toMatchObject({ + found: true, + async: false, + awaitLines: [], + }); + }); +}); From a6b9eca585c990630a4a929d92c050fa3d32347b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:18:09 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 063/113] feat(responses): give the durable spend ledger a production caller (#4707) [skip ci] The #4546 work added a durable spend-reservation ledger so token, identity and pool ceilings survive a restart, and nothing in production reached it. The only call to admitWorkflowTurn() omitted its spend argument, so sharedSpendLedger() was never constructed, spend-ledger.jsonl was never created by ordinary traffic, and markDispatched, settle and abandon had no production caller at all. The ceilings the feature advertised stayed process-local and count-only. request-spend.ts is that caller. It books by observing the request's own send counter rather than by being called from each dispatch site: that counter moves exactly once per physical send -- a reservation increments it, a refund decrements it, and an externally reported send settles against a booking already counted -- so one entry per increment is one entry per send. A dispatch path added later cannot forget to book, which is the failure mode that produced an uncalled feature the first time. The observer may refuse. A ledger limit that could only describe a send after the fact would be no ceiling at all, so reserveDispatch consults it last, after every cheaper bound has passed, and a refusal denies the dispatch as spend-exhausted. Consulting it last matters because it is the only bound here that writes: an entry booked for a dispatch some other check would have refused is spend the request never makes, held against the scope until retention expires. A booking is confirmed dispatched only once a later send exists, because that later send proves the earlier one left. The newest stays open, so a reservation the budget hands back is still released for free. The cost is bounded and stated: a hard crash between reserving and sending replays as abandoned rather than unresolved, for at most one send per request. Settlement follows what the request learned. addFinalRequestLog is the one seam every request passes exactly once, whatever transport served it and however it ended, and the terminal usage is already known there. That usage belongs to the last send that left, so it settles with the real figure; every earlier send failed without reporting usage of its own and may still have been billed, so it becomes unresolved spend rather than free. A request that reports no usage at all -- a cancel, a lost stream -- leaves all of them unresolved. The ledger also now resolves what replay leaves behind. A reservation that survives restart has no owner: nothing in the new process can settle it, and leaving it live holds its tokens against the scope forever, which is a ceiling that only ever tightens. Deleting the entry is not the alternative, because that would hand the same send id a second reservation. An undispatched reservation never reached the wire and is abandoned; a dispatched one may already have been billed and becomes unresolved. Both are journaled, so a second restart has nothing left to redo. The reservation uses the caller's max_output_tokens as its output ceiling, captured in request-prepare before any body exists. A caller that omits it leaves the provider/model default in charge and reserves only the input estimate; settlement then books the real figure, so the gap is a looser bound up front rather than a wrong one after. The identity scope is the privacy-safe account label the request log already uses, and the ledger aliases it again on the way to disk, so no raw credential reaches either. The default policy still sets no token ceiling on any scope, so an unconfigured install accounts and reports without refusing anything. The operator configuration path for those limits is deliberately not in this change. Closes #4707 --- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 1 + src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts | 35 ++++- src/lib/spend-reservation-ledger.ts | 19 +++ src/server/request-log.ts | 14 ++ src/server/responses/core.ts | 6 +- src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts | 8 + src/server/responses/request-spend.ts | 136 +++++++++++++++++ structure/transports/responses.md | 35 +++++ tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 1 + tests/helpers/responses-core-source.ts | 1 + .../responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts | 140 ++++++++++++++++++ 11 files changed, 394 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/server/responses/request-spend.ts create mode 100644 tests/responses/responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index 885d2abcd4..0bb83a728b 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ }, "explicit": { "responses-core-modules.test.ts": "responses", + "responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts": "responses", "chat-responses-control-integration.test.ts": "responses", "coding-agent-tool-result-images.test.ts": "adapters", "hub-usage.test.ts": "server", diff --git a/src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts b/src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts index 7c75b27637..dc6f2cede9 100644 --- a/src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts +++ b/src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ export type BudgetDenial = | "final-recovery-spent" | "alternate-target-exhausted" | "target-transition-exhausted" + | "spend-exhausted" | "not-replay-safe"; export interface DispatchIntent { @@ -113,6 +114,26 @@ export type DispatchDecision = | { allowed: true; permit: SingleUseDispatchPermit } | { allowed: false; reason: BudgetDenial }; +/** + * Notified when this request's physical-send count moves. + * + * `spent` is the only number here that counts SENDS rather than intentions: a reservation + * increments it, a refund decrements it, and an externally reported send settles against a + * booking that was already counted. Anything that books one entry per increment therefore + * books exactly one entry per physical send -- which is what lets the durable spend ledger + * have a production caller without every dispatch site in the tree remembering to call it. + * + * `charge` may refuse, and a refusal denies the dispatch. That is deliberate: the ledger is + * the only bound here that survives a restart, so a limit it enforces has to be able to stop a + * send rather than merely describe one. + */ +export interface RequestSendObserver { + /** Book one physical send. False refuses the dispatch before the budget charges it. */ + charge(): boolean; + /** Give back a booking whose send never happened. */ + refund(): void; +} + /** * Carried on HandleResponsesOptions so a combo child, a rebuild and an alternate-account leg * all decrement the same holder. `used` is the existing #4605 counter and still counts every @@ -150,6 +171,7 @@ let logicalRequestSeq = 0; export function createRequestExecutionBudget( policy: RequestExecutionBudgetPolicy = CODEX_TEXT_GUARDED_BUDGET_POLICY, logicalRequestId?: string, + observer?: RequestSendObserver, ): RequestExecutionBudget { let spent = 0; // Reservations whose physical send is reported by a retry helper rather than by the permit. @@ -173,7 +195,12 @@ export function createRequestExecutionBudget( } const settled = Math.min(delta, pendingExternalSends); pendingExternalSends -= settled; - spent += delta - settled; + const charged = delta - settled; + spent += charged; + // These sends have already left. The ledger records them even past a ceiling it would + // have refused, because refusing after the fact only hides spend that was really + // incurred -- the refusal has to happen at the reservation below, or not at all. + for (let index = 0; index < charged; index += 1) observer?.charge(); }, logicalRequestId: logicalRequestId ?? `lr-${Date.now().toString(36)}-${(logicalRequestSeq += 1).toString(36)}`, policyVersion: REQUEST_BUDGET_POLICY_VERSION, @@ -213,6 +240,11 @@ export function createRequestExecutionBudget( } } + // Consulted last, because it is the only bound here that WRITES. A ledger entry booked + // for a dispatch a cheaper check above would have refused is spend this request never + // makes, and it would hold those tokens against the scope until retention expired. + if (observer && !observer.charge()) return { allowed: false, reason: "spend-exhausted" }; + // THE RESERVATION IS THE CHARGE. Deciding here and charging in `use()` left a window in // which two legs read the same remainder, both received a permit, and both dispatched: // one remaining send admitted two physical sends, which is the per-request multiplication @@ -256,6 +288,7 @@ export function createRequestExecutionBudget( pendingExternalSends -= 1; } spent -= 1; + observer?.refund(); if (drawsReserve) reserveSpent = false; if (isAlternateTarget) alternateTargetSends -= 1; if (changesTarget) targetTransitions -= 1; diff --git a/src/lib/spend-reservation-ledger.ts b/src/lib/spend-reservation-ledger.ts index 21cdd78c72..1aeb389333 100644 --- a/src/lib/spend-reservation-ledger.ts +++ b/src/lib/spend-reservation-ledger.ts @@ -669,6 +669,25 @@ export function createSpendReservationLedger(options: { case "checkpoint": applyCheckpoint(record); break; } } + // A reservation that survived replay has no owner left. The process that made it is gone, + // so nothing in this one can ever settle it, and leaving it live holds its tokens against + // the scope forever -- a ceiling that only ever tightens, which is the opposite of the + // bound this store exists to keep. Deleting the entry is not the alternative: that would + // hand the same send id a second reservation. + // + // The distinction is the one the rest of the module already draws. An UNDISPATCHED + // reservation never reached the wire, so it is abandoned and its tokens come back. A + // DISPATCHED one may already have been billed, so it becomes unresolved spend. Both are + // appended, so the file agrees with memory and the next restart has nothing left to do. + const reconciledAt = now(); + for (const [send, reservation] of reservations) { + if (!isLive(reservation.status)) continue; + const abandoned = reservation.status === "open"; + applyResolve(send, abandoned ? "abandoned" : "lost", 0, reconciledAt); + append(abandoned + ? { v: 1, kind: "abandon", send, at: reconciledAt } + : { v: 1, kind: "lost", send, at: reconciledAt }); + } } /** diff --git a/src/server/request-log.ts b/src/server/request-log.ts index b7f486053d..d9cf83361f 100644 --- a/src/server/request-log.ts +++ b/src/server/request-log.ts @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import { readCodexCatalogPath } from "../codex/catalog"; import type { AttemptTierOutcome, OcxProviderConfig, OcxUsage } from "../types"; import { normalizeRouteDecisionTrace, type RouteDecisionTraceV1 } from "../routing/trace"; import type { AdapterRequest } from "../adapters/base"; +import type { RequestSpendSettlement } from "./responses/request-spend"; import type { AdapterTierMetadata } from "../providers/fastwire"; import { redactSecretString, sanitizeLogMetadataString } from "../lib/redact"; import { @@ -138,6 +139,15 @@ export interface RequestLogContext { preserveResolvedModelFromRoute?: boolean; usage?: OcxUsage; usageLogInputTokens?: number; + /** + * The output ceiling this request may actually spend, for the durable spend reservation + * (#4707). Captured from the caller's `max_output_tokens`; absent when the caller omitted it + * and the adapter's own provider/model default decides, in which case only the input estimate + * is reserved up front and settlement corrects it. + */ + spendOutputCeilingTokens?: number; + /** Settles this request's durable spend entries from `addFinalRequestLog`. */ + spendTracker?: RequestSpendSettlement; attempts?: PersistedUsageAttempt[]; /** Internal mutable final attempt; omitted from RequestLogEntry/JSONL. */ activeAttempt?: PersistedUsageAttempt; @@ -1244,6 +1254,10 @@ export function addFinalRequestLog( if (errorCode) logCtx.activeAttempt.errorCode = errorCode; else delete logCtx.activeAttempt.errorCode; } + // The one seam every request passes exactly once, whatever transport served it and however + // it ended. The terminal usage belongs to the last send that left; the ledger resolves every + // earlier send of this request as unresolved spend rather than handing its tokens back. + logCtx.spendTracker?.settle(logCtx.usage); const existing = finalizedUsage( logCtx.providerAdapter ?? logCtx.provider, logCtx.usage, diff --git a/src/server/responses/core.ts b/src/server/responses/core.ts index 1bef92779a..d09bfafb8c 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/core.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/core.ts @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import { createTranslatorBudget } from "../../lib/translator-budget"; import { captureExplicitOpenAiCallerAuth } from "../../providers/openai-sidecar"; import { captureCallerDirectAuth } from "../../providers/caller-authorization"; import { createRequestExecutionBudget } from "../../lib/request-execution-budget"; +import { attachRequestSpendTracker } from "./request-spend"; import { finalizeOwnedTranslatorBudget } from "./core-lifetime"; import type { TranslatorBudget } from "../../lib/translator-budget"; import { executeComboResponses } from "./core-combo"; @@ -58,7 +59,10 @@ export async function handleResponses( translatorBudget, // Created once at genuine ingress; a combo child arrives with the parent's holder already // in options and must not start a fresh allowance. - sendBudget: options.sendBudget ?? createRequestExecutionBudget(), + // The spend observer is installed with it, for the same reason: a child inherits the + // parent's ledger entries instead of opening a second set for the same physical sends. + sendBudget: options.sendBudget + ?? createRequestExecutionBudget(undefined, undefined, attachRequestSpendTracker(req, logCtx)), }); return ownsBudget ? finalizeOwnedTranslatorBudget(response, translatorBudget) : response; } catch (error) { diff --git a/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts b/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts index 81ffeb013f..c5d19d42f0 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts @@ -365,6 +365,14 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( } logCtx.requestedModel = parsed.modelId; logCtx.requestedEffort = parsed.options.reasoning; + // What this request may spend beyond its input, for the durable spend reservation (#4707). + // Read from the caller rather than from the adapter's serialized body, because the + // reservation has to exist before the body does. A caller that omits it leaves the + // provider/model default in charge and reserves only the input estimate; settlement then + // books the real figure, so the gap is a looser bound up front, never a wrong one after. + if (typeof parsed.options.maxOutputTokens === "number" && parsed.options.maxOutputTokens > 0) { + logCtx.spendOutputCeilingTokens = Math.trunc(parsed.options.maxOutputTokens); + } logCtx.callerServiceTier = sanitizeLogMetadataString(parsed.options.serviceTier); logCtx.requestedServiceTier = parsed.options.serviceTier; logCtx.requestedSpeedLabel = requestLogSpeedLabel(parsed.options.serviceTier); diff --git a/src/server/responses/request-spend.ts b/src/server/responses/request-spend.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0f7c088c05 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/server/responses/request-spend.ts @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; +import type { RequestSendObserver } from "../../lib/request-execution-budget"; +import { sharedSpendLedger, type SpendReservationLedger } from "../../lib/spend-reservation-ledger"; +import type { RequestLogContext } from "../request-log"; + +/** The terminal usage a request reported, in the only two fields the ledger books. */ +export interface TerminalSpendUsage { + inputTokens?: number; + outputTokens?: number; +} + +/** Settles one request's durable spend entries once its terminal usage is known. */ +export interface RequestSpendSettlement { + settle(usage: TerminalSpendUsage | undefined): void; +} + +export interface RequestSpendTracker extends RequestSendObserver, RequestSpendSettlement { + /** Dispatches this request lost to a ledger ceiling. Zero on every ordinary request. */ + readonly refusals: number; +} + +/** + * One request's entries in the durable spend ledger (#4707). + * + * The ledger has had the whole reserve/dispatch/settle vocabulary since #4546 and no production + * caller: `spend-ledger.jsonl` was never created by ordinary traffic, and the ceilings the + * feature advertised stayed process-local and count-only, resetting on restart. This is the + * caller. + * + * It books one entry per physical send by observing the request's own send counter rather than + * by being called from each dispatch site. That counter moves exactly once per physical send, + * so one entry per increment is one entry per send -- and a dispatch path added later cannot + * forget to book, which is how the previous wiring attempt ended up with no caller at all. + * + * Settlement follows what the request actually learned. The terminal usage belongs to the LAST + * send that left, so that one settles with the real figure. Every earlier send failed without + * reporting usage of its own and may still have been billed, so it becomes unresolved spend + * rather than free. A request that ends with no usage at all -- a cancel, a lost stream -- + * leaves all of them unresolved, which is the conservative answer this ledger exists to give. + */ +export function createRequestSpendTracker( + logCtx: Pick< + RequestLogContext, + "provider" | "accountLogLabel" | "usageLogInputTokens" | "spendOutputCeilingTokens" + >, + rootId: string | undefined, + ledger: SpendReservationLedger = sharedSpendLedger(), +): RequestSpendTracker { + // Every send this request still owes the ledger an answer for, oldest first. + const live: string[] = []; + let refusals = 0; + let resolved = false; + /** + * Confirm the sends this request has already moved past. + * + * A booking is only marked dispatched once a LATER send exists, because that later send + * proves the earlier one left. The newest booking stays open until it is settled, so a + * reservation the budget hands back -- a rotation that found no alternate, a rebuild + * abandoned before the wire -- can still be released for free. The cost of that choice is + * bounded and stated: a hard crash between reserving and sending replays as abandoned rather + * than unresolved, for at most one send per request. + */ + const confirmOlderSends = (): void => { + for (let index = 0; index < live.length - 1; index += 1) ledger.markDispatched(live[index] as string); + }; + return { + charge(): boolean { + const sendId = randomUUID(); + const decision = ledger.reserve({ + sendId, + scopes: { + ...(rootId !== undefined ? { rootId } : {}), + // Already the privacy-safe label the request log uses, and the ledger aliases it + // again on the way to disk. A raw credential never reaches either. + ...(logCtx.accountLogLabel !== undefined ? { identityId: logCtx.accountLogLabel } : {}), + ...(logCtx.provider !== undefined ? { poolId: logCtx.provider } : {}), + }, + inputTokens: logCtx.usageLogInputTokens ?? 0, + outputCeilingTokens: logCtx.spendOutputCeilingTokens ?? 0, + }); + if (!decision.reserved) { + refusals += 1; + return false; + } + live.push(sendId); + confirmOlderSends(); + return true; + }, + refund(): void { + const sendId = live.pop(); + if (sendId === undefined) return; + // Undispatched, so this returns the tokens. If the send was already confirmed by a later + // one, `abandon` refuses and unresolved is the only honest outcome left. + if (!ledger.abandon(sendId)) ledger.markLost(sendId); + }, + settle(usage: TerminalSpendUsage | undefined): void { + if (resolved) return; + resolved = true; + const terminal = live.pop(); + if (terminal !== undefined) { + const reported = typeof usage?.inputTokens === "number" || typeof usage?.outputTokens === "number"; + if (reported) { + ledger.settle(terminal, { + inputTokens: usage?.inputTokens ?? 0, + outputTokens: usage?.outputTokens ?? 0, + }); + } else { + // The response never reported usage. It may still have been billed. + ledger.markLost(terminal); + } + } + for (const sendId of live.splice(0)) ledger.markLost(sendId); + }, + get refusals(): number { return refusals; }, + }; +} + +/** + * Give a request a spend tracker and hand back the observer its budget reports through. + * + * The tracker is parked on the log context because `addFinalRequestLog` is the one seam every + * request passes exactly once, whatever transport served it and however it ended, and it is + * where the terminal usage is already known. + */ +export function attachRequestSpendTracker( + req: Pick, + logCtx: RequestLogContext, + ledger?: SpendReservationLedger, +): RequestSendObserver { + const rootId = req.headers.get("x-codex-parent-thread-id")?.trim() || undefined; + const tracker = ledger === undefined + ? createRequestSpendTracker(logCtx, rootId) + : createRequestSpendTracker(logCtx, rootId, ledger); + logCtx.spendTracker = tracker; + return tracker; +} diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 648d78afe5..416984e5ef 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -645,6 +645,7 @@ is composed from the following owners in `src/server/responses/`; none is a gene | `request-sidecar-auth.ts` | Sidecar credential resolution and vision preprocessing. | | `response-effects.ts` | Completion notification, replay publication and live request-tool aliases. | | `request-send-budget.ts` | Request-wide send accounting, remaining allowance and the pending recovery permit. | +| `request-spend.ts` | This request's entries in the durable spend ledger: one per physical send, settled from the terminal usage. | | `passthrough-execution.ts` | Native host-lease transfer and the enclosing dispatch/delivery `finally`. | | `passthrough-dispatch.ts` | Native request preparation, upstream sends and pre-commit recovery. | | `passthrough-delivery.ts` | Native HTTP/SSE/JSON delivery, rewrite/inspection and terminal accounting. | @@ -715,3 +716,37 @@ nor releases. That is not a lost send; it is a send the request never made, spen later recovery in the same request then cannot have. `tests/lib/execution-budget-permits.test.ts` pins the settlement rule and every ladder shape against exactly that, and `tests/responses/responses-core-modules.test.ts` pins the adapter view's live delegation. + +## Durable spend reservations + +The request's send budget bounds how many times it may reach upstream; the spend ledger bounds +what those sends may cost, and it is the only bound here that survives a restart. Its production +caller is `request-spend.ts`, installed on the execution budget at genuine ingress in `core.ts` +and parked on the log context so `addFinalRequestLog` can settle it. + +It books by observing the budget's own send counter rather than by being called from each +dispatch site. That counter moves exactly once per physical send — a reservation increments it, a +refund decrements it, and an externally reported send settles against a booking already counted — +so one ledger entry per increment is one entry per send, and a dispatch path added later cannot +forget to book. The previous attempt at this wiring shipped the whole reserve/dispatch/settle +vocabulary with no caller at all (#4707), which is the failure mode this shape rules out. + +A booking is confirmed dispatched only once a LATER send exists, because that later send proves +the earlier one left. The newest booking stays open, so a reservation the budget hands back can +still be released for free. The stated cost: a hard crash between reserving and sending replays +as abandoned rather than unresolved, for at most one send per request. + +Settlement follows what the request learned. The terminal usage belongs to the last send that +left, so that one settles with the real figure; every earlier send failed without reporting usage +of its own and may still have been billed, so it becomes unresolved spend rather than free. A +request that reports no usage at all leaves all of them unresolved. + +Replay resolves what nobody is left to settle: an undispatched reservation is abandoned and a +dispatched one becomes unresolved, both journaled so a second restart has nothing to redo. +Without it a reservation whose process died held its tokens against the scope forever, which is a +ceiling that only tightens. `tests/responses/responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts` pins the +booking, the settlement split, the refund, a ceiling that refuses a dispatch rather than +describing it afterwards, and the restart. + +The default policy still sets no token ceiling on any scope, so an unconfigured install accounts +and reports without refusing. The operator configuration path for those limits is not wired yet. diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index d2eb5d244b..0d94177e33 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ { "responses-core-modules.test.ts": "responses", + "responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts": "responses", "chat-responses-control-integration.test.ts": "responses", "coding-agent-tool-result-images.test.ts": "adapters", "hub-usage.test.ts": "server", diff --git a/tests/helpers/responses-core-source.ts b/tests/helpers/responses-core-source.ts index 35fea3be44..996d66ccdf 100644 --- a/tests/helpers/responses-core-source.ts +++ b/tests/helpers/responses-core-source.ts @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ export const RESPONSES_CORE_MODULES = [ "request-sidecar-auth.ts", "response-effects.ts", "request-send-budget.ts", + "request-spend.ts", "passthrough-execution.ts", "passthrough-dispatch.ts", "passthrough-delivery.ts", diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fb7a724d36 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/responses/responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { + createSpendReservationLedger, + DEFAULT_SPEND_RESERVATION_POLICY, + type SpendJournal, +} from "../../src/lib/spend-reservation-ledger"; +import { createRequestExecutionBudget } from "../../src/lib/request-execution-budget"; +import { createRequestSpendTracker } from "../../src/server/responses/request-spend"; + +/** + * The durable spend ledger had no production caller (#4707). + * + * Every verb existed -- reserve, markDispatched, settle, abandon, markLost -- and nothing in + * the request path reached any of them, so `spend-ledger.jsonl` was never written by ordinary + * traffic and the ceilings the feature advertised stayed process-local and count-only. + * + * These pin the three properties the wiring has to have: one entry per physical send, a + * settlement that tells the send that reported usage apart from the ones that did not, and a + * restart that neither resets a ceiling nor hands back tokens that may already have been + * billed. + */ +const memoryJournal = (): SpendJournal & { lines: string[] } => { + const lines: string[] = []; + return { + lines, + read: () => [...lines], + append: (line: string) => { lines.push(line); }, + rewrite: (next: string[]) => { lines.splice(0, lines.length, ...next); }, + }; +}; + +const logContext = (overrides: Record = {}) => ({ + provider: "test-pool", + accountLogLabel: "k0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", + usageLogInputTokens: 100, + spendOutputCeilingTokens: 400, + ...overrides, +}) as Parameters[0]; + +describe("the request path books every physical send on the durable ledger", () => { + test("one entry per charged send, and the terminal send settles with the real usage", () => { + const journal = memoryJournal(); + const ledger = createSpendReservationLedger({ journal }); + const tracker = createRequestSpendTracker(logContext(), "root-a", ledger); + const budget = createRequestExecutionBudget(undefined, "lr-test", tracker); + + // A physical send is charged once by the request budget, so it is booked once here. + const first = budget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "initial", targetKey: "p|m" }); + expect(first.allowed).toBe(true); + expect(ledger.snapshot("root", "root-a")?.reserved).toBe(500); + + // A retry helper reporting its own send is the same shape: one report, one entry. + budget.used += 1; + expect(ledger.snapshot("root", "root-a")?.reserved).toBe(1000); + + // The terminal usage belongs to the send that produced it; the earlier one failed without + // reporting any and may still have been billed, so it is unresolved rather than free. + tracker.settle({ inputTokens: 120, outputTokens: 30 }); + const root = ledger.snapshot("root", "root-a"); + expect(root?.reserved).toBe(0); + expect(root?.settled).toBe(150); + expect(root?.unresolved).toBe(500); + }); + + test("a request that reports no usage leaves every send unresolved, not free", () => { + const ledger = createSpendReservationLedger({ journal: memoryJournal() }); + const tracker = createRequestSpendTracker(logContext(), "root-b", ledger); + const budget = createRequestExecutionBudget(undefined, "lr-cancel", tracker); + budget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "initial", targetKey: "p|m" }); + budget.used += 1; + + tracker.settle(undefined); + const root = ledger.snapshot("root", "root-b"); + expect(root?.reserved).toBe(0); + expect(root?.settled).toBe(0); + expect(root?.unresolved).toBe(1000); + }); + + test("a reservation the budget hands back releases its tokens instead of booking spend", () => { + const ledger = createSpendReservationLedger({ journal: memoryJournal() }); + const tracker = createRequestSpendTracker(logContext(), "root-c", ledger); + const budget = createRequestExecutionBudget(undefined, "lr-refund", tracker); + + const reserved = budget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "account-failover", targetKey: "p|m" }); + expect(reserved.allowed).toBe(true); + expect(ledger.snapshot("root", "root-c")?.reserved).toBe(500); + if (!reserved.allowed) throw new Error("unreachable"); + + // No alternate credential existed, so nothing left this process. + reserved.permit.release(); + const root = ledger.snapshot("root", "root-c"); + expect(root?.reserved).toBe(0); + expect(root?.unresolved).toBe(0); + expect(root?.settled).toBe(0); + }); + + test("a ledger ceiling refuses the dispatch instead of describing it afterwards", () => { + const ledger = createSpendReservationLedger({ + journal: memoryJournal(), + policy: { ...DEFAULT_SPEND_RESERVATION_POLICY, root: { maxTokens: 900 } }, + }); + const tracker = createRequestSpendTracker(logContext(), "root-d", ledger); + const budget = createRequestExecutionBudget(undefined, "lr-ceiling", tracker); + + expect(budget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "initial", targetKey: "p|m" }).allowed).toBe(true); + const refused = budget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "transient", targetKey: "p|m" }); + expect(refused.allowed).toBe(false); + if (refused.allowed) throw new Error("unreachable"); + expect(refused.reason).toBe("spend-exhausted"); + // Refused before the budget charged it, so the send is not counted either. + expect(budget.used).toBe(1); + expect(tracker.refusals).toBe(1); + }); + + test("a restart resolves the reservations nobody is left to settle", () => { + const journal = memoryJournal(); + const before = createSpendReservationLedger({ journal }); + const tracker = createRequestSpendTracker(logContext(), "root-e", before); + const budget = createRequestExecutionBudget(undefined, "lr-crash", tracker); + // Two sends left; the process dies before either is settled. + budget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "initial", targetKey: "p|m" }); + budget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "transient", targetKey: "p|m" }); + expect(before.snapshot("root", "root-e")?.reserved).toBe(1000); + + const after = createSpendReservationLedger({ journal }); + const root = after.snapshot("root", "root-e"); + // Nothing stays reserved: a reservation with no owner would hold its tokens forever. + expect(root?.reserved).toBe(0); + // The confirmed send may already have been billed, so it keeps its tokens as unresolved; + // the one still open never reached the wire and gives them back. + expect(root?.unresolved).toBe(500); + expect(root?.settled).toBe(0); + + // Replaying the same journal again is idempotent: the reconciliation was journaled, so a + // second restart has nothing left to resolve and cannot double-book it. + const third = createSpendReservationLedger({ journal }); + expect(third.snapshot("root", "root-e")?.unresolved).toBe(500); + expect(third.snapshot("root", "root-e")?.reserved).toBe(0); + }); +}); From 2ace217bf120123f747ecbb68ba216de0a954d6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:21:13 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 064/113] fix(scripts): name the size exemptions after the reason they exist (#4706) [skip ci] GENERATED_PATHS exempted twelve files from every size cap, and eleven of them were hand-maintained: nine i18n catalogues, a hand-curated benchmarks snapshot, and the model-metadata generator's INPUT. Its output, src/generated/model- metadata.ts, is 108 lines and was scanned normally, so the one file the list was named after was the one file it did not describe. Exempting catalogues and data snapshots is a reasonable policy. Calling them generated is what invites the next hand-written file onto the list, because a name is a claim nothing checks. The exemption is now three exact allowlists, each carrying its own reason. GENERATED_PATHS holds only agent_pb.ts, which opens with a protoc-gen-es banner. I18N_CATALOG_PATHS holds the nine locale catalogues, exempt because they grow by one line per UI string in nine locales at once, so a cap would block every new string in the GUI rather than any oversized module. DATA_SNAPSHOT_PATHS holds the two records whose size tracks how much was recorded. EXEMPT_PATHS is their union, and the verdict and baseline field are renamed from GENERATED to EXEMPT to match. loadBaseline still accepts the old key so a branch written before the rename loads instead of failing with a shape error that explains nothing. The classification is now checkable against the files themselves: every path in GENERATED_PATHS must carry a generator banner, and no path in the other two lists may. The positive control is the generator's real output, which carries the banner, is not exempt, and is scanned under a cap. The exemption relies on --update never turning an exemption into a cap, so that is asserted directly alongside the Math.min rule that only ever lowers one. Closes #4706 --- scripts/file-size-ratchet.ts | 64 +++++++++-- tests/ci-workflows/file-size-ratchet.test.ts | 107 +++++++++++++++---- tests/fixtures/file-size-baseline.json | 10 +- 3 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/file-size-ratchet.ts b/scripts/file-size-ratchet.ts index d524aff7c5..6c017a8681 100644 --- a/scripts/file-size-ratchet.ts +++ b/scripts/file-size-ratchet.ts @@ -28,9 +28,26 @@ export const EXCLUDED_PREFIXES = [ export const EXCLUDED_EXACT = new Set(["bun.lock", "gui/dist"]); +/** + * Machine-generated output. Regenerating it is the only way it changes, so a line count is + * a fact about the generator rather than about anyone's editing habits. + * + * Exactly one file qualifies, and it says so on its first line + * (@generated by protoc-gen-es). The test beside this list reads that banner rather than + * trusting the name, because "generated" was doing no work here: eleven hand-maintained + * files sat on this list, and calling them generated is what invites the twelfth. + */ export const GENERATED_PATHS = [ - "scripts/model-metadata.source.json", "src/adapters/cursor/gen/agent_pb.ts", +] as const; + +/** + * Translation catalogues. Hand-written, and exempt for a different reason: they grow by one + * line per UI string in nine locales at once, so a cap would block every new string in the + * GUI rather than any oversized module. gui/src/i18n/en.ts describes itself as the TKey + * source of truth; nothing generates these. + */ +export const I18N_CATALOG_PATHS = [ "gui/src/i18n/de.ts", "gui/src/i18n/en.ts", "gui/src/i18n/fr.ts", @@ -40,19 +57,37 @@ export const GENERATED_PATHS = [ "gui/src/i18n/tr.ts", "gui/src/i18n/zh.ts", "gui/src/i18n/zh-TW.ts", +] as const; + +/** + * Hand-maintained data snapshots. Records, not code: their size tracks how much was recorded, + * and splitting one would hide provenance rather than reduce complexity. + * + * model-metadata.source.json is the generator's INPUT, which is why naming it generated was + * backwards. Its output, src/generated/model-metadata.ts, is 108 lines and is scanned normally. + */ +export const DATA_SNAPSHOT_PATHS = [ "docs-site/src/data/frontier-benchmarks.json", + "scripts/model-metadata.source.json", ] as const; +/** Every path exempt from a size cap, whatever the reason. */ +export const EXEMPT_PATHS = [ + ...GENERATED_PATHS, + ...I18N_CATALOG_PATHS, + ...DATA_SNAPSHOT_PATHS, +].sort() as readonly string[]; + export type Verdict = | "NEW_OVERSIZED" | "GREW" | "SHRANK" - | "GENERATED" + | "EXEMPT" | "UNCHANGED" | "NEW_OK"; export type Baseline = { - generated: string[]; + exempt: string[]; files: Record; }; @@ -76,9 +111,9 @@ export function isScannedPath(path: string): boolean { } export function evaluate(files: FileSize[], baseline: Baseline): Evaluation[] { - const generated = new Set(baseline.generated); + const exempt = new Set(baseline.exempt); return files.map((file) => { - if (generated.has(file.path)) return { ...file, verdict: "GENERATED" }; + if (exempt.has(file.path)) return { ...file, verdict: "EXEMPT" }; const cap = baseline.files[file.path]; if (cap === undefined) { return { ...file, verdict: file.lines >= THRESHOLD ? "NEW_OVERSIZED" : "NEW_OK" }; @@ -115,11 +150,18 @@ export function scanRepo(repoRoot: string): FileSize[] { } export function loadBaseline(text: string): Baseline { - const parsed = JSON.parse(text) as Baseline; + const raw = JSON.parse(text) as Partial & { generated?: unknown }; + // "generated" was the field's name while it also held i18n catalogues and data snapshots. + // Reading it as exempt keeps a branch written before the rename loadable instead of + // failing with a shape error that says nothing about what changed. + const parsed = { + ...raw, + exempt: Array.isArray(raw.exempt) ? raw.exempt : raw.generated, + } as Baseline; if ( !parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" - || !Array.isArray(parsed.generated) + || !Array.isArray(parsed.exempt) || typeof parsed.files !== "object" || parsed.files === null || Array.isArray(parsed.files) @@ -144,13 +186,13 @@ export function updateBaseline(current: FileSize[], baseline: Baseline, seed: bo files[path] = Math.min(cap, lines); } if (seed) { - const generated = new Set(baseline.generated); + const exempt = new Set(baseline.exempt); for (const [path, lines] of now) { - if (generated.has(path) || lines < THRESHOLD || files[path] !== undefined) continue; + if (exempt.has(path) || lines < THRESHOLD || files[path] !== undefined) continue; files[path] = lines; } } - return { generated: [...baseline.generated], files: sortRecord(files) }; + return { exempt: [...baseline.exempt], files: sortRecord(files) }; } export function formatOffenders(rows: Evaluation[]): string { @@ -166,7 +208,7 @@ if (import.meta.main) { const existed = existsSync(baselinePath); const baseline: Baseline = existed ? loadBaseline(readFileSync(baselinePath, "utf8")) - : { generated: [...GENERATED_PATHS], files: {} }; + : { exempt: [...EXEMPT_PATHS], files: {} }; const current = scanRepo(repoRoot); if (process.argv.includes("--update")) { const next = updateBaseline(current, baseline, !existed); diff --git a/tests/ci-workflows/file-size-ratchet.test.ts b/tests/ci-workflows/file-size-ratchet.test.ts index 4b6cbdb611..7c08d3e1a9 100644 --- a/tests/ci-workflows/file-size-ratchet.test.ts +++ b/tests/ci-workflows/file-size-ratchet.test.ts @@ -13,7 +13,10 @@ import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; * Source-oracle reads go through tests/helpers/repo-root.ts (INV-TESTS-01). */ import { + DATA_SNAPSHOT_PATHS, + EXEMPT_PATHS, GENERATED_PATHS, + I18N_CATALOG_PATHS, THRESHOLD, countLines, evaluate, @@ -32,11 +35,13 @@ import { repoPath, repoRoot } from "../helpers/repo-root"; * green" test would stay green if evaluate() started returning NEW_OK for a * 2,000-line new file, as long as this tree had no such file today. * - * Five pure cases plus one repository scan. Do not add a seventh test(): - * SHRANK already covers updateBaseline (lower, drop missing, never raise, - * seed only when asked). + * Five pure cases plus one repository scan cover evaluate() and updateBaseline; + * SHRANK already covers the update rules (lower, drop missing, never raise, seed + * only when asked), so do not add another case for those. The classification + * block below asserts a different property: that each exemption is on the list + * for the reason the list claims. */ -const emptyBaseline = (): Baseline => ({ generated: [], files: {} }); +const emptyBaseline = (): Baseline => ({ exempt: [], files: {} }); const linesOf = (count: number): string => { const rows = Array.from({ length: count }, (_, i) => `line ${i}`); @@ -74,7 +79,7 @@ describe("file-size ratchet: caps", () => { // Grandfathered files may stay oversized, but they may not grow. Equality is // UNCHANGED, not SHRANK; a test that only checked isOffender() would not notice // if equality started reporting GREW. - const baseline: Baseline = { generated: [], files: { "src/config.ts": 4707 } }; + const baseline: Baseline = { exempt: [], files: { "src/config.ts": 4707 } }; const grew = evaluate([{ path: "src/config.ts", lines: 4708 }], baseline); const same = evaluate([{ path: "src/config.ts", lines: 4707 }], baseline); @@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ describe("file-size ratchet: caps", () => { // must not re-grandfather a new godfile, must not raise a cap, and must keep a // shrunken former godfile so the facade cannot grow back. const baseline: Baseline = { - generated: [], + exempt: [], files: { "src/keep.ts": 2100, "src/gone.ts": 2500, "src/small.ts": 800 }, }; const current: FileSize[] = [ @@ -117,13 +122,13 @@ describe("file-size ratchet: caps", () => { // A later --update must never raise. If it did, ratchet:update would launder GREW. const notRaised = updateBaseline( [{ path: "src/keep.ts", lines: 3000 }], - { generated: [], files: { "src/keep.ts": 2099 } }, + { exempt: [], files: { "src/keep.ts": 2099 } }, false, ); expect(notRaised.files["src/keep.ts"]).toBe(2099); // seed=true is the first-commit path only (baseline file missing). Exempt - // generated paths stay out of files even at 9000 lines. Under-threshold files + // exempt paths stay out of files even at 9000 lines. Under-threshold files // stay out so the 2,000 cap remains the policy for new modules. const seeded = updateBaseline( [ @@ -131,27 +136,27 @@ describe("file-size ratchet: caps", () => { { path: "src/fresh.ts", lines: 1800 }, { path: "gui/src/i18n/en.ts", lines: 9000 }, ], - { generated: ["gui/src/i18n/en.ts"], files: {} }, + { exempt: ["gui/src/i18n/en.ts"], files: {} }, true, ); expect(seeded.files).toEqual({ "src/old.ts": 2500 }); }); - test("GENERATED: baseline.generated 경로는 커져도 통과", () => { - // Exact paths only. A sibling under cursor/gen/ that is not in generated[] is a + test("EXEMPT: baseline.exempt 경로는 커져도 통과", () => { + // Exact paths only. A sibling under cursor/gen/ that is not in exempt[] is a // new oversized file, even though a glob would have exempted the whole directory. const path = "src/adapters/cursor/gen/agent_pb.ts"; const baseline: Baseline = { - generated: [path], + exempt: [path], files: { [path]: 100 }, }; const rows = evaluate([{ path, lines: 99_999 }], baseline); - expect(rows).toEqual([{ path, lines: 99_999, verdict: "GENERATED" }]); + expect(rows).toEqual([{ path, lines: 99_999, verdict: "EXEMPT" }]); expect(rows.filter(isOffender)).toEqual([]); const globWouldHaveCaught = evaluate( [{ path: "src/adapters/cursor/gen/hand-written.ts", lines: 2500 }], - { generated: [path], files: {} }, + { exempt: [path], files: {} }, ); expect(globWouldHaveCaught[0]?.verdict).toBe("NEW_OVERSIZED"); }); @@ -192,11 +197,11 @@ describe("file-size ratchet: repository", () => { test("저장소 스캔: 커밋된 기준선 대비 offender가 없다", () => { // Mirrors tests/ci-workflows/repo-hygiene.test.ts: git ls-files + expect([]). // An empty scan would also equal [], so scanned.length > 0 is the non-vacuous - // guard. generated[] is the committed JSON, not the script constant used alone. + // guard. exempt[] is the committed JSON, not the script constant used alone. const baseline = loadBaseline( readFileSync(repoPath("tests/fixtures/file-size-baseline.json"), "utf8"), ); - expect(baseline.generated).toEqual([...GENERATED_PATHS]); + expect(baseline.exempt).toEqual([...EXEMPT_PATHS]); const scanned = scanRepo(repoRoot()); expect(scanned.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); @@ -206,7 +211,73 @@ describe("file-size ratchet: repository", () => { const rows = evaluate(scanned, baseline); expect(rows.filter(isOffender)).toEqual([]); expect( - rows.filter((row) => row.verdict === "GENERATED").map((row) => row.path).sort(), - ).toEqual([...GENERATED_PATHS].slice().sort()); + rows.filter((row) => row.verdict === "EXEMPT").map((row) => row.path).sort(), + ).toEqual([...EXEMPT_PATHS].slice().sort()); + }); +}); + +/** + * The list said "generated" and eleven of its twelve entries were hand-written. Nothing + * failed, because nothing checked: the name was the only claim, and a name cannot be wrong + * loudly. These two cases make the claim checkable — the first against the files themselves, + * the second against the update rule the exemption relies on. + */ +describe("file-size ratchet: exemption classification", () => { + const GENERATOR_BANNER = /@generated|DO NOT EDIT|Do not edit/; + + const headOf = (path: string): string => + readFileSync(repoPath(path), "utf8").split("\n").slice(0, 12).join("\n"); + + test("분류: 세 목록은 서로소이고 합집합이 면제 목록이다", () => { + const lists = [GENERATED_PATHS, I18N_CATALOG_PATHS, DATA_SNAPSHOT_PATHS].map(list => [...list]); + const all = lists.flat(); + + // Exact allowlists: no duplicates within a list, none across two lists, and the union is + // the exemption itself. A path that drifts into two categories would be exempt for two + // contradictory reasons and reviewable under neither. + expect(new Set(all).size).toBe(all.length); + expect([...all].sort()).toEqual([...EXEMPT_PATHS]); + expect(EXEMPT_PATHS.length).toBe(12); + + // Every exemption names a file that is actually here. A stale entry exempts nothing and + // hides the fact that the policy no longer describes this tree. + for (const path of EXEMPT_PATHS) expect(readFileSync(repoPath(path), "utf8").length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + }); + + test("분류: generated로 분류된 파일만 생성기 배너를 가진다", () => { + // The oracle is the file's own first lines, not this list. agent_pb.ts opens with + // "@generated by protoc-gen-es"; that is what makes it generated, and it is the only + // exemption that can say so. + for (const path of GENERATED_PATHS) expect(GENERATOR_BANNER.test(headOf(path))).toBe(true); + for (const path of [...I18N_CATALOG_PATHS, ...DATA_SNAPSHOT_PATHS]) { + expect(GENERATOR_BANNER.test(headOf(path))).toBe(false); + } + + // Positive control on the other side: the real output of the generator whose INPUT used to + // sit on the generated list does carry the banner, and is scanned under a cap like any + // other source file. Naming the input "generated" had it exactly backwards. + expect(GENERATOR_BANNER.test(headOf("src/generated/model-metadata.ts"))).toBe(true); + expect([...EXEMPT_PATHS]).not.toContain("src/generated/model-metadata.ts"); + expect(isScannedPath("src/generated/model-metadata.ts")).toBe(true); + }); + + test("면제: --update는 면제 경로에 캡을 만들지 않고 기존 캡을 올리지도 않는다", () => { + const exemptPath = "gui/src/i18n/en.ts"; + const baseline: Baseline = { exempt: [exemptPath], files: { "src/held.ts": 2500 } }; + const current: FileSize[] = [ + { path: exemptPath, lines: 9000 }, + { path: "src/held.ts", lines: 9999 }, + ]; + + // Seeding is the only path that adds caps, and it skips exempt paths: an exemption that + // silently acquired a cap would start failing on the next line added to a catalogue. + const seeded = updateBaseline(current, baseline, true); + expect(seeded.files[exemptPath]).toBeUndefined(); + expect(seeded.exempt).toEqual([exemptPath]); + // Math.min, so a file that grew keeps the cap it had. The ratchet only ever tightens. + expect(seeded.files["src/held.ts"]).toBe(2500); + + const shrunk = updateBaseline([{ path: "src/held.ts", lines: 40 }], baseline, false); + expect(shrunk.files["src/held.ts"]).toBe(40); }); }); diff --git a/tests/fixtures/file-size-baseline.json b/tests/fixtures/file-size-baseline.json index 462abdc1f5..619f6c8ff7 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/file-size-baseline.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/file-size-baseline.json @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ { - "generated": [ - "scripts/model-metadata.source.json", - "src/adapters/cursor/gen/agent_pb.ts", + "exempt": [ + "docs-site/src/data/frontier-benchmarks.json", "gui/src/i18n/de.ts", "gui/src/i18n/en.ts", "gui/src/i18n/fr.ts", @@ -9,9 +8,10 @@ "gui/src/i18n/ko.ts", "gui/src/i18n/ru.ts", "gui/src/i18n/tr.ts", - "gui/src/i18n/zh.ts", "gui/src/i18n/zh-TW.ts", - "docs-site/src/data/frontier-benchmarks.json" + "gui/src/i18n/zh.ts", + "scripts/model-metadata.source.json", + "src/adapters/cursor/gen/agent_pb.ts" ], "files": { ".github/scripts/issue-quality.test.cjs": 2143, From 01a2b1f0cdbfa05a270d6d22e9560f8fc972f3af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:21:52 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 065/113] fix(responses): report a spent send budget as this proxy refusing (#4708) [skip ci] When a request exhausts its shared send budget the three dispatch paths disagreed about what the client was told. Passthrough returned 429 and explicitly declined to blame the provider. The adapter paths did not special case SendBudgetExhaustedError: they fell through describeUpstreamConnectFailure and answered 502 "Provider unreachable" for a refusal this process made itself. The runTurn path pushed an unstructured error event, which is inferred back to 502 and delivered under HTTP 200. The status is the load-bearing half, and it is worse than a mislabel. The Codex client retries 5xx and does not retry a direct 429, so telling it the provider broke makes it send the whole turn again -- the amplification this budget exists to stop. Reporting the refusal as a quota code would stop the client for a reason that is not true, and the retryable streaming rate-limit codes would restart the stream, so neither is available. Both adapter catch sites now answer 429 before describeUpstreamConnectFailure can launder the refusal, and runTurn emits it as a structured terminal event with its status, type and code on the event itself, because an unstructured message is inferred back to 502. classifyError keeps the distinct code by matching the supplied type rather than the status. An upstream 429 still classifies as rate_limit_exceeded; only this proxy's own refusal carries request_send_budget_exhausted. Before this the passthrough path asked for that code and the classifier overwrote it, so even the one path that got the status right could not be told apart afterwards. A local 429 must also not look like a provider one to our own routing. rotateRunTurnAdapterOnPreflight429 returns early on the code, before it reads the status, so a refusal cannot rotate a credential or write a cooldown against an account that rate-limited nothing -- a fake quota signal that outlives the request and misroutes later ones. The terminal-guard continuation loop never consulted sendBudgetExhausted() while the main recovery loop did, so a spent budget could still same-key 429-replay on a live stream. It is checked before the wait cancels the upstream body, so a refusal keeps the real 429 with its Retry-After and quota evidence intact. Upstream classification of a provider 429 as org or project spend exhaustion is a separate contract and is not touched here. Closes #4708 --- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 1 + src/lib/errors.ts | 17 ++++ src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts | 7 ++ src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts | 19 +++- src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts | 28 +++++- structure/transports/responses.md | 30 ++++++ tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 1 + .../responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts | 98 +++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/responses/responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index 0bb83a728b..b4a1c1b0cf 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ "explicit": { "responses-core-modules.test.ts": "responses", "responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts": "responses", + "responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts": "responses", "chat-responses-control-integration.test.ts": "responses", "coding-agent-tool-result-images.test.ts": "adapters", "hub-usage.test.ts": "server", diff --git a/src/lib/errors.ts b/src/lib/errors.ts index 46b2fa3ed2..7c4582c2fe 100644 --- a/src/lib/errors.ts +++ b/src/lib/errors.ts @@ -7,6 +7,15 @@ export interface OcxErrorPayload { export const ENCRYPTED_FUNCTION_OUTPUT_REJECTION = "Encrypted function output content could not be decrypted or decoded."; +/** + * The error identity for a send this proxy declined to make (#4708). + * + * Declared here rather than only on the error class because the classifier is what decides + * whether the identity survives serialization, and every dispatch path has to name the same + * string for a client to be able to tell this apart from a provider rate limit. + */ +export const SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE = "request_send_budget_exhausted"; + /** Canonical human-readable message paths used by Responses upstream failures. */ export function upstreamErrorMessageFromPayload(payload: unknown): string | undefined { if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) return undefined; @@ -253,6 +262,14 @@ export function classifyError(status: number, type: string, message: string): Oc ) { return { message, type: "insufficient_quota", code: "insufficient_quota" }; } + // A refusal this proxy made itself, kept apart from the provider rate limits below. The HTTP + // semantics are identical -- 429, do not send this again now -- but the code is the only thing + // that tells an operator reading a log whether the provider throttled the request or whether + // this process declined to send it. Folding it into the generic rate-limit code sent them to + // the provider's dashboard to explain a decision that was never made there. + if (type === SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE) { + return { message, type: "rate_limit_error", code: SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE }; + } if ( status === 429 || text.includes("rate limit") || diff --git a/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts b/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts index 33b0221751..325833c20a 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( | "noteTransientSends" | "reserveCredentialHop" | "pendingHopPermit" + | "sendBudgetExhausted" >, adapterExchange: Pick< AdapterExchange, @@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( remainingTransientSendBudget, noteTransientSends, reserveCredentialHop, + sendBudgetExhausted, } = sendBudgetState; @@ -263,6 +265,11 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( response.status === 429 && rateLimitPolicy !== null && adapterExchange.rateLimitRetries < rateLimitPolicy.attempts + // The main recovery loop and the passthrough ladder both consult the shared remainder + // here; this loop did not, so a request whose budget was already spent could still + // same-key replay on a live stream. Checked BEFORE the wait below cancels the body, so + // a refusal keeps the real upstream 429 -- status, Retry-After, quota evidence -- intact. + && !sendBudgetExhausted() ) { adapterExchange.rateLimitRetries += 1; // Release unread body + heartbeat-fed wait via the shared same-target helper. diff --git a/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts b/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts index 37b9356965..99a0683439 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts @@ -72,7 +72,12 @@ import { consumeComboFailure } from "./core-combo-failure"; import { streamingContextOverflowResponse, jsonContextOverflowResponse } from "./context-overflow"; import { isFixedCodexAccount } from "./core-codex-account"; import { recordSubagentQuotaFailureForThreadSpawn } from "../../codex/subagent-model-fallback"; -import { isCyberPolicyCode, CYBER_POLICY_FALLBACK_MESSAGE, CYBER_POLICY_ERROR_CODE } from "../../lib/errors"; +import { + isCyberPolicyCode, + CYBER_POLICY_FALLBACK_MESSAGE, + CYBER_POLICY_ERROR_CODE, + SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE, +} from "../../lib/errors"; import { resolveClientRetryAfter } from "../../lib/retry-after"; import { cancelBodyOnAbort } from "../../lib/abort"; @@ -332,6 +337,13 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( cleanupUpstreamAbort(); upstream.abort(); if (options.abortSignal?.aborted) return clientCancelledResponse(); + // A budget refusal is a decision this process made, not an upstream fault. Reporting it as + // 502 does more than mislabel it: the Codex client retries 5xx and does not retry a 429, so + // blaming the provider makes the caller send the whole turn again -- the amplification this + // budget exists to stop. The passthrough path has answered 429 here since #4546. + if (err instanceof SendBudgetExhaustedError) { + return formatErrorResponse(429, SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE, err.message); + } const msg = describeUpstreamConnectFailure(err, connectMs); return formatErrorResponse(502, "upstream_error", msg); } finally { @@ -500,6 +512,11 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( if (options.abortSignal?.aborted) { return { failed: clientCancelledResponse() }; } + // Same rule on the recovery leg: the ladder refused to send again, so the answer names + // this proxy rather than the provider it never reached. + if (err instanceof SendBudgetExhaustedError) { + return { failed: formatErrorResponse(429, SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE, err.message) }; + } const msg = describeUpstreamConnectFailure(err, connectMs); return { failed: formatErrorResponse(502, "upstream_error", msg) }; } diff --git a/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts b/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts index 0f3b813177..1bd962e628 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts @@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ import type { AttemptRecoveryKind } from "../../usage/log"; import { providerFetch } from "./fetch-helpers"; import { normalizeLogConversationId } from "../request-log-conversation"; import type { AdapterEvent, OcxProviderContinuationState } from "../../types"; -import { adapterFailureFromMessage } from "../../lib/errors"; +import { adapterFailureFromMessage, SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE } from "../../lib/errors"; +import { SendBudgetExhaustedError } from "../../lib/upstream-retry"; import { GENERIC_OAUTH_MAX_FAILOVERS_PER_REQUEST, isGenericOAuthFailoverEnabled, @@ -178,10 +179,22 @@ export async function executeResponsesRunTurn( retryable: true, message: err.message, } - : { - type: "error", - message: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err), - }); + : err instanceof SendBudgetExhaustedError + // A structured terminal, not a bare message. The turn is already committed to an + // SSE response by the time most of these arrive, so the only way to carry "this + // proxy refused" to the client is on the event itself -- an unstructured message + // is inferred back to 502, which the Codex client retries. + ? { + type: "error", + status: 429, + errorType: "rate_limit_error", + code: SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE, + message: err.message, + } + : { + type: "error", + message: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err), + }); } finally { // Cursor assigns a stable conversation id inside runTurn on the first headerless // turn; backfill so Logs can filter/total that opening request (#330 / #522). @@ -195,6 +208,11 @@ export async function executeResponsesRunTurn( const rotateRunTurnAdapterOnPreflight429 = async ( error: Extract, ): Promise => { + // Our own refusal wears a 429 now, and rotating on it would record a cooldown against an + // account that never rate-limited anything -- a fake quota signal that outlives the + // request and misroutes later ones. The passthrough path has never had this problem + // because it answers before any rotation arm is reached. + if (error.code === SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE) return false; const status = error.status ?? adapterFailureFromMessage(error.message).httpStatus; if ( status !== 429 diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 416984e5ef..aa66104165 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -750,3 +750,33 @@ describing it afterwards, and the restart. The default policy still sets no token ceiling on any scope, so an unconfigured install accounts and reports without refusing. The operator configuration path for those limits is not wired yet. + +## What a spent budget tells the client + +A refusal this proxy made is reported as HTTP 429 with the code `request_send_budget_exhausted`, +on every dispatch path. The three paths used to disagree: passthrough answered 429 and declined +to blame the provider, the adapter paths fell through `describeUpstreamConnectFailure` and +answered 502 "Provider unreachable", and runTurn pushed an unstructured message that was inferred +back to 502 under HTTP 200. + +The status is the load-bearing half. The Codex client retries 5xx and does not retry a direct +429, so reporting a local refusal as 502 makes the caller send the whole turn again — the +amplification the budget exists to stop. Encoding it as a quota code instead would stop the +client for the wrong stated reason, and the retryable streaming rate-limit codes would restart +the stream, so neither is available. + +The distinct code is what an operator reads afterwards. `classifyError` keeps it by matching the +supplied type rather than the status, so an upstream 429 still classifies as +`rate_limit_exceeded` and only this proxy's own refusal carries the other code. Once a response +is committed the refusal travels as a structured terminal event — status, `errorType` and +`code` on the event itself — because an unstructured message is inferred back to 502. + +A local 429 must not look like a provider one to our own routing. `rotateRunTurnAdapterOnPreflight429` +returns early on the code, before it reads the status, so a refusal cannot rotate a credential or +write a cooldown against an account that rate-limited nothing; that fake signal would outlive the +request and misroute later ones. The terminal-guard continuation loop now consults +`sendBudgetExhausted()` before it cancels the upstream body, matching the main recovery loop, so +a spent request keeps the real 429 instead of replaying on a live stream. + +This is the proxy's own accounting only. Classifying an upstream 429 as org or project spend +exhaustion is a separate contract with a separate owner. diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index 0d94177e33..fb9acec3a7 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ { "responses-core-modules.test.ts": "responses", "responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts": "responses", + "responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts": "responses", "chat-responses-control-integration.test.ts": "responses", "coding-agent-tool-result-images.test.ts": "adapters", "hub-usage.test.ts": "server", diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..638bb1a2f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { repoPath } from "../helpers/repo-root"; +import { classifyError, SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE } from "../../src/lib/errors"; +import { adapterFailureFromEvent } from "../../src/bridge/internal"; +import { SendBudgetExhaustedError } from "../../src/lib/upstream-retry"; + +/** + * A refusal this proxy made must not be reported as a provider failure (#4708). + * + * The three dispatch paths disagreed. Passthrough answered 429 and explicitly declined to blame + * the provider; the adapter paths fell through to `describeUpstreamConnectFailure` and answered + * 502 "Provider unreachable"; runTurn pushed an unstructured message that was inferred back to + * 502 under HTTP 200. + * + * The 502 is the damaging one, and not only because it is wrong. The Codex client retries 5xx + * and does not retry a 429, so telling it the provider broke makes it send the whole turn again + * -- the amplification this budget exists to stop. That is why the fix is the status, and the + * distinct code is the part that lets an operator tell the two 429s apart afterwards. + */ +const source = (relative: string): string => readFileSync(repoPath(relative), "utf8"); + +describe("a spent send budget is reported as this proxy's refusal", () => { + test("the distinct code survives serialization instead of collapsing into the generic one", () => { + const refusal = classifyError(429, SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE, "request send budget exhausted before dispatch"); + expect(refusal.type).toBe("rate_limit_error"); + expect(refusal.code).toBe(SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE); + + // A provider rate limit is still the generic identity: the branch above is keyed on the + // supplied type, not on the status, so it cannot capture an upstream 429. + const upstream = classifyError(429, "upstream_error", "Too Many Requests"); + expect(upstream.type).toBe("rate_limit_error"); + expect(upstream.code).toBe("rate_limit_exceeded"); + }); + + test("the error class and the classifier name the same identity", () => { + expect(new SendBudgetExhaustedError("host").code).toBe(SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE); + }); + + test("a committed stream carries the refusal as a structured terminal", () => { + const failure = adapterFailureFromEvent({ + type: "error", + status: 429, + errorType: "rate_limit_error", + code: SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE, + message: "request send budget exhausted before dispatch", + }); + expect(failure.httpStatus).toBe(429); + expect(failure.error.type).toBe("rate_limit_error"); + expect(failure.error.code).toBe(SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE); + + // Without the structure, the same message is inferred from text alone and lands on the 502 + // the client would retry. This is the control that makes the assertion above mean something. + const unstructured = adapterFailureFromEvent({ + type: "error", + message: "request send budget exhausted before dispatch", + }); + expect(unstructured.httpStatus).toBe(502); + }); + + test("both adapter catch sites answer before the upstream-failure description", () => { + const dispatch = source("src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts"); + const guards = dispatch.match(/if \(err instanceof SendBudgetExhaustedError\) \{/g) ?? []; + expect(guards).toHaveLength(2); + // Order is the assertion: describeUpstreamConnectFailure is what launders the refusal into + // "Provider unreachable", so the typed branch has to precede every one of its call sites. + let cursor = 0; + for (let index = 0; index < 2; index += 1) { + const guard = dispatch.indexOf("if (err instanceof SendBudgetExhaustedError) {", cursor); + const describe = dispatch.indexOf("describeUpstreamConnectFailure(err, connectMs)", cursor); + expect(guard).toBeGreaterThan(-1); + expect(describe).toBeGreaterThan(guard); + cursor = describe + 1; + } + }); + + test("a local 429 never rotates a credential or writes a cooldown", () => { + const runTurn = source("src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts"); + const rotate = runTurn.indexOf("const rotateRunTurnAdapterOnPreflight429"); + const guard = runTurn.indexOf("if (error.code === SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE) return false;", rotate); + const status = runTurn.indexOf("const status = error.status", rotate); + expect(rotate).toBeGreaterThan(-1); + expect(guard).toBeGreaterThan(rotate); + // Before the status is even read: a refusal that reached the roster cap would cool down an + // account that rate-limited nothing, and that fake signal outlives the request. + expect(status).toBeGreaterThan(guard); + }); + + test("the continuation 429 loop consults the shared remainder before it cancels the body", () => { + const continuation = source("src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts"); + const loop = continuation.indexOf("adapterExchange.rateLimitRetries < rateLimitPolicy.attempts"); + const check = continuation.indexOf("!sendBudgetExhausted()", loop); + const wait = continuation.indexOf("prepareSameTarget429Wait", loop); + expect(loop).toBeGreaterThan(-1); + expect(check).toBeGreaterThan(loop); + expect(wait).toBeGreaterThan(check); + }); +}); From ac87703657a18087ad7080b47a4528550d52d34f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:21:56 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 066/113] fix(service): stage elevated Task Scheduler XML instead of inlining it (#4692) When "ocx service repair" re-registered the task through the elevated fallback, the spawn failed before UAC ever appeared: WindowsElevationError: ENAMETOOLONG: name too long, uv_spawn at startPowerShellCommand (src/lib/windows-elevation.ts:560) at runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration (.../windows-elevation.ts:704) runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration embedded the new task XML and the expected-existing snapshot as base64(utf16le) inside an inner PowerShell script, which was then base64(utf16le)-encoded again into -EncodedCommand. Two base64 layers over UTF-16 cost roughly 14.2 command-line characters per XML character, and a replacement carries two payloads, so a ~2 KB definition put the outer command past the Windows limit. On a host where Task Scheduler exports the trigger scope as an account name the re-register path runs on every repair, so repair could never exit 0. Both payloads are now staged to files and the command carries two paths and two 64-character digests, so its length no longer depends on the size of the XML at all. A file an administrator process will read is itself a privilege-escalation surface, so three properties hold together and none is sufficient alone: - Access. The staging directory is created fresh by mkdtemp and ACL-hardened through the existing hardenSecretDir/hardenSecretPath before anything is written into it, so the payload is private from the moment it exists. - No redirection. Each artifact is inspected with lstat and rejected unless it is what it claims to be. Exclusive "wx" creation inside a directory that did not exist a moment ago is the atomic step; the explicit check keeps that guarantee from resting on a reading of O_EXCL semantics. - Tamper evidence. The digest covers the exact bytes written, and the elevated script reads the file once, hashes what it read, and refuses before decoding. An ACL cannot cover this: a process running as the same user has the same SID and can rewrite the file, so the digest is what makes a swap during the UAC prompt fail closed instead of registering a different definition. Cleanup runs on every exit -- success, UAC cancellation, a synchronous spawn failure, a failed digest check, and a partial staging failure -- and a cleanup error is aggregated with the registration error rather than replacing it. The original "immutable bytes, never a caller-writable pathname" goal is kept by different means rather than abandoned, and the replacement precondition is untouched: the elevated process still re-queries the live registration and compares it to the verified predecessor before passing -Force. Payloads are UTF-16LE with no BOM and are decoded straight into Register-ScheduledTask, so what is hashed is exactly what is registered, with no trimming step the two sides could disagree about. Closes #4692 --- src/lib/windows-elevation.ts | 71 +++++-- src/service.ts | 2 +- src/service/windows-ops.ts | 199 ++++++++++++++++-- tests/service/service.test.ts | 114 ++++++++++ tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts | 62 +++++- 5 files changed, 410 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/windows-elevation.ts b/src/lib/windows-elevation.ts index b2d02b8123..aa728ab159 100644 --- a/src/lib/windows-elevation.ts +++ b/src/lib/windows-elevation.ts @@ -645,36 +645,79 @@ export function runWindowsElevated(file: string, args: string[]): Promise { - if (replace && !expectedExistingXml?.trim()) { + if (replace && !expectedExisting) { throw new Error("Elevated Task Scheduler replacement requires a captured existing definition."); } - const xmlBase64 = Buffer.from(xml, "utf16le").toString("base64"); - const expectedExistingBase64 = expectedExistingXml === undefined - ? null - : Buffer.from(expectedExistingXml, "utf16le").toString("base64"); const powerShellPath = windowsPowerShell(); const powerShellDirectory = powerShellPath.replace(/[\\/][^\\/]+$/, ""); const scheduledTasksModule = `${powerShellDirectory}\\Modules\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.psd1`; const inner = [ `$taskName = ${psSingleQuote(taskName)}`, - `$xmlBase64 = ${psSingleQuote(xmlBase64)}`, - "$xml = [Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String($xmlBase64))", + READ_STAGED_TASK_XML, + `$xml = Read-OcxStagedTaskXml ${psSingleQuote(xml.path)} ${psSingleQuote(xml.sha256)}`, `$module = Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\\Import-Module -Name ${psSingleQuote(scheduledTasksModule)} -PassThru -Force -ErrorAction Stop`, "$registerTask = $module.ExportedCommands['Register-ScheduledTask']", "if ($null -eq $registerTask) { throw 'Trusted ScheduledTasks module does not export Register-ScheduledTask.' }", ...(replace ? [ - `$expectedBase64 = ${psSingleQuote(expectedExistingBase64!)}`, - "$expectedXml = [Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String($expectedBase64))", + `$expectedXml = Read-OcxStagedTaskXml ${psSingleQuote(expectedExisting!.path)} ${psSingleQuote(expectedExisting!.sha256)}`, `$schtasks = ${psSingleQuote(resolveTrustedWindowsSchtasksExe())}`, "$currentXml = & $schtasks /query /tn $taskName /xml 2>$null | Out-String", "if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'Task Scheduler replacement precondition could not be read.' }", diff --git a/src/service.ts b/src/service.ts index 92cedd7e22..f6a571b574 100644 --- a/src/service.ts +++ b/src/service.ts @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ export { decodeSchtasksOutput, setQuerySchtasksForTests, formatWindowsSchedulerS export type { WindowsSchedulerXmlState } from "./service/windows-taskxml"; export { buildWindowsServiceScript, buildWindowsSchtasksCreateArgs, buildWindowsSchtasksCreateArgsForXml, buildWindowsLauncherVbs, buildWindowsTaskXml, buildWindowsTaskXmlDocument, windowsTaskRegistrationOwnedByAttempt, windowsTaskRegistrationHealthy, readWindowsSchedulerXmlState } from "./service/windows-taskxml"; export type { WindowsSchedulerRegistrationStageDeps, FreshWindowsSchedulerRegistrationDeps, RemoveNativeWindowsServiceDeps } from "./service/windows-ops"; -export { windowsListenPort, winswListenPort, writeServiceDefinitionFile, definitionCarriesCredential, stageWindowsSchedulerRegistrationXml, registerFreshWindowsSchedulerTask, removeNativeWindowsServiceForScheduler, assertWindowsNativeServiceAccountSupported, isWindowsSchedulerEndBenign, stopWindows, stopWindowsChecked, classifyWindowsServiceStop } from "./service/windows-ops"; +export { windowsListenPort, winswListenPort, writeServiceDefinitionFile, definitionCarriesCredential, stageWindowsSchedulerRegistrationXml, stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration, registerFreshWindowsSchedulerTask, removeNativeWindowsServiceForScheduler, assertWindowsNativeServiceAccountSupported, isWindowsSchedulerEndBenign, stopWindows, stopWindowsChecked, classifyWindowsServiceStop } from "./service/windows-ops"; export type { ServiceRepairVerb, RepairServiceDeps } from "./service/repair"; export { repairService } from "./service/repair"; export type { ServiceInstallPreparationDeps, FreshWindowsSchedulerInstallDeps, ServiceStopOutcome, ServiceUninstallOutcome } from "./service/orchestration"; diff --git a/src/service/windows-ops.ts b/src/service/windows-ops.ts index 64e3d48373..75321fb9fc 100644 --- a/src/service/windows-ops.ts +++ b/src/service/windows-ops.ts @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ -import { chmodSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { chmodSync, lstatSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; import { win32 } from "node:path"; import { winswXmlPath } from "../lib/winsw"; import { hardenSecretPath } from "../lib/windows-secret-acl"; @@ -9,7 +10,7 @@ import { existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmdirSync, unlinkSync } from "node: import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { dirname, join } from "node:path"; import { getConfigDir } from "../config"; -import { runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration, WindowsSchtasksError } from "../lib/windows-elevation"; +import { runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration, WindowsSchtasksError, type StagedWindowsTaskXml } from "../lib/windows-elevation"; import { defaultWinswEntry, installWinswService, statusWinswRaw, uninstallWinswService, WINSW_SERVICE_ID, type WinswStatus } from "../lib/winsw"; import { forgetEphemeralSecretDir, forgetEphemeralSecretPath, hardenSecretDir } from "../lib/windows-secret-acl"; import { recordOwnedConfigPath } from "../lib/config-ownership"; @@ -165,6 +166,170 @@ function cleanupWindowsSchedulerStage( if (cleanupError) throw cleanupError; } +/** A staged payload set for one elevated registration, plus the way to remove it. */ +export interface StagedElevatedSchedulerRegistration { + readonly xml: StagedWindowsTaskXml; + readonly expectedExisting?: StagedWindowsTaskXml; + /** Remove every staged artifact. Idempotent, so a second call after success is a no-op. */ + cleanup(): void; +} + +export interface ElevatedSchedulerStagingDeps { + createStageDir?: () => string; + hardenDir?: (path: string) => void; + writePayload?: (path: string, bytes: Buffer) => void; + hardenPath?: (path: string) => void; + inspect?: (path: string) => { isSymbolicLink(): boolean; isFile(): boolean; isDirectory(): boolean }; + removeStageDir?: (path: string) => void; +} + +/** + * Stage the captured definitions an elevated registration needs, as files rather than + * as command-line payloads (#4692). + * + * A file that an administrator process will read is itself a privilege-escalation + * surface, so three properties have to hold together and none of them is sufficient + * alone: + * + * - **Access.** The directory is created fresh by `mkdtemp`, then ACL-hardened before + * anything is written into it, so another local account cannot read or replace the + * payload while the UAC prompt is open. Hardening the directory first is what makes + * the file private from the moment it exists. + * - **No reparse point.** Each artifact is inspected with `lstat` and rejected unless it + * is what it claims to be. `wx` already refuses to create over an existing name, which + * is the atomic step here — there is no replace path to race, because every path is + * inside a directory that did not exist a moment ago. The explicit check is what keeps + * that guarantee from depending on a reading of `O_EXCL` semantics. + * - **Tamper evidence.** The digest is taken over the exact bytes written, and the + * elevated script recomputes it over the bytes it reads. An ACL cannot cover this: + * a process running as the same user has the same SID and can rewrite the file, so + * the digest is the only thing that makes such a swap fail closed rather than + * silently register a different task definition. + * + * Payloads are UTF-16LE with no BOM, and the elevated process decodes them straight into + * `Register-ScheduledTask`. What is hashed is therefore exactly what is registered, with + * no trimming step in between that the two sides could disagree about. + */ +export function stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration( + xml: string, + expectedExistingXml?: string, + deps: ElevatedSchedulerStagingDeps = {}, +): StagedElevatedSchedulerRegistration { + const createStageDir = deps.createStageDir + ?? (() => mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), WINDOWS_SCHEDULER_STAGE_PREFIX))); + const hardenDir = deps.hardenDir ?? ((path: string) => { hardenSecretDir(path, { required: true }); }); + const writePayload = deps.writePayload ?? ((path: string, bytes: Buffer) => { + writeFileSync(path, bytes, { flag: "wx", mode: 0o600 }); + }); + const hardenPath = deps.hardenPath ?? ((path: string) => { hardenSecretPath(path, { required: true }); }); + const inspect = deps.inspect ?? ((path: string) => lstatSync(path)); + const removeStageDir = deps.removeStageDir ?? ((path: string) => { rmdirSync(path); }); + + const stageDir = createStageDir(); + const files: string[] = []; + const cleanup = (): void => { + let failure: unknown; + for (const file of files.splice(0)) { + try { + unlinkSync(file); + forgetEphemeralSecretPath(file); + } catch (error) { + if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException | undefined)?.code === "ENOENT") forgetEphemeralSecretPath(file); + else failure ??= error; + } + } + try { + removeStageDir(stageDir); + forgetEphemeralSecretDir(stageDir); + } catch (error) { + if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException | undefined)?.code === "ENOENT") forgetEphemeralSecretDir(stageDir); + else if (failure) throw new AggregateError([failure, error], "Elevated Task Scheduler staging cleanup failed."); + else failure = error; + } + if (failure) throw failure; + }; + + try { + try { chmodSync(stageDir, 0o700); } catch { /* required Windows ACL is authoritative */ } + const dirStats = inspect(stageDir); + if (dirStats.isSymbolicLink() || !dirStats.isDirectory()) { + throw new Error(`Refusing to stage an elevated Task Scheduler payload under a redirected path: ${stageDir}`); + } + hardenDir(stageDir); + const stage = (name: string, value: string): StagedWindowsTaskXml => { + const path = join(stageDir, name); + const bytes = Buffer.from(value, "utf16le"); + writePayload(path, bytes); + files.push(path); + const stats = inspect(path); + if (stats.isSymbolicLink() || !stats.isFile()) { + throw new Error(`Refusing to stage an elevated Task Scheduler payload through a redirected path: ${path}`); + } + hardenPath(path); + return { path, sha256: createHash("sha256").update(bytes).digest("hex") }; + }; + return { + xml: stage("register.xml", xml), + ...(expectedExistingXml === undefined + ? {} + : { expectedExisting: stage("expected.xml", expectedExistingXml) }), + cleanup, + }; + } catch (error) { + try { + cleanup(); + } catch (cleanupError) { + throw new AggregateError( + [error, cleanupError], + "Elevated Task Scheduler staging failed and could not be cleaned up.", + ); + } + throw error; + } +} + +/** + * Stage, elevate, and clean up — on every exit, including UAC cancellation and a + * synchronous spawn failure. + * + * A cleanup failure never replaces the registration failure it followed: an operator + * told only that a temp directory could not be removed would have no idea the task was + * never registered. + */ +async function runStagedElevatedSchedulerRegistration( + taskName: string, + xml: string, + replace: boolean, + expectedExistingXml: string | undefined, + failureLabel: string, +): Promise { + const staged = stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration(xml, expectedExistingXml); + let failure: unknown; + try { + const exitCode = await runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration( + taskName, + staged.xml, + replace, + staged.expectedExisting, + ); + if (exitCode !== 0) failure = new Error(`${failureLabel} with exit code ${exitCode}.`); + } catch (error) { + failure = error; + } + try { + staged.cleanup(); + } catch (cleanupError) { + if (failure) { + throw new AggregateError( + [failure, cleanupError], + "Elevated Task Scheduler registration failed and its staging could not be cleaned up.", + ); + } + throw cleanupError; + } + if (failure) throw failure; +} + export function stageWindowsSchedulerRegistrationXml( attemptNonce: string, deps: WindowsSchedulerRegistrationStageDeps = {}, @@ -294,7 +459,8 @@ export async function registerFreshWindowsSchedulerTask( throw error; } // Register from the captured XML string inside the elevated process. Another - // same-user process can mutate its own temp files, but cannot change this command. + // same-user process can mutate its own temp files, so the captured bytes are staged + // privately and the elevated script verifies their digest before registering them. // UAC can remain open for an arbitrary amount of time. Recheck the captured predecessor // before launch; the elevated helper repeats the same check after consent and before Force. assertReplacementPrecondition(); @@ -303,15 +469,13 @@ export async function registerFreshWindowsSchedulerTask( xml: string, replaceCurrent: boolean, previousXml?: string, - ) => { - const exitCode = await runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration( - taskName, - xml, - replaceCurrent, - previousXml, - ); - if (exitCode !== 0) throw new Error(`Background service install failed with exit code ${exitCode}.`); - }); + ) => runStagedElevatedSchedulerRegistration( + taskName, + xml, + replaceCurrent, + previousXml, + "Background service install failed", + )); await elevate(TASK, expectedXml, replace, expectedExistingXml); } @@ -501,10 +665,13 @@ export async function restoreWindowsSchedulerTaskIfAbsent(registeredXml: string) ) { throw error; } - const exitCode = await runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration(TASK, registeredXml, false); - if (exitCode !== 0) { - throw new Error(`Task Scheduler rollback failed with exit code ${exitCode}.`); - } + await runStagedElevatedSchedulerRegistration( + TASK, + registeredXml, + false, + undefined, + "Task Scheduler rollback failed", + ); } const recoveredXml = statusWindowsXml(); if (!windowsSchedulerRegistrationMatchesSnapshot(recoveredXml, registeredXml)) { diff --git a/tests/service/service.test.ts b/tests/service/service.test.ts index 5daaa02ec9..3b17cd6e93 100644 --- a/tests/service/service.test.ts +++ b/tests/service/service.test.ts @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ import { afterAll, afterEach, describe, expect, spyOn, test } from "bun:test"; import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; +import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { delimiter, isAbsolute, join, posix, win32 } from "node:path"; import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url"; @@ -2078,6 +2079,119 @@ describe("service lifecycle cleanup ordering", () => { } }); + /** + * #4692: a file an administrator process will read is itself a privilege-escalation + * surface, so access, redirection and tamper-evidence each have to hold. + */ + test("elevated staging hardens before writing, digests the exact bytes, and cleans up", () => { + const parent = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-elevated-stage-")); + const stageDir = join(parent, "private-stage"); + const calls: string[] = []; + try { + const staged = serviceModule.stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration( + "new", + "previous", + { + createStageDir: () => { + mkdirSync(stageDir, { mode: 0o700 }); + calls.push("create-stage-dir"); + return stageDir; + }, + hardenDir: () => { calls.push("harden-dir"); }, + writePayload: (path, bytes) => { + calls.push("write:" + path.slice(stageDir.length + 1)); + writeFileSync(path, bytes, { flag: "wx" }); + }, + hardenPath: path => { calls.push("harden:" + path.slice(stageDir.length + 1)); }, + }, + ); + + // The directory is private before anything is written into it; hardening after the + // write would leave a window where the payload is readable by another account. + expect(calls).toEqual([ + "create-stage-dir", + "harden-dir", + "write:register.xml", + "harden:register.xml", + "write:expected.xml", + "harden:expected.xml", + ]); + + // The digest covers exactly the bytes on disk, and those bytes are UTF-16LE with no + // BOM: the elevated process decodes them straight into Register-ScheduledTask, so + // what is hashed here is what gets registered, with no trimming step in between. + for (const [payload, value] of [ + [staged.xml, "new"], + [staged.expectedExisting!, "previous"], + ] as const) { + const onDisk = readFileSync(payload.path); + expect(onDisk.equals(Buffer.from(value, "utf16le"))).toBe(true); + expect(onDisk[0]).not.toBe(0xff); + expect(payload.sha256).toBe(createHash("sha256").update(onDisk).digest("hex")); + expect(payload.sha256).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/); + } + expect(staged.xml.sha256).not.toBe(staged.expectedExisting!.sha256); + + staged.cleanup(); + expect(existsSync(stageDir)).toBe(false); + // Idempotent: the success path calls it once, but a failure path may race it. + expect(() => staged.cleanup()).not.toThrow(); + } finally { + removeTreeWithRetry(parent); + } + }); + + test("elevated staging refuses a redirected path and leaves nothing behind", () => { + const parent = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-elevated-stage-reparse-")); + const stageDir = join(parent, "private-stage"); + try { + // A staged payload reached through a reparse point is a payload somebody else chose + // the destination for. Exclusive creation already refuses an existing name, so this + // is the check that keeps the guarantee from resting on a reading of O_EXCL. + expect(() => serviceModule.stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration("", undefined, { + createStageDir: () => { + mkdirSync(stageDir, { mode: 0o700 }); + return stageDir; + }, + hardenDir: () => {}, + writePayload: (path, bytes) => { writeFileSync(path, bytes, { flag: "wx" }); }, + hardenPath: () => { throw new Error("must not harden a redirected payload"); }, + inspect: path => ({ + isSymbolicLink: () => path !== stageDir, + isFile: () => true, + isDirectory: () => path === stageDir, + }), + })).toThrow("redirected path"); + expect(existsSync(stageDir)).toBe(false); + } finally { + removeTreeWithRetry(parent); + } + }); + + test("elevated staging cleans up when a payload write fails partway", () => { + const parent = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-elevated-stage-partial-")); + const stageDir = join(parent, "private-stage"); + try { + // The predecessor is the second payload, so this leaves a real file behind unless + // cleanup walks everything it created rather than only the one that failed. + expect(() => serviceModule.stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration("", "", { + createStageDir: () => { + mkdirSync(stageDir, { mode: 0o700 }); + return stageDir; + }, + hardenDir: () => {}, + writePayload: (path, bytes) => { + if (path.endsWith("expected.xml")) throw new Error("synthetic predecessor write failure"); + writeFileSync(path, bytes, { flag: "wx" }); + }, + hardenPath: () => {}, + })).toThrow("synthetic predecessor write failure"); + expect(existsSync(stageDir)).toBe(false); + } finally { + removeTreeWithRetry(parent); + } + }); + test("UAC cancellation removes only staged XML and never enters cleanup or asset publication", async () => { const calls: string[] = []; mkdirSync(TEST_DIR, { recursive: true }); diff --git a/tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts b/tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts index 3eaaec1258..fa0058f51d 100644 --- a/tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts +++ b/tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ describe("runWindowsElevated spawn contract", () => { await expect(runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration( "opencodex-proxy", - "", + { path: "C:\\Temp\\opencodex-service-stage-aaaaaa\\register.xml", sha256: "0".repeat(64) }, )).resolves.toBe(0); const startProcessIndex = commandScript.indexOf("Start-Process"); @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ describe("runWindowsElevated spawn contract", () => { expect(commandScript).not.toMatch(/-ArgumentList\s+'[^']*';\s+-Verb RunAs/); }); - test("scheduled-task registration embeds immutable XML bytes instead of a file path", async () => { + test("scheduled-task registration passes staged paths and digests, never inline payloads", async () => { let commandScript = ""; setWindowsElevationSpawnForTests((( _cmd: string, @@ -196,7 +196,9 @@ describe("runWindowsElevated spawn contract", () => { }) as never); const xml = "fixed-definition"; - await expect(runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration("opencodex-proxy", xml)).resolves.toBe(0); + const stageDir = "C:\\Temp\\opencodex-service-stage-aaaaaa"; + const staged = { path: stageDir + "\\register.xml", sha256: "a".repeat(64) }; + await expect(runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration("opencodex-proxy", staged)).resolves.toBe(0); const match = /-EncodedCommand ([A-Za-z0-9+/=]+)/.exec(commandScript); expect(match).not.toBeNull(); const elevatedScript = Buffer.from(match![1]!, "base64").toString("utf16le"); @@ -211,21 +213,67 @@ describe("runWindowsElevated spawn contract", () => { expect(elevatedScript).toContain("& $registerTask -TaskName $taskName -Xml $xml -ErrorAction Stop"); expect(elevatedScript).not.toContain("-Xml $xml -Force"); expect(elevatedScript.match(/\bRegister-ScheduledTask\b/g)).toHaveLength(2); - expect(elevatedScript).toContain(Buffer.from(xml, "utf16le").toString("base64")); + + // #4692: the definition now travels as a path plus a digest. A pathname on its own + // would be a promise about content, so the elevated side has to check it: read the + // bytes once, hash exactly those bytes, and refuse BEFORE decoding them. Hashing and + // then rereading would leave the swap window this check exists to close. + expect(elevatedScript).toContain(staged.path); + expect(elevatedScript).toContain(staged.sha256); + expect(elevatedScript).toContain("[IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($path)"); + expect(elevatedScript).toContain("$sha.ComputeHash($bytes)"); + expect(elevatedScript).toContain("Task Scheduler staged payload failed its integrity check."); + expect(elevatedScript.indexOf("-cne $expectedHash")) + .toBeLessThan(elevatedScript.indexOf("[Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString($bytes)")); + // No payload rides the command line any more, in either encoding layer. + expect(elevatedScript).not.toContain(Buffer.from(xml, "utf16le").toString("base64")); + expect(elevatedScript).not.toContain("FromBase64String"); expect(commandScript).not.toContain("/xml"); - expect(commandScript).not.toContain("task.xml"); + + // The regression itself. The old form embedded base64(utf16le) of the XML inside a + // script that was base64(utf16le)-encoded again — about 14.2 command-line characters + // per XML character, twice over for a replacement — so a ~2 KB definition pushed the + // spawn past the Windows command-line limit and failed with ENAMETOOLONG. What is + // pinned here is independence, not one lucky measurement: the same staging shape must + // produce the same command length no matter how large the definition behind it is. + const smallLength = commandScript.length; + const largeStaged = { path: stageDir + "\\register.xml", sha256: "b".repeat(64) }; + await expect(runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration("opencodex-proxy", largeStaged)).resolves.toBe(0); + expect(commandScript.length).toBe(smallLength); + expect(commandScript.length).toBeLessThan(8192); const predecessor = "captured-predecessor"; + const stagedPredecessor = { path: stageDir + "\\expected.xml", sha256: "c".repeat(64) }; await expect( - runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration("opencodex-proxy", xml, true, predecessor), + runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration("opencodex-proxy", staged, true, stagedPredecessor), ).resolves.toBe(0); const replaceMatch = /-EncodedCommand ([A-Za-z0-9+/=]+)/.exec(commandScript); expect(replaceMatch).not.toBeNull(); const replaceScript = Buffer.from(replaceMatch![1]!, "base64").toString("utf16le"); expect(replaceScript).toContain("& $registerTask -TaskName $taskName -Xml $xml -Force"); - expect(replaceScript).toContain(Buffer.from(predecessor, "utf16le").toString("base64")); + expect(replaceScript).toContain(stagedPredecessor.path); + expect(replaceScript).toContain(stagedPredecessor.sha256); + expect(replaceScript).not.toContain(Buffer.from(predecessor, "utf16le").toString("base64")); + // The predecessor is verified the same way before it is used as a precondition: two + // call sites, both digest-checked. The helper is declared as + // "Read-OcxStagedTaskXml([string]$path", so the trailing space matches calls only. + expect(replaceScript.match(/Read-OcxStagedTaskXml /g)).toHaveLength(2); + expect(elevatedScript.match(/Read-OcxStagedTaskXml /g)).toHaveLength(1); expect(replaceScript).toContain("$currentXml = & $schtasks /query /tn $taskName /xml"); expect(replaceScript).toContain("Task Scheduler replacement precondition changed."); + // A replacement used to carry TWO payloads, which is what made this the reported + // failure. It stays bounded now. + expect(commandScript.length).toBeLessThan(8192); + }); + + test("an elevated replacement still refuses without a captured predecessor", () => { + // The post-UAC compare-before-Force is the only thing standing between a repair and + // overwriting a registration somebody else changed while the prompt was open. + expect(() => runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration( + "opencodex-proxy", + { path: "C:\\Temp\\opencodex-service-stage-aaaaaa\\register.xml", sha256: "a".repeat(64) }, + true, + )).toThrow("requires a captured existing definition"); }); test("maps exit 1223 to cancelled", async () => { From bf07b72f73b371b8366d7f019f191aeacbe7e01d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:22:46 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 067/113] docs(lanes): correct the Kiro reasoning-text claim and the Desktop alias range Two review findings on this lane were accurate. They are fixed on top of the lane rather than by rewriting a member's commit, so every member's ancestry and authorship stay intact. structure/providers/kiro.md said reasoningContentEvent carries the encrypted blob and "never text". The round-trip test #4682 added shows otherwise: every captured GPT-5.6 frame leaves a literal "..." placeholder on text and the adapter forwards it as a reasoning_raw_delta (tests/providers/kiro/kiro-reasoning-roundtrip.test.ts, "a signature blob is tagged with the field it must be replayed on"). The field is present; what it never carries is model reasoning. The wording now says that, which keeps the doc from contradicting its own binding test. #4224 widened the managed Desktop date aliases from 2026 alone (365 slots) to 2026-2035 (3652), but every user-facing description of that namespace still said claude-opus-4-8-2026MMDD: the ocx claude help text, the Claude Code guide in four locales, and structure/clients/claude-desktop.md did not mention the range at all. A user reading any of them would conclude a 2027 alias is not one of ours. All four surfaces now give the real range and record that 2026 is allocated first, so existing assignments keep their ids. No runtime behaviour changes here. The only src/ edit is the help string in src/cli/registry.ts. --- docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/guides/claude-code.md | 5 +++-- docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/claude-code.md | 7 +++++-- docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/guides/claude-code.md | 8 +++++--- docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/guides/claude-code.md | 5 +++-- src/cli/registry.ts | 3 ++- structure/clients/claude-desktop.md | 9 +++++++++ structure/providers/kiro.md | 10 +++++++--- 7 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/guides/claude-code.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/guides/claude-code.md index de614880e7..43e718d2da 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/guides/claude-code.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/guides/claude-code.md @@ -159,8 +159,9 @@ Support/Claude/configLibrary` sur macOS, `%APPDATA%\Claude\configLibrary` sur Wi `CLAUDE_USER_DATA_DIR` pour utiliser une autre racine de données Claude Desktop. L'ancien répertoire `Claude-3p` n'est ni lu ni supprimé automatiquement. -Les routes non Anthropic reçoivent des alias stables comme `claude-opus-4-8-2026MMDD`. La partie qui ressemble à une date -est un emplacement synthétique de route, et non la date de publication du modèle. Les véritables routes Anthropic Claude conservent +Les routes non Anthropic reçoivent des alias stables comme `claude-opus-4-8-YYYYMMDD`, dont l'année va de 2026 à 2035. La partie qui ressemble à une date +est un emplacement synthétique de route, et non la date de publication du modèle. Les emplacements de 2026 sont attribués en premier, de sorte que les alias +existants conservent leur identifiant ; les années suivantes ne sont utilisées qu'une fois 2026 saturée. Les véritables routes Anthropic Claude conservent leur identité. Les nouvelles routes appartiennent par défaut à la famille Opus, mais déplacer une route ne change ni le fournisseur ni le modèle qu'elle appelle. Les anciens indicateurs `--static`, `--hybrid` et `--discovery-only` restent disponibles pour les scripts existants. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/claude-code.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/claude-code.md index a44867bd09..6d87b8a2ce 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/claude-code.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/claude-code.md @@ -181,8 +181,11 @@ Support/Claude/configLibrary` on macOS, `%APPDATA%\Claude\configLibrary` on Wind `CLAUDE_USER_DATA_DIR` for an alternate Desktop user-data root. The legacy `Claude-3p` directory is not read or deleted automatically. -Non-Anthropic routes receive stable aliases such as `claude-opus-4-8-2026MMDD`. The date-looking -part is a synthetic route slot, not the model's release date. Real Anthropic Claude routes keep +Non-Anthropic routes receive stable aliases such as `claude-opus-4-8-YYYYMMDD`, where the year runs +from 2026 to 2035. The date-looking +part is a synthetic route slot, not the model's release date. 2026 slots are allocated first, so +existing aliases keep their ids; the later years are reached only once 2026 fills. +Real Anthropic Claude routes keep their real ids. New routes default to the Opus family, but moving a route does not change the provider or model it calls. The legacy apply flags `--static`, `--hybrid`, and `--discovery-only` remain available for existing scripts. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/guides/claude-code.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/guides/claude-code.md index 510a7818a7..034f7505b5 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/guides/claude-code.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/guides/claude-code.md @@ -189,9 +189,11 @@ alternatif bir Desktop kullanıcı verisi kökü için `CLAUDE_USER_DATA_DIR` değerini ayarlayın. Eski `Claude-3p` dizini otomatik olarak okunmaz veya silinmez. -Anthropic harici rotalar, `claude-opus-4-8-2026MMDD` gibi kararlı takma adlar -alır. Tarih benzeri kısım, modelin çıkış tarihi değil, sentetik bir rota -yuvasıdır. Gerçek Anthropic Claude rotaları kendi gerçek kimliklerini korur. +Anthropic harici rotalar, `claude-opus-4-8-YYYYMMDD` gibi kararlı takma adlar +alır; yıl 2026 ile 2035 arasındadır. Tarih benzeri kısım, modelin çıkış tarihi +değil, sentetik bir rota yuvasıdır. Önce 2026 yuvaları atanır, bu nedenle mevcut +takma adlar kimliklerini korur; sonraki yıllara ancak 2026 dolduktan sonra +geçilir. Gerçek Anthropic Claude rotaları kendi gerçek kimliklerini korur. Yeni rotalar varsayılan olarak Opus ailesine gider, ancak bir rotayı taşımak çağırdığı sağlayıcıyı veya modeli değiştirmez. Eski uygulama bayrakları `--static`, `--hybrid` ve `--discovery-only` mevcut betikler için kullanılabilir diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/guides/claude-code.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/guides/claude-code.md index 2c1a995cc3..338b19c7ee 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/guides/claude-code.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/guides/claude-code.md @@ -129,8 +129,9 @@ ocx claude desktop import [--apply] 檔案，因此無效檔案不會改動目前設定檔。加上 `--apply` 可在匯入有效設定檔後立即寫入 Desktop。 `none` 僅適用於空系列；每個非空系列都必須保留一個預設。 -非 Anthropic 路由會得到穩定別名，例如 `claude-opus-4-8-2026MMDD`。看起來像日期的部分是合成的 -路由槽位，不是模型釋出日期。真正的 Anthropic Claude 路由保留真實 id。新路由預設落在 Opus +非 Anthropic 路由會得到穩定別名，例如 `claude-opus-4-8-YYYYMMDD`，年份範圍為 2026 至 2035。看起來像日期的部分是合成的 +路由槽位，不是模型釋出日期。系統會先配置 2026 的槽位，因此既有別名的 id 不變；2026 用盡後才會用到後續年份。 +真正的 Anthropic Claude 路由保留真實 id。新路由預設落在 Opus 系列，但移動路由不會改變它所呼叫的供應商或模型。舊版 apply 旗標 `--static`、`--hybrid` 與 `--discovery-only` 仍可供既有腳本使用。 diff --git a/src/cli/registry.ts b/src/cli/registry.ts index bfbe845c5b..d716ccffef 100644 --- a/src/cli/registry.ts +++ b/src/cli/registry.ts @@ -407,7 +407,8 @@ export const CLI_COMMANDS: CliCommandEntry[] = [ "Ensures the proxy is running, then execs `claude` with ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL/ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN,", "CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_GATEWAY_MODEL_DISCOVERY=1 and model slots from config.claudeCode.", "When Claude routing is explicitly disabled, it launches natively after removing proven OpenCodex-owned proxy state.", - "Routed models appear in the native /model picker with stable claude-opus-4-8-2026MMDD slot aliases (Claude Code >= 2.1.129).", + "Routed models appear in the native /model picker with stable claude-opus-4-8-YYYYMMDD slot aliases,", + "where the year runs 2026-2035 and 2026 slots are allocated first (Claude Code >= 2.1.129).", "Older versions: pick models via ANTHROPIC_MODEL or /model directly (any string passes through).", "User-exported ANTHROPIC_* variables take precedence for routed launches; native fallback removes only proven OpenCodex-owned proxy values.", "", diff --git a/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md b/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md index 01a583c182..47497cc3f8 100644 --- a/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md +++ b/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md @@ -38,6 +38,15 @@ writes the resulting local Desktop configuration. No admin token, hub-profile up alias regeneration is part of this flow. Unsupported old hubs, invalid snapshots and unavailable Desktop models fail apply without a local-catalog or loopback fallback. +Managed-namespace date aliases occupy `claude-opus-4-8-YYYYMMDD` slots across 2026-2035, not 2026 +alone. The original 2026-only design held 365 slots and failed with "all 365 encoded date slots are +occupied" once a catalog exceeded 365 routes, because stale assignments are retained by design and +the set only grows. 2026 is still allocated first, so existing assignments keep their ids, and +2027-2035 are reached only after it fills. Years before 2026 stay rejected: dated ids such as +`claude-opus-4-8-20250201` are real Anthropic snapshot ids and the inbound decoder relies on that +distinction. Every emitted suffix stays eight digits so `modelMap` date-stripping keeps working. +`src/claude/desktop-profile.ts` owns this range. + Date-shaped Desktop IDs can overlap genuine native model IDs. When available discovery and mapping evidence cannot resolve one, Messages and count-tokens return HTTP 503 with the fixed `desktop_model_mapping_unavailable` error rather than classifying it as invalid. Unknown legacy hash aliases diff --git a/structure/providers/kiro.md b/structure/providers/kiro.md index 296e226392..5132d9c550 100644 --- a/structure/providers/kiro.md +++ b/structure/providers/kiro.md @@ -34,9 +34,13 @@ raw body. ## Kiro reasoning round-trip (`signature`) Kiro never returns plaintext reasoning for its **GPT-5.6 family** (`gpt-5.6-sol`, `-terra`, -`-luna`): `reasoningContentEvent` carries a KMS-encrypted blob, never `text`. It arrives on -`signature`, holding the `.KTR~~…` value verbatim, which is what every capture of those models -sent. Their `additionalModelRequestFieldsSchema` (`ListAvailableModels`) accepts only +`-luna`): `reasoningContentEvent` carries a KMS-encrypted blob rather than readable reasoning. It +arrives on `signature`, holding the `.KTR~~…` value verbatim, which is what every capture of those +models sent. The event's `text` field is not absent — every captured GPT-5.6 frame left a literal +`"..."` placeholder there, which the adapter forwards as a `reasoning_raw_delta` — but it never +carries model reasoning, so `signature` is the only field worth replaying +(`tests/providers/kiro/kiro-reasoning-roundtrip.test.ts`). +Their `additionalModelRequestFieldsSchema` (`ListAvailableModels`) accepts only `reasoning.effort` with `additionalProperties: false` — there is no display/summary opt-in, so this is the only reasoning these models can return, and all three select that native field (`KIRO_NATIVE_EFFORT_FIELDS` in `src/adapters/kiro/reasoning.ts`). Kiro's own CLI replays the blob From 3640e05e3c5c76f668ed35b242d0c5e468cae979 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:23:26 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 068/113] test(codex): return stderr from the inject harness so failures stay diagnosable runInject declared and returned only stdout and status, but two of the pagination cases pass seed.stderr as the assertion message: expect(seed.status, seed.stderr).toBe(0) That argument was always undefined, so when the injected subprocess failed the assertion printed "expected 1 to be 0" and discarded the subprocess diagnostics that explain why. These cases drive injectCodexConfig in a child process specifically so module-level path constants bind to a temp CODEX_HOME, which means the child's stderr is the only place the real error appears. spawnSync already captures it; the harness just dropped it. Adding the field is additive, so the other call sites that read status or stdout are unaffected. --- .../codex-inject-integration.test.ts | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts index 1b2d65a1ba..3162cc3d36 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-inject-integration.test.ts @@ -33,7 +33,11 @@ test("catalog readback requires a root string rather than a nested namesake", () // Full injectCodexConfig runs in a subprocess with isolated CODEX_HOME/OPENCODEX_HOME so // module-level path constants bind to the temp dirs (same pattern as codex-journal.test.ts). -function runInject(codexHome: string, ocxHome: string, configJson = "{}"): { stdout: string; status: number } { +function runInject( + codexHome: string, + ocxHome: string, + configJson = "{}", +): { stdout: string; stderr: string; status: number } { const script = ` const { injectCodexConfig } = require("./src/codex/inject"); injectCodexConfig(10100, JSON.parse(process.env.TEST_OCX_CONFIG)).then(r => { @@ -46,7 +50,11 @@ function runInject(codexHome: string, ocxHome: string, configJson = "{}"): { std encoding: "utf8", timeout: SPAWN_BUDGET_MS - 5_000, }); - return { stdout: result.stdout?.trim() ?? "", status: result.status ?? 1 }; + return { + stdout: result.stdout?.trim() ?? "", + stderr: result.stderr?.trim() ?? "", + status: result.status ?? 1, + }; } function runRestore(codexHome: string, ocxHome: string, asyncRestore = false): { stdout: string; status: number } { From 06a3b55af3bcd343017636f34a0a2e3d9124d9ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: thisisjun786 <259586770+thisisjun786@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 21:03:50 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 069/113] fix(usage): attribute retries to the dispatched API-key account --- .../content/docs/reference/management-api.md | 16 ++ src/adapters/command-code.ts | 2 +- src/codex/account-label.ts | 17 ++- src/providers/label.ts | 20 ++- src/server/chat-native.ts | 22 ++- src/server/request-log.ts | 116 ++++++++++++++- src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts | 7 +- src/server/responses/adapter-delivery.ts | 14 +- src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts | 10 +- src/server/responses/collaboration.ts | 1 - src/server/responses/compact.ts | 1 - src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts | 4 +- src/server/responses/core-combo.ts | 9 +- src/server/responses/encrypted-payload.ts | 1 - src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts | 12 +- src/server/responses/request-send-budget.ts | 2 +- src/server/responses/request-transport.ts | 65 ++++++++- src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts | 18 +-- src/server/responses/sidecar-execution.ts | 20 +-- src/usage/log.ts | 2 +- structure/adapters/registry.md | 2 +- structure/catalog.md | 2 +- structure/clients/claude-desktop.md | 2 +- structure/codex-home.md | 2 + structure/config.md | 2 +- structure/data-planes/images.md | 2 +- structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md | 2 +- structure/gui-and-management-api.md | 20 +++ structure/ops/docs-and-release.md | 2 +- structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md | 2 +- structure/providers/chat-compat.md | 2 + structure/providers/cursor.md | 2 + structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 2 + structure/providers/xai-grok.md | 2 +- structure/runtime.md | 7 + structure/subagents.md | 2 +- structure/transports/byte-accounting.md | 2 + structure/transports/inventory.md | 2 +- structure/transports/responses.md | 9 ++ structure/transports/streaming-health.md | 2 +- .../codex-account-label.test.ts | 18 +++ tests/providers/rate-limit-retry.test.ts | 8 +- .../chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts | 69 ++++++++- tests/responses/empty-completion-core.test.ts | 12 +- .../server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts | 18 ++- tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts | 137 ++++++++++++++++-- .../server-xai-oauth-401-replay.test.ts | 8 +- tests/usage/request-log.test.ts | 112 ++++++++++++++ 48 files changed, 694 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/management-api.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/management-api.md index b973add5d9..d03a78f5f4 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/management-api.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/management-api.md @@ -246,6 +246,22 @@ final provider. Custom destinations and historic rows omit the field; consumers infer subscription usage from the current configuration, model name, or inbound API key. The log reports usage, not subscription invoice amounts. +API-key attempts also record `accountLogLabel` as `k` followed by 32 lowercase hex digits. +The label is the first 128 bits of SHA-256 over +`JSON.stringify(["ocx-key-account-v1", providerName, entryId ?? null, reference])`. +The reference is the configured key value captured for the physical request, before environment +or keychain resolution. Raw keys, references, and pool IDs are not written to the label field. +A consumer can derive the same label from its local configuration without resolving secrets. +Changing a literal key or reference changes the label; replacing the secret behind an unchanged +reference keeps the same logical account. Older unlabeled records cannot be attributed reliably. + +Key selection is recorded after queued requests have been rebuilt for the current selection. +When a retry changes keys, `attempts` retains a separate record for the preceding key, including +reported usage from failed responses. Missing usage remains unreported. Routed adapter terminals +are observed before image/search loops or continuation guards combine their usage. Consumers +sum the flat attempts by provider/account and do not add the parent combo total again. These +records identify usage; provider quota percentages remain separate upstream observations. + `GET /api/usage` reads `~/.opencodex/usage.jsonl` from the beginning through the current ledger snapshot on a cold start. It processes fixed 1 MiB chunks and retains compact aggregate state rather than every normalized request row. Later refreshes validate the previous line boundary and fold only diff --git a/src/adapters/command-code.ts b/src/adapters/command-code.ts index 4b7c707d7e..3c466829e2 100644 --- a/src/adapters/command-code.ts +++ b/src/adapters/command-code.ts @@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ async function fetchCommandCode(request: AdapterRequest, ctx: AdapterFetchContex const timer = setTimeout(() => timeout.abort(new DOMException("Timeout elapsed", "TimeoutError")), ctx?.timeoutMs ?? 200_000); const callerSignal = ctx?.abortSignal ?? new AbortController().signal; try { - return await executor(request.url, { + return await (ctx?.executor ?? executor)(request.url, { method: request.method, headers: request.headers, body: request.body, diff --git a/src/codex/account-label.ts b/src/codex/account-label.ts index b0a4ab7602..046462670b 100644 --- a/src/codex/account-label.ts +++ b/src/codex/account-label.ts @@ -1,17 +1,19 @@ import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto"; import type { CodexAccount, OcxConfig } from "../types"; import type { CodexAuthContext } from "./auth-context"; +import type { ProviderApiKeySelection } from "../types/provider"; import { MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID } from "./main-account"; export const CODEX_ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE = /^p[a-f0-9]{6}$/; /** - * Account log labels come in two families (#2699): + * Account log labels come in three families: * * - `p` (plus the literal `main`) — a Codex pool account. * - `o` — a non-Codex OAuth provider account (xai, cursor, and siblings). + * - `k` — a request-owned API-key selection, scoped to provider and reference. * - * Both are sha256-derived digests, never an email and never a raw provider account id. That is + * Labels never contain an email, raw key/reference, or raw provider account id. That is * a privacy requirement, not a formatting preference: these labels are written to the usage log * and served over the management API. * @@ -20,7 +22,16 @@ export const CODEX_ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE = /^p[a-f0-9]{6}$/; * accepted cost of keeping the existing `p` format byte-compatible. */ export const OAUTH_ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE = /^o[a-f0-9]{6}$/; -export const ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE = /^(?:main|[po][a-f0-9]{6})$/; +export const KEY_ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE = /^k[a-f0-9]{32}$/; +export const ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE = /^(?:main|[po][a-f0-9]{6}|k[a-f0-9]{32})$/; + +/** Digest the request-owned configured selection, never serialize its key/reference. */ +export function apiKeyAccountLogLabel(provider: string, selection: ProviderApiKeySelection | undefined): `k${string}` | undefined { + if (!selection || typeof selection.reference !== "string" || !selection.reference.length) return undefined; + return `k${createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify([ + "ocx-key-account-v1", provider, selection.entryId ?? null, selection.reference, + ])).digest("hex").slice(0, 32)}`; +} export function oauthAccountLogLabel(accountId: string, provider = ""): string { return `o${createHash("sha256").update(`${provider}\0${accountId}`).digest("hex").slice(0, 6)}`; diff --git a/src/providers/label.ts b/src/providers/label.ts index 099bf04870..38b472a1a0 100644 --- a/src/providers/label.ts +++ b/src/providers/label.ts @@ -1,10 +1,28 @@ -import { CODEX_ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE, oauthAccountLogLabel } from "../codex/account-label"; +import { CODEX_ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE, KEY_ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE, apiKeyAccountLogLabel, oauthAccountLogLabel } from "../codex/account-label"; import type { OcxProviderConfig } from "../types"; export function canonicalUsageProviderLabel(provider: string): string { return provider === "chatgpt" || provider === "openai-multi" ? "openai" : provider; } +export function usesApiKeyAccount(provider: Pick): boolean { + return provider.authMode === "key" + || (provider.authMode === undefined && !!provider._apiKeyAttempt?.reference); +} + +/** Key identity comes from the captured selection, before env/keychain resolution. */ +export function stampApiKeyAccountLabel( + logCtx: { accountLogLabel?: string }, + providerName: string, + provider: Pick, +): void { + if (usesApiKeyAccount(provider)) { + logCtx.accountLogLabel = apiKeyAccountLogLabel(providerName, provider._apiKeyAttempt); + } else if (KEY_ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE.test(logCtx.accountLogLabel ?? "")) { + delete logCtx.accountLogLabel; + } +} + export function baseProviderLabel(provider: string): string { const canonical = canonicalUsageProviderLabel(provider); if (canonical !== provider) return canonical; diff --git a/src/server/chat-native.ts b/src/server/chat-native.ts index b122467103..791c687bd0 100644 --- a/src/server/chat-native.ts +++ b/src/server/chat-native.ts @@ -51,7 +51,9 @@ import { linkAbortSignal } from "./responses"; import { addFinalRequestLog, beginRequestAttempt, - noteAttemptSend, + noteProviderAttemptSend, + recordKeyAttemptFailure, + recordKeyWireAttemptUsage, recordFirstOutput, recordAttemptCredentialSource, sealRequestAttemptIdentity, @@ -344,10 +346,12 @@ export async function handleNativeChatCompletions(options: HandleNativeChatOptio const encoding = new Headers(init.headers).get("accept-encoding"); if (!headers.has("accept-encoding") && encoding) headers.set("accept-encoding", encoding); if (init.signal?.aborted) throw init.signal.reason; - noteAttemptSend(attempt, logCtx.usageLogInputTokens, transportRecovery ?? recovery); - return ((activeProvider as OcxProviderTransport).fetch ?? execute)(request.url, applyUpstreamRecoveryInit({ + noteProviderAttemptSend(logCtx, route.providerName, activeProvider, logCtx.usageLogInputTokens, transportRecovery ?? recovery); + const dispatched = await ((activeProvider as OcxProviderTransport).fetch ?? execute)(request.url, applyUpstreamRecoveryInit({ ...init, method: request.method, headers, body: request.body, }, transportRecovery)); + if (!dispatched.ok) await recordKeyAttemptFailure(logCtx, dispatched, init.signal ?? upstream.signal); + return dispatched; }, }), ); @@ -509,8 +513,10 @@ export async function handleNativeChatCompletions(options: HandleNativeChatOptio stallTimeoutSec: config.stallTimeoutSec, onFirstOutput: logIds ? () => recordFirstOutput(logCtx, logIds.start) : undefined, onUsage: usage => { - logCtx.usage = usage; - attempt.usage = usage; + if (!recordKeyWireAttemptUsage(logCtx, usage)) { + logCtx.usage = usage; + attempt.usage = usage; + } }, onTerminal: (status: number, message?: string) => { terminalStatus = status; @@ -600,8 +606,10 @@ export async function handleNativeChatCompletions(options: HandleNativeChatOptio if (!completion) return fail(502, "upstream response contained no choices", "upstream_error"); const usage = usageFromChat(completion.usage); if (usage) { - logCtx.usage = usage; - attempt.usage = usage; + if (!recordKeyWireAttemptUsage(logCtx, usage)) { + logCtx.usage = usage; + attempt.usage = usage; + } } if (logIds) recordFirstOutput(logCtx, logIds.start); try { diff --git a/src/server/request-log.ts b/src/server/request-log.ts index d9cf83361f..2c09fb9b80 100644 --- a/src/server/request-log.ts +++ b/src/server/request-log.ts @@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto"; +import { stampApiKeyAccountLabel, usesApiKeyAccount } from "../providers/label"; +import { KEY_ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE } from "../codex/account-label"; +import { readBoundedResponseBody } from "../lib/bounded-body"; import type { ResponsesTerminalStatus } from "../bridge"; import { classifyError, @@ -782,8 +785,10 @@ export function applyResponseLogMetadata(logCtx: RequestLogContext, payload: unk } const usage = usageFromResponsesPayload((source as { usage?: unknown }).usage); if (usage && !logCtx.usageFromBridge) { - logCtx.usage = usage; - if (logCtx.activeAttempt) logCtx.activeAttempt.usage = usage; + if (!recordKeyWireAttemptUsage(logCtx, usage)) { + logCtx.usage = usage; + if (logCtx.activeAttempt) logCtx.activeAttempt.usage = usage; + } // Counts taken off a wire, not reported raw. The zero-default token-detail objects strict // clients require are indistinguishable here from a measured zero, so the cache detail these // counts carry is recorded as synthesized rather than as an observed miss. @@ -1216,6 +1221,31 @@ export function recordNoAccountAffinityFailure( logCtx.errorCode ??= "codex_no_account"; return resolved; } +// Attempt identity can change in place while a combo parent retains an older context copy. +// These objects own their usage even after a rotation to an unknown key identity. +const keyUsageOwners = new WeakSet(); +const keyWireUsageBaselines = new WeakMap(); + +function cloneKeyUsage(usage: OcxUsage | undefined): OcxUsage | undefined { + return usage ? { ...usage } : undefined; +} + +/** Replace this physical send's wire snapshot against the pre-send baseline; repeats do not sum. */ +export function recordKeyWireAttemptUsage(logCtx: RequestLogContext, usage: OcxUsage | undefined): boolean { + if (!usage) return false; + const attempt = logCtx.activeAttempt; + if (!attempt || !keyUsageOwners.has(attempt) || !keyWireUsageBaselines.has(attempt)) return false; + const baseline = keyWireUsageBaselines.get(attempt); + const current = { ...usage }; + attempt.usage = baseline + ? aggregateAttemptUsage([ + { ...attempt, usage: baseline, usageStatus: baseline.estimated ? "estimated" : "reported" }, + { ...attempt, usage: current, usageStatus: current.estimated ? "estimated" : "reported" }, + ]).usage + : current; + logCtx.usage = attempt.usage; + return true; +} export function addFinalRequestLog( requestId: string, @@ -1247,7 +1277,9 @@ export function addFinalRequestLog( logCtx.activeAttempt, effectiveStatus, Date.now() - (logCtx.activeAttemptStartedAt ?? start), - logCtx.usage, + keyUsageOwners.has(logCtx.activeAttempt) + ? logCtx.activeAttempt.usage + : logCtx.usage, ); // The final row and its active physical attempt describe the same terminal. Preserve the // semantic code on both so detailed attempt telemetry cannot regress to a generic status code. @@ -1542,6 +1574,84 @@ export function sealRequestAttemptIdentity( attempt.provider = provider; attempt.adapter = adapter; if (isCodexUsageAccountLogLabel(accountLogLabel)) attempt.accountLogLabel = accountLogLabel; + else delete attempt.accountLogLabel; +} + +/** Preserve metered JSON failures before key recovery consumes/cancels their body. */ +export async function recordKeyAttemptFailure(logCtx: RequestLogContext, response: Response, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise { + const attempt = logCtx.activeAttempt; + if (!attempt || !KEY_ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE.test(attempt.accountLogLabel ?? "")) return; + attempt.status = response.status; + const cancelOriginal = (): void => { try { void response.body?.cancel().catch(() => {}); } catch { /* closed */ } }; + signal?.addEventListener("abort", cancelOriginal, { once: true }); + try { + if (signal?.aborted) { cancelOriginal(); return; } + const body = await readBoundedResponseBody(response.clone(), { signal, totalTimeoutMs: 1000, inactivityTimeoutMs: 1000 }); + if (body.truncated || body.oversized) return; + const value = JSON.parse(body.text); + const usage = usageFromResponsesPayload(value?.usage ?? value?.response?.usage); + if (usage) recordKeyWireAttemptUsage(logCtx, usage); + } catch { /* Absent/malformed usage remains unknown; recovery still owns the response. */ } + finally { signal?.removeEventListener("abort", cancelOriginal); } +} + +/** Add raw per-response usage before a bridge combines multiple rounds for the client. */ +export function recordKeyAttemptUsage(logCtx: RequestLogContext, usage: OcxUsage | undefined): void { + const attempt = logCtx.activeAttempt; + if (!attempt || !usage) return; + attempt.usage = attempt.usage + ? aggregateAttemptUsage([{ ...attempt, usageStatus: attempt.usage.estimated ? "estimated" : "reported" }, + { ...attempt, usage, usageStatus: usage.estimated ? "estimated" : "reported" }]).usage + : { ...usage }; + logCtx.usage = attempt.usage; +} + +/** A stable active object lets combo/stream callbacks keep pointing at the final attempt. + * Earlier key segments are immutable, flat snapshots inserted before that active object. */ +export function noteProviderAttemptSend( + logCtx: RequestLogContext, + providerName: string, + provider: OcxProviderConfig, + inputTokenEstimate: number | undefined, + recovery?: AttemptRecoveryKind, +): void { + const attempt = logCtx.activeAttempt; + const previous = attempt?.accountLogLabel; + stampApiKeyAccountLabel(logCtx, providerName, provider); + const next = logCtx.accountLogLabel; + if (attempt && usesApiKeyAccount(provider)) keyUsageOwners.add(attempt); + if (attempt && attempt.sendCount > 0 && previous !== next + && (KEY_ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE.test(previous ?? "") || KEY_ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE.test(next ?? ""))) { + // An input estimate is not evidence that a failed send used that many tokens. + delete attempt.inputTokenEstimate; + finishRequestAttempt(attempt, attempt.status >= 100 ? attempt.status + : recovery === "key-401" ? 401 : recovery?.includes("429") ? 429 : 502, + Date.now() - (logCtx.activeAttemptStartedAt ?? Date.now()), attempt.usage); + const completed = { ...attempt, recoveryKinds: [...attempt.recoveryKinds], + ...(attempt.usage ? { usage: { ...attempt.usage } } : {}), + ...(attempt.tierOutcome ? { tierOutcome: { ...attempt.tierOutcome } } : {}) }; + const attempts = logCtx.attempts ??= [attempt]; + const index = attempts.indexOf(attempt); + if (index >= 0) attempts.splice(index, 0, completed); + else attempts.push(completed, attempt); + const fresh = beginRequestAttempt(completed.ordinal + 1, providerName, completed.model, completed.adapter); + // Effort/tier metadata describes the request and is captured before the physical send. + for (const key of ["requestedEffort", "effectiveEffort", "reasoningWireField", "reasoningWireValue", "tierOutcome"] as const) { + if (completed[key] !== undefined) Object.assign(fresh, { [key]: completed[key] }); + } + for (const key of Object.keys(attempt)) delete (attempt as unknown as Record)[key]; + Object.assign(attempt, fresh); + delete logCtx.usage; + logCtx.activeAttemptStartedAt = Date.now(); + } + if (attempt) { + sealRequestAttemptIdentity(attempt, logCtx.provider, attempt.adapter, next); + recordAttemptCredentialSource(attempt, providerName, provider, attempt.adapter); + } + noteAttemptSend(attempt, inputTokenEstimate, recovery); + if (attempt && keyUsageOwners.has(attempt)) { + keyWireUsageBaselines.set(attempt, cloneKeyUsage(attempt.usage)); + } } /** Capture only the resolved upstream route; inbound auth and today's config cannot label old usage. */ diff --git a/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts b/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts index 325833c20a..6d4ffcfb43 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import type { AdapterRequest } from "../../adapters/base"; import { recordAdapterReasoning, recordAdapterTier, - noteAttemptSend, sealRequestAttemptIdentity, recordAttemptCredentialSource, } from "../request-log"; @@ -78,6 +77,7 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( | "genericFailoverAccountId" | "genericFailovers" | "applyFailoverSnapshot" + | "noteRoutedAttemptSend" >, sidecarState: Pick, sendBudgetState: Pick< @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( const replayKind: AttemptRecoveryKind | undefined = recoveryKind; try { if (transportState.activeAdapter.fetchResponse) { - noteAttemptSend(logCtx.activeAttempt, continuationEstimate, replayKind); + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(continuationEstimate, replayKind); await waitForProviderRequestSlot(route.providerName, route.provider, nextParsed.modelId, upstream.signal); return await transportState.activeAdapter.fetchResponse(builtContinuationRequest, { abortSignal: upstream.signal, @@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( onPhysicalSend: send => noteAdapterPhysicalSend(continuationEstimate, send), stream: nextParsed.stream, executor: providerFetch(route.provider, options.codexWsRuntimeIdentity, { + pacingSlotAcquired: true, dispatchOverride: oauthDispatch(builtContinuationRequest, nextParsed), providerName: route.providerName, modelId: nextParsed.modelId, @@ -208,7 +209,7 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( : fetchWithResetRetry; return await fetchContinuationWithRetryPolicy( recovery => { - noteAttemptSend(logCtx.activeAttempt, continuationEstimate, recovery ?? replayKind); + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(continuationEstimate, recovery ?? replayKind); return fetchWithHeaderTimeout( builtContinuationRequest.url, applyUpstreamRecoveryInit({ diff --git a/src/server/responses/adapter-delivery.ts b/src/server/responses/adapter-delivery.ts index a46d1faf8b..3f6330b6c4 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/adapter-delivery.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/adapter-delivery.ts @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ export async function deliverAdapterResponse( | "rememberKiroDeliveredFinalAnswer" | "responseStateOptions" >, - transportState: Pick, + transportState: Pick, sidecarState: Pick, responseEffects: Pick< ResponsesEffects, @@ -106,11 +106,7 @@ export async function deliverAdapterResponse( ...(logCtx.surface === "grok" ? { heartbeatStyle: "comment" as const } : {}), onUsage: usage => { // Raw adapter usage, pre wire-normalization (see the runTurn branch above). - logCtx.usageFromBridge = true; - if (usage) { - logCtx.usage = usage; - if (logCtx.activeAttempt) logCtx.activeAttempt.usage = usage; - } + transportState.bindKeyUsageFromBridge(usage); }, onCompletedResponse: (response: Record, providerState?: OcxProviderContinuationState) => { commitReasoningReplayServingRoute(); @@ -184,11 +180,7 @@ export async function deliverAdapterResponse( ...(routedCompaction ? { compaction: true } : {}), onProviderState: state => { providerState = state; }, onUsage: usage => { - logCtx.usageFromBridge = true; - if (usage) { - logCtx.usage = usage; - if (logCtx.activeAttempt) logCtx.activeAttempt.usage = usage; - } + transportState.bindKeyUsageFromBridge(usage); }, }); // See the streaming branch: compaction turns skip the continuation cache. diff --git a/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts b/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts index 99a0683439..33135cf75a 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts @@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import { trackStreamLifetime } from "../lifecycle"; import { recordAdapterReasoning, recordAdapterTier, - noteAttemptSend, sealRequestAttemptIdentity, recordAttemptCredentialSource, } from "../request-log"; @@ -120,6 +119,7 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( | "genericFailoverAccountId" | "genericFailovers" | "applyFailoverSnapshot" + | "noteRoutedAttemptSend" >, responseEffects: Pick, sendBudgetState: Pick< @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( let upstreamResponse: Response; try { if (transportState.activeAdapter.fetchResponse) { - noteAttemptSend(logCtx.activeAttempt, inputTokenEstimate); + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(inputTokenEstimate); await waitForProviderRequestSlot(route.providerName, route.provider, route.modelId, upstream.signal); upstreamResponse = await transportState.activeAdapter.fetchResponse(builtInitialRequest, { abortSignal: upstream.signal, @@ -287,6 +287,7 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( onPhysicalSend: send => noteAdapterPhysicalSend(inputTokenEstimate, send), stream: parsed.stream, executor: providerFetch(route.provider, options.codexWsRuntimeIdentity, { + pacingSlotAcquired: true, dispatchOverride: oauthDispatch(builtInitialRequest), providerName: route.providerName, modelId: route.modelId, @@ -306,7 +307,7 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( : fetchWithResetRetry; upstreamResponse = await fetchWithRetryPolicy( recovery => { - noteAttemptSend(logCtx.activeAttempt, inputTokenEstimate, recovery); + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(inputTokenEstimate, recovery); return fetchWithHeaderTimeout(builtInitialRequest.url, applyUpstreamRecoveryInit({ method: builtInitialRequest.method, headers: builtInitialRequest.headers, @@ -425,7 +426,7 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( logCtx.providerAdapter = transportState.activeAdapter.name; sealRequestAttemptIdentity(logCtx.activeAttempt, logCtx.provider, transportState.activeAdapter.name, logCtx.accountLogLabel); recordAttemptCredentialSource(logCtx.activeAttempt, route.providerName, route.provider, transportState.activeAdapter.name); - noteAttemptSend(logCtx.activeAttempt, retryEstimate, recovery); + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(retryEstimate, recovery); try { try { if (transportState.activeAdapter.fetchResponse) { @@ -442,6 +443,7 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( onPhysicalSend: send => noteAdapterPhysicalSend(retryEstimate, send), stream: parsed.stream, executor: providerFetch(route.provider, options.codexWsRuntimeIdentity, { + pacingSlotAcquired: true, dispatchOverride: oauthDispatch(retryRequest), providerName: route.providerName, modelId: route.modelId, diff --git a/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts b/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts index ab6a9b55c9..60b6661936 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts @@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ import { catalogModelSupportsServiceTier, finishRequestAttempt, inspectResponseLogJson, - noteAttemptSend, readConfiguredCodexServiceTier, requestLogSpeedLabel, sealRequestAttemptIdentity, diff --git a/src/server/responses/compact.ts b/src/server/responses/compact.ts index 6b5b979d37..77082bfe00 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/compact.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/compact.ts @@ -140,7 +140,6 @@ import { catalogModelSupportsServiceTier, finishRequestAttempt, inspectResponseLogJson, - noteAttemptSend, readConfiguredCodexServiceTier, requestLogSpeedLabel, sealRequestAttemptIdentity, diff --git a/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts b/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts index 5d0fc50109..f84f83db68 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ import { recordAdapterTier, sealRequestAttemptIdentity, recordAttemptCredentialSource, - noteAttemptSend, + noteProviderAttemptSend, } from "../request-log"; import { codexAuthContextLogLabel } from "../../codex/account-label"; import { chargeWorkflowSends } from "../../lib/workflow-budget"; @@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ export async function retryCodexPoolOnAlternateAccount( // The move is a physical send like any other, so the root workflow is charged too. chargeWorkflowSends(args.options.workflowRootId, 1); } - noteAttemptSend(logCtx.activeAttempt, passthroughEstimate); + noteProviderAttemptSend(logCtx, route.providerName, route.provider, passthroughEstimate); try { upstreamResponse = await fetchWithHeaderTimeout( request.url, diff --git a/src/server/responses/core-combo.ts b/src/server/responses/core-combo.ts index 1db4b9d0bf..6a573e4907 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/core-combo.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/core-combo.ts @@ -452,6 +452,9 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( childLog.requestedEffort = originalRequestedEffort; recordAttemptRequestedEffort(childLog); } + childLog.activeAttemptStartedAt = started; + childLog.attempts = logCtx.attempts ??= []; + childLog.attempts.push(attempt); let attemptRetained = false; const retainCancelledAttempt = (): void => { if (attemptRetained) return; @@ -462,7 +465,6 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( childLog.accountLogLabel, ); finishRequestAttempt(attempt, 499, Date.now() - started, childLog.usage); - (logCtx.attempts ??= []).push(attempt); attemptRetained = true; }; const completedTarget = { provider: pick.target.provider, model: pick.target.model }; @@ -533,6 +535,7 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( retainCancelledAttempt(); return clientCancelledResponse(); } + finishRequestAttempt(attempt, 502, Date.now() - started, childLog.usage); throw error; } @@ -554,6 +557,7 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( retainCancelledAttempt(); return clientCancelledResponse(); } + finishRequestAttempt(attempt, 502, Date.now() - started, childLog.usage); throw error; } if (preflight.kind === "failed") { @@ -574,7 +578,6 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( childLog.providerAdapter ?? attempt.adapter, childLog.accountLogLabel, ); - (logCtx.attempts ??= []).push(attempt); attemptRetained = true; noteComboSuccess(comboId, combo, pick.target, pick.writerGeneration); Object.assign(logCtx, childLog, { @@ -608,6 +611,7 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( retainCancelledAttempt(); return clientCancelledResponse(); } + finishRequestAttempt(attempt, 502, Date.now() - started, childLog.usage); throw error; } if (options.abortSignal?.aborted) { @@ -626,7 +630,6 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( Date.now() - started, failure.usage, ); - (logCtx.attempts ??= []).push(attempt); attemptRetained = true; lastFailure = failure.response; lastFailedChildLog = childLog; diff --git a/src/server/responses/encrypted-payload.ts b/src/server/responses/encrypted-payload.ts index 066bb9b522..0e9efddf99 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/encrypted-payload.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/encrypted-payload.ts @@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ import { catalogModelSupportsServiceTier, finishRequestAttempt, inspectResponseLogJson, - noteAttemptSend, readConfiguredCodexServiceTier, requestLogSpeedLabel, sealRequestAttemptIdentity, diff --git a/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts b/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts index f5c5b94694..0292f1d77a 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts @@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ import { restorePlaintextV2AgentMessageCalls } from "../../responses/plaintext-v import { recordAdapterReasoning, recordAdapterTier, - noteAttemptSend, sealRequestAttemptIdentity, recordAttemptCredentialSource, } from "../request-log"; @@ -171,6 +170,7 @@ export async function preparePassthroughExchange( | "replayOAuthCredentialSnapshot" | "genericFailovers" | "applyFailoverSnapshot" + | "noteRoutedAttemptSend" >, responseEffects: Pick< ResponsesEffects, @@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ export async function preparePassthroughExchange( // Body is a replayable string; nothing has streamed to the client yet. upstreamResponse = await fetchWithTransientRetry( recovery => { - noteAttemptSend(logCtx.activeAttempt, passthroughEstimate, recovery); + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(passthroughEstimate, recovery); return fetchWithHeaderTimeout(request.url, applyUpstreamRecoveryInit({ method: request.method, headers: request.headers, @@ -848,7 +848,7 @@ export async function preparePassthroughExchange( if (allowance.permit && !allowance.permit.use()) { throw new SendBudgetExhaustedError(safeHostLabel(request.url)); } - noteAttemptSend(logCtx.activeAttempt, passthroughEstimate, innerRecovery ?? recovery); + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(passthroughEstimate, innerRecovery ?? recovery); return fetchWithHeaderTimeout(request.url, applyUpstreamRecoveryInit({ method: request.method, headers: request.headers, @@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ export async function preparePassthroughExchange( // every other build site; a replay is exactly when a grown payload reappears. const replayBodyRefusal = refuseOversizedOutboundBody(request); if (replayBodyRefusal) return replayBodyRefusal; - noteAttemptSend(logCtx.activeAttempt, passthroughEstimate, "oauth-401"); + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(passthroughEstimate, "oauth-401"); upstreamResponse = await fetchWithHeaderTimeout( request.url, { method: request.method, headers: request.headers, body: request.body }, @@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ export async function preparePassthroughExchange( try { upstreamResponse = await fetchWithTransientRetry( recovery => { - noteAttemptSend(logCtx.activeAttempt, passthroughEstimate, recovery ?? "oauth-401"); + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(passthroughEstimate, recovery ?? "oauth-401"); return fetchWithHeaderTimeout(request.url, applyUpstreamRecoveryInit({ method: request.method, headers: request.headers, @@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@ export async function preparePassthroughExchange( recovery => { // The first send of every replay is itself a rate-limit retry; inner transient-5xx // recoveries keep their own label (recovery is provided for those). - noteAttemptSend(logCtx.activeAttempt, passthroughEstimate, recovery ?? "rate-limit-429"); + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(passthroughEstimate, recovery ?? "rate-limit-429"); return fetchWithHeaderTimeout(request.url, applyUpstreamRecoveryInit({ method: request.method, headers: request.headers, diff --git a/src/server/responses/request-send-budget.ts b/src/server/responses/request-send-budget.ts index 41bf5d64d6..897f87f9fe 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/request-send-budget.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/request-send-budget.ts @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ export function createResponsesSendBudget( /** * Records an adapter's OWN inner retries against this attempt. * - * Ordinal 1 is the send each call site already recorded through `noteAttemptSend`, so only + * Ordinal 1 is the send each call site already recorded through `noteRoutedAttemptSend`, so only * the extra physical sends are added here and an adapter that does not retry internally * leaves its log byte-for-byte as it was. Kiro reaches roughly eighteen sends per call and * Cursor re-sends a whole turn, and both reported one; a count that cannot be observed diff --git a/src/server/responses/request-transport.ts b/src/server/responses/request-transport.ts index c80f242121..c5b92a177d 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/request-transport.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/request-transport.ts @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { credentialGeneration, } from "../../oauth/store"; import type { ProviderAdapter, AdapterRequest } from "../../adapters/base"; -import type { OcxParsedRequest, OcxProviderConfig } from "../../types"; +import type { AdapterEvent, OcxParsedRequest, OcxProviderConfig, OcxUsage } from "../../types"; import type { AnthropicAccountSelectionReason } from "../../oauth/anthropic-routing"; import { isAnthropicAccountPoolEnabled, @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ import { preferredInitialAccount, noteGenericPoolSelection, } from "../../oauth/generic-account-failover"; -import { stampOAuthAccountLabel } from "../../providers/label"; +import { stampOAuthAccountLabel, usesApiKeyAccount } from "../../providers/label"; import { resolveProviderTransport } from "../../providers/xai-transport"; import { resolveCopilotApiBaseUrl } from "../../oauth/github-copilot"; import { @@ -59,7 +59,11 @@ import { sealRequestAttemptIdentity, recordAttemptCredentialSource, recordAdapterTierMetadata, + noteProviderAttemptSend, + recordKeyAttemptFailure, + recordKeyAttemptUsage, } from "../request-log"; +import type { AttemptRecoveryKind } from "../../usage/log"; import { resolvePassiveRouteSubjectId } from "../passive-route-linker"; /** Owns live credential selection and adapter bindings for one request. */ @@ -241,6 +245,30 @@ export async function prepareResponsesTransport( replayOAuthCredentialSnapshot = { accountId: snapshot.accountId, generation: snapshot.generation }; return true; }; + // Key sends may be rebuilt while queued. Keep metadata pending until the guarded + // physical dispatch binds it to the selection that actually reaches the upstream. + let pendingKeySend: { estimate: number | undefined; recovery?: AttemptRecoveryKind } | undefined; + const noteRoutedAttemptSend = (estimate: number | undefined, recovery?: AttemptRecoveryKind): void => { + if (usesApiKeyAccount(route.provider)) pendingKeySend = { estimate, recovery }; + else noteProviderAttemptSend(logCtx, route.providerName, route.provider, estimate, recovery); + }; + const commitKeyAttemptSend = (): void => { + if (!usesApiKeyAccount(route.provider)) return; + noteProviderAttemptSend(logCtx, route.providerName, route.provider, + pendingKeySend?.estimate ?? logCtx.usageLogInputTokens, pendingKeySend?.recovery); + pendingKeySend = undefined; + }; + const bindKeyUsageFromBridge = (usage: OcxUsage | undefined): void => { + logCtx.usageFromBridge = true; + if (usesApiKeyAccount(route.provider)) { + logCtx.usage = logCtx.activeAttempt?.usage; + return; + } + if (usage) { + logCtx.usage = usage; + if (logCtx.activeAttempt) logCtx.activeAttempt.usage = usage; + } + }; const selectionIsCurrent = (binding: DispatchBinding | undefined): boolean => { if (route.provider.authMode === "forward") return true; if (!binding) return false; @@ -260,6 +288,27 @@ export async function prepareResponsesTransport( : undefined : { kind: "api-key", provider: { ...route.provider } }; if (binding) adapterBindings.set(resolved, binding); + // Observe terminals before search/image loops or continuation guards hide earlier rounds. + // Each adapter parser is called once per physical response; bridge totals are client-only. + const observedResponses = new WeakSet(); + const observeUsage = (event: AdapterEvent, response: object): void => { + if (usesApiKeyAccount(provider) && "usage" in event && event.usage && !observedResponses.has(response)) { + observedResponses.add(response); + recordKeyAttemptUsage(logCtx, event.usage); + } + }; + const parseStream = resolved.parseStream.bind(resolved); + resolved.parseStream = async function* (...args) { + for await (const event of parseStream(...args)) { observeUsage(event, args[0]); yield event; } + }; + if (resolved.parseResponse) { + const parseResponse = resolved.parseResponse.bind(resolved); + resolved.parseResponse = async (...args) => { + const events = await parseResponse(...args); + events.forEach(event => observeUsage(event, args[0])); + return events; + }; + } const build = resolved.buildRequest.bind(resolved); resolved.buildRequest = async (requestParsed, incoming) => { const request = await build(requestParsed, incoming); @@ -268,7 +317,11 @@ export async function prepareResponsesTransport( return request; }; if (resolved.runTurn) { - rawRunTurns.set(resolved, resolved.runTurn.bind(resolved)); + const runTurn = resolved.runTurn.bind(resolved); + rawRunTurns.set(resolved, (requestParsed, incoming, emit) => { + const response = {}; + return runTurn(requestParsed, incoming, event => { observeUsage(event, response); emit(event); }); + }); resolved.runTurn = (requestParsed, incoming, emit) => runSelectedTurn(resolved, requestParsed, incoming, emit); } return resolved; @@ -319,6 +372,7 @@ export async function prepareResponsesTransport( refused = true; throw new Error("Account selection changed before the first turn dispatch"); } + commitKeyAttemptSend(); sent = true; }, }); @@ -351,7 +405,9 @@ export async function prepareResponsesTransport( && sentHeaders?.get("authorization") === `Bearer ${snapshot.accessToken}` && !sentHeaders?.has("x-api-key"); // Reselection can choose a provider override instead of the supplied executor. + commitKeyAttemptSend(); const response = await fetchImpl(destination, { ...dispatchInit, redirect: "manual" }); + if (!response.ok) await recordKeyAttemptFailure(logCtx, response, dispatchInit.signal ?? options.abortSignal); // Observe each physical response before retries replace it. The binding belongs to // this dispatch, so a manual switch cannot file A's headers against B. Header // overrides and credential replacement make ownership unprovable: skip those writes. @@ -736,6 +792,9 @@ export async function prepareResponsesTransport( resolveSelectionAdapter, refreshRunTurnAdapter, oauthDispatch, + noteRoutedAttemptSend, + commitKeyAttemptSend, + bindKeyUsageFromBridge, anthropicSessionKey, isPassthrough, }; diff --git a/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts b/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts index 1bd962e628..20524edd3a 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import { adapterNeedsForcedContinuation, adapterResponseReachedServingTerminal, } from "./core-replay"; -import { sealRequestAttemptIdentity, noteAttemptSend, recordAttemptCredentialSource } from "../request-log"; +import { sealRequestAttemptIdentity, recordAttemptCredentialSource } from "../request-log"; import { waitForProviderRequestSlot, RequestPacingQueueOverloadError } from "../../providers/request-pacing"; import type { AdapterEventQueue } from "../../adapters/run-turn-queue"; import type { AttemptRecoveryKind } from "../../usage/log"; @@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ export async function executeResponsesRunTurn( | "applyFailoverSnapshot" | "resolveSelectionAdapter" | "adapter" + | "noteRoutedAttemptSend" + | "bindKeyUsageFromBridge" >, sidecarState: Pick, responseEffects: Pick< @@ -144,7 +146,7 @@ export async function executeResponsesRunTurn( await waitForProviderRequestSlot(route.providerName, route.provider, route.modelId, runTurnAbort.signal); } await refreshRunTurnSelection(); - noteAttemptSend(logCtx.activeAttempt, logCtx.usageLogInputTokens, recovery); + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(logCtx.usageLogInputTokens, recovery); const runTurnProviderFetch = providerFetch( route.provider, options.codexWsRuntimeIdentity, @@ -381,11 +383,7 @@ export async function executeResponsesRunTurn( onUsage: usage => { // Raw adapter usage, pre wire-normalization: the bridged SSE now always carries // zero-default detail objects, so provenance must come from here (cache_detail_missing). - logCtx.usageFromBridge = true; - if (usage) { - logCtx.usage = usage; - if (logCtx.activeAttempt) logCtx.activeAttempt.usage = usage; - } + transportState.bindKeyUsageFromBridge(usage); }, onCompletedResponse: (response: Record, providerState?: OcxProviderContinuationState) => { commitReasoningReplayServingRoute(); @@ -452,11 +450,7 @@ export async function executeResponsesRunTurn( ...(routedCompaction ? { compaction: true } : {}), onProviderState: state => { providerState = state; }, onUsage: usage => { - logCtx.usageFromBridge = true; - if (usage) { - logCtx.usage = usage; - if (logCtx.activeAttempt) logCtx.activeAttempt.usage = usage; - } + transportState.bindKeyUsageFromBridge(usage); }, }); if (!routedCompaction) { diff --git a/src/server/responses/sidecar-execution.ts b/src/server/responses/sidecar-execution.ts index 7987d5ca93..7aeb9d452d 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/sidecar-execution.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/sidecar-execution.ts @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ import { bindRouteReasoningReplayScope, adapterNeedsForcedContinuation } from ". import { namespacedToolName } from "../../types"; import { providerFetch } from "./fetch-helpers"; import type { AttemptRecoveryKind } from "../../usage/log"; -import { noteAttemptSend, recordAdapterReasoning, recordAdapterTier } from "../request-log"; +import { recordAdapterReasoning, recordAdapterTier } from "../request-log"; import { normalizeLogConversationId } from "../request-log-conversation"; import { rememberResponseState } from "../../responses/state"; import { trackStreamLifetime } from "../lifecycle"; @@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ export async function executeResponsesSidecars( | "commitResolvedOAuthSelection" | "resolveSelectionAdapter" | "oauthDispatch" + | "noteRoutedAttemptSend" + | "bindKeyUsageFromBridge" >, sidecarState: Pick, responseEffects: Pick< @@ -322,7 +324,7 @@ export async function executeResponsesSidecars( ...(vidPlan ? { videoPlan: vidPlan } : {}), forwardHeaders: requestState.selectedForwardHeaders, onAttemptSend: (recovery?: AttemptRecoveryKind) => - noteAttemptSend(logCtx.activeAttempt, logCtx.usageLogInputTokens, recovery), + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(logCtx.usageLogInputTokens, recovery), abortSignal: options.abortSignal, maxRounds: imgPlan && vidPlan ? clampImageMaxRounds(Math.min(config.images?.maxRounds ?? 3, config.images?.videoMaxRounds ?? 2)) @@ -352,11 +354,7 @@ export async function executeResponsesSidecars( if (!logCtx.conversationId && parsed._cursorConversationId) { logCtx.conversationId = normalizeLogConversationId(parsed._cursorConversationId); } - logCtx.usageFromBridge = true; - if (usage) { - logCtx.usage = usage; - if (logCtx.activeAttempt) logCtx.activeAttempt.usage = usage; - } + transportState.bindKeyUsageFromBridge(usage); }, on429: rotateSidecarProviderOn429, retryOn429Policy: rateLimitRetryPolicyFor(route.provider), @@ -432,13 +430,9 @@ export async function executeResponsesSidecars( recordAdapterTier(logCtx, request); }, onAttemptSend: (recovery?: AttemptRecoveryKind) => - noteAttemptSend(logCtx.activeAttempt, logCtx.usageLogInputTokens, recovery), + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(logCtx.usageLogInputTokens, recovery), onUsage: usage => { - logCtx.usageFromBridge = true; - if (usage) { - logCtx.usage = usage; - if (logCtx.activeAttempt) logCtx.activeAttempt.usage = usage; - } + transportState.bindKeyUsageFromBridge(usage); }, recordSidecarOutcome: wsPlan.forwardSidecar?.recordOutcome, connectTimeoutMs: config.connectTimeoutMs ?? 200_000, diff --git a/src/usage/log.ts b/src/usage/log.ts index de03cbf752..aadeb1648b 100644 --- a/src/usage/log.ts +++ b/src/usage/log.ts @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ export type UsageStatus = "reported" | "unreported" | "unsupported" | "estimated * The old name `CodexUsageAccountLogLabel` is kept as an alias because it is exported and used * across modules; the two predicates below are what callers should choose between. */ -export type UsageAccountLogLabel = "main" | `p${string}` | `o${string}`; +export type UsageAccountLogLabel = "main" | `p${string}` | `o${string}` | `k${string}`; export type CodexUsageAccountLogLabel = UsageAccountLogLabel; /** diff --git a/structure/adapters/registry.md b/structure/adapters/registry.md index 83e8f4f466..6714c77665 100644 --- a/structure/adapters/registry.md +++ b/structure/adapters/registry.md @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ so the schema is not something a user can fix from configuration (issue #2673). > Decision record: [ADR-0093](../decisions/ADR-0093-moonshot-ref-with-siblings-normalization.md) -Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. +Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. Connected CLI usage follows the [client-scoped hub usage contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); local management and account data remain separate. diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index bf9d6e3751..2167718056 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ spelling; the V1 and compaction cap exemptions are preserved. Codex display-cache expiry, retained main-policy evidence, and reset history follow the [quota cache contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#quota-cache-and-short-window-history). -Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. +Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. Connected CLI usage follows the [client-scoped hub usage contract](gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); local management and account data remain separate. diff --git a/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md b/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md index 01a583c182..11e62f4e17 100644 --- a/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md +++ b/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ testable on any host: stubbing `process.platform` does not propagate to `os.plat > Decision record: [ADR-0046](../decisions/ADR-0046-claude-desktop-config-library-resolution.md) -Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. +Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. Connected CLI usage follows the [client-scoped hub usage contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); local management and account data remain separate. diff --git a/structure/codex-home.md b/structure/codex-home.md index 339358ea9b..bdacb4ed9c 100644 --- a/structure/codex-home.md +++ b/structure/codex-home.md @@ -275,3 +275,5 @@ Pool quota producers and account commands follow the [bounded raw-observation co The account history response can include a [low-confidence effective capacity estimate](providers/openai-tiers.md#observed-effective-token-capacity); usage normalization retains local-answer provenance so local responses cannot supply samples. Codex pool settings and their consumers follow the [reset-first ordering contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#reset-first-account-ordering), including independent-quota fallback and preserved affinity. + +Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. diff --git a/structure/config.md b/structure/config.md index d00b36b06b..41515893d7 100644 --- a/structure/config.md +++ b/structure/config.md @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ The unregistered executor CLI module stores Remote Workspace state separately fr Remote Workspace uses a separate, explicitly enabled server surface with structural WebSocket callbacks and awaited per-server cleanup; [its contract](remote-workspace.md) owns that integration. -Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. +Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. `dropCodexSafetyBuffering` is an optional boolean, default false. Invalid API candidates reject; malformed persisted values stay disabled. It controls only the allowlisted client-output hints diff --git a/structure/data-planes/images.md b/structure/data-planes/images.md index a7420072bf..a73fcc6f07 100644 --- a/structure/data-planes/images.md +++ b/structure/data-planes/images.md @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ conflicts with `modelSupportsReasoningSummaries: false` for the same model. > Decision record: [ADR-0045](../decisions/ADR-0045-standalone-images.md) -Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. +Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. Connected CLI usage follows the [client-scoped hub usage contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); local management and account data remain separate. diff --git a/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md b/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md index 33ca8c76b0..0e1a030e94 100644 --- a/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md +++ b/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ reasoning ladder into `thinking.effortOptions`. Missing capabilities stay absent falling back to OpenCodex guesses, and the integration does not write the removed `thinking.effort` / `defaultEffort` fields because MCode owns the active effort per session. -Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. +Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. Connected CLI usage follows the [client-scoped hub usage contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); local management and account data remain separate. diff --git a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md index 4628ca5e50..5f01edbc8d 100644 --- a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md +++ b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md @@ -367,6 +367,26 @@ keeps the saved state and renders fixed `ocx sync` guidance without server/accou ## Usage accounting +### Upstream key account attribution + +API-key attempts in `src/usage/log.ts` carry `accountLogLabel` as `k` plus 32 lowercase +hex digits. `src/codex/account-label.ts` derives it from the first 128 bits of SHA-256 over +`JSON.stringify(["ocx-key-account-v1", providerName, entryId ?? null, reference])`. +`reference` is the configured value captured for the physical send, before environment or +keychain resolution. The log contains the digest, not raw keys, references, or pool IDs. +Existing Codex and OAuth label formats remain valid. Replacing a literal or reference changes +identity; rotating the secret behind the same reference preserves the logical account. + +`src/providers/label.ts` stamps only key authentication, including implicit custom-provider +keys. `src/server/request-log.ts` commits identity at dispatch after queued selection changes, +retains separate flat records when retries change keys, and isolates each record's raw usage +from parent combo totals and adapter-loop aggregation. Reported failure usage is retained; +missing usage and historical identities remain unknown. Native wire snapshots replace only the +current physical response contribution, preserving prior sends on the same key without counting +repeated inspections twice. Consumers sum the flat attempts once and keep subscription quota +observations separate from token or API-equivalent cost totals. + + `src/server/hub-usage.ts` serves `GET /v1/usage` on hubs for an explicit configured data key. The authenticated key selects the aggregate; query parameters cannot select an API-key identity. Unscoped environment/admin credentials and loopback bypass are not admitted. The response projects only this client's numeric totals, provider/model/day rows and incomplete-history metadata through `src/remote/hub-usage.ts`; accounts, raw records and key IDs are omitted. Unknown fields are stripped at every object boundary and the serialized body is capped at 1 MiB. Custom usage windows are immutable bounds on the streaming accumulator, applied to each diff --git a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md index 0c0ffe38d0..9a2f6f27d3 100644 --- a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md +++ b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md @@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ The shared atomic replacement publisher also identifies explicit Remote Workspac Remote Workspace uses a separate, explicitly enabled server surface with structural WebSocket callbacks and awaited per-server cleanup; [its contract](../remote-workspace.md) owns that integration. -Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. +Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. Listener startup diagnostics follow [the runtime lifecycle contract](../runtime.md#lifecycle); malformed optional listener blocks follow [config loading](../config.md#config-surface). The Combo guides describe the distinction between display quota and single-credential inference evidence used by routing. See [scoped provider quota](../runtime.md#scoped-provider-quota-for-combo-selection). diff --git a/structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md b/structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md index e28575b432..db1a8653a1 100644 --- a/structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md +++ b/structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ so the flag does not identify the peer responsible for corruption. Existing diag not rewritten. Audio devices, WebRTC media negotiation, captions and spoken handoff delivery remain client responsibilities. -Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. +Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. Connected CLI usage follows the [client-scoped hub usage contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); local management and account data remain separate. diff --git a/structure/providers/chat-compat.md b/structure/providers/chat-compat.md index 5ee17ed807..08cdc58288 100644 --- a/structure/providers/chat-compat.md +++ b/structure/providers/chat-compat.md @@ -339,3 +339,5 @@ prose the model reads beside them. Vendor tool execution stays disabled on both adapters, and Qoder's explicit refusal of original images is unchanged. Canonical Responses identity sanitation and narrowly scoped pre-output combo recovery follow [request-local target compatibility](../runtime.md#request-local-target-compatibility); other adapter contracts remain unchanged. + +Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. diff --git a/structure/providers/cursor.md b/structure/providers/cursor.md index 5ae38028d8..39f06c3915 100644 --- a/structure/providers/cursor.md +++ b/structure/providers/cursor.md @@ -130,3 +130,5 @@ Translated Chat request construction uses the [inline-image budget](../transport Translated audio/file admission follows the [final-adapter input contract](../adapters/registry.md#untranslated-input-media); native raw passthrough remains separate. Canonical Responses identity sanitation and narrowly scoped pre-output combo recovery follow [request-local target compatibility](../runtime.md#request-local-target-compatibility); other adapter contracts remain unchanged. + +Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index ab7511c3b0..fd25e83c46 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -567,3 +567,5 @@ Two call sites need the rule — the live path in `reevaluateAffinityQuota` and `previewReusableAffinityAccount` that subagent fallback reads — and they share one helper rather than restating it, because the suite asserts the two answer identically and a preview that disagreed would hand fallback a different account than the request actually uses. + +Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. diff --git a/structure/providers/xai-grok.md b/structure/providers/xai-grok.md index dc982c5639..114dbd9f80 100644 --- a/structure/providers/xai-grok.md +++ b/structure/providers/xai-grok.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ malformed, gapped, oversized, contradictory, failed, or incomplete streams stay - **Safety & Idempotency:** Managed via `src/grok/reset-coupon-ledger.ts` using UUIDv4 operation tracking before upstream dispatch to prevent duplicate consumption during network flakes. - **Surfaces:** `ocx account grok-reset-coupons` in the terminal, and the dashboard at Providers > xAI Grok > Accounts, where each OAuth row carries a ticket badge with its remaining count and opens a redemption dialog (`gui/src/hooks/useGrokResetCoupons.ts`, `gui/src/components/provider-workspace/GrokResetCoupons.tsx`). The dashboard reads one `GET /api/grok/reset-coupons` per account with at most three in flight, always sends an explicit `tokenId` and a client-minted `operationId`, and treats redemption truth as the settled `code` rather than HTTP 200 — a replayed *failure* returns 200 with `replayed: true`. After a request times out it issues no further consume call, because a redemption whose ledger record is still `open` re-executes. -Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. +Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. Connected CLI usage follows the [client-scoped hub usage contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); local management and account data remain separate. diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index 248c3011c6..2a5a3b82cf 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -442,3 +442,10 @@ change target selection. `src/server/responses/core-combo.ts` applies the policy and preserves the original requested effort separately from effective wire telemetry. `src/server/chat-completions.ts` routes combos through that same child pipeline while retaining the current config-aware native-Chat eligibility check for non-combo routes. +## Upstream key usage identity + +`src/codex/account-label.ts` owns the provider/selection digest and `src/providers/label.ts` +stamps the configured key selected for the physical request. `src/server/request-log.ts` +retains per-key attempt usage, and `src/usage/log.ts` validates and persists labels. The +[account attribution contract](gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution) +defines identity, unknown records, and aggregation boundaries. diff --git a/structure/subagents.md b/structure/subagents.md index c0c92891f7..1edc9e2e34 100644 --- a/structure/subagents.md +++ b/structure/subagents.md @@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ Native Codex advertisements still follow display priority; private guidance rank Codex display-cache expiry, retained main-policy evidence, and reset history follow the [quota cache contract](providers/openai-tiers.md#quota-cache-and-short-window-history). -Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. +Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. Connected CLI usage follows the [client-scoped hub usage contract](gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); local management and account data remain separate. diff --git a/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md b/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md index 7f01dee197..239529ad96 100644 --- a/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md +++ b/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md @@ -39,3 +39,5 @@ These optimizations do not add request queues, retry policies, or RSS-based admi Translated audio/file admission follows the [final-adapter input contract](../adapters/registry.md#untranslated-input-media); native raw passthrough remains separate. Canonical Responses identity sanitation and narrowly scoped pre-output combo recovery follow [request-local target compatibility](../runtime.md#request-local-target-compatibility); other adapter contracts remain unchanged. + +Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. diff --git a/structure/transports/inventory.md b/structure/transports/inventory.md index ca80373a8e..53122d96ea 100644 --- a/structure/transports/inventory.md +++ b/structure/transports/inventory.md @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ Caller-owned `provider.fetch` executors are also deferred: they receive literal/ redirect blocking, but cannot inherit DNS classification or peer pinning without a verified-peer executor contract. Main-request migration must not treat that branch as fixed-transport equivalent. -Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. +Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. Connected CLI usage follows the [client-scoped hub usage contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); local management and account data remain separate. diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index aa66104165..b2de98cec8 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -573,6 +573,15 @@ change target order or attempt accounting; provider-400 decisions follow the [re The shared Responses path follows the [bounded multipart recovery contract](../subagents.md#multipart-encrypted-task-recovery); credential admission and retry policy remain unchanged. +## Upstream key attempt accounting + +Key identity is sealed at the guarded physical dispatch after queued selections are rebuilt. +Raw adapter terminal usage is recorded before continuation, search, or image loops merge it; +repeated parsing of one physical response does not count it twice. Key changes preserve the +previous attempt while retaining the active attempt object shared by streaming/combo callbacks. +Bounded failure-body observation retains reported usage and releases cloned readers on abort. +Identity and consumer aggregation follow the [account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution). + ## Combo streaming commit boundary An HTTP 200 does not by itself commit a streaming combo child. The combo parent runs the child's diff --git a/structure/transports/streaming-health.md b/structure/transports/streaming-health.md index 682fbb2ca2..06783ad651 100644 --- a/structure/transports/streaming-health.md +++ b/structure/transports/streaming-health.md @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ WebSocket clients observe the same canonical lifecycle. frame rather than always emitting `response.completed`. If the response status is `failed`, a `response.failed` frame is sent; otherwise `response.completed` carries through the original status. -Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. +Usage consumers preserve positive incomplete-history metadata as specified in [usage accounting](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); readable totals are not represented as a complete ledger. Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. Connected CLI usage follows the [client-scoped hub usage contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#usage-accounting); local management and account data remain separate. diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-label.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-label.test.ts index 9680e3f8b9..5053d1fc78 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-label.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-label.test.ts @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; import { CODEX_ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE, + ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE, + apiKeyAccountLogLabel, codexAccountLogLabel, createCodexAccountLogLabel, fallbackCodexAccountLogLabel, @@ -8,6 +10,22 @@ import { } from "../../src/codex/account-label"; describe("codex account privacy labels", () => { + test("key labels follow the shared consumer contract and isolate provider, slot and reference", () => { + expect(apiKeyAccountLogLabel("test-provider", { entryId: "slot-a", reference: "test-key-a" })) + .toBe("k35f7c109222440212853c90de03e7df5"); + expect(apiKeyAccountLogLabel("test-provider", { entryId: "slot-b", reference: "test-key-b" })) + .toBe("kae34539c9f0b302367a033166800ae47"); + expect(apiKeyAccountLogLabel("test-provider", { reference: "test-key-a" })) + .toBe("ke4869182d193d18777b6ce175baaa41a"); + expect(apiKeyAccountLogLabel("other-provider", { entryId: "slot-a", reference: "test-key-a" })) + .toBe("k98c6a69a98c5537c6acd344f116e7579"); + expect(apiKeyAccountLogLabel("test-provider", undefined)).toBeUndefined(); + expect(apiKeyAccountLogLabel("test-provider", { reference: "" })).toBeUndefined(); + expect(apiKeyAccountLogLabel("test-provider", { reference: "env:MISSING_SYNTHETIC_KEY" })) + .toMatch(ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE); + expect(ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE.test("kabc123")).toBe(false); + expect(ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE.test("k" + "a".repeat(33))).toBe(false); + }); test("generates non-PII log labels", () => { expect(createCodexAccountLogLabel()).toMatch(CODEX_ACCOUNT_LOG_LABEL_RE); }); diff --git a/tests/providers/rate-limit-retry.test.ts b/tests/providers/rate-limit-retry.test.ts index 709ccdae12..b351057055 100644 --- a/tests/providers/rate-limit-retry.test.ts +++ b/tests/providers/rate-limit-retry.test.ts @@ -121,14 +121,16 @@ describe("retry loop client-abort handling", () => { test("abort during the wait interrupts the sleep, cancels the 429 body, and returns 499 without replaying", async () => { let sends = 0; let upstreamBodyCancelled = false; + let upstreamBodyDrained = false; globalThis.fetch = (async (input, init) => { const url = input instanceof Request ? input.url : String(input); if (url === "https://llmapi.blsc.cn/chat/completions") { sends += 1; return new Response(new ReadableStream({ - start(controller) { + pull(controller) { controller.enqueue(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify({ error: { message: "rate limited" } }))); controller.close(); + upstreamBodyDrained = true; }, cancel() { upstreamBodyCancelled = true; @@ -167,7 +169,7 @@ describe("retry loop client-abort handling", () => { const response = await pending; expect(response.status).toBe(499); expect(sends).toBe(1); - expect(upstreamBodyCancelled).toBe(true); + expect(upstreamBodyCancelled || upstreamBodyDrained).toBe(true); const body = await response.json() as { error?: { code?: string } }; expect(body.error?.code).toBe("client_cancelled"); }); @@ -182,7 +184,7 @@ describe("retry loop client-abort handling", () => { return new Response(new ReadableStream({ start(controller) { controller.enqueue(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify({ error: { message: "rate limited" } }))); - controller.close(); + // Keep the source open so abort must cancel both accounting tee branches. }, cancel() { cancelInitiated = true; diff --git a/tests/responses/chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts b/tests/responses/chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts index 82317d89bd..c88a247674 100644 --- a/tests/responses/chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts @@ -1649,7 +1649,74 @@ test("chat-native preserves same-key retry, key rotation, usage, and request log const entry = getRequestLogEntries().at(-1); expect(entry?.status).toBe(200); expect(entry?.usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 4, outputTokens: 2 }); - expect(entry?.attempts?.[0]?.recoveryKinds).toEqual(["rate-limit-429", "key-429"]); + expect(entry?.attempts).toHaveLength(2); + expect(entry?.attempts?.[0]?.recoveryKinds).toEqual(["rate-limit-429"]); + expect(entry?.attempts?.[0]?.sendCount).toBe(2); + expect(entry?.attempts?.[1]?.recoveryKinds).toEqual(["key-429"]); + expect(entry?.attempts?.[1]?.sendCount).toBe(1); + } finally { + await server.stop(true); + upstream.stop(true); + clearKeyCooldowns("mock"); + } +}); + +test.each([false, true])("chat-native attributes same-key 429 usage then the rotated key (stream=%s)", async (streaming) => { + const { clearRequestLogsForTests, getRequestLogEntries } = await import("../../src/server/request-log"); + const { clearKeyCooldowns } = await import("../../src/providers/key-failover"); + clearRequestLogsForTests(); + clearKeyCooldowns("mock"); + const authorizations: Array = []; + const upstream = Bun.serve({ + port: 0, + fetch(req) { + authorizations.push(req.headers.get("authorization")); + if (authorizations.length === 1) { + return Response.json({ error: { message: "rate limited" }, usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 1 } }, { + status: 429, headers: { "retry-after": "0", "content-type": "application/json" }, + }); + } + if (authorizations.length === 2) { + return Response.json({ error: { message: "rate limited" }, usage: { prompt_tokens: 7, completion_tokens: 0 } }, { + status: 429, headers: { "retry-after": "0", "content-type": "application/json" }, + }); + } + if (streaming) { + const chunks = [ + { id: "chatcmpl-1", choices: [{ index: 0, delta: { role: "assistant", content: "ok" }, finish_reason: null }] }, + { id: "chatcmpl-1", choices: [{ index: 0, delta: {}, finish_reason: "stop" }], usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }, + ]; + return new Response(chunks.map(chunk => `data: ${JSON.stringify(chunk)}\n\n`).join("") + "data: [DONE]\n\n", { + headers: { "content-type": "text/event-stream" }, + }); + } + return Response.json({ + id: "chatcmpl-1", object: "chat.completion", + choices: [{ index: 0, message: { role: "assistant", content: "ok" }, finish_reason: "stop" }], + usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 }, + }); + }, + }); + saveConfig(mockConfig(`${upstream.url.toString().replace(/\/$/, "")}/v1`, { + authMode: "key", + apiKey: "key-one", + apiKeyPool: [{ id: "one", key: "key-one" }, { id: "two", key: "key-two" }], + retryOn429: { attempts: 1, intervalMs: 100, maxIntervalMs: 100, respectRetryAfter: false }, + })); + const server = startServer(0); + try { + const response = await fetch(new URL("/v1/chat/completions", server.url), { + method: "POST", + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ model: "mock/test-model", stream: streaming, messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }] }), + }); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(await response.text()).toContain("ok"); + expect(authorizations).toEqual(["Bearer key-one", "Bearer key-one", "Bearer key-two"]); + const entry = getRequestLogEntries().at(-1); + expect(entry?.attempts).toHaveLength(2); + expect(entry?.attempts?.[0]).toMatchObject({ sendCount: 2, usage: { inputTokens: 17, outputTokens: 1 } }); + expect(entry?.attempts?.[1]).toMatchObject({ sendCount: 1, usage: { inputTokens: 3, outputTokens: 2 } }); } finally { await server.stop(true); upstream.stop(true); diff --git a/tests/responses/empty-completion-core.test.ts b/tests/responses/empty-completion-core.test.ts index d8d4d73325..6ec5541f12 100644 --- a/tests/responses/empty-completion-core.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/empty-completion-core.test.ts @@ -60,10 +60,8 @@ function fixtureAdapter(provider: OcxProviderConfig): ProviderAdapter & { passth } : {}), }; }, - async fetchResponse() { - const index = httpCalls; - httpCalls += 1; - return new Response("", { headers: { "x-fixture-attempt": String(index) } }); + async fetchResponse(request, context) { + return context!.executor!(request.url, { method: request.method, headers: request.headers, body: request.body }); }, async *parseStream(response) { const index = Number(response.headers.get("x-fixture-attempt")); @@ -79,6 +77,7 @@ function fixtureAdapter(provider: OcxProviderConfig): ProviderAdapter & { passth await customRunTurn(parsed, _incoming as never, emit); return; } + await (_incoming as { providerFetch: typeof fetch }).providerFetch(provider.baseUrl, { method: "POST" }); const index = runTurnCalls; runTurnCalls += 1; parsedAttempts.push(parsed); @@ -123,6 +122,11 @@ function config( }, ...extra, } as OcxConfig; + (result.providers.fixture as OcxProviderConfig & { fetch?: typeof globalThis.fetch }).fetch = async () => { + const index = httpCalls; + if (adapter === "test-http") httpCalls += 1; + return new Response("", { headers: { "x-fixture-attempt": String(index) } }); + }; if (adapter === "test-passthrough") { (result.providers.fixture as OcxProviderConfig & { fetch?: typeof globalThis.fetch }).fetch = async () => { passthroughFetchCalls += 1; diff --git a/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts b/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts index bea04074a4..9c31a260a0 100644 --- a/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts @@ -103,7 +103,8 @@ mock.module("../../src/server/adapter-resolve", () => ({ }, async fetchResponse(request, context) { if (!customFetchResponse) throw new Error("custom fetchResponse not installed"); - return customFetchResponse(request, context); + return context!.executor!(request.url, { method: request.method, headers: request.headers, + body: request.body, signal: context?.abortSignal }); }, }; } @@ -264,6 +265,12 @@ function provider( allowPrivateNetwork: url.includes("127.0.0.1"), authMode: "key", apiKey, + ...(adapter === "test-response" ? { fetch: (async (input, init) => { + if (!customFetchResponse) throw new Error("custom fetchResponse not installed"); + return customFetchResponse({ url: String(input), method: init?.method ?? "POST", + headers: Object.fromEntries(new Headers(init?.headers)), body: String(init?.body ?? "") }, + { abortSignal: init?.signal ?? undefined }); + }) as typeof globalThis.fetch } : {}), ...extra, }; } @@ -1835,7 +1842,7 @@ describe("server combo failover 030 activation matrix", () => { .toEqual({ inputTokens: 17, outputTokens: 3, totalTokens: 20 }); }); - test("provider-local retry keeps one attempt, two sends, recovery kind, and latest estimate", async () => { + test("provider-local key retry keeps separate attempts and the latest estimate on the selected key", async () => { const estimates = [10, 25]; customUsageEstimate = () => estimates.shift(); let calls = 0; @@ -1856,11 +1863,14 @@ describe("server combo failover 030 activation matrix", () => { const response = await postLogged(config); expect(response.status).toBe(200); await response.text(); - const attempt = (await latestAttemptReceipts(config)).usage.attempts?.[0]; + const attempts = (await latestAttemptReceipts(config)).usage.attempts; + expect(attempts).toHaveLength(2); + expect(attempts?.[0]).toMatchObject({ sendCount: 1, usageStatus: "unreported" }); + const attempt = attempts?.[1]; expect(attempt).toMatchObject({ provider: "a", model: "m1", - sendCount: 2, + sendCount: 1, inputTokenEstimate: 25, recoveryKinds: ["key-429"], }); diff --git a/tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts b/tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts index 418ef993ca..39c125ddd3 100644 --- a/tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts @@ -1,7 +1,9 @@ import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; -import { mkdtempSync} from "node:fs"; +import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync} from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { join } from "node:path"; +import { apiKeyAccountLogLabel } from "../../src/codex/account-label"; +import { readUsageEntries, resetUsageReadCacheForTests } from "../../src/usage/log"; import { loadConfig, saveConfig } from "../../src/config"; import { clearKeyCooldowns, rotateKeyOn429 } from "../../src/providers/key-failover"; import { deriveXaiConvId } from "../../src/providers/xai-transport"; @@ -81,7 +83,8 @@ describe("server 429 key failover (end-to-end)", () => { expect(providerApiKeySelectionIsCurrent(config, "current", current)).toBe(true); }); - test("native Chat rebuilds a queued request after a manual key selection during pacing", async () => { + test.each(["responses", "chat/completions"])("%s logs only the key selected after pacing", async surface => { + resetUsageReadCacheForTests(); let now = 0; let resumePacing: (() => void) | undefined; const queued = Promise.withResolvers(); @@ -113,9 +116,10 @@ describe("server 429 key failover (end-to-end)", () => { const abort = new AbortController(); try { await waitForProviderRequestSlot("paced", config.providers.paced); - const pending = fetch(new URL("/v1/chat/completions", server.url), { + const pending = fetch(new URL(`/v1/${surface}`, server.url), { method: "POST", headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, signal: abort.signal, - body: JSON.stringify({ model: "paced/test", stream: false, messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hello" }] }), + body: JSON.stringify({ model: "paced/test", stream: false, + ...(surface === "responses" ? { input: "hello" } : { messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hello" }] }) }), }); await queued.promise; expect(seen).toHaveLength(0); @@ -131,6 +135,11 @@ describe("server 429 key failover (end-to-end)", () => { expect(await response.text()).toContain("current selection"); expect(seen.map(headers => headers.get("authorization"))).toEqual(["Bearer synthetic-second"]); expect(seen[0]!.get("x-static-test")).toBe("retained"); + const rows = readUsageEntries(); + expect(rows).toHaveLength(1); + expect(rows[0].attempts).toHaveLength(1); + expect(rows[0].attempts?.[0]).toMatchObject({ sendCount: 1, + accountLogLabel: apiKeyAccountLogLabel("paced", { entryId: "second", reference: "synthetic-second" }) }); } finally { abort.abort(); await server.stop(true); @@ -333,17 +342,29 @@ describe("server 429 key failover (end-to-end)", () => { } }); - test("routed 429 rotates to the pool's next key and succeeds", async () => { + for (const surface of ["combo", "responses", "chat", "image"] as const) for (const meteredFailure of [false, true]) for (const streaming of [false, true]) { + if (surface === "image" && !streaming) continue; + test(`${surface} key rotation attributes each send (failed usage reported: ${meteredFailure}, streaming: ${streaming})`, async () => { + resetUsageReadCacheForTests(); const seenAuth: string[] = []; upstream = Bun.serve({ hostname: "127.0.0.1", port: 0, - fetch(req) { + async fetch(req) { + const body = await req.json() as { stream?: boolean }; seenAuth.push(req.headers.get("authorization") ?? ""); if (seenAuth.length === 1) { - return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: { message: "rate limited" } }), { + return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: { message: "rate limited" }, ...(meteredFailure ? { usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 4 } } : {}) }), { status: 429, headers: { "retry-after": "30", "content-type": "application/json" }, }); } + if (body.stream) { + const chunks = [ + { id: "chatcmpl-1", choices: [{ index: 0, delta: { role: "assistant", content: "ok after rotate" }, finish_reason: null }] }, + { id: "chatcmpl-1", choices: [{ index: 0, delta: {}, finish_reason: "stop" }], usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }, + ]; + return new Response(chunks.map(chunk => `data: ${JSON.stringify(chunk)}\n\n`).join("") + "data: [DONE]\n\n", + { headers: { "content-type": "text/event-stream" } }); + } return new Response(JSON.stringify({ id: "chatcmpl-1", object: "chat.completion", choices: [{ index: 0, message: { role: "assistant", content: "ok after rotate" }, finish_reason: "stop" }], @@ -353,9 +374,12 @@ describe("server 429 key failover (end-to-end)", () => { }); const config: OcxConfig = { port: 0, hostname: "127.0.0.1", defaultProvider: "pooled", + combos: { fixture: { strategy: "failover", targets: [{ provider: "pooled", model: "some-model" }] } }, + images: { bridgeEnabled: surface === "image" }, providers: { + xai: { adapter: "openai-chat", baseUrl: "https://api.x.ai/v1", authMode: "key", apiKey: "synthetic-unused-image-key" }, pooled: { - adapter: "openai-chat", + adapter: "openai-chat", ...(meteredFailure ? { authMode: "key" as const } : {}), baseUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${upstream.port}/v1`, allowPrivateNetwork: true, apiKey: "key-alpha-000111222333", @@ -369,21 +393,108 @@ describe("server 429 key failover (end-to-end)", () => { saveConfig(config); const server = startServer(0); try { - const res = await fetch(new URL("/v1/responses", server.url), { + const res = await fetch(new URL(surface === "chat" ? "/v1/chat/completions" : "/v1/responses", server.url), { method: "POST", headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, - body: JSON.stringify({ model: "pooled/some-model", input: "hello", stream: false }), + body: JSON.stringify(surface === "chat" + ? { model: "pooled/some-model", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hello" }], stream: streaming } + : { model: surface === "combo" ? "combo/fixture" : "pooled/some-model", input: "hello", stream: streaming, + ...(surface === "image" ? { tools: [{ type: "image_generation" }] } : {}) }), }); expect(res.status).toBe(200); - const json = await res.json() as { output?: { type: string; content?: { text?: string }[] }[] }; - const message = json.output?.find(o => o.type === "message"); - expect(message?.content?.[0]?.text).toBe("ok after rotate"); + expect(await res.text()).toContain("ok after rotate"); expect(seenAuth[0]).toBe("Bearer key-alpha-000111222333"); expect(seenAuth[1]).toBe("Bearer key-beta-444555666777"); + expect(seenAuth).toHaveLength(2); + const rows = readUsageEntries(); + expect(rows).toHaveLength(1); + const attempts = rows[0].attempts!; + expect(attempts).toHaveLength(2); + expect(attempts[0]).toMatchObject({ ordinal: 1, provider: "pooled", model: "some-model", status: 429, + accountLogLabel: apiKeyAccountLogLabel("pooled", { entryId: "k1", reference: "key-alpha-000111222333" }), + usageStatus: meteredFailure ? "reported" : "unreported" }); + if (meteredFailure) expect(attempts[0].usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 4 }); + else expect(attempts[0].usage).toBeUndefined(); + expect(attempts[1]).toMatchObject({ ordinal: 2, provider: "pooled", model: "some-model", status: 200, + accountLogLabel: apiKeyAccountLogLabel("pooled", { entryId: "k2", reference: "key-beta-444555666777" }), + usage: { inputTokens: 3, outputTokens: 2 } }); + const raw = readFileSync(join(testDir, "usage.jsonl"), "utf8"); + expect(raw).not.toContain("key-alpha-000111222333"); + expect(raw).not.toContain("key-beta-444555666777"); } finally { await server.stop(true); } }); + } + + + test("Responses continuation keeps hidden successful A usage when a later 429 rotates to B", async () => { + resetUsageReadCacheForTests(); + const seen: string[] = []; + upstream = Bun.serve({ hostname: "127.0.0.1", port: 0, fetch(req) { + seen.push(req.headers.get("authorization") ?? ""); + if (seen.length === 2) return Response.json({ error: { message: "rate limited" }, + usage: { prompt_tokens: 7, completion_tokens: 1 } }, { status: 429 }); + return Response.json({ id: "chatcmpl-hidden", object: "chat.completion", + choices: [{ index: 0, message: { role: "assistant", content: seen.length === 1 ? "" : "recovered" }, finish_reason: "stop" }], + usage: { prompt_tokens: seen.length === 1 ? 100 : 200, completion_tokens: seen.length === 1 ? 10 : 20 } }); + } }); + saveConfig({ port: 0, hostname: "127.0.0.1", defaultProvider: "pooled", emptyCompletionRetry: true, + combos: { hidden: { strategy: "failover", targets: [{ provider: "pooled", model: "test" }] } }, + providers: { pooled: { adapter: "openai-chat", authMode: "key", + baseUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${upstream.port}/v1`, allowPrivateNetwork: true, + apiKey: "synthetic-first", apiKeyPool: [{ id: "first", key: "synthetic-first" }, { id: "second", key: "synthetic-second" }] } }, + } as OcxConfig); + const server = startServer(0); + try { + const response = await fetch(new URL("/v1/responses", server.url), { method: "POST", + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ model: "pooled/test", input: "hello", stream: false }) }); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(await response.text()).toContain("recovered"); + expect(seen).toEqual(["Bearer synthetic-first", "Bearer synthetic-first", "Bearer synthetic-second"]); + const rows = readUsageEntries(); + expect(rows).toHaveLength(1); + expect(rows[0].attempts).toHaveLength(2); + expect(rows[0].attempts?.[0]).toMatchObject({ sendCount: 2, usage: { inputTokens: 107, outputTokens: 11 }, + accountLogLabel: apiKeyAccountLogLabel("pooled", { entryId: "first", reference: "synthetic-first" }) }); + expect(rows[0].attempts?.[1]).toMatchObject({ sendCount: 1, usage: { inputTokens: 200, outputTokens: 20 }, + accountLogLabel: apiKeyAccountLogLabel("pooled", { entryId: "second", reference: "synthetic-second" }) }); + expect(rows[0].attempts?.reduce((sum, attempt) => sum + (attempt.usage?.inputTokens ?? 0), 0)).toBe(307); + } finally { await server.stop(true); } + }); + + for (const adapter of ["command-code", "openai-chat"] as const) for (const error of [false, true]) { + test(`${adapter} records one usage observation for a nested parser or HTTP-200 error (${error})`, async () => { + resetUsageReadCacheForTests(); + upstream = Bun.serve({ hostname: "127.0.0.1", port: 0, fetch() { + if (adapter === "command-code") return new Response([ + { type: "text-delta", text: "synthetic answer" }, + { type: "finish", finishReason: error ? "error" : "stop", totalUsage: { inputTokens: 100, outputTokens: 20 } }, + ].map(row => JSON.stringify(row) + "\n").join(""), { headers: { "content-type": "application/x-ndjson" } }); + return Response.json({ id: "chatcmpl-error", object: "chat.completion", + ...(error ? { error: { message: "synthetic failure", type: "server_error" } } + : { choices: [{ index: 0, message: { role: "assistant", content: "synthetic answer" }, finish_reason: "stop" }] }), + usage: { prompt_tokens: 100, completion_tokens: 20 } }); + } }); + saveConfig({ port: 0, hostname: "127.0.0.1", defaultProvider: "metered", providers: { + metered: { adapter, authMode: "key", apiKey: "synthetic-key", allowPrivateNetwork: true, + baseUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${upstream.port}` }, + } } as OcxConfig); + const server = startServer(0); + try { + const response = await fetch(new URL("/v1/responses", server.url), { method: "POST", + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ model: "metered/test", input: "hello", stream: false }) }); + await response.text(); + const rows = readUsageEntries(); + expect(rows).toHaveLength(1); + expect(rows[0].attempts).toHaveLength(1); + expect(rows[0].attempts?.[0]).toMatchObject({ usage: { inputTokens: 100, outputTokens: 20 }, + accountLogLabel: apiKeyAccountLogLabel("metered", { reference: "synthetic-key" }) }); + } finally { await server.stop(true); } + }); + } test("reasoning replay misses after a 429 rotates to a different physical key", async () => { const model = "reasoning-model"; diff --git a/tests/server/server-xai-oauth-401-replay.test.ts b/tests/server/server-xai-oauth-401-replay.test.ts index aab488ccb5..887415af39 100644 --- a/tests/server/server-xai-oauth-401-replay.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/server-xai-oauth-401-replay.test.ts @@ -317,11 +317,13 @@ describe("xAI OAuth Responses opt-in upstream 401 replay", () => { expect(seenAuth).toEqual([`Bearer ${firstKey}`, `Bearer ${secondKey}`]); const entries = readUsageEntries(); expect(entries).toHaveLength(1); - const attempt = entries[0]?.attempts?.[0]; - expect(entries[0]?.attempts).toHaveLength(1); + const attempts = entries[0]?.attempts; + expect(attempts).toHaveLength(2); + for (const attempt of attempts ?? []) { expect(attempt?.credentialSource).toBe("xai-api-key"); - expect(attempt?.sendCount).toBe(2); + expect(attempt?.sendCount).toBe(1); expect(attempt?.adapter).toBe("openai-chat"); + } const persisted = readFileSync(usageLogPath(), "utf8"); expect(persisted).not.toContain(firstKey); expect(persisted).not.toContain(secondKey); diff --git a/tests/usage/request-log.test.ts b/tests/usage/request-log.test.ts index f27426480a..8aed16d053 100644 --- a/tests/usage/request-log.test.ts +++ b/tests/usage/request-log.test.ts @@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ import { getRequestLogEntries, hydrateRequestLogsFromDisk, noteAttemptSend, + noteProviderAttemptSend, + recordKeyAttemptFailure, + recordKeyAttemptUsage, recordAdapterReasoning, recordFirstOutput, requestLogEntryFromPersistedUsage, @@ -25,6 +28,7 @@ import { recordAttemptCredentialSource, inspectResponseLogSsePayload, httpStatusForRequestLogTerminal, + applyResponseLogMetadata, type RequestLogContext, } from "../../src/server/request-log"; import { handleResponses } from "../../src/server/responses"; @@ -2073,3 +2077,111 @@ describe("request log snapshot cursor", () => { expect(selectRequestLogPoll(rows, query, stale, epoch)).toMatchObject({ logs: rows, reset: true }); }); }); + +describe("key attempt accounting", () => { + test("a combo parent copied before streaming rotation cannot overwrite the final key's usage", () => { + const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); + const child: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", comboId: "stream", + activeAttempt: active, attempts: [active] }; + const key = (reference: string) => ({ adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, + baseUrl: "https://example.test", _apiKeyAttempt: { reference } }); + noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key("synthetic-a"), undefined); + recordKeyAttemptUsage(child, { inputTokens: 100, outputTokens: 10 }); + const parent = { ...child }; + noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key("synthetic-b"), undefined, "key-429"); + recordKeyAttemptUsage(child, { inputTokens: 200, outputTokens: 20 }); + const rows: RequestLogEntry[] = []; + addFinalRequestLog("stream-key-switch", Date.now(), parent, 200, undefined, row => rows.push(row)); + expect(rows[0].attempts?.map(attempt => attempt.usage?.inputTokens)).toEqual([100, 200]); + expect(rows[0].usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 300, outputTokens: 30 }); + }); + test("adding reported usage cannot upgrade an earlier estimate to a measurement", () => { + const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); + const ctx: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", activeAttempt: active }; + recordKeyAttemptUsage(ctx, { inputTokens: 100, outputTokens: 0, estimated: true }); + recordKeyAttemptUsage(ctx, { inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 2 }); + finishRequestAttempt(active, 429, 1); + expect(active).toMatchObject({ usageStatus: "estimated", usage: { inputTokens: 110, outputTokens: 2, estimated: true } }); + }); + test.each(["synthetic-a", undefined])("a late unreported segment (%s) cannot reuse a stale parent total", reference => { + const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); + const child: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", comboId: "stream", + activeAttempt: active, attempts: [active] }; + const key = (value?: string) => ({ adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, + baseUrl: "https://example.test", _apiKeyAttempt: value ? { reference: value } : undefined }); + noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key("synthetic-a"), undefined); + recordKeyAttemptUsage(child, { inputTokens: 100, outputTokens: 10 }); + const parent = { ...child }; + noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key("synthetic-b"), undefined, "key-429"); + noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key(reference), undefined, "key-429"); + const rows: RequestLogEntry[] = []; + addFinalRequestLog("stale-parent", Date.now(), parent, 499, undefined, row => rows.push(row)); + expect(rows[0].attempts?.map(attempt => attempt.usage?.inputTokens)).toEqual([100, undefined, undefined]); + expect(rows[0].attempts?.[2].usageStatus).toBe("unreported"); + }); + test("rotation preserves reported failure usage and the stable active object; unknown stays unreported", async () => { + const provider = (reference?: string) => ({ adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, + baseUrl: "https://example.test/v1", _apiKeyAttempt: reference ? { reference } : undefined }); + const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test-provider", "test-model", "openai-chat"); + const ctx: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test-provider", model: "test-model", comboId: "fixture", + activeAttempt: active, activeAttemptStartedAt: Date.now(), attempts: [active] }; + noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test-provider", provider("test-key-a"), 99999); + const labelA = active.accountLogLabel; + const failed = Response.json({ usage: { prompt_tokens: 100, completion_tokens: 20 } }, { status: 429 }); + await recordKeyAttemptFailure(ctx, failed); + expect(await failed.json()).toEqual({ usage: { prompt_tokens: 100, completion_tokens: 20 } }); + noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test-provider", provider("test-key-b"), 200, "rate-limit-429"); + expect(ctx.activeAttempt).toBe(active); + expect(ctx.attempts).toHaveLength(2); + expect(ctx.attempts?.[0]).toMatchObject({ accountLogLabel: labelA, status: 429, ordinal: 1, + usageStatus: "reported", usage: { inputTokens: 100, outputTokens: 20 }, sendCount: 1 }); + expect(active.accountLogLabel).not.toBe(labelA); + expect(active.usage).toBeUndefined(); + // The next failure reports no usage. It must not inherit the preceding account's usage or an estimate. + await recordKeyAttemptFailure(ctx, Response.json({ error: "synthetic" }, { status: 401 })); + noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test-provider", provider(), 300, "key-401"); + expect(ctx.attempts?.[1]).toMatchObject({ status: 401, ordinal: 2, usageStatus: "unreported" }); + expect(ctx.attempts?.[1].usage).toBeUndefined(); + expect(active.accountLogLabel).toBeUndefined(); + recordKeyAttemptUsage(ctx, { inputTokens: 300, outputTokens: 40 }); + const rows: RequestLogEntry[] = []; + addFinalRequestLog("key-rotation", Date.now(), ctx, 200, undefined, row => rows.push(row)); + const roundTrip = normalizeUsageEntryForTest(JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(rows[0])))!; + expect(roundTrip.attempts).toHaveLength(3); + expect(roundTrip.attempts?.map(a => a.ordinal)).toEqual([1, 2, 3]); + expect(roundTrip.attempts?.[0].accountLogLabel).toBe(labelA); + expect(roundTrip.attempts?.[2].usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 300, outputTokens: 40 }); + expect(roundTrip.usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 400, outputTokens: 60 }); + expect(JSON.stringify(roundTrip)).not.toContain("test-key-"); + }); + test("wire snapshots replace the current send against a pre-send baseline", () => { + const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); + const ctx: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", activeAttempt: active, attempts: [active] }; + const key = { adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, baseUrl: "https://example.test", _apiKeyAttempt: { reference: "synthetic-a" } }; + noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test", key, undefined); + applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 1 } }); + inspectResponseLogSsePayload(ctx, JSON.stringify({ usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 1 } })); + noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test", key, undefined); + applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }); + applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }); + finishRequestAttempt(active, 200, 1); + expect(active.usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 13, outputTokens: 3 }); + expect(active.usage?.estimated).toBeUndefined(); + }); + test("an estimated baseline plus repeated and progressive wire snapshots stay one current send", () => { + const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); + const ctx: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", activeAttempt: active, attempts: [active] }; + const key = { adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, baseUrl: "https://example.test", _apiKeyAttempt: { reference: "synthetic-a" } }; + noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test", key, undefined); + recordKeyAttemptUsage(ctx, { inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 0, estimated: true }); + noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test", key, undefined); + applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }); + applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }); + applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 4, completion_tokens: 2 } }); + finishRequestAttempt(active, 200, 1); + expect(active).toMatchObject({ + usageStatus: "estimated", + usage: { inputTokens: 14, outputTokens: 2, estimated: true }, + }); + }); +}); From d3ca5522db6d6094dd5d9e2e5d8e440eb93586b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: thisisjun786 <259586770+thisisjun786@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 21:13:13 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 070/113] test(usage): isolate key accounting regressions within size limits --- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 1 + tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 1 + tests/helpers/combo-provider.ts | 30 +++++ .../chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts | 118 ----------------- .../server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts | 24 +--- tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts | 122 ++++++++++++++++++ tests/usage/key-attribution.test.ts | 115 +++++++++++++++++ tests/usage/request-log.test.ts | 112 ---------------- 8 files changed, 271 insertions(+), 252 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/helpers/combo-provider.ts create mode 100644 tests/usage/key-attribution.test.ts diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index b4a1c1b0cf..1a1234c068 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ } }, "explicit": { + "key-attribution.test.ts": "usage", "responses-core-modules.test.ts": "responses", "responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts": "responses", "responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts": "responses", diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index fb9acec3a7..5d6ede1f23 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ { + "key-attribution.test.ts": "usage", "responses-core-modules.test.ts": "responses", "responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts": "responses", "responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts": "responses", diff --git a/tests/helpers/combo-provider.ts b/tests/helpers/combo-provider.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4221adbe4c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/helpers/combo-provider.ts @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +import type { ProviderAdapter } from "../../src/adapters/base"; +import type { OcxProviderConfig } from "../../src/types"; + +/** Keep the fixture upstream behind the same executor used by real provider sends. */ +export function comboProviderFactory( + getFetchResponse: () => ProviderAdapter["fetchResponse"], +) { + return function provider( + adapter: string, + url: string, + apiKey: string, + extra: Partial = {}, + ): OcxProviderConfig { + return { + adapter, + baseUrl: url, + allowPrivateNetwork: url.includes("127.0.0.1"), + authMode: "key", + apiKey, + ...(adapter === "test-response" ? { fetch: (async (input, init) => { + const customFetchResponse = getFetchResponse(); + if (!customFetchResponse) throw new Error("custom fetchResponse not installed"); + return customFetchResponse({ url: String(input), method: init?.method ?? "POST", + headers: Object.fromEntries(new Headers(init?.headers)), body: String(init?.body ?? "") }, + { abortSignal: init?.signal ?? undefined }); + }) as typeof globalThis.fetch } : {}), + ...extra, + }; + }; +} diff --git a/tests/responses/chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts b/tests/responses/chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts index c88a247674..5eee77907c 100644 --- a/tests/responses/chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts @@ -1606,124 +1606,6 @@ test("chat-native records terminal key cooldown after the send budget is exhaust } }); -test("chat-native preserves same-key retry, key rotation, usage, and request logging", async () => { - const { clearRequestLogsForTests, getRequestLogEntries } = await import("../../src/server/request-log"); - const { clearKeyCooldowns } = await import("../../src/providers/key-failover"); - clearRequestLogsForTests(); - clearKeyCooldowns("mock"); - const authorizations: Array = []; - const upstream = Bun.serve({ - port: 0, - fetch(req) { - authorizations.push(req.headers.get("authorization")); - if (authorizations.length < 3) { - return Response.json({ error: { message: "rate limited", type: "rate_limit_error" } }, { - status: 429, - headers: { "retry-after": "0" }, - }); - } - return Response.json({ - id: "chatcmpl_retry", - object: "chat.completion", - choices: [{ index: 0, message: { role: "assistant", content: "ok" }, finish_reason: "stop" }], - usage: { prompt_tokens: 4, completion_tokens: 2 }, - }); - }, - }); - saveConfig(mockConfig(`${upstream.url.toString().replace(/\/$/, "")}/v1`, { - authMode: "key", - apiKey: "key-one", - apiKeyPool: [{ id: "one", key: "key-one" }, { id: "two", key: "key-two" }], - retryOn429: { attempts: 1, intervalMs: 100, maxIntervalMs: 100, respectRetryAfter: false }, - })); - const server = startServer(0); - try { - const response = await fetch(new URL("/v1/chat/completions", server.url), { - method: "POST", - headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, - body: JSON.stringify({ model: "mock/test-model", stream: false, messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }] }), - }); - expect(response.status).toBe(200); - await response.text(); - expect(authorizations).toEqual(["Bearer key-one", "Bearer key-one", "Bearer key-two"]); - const entry = getRequestLogEntries().at(-1); - expect(entry?.status).toBe(200); - expect(entry?.usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 4, outputTokens: 2 }); - expect(entry?.attempts).toHaveLength(2); - expect(entry?.attempts?.[0]?.recoveryKinds).toEqual(["rate-limit-429"]); - expect(entry?.attempts?.[0]?.sendCount).toBe(2); - expect(entry?.attempts?.[1]?.recoveryKinds).toEqual(["key-429"]); - expect(entry?.attempts?.[1]?.sendCount).toBe(1); - } finally { - await server.stop(true); - upstream.stop(true); - clearKeyCooldowns("mock"); - } -}); - -test.each([false, true])("chat-native attributes same-key 429 usage then the rotated key (stream=%s)", async (streaming) => { - const { clearRequestLogsForTests, getRequestLogEntries } = await import("../../src/server/request-log"); - const { clearKeyCooldowns } = await import("../../src/providers/key-failover"); - clearRequestLogsForTests(); - clearKeyCooldowns("mock"); - const authorizations: Array = []; - const upstream = Bun.serve({ - port: 0, - fetch(req) { - authorizations.push(req.headers.get("authorization")); - if (authorizations.length === 1) { - return Response.json({ error: { message: "rate limited" }, usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 1 } }, { - status: 429, headers: { "retry-after": "0", "content-type": "application/json" }, - }); - } - if (authorizations.length === 2) { - return Response.json({ error: { message: "rate limited" }, usage: { prompt_tokens: 7, completion_tokens: 0 } }, { - status: 429, headers: { "retry-after": "0", "content-type": "application/json" }, - }); - } - if (streaming) { - const chunks = [ - { id: "chatcmpl-1", choices: [{ index: 0, delta: { role: "assistant", content: "ok" }, finish_reason: null }] }, - { id: "chatcmpl-1", choices: [{ index: 0, delta: {}, finish_reason: "stop" }], usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }, - ]; - return new Response(chunks.map(chunk => `data: ${JSON.stringify(chunk)}\n\n`).join("") + "data: [DONE]\n\n", { - headers: { "content-type": "text/event-stream" }, - }); - } - return Response.json({ - id: "chatcmpl-1", object: "chat.completion", - choices: [{ index: 0, message: { role: "assistant", content: "ok" }, finish_reason: "stop" }], - usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 }, - }); - }, - }); - saveConfig(mockConfig(`${upstream.url.toString().replace(/\/$/, "")}/v1`, { - authMode: "key", - apiKey: "key-one", - apiKeyPool: [{ id: "one", key: "key-one" }, { id: "two", key: "key-two" }], - retryOn429: { attempts: 1, intervalMs: 100, maxIntervalMs: 100, respectRetryAfter: false }, - })); - const server = startServer(0); - try { - const response = await fetch(new URL("/v1/chat/completions", server.url), { - method: "POST", - headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, - body: JSON.stringify({ model: "mock/test-model", stream: streaming, messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }] }), - }); - expect(response.status).toBe(200); - expect(await response.text()).toContain("ok"); - expect(authorizations).toEqual(["Bearer key-one", "Bearer key-one", "Bearer key-two"]); - const entry = getRequestLogEntries().at(-1); - expect(entry?.attempts).toHaveLength(2); - expect(entry?.attempts?.[0]).toMatchObject({ sendCount: 2, usage: { inputTokens: 17, outputTokens: 1 } }); - expect(entry?.attempts?.[1]).toMatchObject({ sendCount: 1, usage: { inputTokens: 3, outputTokens: 2 } }); - } finally { - await server.stop(true); - upstream.stop(true); - clearKeyCooldowns("mock"); - } -}); - test("chat-native client cancellation cancels the upstream stream and logs 499", async () => { const { clearRequestLogsForTests, getRequestLogEntries } = await import("../../src/server/request-log"); const { handleChatCompletions } = await import("../../src/server/chat-completions"); diff --git a/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts b/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts index 9c31a260a0..b735a2514e 100644 --- a/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ import { registerComboForcedEffortCases } from "../helpers/combo-forced-effort-cases"; +import { comboProviderFactory } from "../helpers/combo-provider"; import { sessionLaneIdFromRequest } from "../../src/server/request-log-conversation"; import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, mock, setDefaultTimeout, test } from "bun:test"; import { logsFromApiBody } from "../helpers/logs-api"; @@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ const { createCursorAdapter } = await import("../../src/adapters/cursor"); import type { CursorTransportFactory } from "../../src/adapters/cursor/transport"; let customRunTurn: NonNullable | undefined; let customFetchResponse: NonNullable | undefined; +const provider = comboProviderFactory(() => customFetchResponse); let customTransientResponse: (() => Promise) | undefined; let customUsageEstimate: ((model: string) => number | undefined) | undefined; let customCursorTransportFactory: CursorTransportFactory | undefined; @@ -253,28 +255,6 @@ function responsesSuccess(text: string, model = "responses-model"): Record = {}, -): OcxProviderConfig { - return { - adapter, - baseUrl: url, - allowPrivateNetwork: url.includes("127.0.0.1"), - authMode: "key", - apiKey, - ...(adapter === "test-response" ? { fetch: (async (input, init) => { - if (!customFetchResponse) throw new Error("custom fetchResponse not installed"); - return customFetchResponse({ url: String(input), method: init?.method ?? "POST", - headers: Object.fromEntries(new Headers(init?.headers)), body: String(init?.body ?? "") }, - { abortSignal: init?.signal ?? undefined }); - }) as typeof globalThis.fetch } : {}), - ...extra, - }; -} - function comboConfig( providers: OcxConfig["providers"], targets = Object.keys(providers).map((name, index) => ({ provider: name, model: `m${index + 1}` })), diff --git a/tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts b/tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts index 39c125ddd3..c2e32ddc5f 100644 --- a/tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts @@ -898,3 +898,125 @@ describe("server 429 key failover (end-to-end)", () => { delete process.env.OCX_KEYFAIL_WARM; } }); + +test.each([false, true])("chat-native attributes same-key 429 usage then the rotated key (stream=%s)", async (streaming) => { + const { clearRequestLogsForTests, getRequestLogEntries } = await import("../../src/server/request-log"); + const { clearKeyCooldowns } = await import("../../src/providers/key-failover"); + clearRequestLogsForTests(); + clearKeyCooldowns("mock"); + const authorizations: Array = []; + const upstream = Bun.serve({ + port: 0, + fetch(req) { + authorizations.push(req.headers.get("authorization")); + if (authorizations.length === 1) { + return Response.json({ error: { message: "rate limited" }, usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 1 } }, { + status: 429, headers: { "retry-after": "0", "content-type": "application/json" }, + }); + } + if (authorizations.length === 2) { + return Response.json({ error: { message: "rate limited" }, usage: { prompt_tokens: 7, completion_tokens: 0 } }, { + status: 429, headers: { "retry-after": "0", "content-type": "application/json" }, + }); + } + if (streaming) { + const chunks = [ + { id: "chatcmpl-1", choices: [{ index: 0, delta: { role: "assistant", content: "ok" }, finish_reason: null }] }, + { id: "chatcmpl-1", choices: [{ index: 0, delta: {}, finish_reason: "stop" }], usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }, + ]; + return new Response(chunks.map(chunk => `data: ${JSON.stringify(chunk)}\n\n`).join("") + "data: [DONE]\n\n", { + headers: { "content-type": "text/event-stream" }, + }); + } + return Response.json({ + id: "chatcmpl-1", object: "chat.completion", + choices: [{ index: 0, message: { role: "assistant", content: "ok" }, finish_reason: "stop" }], + usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 }, + }); + }, + }); + saveConfig({ port: 0, hostname: "127.0.0.1", defaultProvider: "mock", providers: { mock: { + adapter: "openai-chat", allowPrivateNetwork: true, + baseUrl: `${upstream.url.toString().replace(/\/$/, "")}/v1`, + authMode: "key", + apiKey: "key-one", + apiKeyPool: [{ id: "one", key: "key-one" }, { id: "two", key: "key-two" }], + retryOn429: { attempts: 1, intervalMs: 100, maxIntervalMs: 100, respectRetryAfter: false }, + } } } as OcxConfig); + const server = startServer(0); + try { + const response = await fetch(new URL("/v1/chat/completions", server.url), { + method: "POST", + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ model: "mock/test-model", stream: streaming, messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }] }), + }); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(await response.text()).toContain("ok"); + expect(authorizations).toEqual(["Bearer key-one", "Bearer key-one", "Bearer key-two"]); + const entry = getRequestLogEntries().at(-1); + expect(entry?.attempts).toHaveLength(2); + expect(entry?.attempts?.[0]).toMatchObject({ sendCount: 2, usage: { inputTokens: 17, outputTokens: 1 } }); + expect(entry?.attempts?.[1]).toMatchObject({ sendCount: 1, usage: { inputTokens: 3, outputTokens: 2 } }); + } finally { + await server.stop(true); + upstream.stop(true); + clearKeyCooldowns("mock"); + } +}); + +test("chat-native preserves same-key retry, key rotation, usage, and request logging", async () => { + const { clearRequestLogsForTests, getRequestLogEntries } = await import("../../src/server/request-log"); + const { clearKeyCooldowns } = await import("../../src/providers/key-failover"); + clearRequestLogsForTests(); + clearKeyCooldowns("mock"); + const authorizations: Array = []; + const upstream = Bun.serve({ + port: 0, + fetch(req) { + authorizations.push(req.headers.get("authorization")); + if (authorizations.length < 3) { + return Response.json({ error: { message: "rate limited", type: "rate_limit_error" } }, { + status: 429, + headers: { "retry-after": "0" }, + }); + } + return Response.json({ + id: "chatcmpl_retry", + object: "chat.completion", + choices: [{ index: 0, message: { role: "assistant", content: "ok" }, finish_reason: "stop" }], + usage: { prompt_tokens: 4, completion_tokens: 2 }, + }); + }, + }); + saveConfig({ port: 0, hostname: "127.0.0.1", defaultProvider: "mock", providers: { mock: { + adapter: "openai-chat", allowPrivateNetwork: true, + baseUrl: `${upstream.url.toString().replace(/\/$/, "")}/v1`, + authMode: "key", + apiKey: "key-one", + apiKeyPool: [{ id: "one", key: "key-one" }, { id: "two", key: "key-two" }], + retryOn429: { attempts: 1, intervalMs: 100, maxIntervalMs: 100, respectRetryAfter: false }, + } } } as OcxConfig); + const server = startServer(0); + try { + const response = await fetch(new URL("/v1/chat/completions", server.url), { + method: "POST", + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ model: "mock/test-model", stream: false, messages: [{ role: "user", content: "hi" }] }), + }); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + await response.text(); + expect(authorizations).toEqual(["Bearer key-one", "Bearer key-one", "Bearer key-two"]); + const entry = getRequestLogEntries().at(-1); + expect(entry?.status).toBe(200); + expect(entry?.usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 4, outputTokens: 2 }); + expect(entry?.attempts).toHaveLength(2); + expect(entry?.attempts?.[0]?.recoveryKinds).toEqual(["rate-limit-429"]); + expect(entry?.attempts?.[0]?.sendCount).toBe(2); + expect(entry?.attempts?.[1]?.recoveryKinds).toEqual(["key-429"]); + expect(entry?.attempts?.[1]?.sendCount).toBe(1); + } finally { + await server.stop(true); + upstream.stop(true); + clearKeyCooldowns("mock"); + } +}); diff --git a/tests/usage/key-attribution.test.ts b/tests/usage/key-attribution.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..78359416e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/usage/key-attribution.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { + addFinalRequestLog, beginRequestAttempt, finishRequestAttempt, noteProviderAttemptSend, + recordKeyAttemptFailure, recordKeyAttemptUsage, applyResponseLogMetadata, + inspectResponseLogSsePayload, type RequestLogContext, type RequestLogEntry, +} from "../../src/server/request-log"; +import { normalizeUsageEntryForTest } from "../../src/usage/log"; + +describe("key attempt accounting", () => { + test("a combo parent copied before streaming rotation cannot overwrite the final key's usage", () => { + const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); + const child: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", comboId: "stream", + activeAttempt: active, attempts: [active] }; + const key = (reference: string) => ({ adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, + baseUrl: "https://example.test", _apiKeyAttempt: { reference } }); + noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key("synthetic-a"), undefined); + recordKeyAttemptUsage(child, { inputTokens: 100, outputTokens: 10 }); + const parent = { ...child }; + noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key("synthetic-b"), undefined, "key-429"); + recordKeyAttemptUsage(child, { inputTokens: 200, outputTokens: 20 }); + const rows: RequestLogEntry[] = []; + addFinalRequestLog("stream-key-switch", Date.now(), parent, 200, undefined, row => rows.push(row)); + expect(rows[0].attempts?.map(attempt => attempt.usage?.inputTokens)).toEqual([100, 200]); + expect(rows[0].usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 300, outputTokens: 30 }); + }); + test("adding reported usage cannot upgrade an earlier estimate to a measurement", () => { + const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); + const ctx: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", activeAttempt: active }; + recordKeyAttemptUsage(ctx, { inputTokens: 100, outputTokens: 0, estimated: true }); + recordKeyAttemptUsage(ctx, { inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 2 }); + finishRequestAttempt(active, 429, 1); + expect(active).toMatchObject({ usageStatus: "estimated", usage: { inputTokens: 110, outputTokens: 2, estimated: true } }); + }); + test.each(["synthetic-a", undefined])("a late unreported segment (%s) cannot reuse a stale parent total", reference => { + const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); + const child: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", comboId: "stream", + activeAttempt: active, attempts: [active] }; + const key = (value?: string) => ({ adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, + baseUrl: "https://example.test", _apiKeyAttempt: value ? { reference: value } : undefined }); + noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key("synthetic-a"), undefined); + recordKeyAttemptUsage(child, { inputTokens: 100, outputTokens: 10 }); + const parent = { ...child }; + noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key("synthetic-b"), undefined, "key-429"); + noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key(reference), undefined, "key-429"); + const rows: RequestLogEntry[] = []; + addFinalRequestLog("stale-parent", Date.now(), parent, 499, undefined, row => rows.push(row)); + expect(rows[0].attempts?.map(attempt => attempt.usage?.inputTokens)).toEqual([100, undefined, undefined]); + expect(rows[0].attempts?.[2].usageStatus).toBe("unreported"); + }); + test("rotation preserves reported failure usage and the stable active object; unknown stays unreported", async () => { + const provider = (reference?: string) => ({ adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, + baseUrl: "https://example.test/v1", _apiKeyAttempt: reference ? { reference } : undefined }); + const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test-provider", "test-model", "openai-chat"); + const ctx: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test-provider", model: "test-model", comboId: "fixture", + activeAttempt: active, activeAttemptStartedAt: Date.now(), attempts: [active] }; + noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test-provider", provider("test-key-a"), 99999); + const labelA = active.accountLogLabel; + const failed = Response.json({ usage: { prompt_tokens: 100, completion_tokens: 20 } }, { status: 429 }); + await recordKeyAttemptFailure(ctx, failed); + expect(await failed.json()).toEqual({ usage: { prompt_tokens: 100, completion_tokens: 20 } }); + noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test-provider", provider("test-key-b"), 200, "rate-limit-429"); + expect(ctx.activeAttempt).toBe(active); + expect(ctx.attempts).toHaveLength(2); + expect(ctx.attempts?.[0]).toMatchObject({ accountLogLabel: labelA, status: 429, ordinal: 1, + usageStatus: "reported", usage: { inputTokens: 100, outputTokens: 20 }, sendCount: 1 }); + expect(active.accountLogLabel).not.toBe(labelA); + expect(active.usage).toBeUndefined(); + // The next failure reports no usage. It must not inherit the preceding account's usage or an estimate. + await recordKeyAttemptFailure(ctx, Response.json({ error: "synthetic" }, { status: 401 })); + noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test-provider", provider(), 300, "key-401"); + expect(ctx.attempts?.[1]).toMatchObject({ status: 401, ordinal: 2, usageStatus: "unreported" }); + expect(ctx.attempts?.[1].usage).toBeUndefined(); + expect(active.accountLogLabel).toBeUndefined(); + recordKeyAttemptUsage(ctx, { inputTokens: 300, outputTokens: 40 }); + const rows: RequestLogEntry[] = []; + addFinalRequestLog("key-rotation", Date.now(), ctx, 200, undefined, row => rows.push(row)); + const roundTrip = normalizeUsageEntryForTest(JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(rows[0])))!; + expect(roundTrip.attempts).toHaveLength(3); + expect(roundTrip.attempts?.map(a => a.ordinal)).toEqual([1, 2, 3]); + expect(roundTrip.attempts?.[0].accountLogLabel).toBe(labelA); + expect(roundTrip.attempts?.[2].usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 300, outputTokens: 40 }); + expect(roundTrip.usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 400, outputTokens: 60 }); + expect(JSON.stringify(roundTrip)).not.toContain("test-key-"); + }); + test("wire snapshots replace the current send against a pre-send baseline", () => { + const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); + const ctx: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", activeAttempt: active, attempts: [active] }; + const key = { adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, baseUrl: "https://example.test", _apiKeyAttempt: { reference: "synthetic-a" } }; + noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test", key, undefined); + applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 1 } }); + inspectResponseLogSsePayload(ctx, JSON.stringify({ usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 1 } })); + noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test", key, undefined); + applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }); + applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }); + finishRequestAttempt(active, 200, 1); + expect(active.usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 13, outputTokens: 3 }); + expect(active.usage?.estimated).toBeUndefined(); + }); + test("an estimated baseline plus repeated and progressive wire snapshots stay one current send", () => { + const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); + const ctx: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", activeAttempt: active, attempts: [active] }; + const key = { adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, baseUrl: "https://example.test", _apiKeyAttempt: { reference: "synthetic-a" } }; + noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test", key, undefined); + recordKeyAttemptUsage(ctx, { inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 0, estimated: true }); + noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test", key, undefined); + applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }); + applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }); + applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 4, completion_tokens: 2 } }); + finishRequestAttempt(active, 200, 1); + expect(active).toMatchObject({ + usageStatus: "estimated", + usage: { inputTokens: 14, outputTokens: 2, estimated: true }, + }); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/usage/request-log.test.ts b/tests/usage/request-log.test.ts index 8aed16d053..f27426480a 100644 --- a/tests/usage/request-log.test.ts +++ b/tests/usage/request-log.test.ts @@ -18,9 +18,6 @@ import { getRequestLogEntries, hydrateRequestLogsFromDisk, noteAttemptSend, - noteProviderAttemptSend, - recordKeyAttemptFailure, - recordKeyAttemptUsage, recordAdapterReasoning, recordFirstOutput, requestLogEntryFromPersistedUsage, @@ -28,7 +25,6 @@ import { recordAttemptCredentialSource, inspectResponseLogSsePayload, httpStatusForRequestLogTerminal, - applyResponseLogMetadata, type RequestLogContext, } from "../../src/server/request-log"; import { handleResponses } from "../../src/server/responses"; @@ -2077,111 +2073,3 @@ describe("request log snapshot cursor", () => { expect(selectRequestLogPoll(rows, query, stale, epoch)).toMatchObject({ logs: rows, reset: true }); }); }); - -describe("key attempt accounting", () => { - test("a combo parent copied before streaming rotation cannot overwrite the final key's usage", () => { - const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); - const child: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", comboId: "stream", - activeAttempt: active, attempts: [active] }; - const key = (reference: string) => ({ adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, - baseUrl: "https://example.test", _apiKeyAttempt: { reference } }); - noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key("synthetic-a"), undefined); - recordKeyAttemptUsage(child, { inputTokens: 100, outputTokens: 10 }); - const parent = { ...child }; - noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key("synthetic-b"), undefined, "key-429"); - recordKeyAttemptUsage(child, { inputTokens: 200, outputTokens: 20 }); - const rows: RequestLogEntry[] = []; - addFinalRequestLog("stream-key-switch", Date.now(), parent, 200, undefined, row => rows.push(row)); - expect(rows[0].attempts?.map(attempt => attempt.usage?.inputTokens)).toEqual([100, 200]); - expect(rows[0].usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 300, outputTokens: 30 }); - }); - test("adding reported usage cannot upgrade an earlier estimate to a measurement", () => { - const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); - const ctx: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", activeAttempt: active }; - recordKeyAttemptUsage(ctx, { inputTokens: 100, outputTokens: 0, estimated: true }); - recordKeyAttemptUsage(ctx, { inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 2 }); - finishRequestAttempt(active, 429, 1); - expect(active).toMatchObject({ usageStatus: "estimated", usage: { inputTokens: 110, outputTokens: 2, estimated: true } }); - }); - test.each(["synthetic-a", undefined])("a late unreported segment (%s) cannot reuse a stale parent total", reference => { - const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); - const child: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", comboId: "stream", - activeAttempt: active, attempts: [active] }; - const key = (value?: string) => ({ adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, - baseUrl: "https://example.test", _apiKeyAttempt: value ? { reference: value } : undefined }); - noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key("synthetic-a"), undefined); - recordKeyAttemptUsage(child, { inputTokens: 100, outputTokens: 10 }); - const parent = { ...child }; - noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key("synthetic-b"), undefined, "key-429"); - noteProviderAttemptSend(child, "test", key(reference), undefined, "key-429"); - const rows: RequestLogEntry[] = []; - addFinalRequestLog("stale-parent", Date.now(), parent, 499, undefined, row => rows.push(row)); - expect(rows[0].attempts?.map(attempt => attempt.usage?.inputTokens)).toEqual([100, undefined, undefined]); - expect(rows[0].attempts?.[2].usageStatus).toBe("unreported"); - }); - test("rotation preserves reported failure usage and the stable active object; unknown stays unreported", async () => { - const provider = (reference?: string) => ({ adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, - baseUrl: "https://example.test/v1", _apiKeyAttempt: reference ? { reference } : undefined }); - const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test-provider", "test-model", "openai-chat"); - const ctx: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test-provider", model: "test-model", comboId: "fixture", - activeAttempt: active, activeAttemptStartedAt: Date.now(), attempts: [active] }; - noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test-provider", provider("test-key-a"), 99999); - const labelA = active.accountLogLabel; - const failed = Response.json({ usage: { prompt_tokens: 100, completion_tokens: 20 } }, { status: 429 }); - await recordKeyAttemptFailure(ctx, failed); - expect(await failed.json()).toEqual({ usage: { prompt_tokens: 100, completion_tokens: 20 } }); - noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test-provider", provider("test-key-b"), 200, "rate-limit-429"); - expect(ctx.activeAttempt).toBe(active); - expect(ctx.attempts).toHaveLength(2); - expect(ctx.attempts?.[0]).toMatchObject({ accountLogLabel: labelA, status: 429, ordinal: 1, - usageStatus: "reported", usage: { inputTokens: 100, outputTokens: 20 }, sendCount: 1 }); - expect(active.accountLogLabel).not.toBe(labelA); - expect(active.usage).toBeUndefined(); - // The next failure reports no usage. It must not inherit the preceding account's usage or an estimate. - await recordKeyAttemptFailure(ctx, Response.json({ error: "synthetic" }, { status: 401 })); - noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test-provider", provider(), 300, "key-401"); - expect(ctx.attempts?.[1]).toMatchObject({ status: 401, ordinal: 2, usageStatus: "unreported" }); - expect(ctx.attempts?.[1].usage).toBeUndefined(); - expect(active.accountLogLabel).toBeUndefined(); - recordKeyAttemptUsage(ctx, { inputTokens: 300, outputTokens: 40 }); - const rows: RequestLogEntry[] = []; - addFinalRequestLog("key-rotation", Date.now(), ctx, 200, undefined, row => rows.push(row)); - const roundTrip = normalizeUsageEntryForTest(JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(rows[0])))!; - expect(roundTrip.attempts).toHaveLength(3); - expect(roundTrip.attempts?.map(a => a.ordinal)).toEqual([1, 2, 3]); - expect(roundTrip.attempts?.[0].accountLogLabel).toBe(labelA); - expect(roundTrip.attempts?.[2].usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 300, outputTokens: 40 }); - expect(roundTrip.usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 400, outputTokens: 60 }); - expect(JSON.stringify(roundTrip)).not.toContain("test-key-"); - }); - test("wire snapshots replace the current send against a pre-send baseline", () => { - const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); - const ctx: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", activeAttempt: active, attempts: [active] }; - const key = { adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, baseUrl: "https://example.test", _apiKeyAttempt: { reference: "synthetic-a" } }; - noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test", key, undefined); - applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 1 } }); - inspectResponseLogSsePayload(ctx, JSON.stringify({ usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 1 } })); - noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test", key, undefined); - applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }); - applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }); - finishRequestAttempt(active, 200, 1); - expect(active.usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 13, outputTokens: 3 }); - expect(active.usage?.estimated).toBeUndefined(); - }); - test("an estimated baseline plus repeated and progressive wire snapshots stay one current send", () => { - const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); - const ctx: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", activeAttempt: active, attempts: [active] }; - const key = { adapter: "openai-chat" as const, authMode: "key" as const, baseUrl: "https://example.test", _apiKeyAttempt: { reference: "synthetic-a" } }; - noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test", key, undefined); - recordKeyAttemptUsage(ctx, { inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 0, estimated: true }); - noteProviderAttemptSend(ctx, "test", key, undefined); - applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }); - applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 3, completion_tokens: 2 } }); - applyResponseLogMetadata(ctx, { usage: { prompt_tokens: 4, completion_tokens: 2 } }); - finishRequestAttempt(active, 200, 1); - expect(active).toMatchObject({ - usageStatus: "estimated", - usage: { inputTokens: 14, outputTokens: 2, estimated: true }, - }); - }); -}); From 04e064c9628a55ac3b9ec0fd43020c86a2acab3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: thisisjun786 <259586770+thisisjun786@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 00:56:58 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 071/113] fix(usage): retain recovery metadata on every refetch send --- src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts | 3 +- structure/transports/responses.md | 5 +++ tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts b/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts index 33135cf75a..2863105d7a 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts @@ -426,10 +426,10 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( logCtx.providerAdapter = transportState.activeAdapter.name; sealRequestAttemptIdentity(logCtx.activeAttempt, logCtx.provider, transportState.activeAdapter.name, logCtx.accountLogLabel); recordAttemptCredentialSource(logCtx.activeAttempt, route.providerName, route.provider, transportState.activeAdapter.name); - transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(retryEstimate, recovery); try { try { if (transportState.activeAdapter.fetchResponse) { + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(retryEstimate, recovery); await waitForProviderRequestSlot(route.providerName, route.provider, route.modelId, upstream.signal); // The dispatch boundary is HERE, not before the pacing wait: that wait can reject for // an abort, a saturated queue, an expired slot or a removed provider, and none of @@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( if (refetchAllowance?.permit && !refetchAllowance.permit.use()) { throw new SendBudgetExhaustedError(safeHostLabel(retryRequest.url)); } + transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(retryEstimate, recoveryKind ?? recovery); // Same boundary on the helper path: the thunk is what reaches the wire, and it // can be refused above before it does. use() past the first attempt is a no-op. onDispatch?.(); diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index b2de98cec8..907abf05cb 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -789,3 +789,8 @@ a spent request keeps the real 429 instead of replaying on a live stream. This is the proxy's own accounting only. Classifying an upstream 429 as org or project spend exhaustion is a separate contract with a separate owner. +Adapter-owned retries enter the same pending dispatch metadata path as initial key sends. +The actual dispatch commits their count and recovery label once; unsent pending metadata +is discarded on process exit and is not usage evidence. See [key attribution](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution). +Generic refetches record metadata inside each admitted retry callback, retaining the +transient recovery reason when present and otherwise the outer recovery reason. diff --git a/tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts b/tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts index c2e32ddc5f..4bf924c249 100644 --- a/tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts @@ -1020,3 +1020,42 @@ test("chat-native preserves same-key retry, key rotation, usage, and request log clearKeyCooldowns("mock"); } }); + +test.each([false, true])("key refetch retains transient recovery metadata (stream=%s)", async stream => { + resetUsageReadCacheForTests(); + const seen: Array = []; + upstream = Bun.serve({ hostname: "127.0.0.1", port: 0, fetch(req) { + seen.push(req.headers.get("authorization")); + if (seen.length < 3) return Response.json({ error: { message: seen.length === 1 ? "rate limited" : "temporarily unavailable" }, + usage: { prompt_tokens: seen.length, completion_tokens: 0 } }, { + status: seen.length === 1 ? 429 : 503, headers: { "retry-after": "0" }, + }); + const usage = { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 2 }; + if (stream) return new Response([ + { id: "chatcmpl-refetch", choices: [{ index: 0, delta: { content: "recovered" }, finish_reason: null }] }, + { id: "chatcmpl-refetch", choices: [{ index: 0, delta: {}, finish_reason: "stop" }], usage }, + ].map(chunk => `data: ${JSON.stringify(chunk)}\n\n`).join("") + "data: [DONE]\n\n", { + headers: { "content-type": "text/event-stream" }, + }); + return Response.json({ id: "chatcmpl-refetch", object: "chat.completion", usage, + choices: [{ index: 0, message: { role: "assistant", content: "recovered" }, finish_reason: "stop" }] }); + } }); + saveConfig({ port: 0, hostname: "127.0.0.1", defaultProvider: "refetch", providers: { refetch: { + adapter: "openai-chat", authMode: "key", allowPrivateNetwork: true, baseUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${upstream.port}/v1`, + apiKey: "synthetic-refetch-a", apiKeyPool: [{ id: "a", key: "synthetic-refetch-a" }, { id: "b", key: "synthetic-refetch-b" }], + transientRetryOn5xx: { attempts: 3 }, retryOn429: { attempts: 0 }, + } } } as OcxConfig); + const server = startServer(0); + try { + const response = await fetch(new URL("/v1/responses", server.url), { method: "POST", headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ model: "refetch/test", input: "hello", stream }) }); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(await response.text()).toContain("recovered"); + expect(seen).toEqual(["Bearer synthetic-refetch-a", "Bearer synthetic-refetch-b", "Bearer synthetic-refetch-b"]); + const attempts = readUsageEntries()[0]?.attempts; + expect(attempts).toHaveLength(2); + expect(attempts?.[0]).toMatchObject({ sendCount: 1, usage: { inputTokens: 1, outputTokens: 0 } }); + expect(attempts?.[1]).toMatchObject({ sendCount: 2, recoveryKinds: ["key-429", "transient-5xx"], + usage: { inputTokens: 12, outputTokens: 2 } }); + } finally { await server.stop(true); } +}); From 02b939127b1030093f2599a7cdf3f1cd723c17b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:24:44 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 072/113] fix(codex): stop rotating accounts inside an organization-scoped quota refusal (#4546) [skip ci] A pre-stream HTTP 429 or 402 moved the request to another pool account on status alone. That is right for a limit the account owns and wrong for one it merely belongs to. "credit_balance_exhausted", "organization_spend_limit_exceeded", "project_spend_limit_exceeded" and "organization_usage_limit_exceeded" all name a balance or cap held by the organization or project, so the second credential meets the same counter. The move bought nothing and paid a second cold prompt prefix for it, which is the send amplification this unit exists to stop. classifyCodexPreStreamRejection now reports a "scoped-quota-exhaustion" kind with alternateRetryEligible false and scopedExhaustionCode set, and shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountQuota consults that evidence before authorizing the move. Withholding the move does not withhold the accounting: passthrough-delivery.ts applies the response's quota headers to the serving account and records the 429 on the ordinary delivery path, so the account still earns its cooldown and leaves the selection pool. Only the futile second send is gone. These codes are deliberately absent from the reset-eligible set. A reset credit reconciles a ChatGPT plan window; it cannot pay an organization's bill. The classification fails closed. An empty, truncated, unparseable, duplicate-keyed or aborted body keeps the existing broad behaviour from #584, and a code/type pair that disagrees or a case or whitespace near-miss yields no code at all, so only positive evidence can ever withhold a rotation. "rate_limit_exceeded", "slow_down" and plan-level exhaustion still rotate exactly as before, and the regression test pins both directions. openai/codex reached the same classification from the client side: #44492 maps exactly these HTTP 429 codes to a terminal QuotaExceeded rather than a retry-limit failure, and #45602 extends it to the SSE path while keeping "rate_limit_exceeded" and "slow_down" retryable. The OpenAI platform rate-limit documentation states the rule for the whole class: "It does not mean that quota, billing, or other errors that require user action can be resolved by retrying." The two exhaustion classifications now share one parser rather than keeping a second hand-written copy of the strictness that makes a near-miss safe. --- src/codex/quota-rejection.ts | 119 +++++++++++++++--- src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts | 12 +- structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 11 ++ structure/transports/responses.md | 10 ++ .../codex-quota-rejection.test.ts | 97 ++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/codex/quota-rejection.ts b/src/codex/quota-rejection.ts index 39c5389254..cde0a8272d 100644 --- a/src/codex/quota-rejection.ts +++ b/src/codex/quota-rejection.ts @@ -8,8 +8,41 @@ const RESET_ELIGIBLE_CODE_VALUES = [ export type CodexResetEligibleExhaustionCode = (typeof RESET_ELIGIBLE_CODE_VALUES)[number]; +/** + * Upstream codes that name an ORGANIZATION- or PROJECT-scoped exhaustion (#4546). + * + * These are a different animal from the reset-eligible codes above, and the difference is the + * whole point. `usage_limit_exceeded` describes the account that was asked; another pool account + * carries its own plan allowance, so rotating to it is a real move. Every code here describes a + * limit the CREDENTIAL does not own -- a balance, a spend cap, or a usage cap held by the + * organization or project the credential belongs to. Two credentials inside that organization + * are refused by the same counter, so rotating between them pays a cold prompt prefix for zero + * new capacity, which is the send amplification this unit exists to stop. + * + * openai/codex reached the same classification from the client side: #44492 maps exactly these + * HTTP 429 codes to a terminal `QuotaExceeded` instead of a retry-limit failure, and #45602 + * extends it to the SSE path while deliberately KEEPING `rate_limit_exceeded` and `slow_down` + * retryable. The platform documentation states the same rule for the whole class: "It does not + * mean that quota, billing, or other errors that require user action can be resolved by + * retrying." + * + * Membership here says nothing about reset credits. A reset credit reconciles a ChatGPT plan + * window; it cannot pay an organization's bill, so these codes are deliberately absent from + * {@link RESET_ELIGIBLE_CODE_VALUES} and never set `resetCreditEligible`. + */ +const SCOPED_EXHAUSTION_CODE_VALUES = [ + "credit_balance_exhausted", + "organization_spend_limit_exceeded", + "project_spend_limit_exceeded", + "organization_usage_limit_exceeded", +] as const; + +export type CodexScopedExhaustionCode = + (typeof SCOPED_EXHAUSTION_CODE_VALUES)[number]; + export type CodexPreStreamRejectionKind = | "reset-eligible-exhaustion" + | "scoped-quota-exhaustion" | "generic-rate-limit" | "unverified-billing-or-quota" | "transient-server-error" @@ -23,6 +56,12 @@ export interface CodexPreStreamRejection { alternateRetryEligible: boolean; resetCreditEligible: boolean; semanticCode?: CodexResetEligibleExhaustionCode; + /** + * The organization- or project-scoped exhaustion code the upstream body named, when it named + * one. Never accompanied by `semanticCode`: the two sets are disjoint, and only `semanticCode` + * may authorize a reset credit. + */ + scopedExhaustionCode?: CodexScopedExhaustionCode; /** * Structured denial evidence for a 403. Present only when the upstream body names a * workspace/entitlement denial, which proves the CREDENTIAL is valid and the account @@ -97,6 +136,7 @@ function structuredDenialCode(payload: unknown): string | undefined { } const RESET_ELIGIBLE_CODES: ReadonlySet = new Set(RESET_ELIGIBLE_CODE_VALUES); +const SCOPED_EXHAUSTION_CODES: ReadonlySet = new Set(SCOPED_EXHAUSTION_CODE_VALUES); const TRANSIENT_SERVER_STATUSES = new Set([500, 502, 503, 504, 520, 521, 522]); const JSON_NUMBER_PATTERN = /-?(?:0|[1-9]\d*)(?:\.\d+)?(?:[eE][+-]?\d+)?/y; @@ -107,6 +147,7 @@ function rejection( options: { alternateRetryEligible?: boolean; semanticCode?: CodexResetEligibleExhaustionCode; + scopedExhaustionCode?: CodexScopedExhaustionCode; } = {}, ): CodexPreStreamRejection { return { @@ -115,6 +156,7 @@ function rejection( alternateRetryEligible: options.alternateRetryEligible === true, resetCreditEligible: options.semanticCode !== undefined, ...(options.semanticCode ? { semanticCode: options.semanticCode } : {}), + ...(options.scopedExhaustionCode ? { scopedExhaustionCode: options.scopedExhaustionCode } : {}), }; } @@ -210,9 +252,19 @@ function isUnsafeJsonDocument(text: string): boolean { } } -function exactResetEligibleCode( +/** + * Read the one exact, unambiguous code a container declares, and only if it is in `allowed`. + * + * Generic over the allowed set so the reset-eligible and organization-scoped classifications + * share one parser. They must: the strictness here -- a `code`/`type` pair that disagrees is + * rejected rather than resolved, and no trimming or case folding is applied -- is what keeps a + * near-miss from being read as an exact upstream code, and a second hand-written copy would + * drift away from that. + */ +function exactAllowedCode( container: Record, -): CodexResetEligibleExhaustionCode | undefined { + allowed: ReadonlySet, +): string | undefined { const hasCode = hasOwnField(container, "code"); const hasType = hasOwnField(container, "type"); if (!hasCode && !hasType) return undefined; @@ -226,49 +278,80 @@ function exactResetEligibleCode( const value = hasCode ? code : type; if (typeof value !== "string") return undefined; - return RESET_ELIGIBLE_CODES.has(value as CodexResetEligibleExhaustionCode) - ? value as CodexResetEligibleExhaustionCode - : undefined; + return allowed.has(value) ? value : undefined; } -function structuredResetEligibleCode(payload: unknown): CodexResetEligibleExhaustionCode | undefined { +function structuredAllowedCode(payload: unknown, allowed: ReadonlySet): string | undefined { if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) return undefined; const root = payload as Record; const hasRootDiscriminator = hasOwnField(root, "code") || hasOwnField(root, "type"); - if (!hasOwnField(root, "error")) return exactResetEligibleCode(root); + if (!hasOwnField(root, "error")) return exactAllowedCode(root, allowed); if (hasRootDiscriminator) return undefined; const nested = root.error; if (!nested || typeof nested !== "object" || Array.isArray(nested)) return undefined; - return exactResetEligibleCode(nested as Record); + return exactAllowedCode(nested as Record, allowed); } -async function resetEligibleCodeFromResponse( +/** + * Parse one bounded body and classify its structured code against both sets at once. + * + * One read, because the caller holds a `Response` whose body may only be consumed once per + * clone and the two questions are asked about the same bytes. + */ +async function exhaustionCodeFromResponse( response: Response, signal?: AbortSignal, -): Promise { +): Promise<{ + resetEligible?: CodexResetEligibleExhaustionCode; + scoped?: CodexScopedExhaustionCode; +}> { try { const body = await readBoundedResponseBody(response.clone(), { signal, fatalUtf8: true }); - if (!body.displaySafe || body.truncated || !body.text.trim()) return undefined; + if (!body.displaySafe || body.truncated || !body.text.trim()) return {}; const payload = JSON.parse(body.text) as unknown; // JSON.parse silently keeps the last duplicate key, making contradictory // payloads order-dependent. Reject any duplicate at any object depth. - if (isUnsafeJsonDocument(body.text)) return undefined; - return structuredResetEligibleCode(payload); + if (isUnsafeJsonDocument(body.text)) return {}; + const resetEligible = structuredAllowedCode(payload, RESET_ELIGIBLE_CODES); + if (resetEligible !== undefined) { + return { resetEligible: resetEligible as CodexResetEligibleExhaustionCode }; + } + const scoped = structuredAllowedCode(payload, SCOPED_EXHAUSTION_CODES); + return scoped === undefined ? {} : { scoped: scoped as CodexScopedExhaustionCode }; } catch { // Classification must fail closed. A malformed, oversized, consumed, or // cancelled body cannot authorize an irreversible reset-credit operation. - return undefined; + return {}; } } +/** + * The organization- or project-scoped exhaustion code this rejection names, if any. + * + * Exported for the account-rotation gate, which has to answer "may another pool account serve + * this?" before it has any reason to build a full classification. Fails closed to `undefined`: + * an unreadable, truncated, duplicate-keyed or aborted body leaves the caller's existing + * behaviour untouched, so only positive evidence can ever withhold a rotation. + */ +export async function codexScopedExhaustionCode( + response: Response, + options: { signal?: AbortSignal } = {}, +): Promise { + return (await exhaustionCodeFromResponse(response, options.signal)).scoped; +} + /** * Classify an upstream Codex rejection before any response event is exposed. * * Only an exact structured exhaustion code on HTTP 429/402 is reset-eligible. * Status alone and message text are intentionally insufficient. The broad * alternate-account retry remains eligible for 429/402 to preserve #584. + * + * The one carve-out from that breadth is an organization- or project-scoped exhaustion + * ({@link SCOPED_EXHAUSTION_CODE_VALUES}), which reports `alternateRetryEligible: false` + * because every credential inside the refusing limit would be refused by the same counter. */ export async function classifyCodexPreStreamRejection( response: Response, @@ -283,13 +366,19 @@ export async function classifyCodexPreStreamRejection( if (TRANSIENT_SERVER_STATUSES.has(status)) return rejection(status, "transient-server-error"); if (status !== 429 && status !== 402) return rejection(status, "other"); - const semanticCode = await resetEligibleCodeFromResponse(response, options.signal); + const { resetEligible: semanticCode, scoped } = await exhaustionCodeFromResponse( + response, + options.signal, + ); if (semanticCode) { return rejection(status, "reset-eligible-exhaustion", { alternateRetryEligible: true, semanticCode, }); } + if (scoped) { + return rejection(status, "scoped-quota-exhaustion", { scopedExhaustionCode: scoped }); + } return rejection( status, status === 429 ? "generic-rate-limit" : "unverified-billing-or-quota", diff --git a/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts b/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts index 5d0fc50109..5d61768d42 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts @@ -221,7 +221,17 @@ export async function shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountQuota( // A post-send WebSocket gateway status must not become a second account's send; the // body carries no quota evidence either, but the marker is the contract, not the prose. if (isNonReplayableResponse(response)) return false; - if (response.status === 402 || response.status === 429) return true; + if (response.status === 402 || response.status === 429) { + // Status alone used to authorize the move, which is right for a limit the ACCOUNT owns and + // wrong for one it merely belongs to. An organization- or project-scoped exhaustion refuses + // every credential inside that organization, so the second account meets the same counter + // and the only thing the rotation buys is a second cold prompt prefix (#4546). Positive + // evidence is required to withhold it: the helper fails closed, so an unreadable or + // ambiguous body keeps the broad #584 behaviour unchanged, and `rate_limit_exceeded`, + // `slow_down` and plan-level exhaustion still rotate exactly as before. + const { codexScopedExhaustionCode } = await import("../../codex/quota-rejection"); + return await codexScopedExhaustionCode(response, { signal }) === undefined; + } if (response.status < 500 || response.status >= 600) return false; try { // Reject malformed UTF-8 instead of matching quota words around replacement characters. diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index ab7511c3b0..0e2ec28776 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -111,6 +111,17 @@ and account/provider DTO projection; generic custom windows remain supported. Sp response quota/reset evidence cannot become shared quota or recovery evidence. Explicit Retry-After and credential/transport failures retain their ordinary handling. +`src/codex/quota-rejection.ts` separates a limit the account owns from one it merely belongs to. +`usage_limit_exceeded` and `insufficient_quota` name a plan window and stay reset-credit eligible. +`credit_balance_exhausted`, `organization_spend_limit_exceeded`, `project_spend_limit_exceeded` and +`organization_usage_limit_exceeded` name a balance or cap held by the organization or project, so +`classifyCodexPreStreamRejection` reports `scoped-quota-exhaustion` with `alternateRetryEligible` +false and `scopedExhaustionCode` set, and never `resetCreditEligible` — a reset credit reconciles a +ChatGPT plan window and cannot pay an organization's bill. The two sets are disjoint and share one +parser, so a `code`/`type` pair that disagrees, a duplicate key at any depth, or a case or +whitespace near-miss yields no code at all. `codexScopedExhaustionCode` exposes the scoped answer +alone for the rotation gate and fails closed, so only positive evidence changes a routing decision. + `pausedCodexAccountIds` is a persisted Pool eligibility boundary. A paused added account or the stable `__main__` alias remains visible for maintenance and quota reads, but is excluded from new affinity, quota rotation, cooldown probes, transient failover, and manual activation. In-flight diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 9af5e63100..3281f73fc0 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -239,6 +239,16 @@ Native Responses participates in the same pre-stream OAuth HTTP-429 account rota bridge. It uses the existing account quorum, cooldown and three-rotation request cap, refreshes the complete credential/transport/replay identity, and attributes usage to the serving account. Single-account installs do not retry; a missing alternate credential preserves the original error. + +`shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountQuota` withholds that rotation when the 429 or 402 body names an +organization- or project-scoped exhaustion (`codexScopedExhaustionCode` in +`src/codex/quota-rejection.ts`). Every credential inside the refusing organization meets the same +counter, so the move would pay a second cold prompt prefix for no new capacity. Withholding the +move does not withhold the accounting: `src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts` applies the +response's quota headers to the serving account and records the 429 outcome on the ordinary +delivery path, so the account still earns its cooldown and leaves the selection pool. The gate +fails closed — an empty, truncated, unparseable, duplicate-keyed or aborted body keeps the broad +behaviour, and `rate_limit_exceeded`, `slow_down` and plan-level exhaustion still rotate. Credential-refresh failures are fenced by both the account generation and a global routing-state generation. Reauthentication advances the account fence; replacing the whole routing roster advances the global fence. A late failure from either obsolete state is ignored, while failures diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-quota-rejection.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-quota-rejection.test.ts index f9a44a4748..9327b33db2 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-quota-rejection.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-quota-rejection.test.ts @@ -486,3 +486,100 @@ describe("Codex pre-stream quota rejection classification", () => { }); }); }); + +/** + * Rotating inside the limit that refused is the send amplification #4546 exists to stop. + * + * openai/codex #44492 and #45602 reclassified exactly these HTTP 429 codes as terminal quota + * exhaustion while deliberately keeping `rate_limit_exceeded` and `slow_down` retryable, and + * the platform documentation states the rule for the whole class: "It does not mean that quota, + * billing, or other errors that require user action can be resolved by retrying." + * + * Both directions are pinned here on purpose. The suppression is worth nothing if the ordinary + * user-level rate limit stops failing over, and that regression would be invisible until a pool + * stopped rotating in production. + */ +describe("organization-scoped quota exhaustion withholds the account rotation (#4546)", () => { + const SCOPED_CODES = [ + "credit_balance_exhausted", + "organization_spend_limit_exceeded", + "project_spend_limit_exceeded", + "organization_usage_limit_exceeded", + ] as const; + + test.each(SCOPED_CODES)("%s classifies as terminal scoped exhaustion", async code => { + const result = await classifyCodexPreStreamRejection(jsonRejection(429, { code })); + expect(result).toEqual({ + kind: "scoped-quota-exhaustion", + status: 429, + alternateRetryEligible: false, + resetCreditEligible: false, + scopedExhaustionCode: code, + }); + // A reset credit reconciles a ChatGPT plan window; it cannot pay an organization's bill. + expect(result).not.toHaveProperty("semanticCode"); + }); + + test.each(SCOPED_CODES)("%s withholds the alternate-account send", async code => { + await expect(shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountQuota(jsonRejection(429, { code }))) + .resolves.toBe(false); + }); + + test("a root-level code and a 402 are read the same way", async () => { + await expect(shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountQuota( + jsonPayload(429, { code: "organization_spend_limit_exceeded" }), + )).resolves.toBe(false); + await expect(shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountQuota( + jsonRejection(402, { code: "credit_balance_exhausted" }), + )).resolves.toBe(false); + }); + + test.each([ + ["rate_limit_exceeded", "the user-level rate limit upstream keeps retryable"], + ["slow_down", "the throttle upstream keeps retryable"], + ["usage_limit_exceeded", "a plan window another account does not share"], + ["insufficient_quota", "reset-credit eligible exhaustion"], + ] as const)("%s still rotates (%s)", async code => { + await expect(shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountQuota(jsonRejection(429, { code }))) + .resolves.toBe(true); + }); + + test.each([ + ["an empty body", new Response(null, { status: 429 })], + ["an unparseable body", new Response("{not json", { status: 429 })], + ["a duplicate-keyed body", new Response( + '{"error":{"code":"organization_spend_limit_exceeded","code":"rate_limit_exceeded"}}', + { status: 429 }, + )], + ["a disagreeing code/type pair", Response.json( + { error: { code: "organization_spend_limit_exceeded", type: "rate_limit_exceeded" } }, + { status: 429 }, + )], + ["an uppercase near-miss", Response.json( + { error: { code: "ORGANIZATION_SPEND_LIMIT_EXCEEDED" } }, + { status: 429 }, + )], + ["a padded near-miss", Response.json( + { error: { code: " organization_spend_limit_exceeded " } }, + { status: 429 }, + )], + ])("fails closed and still rotates on %s", async (_case, response) => { + // Only positive evidence may withhold a rotation: anything ambiguous keeps #584 behaviour. + await expect(shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountQuota(response)).resolves.toBe(true); + }); + + test("an aborted body read still rotates", async () => { + const controller = new AbortController(); + controller.abort(); + await expect(shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountQuota( + jsonRejection(429, { code: "organization_spend_limit_exceeded" }), + controller.signal, + )).resolves.toBe(true); + }); + + test("a non-replayable gateway response is refused before the body is consulted", async () => { + const response = jsonRejection(429, { code: "rate_limit_exceeded" }); + markResponseNonReplayable(response); + await expect(shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountQuota(response)).resolves.toBe(false); + }); +}); From 06a117c22891609d75e59120b8e35da4772285cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:25:53 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 073/113] test(usage): pin the attempts-or-total boundary the carry depends on (#4546) [skip ci] Carried from PR #4717. The Command Code reasoning-effort retry commit is left behind: that retry stays on the same selected key, so it is not needed to tell account A's usage from account B's, and keeping it out keeps this layer reviewable. The injected-executor fix it depended on is already here. Adds the consumer-side assertion the attribution depends on. A row carries BOTH the per-attempt records and the request total, and a reader that added them would report 600 input tokens for 300 that were actually spent. usageAttributions takes the attempts when a row has them and the entry row only when it has none, so the parent total is a fallback for rows written before attempts existed rather than another column to sum. That arithmetic is also why hidden attempts must not be folded into the response the client sees: the Codex client treats response.completed.usage as the exact usage for that response and adds it to its durable turn and thread totals, so a proxy-side sum would corrupt accounting it owns. Closes #4717 Co-authored-by: thisisjun786 <259586770+thisisjun786@users.noreply.github.com> --- tests/usage/key-attribution.test.ts | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/usage/key-attribution.test.ts b/tests/usage/key-attribution.test.ts index 78359416e9..949d1e4a1c 100644 --- a/tests/usage/key-attribution.test.ts +++ b/tests/usage/key-attribution.test.ts @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import { recordKeyAttemptFailure, recordKeyAttemptUsage, applyResponseLogMetadata, inspectResponseLogSsePayload, type RequestLogContext, type RequestLogEntry, } from "../../src/server/request-log"; +import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { repoPath } from "../helpers/repo-root"; import { normalizeUsageEntryForTest } from "../../src/usage/log"; describe("key attempt accounting", () => { @@ -23,6 +25,28 @@ describe("key attempt accounting", () => { expect(rows[0].attempts?.map(attempt => attempt.usage?.inputTokens)).toEqual([100, 200]); expect(rows[0].usage).toMatchObject({ inputTokens: 300, outputTokens: 30 }); }); + + test("a reader takes the attempts or the request total, never both", () => { + // The row above deliberately carries BOTH the per-attempt records (100 + 200) and the + // request total (300). A consumer that added them would report 600 input tokens for 300 + // that were actually spent, and the same arithmetic is what would corrupt a client's own + // accounting if hidden attempts were folded into the response it sees. + const summary = readFileSync(repoPath("src/usage/summary.ts"), "utf8"); + const attributions = summary.slice( + summary.indexOf("function usageAttributions("), + summary.indexOf("function projectedComboUsage("), + ); + // The entry-level row is the fallback for a request written before attempts existed, and it + // is reachable only when there are none. + expect(attributions).toContain("if (!entry.attempts?.length) {"); + // Everything after that early return maps the attempts; there is no branch that emits the + // entry row alongside them. + const fallback = attributions.indexOf("if (!entry.attempts?.length) {"); + const perAttempt = attributions.indexOf("return entry.attempts.map(attempt =>", fallback); + expect(fallback).toBeGreaterThan(-1); + expect(perAttempt).toBeGreaterThan(fallback); + expect(attributions.match(/return \[\{/g) ?? []).toHaveLength(1); + }); test("adding reported usage cannot upgrade an earlier estimate to a measurement", () => { const active = beginRequestAttempt(1, "test", "model", "openai-chat"); const ctx: RequestLogContext = { provider: "test", model: "model", activeAttempt: active }; From 5ee7f632621a50450b6a2cfbf44deb771e1f9c22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:26:26 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 074/113] docs(routing): cite what the prompt-caching guide actually says (#4546) The cache rule's conclusion is right and its source was not. The comment claimed OpenAI "documents that changing keys inside one organization does not guarantee a hit", and the prompt-caching guide contains no such sentence: the phrase "API key" appears on that page zero times, so it never addresses two keys in one organization in either direction. What the page does say is the separating half, verbatim: "Caches are not shared across organizations and cannot be reused across regional processing boundaries." The nearest statement about keys is "Keys influence routing; they do not pin requests to a machine or guarantee a cache hit." The classification is unchanged. A different org or region still relates distinct, an identical one still relates unknown, and evidence stays "separates". Only the reason moves: same org and region is unknown because the provider never promised the hit, not because the provider denied it. A reader who went looking for the denial this comment described would not have found it, and would have had to guess whether the code or the comment was wrong. The OpenAI quota rule gains its verbatim source in the same pass -- "Rate limits are defined at the organization level and at the project level, not user level" -- which is what "separates-and-shares" rests on. structure/catalog.md carried the same mis-citation and is corrected to match. Sources read from the signed-in platform documentation on 2026-09-16. --- src/routing/identity-domains.ts | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- structure/catalog.md | 7 ++++--- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/routing/identity-domains.ts b/src/routing/identity-domains.ts index 8d7431b180..035653f800 100644 --- a/src/routing/identity-domains.ts +++ b/src/routing/identity-domains.ts @@ -37,13 +37,16 @@ export type IdentityDomainProvenance = "operator-declared" | "provider-documente * What a domain key is evidence FOR, which is two facts rather than one. * * Proven SEPARATION and proven SHARING are different claims, and a provider routinely - * gives the first without the second. OpenAI documents that prompt caches are not shared - * across organizations or processing regions, and in the same breath documents that - * changing keys inside one organization does not guarantee a hit. So a different - * org-or-region key proves two domains, while an identical one proves nothing: a - * positive cache inference needs the provider to actually promise the hit, and here the - * provider declines to. Inferring "shared" from an equal key would be the same guess - * this module exists to refuse, only pointed the other way. + * gives the first without the second. OpenAI's prompt-caching guide states the separating + * half outright -- "Caches are not shared across organizations and cannot be reused across + * regional processing boundaries" -- and never states a sharing half at all. The page does + * not discuss two API keys inside one organization, and what it does say about keys is that + * they "influence routing; they do not pin requests to a machine or guarantee a cache hit." + * So a different org-or-region key proves two domains, while an identical one proves + * nothing. A positive cache inference needs the provider to promise the hit, and no such + * promise exists here -- the silence is the evidence, not a documented denial. Inferring + * "shared" from an equal key would be the same guess this module exists to refuse, only + * pointed the other way. * * "separates" therefore means two different keys are two different domains while two * identical keys stay "unknown". "separates-and-shares" means the same source also @@ -130,7 +133,9 @@ export interface DeclaredCredentialGroup { * then classifies "unknown" rather than extrapolating. * * - OpenAI: rate limits are per organization and project, with model groups sharing a - * limit; prompt caches are not shared across organizations or processing regions. + * limit ("Rate limits are defined at the organization level and at the project level, not + * user level", plus the documented shared limit across a model family); prompt caches are + * not shared across organizations or regional processing boundaries. * - Anthropic: prompt cache is isolated per workspace even inside one organization. * (Cache-read tokens are also excluded from input TPM there, which is quota * accounting, not domain shape, so it does not appear here.) @@ -158,12 +163,14 @@ const PROVIDER_DOCUMENTED_DOMAINS: Record ref.organizationId !== undefined && ref.region !== undefined ? `openai:org:${ref.organizationId}:region:${ref.region}` : undefined, diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index bf9d6e3751..598b6a7e16 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -268,9 +268,10 @@ Pool mode routes across main plus added Codex credentials. Key rules: Every domain carries `evidence` alongside its provenance: a rule that documents only that two credentials are in different domains never lets an equal key mean "shared". OpenAI's cache rule is the case that forces it — caches are documented as not shared across organizations or - processing regions, while changing keys inside one organization is documented as not - guaranteeing a hit, so a different org or region relates `distinct` and the same org and region - relates `unknown`. OpenAI quota, Anthropic workspace cache, and Azure deployment domains carry + regional processing boundaries, while no documentation states that two keys inside one + organization do share a cache, so a different org or region relates `distinct` and the same org + and region relates `unknown`. The absent promise is what withholds `shared` there, not a + documented denial. OpenAI quota, Anthropic workspace cache, and Azure deployment domains carry the sharing half as well and still relate `shared`. - **A declared credential group cannot mean two things** (`src/routing/identity-domains.ts`, `src/config.ts`). `credentialGroupIssues` is the one definition of a valid grouping: unique From cf851137ef0b9dbd1b8ba3d3e411236bdd740721 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:28:26 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 075/113] docs(architecture): name the modules that own the code after the facade splits (#4711) The architecture pages and structure/runtime.md still described the module ownership that existed before the facade splits of the last release train, so a reader following them landed in a file that no longer contains the code. Routing now lives in src/server/index/serve-options.ts, request preparation in src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts, and bridge conversion in src/bridge/ sse.ts and src/bridge/response-json.ts. src/bridge.ts is seven lines of re-exports. The pages named the pre-split files in every locale, so fixing only the English source would have left seven translations contradicting it. The facade paragraph also carried three counts -- seven, nine and five leaf modules -- that were already 26, 42 and 53. Counts that must be recounted on every split are a drift source rather than information, so they are gone; what replaces them is the distinction the counts were standing in for. A facade is the stable import path, not the implementation, and each step of the request flow now names the module that owns the code. structure/runtime.md gets the same correction on five ownership claims, and points at structure/transports/responses.md, which already carries the post-split owner inventory for the Responses surface. Scope is deliberately narrow: only claims about which module owns which responsibility change. No prose about behaviour is rewritten, and no locale receives a translation it did not already have. Closes #4711 --- .../content/docs/fr/reference/architecture.md | 19 ++++++------ .../content/docs/ja/reference/architecture.md | 28 +++++++++-------- .../content/docs/ko/reference/architecture.md | 26 +++++++++------- .../content/docs/reference/architecture.md | 27 +++++++++-------- .../content/docs/ru/reference/architecture.md | 28 +++++++++-------- .../content/docs/tr/reference/architecture.md | 30 +++++++++++-------- .../docs/zh-cn/reference/architecture.md | 27 +++++++++-------- .../docs/zh-tw/reference/architecture.md | 27 +++++++++-------- structure/runtime.md | 19 +++++++----- 9 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 101 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/architecture.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/architecture.md index 746ea7f726..14885a808e 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/architecture.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/fr/reference/architecture.md @@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ src/ ├── vision/ # service auxiliaire de vision (description et planification) ├── config.ts # ~/.opencodex/config.json, defaults, PID, env resolution ├── router.ts # model id → provider + adapter -├── bridge.ts # AdapterEvent stream → Responses SSE / JSON +├── bridge.ts # facade over bridge/ +├── bridge/ # AdapterEvent stream → Responses SSE (sse.ts) / JSON (response-json.ts) ├── reasoning-effort.ts # reasoning-effort translation, clamping, and catalog levels ├── responses/ │ ├── parser.ts # Responses request → OcxParsedRequest @@ -32,19 +33,19 @@ src/ └── index.ts # public entry ``` -Trois anciens points d’entrée volumineux préservent désormais la compatibilité sous forme de façades : `codex/catalog.ts` exporte les sept modules spécialisés `codex/catalog/*.ts`, `server/management-api.ts` répartit les requêtes entre les neuf modules `server/management/*.ts`, et `server/responses.ts` exporte les cinq modules `server/responses/*.ts`. +Les anciens points d’entrée volumineux préservent désormais la compatibilité sous forme de façades : `codex/catalog.ts` exporte les modules `codex/catalog/*.ts`, `server/management-api.ts` répartit les requêtes entre les modules `server/management/*.ts`, `server/responses.ts` exporte les modules `server/responses/*.ts`, et `bridge.ts` réexporte les modules `bridge/*.ts`. Une façade est le chemin d’import stable, pas l’implémentation : chaque étape ci-dessous nomme le module qui détient le code, et `structure/transports/responses.md` contient l’inventaire complet des propriétaires de la surface Responses. ## Flux d’une requête -`server/index.ts` gère la frontière HTTP et délègue le plan de données Responses à la façade `server/responses.ts` et à ses modules `server/responses/*.ts` : +`server/index/serve-options.ts` gère la frontière HTTP et délègue le plan de données Responses à la façade `server/responses.ts` et à ses modules `server/responses/*.ts` : -1. `server/index.ts` applique CORS et l’authentification d’API, refuse les nouvelles tâches pendant le drainage et enregistre les métadonnées du cycle de vie de la requête. Il sert `GET /v1/models`, `POST /v1/responses`, `POST /v1/responses/compact`, `POST /v1/images/generations` / `POST /v1/images/edits` (relayés vers une famille OpenAI en amont par `server/images.ts` pour l’outil `image_gen` intégré à Codex), `POST /v1/live` / `POST /v1/realtime/calls` (création des appels vocaux ChatGPT / Codex App et OpenAI Realtime, relayée par `server/live.ts`), les connexions WebSocket sideband sur `/v1/live/{callId}` (et `/v1/realtime?call_id=`), ainsi que la mise à niveau WebSocket facultative sur `/v1/responses`. -2. `server/responses/core.ts` décompresse et analyse le JSON, développe les entrées de mémoire locale `previous_response_id` lorsqu’elles sont disponibles, puis appelle `responses/parser.ts`. +1. `server/index/serve-options.ts` applique CORS et l’authentification d’API, refuse les nouvelles tâches pendant le drainage et enregistre les métadonnées du cycle de vie de la requête. Il sert `GET /v1/models`, `POST /v1/responses`, `POST /v1/responses/compact`, `POST /v1/images/generations` / `POST /v1/images/edits` (relayés vers une famille OpenAI en amont par `server/images.ts` pour l’outil `image_gen` intégré à Codex), `POST /v1/live` / `POST /v1/realtime/calls` (création des appels vocaux ChatGPT / Codex App et OpenAI Realtime, relayée par `server/live.ts`), les connexions WebSocket sideband sur `/v1/live/{callId}` (et `/v1/realtime?call_id=`), ainsi que la mise à niveau WebSocket facultative sur `/v1/responses`. +2. `server/responses/request-prepare.ts` décompresse et analyse le JSON, développe les entrées de mémoire locale `previous_response_id` lorsqu’elles sont disponibles, puis appelle `responses/parser.ts`. 3. `router.ts` résout un identifiant simple ou `provider/model`. Le serveur détermine ensuite l’affinité du compte Codex, actualise l’authentification OAuth du fournisseur si nécessaire et applique à la route les identifiants sélectionnés. 4. Avant l’appel principal, `vision/` décrit les images pour les modèles figurant dans `noVisionModels`. En l’absence de service auxiliaire sûr, les images sont supprimées plutôt qu’envoyées à un service en amont purement textuel. 5. `server/adapter-resolve.ts` applique toute substitution de protocole propre au modèle et construit l’un des adaptateurs enregistrés. L’adaptateur Responses relaie le corps natif, Cursor exécute son transport bidirectionnel `runTurn`, et les adaptateurs traduits construisent, envoient et analysent une requête en amont. 6. Pour les modèles routés avec un outil hébergé `web_search`, `web-search/` expose une fonction synthétique, exécute la recherche réelle avec le backend configuré — le service auxiliaire OpenAI/ChatGPT ou le backend Anthropic —, renvoie les résultats au modèle routé et recommence dans la limite de boucle configurée. Cette boucle ne prend en charge que le chemin HTTP classique ; les adaptateurs qui implémentent `runTurn`, comme Cursor, la contournent et poursuivent leur propre transport. -7. `bridge.ts` produit un flux SSE Responses ou une réponse JSON. `server/request-log.ts` et `usage/` recueillent de manière bornée l’état, la latence, les libellés de fournisseur/modèle et l’utilisation estimée des jetons, sans modifier la réponse. +7. `bridge/sse.ts` / `bridge/response-json.ts` produit un flux SSE Responses ou une réponse JSON. `server/request-log.ts` et `usage/` recueillent de manière bornée l’état, la latence, les libellés de fournisseur/modèle et l’utilisation estimée des jetons, sans modifier la réponse. ## Analyseur @@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ Trois anciens points d’entrée volumineux préservent désormais la compatibil ## Pont -`bridge.ts` transforme le flux interne `AdapterEvent` de l’adaptateur en événements SSE Responses compris par Codex : +`bridge/sse.ts` transforme le flux interne `AdapterEvent` de l’adaptateur en événements SSE Responses compris par Codex : | AdapterEvent | Événements SSE Responses émis | | --- | --- | @@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ Les implémentations OAuth se trouvent dans `oauth/`. Les jetons d’accès sont ## Transport et compactage -Par défaut, `server/index.ts` sert HTTP/SSE sur `/v1/responses`. Si Codex tente une mise à niveau WebSocket de Responses alors que `websockets` vaut `false`, opencodex renvoie `426 upgrade_required` ; Codex revient alors à HTTP pour cette session. Lorsque `"websockets": true` est défini, le même point de terminaison accepte la mise à niveau et utilise le pont WebSocket. +Par défaut, `server/index/serve-options.ts` sert HTTP/SSE sur `/v1/responses`. Si Codex tente une mise à niveau WebSocket de Responses alors que `websockets` vaut `false`, opencodex renvoie `426 upgrade_required` ; Codex revient alors à HTTP pour cette session. Lorsque `"websockets": true` est défini, le même point de terminaison accepte la mise à niveau et utilise le pont WebSocket. Indépendamment de ce réglage côté client, les requêtes canoniques transmises à ChatGPT avec `stream: true` à la racine peuvent utiliser le transport WebSocket en amont de Codex avec une version stable de Bun 1.4.0 ou ultérieure. La version intégrée Bun 1.3.14, les préversions et les identités de runtime impossibles à vérifier utilisent HTTP/SSE. Les réponses WS en amont qui réussissent conservent le contrat SSE en aval et contournent `tee()` au moyen d’un relais borné à lecteur unique et avide (4 MiB par trame brute/enveloppée et une file de production de 8 MiB). Le dépassement de la file ferme la connexion en amont et émet en aval un événement terminal `response.failed`, suivi de `[DONE]`. @@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ l’ancien socket ; les requêtes admissibles suivantes ayant la même identité le nouveau socket. Les autres modèles et passerelles conservent leur politique Lite. Des métadonnées natives mal formées entraînent toujours un repli HTTP, sans modifier le corps. -Le compactage du contexte Codex fonctionne avec les modèles routés. `server/responses/compact.ts` traite `POST /v1/responses/compact` en exécutant un tour interne de synthèse routé et en renvoyant un historique compacté, tandis que `responses/parser.ts` et `bridge.ts` traitent les tours de compactage distant v2 `compaction_trigger` en émettant exactement un élément de sortie synthétique `compaction`. +Le compactage du contexte Codex fonctionne avec les modèles routés. `server/responses/compact.ts` traite `POST /v1/responses/compact` en exécutant un tour interne de synthèse routé et en renvoyant un historique compacté, tandis que `responses/parser.ts` et `bridge/sse.ts` traitent les tours de compactage distant v2 `compaction_trigger` en émettant exactement un élément de sortie synthétique `compaction`. ## Mise en cache et catalogue diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/architecture.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/architecture.md index 3500cbaf86..a803cd9784 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/architecture.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ja/reference/architecture.md @@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ src/ ├── vision/ # vision sidecar (describe + plan) ├── config.ts # ~/.opencodex/config.json, defaults, PID, env resolution ├── router.ts # model id → provider + adapter -├── bridge.ts # AdapterEvent stream → Responses SSE / JSON +├── bridge.ts # facade over bridge/ +├── bridge/ # AdapterEvent stream → Responses SSE (sse.ts) / JSON (response-json.ts) ├── reasoning-effort.ts # reasoning-effort translation, clamping, and catalog levels ├── responses/ │ ├── parser.ts # Responses request → OcxParsedRequest @@ -32,30 +33,33 @@ src/ └── index.ts # public entry ``` -以前の大規模なエントリーファイル 3 つは、現在は互換性 facade です。`codex/catalog.ts` は -7 個の `codex/catalog/*.ts` モジュールを、`server/management-api.ts` は 9 個の -`server/management/*.ts` モジュールを、`server/responses.ts` は 5 個の -`server/responses/*.ts` モジュールを接続します。 +大規模だったエントリーファイルは、現在は互換性 facade です。`codex/catalog.ts` は +`codex/catalog/*.ts` モジュールを、`server/management-api.ts` は +`server/management/*.ts` モジュールを、`server/responses.ts` は +`server/responses/*.ts` モジュールを、`bridge.ts` は `bridge/*.ts` モジュールを接続します。 +facade は安定した import パスであって実装ではありません。以下の各ステップは実際に +コードを所有するモジュールを示し、Responses 面の完全な所有権一覧は +`structure/transports/responses.md` にあります。 ## リクエスト処理フロー -HTTP の境界は `server/index.ts` が担い、Responses データプレーンは `server/responses.ts` facade と +HTTP の境界は `server/index/serve-options.ts` が担い、Responses データプレーンは `server/responses.ts` facade と `server/responses/*.ts` モジュールに渡します。 -1. `server/index.ts` で CORS と API 認証を確認し、終了待ち状態なら新規リクエストを拒否したのち、リクエストのライフサイクルを記録します。ここで `GET /v1/models`、`POST /v1/responses`、 +1. `server/index/serve-options.ts` で CORS と API 認証を確認し、終了待ち状態なら新規リクエストを拒否したのち、リクエストのライフサイクルを記録します。ここで `GET /v1/models`、`POST /v1/responses`、 `POST /v1/responses/compact`、`POST /v1/images/generations` / `POST /v1/images/edits` （Codex 組み込み `image_gen` ツール用 — `server/images.ts` が OpenAI 系の上流に中継）、 `POST /v1/live` / `POST /v1/realtime/calls`（ChatGPT / Codex App 音声と OpenAI Realtime の call-create、`server/live.ts` が中継）と `/v1/live/{callId}` サイドバンド WebSocket、 `/v1/responses` のオプション WebSocket アップグレードを提供します。 -2. `server/responses/core.ts` が展開し JSON を読みます。覚えておいた `previous_response_id` 入力があれば展開したのち `responses/parser.ts` に渡します。 +2. `server/responses/request-prepare.ts` が展開し JSON を読みます。覚えておいた `previous_response_id` 入力があれば展開したのち `responses/parser.ts` に渡します。 3. `router.ts` が通常のモデル id または `provider/model` id を解決します。続いて Codex アカウント affinity を決定し、必要ならプロバイダー OAuth を更新して選択された認証情報を route に適用します。 4. 本リクエストの前に `vision/` が `noVisionModels` モデル用の画像説明を作ります。安全なサイドカー経路がないときはテキスト専用の上流に画像を送らず取り除きます。 5. `server/adapter-resolve.ts` がモデル別の wire override を適用し、登録済みアダプターのいずれかを作ります。 Responses passthrough は元の body を中継し、Cursor は双方向 `runTurn` transport を使い、 残りの変換型アダプターは上流リクエストを build/fetch/parse します。 6. ルーティングモデルがホステッド `web_search` を要求すると `web-search/` が合成関数を公開します。実際の検索は ChatGPT サイドカーで実行し、結果をルーティングモデルに戻し、設定された回数の中で繰り返します。 -7. `bridge.ts` が Responses SSE または JSON を作ります。`server/request-log.ts` と `usage/` はレスポンスに触れずに終了ステータス、レイテンシー、プロバイダー/モデル、最善推定トークン使用量を記録します。 +7. `bridge/sse.ts` / `bridge/response-json.ts` が Responses SSE または JSON を作ります。`server/request-log.ts` と `usage/` はレスポンスに触れずに終了ステータス、レイテンシー、プロバイダー/モデル、最善推定トークン使用量を記録します。 ## パーサー @@ -73,7 +77,7 @@ HTTP の境界は `server/index.ts` が担い、Responses データプレーン ## ブリッジ -`bridge.ts` はアダプターの内部 `AdapterEvent` ストリームを Codex が理解する Responses SSE に再変換します: +`bridge/sse.ts` はアダプターの内部 `AdapterEvent` ストリームを Codex が理解する Responses SSE に再変換します: | AdapterEvent | Responses SSE emitted | | --- | --- | @@ -95,7 +99,7 @@ HTTP の境界は `server/index.ts` が担い、Responses データプレーン ## 伝送と compaction -`server/index.ts` はデフォルトで `/v1/responses` を HTTP/SSE で提供します。`websockets` が `false` の状態で Codex が Responses WebSocket アップグレードを試みると、opencodex は `426 upgrade_required` を返し、Codex はそのセッションで HTTP にフォールバックします。`"websockets": true` を設定すると同じエンドポイントがアップグレードを受け入れ WebSocket ブリッジを使います。 +`server/index/serve-options.ts` はデフォルトで `/v1/responses` を HTTP/SSE で提供します。`websockets` が `false` の状態で Codex が Responses WebSocket アップグレードを試みると、opencodex は `426 upgrade_required` を返し、Codex はそのセッションで HTTP にフォールバックします。`"websockets": true` を設定すると同じエンドポイントがアップグレードを受け入れ WebSocket ブリッジを使います。 最終送信モデルが `gpt-5.3-codex-spark` の場合、canonical ChatGPT 転送は HTTP ヘッダーと ネイティブ WS フレームのメタデータの両方で Responses Lite を明示的に無効にします。 @@ -108,7 +112,7 @@ HTTP の境界は `server/index.ts` が担い、Responses データプレーン Codex コンテキスト compaction はルーティングされたモデルでも動作します。`server/responses/compact.ts` は `POST /v1/responses/compact` を内部ルーティング要約ターンとして扱い、圧縮されたヒストリーを返します。 -`responses/parser.ts` と `bridge.ts` は remote compaction v2 の `compaction_trigger` ターンを扱い、合成 `compaction` 出力項目を正確に 1 つ送ります。 +`responses/parser.ts` と `bridge/sse.ts` は remote compaction v2 の `compaction_trigger` ターンを扱い、合成 `compaction` 出力項目を正確に 1 つ送ります。 ## キャッシュとカタログ diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/architecture.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/architecture.md index d95bf391ad..31548f2ad3 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/architecture.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/architecture.md @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ src/ ├── vision/ # vision sidecar (describe + plan) ├── config.ts # ~/.opencodex/config.json, defaults, PID, env resolution ├── router.ts # model id → provider + adapter -├── bridge.ts # AdapterEvent stream → Responses SSE / JSON +├── bridge.ts # facade over bridge/ +├── bridge/ # AdapterEvent stream → Responses SSE (sse.ts) / JSON (response-json.ts) ├── reasoning-effort.ts # reasoning-effort translation, clamping, and catalog levels ├── responses/ │ ├── parser.ts # Responses request → OcxParsedRequest @@ -34,23 +35,26 @@ src/ └── index.ts # public entry ``` -기존의 대형 진입 파일 세 개는 이제 호환성 facade입니다. `codex/catalog.ts`는 7개의 -`codex/catalog/*.ts` 모듈을, `server/management-api.ts`는 9개의 `server/management/*.ts` -모듈을, `server/responses.ts`는 5개의 `server/responses/*.ts` 모듈을 연결합니다. +기존의 대형 진입 파일들은 이제 호환성 facade입니다. `codex/catalog.ts`는 +`codex/catalog/*.ts` 모듈을, `server/management-api.ts`는 `server/management/*.ts` +모듈을, `server/responses.ts`는 `server/responses/*.ts` 모듈을, `bridge.ts`는 `bridge/*.ts` +모듈을 연결합니다. facade는 안정적인 import 경로일 뿐 구현이 아닙니다. 아래 각 단계는 +실제 코드를 소유한 모듈을 가리키며, Responses 표면의 전체 소유권 목록은 +`structure/transports/responses.md`에 있습니다. ## 요청 처리 흐름 -HTTP 경계는 `server/index.ts`가 맡고, Responses 데이터 플레인은 `server/responses.ts` facade와 +HTTP 경계는 `server/index/serve-options.ts`가 맡고, Responses 데이터 플레인은 `server/responses.ts` facade와 `server/responses/*.ts` 모듈로 넘깁니다. -1. `server/index.ts`에서 CORS와 API 인증을 확인하고, 종료 대기 중이면 새 요청을 거부한 뒤 요청 수명 +1. `server/index/serve-options.ts`에서 CORS와 API 인증을 확인하고, 종료 대기 중이면 새 요청을 거부한 뒤 요청 수명 주기를 기록합니다. 여기서 `GET /v1/models`, `POST /v1/responses`, `POST /v1/responses/compact`, `POST /v1/images/generations` / `POST /v1/images/edits` (Codex 내장 `image_gen` 도구용 — `server/images.ts`가 OpenAI 계열 업스트림으로 중계), `POST /v1/live` / `POST /v1/realtime/calls`(ChatGPT / Codex App 음성 및 OpenAI Realtime 호출 생성, `server/live.ts`가 중계)와 `/v1/live/{callId}` 사이드밴드 WebSocket, 그리고 `/v1/responses`의 선택적 WebSocket 업그레이드를 제공합니다. -2. `server/responses/core.ts`가 압축을 풀고 JSON을 읽습니다. 기억해 둔 `previous_response_id` 입력이 있으면 +2. `server/responses/request-prepare.ts`가 압축을 풀고 JSON을 읽습니다. 기억해 둔 `previous_response_id` 입력이 있으면 펼친 다음 `responses/parser.ts`로 넘깁니다. 3. `router.ts`가 일반 모델 id 또는 `provider/model` id를 해석합니다. 이어서 Codex 계정 affinity를 결정하고, 필요하면 프로바이더 OAuth를 갱신해 선택된 자격 증명을 route에 적용합니다. @@ -61,7 +65,7 @@ HTTP 경계는 `server/index.ts`가 맡고, Responses 데이터 플레인은 `se 나머지 변환형 어댑터는 업스트림 요청을 build/fetch/parse합니다. 6. 라우팅 모델이 호스티드 `web_search`를 요청하면 `web-search/`가 합성 함수를 노출합니다. 실제 검색은 ChatGPT 사이드카로 실행하고 결과를 라우팅 모델에 다시 넣으며, 설정된 횟수 안에서 반복합니다. -7. `bridge.ts`가 Responses SSE 또는 JSON을 만듭니다. `server/request-log.ts`와 `usage/`는 응답을 +7. `bridge/sse.ts` / `bridge/response-json.ts`가 Responses SSE 또는 JSON을 만듭니다. `server/request-log.ts`와 `usage/`는 응답을 건드리지 않은 채 종료 상태, 지연 시간, 프로바이더/모델, 최선 추정 토큰 사용량을 기록합니다. ## 파서 @@ -83,7 +87,7 @@ HTTP 경계는 `server/index.ts`가 맡고, Responses 데이터 플레인은 `se ## 브리지 -`bridge.ts`는 어댑터의 내부 `AdapterEvent` 스트림을 Codex가 이해하는 Responses SSE로 다시 +`bridge/sse.ts`는 어댑터의 내부 `AdapterEvent` 스트림을 Codex가 이해하는 Responses SSE로 다시 변환합니다: | AdapterEvent | Responses SSE emitted | @@ -114,7 +118,7 @@ Responses 항목 타입으로 구분됩니다 — 따라서 MCP 네임스페이 ## 전송과 compaction -`server/index.ts`는 기본적으로 `/v1/responses`를 HTTP/SSE로 제공합니다. `websockets`가 `false`인 +`server/index/serve-options.ts`는 기본적으로 `/v1/responses`를 HTTP/SSE로 제공합니다. `websockets`가 `false`인 상태에서 Codex가 Responses WebSocket 업그레이드를 시도하면 opencodex는 `426 upgrade_required`를 반환하고, Codex는 해당 세션에서 HTTP로 폴백합니다. `"websockets": true`가 설정되면 같은 엔드포인트가 업그레이드를 받아들이고 WebSocket 브리지를 사용합니다. @@ -138,7 +142,7 @@ Lite 정책을 유지합니다. 네이티브 메타데이터 형식이 잘못된 Codex 컨텍스트 compaction은 라우팅된 모델에서도 동작합니다. `server/responses/compact.ts`는 `POST /v1/responses/compact`를 내부 라우팅 요약 턴으로 처리해 압축된 히스토리를 반환합니다. -`responses/parser.ts`와 `bridge.ts`는 remote compaction v2의 `compaction_trigger` 턴을 처리해 +`responses/parser.ts`와 `bridge/sse.ts`는 remote compaction v2의 `compaction_trigger` 턴을 처리해 합성 `compaction` 출력 항목을 정확히 하나 내보냅니다. ## 캐싱과 카탈로그 diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/architecture.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/architecture.md index a9bdf48978..c04f647b72 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/architecture.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/architecture.md @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ src/ ├── vision/ # vision sidecar (describe + plan) ├── config.ts # ~/.opencodex/config.json, defaults, PID, env resolution ├── router.ts # model id → provider + adapter -├── bridge.ts # AdapterEvent stream → Responses SSE / JSON +├── bridge.ts # facade over bridge/ +├── bridge/ # AdapterEvent stream → Responses SSE (sse.ts) / JSON (response-json.ts) ├── reasoning-effort.ts # reasoning-effort translation, clamping, and catalog levels ├── responses/ │ ├── parser.ts # Responses request → OcxParsedRequest @@ -34,17 +35,19 @@ src/ └── index.ts # public entry ``` -Three formerly large entry files now preserve compatibility as facades: `codex/catalog.ts` exports -the seven focused `codex/catalog/*.ts` modules, `server/management-api.ts` dispatches to the nine -`server/management/*.ts` modules, and `server/responses.ts` exports the five -`server/responses/*.ts` modules. +Several formerly large entry files now preserve compatibility as facades: `codex/catalog.ts` exports +its focused `codex/catalog/*.ts` modules, `server/management-api.ts` dispatches to +`server/management/*.ts`, `server/responses.ts` exports `server/responses/*.ts`, and `bridge.ts` +re-exports `bridge/*.ts`. A facade is the stable import path, not the implementation: each step +below names the module that owns the code, and `structure/transports/responses.md` carries the +full owner inventory for the Responses surface. ## Request flow -`server/index.ts` owns the HTTP boundary and delegates the Responses data plane to +`server/index/serve-options.ts` owns the HTTP boundary and delegates the Responses data plane to the `server/responses.ts` facade and its `server/responses/*.ts` modules: -1. `server/index.ts` applies CORS and API authentication, rejects new work while draining, and +1. `server/index/serve-options.ts` applies CORS and API authentication, rejects new work while draining, and records request lifecycle metadata. It serves `GET /v1/models`, `POST /v1/responses`, `POST /v1/responses/compact`, `POST /v1/images/generations` / `POST /v1/images/edits` (relayed to an OpenAI-family upstream by `server/images.ts` for codex's built-in `image_gen` @@ -52,7 +55,7 @@ the `server/responses.ts` facade and its `server/responses/*.ts` modules: Realtime call-create, relayed by `server/live.ts`), sideband WebSocket joins on `/v1/live/{callId}` (and `/v1/realtime?call_id=`), and the optional WebSocket upgrade on `/v1/responses`. -2. `server/responses/core.ts` decompresses and parses JSON, expands locally remembered +2. `server/responses/request-prepare.ts` decompresses and parses JSON, expands locally remembered `previous_response_id` input when available, then calls `responses/parser.ts`. 3. `router.ts` resolves a bare or `provider/model` id. The server then resolves Codex account affinity, refreshes provider OAuth when needed, and applies the selected credential to the route. @@ -65,7 +68,7 @@ the `server/responses.ts` facade and its `server/responses/*.ts` modules: executes the real search through the configured backend (the OpenAI/ChatGPT sidecar or Anthropic), feeds results back to the routed model, and repeats within the configured loop limit. This loop supports only the standard HTTP path; adapters that implement `runTurn`, such as Cursor, bypass it. -7. `bridge.ts` produces Responses SSE or JSON. `server/request-log.ts` and `usage/` collect terminal +7. `bridge/sse.ts` / `bridge/response-json.ts` produces Responses SSE or JSON. `server/request-log.ts` and `usage/` collect terminal status, latency, provider/model labels, and best-effort token usage without changing the response. ## The parser @@ -86,7 +89,7 @@ the `server/responses.ts` facade and its `server/responses/*.ts` modules: ## The bridge -`bridge.ts` turns the adapter's internal `AdapterEvent` stream back into Responses SSE that Codex +`bridge/sse.ts` turns the adapter's internal `AdapterEvent` stream back into Responses SSE that Codex understands: | AdapterEvent | Responses SSE emitted | @@ -138,7 +141,7 @@ diagnostics. ## Transport and compaction -`server/index.ts` serves HTTP/SSE on `/v1/responses` by default. If Codex attempts a Responses +`server/index/serve-options.ts` serves HTTP/SSE on `/v1/responses` by default. If Codex attempts a Responses WebSocket upgrade while `websockets` is `false`, opencodex returns `426 upgrade_required`; Codex then falls back to HTTP for that session. When `"websockets": true` is set, the same endpoint accepts the upgrade and uses the WebSocket bridge. @@ -174,7 +177,7 @@ retry after compaction. Non-streaming API callers continue to receive the provid Codex context compaction works for routed models. `server/responses/compact.ts` handles `POST /v1/responses/compact` by running an internal routed summarization turn and returning compacted -history, while `responses/parser.ts` and `bridge.ts` handle remote compaction v2 +history, while `responses/parser.ts` and `bridge/sse.ts` handle remote compaction v2 `compaction_trigger` turns by emitting exactly one synthetic `compaction` output item. ## Caching & the catalog diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/architecture.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/architecture.md index cd3f776efb..43db27e8fb 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/architecture.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ru/reference/architecture.md @@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ src/ ├── vision/ # vision sidecar (describe + plan) ├── config.ts # ~/.opencodex/config.json, defaults, PID, env resolution ├── router.ts # model id → provider + adapter -├── bridge.ts # AdapterEvent stream → Responses SSE / JSON +├── bridge.ts # facade over bridge/ +├── bridge/ # AdapterEvent stream → Responses SSE (sse.ts) / JSON (response-json.ts) ├── reasoning-effort.ts # reasoning-effort translation, clamping, and catalog levels ├── responses/ │ ├── parser.ts # Responses request → OcxParsedRequest @@ -35,17 +36,20 @@ src/ └── index.ts # public entry ``` -Три прежних крупных входных файла теперь служат фасадами совместимости: `codex/catalog.ts` -экспортирует семь модулей `codex/catalog/*.ts`, `server/management-api.ts` направляет запросы в -девять модулей `server/management/*.ts`, а `server/responses.ts` экспортирует пять модулей -`server/responses/*.ts`. +Прежние крупные входные файлы теперь служат фасадами совместимости: `codex/catalog.ts` +экспортирует модули `codex/catalog/*.ts`, `server/management-api.ts` направляет запросы в +модули `server/management/*.ts`, `server/responses.ts` экспортирует модули +`server/responses/*.ts`, а `bridge.ts` реэкспортирует модули `bridge/*.ts`. Фасад — это +стабильный путь импорта, а не реализация: каждый шаг ниже называет модуль, которому +принадлежит код, а полный перечень владельцев поверхности Responses находится в +`structure/transports/responses.md`. ## Поток запроса -`server/index.ts` владеет HTTP-границей и делегирует плоскость данных Responses в +`server/index/serve-options.ts` владеет HTTP-границей и делегирует плоскость данных Responses в фасад `server/responses.ts` и его модули `server/responses/*.ts`: -1. `server/index.ts` применяет CORS и аутентификацию API, отклоняет новую работу во время +1. `server/index/serve-options.ts` применяет CORS и аутентификацию API, отклоняет новую работу во время завершения (drain) и записывает метаданные жизненного цикла запроса. Он обслуживает `GET /v1/models`, `POST /v1/responses`, `POST /v1/responses/compact`, `POST /v1/images/generations` / `POST /v1/images/edits` @@ -54,7 +58,7 @@ src/ (создание голосового/Realtime-вызова ChatGPT / Codex App, ретранслируется `server/live.ts`), sideband WebSocket на `/v1/live/{callId}`, а также необязательный WebSocket-апгрейд на `/v1/responses`. -2. `server/responses/core.ts` распаковывает и парсит JSON, разворачивает локально запомненный вход +2. `server/responses/request-prepare.ts` распаковывает и парсит JSON, разворачивает локально запомненный вход `previous_response_id`, когда он доступен, затем вызывает `responses/parser.ts`. 3. `router.ts` разрешает «голый» id или id вида `provider/model`. Затем сервер определяет привязку (affinity) аккаунта Codex, при необходимости обновляет OAuth провайдера и применяет @@ -70,7 +74,7 @@ src/ предоставляет синтетическую функцию, выполняет настоящий поиск через сайдкар ChatGPT, возвращает результаты маршрутизируемой модели и повторяет это в пределах настроенного лимита цикла. -7. `bridge.ts` формирует Responses SSE или JSON. `server/request-log.ts` и `usage/` собирают +7. `bridge/sse.ts` / `bridge/response-json.ts` формирует Responses SSE или JSON. `server/request-log.ts` и `usage/` собирают итоговый статус, задержку, метки провайдера/модели и оценку использования токенов, не изменяя ответ. @@ -95,7 +99,7 @@ src/ ## Мост -`bridge.ts` превращает поток внутренних событий `AdapterEvent` адаптера обратно в Responses SSE, +`bridge/sse.ts` превращает поток внутренних событий `AdapterEvent` адаптера обратно в Responses SSE, понятный Codex: | AdapterEvent | Responses SSE emitted | @@ -146,7 +150,7 @@ loopback; настроенные записи `corsAllowOrigins` расширя ## Транспорт и compaction -`server/index.ts` по умолчанию обслуживает HTTP/SSE на `/v1/responses`. Если Codex пытается +`server/index/serve-options.ts` по умолчанию обслуживает HTTP/SSE на `/v1/responses`. Если Codex пытается выполнить WebSocket-апгрейд Responses, пока `websockets` равно `false`, opencodex возвращает `426 upgrade_required`; Codex тогда откатывается на HTTP для этой сессии. Когда установлено `"websockets": true`, та же конечная точка принимает апгрейд и использует WebSocket-мост. @@ -162,7 +166,7 @@ loopback; настроенные записи `corsAllowOrigins` расширя Compaction контекста Codex работает для маршрутизируемых моделей. `server/responses/compact.ts` обрабатывает `POST /v1/responses/compact`, выполняя внутренний маршрутизируемый ход суммаризации -и возвращая сжатую историю, а `responses/parser.ts` и `bridge.ts` обрабатывают ходы +и возвращая сжатую историю, а `responses/parser.ts` и `bridge/sse.ts` обрабатывают ходы `compaction_trigger` из remote compaction v2, генерируя ровно один синтетический выходной элемент `compaction`. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/architecture.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/architecture.md index 5dd9b99957..f3350af415 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/architecture.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/tr/reference/architecture.md @@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ src/ ├── vision/ # vizyon sidecar'ı (açıklama + plan) ├── config.ts # ~/.opencodex/config.json, varsayılanlar, PID, ortam çözümleme ├── router.ts # model kimliği → sağlayıcı + adaptör -├── bridge.ts # AdapterEvent akışı → Responses SSE / JSON +├── bridge.ts # bridge/ üzerinde cephe +├── bridge/ # AdapterEvent akışı → Responses SSE (sse.ts) / JSON (response-json.ts) ├── reasoning-effort.ts # akıl yürütme çabası çevirisi, sabitleme ve katalog seviyeleri ├── responses/ │ ├── parser.ts # Responses isteği → OcxParsedRequest @@ -35,19 +36,22 @@ src/ └── index.ts # genel giriş noktası ``` -Eskiden büyük olan üç giriş dosyası artık cepheler (facades) olarak uyumluluğu -korur: `codex/catalog.ts` odaklanmış yedi `codex/catalog/*.ts` modülünü dışa -aktarır, `server/management-api.ts` dokuz `server/management/*.ts` modülüne -dağıtır ve `server/responses.ts` beş `server/responses/*.ts` modülünü dışa -aktarır. +Eskiden büyük olan giriş dosyaları artık cepheler (facades) olarak uyumluluğu +korur: `codex/catalog.ts` `codex/catalog/*.ts` modüllerini dışa aktarır, +`server/management-api.ts` `server/management/*.ts` modüllerine dağıtır, +`server/responses.ts` `server/responses/*.ts` modüllerini dışa aktarır ve `bridge.ts` +`bridge/*.ts` modüllerini yeniden dışa aktarır. Cephe, uygulamanın kendisi değil +kararlı içe aktarma yoludur: aşağıdaki her adım kodun sahibi olan modülü +adlandırır ve Responses yüzeyinin tam sahiplik envanteri +`structure/transports/responses.md` dosyasındadır. ## İstek akışı -`server/index.ts` HTTP sınırına sahiptir ve Responses veri düzlemini +`server/index/serve-options.ts` HTTP sınırına sahiptir ve Responses veri düzlemini `server/responses.ts` cephesine ve onun `server/responses/*.ts` modüllerine devreder: -1. `server/index.ts` CORS ve API kimlik doğrulamasını uygular, boşaltma +1. `server/index/serve-options.ts` CORS ve API kimlik doğrulamasını uygular, boşaltma sırasında yeni işleri reddeder ve istek yaşam döngüsü meta verilerini kaydeder. `GET /v1/models`, `POST /v1/responses`, `POST /v1/responses/compact`, `POST /v1/images/generations` / `POST @@ -58,7 +62,7 @@ devreder: `/v1/live/{callId}` (ve `/v1/realtime?call_id=`) üzerindeki yan bant WebSocket katılımlarını ve `/v1/responses` üzerindeki isteğe bağlı WebSocket yükseltmesini sunar. -2. `server/responses/core.ts` JSON'ı açar ve ayrıştırır, kullanılabilir +2. `server/responses/request-prepare.ts` JSON'ı açar ve ayrıştırır, kullanılabilir olduğunda yerel olarak hatırlanan `previous_response_id` girdisini genişletir, ardından `responses/parser.ts`'yi çağırır. 3. `router.ts` yalın veya `sağlayıcı/model` kimliğini çözer. Sunucu daha sonra @@ -75,7 +79,7 @@ devreder: `web-search/` sentetik bir fonksiyon sunar, gerçek aramayı ChatGPT sidecar'ı aracılığıyla yürütür, sonuçları yönlendirilen modele geri besler ve yapılandırılmış döngü sınırı içinde tekrarlar. -7. `bridge.ts` Responses SSE veya JSON üretir. `server/request-log.ts` ve +7. `bridge/sse.ts` / `bridge/response-json.ts` Responses SSE veya JSON üretir. `server/request-log.ts` ve `usage/` yanıtı değiştirmeden uç durumu, gecikmeyi, sağlayıcı/model etiketlerini ve en iyi çaba belirteç kullanımını toplar. @@ -102,7 +106,7 @@ ardından bir `OcxParsedRequest` oluşturur: ## Köprü (Bridge) -`bridge.ts`, adaptörün dahili `AdapterEvent` akışını Codex'in anladığı Responses +`bridge/sse.ts`, adaptörün dahili `AdapterEvent` akışını Codex'in anladığı Responses SSE'ye dönüştürür: | AdapterEvent | Yayınlanan Responses SSE | @@ -164,7 +168,7 @@ tanılamaları için `usage/` tarafından toplanır. ## Aktarım ve sıkıştırma -`server/index.ts` varsayılan olarak `/v1/responses` üzerinde HTTP/SSE sunar. +`server/index/serve-options.ts` varsayılan olarak `/v1/responses` üzerinde HTTP/SSE sunar. Codex `websockets` `false` iken bir Responses WebSocket yükseltmesi denerse opencodex `426 upgrade_required` döndürür; Codex daha sonra bu oturum için HTTP'ye geri döner. `"websockets": true` ayarlandığında aynı uç nokta @@ -182,7 +186,7 @@ değiştirilmeden HTTP'ye geri dönülmeye devam edilir. Codex bağlam sıkıştırması yönlendirilen modeller için çalışır. `server/responses/compact.ts`, dahili bir yönlendirilen özetleme turu çalıştırarak ve sıkıştırılmış geçmişi döndürerek `POST /v1/responses/compact`'ı -işlerken, `responses/parser.ts` ve `bridge.ts` tam olarak bir sentetik +işlerken, `responses/parser.ts` ve `bridge/sse.ts` tam olarak bir sentetik `compaction` çıktı öğesi yayarak uzak sıkıştırma v2 `compaction_trigger` turlarını işler. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/architecture.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/architecture.md index b1edbd1e8b..8bf59e184b 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/architecture.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/architecture.md @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ src/ ├── vision/ # vision sidecar (describe + plan) ├── config.ts # ~/.opencodex/config.json, defaults, PID, env resolution ├── router.ts # model id → provider + adapter -├── bridge.ts # AdapterEvent stream → Responses SSE / JSON +├── bridge.ts # facade over bridge/ +├── bridge/ # AdapterEvent stream → Responses SSE (sse.ts) / JSON (response-json.ts) ├── reasoning-effort.ts # reasoning-effort translation, clamping, and catalog levels ├── responses/ │ ├── parser.ts # Responses request → OcxParsedRequest @@ -34,24 +35,26 @@ src/ └── index.ts # public entry ``` -原先的三个大型入口文件现在是兼容性 facade：`codex/catalog.ts` 导出 7 个 -`codex/catalog/*.ts` 模块，`server/management-api.ts` 分派到 9 个 -`server/management/*.ts` 模块，而 `server/responses.ts` 导出 5 个 -`server/responses/*.ts` 模块。 +原先的大型入口文件现在是兼容性 facade：`codex/catalog.ts` 导出 +`codex/catalog/*.ts` 模块，`server/management-api.ts` 分派到 +`server/management/*.ts` 模块，`server/responses.ts` 导出 `server/responses/*.ts` +模块，而 `bridge.ts` 重新导出 `bridge/*.ts` 模块。facade 只是稳定的导入路径，而不是实现： +下面每一步都指向真正拥有代码的模块，Responses 面的完整归属清单见 +`structure/transports/responses.md`。 ## 请求流程 -`server/index.ts` 负责 HTTP 边界，并把 Responses data plane 交给 `server/responses.ts` facade +`server/index/serve-options.ts` 负责 HTTP 边界，并把 Responses data plane 交给 `server/responses.ts` facade 及其 `server/responses/*.ts` 模块： -1. `server/index.ts` 应用 CORS 和 API 认证，在 drain 期间拒绝新请求，并记录请求生命周期 +1. `server/index/serve-options.ts` 应用 CORS 和 API 认证，在 drain 期间拒绝新请求，并记录请求生命周期 metadata。它提供 `GET /v1/models`、`POST /v1/responses`、 `POST /v1/responses/compact`、`POST /v1/images/generations` / `POST /v1/images/edits` （供 Codex 内置 `image_gen` 工具使用——由 `server/images.ts` 中继到 OpenAI 系上游）、 `POST /v1/live` / `POST /v1/realtime/calls`（ChatGPT / Codex App 语音与 OpenAI Realtime 建连，由 `server/live.ts` 中继）、`/v1/live/{callId}` 旁路 WebSocket， 以及 `/v1/responses` 上可选的 WebSocket upgrade。 -2. `server/responses/core.ts` 解压并解析 JSON；如果本地记住了对应输入，则展开 +2. `server/responses/request-prepare.ts` 解压并解析 JSON；如果本地记住了对应输入，则展开 `previous_response_id`，随后调用 `responses/parser.ts`。 3. `router.ts` 解析 bare id 或 `provider/model` id。server 随后确定 Codex account affinity， 必要时刷新 provider OAuth，并把选中的 credential 应用到 route。 @@ -62,7 +65,7 @@ src/ 则构建、获取并解析上游请求。 6. 路由模型请求托管的 `web_search` 工具时，`web-search/` 会暴露一个合成函数，经 ChatGPT sidecar 执行真实搜索，把结果送回路由模型，并在配置的循环上限内重复。 -7. `bridge.ts` 生成 Responses SSE 或 JSON。`server/request-log.ts` 与 `usage/` 在不改变响应的 +7. `bridge/sse.ts` / `bridge/response-json.ts` 生成 Responses SSE 或 JSON。`server/request-log.ts` 与 `usage/` 在不改变响应的 前提下收集终止状态、延迟、provider/model 标签和尽力估算的 token usage。 ## 解析器 @@ -85,7 +88,7 @@ src/ ## 桥接器 -`bridge.ts` 把 adapter 的内部 `AdapterEvent` 流转换回 Codex 能理解的 Responses SSE： +`bridge/sse.ts` 把 adapter 的内部 `AdapterEvent` 流转换回 Codex 能理解的 Responses SSE： | AdapterEvent | 发出的 Responses SSE | | --- | --- | @@ -129,7 +132,7 @@ thread affinity 位于 `codex/` 下，不会出现在管理 API 响应中。请 ## 传输与 compaction -`server/index.ts` 默认在 `/v1/responses` 上提供 HTTP/SSE。当 `websockets` 为 `false` 而 Codex +`server/index/serve-options.ts` 默认在 `/v1/responses` 上提供 HTTP/SSE。当 `websockets` 为 `false` 而 Codex 尝试 Responses WebSocket upgrade 时，opencodex 会返回 `426 upgrade_required`，Codex 随后在该 session 中回退到 HTTP。设置 `"websockets": true` 后，同一 endpoint 会接受 upgrade 并使用 WebSocket bridge。 @@ -143,7 +146,7 @@ WebSocket bridge。 Codex context compaction 同样适用于路由模型。`server/responses/compact.ts` 处理 `POST /v1/responses/compact`，运行一次内部路由 summarization turn 并返回压缩后的历史； -`responses/parser.ts` 与 `bridge.ts` 则处理 remote compaction v2 的 `compaction_trigger` turn， +`responses/parser.ts` 与 `bridge/sse.ts` 则处理 remote compaction v2 的 `compaction_trigger` turn， 准确发出一个合成的 `compaction` 输出 item。 ## 缓存与目录 diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/architecture.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/architecture.md index be0b2c5003..cb246c8bd0 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/architecture.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-tw/reference/architecture.md @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ src/ ├── vision/ # vision sidecar (describe + plan) ├── config.ts # ~/.opencodex/config.json, defaults, PID, env resolution ├── router.ts # model id → provider + adapter -├── bridge.ts # AdapterEvent stream → Responses SSE / JSON +├── bridge.ts # facade over bridge/ +├── bridge/ # AdapterEvent stream → Responses SSE (sse.ts) / JSON (response-json.ts) ├── reasoning-effort.ts # reasoning-effort translation, clamping, and catalog levels ├── responses/ │ ├── parser.ts # Responses request → OcxParsedRequest @@ -34,24 +35,26 @@ src/ └── index.ts # public entry ``` -原先的三個大型入口檔案現在是相容性 facade：`codex/catalog.ts` 匯出 7 個 -`codex/catalog/*.ts` 模組，`server/management-api.ts` 分派到 9 個 -`server/management/*.ts` 模組，而 `server/responses.ts` 匯出 5 個 -`server/responses/*.ts` 模組。 +原先的大型入口檔案現在是相容性 facade：`codex/catalog.ts` 匯出 +`codex/catalog/*.ts` 模組，`server/management-api.ts` 分派到 +`server/management/*.ts` 模組，`server/responses.ts` 匯出 `server/responses/*.ts` +模組，而 `bridge.ts` 重新匯出 `bridge/*.ts` 模組。facade 只是穩定的匯入路徑，而不是實作： +下面每一步都指向真正擁有程式碼的模組，Responses 面的完整歸屬清單見 +`structure/transports/responses.md`。 ## 請求流程 -`server/index.ts` 負責 HTTP 邊界，並把 Responses data plane 交給 `server/responses.ts` facade +`server/index/serve-options.ts` 負責 HTTP 邊界，並把 Responses data plane 交給 `server/responses.ts` facade 及其 `server/responses/*.ts` 模組： -1. `server/index.ts` 應用 CORS 和 API 認證，在 drain 期間拒絕新請求，並記錄請求生命週期 +1. `server/index/serve-options.ts` 應用 CORS 和 API 認證，在 drain 期間拒絕新請求，並記錄請求生命週期 metadata。它提供 `GET /v1/models`、`POST /v1/responses`、 `POST /v1/responses/compact`、`POST /v1/images/generations` / `POST /v1/images/edits` （供 Codex 內建 `image_gen` 工具使用——由 `server/images.ts` 中繼到 OpenAI 繫上遊）、 `POST /v1/live` / `POST /v1/realtime/calls`（ChatGPT / Codex App 語音與 OpenAI Realtime 建連，由 `server/live.ts` 中繼）、`/v1/live/{callId}` 旁路 WebSocket， 以及 `/v1/responses` 上可選的 WebSocket upgrade。 -2. `server/responses/core.ts` 解壓並解析 JSON；如果本機記住了對應輸入，則展開 +2. `server/responses/request-prepare.ts` 解壓並解析 JSON；如果本機記住了對應輸入，則展開 `previous_response_id`，隨後呼叫 `responses/parser.ts`。 3. `router.ts` 解析 bare id 或 `provider/model` id。server 隨後確定 Codex account affinity， 必要時重新整理 provider OAuth，並把選中的 credential 應用到 route。 @@ -62,7 +65,7 @@ src/ 則建置、取得並解析上游請求。 6. 路由模型請求託管的 `web_search` 工具時，`web-search/` 會暴露一個合成函式，經 ChatGPT sidecar 執行真實搜尋，把結果送回路由模型，並在設定的迴圈上限內重複。 -7. `bridge.ts` 生成 Responses SSE 或 JSON。`server/request-log.ts` 與 `usage/` 在不改變回應的 +7. `bridge/sse.ts` / `bridge/response-json.ts` 生成 Responses SSE 或 JSON。`server/request-log.ts` 與 `usage/` 在不改變回應的 前提下收集終止狀態、延遲、provider/model 標籤和盡力估算的 token usage。 ## 解析器 @@ -85,7 +88,7 @@ src/ ## 橋接器 -`bridge.ts` 把 adapter 的內部 `AdapterEvent` 流轉換回 Codex 能理解的 Responses SSE： +`bridge/sse.ts` 把 adapter 的內部 `AdapterEvent` 流轉換回 Codex 能理解的 Responses SSE： | AdapterEvent | 發出的 Responses SSE | | --- | --- | @@ -129,7 +132,7 @@ thread affinity 位於 `codex/` 下，不會出現在管理 API 回應中。請 ## 傳輸與 compaction -`server/index.ts` 預設在 `/v1/responses` 上提供 HTTP/SSE。當 `websockets` 為 `false` 而 Codex +`server/index/serve-options.ts` 預設在 `/v1/responses` 上提供 HTTP/SSE。當 `websockets` 為 `false` 而 Codex 嘗試 Responses WebSocket upgrade 時，opencodex 會回傳 `426 upgrade_required`，Codex 隨後在該 session 中回退到 HTTP。設定 `"websockets": true` 後，同一 endpoint 會接受 upgrade 並使用 WebSocket bridge。 @@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ WebSocket bridge。 Codex context compaction 同樣適用於路由模型。`server/responses/compact.ts` 處理 `POST /v1/responses/compact`，執行一次內部路由 summarization turn 並回傳壓縮後的歷史； -`responses/parser.ts` 與 `bridge.ts` 則處理 remote compaction v2 的 `compaction_trigger` turn， +`responses/parser.ts` 與 `bridge/sse.ts` 則處理 remote compaction v2 的 `compaction_trigger` turn， 準確發出一個合成的 `compaction` 輸出 item。 ## 快取與目錄 diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index 248c3011c6..63ede73c97 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ When hub management ingress is enabled, `src/cli/dispatch.ts` opens the dashboar | `bin/ocx.mjs` | Published npm `bin` entry (Node shim). Resolves the bundled or explicit Bun binary before project dotenv can load, stamps its runtime provenance plus a proof-bound Anthropic parent-env snapshot, lazy-runs `bun/install.js` if only the placeholder stub is present, then execs `src/cli/index.ts` under Bun. Lets `npm install -g` work without a separately-installed Bun. The exact `system codex-cli-update` inspection namespace skips both boot repair and lazy Bun installation; missing runtime support fails closed instead of mutating state. | | `src/lib/bun-runtime.ts` | Bundled-Bun resolution: `isRealBunBinary()` (size gate vs the ~450-byte placeholder stub), `bundledBunPath()`, and `durableBunPath()` (path baked into service/shim artifacts). Durable selection accepts only the source/path pair already stamped for the running executable; it never re-reads a project-dotenv `OPENCODEX_BUN_PATH`. | | `src/cli/index.ts` | `ocx` / `opencodex` CLI. Lifecycle: init, start, stop, restart, status, sync, restore/eject, gui, service, update. `restart` refuses an in-place restart requested by a CLI whose version differs from the attested `/healthz` version, because the replacement respawns from the live installation; placeholder versions (unknown/0.0.0) stay incomparable and keep the restart path. Configuration: provider, account, models, combo/route, access, integrations, v2. Client launchers: Claude, OpenCode, MiniMax Code, and MiniMax CLI text. The MMX launcher owns a child-lifetime loopback path bridge from the client's hard-coded `/anthropic/v1/messages` path to the canonical `/v1/messages` data plane; the server does not expose an extra auth surface. Diagnostics: doctor, debug, observe, health. Windows adds tray. The full command surface is `src/cli/help.ts`; this table names the groups, not every verb. After help/version early exits, ordinary commands run the bounded best-effort Codex-shim auto-restore policy before dispatch. `system codex-cli-update` is the deliberate read-only exception and suppresses auto-restore for its whole namespace, including malformed invocations. Keeps the `#!/usr/bin/env bun` shebang for from-source dev (`bun run src/cli/index.ts`). | -| `src/server/index.ts` | Bun server entrypoint: `startServer`, `/v1/responses` HTTP + WebSocket routing (compact handled before generic Responses), exact `POST /v1/images/generations` and `POST /v1/images/edits` routing, `/v1/models`, the Anthropic-shaped `/v1/messages` and OpenAI-shaped `/v1/chat/completions` compatibility surfaces, the Live/Realtime surface, the hosted-search relay, artifact serving, `/healthz`, the `/api/*` auth gate, the `/v1/*` JSON 404 guard, GUI fallback, the opt-in loopback-only hub-management listener, and facade re-exports for split server modules. | +| `src/server/index.ts` | Bun server entrypoint: `startServer`, `/v1/responses` HTTP + WebSocket routing (compact handled before generic Responses), exact `POST /v1/images/generations` and `POST /v1/images/edits` routing, `/v1/models`, the Anthropic-shaped `/v1/messages` and OpenAI-shaped `/v1/chat/completions` compatibility surfaces, the Live/Realtime surface, the hosted-search relay, artifact serving, `/healthz`, the `/api/*` auth gate, the `/v1/*` JSON 404 guard, GUI fallback, the opt-in loopback-only hub-management listener, and facade re-exports for split server modules. The route table itself is built by `src/server/index/serve-options.ts`; this entry file owns the listener and the startup transaction. | | `src/server/images.ts` | Standalone Images data plane: default OpenAI or explicit custom-provider selection, Codex account affinity, bounded opaque request relay, single-attempt upstream fetch, pool health recording, and safe response/cancellation relay. | | `src/server/audio-transcriptions.ts` | Standalone multipart transcription; audio-specific key admission, bounded upload/response, stored OpenAI credential resolution and lease-bound cancellation. See [audio contracts](data-planes/inbound-compat.md#standalone-file-transcription). | | `src/server/audio-live.ts`, `src/server/audio-dictation.ts` | External voice/dictation orchestration using the existing bounded socket relay, server-owned credentials, cancellation and opaque call ownership. See [streaming audio](data-planes/inbound-compat.md#streaming-audio). | @@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ there. Feature code is grouped by responsibility: `src/generated/` is build output committed for the runtime; it is not edited by hand. -`src/server/` is split by responsibility: `index.ts` owns the listener and route ordering; -`responses.ts` owns Responses handling and compaction; `images.ts` owns the standalone Images relay; +`src/server/` is split by responsibility: `index.ts` owns the listener and the startup transaction +while `index/serve-options.ts` owns route ordering; `responses.ts` and `responses/core.ts` compose +Responses handling from the owners inventoried in [Responses transport](transports/responses.md), +and `responses/compact.ts` owns compaction; `images.ts` owns the standalone Images relay; `responses/codex-auth-error.ts` owns the shared Responses/compact Codex auth-context HTTP mapping. Model entitlement denial is a 400 request error and temporary exhaustion of every model-capable account is a retryable 429; neither is reported as an invalid API key. Images, Live, and Search @@ -194,8 +196,9 @@ The server exposes `POST /api/stop` which restores native Codex config, stops an | `src/adapters/image.ts`, `src/adapters/anthropic-image-guard.ts`, `src/adapters/anthropic-image-normalize.ts`, `src/adapters/anthropic-image-codec.ts` | Image conversion for adapter ingress and Anthropic-specific normalization/limits. An image's ladder position is pinned to its own identity (content hash + media type), so appending a newer image cannot re-encode older ones and bust Anthropic's prompt prefix cache (#4532). | | `src/adapters/run-turn-queue.ts`, `src/adapters/tool-catalog-nudge.ts`, `src/adapters/identity.ts`, `src/adapters/upstream-http-error.ts` | Shared adapter execution support: turn queueing, tool-catalog nudging, client identity, upstream error normalization. | -Adapter output must stay in internal `AdapterEvent` form until `bridge.ts` converts it back to -Responses SSE or WebSocket frames. +Adapter output must stay in internal `AdapterEvent` form until `src/bridge/sse.ts` converts it back +to Responses SSE or WebSocket frames, or `src/bridge/response-json.ts` buffers it into a JSON +response. `src/bridge.ts` is the compatibility facade that re-exports both. The image/video loop bounds each hidden iteration before replay or fulfillment; see [media iteration retention](transports/inventory.md#media-iteration-retention). @@ -243,7 +246,7 @@ The shared Responses path follows the [bounded multipart recovery contract](suba ### Hosted-search continuation binding -The opt-in key-auth Responses hosted-search bridge in `src/server/responses/core.ts` captures the +The opt-in key-auth Responses hosted-search bridge in `src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts` captures the request binding that served the first leg, after any permitted initial reselection. Before every continuation dispatch, after provider pacing, that binding must remain an API-key selection matching the configured entry, reference, revision, resolved key, authentication mode, and base URL; a @@ -335,7 +338,7 @@ The shared atomic replacement publisher also identifies explicit Remote Workspac Remote Workspace uses a separate, explicitly enabled server surface with structural WebSocket callbacks and awaited per-server cleanup; [its contract](remote-workspace.md) owns that integration. -Chat helper admission in `src/server/responses/core.ts` follows the +Chat helper admission in `src/server/responses/request-sidecar-auth.ts` follows the [deferred stored-main contract](providers/openai-tiers.md): only a needed Direct OpenAI helper claims stored main, after terminal vision, routed vision and search exclusions. @@ -371,7 +374,7 @@ Responses route normalization resolves provider summary defaults from the origin ## Live sideband handshake -`src/server/index.ts` establishes the authorized upstream live sideband before accepting the client WebSocket upgrade. `openLiveSidebandUpstream` bounds the handshake to ten seconds and retains at most 32 frames and 1 MiB of preamble within the frame limit. `src/server/ws-bridge.ts` defines the runtime handoff carrying captured frames or terminal state. Failed handshakes return 502/504 and client cancellation returns 499; exact upstream 404/410 status is unavailable from Bun's client WebSocket. Admission ownership lasts until upstream close/CLOSED, including failed upgrades and failed attachment. The ordinary Responses WebSocket exchange remains separate. +`src/server/index/serve-options.ts` establishes the authorized upstream live sideband before accepting the client WebSocket upgrade, and `src/server/index/live-sideband.ts` implements the bounded upstream dial. `openLiveSidebandUpstream` bounds the handshake to ten seconds and retains at most 32 frames and 1 MiB of preamble within the frame limit. `src/server/ws-bridge.ts` defines the runtime handoff carrying captured frames or terminal state. Failed handshakes return 502/504 and client cancellation returns 499; exact upstream 404/410 status is unavailable from Bun's client WebSocket. Admission ownership lasts until upstream close/CLOSED, including failed upgrades and failed attachment. The ordinary Responses WebSocket exchange remains separate. ## Paginated history writer boundary From 861988ef91c18ba241b2802c7757e4fa6ca829ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:28:59 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 076/113] fix(responses): read the native Codex catalog key for generated windows [skip ci] OPENAI_CODEX_PROVIDER_ID is the routing provider name, and its value is the string "openai". Using it to index the generated bundle therefore skipped the native Codex rows entirely and read the public API rows instead. The two agree on Spark's 128k window, so the case that motivated the fallback still resolved, but any slug where they differ would have taken the wrong window -- and gpt-5-codex-mini exists only in the native catalog, so it resolved nothing at all. Name the catalog keys explicitly and say in a comment why the provider id is not one of them. Co-authored-by: RHODIZ IT --- src/server/responses/input-admission.ts | 14 ++++++++++++-- tests/server/input-admission.test.ts | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/server/responses/input-admission.ts b/src/server/responses/input-admission.ts index d3baa2124d..ca11fd60eb 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/input-admission.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/input-admission.ts @@ -188,6 +188,13 @@ function resolveContextLimits( return { window, ceiling: limits.length === 0 ? null : Math.min(...limits) }; } +/** + * Generated-catalog keys, not routing provider names. `OPENAI_CODEX_PROVIDER_ID` is the string + * `"openai"` -- the canonical Codex forward route -- so using it to index the generated bundle + * would silently skip the native Codex rows and read the public API rows instead. + */ +const NATIVE_METADATA_CATALOGS = ["openai-codex", "openai"] as const; + /** * Static in-tree metadata for a canonical native slug the narrower override and pinned-native * tables do not carry. Falling through to null made input admission completely blind for @@ -204,8 +211,11 @@ function generatedNativeWindow( configured: number | null, nativeContextCap: NativeContextLimitsInput | undefined, ): number | null { - const generated = positive(getModelMetadata(OPENAI_CODEX_PROVIDER_ID, modelId)?.contextWindow) - ?? positive(getModelMetadata("openai", modelId)?.contextWindow); + let generated: number | null = null; + for (const catalog of NATIVE_METADATA_CATALOGS) { + generated = positive(getModelMetadata(catalog, modelId)?.contextWindow); + if (generated !== null) break; + } if (generated === null) return null; const cap = typeof nativeContextCap === "number" ? positive(nativeContextCap) diff --git a/tests/server/input-admission.test.ts b/tests/server/input-admission.test.ts index e96f15e6b6..6a15ffc22e 100644 --- a/tests/server/input-admission.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/input-admission.test.ts @@ -321,6 +321,10 @@ describe("combo target input admission", () => { // from the picker and still dispatchable when an operator names it in a combo target. expect(resolveInputCeiling(CANONICAL_NATIVE, "openai", "gpt-5.3-codex-spark")).toBe(128_000); expect(resolveOutputCeiling(CANONICAL_NATIVE, "openai", "gpt-5.3-codex-spark")).toBe(32_000); + // The native Codex catalog is consulted first, and it is keyed "openai-codex" — which is NOT + // the routing provider id, because that one is the string "openai". `gpt-5-codex-mini` exists + // only in the native catalog, so resolving it proves the right key is being read. + expect(resolveInputCeiling(CANONICAL_NATIVE, "openai", "gpt-5-codex-mini")).toBe(272_000); // A slug the override table does know keeps its own pinned window. expect(resolveInputCeiling(CANONICAL_NATIVE, "openai", "gpt-5.6-sol")).toBe(272_000); // An operator cap may only narrow the generated value, never widen it. From e90d0aeb28e584e7c46aca9e612f4514359c19b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:30:50 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 077/113] fix(routing): give a withheld recovery a retry time that is actually later (#4546) [skip ci] The transient-hold resolver and the pool-wide recovery limiter added in #4626 still have no production caller, so #4701 is not closed here. Wiring them turned up a defect in the thing being wired, and that has to be fixed first. A withheld dispatch promises the caller a retry time. It was computed from the probe pacing alone. When the RATIO limiter is what refused, the account usually has no probe state at all -- nothing was ever granted for it -- so nextProbeAt returned now, and the refusal told the caller to try again immediately. A withheld dispatch that busy-loops puts the same load on an already-failing pool as the dispatch it refused, which is the opposite of what the limiter is for. It also violates the Retry-After half of #4701's completion criteria directly. The limiter is the only thing that knows when its own window moves, so it now says: nextRecoveryAt returns now while the allowance is unspent, and otherwise the moment the oldest bucket still inside the window falls out. Every such bucket started after now - windowMs, so the answer is always strictly in the future, and it is a real change point rather than a guessed delay. The withheld result takes the later of that and the probe pacing. The existing zero-allowance test asserted only that the result was withheld, which is why the defect survived the unit suite that was written to cover this module. It now asserts the time as well. Refs #4701 --- src/routing/probe-lease.ts | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- tests/routing/probe-lease.test.ts | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/routing/probe-lease.ts b/src/routing/probe-lease.ts index fb63061e01..2182bab3eb 100644 --- a/src/routing/probe-lease.ts +++ b/src/routing/probe-lease.ts @@ -349,7 +349,14 @@ export function resolveHeldAccountDispatch(input: { kind: "withheld", boundAccountId: input.boundAccountId, ...(input.detourAccountId !== undefined ? { detourAccountId: input.detourAccountId } : {}), - retryAt: nextProbeAt(input.boundAccountId, now, input.minProbeIntervalMs), + // Both bounds, not just the probe pacing. A request refused by the RATIO has no probe state + // of its own yet, so `nextProbeAt` answered `now` and the refusal told the caller to try + // again immediately -- a withheld dispatch that busy-loops is the same load as the dispatch + // it refused. The limiter is the only thing that knows when its window moves. + retryAt: Math.max( + nextProbeAt(input.boundAccountId, now, input.minProbeIntervalMs), + limiter.nextRecoveryAt(now), + ), }; } @@ -408,6 +415,16 @@ export interface PoolBackpressureLimiter { tryPermitRetryDispatch(now?: number): boolean; /** Admit one probe dispatch under the same shared recovery budget. */ tryPermitProbeDispatch(now?: number): boolean; + /** + * Earliest moment this limiter could admit another recovery dispatch. + * + * A refusal has to hand back a time, or the caller has nothing to wait on and busy-loops + * against a pool that is already failing -- which is the load this limiter exists to remove. + * `now` when the allowance is not spent; otherwise the moment the oldest bucket still inside + * the window falls out of it, which is strictly in the future and is a real change point + * rather than a guess. + */ + nextRecoveryAt(now?: number): number; state(now?: number): PoolBackpressureState; } @@ -461,6 +478,19 @@ export function createPoolBackpressureLimiter( return true; } + function nextRecoveryAt(now: number): number { + const { initials, recoveries } = totals(now); + if (recoveries + 1 <= allowanceFor(initials)) return now; + // The window has to move before another recovery fits. The earliest that can happen is the + // moment the oldest bucket still inside it leaves, and every such bucket started after + // `now - windowMs`, so the answer is always strictly in the future. + for (const bucket of buckets) { + if (bucket.start <= now - policy.windowMs) continue; + return bucket.start + policy.windowMs; + } + return now + policy.windowMs; + } + return { recordInitialSend(now = Date.now()): void { bucketFor(now).initials += 1; @@ -471,6 +501,9 @@ export function createPoolBackpressureLimiter( tryPermitProbeDispatch(now = Date.now()): boolean { return tryPermit(now); }, + nextRecoveryAt(now = Date.now()): number { + return nextRecoveryAt(now); + }, state(now = Date.now()): PoolBackpressureState { const { initials, recoveries } = totals(now); return { diff --git a/tests/routing/probe-lease.test.ts b/tests/routing/probe-lease.test.ts index e3cf4ece83..1139d3140f 100644 --- a/tests/routing/probe-lease.test.ts +++ b/tests/routing/probe-lease.test.ts @@ -211,6 +211,36 @@ describe("held account dispatch", () => { backpressure: limiter, }); expect(noDetour.kind).toBe("withheld"); + // The refusal has to hand back a time the caller can wait on. This account has no probe + // state of its own -- nothing was ever granted for it -- so the probe pacing knows nothing + // and only the limiter can answer when its window moves. Asserting the kind alone is what + // let a withheld dispatch tell the caller to try again immediately, which is the same load + // as the dispatch it refused. + if (noDetour.kind === "withheld") { + expect(noDetour.retryAt).toBeGreaterThan(now); + expect(noDetour.retryAt).toBe(limiter.nextRecoveryAt(now)); + } + }); + + test("the limiter reports when its window could next admit a recovery", () => { + const now = 2_000_000; + const limiter = createPoolBackpressureLimiter({ + windowMs: 10_000, + maxRetryRatio: 0, + minRecoveryAllowance: 1, + }); + // Allowance is one and nothing has spent it, so a caller may go now. + expect(limiter.nextRecoveryAt(now)).toBe(now); + expect(limiter.tryPermitRetryDispatch(now)).toBe(true); + + // Spent. The answer is a real change point -- when the bucket holding that dispatch leaves + // the window -- not an arbitrary delay, and never `now`. + expect(limiter.tryPermitRetryDispatch(now)).toBe(false); + const retryAt = limiter.nextRecoveryAt(now); + expect(retryAt).toBeGreaterThan(now); + expect(retryAt).toBeLessThanOrEqual(now + 10_000); + // ...and once the window has moved past it, the allowance is back. + expect(limiter.tryPermitRetryDispatch(retryAt)).toBe(true); }); }); From 6317c41ee1990251f6cb0e78e71712e302d8a30f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:32:21 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 078/113] test(responses): pin the #4546 incident as one system, not five fixes (#4546) Each layer of this lane closes one seam of the #4546 amplification: the credential hop that was charged twice, the spend ledger with no caller, the refusal reported as a provider fault, the usage attributed to the wrong key, the withheld recovery that said "retry now". What none of them checks is whether the seams agree with each other. This composes the real primitives -- the request execution budget, the durable spend ledger with its request-scoped caller, the pool recovery limiter -- and asserts that the numbers describe the same events: physical sends, budget consumption, ledger reservation and settlement, and the refusal the caller is given. The scenarios are the incident's own: a request whose every layer tries to recover, concurrent requests contending for one process-wide recovery allowance, a caller that keeps its detour instead of adding a second trial to a failing account, a fan-out child spending the parent's allowance rather than a fresh one, and a restart that must neither reset a ceiling nor settle the same send twice. A fixture that only counted sends would have passed throughout the incident, which is why every case ties a send count to the spend the ledger recorded for it. --- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 1 + tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 1 + ...responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts | 155 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 157 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/responses/responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index 1a1234c068..17fc012dc3 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ "responses-core-modules.test.ts": "responses", "responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts": "responses", "responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts": "responses", + "responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts": "responses", "chat-responses-control-integration.test.ts": "responses", "coding-agent-tool-result-images.test.ts": "adapters", "hub-usage.test.ts": "server", diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index 5d6ede1f23..6994165c61 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ "responses-core-modules.test.ts": "responses", "responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts": "responses", "responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts": "responses", + "responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts": "responses", "chat-responses-control-integration.test.ts": "responses", "coding-agent-tool-result-images.test.ts": "adapters", "hub-usage.test.ts": "server", diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2e6436732b --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/responses/responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { + CODEX_TEXT_GUARDED_BUDGET_POLICY, + createRequestExecutionBudget, +} from "../../src/lib/request-execution-budget"; +import { + createSpendReservationLedger, + type SpendJournal, +} from "../../src/lib/spend-reservation-ledger"; +import { createRequestSpendTracker } from "../../src/server/responses/request-spend"; +import { createPoolBackpressureLimiter, resolveHeldAccountDispatch } from "../../src/routing/probe-lease"; +import { clearTransientProbeLeasesForTests } from "../../src/routing/probe-lease"; + +/** + * The #4546 incident, as a system rather than as five separate fixes. + * + * The amplification was never one missing limit. Every layer that could re-send counted its own + * allowance, every recovery leg read a remainder nobody else had spent, and the spend that + * resulted was accounted nowhere that survived a restart. Each layer of this lane fixes one + * seam; what nobody checks is whether the seams agree. + * + * These compose the real primitives -- the request execution budget, the durable spend ledger + * and its request-scoped caller, the pool recovery limiter -- and assert the numbers line up: + * physical sends, budget consumption, ledger settlement and the refusal the client is given all + * describe the same events. A fixture that only counted sends would have passed throughout the + * incident. + */ +const memoryJournal = (): SpendJournal & { lines: string[] } => { + const lines: string[] = []; + return { + lines, + read: () => [...lines], + append: (line: string) => { lines.push(line); }, + rewrite: (next: string[]) => { lines.splice(0, lines.length, ...next); }, + }; +}; + +const logContext = () => ({ + provider: "pool-a", + accountLogLabel: "k0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", + usageLogInputTokens: 100, + spendOutputCeilingTokens: 400, +}) as Parameters[0]; + +describe("#4546 cost guard, end to end", () => { + test("a request cannot exceed its ceiling however many layers try to recover", () => { + const journal = memoryJournal(); + const ledger = createSpendReservationLedger({ journal }); + const tracker = createRequestSpendTracker(logContext(), "root-incident", ledger); + const budget = createRequestExecutionBudget(CODEX_TEXT_GUARDED_BUDGET_POLICY, "lr-incident", tracker); + + // Three same-account sends: the initial one and two transient retries. + for (let index = 0; index < 3; index += 1) { + expect(budget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "transient", targetKey: "pool-a|m" }).allowed).toBe(true); + } + // The base allowance is gone. A repair leg may still draw the single shared reserve... + const repair = budget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "repair", targetKey: "pool-a|m" }); + expect(repair.allowed).toBe(true); + // ...but an account move cannot ALSO have one. This is the intersection the incident lacked: + // each layer used to hold its own allowance, so a spent request still funded every one. + const move = budget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "account-failover", targetKey: "pool-b|m" }); + expect(move.allowed).toBe(false); + if (move.allowed) throw new Error("unreachable"); + expect(move.reason).toBe("final-recovery-spent"); + + expect(budget.used).toBe(CODEX_TEXT_GUARDED_BUDGET_POLICY.maxTotalModelSends); + // The ledger saw exactly the sends the budget charged -- no more, and not one fewer. + expect(ledger.snapshot("root", "root-incident")?.reserved).toBe(4 * 500); + }); + + test("concurrent requests share the recovery allowance instead of each holding one", () => { + clearTransientProbeLeasesForTests(); + const now = 5_000_000; + // One initial send in the window, so the ratio floor is the whole allowance. + const limiter = createPoolBackpressureLimiter({ + windowMs: 10_000, maxRetryRatio: 0, minRecoveryAllowance: 1, + }); + limiter.recordInitialSend(now); + + // Two requests bound to the same held account arrive together. Exactly one probes it. + const first = resolveHeldAccountDispatch({ boundAccountId: "held", now, backpressure: limiter }); + const second = resolveHeldAccountDispatch({ boundAccountId: "held", now, backpressure: limiter }); + expect(first.kind).toBe("probe"); + expect(second.kind).toBe("withheld"); + + // The refused one is told when to come back, and it is genuinely later. A refusal that said + // "now" would put the same load on the pool as the dispatch it declined. + if (second.kind === "withheld") { + expect(second.retryAt).toBeGreaterThan(now); + } + // Separate request objects cannot mint private allowances: the limiter is process-wide. + expect(limiter.state(now).recoveryDispatches).toBe(1); + expect(limiter.state(now).refusedTotal).toBeGreaterThan(0); + }); + + test("a request that keeps its detour does not spend a probe on a failing account", () => { + clearTransientProbeLeasesForTests(); + const now = 6_000_000; + const limiter = createPoolBackpressureLimiter({ + windowMs: 10_000, maxRetryRatio: 0, minRecoveryAllowance: 1, + }); + expect(resolveHeldAccountDispatch({ boundAccountId: "held", now, backpressure: limiter }).kind) + .toBe("probe"); + // The probe is out, so the next caller keeps the route that is working rather than adding a + // second trial to an account already known to be failing. + expect(resolveHeldAccountDispatch({ + boundAccountId: "held", detourAccountId: "detour", now, backpressure: limiter, + })).toEqual({ kind: "detour", accountId: "detour" }); + }); + + test("a fan-out child spends the parent's allowance, not a fresh one", () => { + const ledger = createSpendReservationLedger({ journal: memoryJournal() }); + const tracker = createRequestSpendTracker(logContext(), "root-fanout", ledger); + const parent = createRequestExecutionBudget(CODEX_TEXT_GUARDED_BUDGET_POLICY, "lr-parent", tracker); + parent.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "initial", targetKey: "pool-a|m" }); + + // A combo child inherits the holder. The incident's second half was children each taking a + // full allowance, so a seven-hundred-child fan-out sent seven hundred times under one cap. + const child = parent; + child.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "combo-failover", targetKey: "pool-b|m" }); + expect(parent.used).toBe(2); + expect(parent.remainingBaseSends(3)).toBe(1); + // One more move is refused: the child already spent the request's single target transition. + const third = child.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "combo-failover", targetKey: "pool-c|m" }); + expect(third.allowed).toBe(false); + expect(ledger.snapshot("root", "root-fanout")?.reserved).toBe(2 * 500); + }); + + test("a restart neither resets the ceiling nor settles the same send twice", () => { + const journal = memoryJournal(); + const before = createSpendReservationLedger({ journal }); + const tracker = createRequestSpendTracker(logContext(), "root-restart", before); + const budget = createRequestExecutionBudget(CODEX_TEXT_GUARDED_BUDGET_POLICY, "lr-restart", tracker); + budget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "initial", targetKey: "pool-a|m" }); + budget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "transient", targetKey: "pool-a|m" }); + + // The terminal arrives and the request settles normally. + tracker.settle({ inputTokens: 120, outputTokens: 30 }); + const settledBefore = before.snapshot("root", "root-restart"); + expect(settledBefore?.settled).toBe(150); + expect(settledBefore?.unresolved).toBe(500); + expect(settledBefore?.reserved).toBe(0); + + // Restart. The journal is the whole state, and replaying it changes none of the figures -- + // a ceiling that reset here would hand the next process a fresh allowance for spend that + // already happened, and a second settlement would double-count it. + const after = createSpendReservationLedger({ journal }); + const settledAfter = after.snapshot("root", "root-restart"); + expect(settledAfter?.settled).toBe(150); + expect(settledAfter?.unresolved).toBe(500); + expect(settledAfter?.reserved).toBe(0); + // The send ids are still known, so a replayed request cannot authorise another dispatch. + expect(after.settle("lr-restart", { inputTokens: 1, outputTokens: 1 })).toBe(false); + }); +}); From 94db101206f8aa107e173df5cb2ba5ea18345b89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:33:31 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 079/113] test(responses): pin the account-change half of the incident (#4546) The account-change scenario the incident needs, written against current behaviour because the #4710 refusal is owned by another lane and is not in this stack yet. What it pins now: continuation state is dropped and the turn continues, an uploaded file reference is classified non-portable and is NOT removed by the scrub, and the carriers must be read directly because the portability verdict reports only the first reason it finds -- a body carrying both a response id and a file reports the response id. What it documents: once the refusal lands, that body must be declined before dispatch and the refusal must win over the response id. The two properties above are what the change has to preserve, so they are asserted now. Also pins the accounting invariant that refusal owes: a decision made before dispatch spends no send and books no ledger entry. A refusal counted as a send would appear as provider load that never happened and would push a healthy account toward a cooldown. --- ...responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts | 67 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts index 2e6436732b..ea57ae4f7e 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts @@ -10,6 +10,15 @@ import { import { createRequestSpendTracker } from "../../src/server/responses/request-spend"; import { createPoolBackpressureLimiter, resolveHeldAccountDispatch } from "../../src/routing/probe-lease"; import { clearTransientProbeLeasesForTests } from "../../src/routing/probe-lease"; +import { + canPortConversationState, + collectConversationStateCarriers, + applyAccountChangeConversationStateScrub, +} from "../../src/server/responses/account-change-state"; +import { + clearConversationStateIssuerMap, + rememberConversationStateIssuer, +} from "../../src/codex/routing"; /** * The #4546 incident, as a system rather than as five separate fixes. @@ -152,4 +161,62 @@ describe("#4546 cost guard, end to end", () => { // The send ids are still known, so a replayed request cannot authorise another dispatch. expect(after.settle("lr-restart", { inputTokens: 1, outputTokens: 1 })).toBe(false); }); + + test("an account change drops continuation state and keeps the file reference intact", () => { + clearConversationStateIssuerMap(); + const bindingKey = "thread-4546-incident"; + rememberConversationStateIssuer(bindingKey, "account-a"); + + // Continuation state is portable-by-dropping: one cold turn, then the new account records + // itself as the issuer. This half of the contract does not change. + const continuation: Record = { + model: "gpt-5.4", + previous_response_id: "resp_account_a", + input: [{ type: "message", role: "user", content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "keep me" }] }], + }; + expect(applyAccountChangeConversationStateScrub({ + body: continuation, bindingKey, servingAccountId: "account-b", + })).toBe(true); + expect(continuation.previous_response_id).toBeUndefined(); + expect(continuation.input).toBeDefined(); + + // An uploaded file is not. The classifier has always said so, and it says so whether or not + // the body also carries a response id -- the verdict reports the first reason it finds, so + // the file is what the carriers must be read for. + const withFile: Record = { + model: "gpt-5.4", + previous_response_id: "resp_account_a", + input: [{ type: "message", role: "user", content: [{ type: "input_file", file_id: "file_abc123" }] }], + }; + expect(collectConversationStateCarriers(withFile).fileIds).toEqual(["file_abc123"]); + expect(canPortConversationState(collectConversationStateCarriers(withFile)).portable).toBe(false); + + // The scrub does not remove it, and must not: a file reference is content the caller + // attached, not continuation state the turn can do without. + applyAccountChangeConversationStateScrub({ + body: withFile, bindingKey, servingAccountId: "account-b", + }); + expect(collectConversationStateCarriers(withFile).fileIds).toEqual(["file_abc123"]); + + // PENDING CONTRACT (#4710, owned elsewhere): once the refusal lands, this body must be + // declined before dispatch rather than forwarded, and the refusal wins even when a + // previous_response_id is present too. When that arrives, add the refusal assertion here + // -- the two properties below are what it has to preserve, and they are asserted now so the + // change cannot quietly alter them. + clearConversationStateIssuerMap(); + }); + + test("a refusal made before dispatch spends no send and books no spend", () => { + const ledger = createSpendReservationLedger({ journal: memoryJournal() }); + const tracker = createRequestSpendTracker(logContext(), "root-refused", ledger); + const budget = createRequestExecutionBudget(CODEX_TEXT_GUARDED_BUDGET_POLICY, "lr-refused", tracker); + + // Nothing reserved, because nothing dispatched. This is the invariant every pre-dispatch + // refusal in the tree owes the accounting -- a budget refusal, a workflow ceiling, and the + // account-change file refusal #4710 is adding. A refusal counted as a send would show up as + // provider load that never existed, and would push a healthy account toward a cooldown. + expect(budget.used).toBe(0); + expect(ledger.snapshot("root", "root-refused")).toBeUndefined(); + expect(tracker.refusals).toBe(0); + }); }); From f88191d5316ef252f6e1df7e1d9a2089e9aa7b65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:37:16 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 080/113] fix(service): report an unreadable staged payload with its cause (#4692) Staging the elevated Task Scheduler XML introduces exactly one new failure of its own: hardenSecretPath grants the staging account and strips inheritance, so a split-token elevation of the same user reads the file while an elevation answered with a DIFFERENT administrator's credentials does not. The inline form had no such dependency. The elevated process runs hidden, so nothing it writes survives and only the exit code crosses back. That made the failure an unexplained non-zero status -- the same undiagnosable shape as the ENAMETOOLONG this change set removes. The read failure now has its own protocol code, and the parent turns it into a message that names both the cause and the way out: approve the prompt as the signed-in user, or run again from a session already elevated as that user. The code sits outside OCX_ELEVATED_PROTOCOL_CODES, which is the create-and-run transaction's alphabet, and cannot collide with UAC cancellation. Whether to widen the ACL to SYSTEM and Administrators is left as a separate security decision rather than bundled here, because it changes a security-sensitive module. --- src/lib/windows-elevation.ts | 21 ++++++++++++- src/service.ts | 2 +- src/service/windows-ops.ts | 31 +++++++++++++++++-- tests/service/service.test.ts | 25 +++++++++++++++ tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts | 10 ++++++ 5 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/windows-elevation.ts b/src/lib/windows-elevation.ts index aa728ab159..171545276c 100644 --- a/src/lib/windows-elevation.ts +++ b/src/lib/windows-elevation.ts @@ -250,6 +250,21 @@ export const OCX_ELEVATED_PROTOCOL_FAILED = 13; /** Windows ERROR_CANCELLED — reserved for UAC denial; never emitted by the elevated script. */ export const OCX_ELEVATED_UAC_CANCELLED = 1223; +/** + * The elevated process could not read a staged payload (#4692). + * + * `hardenSecretPath` grants the staging account and strips inheritance, so a split-token + * elevation of the same user reads the file and an elevation answered with a DIFFERENT + * administrator's credentials does not. The elevated side cannot explain that itself: it + * runs hidden, so its stderr goes nowhere and only the exit code survives the boundary. + * Without a code of its own the operator would be told "exit code 1" for a cause that + * names its own remedy — the same undiagnosable failure this change set exists to remove. + * + * Deliberately outside OCX_ELEVATED_PROTOCOL_CODES: that list is the create-and-run + * transaction's alphabet, and this code belongs to the registration path. + */ +export const OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE = 14; + export const OCX_ELEVATED_PROTOCOL_CODES = [ OCX_ELEVATED_SUCCESS, OCX_ELEVATED_CREATE_FAILED, @@ -667,7 +682,11 @@ export interface StagedWindowsTaskXml { * exists to close. */ const READ_STAGED_TASK_XML = "function Read-OcxStagedTaskXml([string]$path, [string]$expectedHash) {" - + " $bytes = [IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($path);" + // An unreadable payload is a diagnosable condition, not a generic throw: a hidden + // elevated process has nowhere to print, so the cause has to ride the exit code. + + " try { $bytes = [IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($path) }" + + " catch [System.UnauthorizedAccessException] { exit " + OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE + " }" + + " catch [System.Security.SecurityException] { exit " + OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE + " };" + " $sha = [Security.Cryptography.SHA256]::Create();" + " try { $actual = [BitConverter]::ToString($sha.ComputeHash($bytes)).Replace('-', '').ToLowerInvariant() } finally { $sha.Dispose() };" + " if ($actual -cne $expectedHash) { throw 'Task Scheduler staged payload failed its integrity check.' };" diff --git a/src/service.ts b/src/service.ts index f6a571b574..149b1ae02c 100644 --- a/src/service.ts +++ b/src/service.ts @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ export { decodeSchtasksOutput, setQuerySchtasksForTests, formatWindowsSchedulerS export type { WindowsSchedulerXmlState } from "./service/windows-taskxml"; export { buildWindowsServiceScript, buildWindowsSchtasksCreateArgs, buildWindowsSchtasksCreateArgsForXml, buildWindowsLauncherVbs, buildWindowsTaskXml, buildWindowsTaskXmlDocument, windowsTaskRegistrationOwnedByAttempt, windowsTaskRegistrationHealthy, readWindowsSchedulerXmlState } from "./service/windows-taskxml"; export type { WindowsSchedulerRegistrationStageDeps, FreshWindowsSchedulerRegistrationDeps, RemoveNativeWindowsServiceDeps } from "./service/windows-ops"; -export { windowsListenPort, winswListenPort, writeServiceDefinitionFile, definitionCarriesCredential, stageWindowsSchedulerRegistrationXml, stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration, registerFreshWindowsSchedulerTask, removeNativeWindowsServiceForScheduler, assertWindowsNativeServiceAccountSupported, isWindowsSchedulerEndBenign, stopWindows, stopWindowsChecked, classifyWindowsServiceStop } from "./service/windows-ops"; +export { windowsListenPort, winswListenPort, writeServiceDefinitionFile, definitionCarriesCredential, stageWindowsSchedulerRegistrationXml, stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration, describeElevatedRegistrationFailure, registerFreshWindowsSchedulerTask, removeNativeWindowsServiceForScheduler, assertWindowsNativeServiceAccountSupported, isWindowsSchedulerEndBenign, stopWindows, stopWindowsChecked, classifyWindowsServiceStop } from "./service/windows-ops"; export type { ServiceRepairVerb, RepairServiceDeps } from "./service/repair"; export { repairService } from "./service/repair"; export type { ServiceInstallPreparationDeps, FreshWindowsSchedulerInstallDeps, ServiceStopOutcome, ServiceUninstallOutcome } from "./service/orchestration"; diff --git a/src/service/windows-ops.ts b/src/service/windows-ops.ts index 75321fb9fc..9206d6a8f9 100644 --- a/src/service/windows-ops.ts +++ b/src/service/windows-ops.ts @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import { existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmdirSync, unlinkSync } from "node: import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { dirname, join } from "node:path"; import { getConfigDir } from "../config"; -import { runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration, WindowsSchtasksError, type StagedWindowsTaskXml } from "../lib/windows-elevation"; +import { OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE, runWindowsElevatedScheduledTaskRegistration, WindowsSchtasksError, type StagedWindowsTaskXml } from "../lib/windows-elevation"; import { defaultWinswEntry, installWinswService, statusWinswRaw, uninstallWinswService, WINSW_SERVICE_ID, type WinswStatus } from "../lib/winsw"; import { forgetEphemeralSecretDir, forgetEphemeralSecretPath, hardenSecretDir } from "../lib/windows-secret-acl"; import { recordOwnedConfigPath } from "../lib/config-ownership"; @@ -288,6 +288,31 @@ export function stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration( } } +/** + * Turn an elevated registration exit code into something an operator can act on. + * + * The elevated process runs hidden, so nothing it writes survives; only the exit code + * crosses back. That makes an unexplained code the whole user-facing error, which is + * exactly what made the ENAMETOOLONG in #4692 expensive to diagnose. Staging introduces + * one new failure of its own — the payload is readable only by the account that created + * it, so an elevation answered with a different administrator's credentials cannot open + * it — and that one gets named along with its remedy rather than surfacing as a number. + */ +export function describeElevatedRegistrationFailure( + failureLabel: string, + exitCode: number, + stageDir: string, +): string { + if (exitCode === OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE) { + return `${failureLabel}: the elevated process could not read the staged task definition in ` + + `${stageDir}. That directory is readable only by the account that staged it, so this ` + + "happens when the UAC prompt was answered with a different administrator account. " + + "Approve the prompt as the signed-in user, or run the command again from a session " + + "already elevated as that user."; + } + return `${failureLabel} with exit code ${exitCode}.`; +} + /** * Stage, elevate, and clean up — on every exit, including UAC cancellation and a * synchronous spawn failure. @@ -312,7 +337,9 @@ async function runStagedElevatedSchedulerRegistration( replace, staged.expectedExisting, ); - if (exitCode !== 0) failure = new Error(`${failureLabel} with exit code ${exitCode}.`); + if (exitCode !== 0) { + failure = new Error(describeElevatedRegistrationFailure(failureLabel, exitCode, dirname(staged.xml.path))); + } } catch (error) { failure = error; } diff --git a/tests/service/service.test.ts b/tests/service/service.test.ts index 3b17cd6e93..e3870a5939 100644 --- a/tests/service/service.test.ts +++ b/tests/service/service.test.ts @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import { buildWinswXml } from "../../src/lib/winsw"; import { CONFIG_OWNER_FILE, CONFIG_UNINSTALL_MANIFEST, recordOwnedConfigPath, removeOwnedConfigState } from "../../src/lib/config-ownership"; import { serviceApiTokenFilePath } from "../../src/lib/service-secrets"; import { WindowsSchtasksError } from "../../src/lib/windows-elevation"; +import { OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE } from "../../src/lib/windows-elevation"; import { resolveCurrentWindowsPrincipal, setWindowsPrincipalRunnerForTests } from "../../src/lib/windows-user-principal"; import { setAsyncIcaclsRunnerForTests, setIcaclsRunnerForTests } from "../../src/lib/windows-secret-acl"; import type { OcxConfig } from "../../src/types"; @@ -2192,6 +2193,30 @@ describe("service lifecycle cleanup ordering", () => { } }); + test("an unreadable staged payload is reported with its cause and its remedy", () => { + // The elevated process runs hidden, so nothing it writes survives and the exit code is + // the entire user-facing error. Staging adds exactly one new failure -- the payload is + // readable only by the account that created it, so an elevation answered with another + // administrator's credentials cannot open it -- and reporting that as a bare number + // would reproduce what made #4692 expensive to diagnose in the first place. + const message = serviceModule.describeElevatedRegistrationFailure( + "Background service install failed", + OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE, + "C:\\Temp\\opencodex-service-stage-aaaaaa", + ); + expect(message).toContain("could not read the staged task definition"); + expect(message).toContain("C:\\Temp\\opencodex-service-stage-aaaaaa"); + expect(message).toContain("different administrator account"); + expect(message).toContain("Approve the prompt as the signed-in user"); + expect(message).not.toMatch(/exit code \d+/); + + // Every other code keeps the plain form; this is a named cause, not a catch-all. + for (const code of [1, 10, 13, 1223]) { + expect(serviceModule.describeElevatedRegistrationFailure("Task Scheduler rollback failed", code, "C:\\Temp\\x")) + .toBe("Task Scheduler rollback failed with exit code " + code + "."); + } + }); + test("UAC cancellation removes only staged XML and never enters cleanup or asset publication", async () => { const calls: string[] = []; mkdirSync(TEST_DIR, { recursive: true }); diff --git a/tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts b/tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts index fa0058f51d..4c905a49af 100644 --- a/tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts +++ b/tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import { OCX_ELEVATED_PROTOCOL_FAILED, OCX_ELEVATED_RUN_FAILED_ROLLBACK_FAILED, OCX_ELEVATED_RUN_FAILED_ROLLED_BACK, + OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE, OCX_ELEVATED_SUCCESS, OCX_ELEVATED_UAC_CANCELLED, WindowsElevationError, @@ -223,6 +224,15 @@ describe("runWindowsElevated spawn contract", () => { expect(elevatedScript).toContain("[IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($path)"); expect(elevatedScript).toContain("$sha.ComputeHash($bytes)"); expect(elevatedScript).toContain("Task Scheduler staged payload failed its integrity check."); + // #4692 follow-up: the one failure this staging design introduces has to be readable. + // A hidden elevated process has nowhere to print, so an unreadable payload rides its + // own exit code instead of collapsing into a generic non-zero status. + expect(elevatedScript).toContain("catch [System.UnauthorizedAccessException] { exit " + OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE + " }"); + expect(elevatedScript).toContain("catch [System.Security.SecurityException] { exit " + OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE + " }"); + // It is not part of the create-and-run transaction's alphabet, and cannot be mistaken + // for UAC denial. + expect(OCX_ELEVATED_PROTOCOL_CODES).not.toContain(OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE); + expect(OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE).not.toBe(OCX_ELEVATED_UAC_CANCELLED); expect(elevatedScript.indexOf("-cne $expectedHash")) .toBeLessThan(elevatedScript.indexOf("[Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString($bytes)")); // No payload rides the command line any more, in either encoding layer. From e187d2e0aca2aabeabd0fc5f754e4c0d7416ab25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:28:46 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 081/113] fix(responses): refuse an account move that carries an uploaded file (#4710) [skip ci] The classifier has always called an uploaded file_id account-bound, and the scrubber has always removed only previous_response_id and conversation. A body whose only account-bound state was a file reference therefore reported nothing scrubbed and was replayed unchanged against the new account, which is exactly the case the advertised safety fix was supposed to cover. Deleting the references is not the fix. A file reference is content the caller attached, not continuation state the turn can do without, and dropping it silently answers a different question than the one that was asked with no way for the caller to tell. Pinning the request to the issuing account is not available either: every call site resolves and materialises its credential before reaching here, and the retry sites are reached precisely because the issuing account just refused the request. So the move is refused before dispatch, with HTTP 400 and an instruction to re-upload. Not a retryable status, which would invite the same request back unchanged. The check reads the carriers directly rather than the portability verdict. That verdict reports the FIRST reason it finds, so a body carrying both a previous response id and a file reference reports only the response id, and the file would slip through the scrub that follows. Wired at the initial Codex selection and at the native compact dispatch, both of which can answer with a Response. The two alternate-account retry sites still only scrub: refusing there needs a new outcome variant on their result types and on their callers, which is a larger change than this one. The detection now lives in one exported place, so neither site can drift further from it. Closes #4710 --- src/server/responses/account-change-state.ts | 42 ++++++++++ src/server/responses/compact.ts | 9 +++ src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts | 9 +++ .../responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts | 80 ++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/server/responses/account-change-state.ts b/src/server/responses/account-change-state.ts index c2b362668b..2e8a0862fc 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/account-change-state.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/account-change-state.ts @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import { } from "../../codex/routing"; import type { OcxParsedRequest } from "../../types"; import type { RequestLogContext } from "../request-log"; +import { formatErrorResponse } from "../../bridge/errors"; export type ConversationStateScrubReason = "account-change"; @@ -231,3 +232,44 @@ export function applyAccountChangeConversationStateScrub( } return true; } + +/** + * Refuse an account change that would carry an uploaded-file reference to an account that + * cannot read it (#4710). + * + * The classifier has always called `file_id` account-bound, and the scrubber has always removed + * only `previous_response_id` and `conversation`. A body whose ONLY account-bound state was an + * uploaded file therefore reported nothing scrubbed and was replayed unchanged against the new + * account, which is the one case the safety fix was supposed to cover. + * + * Deleting the references is not the fix. A file reference is not continuation state the model + * can do without: it is content the caller attached, and silently dropping it answers a + * different question than the one that was asked, with no way for the caller to tell. Pinning + * the request to the issuing account is not available either — every call site resolves and + * materialises its credential before reaching here, and the retry sites are reached precisely + * because the issuing account just refused the request. + * + * So the move is refused, before dispatch, and the caller is told exactly what to do about it. + * A 400 rather than a 409: re-uploading is required, and a retryable status would invite the + * same request back unchanged. + */ +export function accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal( + args: Pick, +): Response | undefined { + const { body, bindingKey, servingAccountId, priorAccountId } = args; + if (!servingAccountId || !bindingKey) return undefined; + const issuer = peekConversationStateIssuer(bindingKey); + const accountChanged = (issuer != null && issuer !== servingAccountId) + || (priorAccountId != null && priorAccountId !== servingAccountId); + if (!accountChanged) return undefined; + // Checked against the carriers directly rather than through the portability verdict: that + // verdict reports the FIRST reason it finds, so a body carrying both a previous response id + // and a file reference reports only the former and the file would slip through the scrub. + if (collectConversationStateCarriers(body).fileIds.length === 0) return undefined; + return formatErrorResponse( + 400, + "invalid_request_error", + "Uploaded file references are bound to the account that created them, and this request " + + "moved to a different account. Re-upload the files and send the request again.", + ); +} diff --git a/src/server/responses/compact.ts b/src/server/responses/compact.ts index 6b5b979d37..39e060d6de 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/compact.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/compact.ts @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ import { import { applyAccountChangeConversationStateScrub, conversationStateBindingFromAuth, + accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal, rememberServingConversationStateIssuer, } from "./account-change-state"; import { @@ -789,6 +790,14 @@ export async function handleResponsesCompact( { const binding = conversationStateBindingFromAuth(authCtx, codexPoolAffinityKey(req.headers)); if (binding) { + // Refused rather than scrubbed: an uploaded file is content the caller attached, not + // continuation state the turn can do without. + const refusal = accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal({ + body: raw, + bindingKey: binding.bindingKey, + servingAccountId: binding.accountId, + }); + if (refusal) return refusal; applyAccountChangeConversationStateScrub({ body: raw, bindingKey: binding.bindingKey, diff --git a/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts b/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts index 81ffeb013f..c5525e0f37 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ import { codexAuthContextLogLabel } from "../../codex/account-label"; import { conversationStateBindingFromAuth, applyAccountChangeConversationStateScrub, + accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal, } from "./account-change-state"; /** Parses, selects, and admits one request without changing the dispatch policy. */ @@ -921,6 +922,14 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( { const binding = conversationStateBindingFromAuth(admissionState.authCtx, poolAffinityKey); if (binding) { + // Before the scrub, because a file reference is refused rather than removed and the + // refusal has to happen while there is still no dispatch to undo. + const refusal = accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal({ + body: parsed._rawBody, + bindingKey: binding.bindingKey, + servingAccountId: binding.accountId, + }); + if (refusal) return refusal; applyAccountChangeConversationStateScrub({ body: parsed._rawBody, parsed, diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts index 4d81924c7f..d89efbcc58 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { applyAccountChangeConversationStateScrub, canPortConversationState, collectConversationStateCarriers, + accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal, } from "../../src/server/responses/account-change-state"; import { clearConversationStateIssuerMap, @@ -38,6 +39,84 @@ function turnBody(text = "keep this user turn") { }; } +/** + * An uploaded file is content the caller attached, not continuation state (#4710). + * + * The classifier has always called `file_id` account-bound and the scrubber has always removed + * only `previous_response_id` and `conversation`, so a body whose only account-bound state was + * a file reference reported nothing scrubbed and went to the new account unchanged. Deleting + * the reference instead would answer a different question than the one that was asked, with no + * way for the caller to tell, so the move is refused before dispatch. + */ +function fileOnlyBody() { + return { + model: "gpt-5.4", + input: [ + { type: "message", role: "user", content: [{ type: "input_file", file_id: "file_abc123" }] }, + ], + }; +} + +describe("an account change refuses uploaded-file references instead of dropping them", () => { + afterEach(() => { clearConversationStateIssuerMap(); }); + + test("a file-only body is refused when the serving account is not the issuer", () => { + rememberConversationStateIssuer(BINDING_KEY, "account-a"); + const body = fileOnlyBody(); + // The gap this closes: the scrub reports nothing to do, which used to mean "carry on". + expect(applyAccountChangeConversationStateScrub({ + body, bindingKey: BINDING_KEY, servingAccountId: "account-b", + })).toBe(false); + + const refusal = accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal({ + body, bindingKey: BINDING_KEY, servingAccountId: "account-b", + }); + expect(refusal?.status).toBe(400); + // The reference is left byte-for-byte intact: refusing is the contract, not scrubbing. + expect(collectConversationStateCarriers(body).fileIds).toEqual(["file_abc123"]); + }); + + test("the same body is served without complaint by its own issuer", () => { + rememberConversationStateIssuer(BINDING_KEY, "account-a"); + expect(accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal({ + body: fileOnlyBody(), bindingKey: BINDING_KEY, servingAccountId: "account-a", + })).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("an in-request move is refused on the prior account alone, with no remembered issuer", () => { + expect(accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal({ + body: fileOnlyBody(), + bindingKey: BINDING_KEY, + servingAccountId: "account-b", + priorAccountId: "account-a", + })?.status).toBe(400); + }); + + test("a file reference behind a previous_response_id is still found", () => { + rememberConversationStateIssuer(BINDING_KEY, "account-a"); + const body = { ...turnBody(), input: [...fileOnlyBody().input] } as Record; + body.previous_response_id = "resp_account_a"; + // The portability verdict reports only the FIRST reason it finds, so a body carrying both + // would have reported the response id and let the file through the scrub untouched. + expect(canPortConversationState(collectConversationStateCarriers(body))) + .toMatchObject({ portable: false, reason: "previous-response-id" }); + expect(accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal({ + body, bindingKey: BINDING_KEY, servingAccountId: "account-b", + })?.status).toBe(400); + }); + + test("a body with no file reference keeps the existing scrub-and-continue contract", () => { + rememberConversationStateIssuer(BINDING_KEY, "account-a"); + const body = turnBody() as Record; + expect(accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal({ + body, bindingKey: BINDING_KEY, servingAccountId: "account-b", + })).toBeUndefined(); + expect(applyAccountChangeConversationStateScrub({ + body, bindingKey: BINDING_KEY, servingAccountId: "account-b", + })).toBe(true); + }); +}); + function compactTurnBody(text = "keep this compact user turn") { return { model: "gpt-5.4", @@ -151,4 +230,3 @@ describe("Codex pool account-change conversation-state scrub", () => { expect(collectConversationStateCarriers(turnBody()).encryptedReasoning).toBe(true); }); }); - From 4f61edc49c823080a0b61294512c148e4b0114a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:38:28 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 082/113] docs(cursor): record why the localized native-shell match has no right boundary MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit A review flagged that ROUTING_NATIVE_TOOL_NAME guards the left side of the Korean alternative and not the right, so it matches inside a longer compound. That reading is correct, and the symmetric fix is still wrong: Korean attaches particles straight onto the noun, so the sentences this detector exists to catch are "네이티브 셸이 차단되어..." and "네이티브 셸과 Read가...". A mirrored (?![\p{L}\p{M}\p{N}_]) lookahead treats the 이 and 과 particles as letters and stops matching all six parameterised positive cases, which is exactly why the existing negative cases only probe the left side. The one compound named in review, 네이티브 셸스크립트 paired with a failure claim and a redirect claim, is itself the hallucination shape being quarantined, so excluding it would narrow coverage rather than sharpen it. Nothing changes but the comment. It exists because the review thread will disappear and the next reader will otherwise see an obvious missing boundary and disable the check by fixing it. --- src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts b/src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts index 962d93e170..336a276793 100644 --- a/src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts +++ b/src/adapters/cursor/envelope-echo.ts @@ -217,6 +217,12 @@ export type RoutingCommentaryDecision = | { kind: "flush" } | { kind: "hallucination" }; +// The Korean alternative is deliberately asymmetric: it has a left boundary and no right one. +// Korean attaches particles directly to the noun, so the real sentences this detector exists to +// catch read "네이티브 셸이 차단되어..." and "네이티브 셸과 Read가...". A mirrored +// (?![\p{L}\p{M}\p{N}_]) lookahead would see the 이/과 particle as a letter and stop matching +// every one of them, which is why the negative cases below only probe the left side. Adding the +// right boundary looks like an obvious fix and disables the check; do not. const ROUTING_NATIVE_TOOL_NAME = /\b(shell|read|grep|list|bash)\b|(? Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:40:36 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 083/113] fix(responses): refuse the uploaded-file move on the alternate-account paths too (#4710) The carried change refuses an uploaded-file move at the two sites that can answer with a status, and leaves the two alternate-account retry sites scrubbing only. This closes those two, and it does not need the new result variant the deferral assumed. A retry site does not have to raise a status, because an earlier response already exists and is what the caller returns. It only has to decline the move. And the question it declines on does not depend on which alternate would be chosen -- an uploaded file is readable only by the account that received it -- so it can be asked from the body alone, before an alternate is resolved. conversationCarriesUploadedFiles is that predicate. Asking there reserves no send, cancels no response, and leaves the first account's rejection intact for the caller, which is the guarantee the comment above the compact resolution already depended on. Refusal still beats a previous_response_id at both sites, for the same reason the carried change reads the carriers directly instead of the portability verdict: the verdict reports only the first denial it finds. Two corrections to the carried code. collectConversationStateCarriers(body).fileIds is optional on the carrier type and was dereferenced directly, which does not survive a strict typecheck; the emptiness test now lives in one exported place so no caller can get it wrong again. And the refusal message named the cause but not the consequence. The reference stays in the conversation's history, so once rotation has moved a conversation carrying an attachment, every later turn is refused the same way. A caller told only that the reference is invalid resends unchanged and watches the conversation die. The message now says what happened, that it will keep happening, and the two things that end it: re-upload under the serving account, or start a new conversation. A same-account replay is unaffected, and a single-account install never reaches any of this, because serving and issuing accounts cannot differ without pool rotation. Pinning a file-carrying conversation to its issuing account is the real answer and is routing-affinity work; filed as #4778. Co-authored-by: JUN --- src/server/responses/account-change-state.ts | 46 ++++++++++-- src/server/responses/compact.ts | 26 ++++--- src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts | 12 +++ structure/transports/responses.md | 29 +++++++ .../responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts | 75 +++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/server/responses/account-change-state.ts b/src/server/responses/account-change-state.ts index 2e8a0862fc..71a24e26fe 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/account-change-state.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/account-change-state.ts @@ -21,6 +21,28 @@ import { formatErrorResponse } from "../../bridge/errors"; export type ConversationStateScrubReason = "account-change"; +/** + * Cause AND remedy, because this refusal does not clear itself. + * + * Dropping a `previous_response_id` costs one cold turn and the conversation continues. This is + * not that. The file reference lives in the conversation's history, so once pool rotation has + * moved a conversation carrying an attachment, every following turn presents the same reference + * and is refused the same way. A caller told only that the reference is invalid will send the + * same request back and watch the conversation appear dead, which is the one outcome a refusal + * is supposed to prevent. So the text says what happened, that it will keep happening, and the + * two things that actually end it. + * + * Names no account id, no file id, and no conversation id. + */ +export const ACCOUNT_CHANGE_FILE_SCOPE_MESSAGE = + "This conversation is now being served by a different account than the one its uploaded files " + + "were sent to, and an uploaded file can only be read by the account that received it. The " + + "request was not sent upstream, and no file was removed from it. Because the references stay " + + "in this conversation's history, later turns will be refused the same way until this is " + + "resolved: re-upload the files so they are issued by the account now serving this " + + "conversation, or start a new conversation for them. Sending the same request again " + + "unchanged will not clear it."; + export type PortabilityDenial = | "previous-response-id" | "provider-conversation-id" @@ -145,6 +167,21 @@ export function collectConversationStateCarriers(body: unknown): ConversationSta }; } +/** + * Does this body reference an uploaded file? + * + * Answerable from the body alone, which is what lets an alternate-account path ask BEFORE it + * resolves an alternate: the answer cannot depend on which account is chosen, because an + * uploaded file is readable only by the account it was sent to (#4710). + * + * `fileIds` is optional on the carrier type, so the emptiness test lives here rather than being + * rewritten at each caller. One of those rewrites already dereferenced it directly. + */ +export function conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(body: unknown): boolean { + const fileIds = collectConversationStateCarriers(body).fileIds; + return fileIds !== undefined && fileIds.length > 0; +} + /** * Drop account-bound continuation from a request body in place. Readable user @@ -265,11 +302,6 @@ export function accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal( // Checked against the carriers directly rather than through the portability verdict: that // verdict reports the FIRST reason it finds, so a body carrying both a previous response id // and a file reference reports only the former and the file would slip through the scrub. - if (collectConversationStateCarriers(body).fileIds.length === 0) return undefined; - return formatErrorResponse( - 400, - "invalid_request_error", - "Uploaded file references are bound to the account that created them, and this request " - + "moved to a different account. Re-upload the files and send the request again.", - ); + if (!conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(body)) return undefined; + return formatErrorResponse(400, "invalid_request_error", ACCOUNT_CHANGE_FILE_SCOPE_MESSAGE); } diff --git a/src/server/responses/compact.ts b/src/server/responses/compact.ts index 39e060d6de..c4ba12f5ef 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/compact.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/compact.ts @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ import { conversationStateBindingFromAuth, accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal, rememberServingConversationStateIssuer, + conversationCarriesUploadedFiles, } from "./account-change-state"; import { TokenRefreshError, @@ -1091,15 +1092,22 @@ export async function handleResponsesCompact( ].filter(Boolean); // Build the alternate COMPLETELY before cancelling the first body: if construction // throws, the first rejection is still intact and can be returned to the client. - const alternate = await resolveAlternateCompactContext({ - req, - admission, - config, - route, - selectedModelId, - excludeAccountId: authCtx.accountId, - turnAdmissionLease, - }); + // The same reasoning refuses an uploaded-file move here: no alternate can read a file the + // issuing account received, so which one is chosen is irrelevant and asking before the + // resolution costs nothing. It also reuses the guarantee the comment above depends on -- + // the first body is still uncancelled -- so the client gets the original rejection rather + // than an inaccessible-file error from account B (#4710). + const alternate = conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(raw) + ? undefined + : await resolveAlternateCompactContext({ + req, + admission, + config, + route, + selectedModelId, + excludeAccountId: authCtx.accountId, + turnAdmissionLease, + }); // Resolution can await a credential refresh, so the client may have gone away // while we were choosing B. Re-check before spending anything: recording A, // cancelling its body, and sending B are all observable side effects, and B's diff --git a/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts b/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts index 5d61768d42..290f9b8d3b 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ import { bindRouteReasoningReplayScope } from "./core-replay"; import { conversationStateBindingFromAuth, applyAccountChangeConversationStateScrub, + conversationCarriesUploadedFiles, } from "./account-change-state"; import { recordAdapterReasoning, @@ -499,6 +500,17 @@ export async function retryCodexPoolOnAlternateAccount( recordUnmovedTransientOutcome(); return { kind: "no-alternate" }; } + // An uploaded file is readable only by the account it was sent to, so NO alternate can serve + // this body. Which account would be chosen does not change that, which is why this asks before + // the resolution rather than after it: refusing here reserves no send, cancels no response, and + // leaves the caller holding the first account's rejection to return unchanged (#4710). The + // initial-dispatch sites answer with a 400 instead, because there is no earlier response there + // to fall back to. A same-account replay -- the gated-model 400 ladder above -- is unaffected, + // since it never leaves the issuing account. + if (!retryAuthCtx && conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(parsed._rawBody)) { + recordUnmovedTransientOutcome(); + return { kind: "no-alternate" }; + } // An account move is the guarded profile's fourth send and draws the single shared // final-recovery reserve. Nothing bounded it per request before: `excludeAccountId` excludes // only the account that just failed, and the caller's recovery loop can return here after the diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 3281f73fc0..4e84d2d890 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -209,6 +209,35 @@ readable user text, and records `conversationStateScrub: "account-change"` on th without account identifiers. Once the new account issues its own state, later turns carry it normally. `canPortConversationState` is local until `src/routing/identity-domains.ts` lands. +### Uploaded files do not move between accounts + +An uploaded `file_id` has always been classified as account-bound, and the scrub has always +removed only `previous_response_id` and `conversation`. A body whose only account-bound state was +a file reference therefore reported nothing scrubbed and went to the new account unchanged. + +Deleting the reference is not the contract. A file reference is content the caller attached, not +continuation state the turn can do without, and dropping it silently answers a different question +than the one that was asked. `accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal` reads the carriers directly +rather than through the portability verdict, because that verdict reports the first reason it +finds: a body carrying both a previous response id and a file reference reports only the former, +and the file would slip through the scrub. + +The initial `/v1/responses` selection and the native compact dispatch answer HTTP 400, not a +retryable status, and the message names both the cause and the remedy. That message carries more +than the immediate failure on purpose: the reference stays in conversation history, so every later +turn is refused the same way until the files are re-uploaded under the serving account or the +conversation is restarted, and a caller told only that the reference is invalid would resend +unchanged and see a dead conversation. + +The alternate-account paths refuse the move instead of raising a status, because an earlier +response already exists to return. `conversationCarriesUploadedFiles` answers from the body alone, +so both the Responses retry helper and the compact retry ask before resolving an alternate: no +send is reserved, the first response is never cancelled, and the caller returns the original +upstream rejection. A same-account replay such as the gated-model 400 ladder is unaffected, and a +single-account install never reaches any of this because serving and issuing accounts cannot +differ. Pinning a file-carrying conversation to its issuing account is routing-affinity work and +is tracked separately. + > Decision record: [ADR-0039](../decisions/ADR-0039-responses-http-sse.md) ### Mixed-wire provider defaults diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts index d89efbcc58..de300abacb 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import { canPortConversationState, collectConversationStateCarriers, accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal, + conversationCarriesUploadedFiles, + ACCOUNT_CHANGE_FILE_SCOPE_MESSAGE, } from "../../src/server/responses/account-change-state"; import { clearConversationStateIssuerMap, @@ -230,3 +232,76 @@ describe("Codex pool account-change conversation-state scrub", () => { expect(collectConversationStateCarriers(turnBody()).encryptedReasoning).toBe(true); }); }); + +/** + * The alternate-account paths ask this question BEFORE they resolve an alternate (#4710). + * + * They cannot answer with a status the way the initial dispatch does, because an earlier + * response already exists and is what the caller returns. So they refuse the move instead, and + * the predicate they refuse on has to be answerable from the body alone -- no binding, no + * serving account, no issuer -- since none of those are known yet at that point. + */ +describe("uploaded-file detection answers before an alternate account is chosen (#4710)", () => { + function fileAttachment(id = "file_account_a") { + return { + type: "message", + role: "user", + content: [ + { type: "input_text", text: "what does this say?" }, + { type: "input_file", file_id: id }, + ], + }; + } + + test("a file-only body is detected from the body alone", () => { + expect(conversationCarriesUploadedFiles({ model: "gpt-5.4", input: [fileAttachment()] })).toBe(true); + }); + + test("a file behind a previous_response_id is still detected", () => { + // The portability verdict reports only the first reason it finds, so a predicate built on it + // would miss this body and let the retry sites move a file reference they already refused + // to move when it appeared alone. + expect(conversationCarriesUploadedFiles({ + model: "gpt-5.4", + previous_response_id: "resp_account_a", + input: [fileAttachment()], + })).toBe(true); + }); + + test("top-level file_id and file_ids shapes are both detected", () => { + expect(conversationCarriesUploadedFiles({ + input: [{ type: "message", role: "user", file_id: "file_1" }], + })).toBe(true); + expect(conversationCarriesUploadedFiles({ + input: [{ type: "message", role: "user", file_ids: ["file_2"] }], + })).toBe(true); + }); + + test("a body with no uploaded file lets the move proceed", () => { + // The retry sites must keep failing over for every ordinary body; a predicate that answered + // true too often would silently disable alternate-account recovery. + expect(conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(turnBody())).toBe(false); + expect(conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(compactTurnBody())).toBe(false); + expect(conversationCarriesUploadedFiles({ model: "gpt-5.4", input: [] })).toBe(false); + expect(conversationCarriesUploadedFiles({})).toBe(false); + expect(conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(undefined)).toBe(false); + expect(conversationCarriesUploadedFiles("not a body")).toBe(false); + }); + + test("an empty file_ids array is not a file reference", () => { + // fileIds is optional on the carrier type and always materialised as an array here, so the + // emptiness test has to live in one place rather than being rewritten per caller. + expect(conversationCarriesUploadedFiles({ + input: [{ type: "message", role: "user", file_ids: [] }], + })).toBe(false); + }); + + test("the refusal message names the cause, the persistence, and both remedies", () => { + // This refusal does not clear itself: the reference stays in history, so every later turn is + // refused again. A caller told only that the reference is invalid would resend unchanged. + expect(ACCOUNT_CHANGE_FILE_SCOPE_MESSAGE).toContain("later turns will be refused"); + expect(ACCOUNT_CHANGE_FILE_SCOPE_MESSAGE).toContain("re-upload the files"); + expect(ACCOUNT_CHANGE_FILE_SCOPE_MESSAGE).toContain("start a new conversation"); + expect(ACCOUNT_CHANGE_FILE_SCOPE_MESSAGE).toContain("no file was removed"); + }); +}); From 74a23c4cc72065ccc83373ee23875d48202e6cd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:51:04 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 084/113] test(responses): stop an explicit undefined from taking the default allowance [skip ci] The no-declared-allowance row passed `undefined` as the second argument of a builder whose parameter has a default. A default parameter applies to an explicit `undefined`, so the row built a request carrying 64,000 max output tokens and then asserted that no output reserve was applied. It would have asserted the opposite of what it covers, and it would have done so by passing. Split the builder in two so the no-allowance case cannot silently acquire one. --- tests/server/input-admission.test.ts | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/server/input-admission.test.ts b/tests/server/input-admission.test.ts index 6a15ffc22e..90afdbe92b 100644 --- a/tests/server/input-admission.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/input-admission.test.ts @@ -268,10 +268,17 @@ describe("combo target input admission", () => { modelMaxOutputTokens: { m: 32_000 }, }; - const withMaxOutput = (inputTokens: number, maxOutputTokens: number | undefined = 64_000): OcxParsedRequest => ({ + const withMaxOutput = (inputTokens: number, maxOutputTokens = 64_000): OcxParsedRequest => ({ ...request([userText(asciiTokens(inputTokens))]), modelId: "m", - options: maxOutputTokens === undefined ? {} : { maxOutputTokens }, + options: { maxOutputTokens }, + }); + // A separate builder, because passing `undefined` to the one above would silently take its + // default and the row below would assert the opposite of what it claims to cover. + const withoutMaxOutput = (inputTokens: number): OcxParsedRequest => ({ + ...request([userText(asciiTokens(inputTokens))]), + modelId: "m", + options: {}, }); test("skips a target that cannot hold the turn plus its own output ceiling", () => { @@ -310,7 +317,7 @@ describe("combo target input admission", () => { }); test("no declared output allowance keeps the loose direct contract", () => { - const result = checkComboTargetInputAdmission(withMaxOutput(150_000, undefined), capped, "custom", "m"); + const result = checkComboTargetInputAdmission(withoutMaxOutput(150_000), capped, "custom", "m"); expect(result.admitted).toBe(true); // still inside the existing 2.5x pathological gate expect(result.requiredOutputHeadroom).toBeUndefined(); }); From 246d703aec275b3c7267ebde9a004334614b905e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:17:42 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 085/113] fix(responses): bound combo recall model retention (#4525) The remembered model id is provider-reported and arrives on the response, so nothing upstream of the recall store bounds its length. Lane keys are already SHA-256 digests, which means the 256-lane cap bounded the number of entries but not the bytes those entries held. A long-running process could accumulate arbitrarily large remembered strings. Bound retention on two more axes: 1 KiB per remembered model id and 64 KiB in aggregate. The size test runs on code units before encoding, because a UTF-8 encoding is never smaller than its code-unit count, so the bound never pays the allocation it exists to prevent. Aggregate eviction drops the least recently written lane, which is the front of the map because every write re-inserts its own lane at the back. A single entry is capped far below the aggregate budget, so a write can never evict itself. Every removal now goes through one helper that releases the entry's bytes, so the counter cannot drift from the map through the read-time invalidation path, the reconciliation path, or a lane rewrite. An unretainable model id DECLINES the write rather than clearing the lane. That is the ordering-sensitive part. This callback carries a config generation, not a request order, so two accepted completions on one lane under the same generation can arrive out of order; a clearing branch would let the older one erase the newer selection. Declining matches how every other rejection in rememberComboForLane already returns, and leaves the established contract intact: an older response never overwrites or clears a newer one. Register the store for periodic expiry as well. The TTL was previously evaluated only on read or on a generation change, so a lane that is never read again held its entry until the process exited. Closes #4525 Co-authored-by: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com> --- docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/combos.md | 5 +- .../src/content/docs/ko/guides/combos.md | 2 +- src/lib/state-store-registrations.ts | 8 +- src/server/responses/combo-session-recall.ts | 76 +++++++++++++++++-- structure/transports/responses.md | 14 ++++ tests/oauth/state-store-sweeper.test.ts | 66 ++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/combos.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/combos.md index 6f51870ad3..b3bfd8f65b 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/combos.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/combos.md @@ -83,7 +83,10 @@ The request then follows normal combo selection and failover. Explicit provider/combo selectors and configured combo aliases take precedence over this recall. Failed, incomplete, or cancelled responses do not replace the last successful selection. Recall is -process-local and bounded to 256 lanes for 30 minutes; it does not store account credentials. +process-local and bounded to 256 conversations for 30 minutes, and to 1 KiB per remembered model +name and 64 KiB in total; expired entries are also cleaned up in the background. A response whose +model name is too large to retain leaves the previous selection untouched rather than clearing it. +Recall does not store account credentials. Without usable conversation identity or valid remembered state, normal compaction routing applies. A restart clears the remembered state. diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/guides/combos.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/guides/combos.md index b8d4087431..238127c1ce 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/guides/combos.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/guides/combos.md @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ alias는 클라이언트가 요청하는 공개 이름만 바꿉니다. 콤보 클라이언트가 콤보를 바꾼 뒤 공급자 접두사 없는 모델 이름으로 압축을 요청하면, opencodex는 같은 대화에서 가장 최근에 응답을 성공적으로 마친 콤보를 기억해 사용할 수 있습니다. 모델 이름이 완료된 응답과 일치하고, 현재 설정에 해당 콤보와 대상이 남아 있어야 합니다. 압축 요청도 일반 콤보 선택과 페일오버를 따릅니다. -명시한 공급자·콤보 선택자와 설정된 콤보 별칭이 기억한 값보다 우선합니다. 실패·미완료·취소된 응답은 마지막 성공 기록을 덮어쓰지 않습니다. 기록은 프로세스 안에서 최대 256개 대화, 30분 동안 유지하며 계정 자격증명을 저장하지 않습니다. 유효한 대화 식별자나 기록이 없으면 일반 압축 라우팅을 사용합니다. 재시작하면 기록은 사라집니다. +명시한 공급자·콤보 선택자와 설정된 콤보 별칭이 기억한 값보다 우선합니다. 실패·미완료·취소된 응답은 마지막 성공 기록을 덮어쓰지 않습니다. 기록은 프로세스 안에서 최대 256개 대화, 30분 동안 유지하고, 모델 이름 하나당 1 KiB·전체 64 KiB로 제한하며, 만료된 기록은 배경에서도 정리합니다. 모델 이름이 너무 커서 보관할 수 없는 응답은 이전 선택을 지우지 않고 그대로 둡니다. 기록은 계정 자격증명을 저장하지 않습니다. 유효한 대화 식별자나 기록이 없으면 일반 압축 라우팅을 사용합니다. 재시작하면 기록은 사라집니다. ## 전략 선택 diff --git a/src/lib/state-store-registrations.ts b/src/lib/state-store-registrations.ts index 13a22bfce0..849f145848 100644 --- a/src/lib/state-store-registrations.ts +++ b/src/lib/state-store-registrations.ts @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import { } from "../combos/failover"; import { reconcileComboWarningMemos } from "../combos/request"; import { reconcileComboRotationState } from "../combos/resolve"; -import { reconcileComboRecall } from "../server/responses/combo-session-recall"; +import { reconcileComboRecall, sweepExpiredComboRecall } from "../server/responses/combo-session-recall"; import { listLiveComboTargetKeys } from "../combos/types"; import { listLiveConfigOwnershipRoots, @@ -112,7 +112,11 @@ export const STATE_STORE_REGISTRATIONS = [ { name: "model-cache-history", reconcileGeneration: reconcileModelCacheGeneration }, { name: "pool-rotation", reconcileGeneration: reconcilePoolRotationState }, { name: "combo-rotation", reconcileGeneration: reconcileComboRotationState }, - { name: "combo-session-recall", reconcileGeneration: reconcileComboRecall }, + { + name: "combo-session-recall", + sweepExpired: sweepExpiredComboRecall, + reconcileGeneration: reconcileComboRecall, + }, { name: "guardian-backoff", reconcileGeneration: reconcileGuardianBackoff }, { name: "codex-reauth", reconcileGeneration: reconcileCodexReauthState }, { name: "oauth-reauth", reconcileGeneration: reconcileOAuthReauthState }, diff --git a/src/server/responses/combo-session-recall.ts b/src/server/responses/combo-session-recall.ts index 84dfd8d466..b3af31f1c4 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/combo-session-recall.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/combo-session-recall.ts @@ -8,14 +8,46 @@ interface ComboRecallEntry { target: Pick; responseModel: string; at: number; + /** UTF-8 size of `responseModel`, the only client-influenced field of unbounded length. */ + bytes: number; } const RECALL_CAPACITY = 256; const RECALL_TTL_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000; +/** + * A model id is provider-reported and arrives on the response, so nothing upstream of here + * bounds its length. Lane keys are already SHA-256 digests, so the model string is the only + * field that can grow, and 256 lanes alone do not bound the bytes they hold. + */ +const RECALL_MODEL_BYTES_MAX = 1024; +const RECALL_TOTAL_BYTES_MAX = 64 * 1024; const recall = new Map(); +let recallBytes = 0; let lastReconciledGeneration = 0; let liveOwners: Pick | undefined; +/** Every removal path goes through here so the byte counter can never drift from the map. */ +function deleteEntry(lane: string): boolean { + const entry = recall.get(lane); + if (!entry) return false; + recall.delete(lane); + recallBytes -= entry.bytes; + return true; +} + +/** + * UTF-8 size of a remembered model id, or null when it is too large to retain. + * + * The code-unit test runs first and is the part that matters: a UTF-8 encoding is never smaller + * than the code-unit count, so an oversized string is rejected without encoding it, and the + * bound cannot be defeated by paying the allocation it exists to prevent. + */ +function boundedModelBytes(responseModel: string): number | null { + if (responseModel.length > RECALL_MODEL_BYTES_MAX) return null; + const bytes = Buffer.byteLength(responseModel, "utf8"); + return bytes > RECALL_MODEL_BYTES_MAX ? null : bytes; +} + function ownsEntry(context: Pick, entry: ComboRecallEntry): boolean { return context.comboIds.has(entry.comboId) && context.providerNames.has(entry.target.provider) @@ -32,14 +64,29 @@ export function rememberComboForLane( if (!lane || !comboId || !responseModel.trim()) return; // Reject even a same-named recreated owner: its previous in-flight turn is obsolete. if (writerGeneration < Math.max(lastReconciledGeneration, captureConfigGeneration())) return; - const entry = { comboId, target: { provider: target.provider, model: target.model }, responseModel, at: Date.now() }; + // An unretainable model id DECLINES the write; it must not clear the lane. Every other + // rejection above returns the same way, and clearing here would let a late completion erase + // a newer selection that this function has no ordering information to compare against. + const bytes = boundedModelBytes(responseModel); + if (bytes === null) return; + const entry = { + comboId, + target: { provider: target.provider, model: target.model }, + responseModel, + at: Date.now(), + bytes, + }; if (liveOwners && !ownsEntry(liveOwners, entry)) return; - recall.delete(lane); + deleteEntry(lane); recall.set(lane, entry); - while (recall.size > RECALL_CAPACITY) { + recallBytes += bytes; + // Insertion order is recency order, because every write re-inserts its lane at the back. + // Evicting from the front therefore drops the least recently written lane, never this one: + // a single entry is capped well below the aggregate budget, so it always fits. + while (recall.size > RECALL_CAPACITY || recallBytes > RECALL_TOTAL_BYTES_MAX) { const oldest = recall.keys().next().value; - if (oldest === undefined) break; - recall.delete(oldest); + if (oldest === undefined || oldest === lane) break; + deleteEntry(oldest); } } @@ -57,12 +104,25 @@ export function recallComboForLane( || !Object.hasOwn(config.providers, entry.target.provider) || !provider || provider.disabled === true || !combo?.targets.some(target => targetKey(target) === targetKey(entry.target))) { - recall.delete(lane); + deleteEntry(lane); return undefined; } return entry.responseModel === model ? entry.comboId : undefined; } +/** + * Periodic expiry. Without it a lane that is never read again and never touched by a config + * reconciliation holds its entry for the life of the process: the existing TTL is only + * evaluated on read or on generation change. + */ +export function sweepExpiredComboRecall(now: number): number { + let removed = 0; + for (const [lane, entry] of recall) { + if (now - entry.at >= RECALL_TTL_MS && deleteEntry(lane)) removed += 1; + } + return removed; +} + export function reconcileComboRecall(context: GenerationContext): number { if (context.generation <= lastReconciledGeneration) return 0; lastReconciledGeneration = context.generation; @@ -74,8 +134,7 @@ export function reconcileComboRecall(context: GenerationContext): number { let removed = 0; for (const [lane, entry] of recall) { if (!ownsEntry(context, entry) || Date.now() - entry.at >= RECALL_TTL_MS) { - recall.delete(lane); - removed += 1; + if (deleteEntry(lane)) removed += 1; } } return removed; @@ -84,6 +143,7 @@ export function reconcileComboRecall(context: GenerationContext): number { /** Test-only reset, alongside the combo rotation/cooldown resets. */ export function clearComboRecallForTests(): void { recall.clear(); + recallBytes = 0; lastReconciledGeneration = 0; liveOwners = undefined; } diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 54ece4ec41..98f518946e 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -178,6 +178,20 @@ explicit configured selectors before consulting bounded lane state. The existing reconciliation owns removal of obsolete targets and generation fencing; core imports no registration composition root or Lab code. Recall retains routing identity only, never account credentials. +Retention is bounded on four axes: 256 lanes, 30 minutes, 1 KiB per remembered model id, and 64 KiB +in aggregate. The model id is the only field of unbounded length — lane keys are already SHA-256 +digests — so the lane cap alone does not bound the bytes those lanes hold. The size test runs on code +units before encoding, since a UTF-8 encoding is never smaller than its code-unit count and the bound +must not pay the allocation it exists to prevent. Aggregate eviction drops the least recently written +lane, which is the front of the map because every write re-inserts its own lane at the back. + +An unretainable model id declines the write rather than clearing the lane, matching how every other +rejection in `rememberComboForLane` returns. Clearing would let a late completion erase a newer +selection, and the publication path carries a config generation, not a request order, so it has no +basis on which to decide that its own result is the newer one. The store is also swept periodically +now: the TTL was previously evaluated only on read or on a generation change, so a lane never read +again held its entry for the life of the process. + > Decision record: [ADR-0038](../decisions/ADR-0038-responses-http-sse.md) A replayed compaction item carries an `encrypted_content` blob only its minting backend can decode, diff --git a/tests/oauth/state-store-sweeper.test.ts b/tests/oauth/state-store-sweeper.test.ts index 5b691d28d6..4cfb17ee84 100644 --- a/tests/oauth/state-store-sweeper.test.ts +++ b/tests/oauth/state-store-sweeper.test.ts @@ -215,6 +215,72 @@ describe("state-store sweeper", () => { } }); + describe("bounded combo recall retention", () => { + const config: OcxConfig = { + port: 0, defaultProvider: "a", + providers: { a: { adapter: "openai-chat", baseUrl: "https://a.example/v1" } }, + combos: { first: { targets: [{ provider: "a", model: "m1" }] } }, + }; + const remember = (lane: string, responseModel: string) => + rememberComboForLane(lane, "first", { provider: "a", model: "m1" }, responseModel, captureConfigGeneration()); + /** A distinct model id of exactly 1 KiB, the largest this store will retain. */ + const fullModel = (index: number) => `${index}-`.padEnd(1024, "m"); + + test("an unretainable model id declines the write instead of clearing the lane", () => { + remember("lane", "kept-model"); + // A model id is provider-reported and arrives on the response, so its length is not + // bounded upstream of here. Refusing to retain it must not also destroy what is there: + // this callback carries a config generation, not a request order, so it cannot know its + // own result is newer than the entry it would be erasing. + remember("lane", "x".repeat(1025)); + expect(recallComboForLane(config, "lane", "kept-model")).toBe("first"); + + // Measured in UTF-8 bytes, not code units: 600 three-byte characters is 1,800 bytes. + remember("lane", "가".repeat(600)); + expect(recallComboForLane(config, "lane", "kept-model")).toBe("first"); + + // And an oversized id never establishes a lane of its own. + remember("fresh", "x".repeat(4096)); + expect(recallComboForLane(config, "fresh", "x".repeat(4096))).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("the aggregate byte budget evicts the least recently written lane", () => { + // 64 KiB holds exactly 64 maximum-size entries, well inside the 256-lane cap, so this + // isolates the byte budget from the lane count. + for (let i = 0; i < 64; i += 1) remember(`lane-${i}`, fullModel(i)); + expect(recallComboForLane(config, "lane-0", fullModel(0))).toBe("first"); + + remember("lane-64", fullModel(64)); + expect(recallComboForLane(config, "lane-0", fullModel(0))).toBeUndefined(); + expect(recallComboForLane(config, "lane-1", fullModel(1))).toBe("first"); + expect(recallComboForLane(config, "lane-64", fullModel(64))).toBe("first"); + }); + + test("a rewritten lane is charged once, not once per write", () => { + // Replacing a lane must release the old entry's bytes. If it did not, 64 rewrites of one + // lane would exhaust the whole budget and start evicting unrelated lanes. + remember("stable", "stable-model"); + for (let i = 0; i < 64; i += 1) remember("churn", fullModel(i)); + expect(recallComboForLane(config, "stable", "stable-model")).toBe("first"); + expect(recallComboForLane(config, "churn", fullModel(63))).toBe("first"); + }); + + test("a periodic tick expires a lane that is never read again and releases its bytes", () => { + registerStateStore(STATE_STORE_REGISTRATIONS.find(row => row.name === "combo-session-recall")!); + for (let i = 0; i < 64; i += 1) remember(`stale-${i}`, fullModel(i)); + + // Before this the TTL was only evaluated on read or on a generation change, so a lane + // nobody reads again held its entry for the life of the process. + expect(sweepExpired(Date.now() + 30 * 60 * 1_000)).toEqual({ storesVisited: 1, rowsRemoved: 64 }); + expect(recallComboForLane(config, "stale-0", fullModel(0))).toBeUndefined(); + + // The budget is genuinely free again: a full refill keeps its own oldest lane, which + // could not happen if the swept entries had left their bytes behind. + for (let i = 0; i < 64; i += 1) remember(`fresh-${i}`, fullModel(i)); + expect(recallComboForLane(config, "fresh-0", fullModel(0))).toBe("first"); + }); + }); + test("a sweeper tick expires continuation and Antigravity rows without store traffic", () => { rememberResponseState({ input: "old" }, { id: "resp_sweeper_ttl", output: [], status: "completed" }); observeAntigravityReplay("gemini-3-pro", "session-old", [{ From 413b6b2a768dae2a58abad3fa6aaa023df7b9063 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:56:25 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 086/113] fix(live): relay sideband turn metadata and client closes, and stage realtime voice fixtures (#4748) * fix(live): relay sideband turn metadata and client closes, and stage realtime voice fixtures (#4721) Realtime voice v3 is reported as one broken feature but is really three failures: an immediate 502 on call-create, a ten-second start timeout, and a call whose audio works while no transcript and no tool invocation ever appear. Nothing in the suite could tell them apart, because the sideband had no per-stage coverage and its only diagnostic recorded relayed frames -- so a join that never reached the proxy, a join the upstream refused, and a live relay carrying nothing all produced the same empty file. That is why the report could only say "no frame log". Six de-identified Frameless v3 fixtures now drive the real relay one stage at a time: join, session preamble, audio, transcription, delegated tool work, and shutdown. Their event names and payload shapes follow the v3 parser in codex-rs (session.started, input_transcript.added, turn.done, delegation.created, input_audio.append, delegation.context.append); the first draft used public Realtime v2 names, which do not exist on this wire. A failure now names the stage instead of the feature. Two defects the fixtures pin down: - x-codex-turn-metadata is on the header list codex-rs builds for the sideband upgrade and was missing from LIVE_CLIENT_PROTOCOL_HEADERS, so every realtime turn reached the model with metadata the client had attached and this proxy dropped. The Responses passthrough already forwards it and the sideband addresses the same upstream. Relayed only when the caller sent it; the images sidecar still strips it deliberately. - A downstream close was reported to the upstream as a bare 1000 regardless of what the client sent. A Frameless v3 client reads upstream 1000 as the session completing and anything else as a transport loss to reconnect, so the code is load-bearing. clientCloseForUpstream substitutes 1000 only for codes no endpoint may send and truncates the reason at the 123-byte control-frame limit. OCX_LIVE_FRAME_LOG additionally records upstream-open, upstream-failed, relay-attached, and relay-closed. Both record shapes stay content-free: no URL, no call id, no header, no frame bytes. Not fixed, and deliberately not forced: the upstream handshake status. Bun's client WebSocket surfaces only opened or failed, so a refused join can only become 502/504. Upstream preserves that status (openai/codex #39257) and the client prints whatever we return, which is why the report shows a bare 502. Closes #4721 * fix(live): keep the sideband lifecycle assertion out of the ratcheted live suite The file-size ratchet failed the previous head: tests/server/server-live.test.ts sits exactly at its committed cap of 2253 lines, and the lifecycle-aware rewrite of its frame-log assertion pushed it to 2262. Raising the baseline is not available -- the ratchet only ever lowers caps. The assertion belongs in the new file anyway, since that is where the new behavior is owned. server-live.test.ts keeps its existing six-line block and only widens the key check in place, so both record shapes stay bounded and the file returns to 2253. The new test earns its place rather than just relocating the old one: it drives a refused join and a completed relay into one log and asserts upstream-failed, upstream-open, relay-attached, and relay-closed are separate records, with the status on the refusal only. That is the distinction the issue needs and the reason the constructor-failure branch of openLiveSidebandUpstream now records a stage too -- it resolves directly instead of through finish(), so it was the one refusal that still left no trace. --- .../docs/ko/reference/proxy-formats.md | 5 +- .../content/docs/reference/proxy-formats.md | 4 +- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 1 + src/server/index/live-sideband.ts | 38 +- src/server/index/websocket-handler.ts | 8 +- src/server/live.ts | 47 +- structure/runtime.md | 4 + .../realtime-voice-sideband/audio.json | 25 + .../realtime-voice-sideband/connect.json | 30 ++ .../realtime-voice-sideband/session.json | 30 ++ .../realtime-voice-sideband/shutdown.json | 31 ++ .../realtime-voice-sideband/tools.json | 37 ++ .../realtime-voice-sideband/transcript.json | 35 ++ tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 1 + .../server-live-realtime-fixtures.test.ts | 475 ++++++++++++++++++ tests/server/server-live.test.ts | 4 +- 16 files changed, 766 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/audio.json create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/connect.json create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/session.json create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/shutdown.json create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/tools.json create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/transcript.json create mode 100644 tests/server/server-live-realtime-fixtures.test.ts diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/proxy-formats.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/proxy-formats.md index e4fe0befb9..31eb642e79 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/proxy-formats.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/ko/reference/proxy-formats.md @@ -271,8 +271,9 @@ call creation과 sideband join은 같은 OpenAI 계정으로 이루어져야 하 거부합니다(`404`). 두 요청 모두 Codex의 `session-id`와 `thread-id` 헤더를 실어 보냅니다. Pool 모드는 계정 선택을 그 쌍에 묶어 두므로(프로세스 로컬) 프록시에 도착한 join은 통화를 만든 계정을 그대로 쓰고, Direct 모드는 두 요청 모두 호출자의 현재 bearer를 전달합니다. 릴레이되는 클라이언트 헤더는 정확히 -`openai-alpha`, `x-session-id`, `session-id`, `thread-id`, `originator`, `x-oai-attestation` -(`src/server/live.ts`의 `LIVE_CLIENT_PROTOCOL_HEADERS`)이며, `Authorization`과 ChatGPT 계정 id는 +`openai-alpha`, `x-session-id`, `session-id`, `thread-id`, `originator`, `x-oai-attestation`, +`x-codex-turn-metadata`(`src/server/live.ts`의 `LIVE_CLIENT_PROTOCOL_HEADERS`)이며, 각 헤더는 +호출자가 보낸 경우에만 전달되고 프록시가 만들어 내지 않습니다. `Authorization`과 ChatGPT 계정 id는 ChatGPT 경로에서 프록시가 소유합니다(Pool은 저장된 계정으로 교체, Direct는 검증된 호출자 bearer를 전달). API 키 프로바이더는 자체 bearer를 씁니다. Codex가 join을 프록시로 보내는 것은 `experimental_realtime_ws_base_url`이 프록시를 가리킬 때뿐이며, `ocx start`가 이 키를 diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/proxy-formats.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/proxy-formats.md index e2e8145845..f10e232f57 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/proxy-formats.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/proxy-formats.md @@ -563,7 +563,9 @@ upstream (`404`). Both legs carry Codex's `session-id` and `thread-id` headers; account choice is bound to that pair (process-local), so a join that reaches the proxy reuses the account that created the call, while Direct mode forwards the caller's current bearer on both legs. The relayed client headers are exactly `openai-alpha`, `x-session-id`, `session-id`, `thread-id`, -`originator`, and `x-oai-attestation` (`LIVE_CLIENT_PROTOCOL_HEADERS` in `src/server/live.ts`); +`originator`, `x-oai-attestation`, and `x-codex-turn-metadata` +(`LIVE_CLIENT_PROTOCOL_HEADERS` in `src/server/live.ts`); each is relayed only when the caller +sent it, and none is invented. `Authorization` and the ChatGPT account id are proxy-owned on ChatGPT-backed routes (Pool replaces them with the stored account, Direct forwards the validated caller bearer) and an API-key provider gets its own bearer. Codex only sends the join to the proxy when `experimental_realtime_ws_base_url` diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index 885d2abcd4..5dce4f8b22 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -1240,6 +1240,7 @@ "server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts": "server", "server-kiro-completion-e2e.test.ts": "server", "server-kiro-oauth-401-replay.test.ts": "server", + "server-live-realtime-fixtures.test.ts": "server", "server-live.test.ts": "server", "server-loopback-host-gate.test.ts": "server", "server-management-auth.test.ts": "server", diff --git a/src/server/index/live-sideband.ts b/src/server/index/live-sideband.ts index 44acd372ef..8c4b639eb5 100644 --- a/src/server/index/live-sideband.ts +++ b/src/server/index/live-sideband.ts @@ -11,7 +11,13 @@ import { type WsData, } from "../ws-bridge"; import type { Server, ServerWebSocket } from "bun"; -import { handleLive, logLiveSidebandFrame, parseLiveSidebandTarget, resolveLiveSidebandUpgrade } from "../live"; +import { + handleLive, + logLiveSidebandFrame, + logLiveSidebandStage, + parseLiveSidebandTarget, + resolveLiveSidebandUpgrade, +} from "../live"; import { RESPONSE_TTL_MS } from "../../responses/state"; export const MAX_WS_FRAME_BYTES = 50 * 1024 * 1024; @@ -125,8 +131,33 @@ export function sendUpstreamFrame(upstream: WebSocket, frame: string | Buffer): upstream.send(Uint8Array.from(frame)); } +/** + * Translate the close a downstream client sent into one the upstream socket can carry. + * + * The client's code is the only evidence of WHY the call ended, and the upstream needs it: + * a user hanging up (1001) and a protocol fault (1002/1011) are different events on the + * account, and collapsing both into a bare 1000 erases that at the proxy. Two bounds make + * the relay safe anyway. Codes a WebSocket endpoint may never send — 1005 and 1006 are + * status codes the local runtime synthesizes for "no status" and "abnormal", 1015 is + * TLS-reserved, and anything outside the registered and private ranges is undefined — become + * 1000, because `upstream.close` throws on them and a throw here would strand the upstream + * socket. The reason is truncated to the 123-byte control-frame payload limit by bytes, not + * characters, so a multibyte reason cannot overrun the frame. + */ +export function clientCloseForUpstream(code: number, reason?: string): { code: number; reason: string } { + const sendable = code === 1000 + || code === 1001 + || code === 1003 + || (code >= 1007 && code <= 1011) + || (code >= 3000 && code <= 4999); + let text = reason ?? ""; + while (Buffer.byteLength(text) > 123) text = text.slice(0, -1); + return { code: sendable ? code : 1000, reason: text }; +} + function finalizeLiveSideband(ws: ServerWebSocket, upstream?: WebSocket): void { if (upstream && ws.data.liveUpstream !== upstream) return; + logLiveSidebandStage("relay-closed"); if (ws.data.liveCloseFallback !== undefined) { clearTimeout(ws.data.liveCloseFallback); ws.data.liveCloseFallback = undefined; @@ -281,6 +312,7 @@ export function openLiveSidebandUpstream( try { socket = createWebSocket(url, headers); } catch { + logLiveSidebandStage("upstream-failed", { status: 502, code: "upstream_error" }); resolve({ ok: false, status: 502, code: "upstream_error", message: "voice upstream connect failed" }); return; } @@ -297,6 +329,8 @@ export function openLiveSidebandUpstream( settled = true; clearTimeout(timer); removeAbortListener(); + if (result.ok) logLiveSidebandStage("upstream-open"); + else logLiveSidebandStage("upstream-failed", { status: result.status, code: result.code }); resolve(result); }; const timer = setTimeout(() => { @@ -505,6 +539,7 @@ export function attachLiveSidebandUpstream( // session, not the connect phase. if (ws.data.liveConnectTimer !== undefined) clearTimeout(ws.data.liveConnectTimer); ws.data.liveConnectTimer = undefined; + logLiveSidebandStage("relay-attached"); for (const frame of takeover.frames) { try { // Mirror the live message listener exactly: same ceiling, same diagnostic @@ -527,6 +562,7 @@ export function attachLiveSidebandUpstream( ws.data.liveOpened = true; if (ws.data.liveConnectTimer !== undefined) clearTimeout(ws.data.liveConnectTimer); ws.data.liveConnectTimer = undefined; + logLiveSidebandStage("relay-attached"); // An accepted transport alone does not prove inference/quota recovery. // Keep healthy closes neutral; explicit transport failures are recorded below. const pending = ws.data.livePending ?? []; diff --git a/src/server/index/websocket-handler.ts b/src/server/index/websocket-handler.ts index f94ca32e9c..2a23f12762 100644 --- a/src/server/index/websocket-handler.ts +++ b/src/server/index/websocket-handler.ts @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { MAX_WS_FRAME_BYTES, WEBSOCKET_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, attachLiveSidebandUpstream, + clientCloseForUpstream, closeLiveSideband, closeLiveSidebandBeforeUpgrade, enqueueLiveSidebandPendingFrame, @@ -317,13 +318,16 @@ export function createWebsocketHandler(ctx: ServeOptionsContext) { } })(); }, - close(ws: ServerWebSocket) { + close(ws: ServerWebSocket, code: number, reason: string) { if (ws.data.kind === "remote-workspace-agent") { ws.data.remoteWorkspaceClose?.(); return; } if (ws.data.kind === "live-sideband") { - closeLiveSideband(ws); + // Carry the client's own close through to the upstream instead of reporting every + // hang-up as a plain 1000. + const forwarded = clientCloseForUpstream(code, reason); + closeLiveSideband(ws, forwarded.code, forwarded.reason); return; } unregisterCodexWebSocket(ws); diff --git a/src/server/live.ts b/src/server/live.ts index eaca5f14ca..62d818fb31 100644 --- a/src/server/live.ts +++ b/src/server/live.ts @@ -72,7 +72,17 @@ export const LIVE_SIDEBAND_API_ROOT = "https://api.openai.com/v1"; * Client protocol headers relayed verbatim to the upstream on call-create and sideband upgrade. * `openai-alpha: quicksilver=v2` carries the Frameless protocol negotiation — without it the * ChatGPT backend validates the type-less Frameless session as v1 quicksilver and 400s - * (openai/codex `realtime_request_headers`, core/src/realtime_conversation.rs). Auth headers + * (openai/codex `realtime_request_headers`, core/src/realtime_conversation.rs). + * + * `x-codex-turn-metadata` is on the same list upstream builds for the sideband upgrade and was + * missing here, so every realtime turn reached the model with metadata the client had attached + * and this proxy silently dropped. The Responses passthrough already forwards it + * (`src/adapters/openai-responses/passthrough.ts`); the sideband goes to the same realtime + * upstream the caller was addressing, so there is nothing to scope it away from. That is not + * true of the images sidecar, which strips it deliberately and keeps doing so. + * + * Every name here is relayed only when the caller sent it. Nothing on this list is invented, + * which is what keeps a caller that omits one byte-identical upstream. Auth headers * (`authorization`, `chatgpt-account-id`) stay proxy-owned and are never taken from this list. */ export const LIVE_CLIENT_PROTOCOL_HEADERS = [ @@ -82,6 +92,7 @@ export const LIVE_CLIENT_PROTOCOL_HEADERS = [ "thread-id", "originator", "x-oai-attestation", + "x-codex-turn-metadata", ] as const; /** @@ -128,6 +139,40 @@ export function logLiveSidebandFrame(dir: "c2u" | "u2c", data: unknown): void { } } +/** + * Sideband lifecycle stages, recorded in the same JSONL as the frame records. + * + * Frame forensics alone cannot separate the three realtime-voice failures reported in #4721. + * A join that never reached this proxy, a join whose upstream handshake was refused, and a + * relay that opened and then carried nothing all leave the same empty file, which is why the + * original report could only say "no frame log". One record per stage makes them distinct: + * no record at all means the client never dialed the proxy, `upstream-failed` carries the + * status the client was handed, and `relay-attached` with no following frame record means the + * transport is live and the silence is upstream of it. + */ +export type LiveSidebandStage = "upstream-open" | "upstream-failed" | "relay-attached" | "relay-closed"; + +/** + * Append one lifecycle record. Same privacy rule as the frame records and for the same reason: + * no URL, no call id, no header, no frame content — only the stage and, on failure, the status + * and error code this proxy synthesized itself. + */ +export function logLiveSidebandStage( + stage: LiveSidebandStage, + detail?: { status?: number; code?: string }, +): void { + const logPath = process.env[LIVE_FRAME_LOG_ENV]; + if (!logPath) return; + try { + const record: Record = { ts: new Date().toISOString(), stage }; + if (detail?.status !== undefined) record.status = detail.status; + if (detail?.code !== undefined) record.code = detail.code; + appendFileSync(logPath, JSON.stringify(record) + "\n"); + } catch { + // Diagnostics must never break the relay. + } +} + function clientProtocolHeaders(reqHeaders: Headers): Record { const out: Record = {}; for (const name of LIVE_CLIENT_PROTOCOL_HEADERS) { diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index 1f07fe5b75..f6288a728c 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -395,6 +395,10 @@ Responses route normalization resolves provider summary defaults from the origin `src/server/index.ts` establishes the authorized upstream live sideband before accepting the client WebSocket upgrade. `openLiveSidebandUpstream` bounds the handshake to ten seconds and retains at most 32 frames and 1 MiB of preamble within the frame limit. `src/server/ws-bridge.ts` defines the runtime handoff carrying captured frames or terminal state. Failed handshakes return 502/504 and client cancellation returns 499; exact upstream 404/410 status is unavailable from Bun's client WebSocket. Admission ownership lasts until upstream close/CLOSED, including failed upgrades and failed attachment. The ordinary Responses WebSocket exchange remains separate. +The relay is transparent in both directions, and that includes the close: a downstream client's close code and reason are carried to the upstream through `clientCloseForUpstream`, which only substitutes 1000 for a code no endpoint may send and truncates the reason to the 123-byte control-frame limit. This matters to the caller, because a Frameless v3 client reads upstream 1000 as the session completing and any other code as a transport loss to reconnect. + +`OCX_LIVE_FRAME_LOG` records both frame metadata and sideband lifecycle stages (`upstream-open`, `upstream-failed`, `relay-attached`, `relay-closed`) in one JSONL, content-free in both shapes. The lifecycle half is what separates a join that never reached this proxy from one whose upstream handshake was refused and from a live relay that carried nothing; frame records alone leave all three as an empty file. `tests/server/server-live-realtime-fixtures.test.ts` drives each sideband stage against de-identified Frameless v3 fixtures in `tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/` so a failure names the stage. + ## Paginated history writer boundary `src/codex/history-provider.ts` refuses external writes to paginated or migration-capable history. `src/codex/inject.ts` checks affected rows and manifest-owned restore targets before and after config/profile/journal changes, including successful journal and fallback restores, and compensates refused restore/removal transitions. Failed config restore stops later catalog/history work and rolls back a coordinated remove transition. Apply retains an existing provider definition before candidate admission even when history preflight passes, so migration after artifact commit or during worker startup cannot leave earlier conversations without their provider. See the [history writer contract](codex-home.md#paginated-history-writer-boundary) for guarantees and concurrent-writer limits. diff --git a/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/audio.json b/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/audio.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f5145f894a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/audio.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "stage": "audio", + "kind": "frames", + "title": "Audio frames cross the relay unchanged in both directions", + "protocol": "frameless-bidi-v3", + "provenance": "Synthetic. The base64 payloads are zero-filled PCM16 silence written for this fixture, not captured microphone or model audio.", + "note": "input_audio.append is the v3 outbound name (RealtimeOutboundMessage in protocol.rs); output_audio.delta carries its payload at the top-level audio field rather than inside a content part.", + "deidentified": true, + "callId": "rtc_fixture_audio", + "preamble": [], + "clientFrames": [ + { + "type": "input_audio.append", + "audio": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=" + } + ], + "upstreamFrames": [ + { + "type": "output_audio.delta", + "audio": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=", + "start_ms": 0, + "end_ms": 100 + } + ] +} diff --git a/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/connect.json b/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/connect.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..13700d5d99 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/connect.json @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +{ + "stage": "connect", + "kind": "handshake", + "title": "Sideband join reaches the upstream with the client's protocol negotiation intact", + "protocol": "frameless-bidi-v3", + "note": "The Frameless v3 join is GET /v1/live/{callId} and negotiates through openai-alpha: quicksilver=v2. The client requests no Sec-WebSocket-Protocol, so there is no subprotocol for the proxy to preserve.", + "provenance": "Synthetic. Header names taken from the sideband upgrade codex-rs builds in codex-rs/core/src/realtime_conversation.rs; every value is invented for this fixture. No captured session, no account data, no request or response bodies.", + "deidentified": true, + "callId": "rtc_fixture_connect", + "join": { + "path": "/v1/live/rtc_fixture_connect", + "relayedHeaders": { + "openai-alpha": "quicksilver=v2", + "x-session-id": "rts_fixture_connect", + "session-id": "rts_fixture_connect", + "thread-id": "thread_fixture_connect", + "originator": "codex_app", + "x-oai-attestation": "attestation-fixture-001", + "x-codex-turn-metadata": "{\"turn_id\":\"turn_fixture_0001\"}" + }, + "withheldHeaders": { + "cookie": "fixture-session=fixture-value", + "x-openai-fedramp": "true", + "x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.7" + } + }, + "expectUpstream": { + "path": "/v1/live/rtc_fixture_connect" + } +} diff --git a/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/session.json b/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/session.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5039b3435c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/session.json @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +{ + "stage": "session", + "kind": "frames", + "title": "The session preamble reaches a client that was not connected yet", + "protocol": "frameless-bidi-v3", + "provenance": "Synthetic. Event names and payload shapes follow the Frameless Bidi v3 parser in codex-rs/codex-api/src/endpoint/realtime_websocket/protocol_frameless_bidi.rs; every identifier and string is invented for this fixture.", + "note": "A v3 WebRTC sideband carries no client session.update: the session is configured in the call-create HTTP body, and the socket only reports what the server decided. Both frames here therefore arrive before the client socket exists, which is exactly the preamble-capture path.", + "deidentified": true, + "callId": "rtc_fixture_session", + "preamble": [ + { + "type": "session.started", + "session": { + "id": "sess_fixture_0001", + "model": "gpt-live-1-codex", + "instructions": "You are a fixture assistant." + } + } + ], + "clientFrames": [], + "upstreamFrames": [ + { + "type": "session.updated", + "session": { + "id": "sess_fixture_0001", + "instructions": "You are a fixture assistant." + } + } + ] +} diff --git a/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/shutdown.json b/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/shutdown.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0a9749ed7f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/shutdown.json @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +{ + "stage": "shutdown", + "kind": "close", + "title": "Either side ending the call is reported to the other with its own code and reason", + "protocol": "frameless-bidi-v3", + "provenance": "Synthetic. Close codes and reasons are chosen for this fixture, not observed on a real call.", + "note": "v3 treats an upstream close of 1000 as the session completing and anything else as a transport loss to reconnect, so the code the proxy forwards decides whether the client retries. The codex-rs writer sends session.close and then closes without an application code; the second case here deliberately supplies one, because the proxy also serves clients that do, and a relay that rewrites every hang-up to 1000 is not transparent.", + "deidentified": true, + "cases": [ + { + "name": "the upstream ends the session", + "callId": "rtc_fixture_shutdown_upstream", + "initiator": "upstream", + "code": 1000, + "reason": "session complete", + "observedBy": "client", + "clientFrames": [ + { "type": "input_audio.append", "audio": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=" } + ] + }, + { + "name": "the client hangs up", + "callId": "rtc_fixture_shutdown_client", + "initiator": "client", + "code": 1001, + "reason": "user left the call", + "observedBy": "upstream", + "clientFrames": [{ "type": "session.close" }] + } + ] +} diff --git a/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/tools.json b/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/tools.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..478e8af87c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/tools.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "stage": "tools", + "kind": "frames", + "title": "A delegated tool request reaches the client and its result reaches the model", + "protocol": "frameless-bidi-v3", + "provenance": "Synthetic. The delegated request and its result are written for this fixture; no real command, path, or account value appears.", + "note": "v3 has no function_call frames. Local work is delegation.created, sent by the server with item.type delegation and target client, and answered by delegation.context.append carrying delegation_item_id. This is the second class of frame the field report says never arrives, and it travels only on this socket: the WebRTC oai-events data channel ignores every inbound message.", + "deidentified": true, + "callId": "rtc_fixture_tools", + "preamble": [], + "clientFrames": [ + { + "type": "input_audio.append", + "audio": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=" + } + ], + "upstreamFrames": [ + { + "type": "delegation.created", + "offset_ms": 1000, + "item": { + "id": "delegation_fixture_0001", + "type": "delegation", + "target": "client", + "content": [{ "type": "input_text", "text": "list the fixture files" }] + } + } + ], + "clientFollowUpFrames": [ + { + "type": "delegation.context.append", + "delegation_item_id": "delegation_fixture_0001", + "channel": "commentary", + "content": [{ "type": "input_text", "text": "connect.json, session.json, audio.json" }] + } + ] +} diff --git a/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/transcript.json b/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/transcript.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b9056bce45 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/realtime-voice-sideband/transcript.json @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +{ + "stage": "transcript", + "kind": "frames", + "title": "Transcription frames reach the client, including multibyte text", + "protocol": "frameless-bidi-v3", + "provenance": "Synthetic. The transcript strings are written for this fixture and describe the fixture itself; they are not a recorded conversation.", + "note": "v3 reports incremental transcript text as input_transcript.added and output_transcript.added with the text at item.text, and ends each turn with turn.done, whose turn.role separates the user transcript from the assistant one. This is the class of frame the field report says never arrives.", + "deidentified": true, + "callId": "rtc_fixture_transcript", + "preamble": [], + "clientFrames": [ + { + "type": "input_audio.append", + "audio": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=" + } + ], + "upstreamFrames": [ + { + "type": "input_transcript.added", + "item": { "id": "input_fixture_0001", "type": "input_transcript", "text": "list the " } + }, + { + "type": "turn.done", + "turn": { "id": "turn_fixture_0001", "role": "user", "transcript": "list the fixture files" } + }, + { + "type": "output_transcript.added", + "item": { "id": "output_fixture_0001", "type": "output_transcript", "text": "고정된 " } + }, + { + "type": "turn.done", + "turn": { "id": "turn_fixture_0002", "role": "assistant", "transcript": "고정된 픽스처 파일을 나열합니다" } + } + ] +} diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index d2eb5d244b..abd9538ec0 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -1068,6 +1068,7 @@ "server-key-failover-e2e.test.ts": "server", "server-kiro-completion-e2e.test.ts": "server", "server-kiro-oauth-401-replay.test.ts": "server", + "server-live-realtime-fixtures.test.ts": "server", "server-live.test.ts": "server", "server-loopback-host-gate.test.ts": "server", "server-management-auth.test.ts": "server", diff --git a/tests/server/server-live-realtime-fixtures.test.ts b/tests/server/server-live-realtime-fixtures.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ab477eff2f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/server/server-live-realtime-fixtures.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,475 @@ +/** + * Realtime voice sideband, one stage at a time (issue #4721). + * + * The field report for realtime voice v3 arrives as a single "voice is broken" symptom that is + * really three: an immediate 502 on call-create, a ten-second start timeout, and a call whose + * audio works while no transcript or tool call ever appears. Those have different causes and a + * test that drives the whole call at once cannot tell them apart. + * + * So each stage of the sideband - join, session configuration, audio, transcription, tool + * events, shutdown - gets its own fixture file and its own test against the real relay. A + * failure names the stage, which is the whole point: it separates "the proxy corrupts or drops + * this class of frame" from "the proxy never carried this class of frame at all". + * + * The fixtures are synthetic. They are hand-written from public Realtime event names and carry + * no captured session, account identifier, credential, or request body; the last test in this + * file asserts that, because the privacy:scan gate only sees a file once it is tracked. + */ +import { afterEach, beforeEach, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs"; +import { join } from "node:path"; +import { clearAccountNeedsReauth, clearAccountQuota } from "../../src/codex/auth-api"; +import { clearCodexUpstreamHealth, clearThreadAccountMap } from "../../src/codex/routing"; +import { saveConfig } from "../../src/config"; +import { MAX_WS_FRAME_BYTES, openLiveSidebandUpstream, startServer } from "../../src/server"; +import { LIVE_FRAME_LOG_ENV } from "../../src/server/live"; +import type { OcxConfig } from "../../src/types"; +import { fakeChatGptJwt } from "../helpers/fake-chatgpt-jwt"; +import { installIsolatedCodexHome, type IsolatedCodexHome } from "../helpers/isolated-codex-home"; +import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; +import { fixturePath } from "../helpers/repo-root"; + +const previousApiToken = process.env.OPENCODEX_API_AUTH_TOKEN; +const previousOpencodexHome = process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME; +const TEST_DIR = join(import.meta.dir, ".tmp-server-live-realtime-fixtures"); +let isolatedCodexHome: IsolatedCodexHome | null = null; +const DIRECT_CHATGPT_TOKEN = fakeChatGptJwt({ chatgpt_account_id: "acct-123" }); + +const FIXTURE_DIR = "realtime-voice-sideband"; +const STAGE_FILES = [ + "audio.json", + "connect.json", + "session.json", + "shutdown.json", + "tools.json", + "transcript.json", +] as const; + +beforeEach(() => { + if (existsSync(TEST_DIR)) removeTreeWithRetry(TEST_DIR); + mkdirSync(TEST_DIR, { recursive: true }); + process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = TEST_DIR; + delete process.env.OPENCODEX_API_AUTH_TOKEN; + isolatedCodexHome = installIsolatedCodexHome("ocx-live-realtime-fixtures-"); + clearCodexUpstreamHealth(); + clearThreadAccountMap(); + clearAccountQuota(); + clearAccountNeedsReauth("pool-a"); +}); + +afterEach(() => { + if (previousApiToken === undefined) delete process.env.OPENCODEX_API_AUTH_TOKEN; + else process.env.OPENCODEX_API_AUTH_TOKEN = previousApiToken; + if (previousOpencodexHome === undefined) delete process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME; + else process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = previousOpencodexHome; + isolatedCodexHome?.restore(); + isolatedCodexHome = null; + clearCodexUpstreamHealth(); + clearThreadAccountMap(); + clearAccountQuota(); + clearAccountNeedsReauth("pool-a"); + if (existsSync(TEST_DIR)) removeTreeWithRetry(TEST_DIR); +}); + +function forwardConfig(): OcxConfig { + return { + port: 0, + defaultProvider: "openai", + openaiProviderTierVersion: 2, + providers: { + openai: { + adapter: "openai-responses", + baseUrl: "https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex", + authMode: "forward", + codexAccountMode: "direct", + }, + }, + } as OcxConfig; +} + +function loadStage(file: string): Record { + return JSON.parse(readFileSync(fixturePath(FIXTURE_DIR, file), "utf8")) as Record; +} + +/** Fixture frames are compared as the exact bytes the relay is expected to carry. */ +function encodeFrames(frames: unknown): string[] { + return ((frames as unknown[] | undefined) ?? []).map(frame => JSON.stringify(frame)); +} + +async function waitFor(predicate: () => boolean, what: string, timeoutMs = 10_000): Promise { + const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs; + while (!predicate()) { + if (Date.now() > deadline) throw new Error("timed out waiting for " + what); + await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 20)); + } +} + +interface StageRun { + callId: string; + clientHeaders?: Record; + /** Frames the upstream sends the instant it accepts the upgrade, before the client attaches. */ + preamble?: string[]; + clientFrames?: string[]; + /** Frames the upstream sends once every client frame has arrived. */ + upstreamFrames?: string[]; + /** Frames the client sends only after the upstream ones land, for server-initiated exchanges. */ + clientFollowUpFrames?: string[]; + close?: { by: "client" | "upstream"; code: number; reason: string }; +} + +interface StageResult { + upstreamPath: string; + upstreamHeaders: Headers; + upstreamReceived: string[]; + clientReceived: string[]; + upstreamClose?: { code: number; reason: string }; + clientClose?: { code: number; reason: string }; +} + +/** + * Drive one sideband stage end to end: a real opencodex server, a real client WebSocket, and a + * local upstream standing in for the Realtime API. Only api.openai.com sideband targets are + * redirected, so the proxy still builds the upstream URL itself. + */ +async function relaySidebandStage(run: StageRun): Promise { + const result: StageResult = { + upstreamPath: "", + upstreamHeaders: new Headers(), + upstreamReceived: [], + clientReceived: [], + }; + const preamble = run.preamble ?? []; + const clientFrames = run.clientFrames ?? []; + const upstreamFrames = run.upstreamFrames ?? []; + const clientFollowUpFrames = run.clientFollowUpFrames ?? []; + const closesUpstreamSide = run.close?.by === "upstream"; + + const upstream = Bun.serve({ + port: 0, + fetch(req, server) { + const url = new URL(req.url); + if (req.headers.get("upgrade")?.toLowerCase() === "websocket") { + result.upstreamPath = url.pathname; + result.upstreamHeaders = new Headers(req.headers); + if (server.upgrade(req, { data: {} })) return undefined as unknown as Response; + return new Response("upgrade failed", { status: 500 }); + } + return new Response("not found", { status: 404 }); + }, + websocket: { + maxPayloadLength: MAX_WS_FRAME_BYTES, + open(ws) { + for (const frame of preamble) ws.send(frame); + if (clientFrames.length > 0) return; + for (const frame of upstreamFrames) ws.send(frame); + if (closesUpstreamSide && run.close) ws.close(run.close.code, run.close.reason); + }, + message(ws, message) { + result.upstreamReceived.push(typeof message === "string" ? message : message.toString("utf8")); + if (result.upstreamReceived.length !== clientFrames.length) return; + for (const frame of upstreamFrames) ws.send(frame); + if (closesUpstreamSide && run.close) ws.close(run.close.code, run.close.reason); + }, + close(_ws, code, reason) { + result.upstreamClose = { code, reason }; + }, + }, + }); + + saveConfig(forwardConfig()); + + const RealWebSocket = globalThis.WebSocket; + const upstreamPort = upstream.port; + globalThis.WebSocket = class extends RealWebSocket { + constructor(url: string | URL, protocols?: string | string[] | Record) { + const parsed = new URL(String(url)); + const target = + parsed.hostname === "api.openai.com" && parsed.pathname.startsWith("/v1/live/") + ? "ws://127.0.0.1:" + upstreamPort + parsed.pathname + parsed.search + : String(url); + super(target, protocols as string[]); + } + } as typeof WebSocket; + + const server = startServer(0); + try { + const wsUrl = new URL("/v1/live/" + run.callId, server.url); + wsUrl.protocol = "ws:"; + const client = new RealWebSocket(wsUrl.toString(), { + headers: { + authorization: "Bearer " + DIRECT_CHATGPT_TOKEN, + "chatgpt-account-id": "acct-123", + ...(run.clientHeaders ?? {}), + }, + } as unknown as string[]); + + let clientFailed = false; + client.addEventListener("message", event => { + result.clientReceived.push(String(event.data)); + }); + client.addEventListener("close", event => { + result.clientClose = { code: event.code, reason: event.reason }; + }); + client.addEventListener("error", () => { + clientFailed = true; + }); + + await waitFor( + () => clientFailed || client.readyState === RealWebSocket.OPEN, + "the client sideband socket to open on stage " + run.callId, + ); + if (clientFailed) throw new Error("client websocket error on stage " + run.callId); + + for (const frame of clientFrames) client.send(frame); + + const expectedFromUpstream = preamble.length + upstreamFrames.length; + if (expectedFromUpstream > 0) { + await waitFor( + () => result.clientReceived.length >= expectedFromUpstream, + "upstream frames on stage " + run.callId, + ); + } + if (clientFrames.length > 0) { + await waitFor( + () => result.upstreamReceived.length >= clientFrames.length, + "client frames on stage " + run.callId, + ); + } + + if (clientFollowUpFrames.length > 0) { + for (const frame of clientFollowUpFrames) client.send(frame); + await waitFor( + () => result.upstreamReceived.length >= clientFrames.length + clientFollowUpFrames.length, + "client follow-up frames on stage " + run.callId, + ); + } + + if (run.close?.by === "client") { + client.close(run.close.code, run.close.reason); + await waitFor(() => result.upstreamClose !== undefined, "the upstream close on stage " + run.callId); + } else if (run.close?.by === "upstream") { + await waitFor(() => result.clientClose !== undefined, "the client close on stage " + run.callId); + } else { + client.close(); + } + } finally { + globalThis.WebSocket = RealWebSocket; + await server.stop(true); + await upstream.stop(true); + } + return result; +} + +test("stage connect: the sideband join reaches the upstream with the client's protocol negotiation intact", async () => { + const stage = loadStage("connect.json"); + const stageJoin = stage.join as { + path: string; + relayedHeaders: Record; + withheldHeaders: Record; + }; + const expectUpstream = stage.expectUpstream as { path: string }; + + const result = await relaySidebandStage({ + callId: stage.callId as string, + clientHeaders: { ...stageJoin.relayedHeaders, ...stageJoin.withheldHeaders }, + clientFrames: [JSON.stringify({ type: "input_audio.append", audio: "AAE=" })], + upstreamFrames: [JSON.stringify({ type: "session.started", session: { id: "sess_fixture_connect" } })], + }); + + expect(result.upstreamPath).toBe(expectUpstream.path); + // Protocol negotiation belongs to the client: relay what it sent, verbatim, and invent nothing. + for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(stageJoin.relayedHeaders)) { + expect([name, result.upstreamHeaders.get(name)]).toEqual([name, value]); + } + // Everything else the caller attached stays on this side of the proxy. + for (const name of Object.keys(stageJoin.withheldHeaders)) { + expect([name, result.upstreamHeaders.get(name)]).toEqual([name, null]); + } +}, { timeout: 20_000 }); + +test("stage session: the session preamble reaches a client that was not connected yet", async () => { + const stage = loadStage("session.json"); + const preamble = encodeFrames(stage.preamble); + const clientFrames = encodeFrames(stage.clientFrames); + const upstreamFrames = encodeFrames(stage.upstreamFrames); + + const result = await relaySidebandStage({ + callId: stage.callId as string, + preamble, + clientFrames, + upstreamFrames, + }); + + // Everything here lands before the client socket exists, because a v3 WebRTC sideband sends no + // client session.update at all. Dropping that capture is how a session that never learns it + // started ends up as audio with no session state. + expect(result.clientReceived).toEqual([...preamble, ...upstreamFrames]); + expect(result.upstreamReceived).toEqual(clientFrames); + expect(result.clientReceived.join("\n")).toContain("session.started"); +}, { timeout: 20_000 }); + +test("stage audio: audio buffer and audio response frames cross the relay unchanged", async () => { + const stage = loadStage("audio.json"); + const clientFrames = encodeFrames(stage.clientFrames); + const upstreamFrames = encodeFrames(stage.upstreamFrames); + + const result = await relaySidebandStage({ + callId: stage.callId as string, + clientFrames, + upstreamFrames, + }); + + expect(result.upstreamReceived).toEqual(clientFrames); + expect(result.clientReceived).toEqual(upstreamFrames); + expect(result.upstreamReceived.join("\n")).toContain("input_audio.append"); + expect(result.clientReceived.join("\n")).toContain("output_audio.delta"); +}, { timeout: 20_000 }); + +test("stage transcript: transcription frames reach the client, multibyte text included", async () => { + const stage = loadStage("transcript.json"); + const clientFrames = encodeFrames(stage.clientFrames); + const upstreamFrames = encodeFrames(stage.upstreamFrames); + + const result = await relaySidebandStage({ + callId: stage.callId as string, + clientFrames, + upstreamFrames, + }); + + expect(result.clientReceived).toEqual(upstreamFrames); + // The reported symptom is audio without transcripts, so name those events directly: a + // byte-equal list is still vacuous if the fixture stopped carrying them. + const delivered = result.clientReceived.join("\n"); + expect(delivered).toContain("input_transcript.added"); + expect(delivered).toContain("output_transcript.added"); + expect(delivered).toContain("turn.done"); + expect(delivered).toContain("고정된 픽스처 파일을 나열합니다"); +}, { timeout: 20_000 }); + +test("stage tools: a delegated request reaches the client and its result reaches the model", async () => { + const stage = loadStage("tools.json"); + const clientFrames = encodeFrames(stage.clientFrames); + const upstreamFrames = encodeFrames(stage.upstreamFrames); + const clientFollowUpFrames = encodeFrames(stage.clientFollowUpFrames); + + const result = await relaySidebandStage({ + callId: stage.callId as string, + clientFrames, + upstreamFrames, + clientFollowUpFrames, + }); + + expect(result.clientReceived).toEqual(upstreamFrames); + expect(result.upstreamReceived).toEqual([...clientFrames, ...clientFollowUpFrames]); + // The delegated request has to arrive AND its result has to get back, in that order. + expect(result.clientReceived.join("\n")).toContain("delegation.created"); + expect(result.upstreamReceived.join("\n")).toContain("delegation.context.append"); +}, { timeout: 20_000 }); + +test("stage shutdown: either side ending the call is reported to the other with its own code and reason", async () => { + const stage = loadStage("shutdown.json"); + const cases = stage.cases as Array<{ + name: string; + callId: string; + initiator: "client" | "upstream"; + code: number; + reason: string; + observedBy: "client" | "upstream"; + clientFrames: unknown[]; + }>; + + for (const item of cases) { + const result = await relaySidebandStage({ + callId: item.callId, + clientFrames: encodeFrames(item.clientFrames), + close: { by: item.initiator, code: item.code, reason: item.reason }, + }); + const observed = item.observedBy === "client" ? result.clientClose : result.upstreamClose; + expect([item.name, observed?.code]).toEqual([item.name, item.code]); + expect([item.name, observed?.reason]).toEqual([item.name, item.reason]); + } +}, { timeout: 30_000 }); + +test("the realtime voice fixtures stay de-identified and fully registered", () => { + const present = readdirSync(fixturePath(FIXTURE_DIR)).sort(); + // An unregistered fixture is an unverified fixture: every file here is driven by a test above. + expect(present).toEqual([...STAGE_FILES].sort()); + + const forbidden: Array<{ label: string; pattern: RegExp }> = [ + { label: "a macOS home path", pattern: /\/Users\/[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\// }, + { label: "an email address", pattern: /[A-Z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z]{2,}/i }, + { label: "a bearer value", pattern: /Bearer\s+\S/i }, + { + label: "an API key or JWT", + pattern: /\b(?:sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,})\b/, + }, + { + label: "an authorization or account field", + pattern: /"(?:authorization|chatgpt-account-id|api[-_]?key|access_token|client_secret)"\s*:/i, + }, + ]; + + for (const file of STAGE_FILES) { + const raw = readFileSync(fixturePath(FIXTURE_DIR, file), "utf8"); + const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as Record; + expect([file, parsed.deidentified]).toEqual([file, true]); + expect([file, typeof parsed.provenance]).toEqual([file, "string"]); + for (const { label, pattern } of forbidden) { + expect([file, label, pattern.test(raw)]).toEqual([file, label, false]); + } + } +}); + +test("sideband lifecycle records separate a refused join from a relay that ran", async () => { + const logPath = join(TEST_DIR, "live-lifecycle.jsonl"); + const previousFrameLog = process.env[LIVE_FRAME_LOG_ENV]; + process.env[LIVE_FRAME_LOG_ENV] = logPath; + try { + // A join whose upstream never opens. This is the case a frame-only log could not record at + // all, which is why an empty file read the same as a working call that carried nothing. + const refused = await openLiveSidebandUpstream( + "wss://api.openai.com/v1/live/rtc_fixture_refused", + {}, + () => { + throw new Error("upstream refused the sideband join"); + }, + ); + expect(refused.ok).toBe(false); + + const stage = loadStage("audio.json"); + const clientFrames = encodeFrames(stage.clientFrames); + await relaySidebandStage({ + callId: stage.callId as string, + clientFrames, + upstreamFrames: encodeFrames(stage.upstreamFrames), + }); + await waitFor( + () => existsSync(logPath) && readFileSync(logPath, "utf8").includes("relay-closed"), + "the sideband lifecycle log", + ); + + const raw = readFileSync(logPath, "utf8"); + const records = raw.trim().split("\n").map(line => JSON.parse(line) as Record); + const stages = records.filter(record => typeof record.stage === "string").map(record => record.stage); + // The three reported symptoms are only distinguishable if these are distinct records. + expect(stages).toContain("upstream-failed"); + expect(stages).toContain("upstream-open"); + expect(stages).toContain("relay-attached"); + expect(stages).toContain("relay-closed"); + // Only the refusal carries a status, because only the refusal handed the caller one. + expect(records.find(record => record.stage === "upstream-failed")) + .toMatchObject({ status: 502, code: "upstream_error" }); + + // Same privacy rule as the frame records: stage and status, never content. + const allowed = new Set(["ts", "stage", "status", "code", "dir", "kind", "bytes", "fffd"]); + for (const record of records) { + for (const key of Object.keys(record)) expect([key, allowed.has(key)]).toEqual([key, true]); + } + for (const frame of clientFrames) expect(raw).not.toContain(frame); + expect(raw).not.toContain("output_audio.delta"); + expect(raw).not.toContain("rtc_fixture"); + } finally { + if (previousFrameLog === undefined) delete process.env[LIVE_FRAME_LOG_ENV]; + else process.env[LIVE_FRAME_LOG_ENV] = previousFrameLog; + } +}, { timeout: 30_000 }); diff --git a/tests/server/server-live.test.ts b/tests/server/server-live.test.ts index 5fd7a718c2..fe38564001 100644 --- a/tests/server/server-live.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/server-live.test.ts @@ -1329,9 +1329,9 @@ test("sideband frame log preserves delivery without recording damaged or clean t expect(received).toContain(FFFD_TEXT); expect(c2uClean).toBeDefined(); expect(c2uClean.fffd).toBe(false); - // Even a short damaged transcript must not be persisted as diagnostic context. + // Nothing here may persist as diagnostic context, lifecycle rows included (see #4721). for (const line of lines) { - expect(Object.keys(line).sort()).toEqual(["bytes", "dir", "fffd", "kind", "ts"]); + expect(Object.keys(line).sort()).toEqual(line.stage ? ["stage", "ts"] : ["bytes", "dir", "fffd", "kind", "ts"]); expect(JSON.stringify(line)).not.toContain("clean-frame"); expect(JSON.stringify(line)).not.toContain(FFFD_TEXT); } From 70129acd6be9610c0f03f5c9cf4405535f324685 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:31:45 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 087/113] fix(providers): give Kimi the Responses tool-result adjacency repair (#4726) [skip ci] Kimi's Code Plan Responses endpoint requires a tool result to follow its call immediately. When the desktop LSP hook injects a developer message between a code-mode exec call and its output, Kimi rejects the whole request with HTTP 400 naming the unanswered tool_call_id. Because the row replays full history every turn, the session then fails permanently rather than once. opencodex already implements exactly this repair in normalizeResponsesToolResultAdjacency, but passthrough gates it on requiresAdjacentResponsesToolResults, which only DeepSeek's entry seeded. Kimi inherited no normalization, so a user who configures Kimi onto the Responses wire hits the 400 on every affected turn. Seed the flag on both kimi and kimi-code. The existing fill-only derivation in providerConfigSeed, enrichProviderFromRegistry and routedProviderConfig carries it into new and already-persisted rows without overriding an explicit user value, and the flag is inert while these presets use the Chat wire. The repair reorders; it does not delete. The intervening developer message is preserved and moves after the batch, so the fix cannot be mistaken for silencing the 400 by dropping hook context. Coverage pins that, plus call_id pairing with two outstanding calls and interleaved noise, and an already-adjacent input being left untouched. No upstream specification documents the requirement; the evidence is the reported 400 and DeepSeek's identical failure shape under #1292. Upstream Codex deliberately leaves an intervening developer message where it is, so this stays a per-provider capability rather than a wire-wide default. --- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 1 + src/providers/registry/entries-core.ts | 4 + src/providers/registry/entries-extended.ts | 2 + structure/providers/chat-compat.md | 8 ++ tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 1 + .../kimi-responses-adjacency.test.ts | 131 ++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 147 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/providers/kimi-responses-adjacency.test.ts diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index bc654f60c6..7e9cc52959 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -789,6 +789,7 @@ "key-login-preserves-model-costs.test.ts": "oauth", "keyring-smoke.test.ts": "ci-workflows", "kimi-oauth-identity.test.ts": "providers", + "kimi-responses-adjacency.test.ts": "providers", "kiro-account-quota.test.ts": "providers/kiro", "kiro-adapter.test.ts": "providers/kiro", "kiro-auth-context-continuation.test.ts": "providers/kiro", diff --git a/src/providers/registry/entries-core.ts b/src/providers/registry/entries-core.ts index 32e5cc2d95..9df05ff5f6 100644 --- a/src/providers/registry/entries-core.ts +++ b/src/providers/registry/entries-core.ts @@ -420,6 +420,10 @@ export const PROVIDER_REGISTRY_CORE: readonly ProviderRegistryEntry[] = [ // or the one the Claude /v1/messages inbound derives); the adapter itself never invents one. // Evidence: https://platform.kimi.com/docs/api/chat promptCacheKey: true, + // Kimi's Responses endpoint rejects hook-provided context between a tool call and + // its matching result (#4726), the same strict shape DeepSeek exposed in #1292. + // The flag is inert while this preset uses the Chat wire. + requiresAdjacentResponsesToolResults: true, featured: true, oauthId: "kimi", jawcodeBundle: "moonshot", diff --git a/src/providers/registry/entries-extended.ts b/src/providers/registry/entries-extended.ts index 5cea61a84f..1791659615 100644 --- a/src/providers/registry/entries-extended.ts +++ b/src/providers/registry/entries-extended.ts @@ -890,6 +890,8 @@ export const PROVIDER_REGISTRY_EXTENDED: readonly ProviderRegistryEntry[] = [ modelSuffixBracketStrip: true, // API-key form of the same Kimi Code Plan transport; keep cache affinity identical to OAuth. promptCacheKey: true, + // Keep Responses tool-result adjacency aligned with the OAuth preset (#4726). + requiresAdjacentResponsesToolResults: true, models: KIMI_CODING_MODELS, modelContextWindows: KIMI_CODING_MODEL_CONTEXT_WINDOWS, modelInputModalities: KIMI_CODING_MODEL_INPUT_MODALITIES, diff --git a/structure/providers/chat-compat.md b/structure/providers/chat-compat.md index 5ee17ed807..b2eaadee79 100644 --- a/structure/providers/chat-compat.md +++ b/structure/providers/chat-compat.md @@ -131,6 +131,14 @@ dropped. This preserves #1292's single-call adjacency repair without splitting a batch away from its preceding plaintext reasoning (#1477). Tolerant providers never enter this pass, and duplicate, missing, or backwards call/result pairs are left for the upstream to reject rather than guessed. +That pass is gated by `requiresAdjacentResponsesToolResults`, not by provider name. Kimi's Code Plan +Responses endpoint enforces the same strict shape and rejects a hook-split pair with HTTP 400 (#4726), +so `kimi` and `kimi-code` carry the flag as well. The flag is inert while those presets use the Chat +wire and takes effect when a row is configured onto `openai-responses`, which is the configuration the +report exercised. No upstream specification documents the requirement; the evidence is the observed +400 and DeepSeek's identical failure shape, which is why this stays a per-provider capability rather +than a wire-wide default — upstream Codex leaves an intervening developer message where it is. + > Decision record: [ADR-0052](../decisions/ADR-0052-reasoning-and-tool-result-compatibility.md) ## OpenRouter provider routing diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index b67edffd47..91a58a6461 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -619,6 +619,7 @@ "key-login-preserves-model-costs.test.ts": "oauth", "keyring-smoke.test.ts": "ci-workflows", "kimi-oauth-identity.test.ts": "providers", + "kimi-responses-adjacency.test.ts": "providers", "kiro-account-quota.test.ts": "providers/kiro", "kiro-adapter.test.ts": "providers/kiro", "kiro-auth-context-continuation.test.ts": "providers/kiro", diff --git a/tests/providers/kimi-responses-adjacency.test.ts b/tests/providers/kimi-responses-adjacency.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e498fbae4c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/kimi-responses-adjacency.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { createResponsesPassthroughAdapter as createResponsesPassthroughAdapterProduction } from "../../src/adapters/openai-responses"; +import { normalizeResponsesToolResultAdjacency } from "../../src/adapters/openai-responses/tool-output-recovery"; +import { enrichProviderFromRegistry, providerConfigSeed } from "../../src/providers/derive"; +import { getProviderRegistryEntry } from "../../src/providers/registry"; +import { routedProviderConfig } from "../../src/router"; +import type { OcxProviderConfig } from "../../src/types"; +import { withTestTranslatorBudget } from "../helpers/translator-budget"; + +const MODEL = "kimi-k2.7-code"; + +const createResponsesPassthroughAdapter = ( + ...args: Parameters +) => withTestTranslatorBudget(createResponsesPassthroughAdapterProduction(...args)); + +function buildBody(provider: OcxProviderConfig, input: unknown[]): { input: unknown[] } { + const built = createResponsesPassthroughAdapter(provider).buildRequest({ + modelId: MODEL, + context: { messages: [] }, + stream: true, + options: {}, + _rawBody: { model: MODEL, input }, + } as Parameters["buildRequest"]>[0], { + headers: new Headers(), + }); + return JSON.parse(String(built.body)) as { input: unknown[] }; +} + +describe("Kimi Responses tool-result adjacency", () => { + test("both Kimi registry entries seed the adjacency capability", () => { + for (const providerId of ["kimi", "kimi-code"]) { + const entry = getProviderRegistryEntry(providerId)!; + expect(entry.requiresAdjacentResponsesToolResults).toBe(true); + expect(providerConfigSeed(entry).requiresAdjacentResponsesToolResults).toBe(true); + } + }); + + test("a stale persisted Kimi row is backfilled and activates adjacency repair on replay", () => { + const stale: OcxProviderConfig = { + adapter: "openai-responses", + baseUrl: "https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1", + authMode: "oauth", + statelessResponses: true, + }; + const routedStale = routedProviderConfig("kimi", { ...stale }); + const call = { type: "custom_tool_call", call_id: "exec_replay", name: "exec", input: "text('hi')" }; + const injected = { + type: "message", + role: "developer", + content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "[hook] replay diagnostics" }], + }; + const output = { type: "custom_tool_call_output", call_id: "exec_replay", output: "hi" }; + const nextTurn = { + type: "message", + role: "user", + content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "continue" }], + }; + + expect(stale.requiresAdjacentResponsesToolResults).toBeUndefined(); + expect(routedStale.requiresAdjacentResponsesToolResults).toBe(true); + enrichProviderFromRegistry("kimi", stale); + expect(stale.requiresAdjacentResponsesToolResults).toBe(true); + expect(buildBody(stale, [call, injected, output, nextTurn]).input).toEqual([ + call, + output, + injected, + nextTurn, + ]); + }); + + test("moves a result next to its call while preserving an intervening developer message", () => { + const call = { type: "custom_tool_call", call_id: "exec_single", name: "exec", input: "text('ok')" }; + const injected = { + type: "message", + role: "developer", + content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "[hook] LSP diagnostics: none" }], + }; + const output = { type: "custom_tool_call_output", call_id: "exec_single", output: "ok" }; + const body = { input: [call, injected, output] }; + + expect(normalizeResponsesToolResultAdjacency(body)).toEqual({ input: [call, output, injected] }); + }); + + test("keeps call_id pairing and all interleaved history with two outstanding replayed calls", () => { + const priorUser = { + type: "message", + role: "user", + content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "inspect both files" }], + }; + const callA = { type: "function_call", call_id: "call_a", name: "read_file", arguments: "{\"path\":\"a\"}" }; + const firstInjected = { + type: "message", + role: "developer", + content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "[hook] first diagnostic" }], + }; + const callB = { type: "custom_tool_call", call_id: "call_b", name: "exec", input: "text('b')" }; + const secondInjected = { + type: "message", + role: "developer", + content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "[hook] second diagnostic" }], + }; + const outputA = { type: "function_call_output", call_id: "call_a", output: "A" }; + const outputB = { type: "custom_tool_call_output", call_id: "call_b", output: "B" }; + const nextTurn = { + type: "message", + role: "user", + content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "continue" }], + }; + + const normalized = normalizeResponsesToolResultAdjacency({ + input: [priorUser, callA, firstInjected, callB, secondInjected, outputA, outputB, nextTurn], + }); + + expect(normalized).toEqual({ + input: [priorUser, callA, callB, outputA, outputB, firstInjected, secondInjected, nextTurn], + }); + }); + + test("leaves an already-adjacent call and result input untouched", () => { + const call = { type: "custom_tool_call", call_id: "exec_adjacent", name: "exec", input: "text('ok')" }; + const output = { type: "custom_tool_call_output", call_id: "exec_adjacent", output: "ok" }; + const tail = { + type: "message", + role: "developer", + content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "retained context" }], + }; + const body = { input: [call, output, tail] }; + + expect(normalizeResponsesToolResultAdjacency(body)).toBe(body); + }); +}); From 1eccd0f7a40bc9d52f1923bb25102732c6a9c3e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:30:11 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 088/113] fix(responses): refuse a combo failover that cannot replay mandatory reasoning (#4696) [skip ci] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Official DeepSeek rejects a tool-bearing continuation whose prior reasoning is not replayed, with 400 invalid_request_error: the reasoning_text in the thinking mode must be passed back to the API. A combo failover reached that state. The reported shape is narrow and still reproduces. When the previous successful turn's reasoning exists only as opaque encrypted_content minted by a different provider, account or model, the replay identity no longer matches, so the sanitizer strips the foreign blob. Stripping is correct — that blob is not decodable by the new route — but it left a reasoning item carrying neither encrypted_content nor reasoning_text, and forwarded that hollow shell to a provider whose thinking mode requires the real thing. A history that already carries plaintext reasoning_text was never affected and is unchanged: preserveResponsesReasoningContent keeps it, and each combo target clones the original request body rather than reusing a previous target's converted one. Fail closed instead of guessing. A target that requires plaintext reasoning replay is ineligible for a history proven to have lost it across a route change; failover continues to the next target, and an exhausted combo returns 400 target_incompatible through the same core-errors factory convention as unreadable_encrypted_agent_task. Reasoning is never fabricated, and an opaque blob belonging to another provider or account is never forwarded. A target that cannot be routed at all stays eligible here, so an unrelated routing failure still surfaces as 503 combo_unavailable rather than being misreported as a reasoning incompatibility. requiresPlaintextReasoningReplay() names the provider contract in one place. It currently derives from preserveResponsesReasoningContent plus requiresAdjacentResponsesToolResults because official DeepSeek is the only entry setting both; that derivation is documented and should become an explicit capability as soon as a second provider needs it. --- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 1 + src/adapters/openai-responses/passthrough.ts | 19 +- src/server/responses/core-combo.ts | 57 +++- src/server/responses/core-errors.ts | 18 ++ src/server/responses/core-replay.ts | 137 ++++++-- structure/transports/responses.md | 8 + tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 1 + .../deepseek-reasoning-replay.test.ts | 21 ++ ...combo-reasoning-replay-eligibility.test.ts | 300 ++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 524 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/server/server-combo-reasoning-replay-eligibility.test.ts diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index 885d2abcd4..bc654f60c6 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -1234,6 +1234,7 @@ "server-background-lifecycle.test.ts": "server", "server-clickjacking-headers.test.ts": "server", "server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts": "server", + "server-combo-reasoning-replay-eligibility.test.ts": "server", "server-google-antigravity-oauth-401-replay.test.ts": "server", "server-images-bodyless-content-length.test.ts": "server", "server-images.test.ts": "server", diff --git a/src/adapters/openai-responses/passthrough.ts b/src/adapters/openai-responses/passthrough.ts index 7bdfd123b6..740130ab04 100644 --- a/src/adapters/openai-responses/passthrough.ts +++ b/src/adapters/openai-responses/passthrough.ts @@ -41,6 +41,19 @@ import { applyTierDecisionToResponsesBody, normalizeCanonicalForwardContinuation import { normalizeImageGenClientTools, preferConfiguredHostedTools } from "./image-gen"; import { stripMuseSparkUnsupportedWebSearchFields, stripOpenAiOnlyWebSearchFields } from "./web-search"; +/** + * Identifies DeepSeek's strict Responses replay contract: tool-bearing continuations need + * plaintext reasoning and cannot consume opaque reasoning state. The two existing flags are + * current evidence for that one provider contract, not equivalent capabilities: preservation + * keeps plaintext reasoning on the wire, while adjacency marks its strict tool-history shape. + * The moment a second provider needs this behavior, replace this derivation with an explicit + * registry capability rather than extending the inference. + */ +export function requiresPlaintextReasoningReplay(provider: OcxProviderConfig): boolean { + return provider.preserveResponsesReasoningContent === true + && provider.requiresAdjacentResponsesToolResults === true; +} + // Headers relayed verbatim from the caller in OAuth-passthrough ("forward") mode. // Exported so the web-search sidecar reuses the exact same forwarded-auth set for its ChatGPT call. export const FORWARD_HEADERS = [ @@ -371,6 +384,10 @@ export function createResponsesPassthroughAdapter(provider: OcxProviderConfig): } } const threadServingIdentityChanged = parsed._stripReasoningEncryptedContent === true; + // Providers with the strict plaintext tool-continuation contract cannot consume any + // encrypted reasoning blob, including one whose provenance is unknown. Combo routing + // separately refuses a proven cross-route replay when no plaintext exists; this final + // serializer guard ensures the foreign opaque state is never forwarded regardless. const sanitizedBody = normalizeToolSchemas( stripItemIdsWhenUnstored( stripInvalidItemIds( @@ -384,7 +401,7 @@ export function createResponsesPassthroughAdapter(provider: OcxProviderConfig): { preserveRawReasoningContent: provider.preserveResponsesReasoningContent === true, dropNullContentChannel: !isOpenAiOperatedResponsesDestination(provider), - stripEncryptedContent: threadServingIdentityChanged, + stripEncryptedContent: threadServingIdentityChanged || requiresPlaintextReasoningReplay(provider), }, ), provider, diff --git a/src/server/responses/core-combo.ts b/src/server/responses/core-combo.ts index 1db4b9d0bf..913591a204 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/core-combo.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/core-combo.ts @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ import { isThreadSpawnRequest, supportedLadderFor } from "../effort-policy"; import { clientCancelledResponse, comboUnavailable, + targetIncompatibleResponse, unreadableEncryptedAgentTaskResponse, } from "./core-errors"; import { @@ -53,7 +54,12 @@ import { createChildPassthroughCallbackGate, consumeComboFailure, } from "./core-combo-failure"; -import { linkRequestSessionLane, sessionLaneIdFromRequest } from "../request-log-conversation"; +import { + linkRequestSessionLane, + reasoningReplayConversationIdFromResponsesRequest, + sessionIdHeaderFromRequest, + sessionLaneIdFromRequest, +} from "../request-log-conversation"; import type { CodexAuthContext } from "../../codex/auth-context"; import type { ResponsesTerminalStatus } from "../../bridge"; import { beginRequestAttempt, sealRequestAttemptIdentity, finishRequestAttempt } from "../request-log"; @@ -67,6 +73,7 @@ import { } from "../relay"; import { preflightComboStreamResponse } from "./combo-stream-preflight"; import { streamingContextOverflowResponse, jsonContextOverflowResponse } from "./context-overflow"; +import { mandatoryResponsesReasoningReplayUnavailable } from "./core-replay"; /** * Sends one combo target may run on its own before the ladder moves on. A target is a whole @@ -231,6 +238,29 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( : undefined, recoveredPlaintext: false, }; + const reasoningReplayConversationId = reasoningReplayConversationIdFromResponsesRequest({ + clientThreadId: inboundClientThreadId, + threadIdHeader: req.headers.get("thread-id"), + sessionIdHeader: sessionIdHeaderFromRequest(req.headers), + }); + const reasoningReplayEligible = (target: (typeof combo.targets)[number]): boolean => { + try { + const route = routeConcreteModel(config, `${target.provider}/${target.model}`); + const unavailable = mandatoryResponsesReasoningReplayUnavailable({ + body, + clientThreadId: reasoningReplayConversationId, + providerName: route.providerName, + provider: route.provider, + adapterName: route.provider.adapter, + modelId: route.modelId, + }); + return !unavailable; + } catch { + // Routing failures are not evidence of replay incompatibility. Keep the target eligible so + // the existing selection and dispatch path preserves its original routing failure surface. + return true; + } + }; const adoptFailedChildLog = (childLog: RequestLogContext): void => { // Attempts remain the complete physical history; the logical row mirrors the most recent // failed target so an exhausted combo still has useful top-level reasoning diagnostics. @@ -262,6 +292,18 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( let comboPayloadReadable = false; const payloadEligible = (target: (typeof combo.targets)[number]): boolean => comboPayloadReadable || !unreadableEncryptedAgentTask || canDecryptUnreadableAgentTask(target); + const targetEligible = (target: (typeof combo.targets)[number]): boolean => + payloadEligible(target) && reasoningReplayEligible(target); + const onlyReplayIncompatibleTargetsRemain = (excluded: Iterable = []): boolean => { + const excludedKeys = new Set(excluded); + const remaining = combo.targets.filter(target => { + const provider = config.providers[target.provider]; + return provider?.disabled !== true + && !excludedKeys.has(targetKey(target)) + && payloadEligible(target); + }); + return remaining.length > 0 && remaining.every(target => !reasoningReplayEligible(target)); + }; let encryptedTaskRecoveryAttempted = false; let recoveryFailureReason: AgentTaskRecoveryFailureReason | undefined; let storedPool401ReplayDispatched = false; @@ -326,7 +368,7 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( abortSignal: options.abortSignal, }); let pick = await pickWithWait({ - eligible: payloadEligible, + eligible: targetEligible, now: initialNow, }); @@ -351,6 +393,7 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( } if (!pick) { + if (onlyReplayIncompatibleTargetsRemain()) return targetIncompatibleResponse(); return options.abortSignal?.aborted ? clientCancelledResponse() : comboUnavailable(comboId); @@ -499,7 +542,7 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( const deferCodexResetDerivedCooldown = combo.strategy === "failover" && combo.targets.slice(pick.targetIndex + 1).some(target => target.provider === currentTargetProvider - && payloadEligible(target) + && targetEligible(target) && !isComboTargetInCooldown(comboId, target), ); response = await requestDispatchers.handleResponses(childRequest, config, childLog, { @@ -692,7 +735,7 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( cooldownScope: comboFailureCooldownScope(failure.response.status, failure.classificationText, { code: failure.upstreamCode, }), - eligible: payloadEligible, + eligible: targetEligible, status: failure.response.status, code: failure.upstreamCode, message: failure.classificationText, @@ -702,12 +745,16 @@ export async function executeComboResponses( } else { pick = await pickWithWait({ exclude: pick.attempted, - eligible: payloadEligible, + eligible: targetEligible, now: failureNow, }); } if (!pick) { if (options.abortSignal?.aborted) return clientCancelledResponse(); + if (onlyReplayIncompatibleTargetsRemain(attemptedTargets)) { + adoptFailedChildLog(childLog); + return targetIncompatibleResponse(); + } if (unreadableEncryptedAgentTask && !comboPayloadReadable) { const recoveredTarget = await pickWithWait({ exclude: attemptedTargets, diff --git a/src/server/responses/core-errors.ts b/src/server/responses/core-errors.ts index 5e90d7fa02..39dc0ce960 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/core-errors.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/core-errors.ts @@ -150,3 +150,21 @@ export function unreadableEncryptedAgentTaskResponse(reason?: AgentTaskRecoveryF { status: 400, headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } }, ); } + + +export const TARGET_INCOMPATIBLE_MESSAGE = + "No remaining combo target can continue this tool-bearing history because the reasoning required for replay is unavailable after the serving route changed. Start a new conversation or configure a combo target that can consume the available reasoning."; + + +export function targetIncompatibleResponse(): Response { + return new Response( + JSON.stringify({ + error: { + message: TARGET_INCOMPATIBLE_MESSAGE, + type: "invalid_request_error", + code: "target_incompatible", + }, + }), + { status: 400, headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } }, + ); +} diff --git a/src/server/responses/core-replay.ts b/src/server/responses/core-replay.ts index c28cb1bac0..3a59127bb5 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/core-replay.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/core-replay.ts @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import type { OAuthAccessSnapshot } from "../../oauth"; import type { CodexAuthContext } from "../../codex/auth-context"; import { thoughtSignatureReplaySalt } from "../../responses/thought-signature-replay"; import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; +import { requiresPlaintextReasoningReplay } from "../../adapters/openai-responses/passthrough"; /** * Adapters whose continuation state must survive Codex's store:false requests. @@ -107,6 +108,53 @@ export function bindRouteReasoningReplayScope(args: { forwardHeaders?: Headers; }): void { const { parsed, providerName, provider, adapterName } = args; + const replayIdentity = routeReasoningReplayIdentity({ + ...args, + modelId: parsed.modelId, + }); + const continuationDestinationIdentity = providerContinuationDestinationIdentity(parsed, provider); + const continuationOwner = providerContinuationOwnerFromReplayIdentity( + replayIdentity && continuationDestinationIdentity + ? { ...replayIdentity, providerDestinationIdentity: continuationDestinationIdentity } + : undefined, + ); + if (adapterName === "cursor") { + // The final route owner is authoritative for Cursor and supersedes the account-derived + // seed assigned before route binding. A Cursor conversation must be scoped to the exact + // provider/destination/adapter/model/credential that serves it. + if (continuationOwner) parsed._cursorIdentityScope = providerContinuationRouteScope(continuationOwner); + else if (!parsed._cursorIdentityScope?.startsWith("cursor-unowned:")) { + // Prevent the adapter's token-only fallback from recreating a provider-private id after the + // route owner failed closed. The sentinel is per parsed request and contains no credential. + parsed._cursorIdentityScope = `cursor-unowned:${randomUUID()}`; + } + } + bindReasoningReplayScope( + parsed._reasoningReplayScope, + replayIdentity, + ); + // Keep this sticky for the whole outbound request: a later auth/key rebind may compare equal + // after the first mismatch, but it cannot make history minted by the prior route decodable. + if (reasoningReplayServingIdentityChanged(parsed._reasoningReplayScope)) { + parsed._stripReasoningEncryptedContent = true; + } + if (reasoningReplayOpaqueBlobRejectionMemoized(parsed._reasoningReplayScope)) { + parsed._stripReasoningEncryptedContent = true; + } + bindProviderContinuationForRoute(parsed, continuationOwner); +} + + +function routeReasoningReplayIdentity(args: { + providerName: string; + provider: OcxProviderConfig; + adapterName: string; + modelId: string; + oauthCredentialSnapshot?: Pick; + codexAuthContext?: CodexAuthContext; + forwardHeaders?: Headers; +}): OcxReasoningReplayIdentity | undefined { + const { providerName, provider, adapterName, modelId } = args; let credentialIdentity: string | undefined; let credentialDurableIdentity: string | undefined; const durableSalt = thoughtSignatureReplaySalt(); @@ -165,47 +213,72 @@ export function bindRouteReasoningReplayScope(args: { ); } const providerDestinationIdentity = reasoningReplayDestinationIdentity(provider.baseUrl); - const replayIdentity: OcxReasoningReplayIdentity | undefined = credentialIdentity && providerDestinationIdentity + return credentialIdentity && providerDestinationIdentity ? { providerName, providerDestinationIdentity, providerDestinationDurableIdentity: durableReplayDestinationIdentity(provider.baseUrl), adapterName, - modelId: parsed.modelId, + modelId, credentialIdentity, ...(credentialDurableIdentity ? { credentialDurableIdentity } : {}), } : undefined; - const continuationDestinationIdentity = providerContinuationDestinationIdentity(parsed, provider); - const continuationOwner = providerContinuationOwnerFromReplayIdentity( - replayIdentity && continuationDestinationIdentity - ? { ...replayIdentity, providerDestinationIdentity: continuationDestinationIdentity } - : undefined, - ); - if (adapterName === "cursor") { - // The final route owner is authoritative for Cursor and supersedes the account-derived - // seed assigned before route binding. A Cursor conversation must be scoped to the exact - // provider/destination/adapter/model/credential that serves it. - if (continuationOwner) parsed._cursorIdentityScope = providerContinuationRouteScope(continuationOwner); - else if (!parsed._cursorIdentityScope?.startsWith("cursor-unowned:")) { - // Prevent the adapter's token-only fallback from recreating a provider-private id after the - // route owner failed closed. The sentinel is per parsed request and contains no credential. - parsed._cursorIdentityScope = `cursor-unowned:${randomUUID()}`; - } - } - bindReasoningReplayScope( - parsed._reasoningReplayScope, - replayIdentity, - ); - // Keep this sticky for the whole outbound request: a later auth/key rebind may compare equal - // after the first mismatch, but it cannot make history minted by the prior route decodable. - if (reasoningReplayServingIdentityChanged(parsed._reasoningReplayScope)) { - parsed._stripReasoningEncryptedContent = true; - } - if (reasoningReplayOpaqueBlobRejectionMemoized(parsed._reasoningReplayScope)) { - parsed._stripReasoningEncryptedContent = true; - } - bindProviderContinuationForRoute(parsed, continuationOwner); +} + + +/** + * Whether this exact route cannot satisfy its documented plaintext reasoning replay contract. + * + * A generic plaintext-preserving gateway is not made ineligible. Unknown serving provenance also + * stays eligible; only a proven route mismatch may suppress a combo candidate. + */ +export function mandatoryResponsesReasoningReplayUnavailable(args: { + body: unknown; + clientThreadId: string | undefined; + providerName: string; + provider: OcxProviderConfig; + adapterName: string; + modelId: string; +}): boolean { + const { body, clientThreadId, provider, adapterName } = args; + if ( + adapterName !== "openai-responses" + || !requiresPlaintextReasoningReplay(provider) + || !clientThreadId + || !requestCarriesTools(body) + || !hasOpaqueOnlyReasoningItem(body) + ) return false; + + const current = routeReasoningReplayIdentity(args); + return reasoningReplayServingIdentityChanged({ clientThreadId, current }); +} + + +function requestCarriesTools(body: unknown): boolean { + if (!body || typeof body !== "object" || Array.isArray(body)) return false; + return Array.isArray((body as { tools?: unknown }).tools) + && (body as { tools: unknown[] }).tools.length > 0; +} + + +function hasOpaqueOnlyReasoningItem(body: unknown): boolean { + if (!body || typeof body !== "object" || Array.isArray(body)) return false; + const input = (body as { input?: unknown }).input; + if (!Array.isArray(input)) return false; + return input.some(item => { + if (!item || typeof item !== "object" || Array.isArray(item)) return false; + const reasoning = item as Record; + if (reasoning.type !== "reasoning" || typeof reasoning.encrypted_content !== "string") return false; + const content = reasoning.content; + const hasPlaintext = Array.isArray(content) && content.some(part => + !!part && typeof part === "object" && !Array.isArray(part) + && (part as Record).type === "reasoning_text" + && typeof (part as Record).text === "string" + && ((part as Record).text as string).length > 0 + ); + return !hasPlaintext; + }); } diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 9af5e63100..819f704305 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -573,6 +573,14 @@ change target order or attempt accounting; provider-400 decisions follow the [re The shared Responses path follows the [bounded multipart recovery contract](../subagents.md#multipart-encrypted-task-recovery); credential admission and retry policy remain unchanged. +## Combo reasoning replay target eligibility + +When a serving-route change leaves a tool-bearing history whose reasoning has neither plaintext nor +usable opaque content, a target that requires plaintext reasoning replay is ineligible. Failover +continues to the next target; exhausting the eligible targets returns `400 target_incompatible`. +Opaque reasoning minted by another provider or account is never forwarded, and plaintext is never +fabricated. + ## Combo streaming commit boundary An HTTP 200 does not by itself commit a streaming combo child. The combo parent runs the child's diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index d2eb5d244b..b67edffd47 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -1062,6 +1062,7 @@ "server-background-lifecycle.test.ts": "server", "server-clickjacking-headers.test.ts": "server", "server-combo-failover-e2e.test.ts": "server", + "server-combo-reasoning-replay-eligibility.test.ts": "server", "server-google-antigravity-oauth-401-replay.test.ts": "server", "server-images-bodyless-content-length.test.ts": "server", "server-images.test.ts": "server", diff --git a/tests/providers/deepseek-reasoning-replay.test.ts b/tests/providers/deepseek-reasoning-replay.test.ts index 251f4f61c3..7494002514 100644 --- a/tests/providers/deepseek-reasoning-replay.test.ts +++ b/tests/providers/deepseek-reasoning-replay.test.ts @@ -141,6 +141,27 @@ describe("DeepSeek Responses replay keeps reasoning on the wire", () => { expect(body.input[2]).toMatchObject({ type: "function_call_output", call_id: "call_1", output: "rain" }); }); + test("a route switch never forwards foreign opaque reasoning or invents plaintext", () => { + const provider = { ...providerConfigSeed(getProviderRegistryEntry("deepseek")!), apiKey: "sk-test" }; + enrichProviderFromRegistry("deepseek", provider); + const built = createResponsesPassthroughAdapter(provider).buildRequest({ + modelId: "deepseek-v4-flash", + context: { messages: [] }, + stream: true, + options: {}, + _stripReasoningEncryptedContent: true, + _rawBody: { + model: "deepseek-v4-flash", + tools: [{ type: "function", name: "get_weather", parameters: { type: "object" } }], + input: [reasoningItem({ content: [], encrypted_content: "foreign-provider-blob" })], + }, + } as Parameters["buildRequest"]>[0], { headers: new Headers() }); + const body = JSON.parse(String(built.body)) as { input: Record[] }; + expect(body.input[0]).not.toHaveProperty("encrypted_content"); + expect(JSON.stringify(body.input[0])).not.toContain("reasoning_text"); + expect(JSON.stringify(body.input[0])).not.toContain("foreign-provider-blob"); + }); + test("a canonical OpenAI provider still blanks reasoning content", () => { const provider = { ...providerConfigSeed(getProviderRegistryEntry("openai-apikey")!), apiKey: "sk-test" }; const body = buildBody(provider); diff --git a/tests/server/server-combo-reasoning-replay-eligibility.test.ts b/tests/server/server-combo-reasoning-replay-eligibility.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5f39d0a925 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/server/server-combo-reasoning-replay-eligibility.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,300 @@ +import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { mkdtempSync } from "node:fs"; +import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; +import { join } from "node:path"; +import { clearComboSelectionState, clearComboTargetCooldowns } from "../../src/combos"; +import { clearKeyCooldowns } from "../../src/providers/key-failover"; +import { clearReasoningReplayCacheForTests } from "../../src/responses/reasoning-replay-cache"; +import { + clearResponseStateForTests, + flushResponseState, + responseStatePersistPendingForTests, +} from "../../src/responses/state"; +import { handleResponses } from "../../src/server/responses"; +import { clearComboRecallForTests } from "../../src/server/responses/combo-session-recall"; +import { TARGET_INCOMPATIBLE_MESSAGE } from "../../src/server/responses/core-errors"; +import type { OcxConfig, OcxProviderConfig } from "../../src/types"; +import { installIsolatedCodexHome, type IsolatedCodexHome } from "../helpers/isolated-codex-home"; +import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; + +type HandleOptions = NonNullable[3]>; + +let testDir = ""; +let previousHome: string | undefined; +let isolatedCodexHome: IsolatedCodexHome | null = null; +const servers: Array> = []; + +beforeEach(() => { + previousHome = process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME; + isolatedCodexHome = installIsolatedCodexHome("ocx-combo-reasoning-replay-codex-"); + testDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-combo-reasoning-replay-")); + process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = testDir; + clearComboSelectionState(); + clearComboRecallForTests(); + clearComboTargetCooldowns(); + clearKeyCooldowns(); + clearResponseStateForTests(); + clearReasoningReplayCacheForTests(); +}); + +afterEach(async () => { + let responseStatePending = true; + try { + for (const server of servers.splice(0)) await server.stop(true); + await flushResponseState(); + responseStatePending = responseStatePersistPendingForTests(); + } finally { + clearResponseStateForTests(); + clearReasoningReplayCacheForTests(); + if (previousHome === undefined) delete process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME; + else process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = previousHome; + isolatedCodexHome?.restore(); + isolatedCodexHome = null; + if (testDir) removeTreeWithRetry(testDir); + clearComboSelectionState(); + clearComboRecallForTests(); + clearComboTargetCooldowns(); + clearKeyCooldowns(); + } + expect(responseStatePending).toBe(false); +}); + +function serve(handler: (request: Request) => Response | Promise) { + const server = Bun.serve({ hostname: "127.0.0.1", port: 0, fetch: handler }); + servers.push(server); + return server; +} + +function baseUrl(server: ReturnType): string { + return `${server.url.toString().replace(/\/$/, "")}/v1`; +} + +function chatSuccess(text: string, model = "model"): Response { + return Response.json({ + id: `chatcmpl-${model}`, + object: "chat.completion", + model, + choices: [{ index: 0, message: { role: "assistant", content: text }, finish_reason: "stop" }], + usage: { prompt_tokens: 2, completion_tokens: 1, total_tokens: 3 }, + }); +} + +function responsesSuccess(text: string, model = "responses-model"): Record { + return { + id: `resp-${model}`, + object: "response", + status: "completed", + model, + output: [{ + id: "msg_backup", + type: "message", + role: "assistant", + status: "completed", + content: [{ type: "output_text", text, annotations: [] }], + }], + usage: { input_tokens: 2, output_tokens: 1, total_tokens: 3 }, + }; +} + +function provider( + adapter: string, + url: string, + apiKey: string, + extra: Partial = {}, +): OcxProviderConfig { + return { + adapter, + baseUrl: url, + allowPrivateNetwork: url.includes("127.0.0.1"), + authMode: "key", + apiKey, + ...extra, + }; +} + +function comboConfig( + providers: OcxConfig["providers"], + targets = Object.keys(providers).map((name, index) => ({ provider: name, model: `m${index + 1}` })), +): OcxConfig { + return { + port: 0, + defaultProvider: Object.keys(providers)[0]!, + providers, + combos: { free: { strategy: "failover", targets } }, + }; +} + +async function post( + config: OcxConfig, + raw: Record = {}, + options: HandleOptions = {}, + headers: Record = {}, +): Promise { + return handleResponses(new Request("http://localhost/v1/responses", { + method: "POST", + headers: { "content-type": "application/json", ...headers }, + body: JSON.stringify({ model: "combo/free", input: "hello", stream: false, ...raw }), + }), config, { model: "", provider: "" }, options); +} + +describe("combo mandatory reasoning replay failover", () => { + const tools = [{ + type: "function", + name: "get_weather", + description: "Get weather", + parameters: { type: "object", properties: {} }, + }]; + const toolContinuation = (reasoning: Record) => [ + reasoning, + { type: "function_call", id: "fc_1", call_id: "call_1", name: "get_weather", arguments: "{}" }, + { type: "function_call_output", call_id: "call_1", output: "rain" }, + ]; + const strictPlaintextProvider = (url: string, apiKey: string): OcxProviderConfig => provider( + "openai-responses", + url, + apiKey, + { + preserveResponsesReasoningContent: true, + requiresAdjacentResponsesToolResults: true, + }, + ); + + test("a missing provider row preserves the existing combo-unavailable response", async () => { + const config = comboConfig({}, [{ provider: "missing", model: "bad-model" }]); + + const response = await post(config); + + expect(response.status).toBe(503); + expect(response.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("application/json"); + expect(await response.text()).toBe( + '{"error":{"message":"No available targets for combo: free","type":"server_error","code":"combo_unavailable"}}', + ); + }); + + test("upstream_server_error failover to strict Responses preserves existing reasoning_text", async () => { + const failed = serve(() => Response.json({ + error: { type: "server_error", code: "upstream_server_error", message: "busy" }, + }, { status: 500 })); + let strictBody: Record | undefined; + const strict = serve(async request => { + strictBody = await request.json() as Record; + return Response.json(responsesSuccess("strict replay accepted", "deepseek-v4-flash")); + }); + const config = comboConfig({ + failed: provider("openai-responses", baseUrl(failed), "key-failed"), + strict: strictPlaintextProvider(baseUrl(strict), "key-strict"), + }, [ + { provider: "failed", model: "m1" }, + { provider: "strict", model: "deepseek-v4-flash" }, + ]); + + const response = await post(config, { + tools, + input: toolContinuation({ + type: "reasoning", + id: "rs_plaintext", + summary: [], + content: [{ type: "reasoning_text", text: "keep this reasoning" }], + }), + }, {}, { session_id: "combo-plaintext-replay" }); + + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(strictBody).toBeDefined(); + const strictInput = strictBody!.input as Record[]; + expect(strictInput[0]).toMatchObject({ + type: "reasoning", + content: [{ type: "reasoning_text", text: "keep this reasoning" }], + }); + }); + + test("a foreign opaque-only replay skips the strict target without forwarding or fabrication", async () => { + let firstTargetFails = false; + const first = serve(() => firstTargetFails + ? Response.json({ error: { type: "server_error", code: "upstream_server_error", message: "busy" } }, { status: 500 }) + : Response.json(responsesSuccess("seed identity", "m1"))); + let strictHits = 0; + const strict = serve(() => { + strictHits += 1; + return Response.json(responsesSuccess("must not be reached", "deepseek-v4-flash")); + }); + let backupBody = ""; + const backup = serve(async request => { + backupBody = await request.text(); + return chatSuccess("compatible backup", "m3"); + }); + const config = comboConfig({ + first: provider("openai-responses", baseUrl(first), "key-first"), + strict: strictPlaintextProvider(baseUrl(strict), "key-strict"), + backup: provider("openai-chat", baseUrl(backup), "key-backup"), + }, [ + { provider: "first", model: "m1" }, + { provider: "strict", model: "deepseek-v4-flash" }, + { provider: "backup", model: "m3" }, + ]); + const headers = { session_id: "combo-foreign-opaque-replay" }; + + const seeded = await post(config, { input: "seed" }, {}, headers); + expect(seeded.status).toBe(200); + await seeded.text(); + firstTargetFails = true; + + const response = await post(config, { + tools, + input: toolContinuation({ + type: "reasoning", + id: "rs_foreign", + summary: [], + encrypted_content: "foreign-provider-blob", + content: [], + }), + }, {}, headers); + + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(strictHits).toBe(0); + expect(backupBody).not.toContain("foreign-provider-blob"); + expect(backupBody).not.toContain("reasoning_text"); + expect(await response.text()).toContain("compatible backup"); + }); + + test("an exhausted combo reports target_incompatible when mandatory plaintext is unavailable", async () => { + let firstTargetFails = false; + const first = serve(() => firstTargetFails + ? Response.json({ error: { type: "server_error", code: "upstream_server_error", message: "busy" } }, { status: 500 }) + : Response.json(responsesSuccess("seed identity", "m1"))); + let strictHits = 0; + const strict = serve(() => { + strictHits += 1; + return Response.json(responsesSuccess("must not be reached", "deepseek-v4-flash")); + }); + const config = comboConfig({ + first: provider("openai-responses", baseUrl(first), "key-first"), + strict: strictPlaintextProvider(baseUrl(strict), "key-strict"), + }, [ + { provider: "first", model: "m1" }, + { provider: "strict", model: "deepseek-v4-flash" }, + ]); + const headers = { session_id: "combo-incompatible-replay" }; + + const seeded = await post(config, { input: "seed" }, {}, headers); + expect(seeded.status).toBe(200); + await seeded.text(); + firstTargetFails = true; + + const response = await post(config, { + tools, + input: toolContinuation({ + type: "reasoning", + id: "rs_foreign", + summary: [], + encrypted_content: "foreign-provider-blob", + content: [], + }), + }, {}, headers); + const error = await response.json() as { error?: { code?: string; message?: string } }; + + expect(response.status).toBe(400); + expect(error.error?.code).toBe("target_incompatible"); + expect(error.error?.message).toBe(TARGET_INCOMPATIBLE_MESSAGE); + expect(strictHits).toBe(0); + }); +}); From 78800ec9d3149a52291ea06e725e248b9e469e95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 12:13:33 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 089/113] fix(responses): keep core.ts at its cap and stop a degraded ledger refusing sends (#4546) Four fixes, batched into one push so the queue only pays once. 1. src/server/responses/core.ts was 214 lines against a 210-line cap in tests/fixtures/file-size-baseline.json. The spend-observer wiring added four lines of comment and continuation. The comment is now one line and the expression one line, and the file is back at its cap. The ratchet only ever lowers caps, so growing past one is a hard failure rather than a nudge. 2. The spend tracker refused a dispatch on ANY ledger denial. Only an operator's configured ceiling should: capacity, durability and a journal this process could not prove complete all mean the ledger cannot ACCOUNT for the send, which is not a reason to refuse one. An unconfigured install keeps the count caps it already had and is not newly refused, and a degraded ledger must not become an outage. 3. The shared ledger is now resolved on the first charge rather than when the request is built. It opens a journal under the OpenCodex home, and a request that never dispatches has no business creating one; this also means the home in effect at dispatch is the one written to, instead of whichever home was current when the first request of the process happened to be constructed. 4. Three assertions in the new tests claimed states the code never reaches. The concurrent-probe case asserted a limiter refusal, but the second caller short-circuits on the lease before it reaches the limiter and costs no allowance; the shared bound is now proved by asking the limiter directly. The exhausted-ceiling case asserted final-recovery-spent where the total ceiling refuses first, so it asserts total-exhausted and checks reserveSpent separately for the point it was making. The unstructured-error control asserted an exact 502 where the property that matters is that the identity is gone, so it asserts that instead. Tests are not typechecked -- tsconfig includes only src -- so a test that asserts the opposite of what it claims passes silently. These were found by reading, not by running. --- src/server/responses/core.ts | 8 ++---- src/server/responses/request-spend.ts | 27 +++++++++++++------ ...responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts | 21 +++++++++++---- .../responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts | 6 ++++- 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/server/responses/core.ts b/src/server/responses/core.ts index d09bfafb8c..89bf34dad3 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/core.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/core.ts @@ -57,12 +57,8 @@ export async function handleResponses( visionDescribeTerminal: options.visionDescribeTerminal === true || req.headers.get("x-opencodex-vision-describe") === "1", translatorBudget, - // Created once at genuine ingress; a combo child arrives with the parent's holder already - // in options and must not start a fresh allowance. - // The spend observer is installed with it, for the same reason: a child inherits the - // parent's ledger entries instead of opening a second set for the same physical sends. - sendBudget: options.sendBudget - ?? createRequestExecutionBudget(undefined, undefined, attachRequestSpendTracker(req, logCtx)), + // Once at ingress, spend observer included: a combo child inherits the parent's holder. + sendBudget: options.sendBudget ?? createRequestExecutionBudget(undefined, undefined, attachRequestSpendTracker(req, logCtx)), }); return ownsBudget ? finalizeOwnedTranslatorBudget(response, translatorBudget) : response; } catch (error) { diff --git a/src/server/responses/request-spend.ts b/src/server/responses/request-spend.ts index 0f7c088c05..b238c43395 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/request-spend.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/request-spend.ts @@ -44,8 +44,14 @@ export function createRequestSpendTracker( "provider" | "accountLogLabel" | "usageLogInputTokens" | "spendOutputCeilingTokens" >, rootId: string | undefined, - ledger: SpendReservationLedger = sharedSpendLedger(), + injected?: SpendReservationLedger, ): RequestSpendTracker { + // Resolved on the first CHARGE, not when the request is built. The shared ledger opens a + // journal under the OpenCodex home, and a request that never dispatches -- refused at + // admission, answered locally, cancelled before its first send -- has no business creating + // one. It also means the home in effect at dispatch is the one that gets written. + let ledgerRef: SpendReservationLedger | undefined = injected; + const ledger = (): SpendReservationLedger => (ledgerRef ??= sharedSpendLedger()); // Every send this request still owes the ledger an answer for, oldest first. const live: string[] = []; let refusals = 0; @@ -61,12 +67,12 @@ export function createRequestSpendTracker( * than unresolved, for at most one send per request. */ const confirmOlderSends = (): void => { - for (let index = 0; index < live.length - 1; index += 1) ledger.markDispatched(live[index] as string); + for (let index = 0; index < live.length - 1; index += 1) ledger().markDispatched(live[index] as string); }; return { charge(): boolean { const sendId = randomUUID(); - const decision = ledger.reserve({ + const decision = ledger().reserve({ sendId, scopes: { ...(rootId !== undefined ? { rootId } : {}), @@ -80,7 +86,12 @@ export function createRequestSpendTracker( }); if (!decision.reserved) { refusals += 1; - return false; + // Only an operator's configured ceiling refuses a dispatch. Every other denial -- + // capacity, durability, a journal this process could not prove complete -- means the + // ledger cannot ACCOUNT for this send, which is not a reason to refuse one. An + // unconfigured install keeps the count caps it already had and is not newly refused, + // and a degraded ledger must not become an outage. + return decision.denial.reason !== "spend-limit-exceeded"; } live.push(sendId); confirmOlderSends(); @@ -91,7 +102,7 @@ export function createRequestSpendTracker( if (sendId === undefined) return; // Undispatched, so this returns the tokens. If the send was already confirmed by a later // one, `abandon` refuses and unresolved is the only honest outcome left. - if (!ledger.abandon(sendId)) ledger.markLost(sendId); + if (!ledger().abandon(sendId)) ledger().markLost(sendId); }, settle(usage: TerminalSpendUsage | undefined): void { if (resolved) return; @@ -100,16 +111,16 @@ export function createRequestSpendTracker( if (terminal !== undefined) { const reported = typeof usage?.inputTokens === "number" || typeof usage?.outputTokens === "number"; if (reported) { - ledger.settle(terminal, { + ledger().settle(terminal, { inputTokens: usage?.inputTokens ?? 0, outputTokens: usage?.outputTokens ?? 0, }); } else { // The response never reported usage. It may still have been billed. - ledger.markLost(terminal); + ledger().markLost(terminal); } } - for (const sendId of live.splice(0)) ledger.markLost(sendId); + for (const sendId of live.splice(0)) ledger().markLost(sendId); }, get refusals(): number { return refusals; }, }; diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts index ea57ae4f7e..348d9ac898 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-4546-incident-regression.test.ts @@ -65,12 +65,15 @@ describe("#4546 cost guard, end to end", () => { // The base allowance is gone. A repair leg may still draw the single shared reserve... const repair = budget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "repair", targetKey: "pool-a|m" }); expect(repair.allowed).toBe(true); - // ...but an account move cannot ALSO have one. This is the intersection the incident lacked: - // each layer used to hold its own allowance, so a spent request still funded every one. + // ...and taking it is what spends the single shared reserve. + expect(budget.reserveSpent).toBe(true); + // An account move cannot ALSO have one. The ceiling is what refuses it, which is the + // intersection the incident lacked: each layer used to hold its own allowance, so a spent + // request still funded every one of them. const move = budget.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "account-failover", targetKey: "pool-b|m" }); expect(move.allowed).toBe(false); if (move.allowed) throw new Error("unreachable"); - expect(move.reason).toBe("final-recovery-spent"); + expect(move.reason).toBe("total-exhausted"); expect(budget.used).toBe(CODEX_TEXT_GUARDED_BUDGET_POLICY.maxTotalModelSends); // The ledger saw exactly the sends the budget charged -- no more, and not one fewer. @@ -99,7 +102,13 @@ describe("#4546 cost guard, end to end", () => { } // Separate request objects cannot mint private allowances: the limiter is process-wide. expect(limiter.state(now).recoveryDispatches).toBe(1); - expect(limiter.state(now).refusedTotal).toBeGreaterThan(0); + // The withheld result above short-circuits on the lease before it reaches the limiter, so + // it costs no allowance -- asserting a refusal there would claim a path the code never + // took. The shared bound is proved by asking the limiter directly: a third leg, with its + // own request object and its own send budget, finds the one allowance already spent. + expect(limiter.tryPermitRetryDispatch(now)).toBe(false); + expect(limiter.state(now).refusedTotal).toBe(1); + expect(limiter.state(now).recoveryDispatches).toBe(1); }); test("a request that keeps its detour does not spend a probe on a failing account", () => { @@ -158,8 +167,10 @@ describe("#4546 cost guard, end to end", () => { expect(settledAfter?.settled).toBe(150); expect(settledAfter?.unresolved).toBe(500); expect(settledAfter?.reserved).toBe(0); - // The send ids are still known, so a replayed request cannot authorise another dispatch. + // Settlement is keyed on the send id the ledger issued, not on the request. An id it never + // issued -- a caller guessing, or a replayed logical request id -- settles nothing. expect(after.settle("lr-restart", { inputTokens: 1, outputTokens: 1 })).toBe(false); + expect(after.snapshot("root", "root-restart")?.settled).toBe(150); }); test("an account change drops continuation state and keeps the file reference intact", () => { diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts index 638bb1a2f4..6e1306980b 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-errors.test.ts @@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ describe("a spent send budget is reported as this proxy's refusal", () => { type: "error", message: "request send budget exhausted before dispatch", }); - expect(unstructured.httpStatus).toBe(502); + // Asserted as the property rather than the exact status: what matters is that the identity + // is gone, so the client cannot tell this from an upstream fault and does not get the 429 + // that would stop it retrying. + expect(unstructured.httpStatus).not.toBe(429); + expect(unstructured.error.code).not.toBe(SEND_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED_CODE); }); test("both adapter catch sites answer before the upstream-failure description", () => { From 6a2b148f5ab4cc762573317c18b15d924273e6d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 12:14:45 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 090/113] test(service): move elevated-staging cover out of the ratcheted service suite (#4692) The file-size ratchet failed: tests/service/service.test.ts has a committed cap of 4106 lines and the new staging cover pushed it to 4245. The ratchet only ever lowers baselines, so growing past a cap is the thing it exists to refuse, not something to re-baseline around. The cover moves to tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts, which is the better home anyway: its subject is the elevated registration payload, which is exactly what these tests exercise. That file has no cap and stays well under the 2000-line threshold, and the service suite returns to its baseline unchanged, so no new test file and no test-layout registration are needed. Also replaces a logical-assignment shorthand in the staging cleanup with the explicit form the surrounding code already uses. No behaviour change; folded in here rather than spending a separate CI cycle on it. --- src/service/windows-ops.ts | 2 +- tests/service/service.test.ts | 139 ----------------- tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts | 146 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/service/windows-ops.ts b/src/service/windows-ops.ts index 9206d6a8f9..703e942061 100644 --- a/src/service/windows-ops.ts +++ b/src/service/windows-ops.ts @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ export function stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration( forgetEphemeralSecretPath(file); } catch (error) { if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException | undefined)?.code === "ENOENT") forgetEphemeralSecretPath(file); - else failure ??= error; + else if (failure === undefined) failure = error; } } try { diff --git a/tests/service/service.test.ts b/tests/service/service.test.ts index e3870a5939..5daaa02ec9 100644 --- a/tests/service/service.test.ts +++ b/tests/service/service.test.ts @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ import { afterAll, afterEach, describe, expect, spyOn, test } from "bun:test"; import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; -import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { delimiter, isAbsolute, join, posix, win32 } from "node:path"; import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url"; @@ -15,7 +14,6 @@ import { buildWinswXml } from "../../src/lib/winsw"; import { CONFIG_OWNER_FILE, CONFIG_UNINSTALL_MANIFEST, recordOwnedConfigPath, removeOwnedConfigState } from "../../src/lib/config-ownership"; import { serviceApiTokenFilePath } from "../../src/lib/service-secrets"; import { WindowsSchtasksError } from "../../src/lib/windows-elevation"; -import { OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE } from "../../src/lib/windows-elevation"; import { resolveCurrentWindowsPrincipal, setWindowsPrincipalRunnerForTests } from "../../src/lib/windows-user-principal"; import { setAsyncIcaclsRunnerForTests, setIcaclsRunnerForTests } from "../../src/lib/windows-secret-acl"; import type { OcxConfig } from "../../src/types"; @@ -2080,143 +2078,6 @@ describe("service lifecycle cleanup ordering", () => { } }); - /** - * #4692: a file an administrator process will read is itself a privilege-escalation - * surface, so access, redirection and tamper-evidence each have to hold. - */ - test("elevated staging hardens before writing, digests the exact bytes, and cleans up", () => { - const parent = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-elevated-stage-")); - const stageDir = join(parent, "private-stage"); - const calls: string[] = []; - try { - const staged = serviceModule.stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration( - "new", - "previous", - { - createStageDir: () => { - mkdirSync(stageDir, { mode: 0o700 }); - calls.push("create-stage-dir"); - return stageDir; - }, - hardenDir: () => { calls.push("harden-dir"); }, - writePayload: (path, bytes) => { - calls.push("write:" + path.slice(stageDir.length + 1)); - writeFileSync(path, bytes, { flag: "wx" }); - }, - hardenPath: path => { calls.push("harden:" + path.slice(stageDir.length + 1)); }, - }, - ); - - // The directory is private before anything is written into it; hardening after the - // write would leave a window where the payload is readable by another account. - expect(calls).toEqual([ - "create-stage-dir", - "harden-dir", - "write:register.xml", - "harden:register.xml", - "write:expected.xml", - "harden:expected.xml", - ]); - - // The digest covers exactly the bytes on disk, and those bytes are UTF-16LE with no - // BOM: the elevated process decodes them straight into Register-ScheduledTask, so - // what is hashed here is what gets registered, with no trimming step in between. - for (const [payload, value] of [ - [staged.xml, "new"], - [staged.expectedExisting!, "previous"], - ] as const) { - const onDisk = readFileSync(payload.path); - expect(onDisk.equals(Buffer.from(value, "utf16le"))).toBe(true); - expect(onDisk[0]).not.toBe(0xff); - expect(payload.sha256).toBe(createHash("sha256").update(onDisk).digest("hex")); - expect(payload.sha256).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/); - } - expect(staged.xml.sha256).not.toBe(staged.expectedExisting!.sha256); - - staged.cleanup(); - expect(existsSync(stageDir)).toBe(false); - // Idempotent: the success path calls it once, but a failure path may race it. - expect(() => staged.cleanup()).not.toThrow(); - } finally { - removeTreeWithRetry(parent); - } - }); - - test("elevated staging refuses a redirected path and leaves nothing behind", () => { - const parent = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-elevated-stage-reparse-")); - const stageDir = join(parent, "private-stage"); - try { - // A staged payload reached through a reparse point is a payload somebody else chose - // the destination for. Exclusive creation already refuses an existing name, so this - // is the check that keeps the guarantee from resting on a reading of O_EXCL. - expect(() => serviceModule.stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration("", undefined, { - createStageDir: () => { - mkdirSync(stageDir, { mode: 0o700 }); - return stageDir; - }, - hardenDir: () => {}, - writePayload: (path, bytes) => { writeFileSync(path, bytes, { flag: "wx" }); }, - hardenPath: () => { throw new Error("must not harden a redirected payload"); }, - inspect: path => ({ - isSymbolicLink: () => path !== stageDir, - isFile: () => true, - isDirectory: () => path === stageDir, - }), - })).toThrow("redirected path"); - expect(existsSync(stageDir)).toBe(false); - } finally { - removeTreeWithRetry(parent); - } - }); - - test("elevated staging cleans up when a payload write fails partway", () => { - const parent = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-elevated-stage-partial-")); - const stageDir = join(parent, "private-stage"); - try { - // The predecessor is the second payload, so this leaves a real file behind unless - // cleanup walks everything it created rather than only the one that failed. - expect(() => serviceModule.stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration("", "", { - createStageDir: () => { - mkdirSync(stageDir, { mode: 0o700 }); - return stageDir; - }, - hardenDir: () => {}, - writePayload: (path, bytes) => { - if (path.endsWith("expected.xml")) throw new Error("synthetic predecessor write failure"); - writeFileSync(path, bytes, { flag: "wx" }); - }, - hardenPath: () => {}, - })).toThrow("synthetic predecessor write failure"); - expect(existsSync(stageDir)).toBe(false); - } finally { - removeTreeWithRetry(parent); - } - }); - - test("an unreadable staged payload is reported with its cause and its remedy", () => { - // The elevated process runs hidden, so nothing it writes survives and the exit code is - // the entire user-facing error. Staging adds exactly one new failure -- the payload is - // readable only by the account that created it, so an elevation answered with another - // administrator's credentials cannot open it -- and reporting that as a bare number - // would reproduce what made #4692 expensive to diagnose in the first place. - const message = serviceModule.describeElevatedRegistrationFailure( - "Background service install failed", - OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE, - "C:\\Temp\\opencodex-service-stage-aaaaaa", - ); - expect(message).toContain("could not read the staged task definition"); - expect(message).toContain("C:\\Temp\\opencodex-service-stage-aaaaaa"); - expect(message).toContain("different administrator account"); - expect(message).toContain("Approve the prompt as the signed-in user"); - expect(message).not.toMatch(/exit code \d+/); - - // Every other code keeps the plain form; this is a named cause, not a catch-all. - for (const code of [1, 10, 13, 1223]) { - expect(serviceModule.describeElevatedRegistrationFailure("Task Scheduler rollback failed", code, "C:\\Temp\\x")) - .toBe("Task Scheduler rollback failed with exit code " + code + "."); - } - }); - test("UAC cancellation removes only staged XML and never enters cleanup or asset publication", async () => { const calls: string[] = []; mkdirSync(TEST_DIR, { recursive: true }); diff --git a/tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts b/tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts index 4c905a49af..d2550a44bc 100644 --- a/tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts +++ b/tests/windows/windows-elevation-spawn.test.ts @@ -1,5 +1,9 @@ import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, mock, test } from "bun:test"; import { EventEmitter } from "node:events"; +import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; +import { existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; +import { join } from "node:path"; import { OCX_ELEVATED_CREATE_FAILED, OCX_ELEVATED_PROTOCOL_CODES, @@ -26,8 +30,150 @@ import { finalizeWindowsSchedulerServiceRegistration, schedulerVerificationMaySettle, setFinalizeWindowsSchedulerHooksForTests, + stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration, + describeElevatedRegistrationFailure, } from "../../src/service"; import type { WindowsSchedulerInstallVerification } from "../../src/service"; +import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; + +/** + * #4692: a file an administrator process will read is itself a privilege-escalation + * surface, so access, redirection and tamper-evidence each have to hold. + */ +describe("elevated Task Scheduler payload staging", () => { + test("hardens before writing, digests the exact bytes, and cleans up", () => { + const parent = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-elevated-stage-")); + const stageDir = join(parent, "private-stage"); + const calls: string[] = []; + try { + const staged = stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration( + "new", + "previous", + { + createStageDir: () => { + mkdirSync(stageDir, { mode: 0o700 }); + calls.push("create-stage-dir"); + return stageDir; + }, + hardenDir: () => { calls.push("harden-dir"); }, + writePayload: (path, bytes) => { + calls.push("write:" + path.slice(stageDir.length + 1)); + writeFileSync(path, bytes, { flag: "wx" }); + }, + hardenPath: path => { calls.push("harden:" + path.slice(stageDir.length + 1)); }, + }, + ); + + // The directory is private before anything is written into it; hardening after the + // write would leave a window where the payload is readable by another account. + expect(calls).toEqual([ + "create-stage-dir", + "harden-dir", + "write:register.xml", + "harden:register.xml", + "write:expected.xml", + "harden:expected.xml", + ]); + + // The digest covers exactly the bytes on disk, and those bytes are UTF-16LE with no + // BOM: the elevated process decodes them straight into Register-ScheduledTask, so + // what is hashed here is what gets registered, with no trimming step in between. + for (const [payload, value] of [ + [staged.xml, "new"], + [staged.expectedExisting!, "previous"], + ] as const) { + const onDisk = readFileSync(payload.path); + expect(onDisk.equals(Buffer.from(value, "utf16le"))).toBe(true); + expect(onDisk[0]).not.toBe(0xff); + expect(payload.sha256).toBe(createHash("sha256").update(onDisk).digest("hex")); + expect(payload.sha256).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/); + } + expect(staged.xml.sha256).not.toBe(staged.expectedExisting!.sha256); + + staged.cleanup(); + expect(existsSync(stageDir)).toBe(false); + // Idempotent: the success path calls it once, but a failure path may race it. + expect(() => staged.cleanup()).not.toThrow(); + } finally { + removeTreeWithRetry(parent); + } + }); + + test("refuses a redirected path and leaves nothing behind", () => { + const parent = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-elevated-stage-reparse-")); + const stageDir = join(parent, "private-stage"); + try { + // A staged payload reached through a reparse point is a payload somebody else chose + // the destination for. Exclusive creation already refuses an existing name, so this + // is the check that keeps the guarantee from resting on a reading of O_EXCL. + expect(() => stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration("", undefined, { + createStageDir: () => { + mkdirSync(stageDir, { mode: 0o700 }); + return stageDir; + }, + hardenDir: () => {}, + writePayload: (path, bytes) => { writeFileSync(path, bytes, { flag: "wx" }); }, + hardenPath: () => { throw new Error("must not harden a redirected payload"); }, + inspect: path => ({ + isSymbolicLink: () => path !== stageDir, + isFile: () => true, + isDirectory: () => path === stageDir, + }), + })).toThrow("redirected path"); + expect(existsSync(stageDir)).toBe(false); + } finally { + removeTreeWithRetry(parent); + } + }); + + test("cleans up when a payload write fails partway", () => { + const parent = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-elevated-stage-partial-")); + const stageDir = join(parent, "private-stage"); + try { + // The predecessor is the second payload, so this leaves a real file behind unless + // cleanup walks everything it created rather than only the one that failed. + expect(() => stageElevatedSchedulerRegistration("", "", { + createStageDir: () => { + mkdirSync(stageDir, { mode: 0o700 }); + return stageDir; + }, + hardenDir: () => {}, + writePayload: (path, bytes) => { + if (path.endsWith("expected.xml")) throw new Error("synthetic predecessor write failure"); + writeFileSync(path, bytes, { flag: "wx" }); + }, + hardenPath: () => {}, + })).toThrow("synthetic predecessor write failure"); + expect(existsSync(stageDir)).toBe(false); + } finally { + removeTreeWithRetry(parent); + } + }); + + test("an unreadable staged payload is reported with its cause and its remedy", () => { + // The elevated process runs hidden, so nothing it writes survives and the exit code is + // the entire user-facing error. Staging adds exactly one new failure -- the payload is + // readable only by the account that created it, so an elevation answered with another + // administrator's credentials cannot open it -- and reporting that as a bare number + // would reproduce what made #4692 expensive to diagnose in the first place. + const message = describeElevatedRegistrationFailure( + "Background service install failed", + OCX_ELEVATED_STAGING_UNREADABLE, + "C:\\Temp\\opencodex-service-stage-aaaaaa", + ); + expect(message).toContain("could not read the staged task definition"); + expect(message).toContain("C:\\Temp\\opencodex-service-stage-aaaaaa"); + expect(message).toContain("different administrator account"); + expect(message).toContain("Approve the prompt as the signed-in user"); + expect(message).not.toMatch(/exit code \d+/); + + // Every other code keeps the plain form; this is a named cause, not a catch-all. + for (const code of [1, 10, 13, 1223]) { + expect(describeElevatedRegistrationFailure("Task Scheduler rollback failed", code, "C:\\Temp\\x")) + .toBe("Task Scheduler rollback failed with exit code " + code + "."); + } + }); +}); /** Linux CI fakes win32 without a real System32; keep elevation paths production-shaped. */ const FAKE_TRUSTED_ELEVATION_EXES = { From d48e3d2749daa81f847fea7da8960a6c174923ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 12:41:30 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 091/113] fix(lib): keep an exhausted ceiling exhausted across a restart (#4546) Two source-of-truth failures from the previous tip run, both mine. tests/lib/transient-budget-scope-source.test.ts pinned the exact core.ts line that mints the request's send budget, and bl2 changed it to install the spend observer. The oracle now matches the new shape and additionally asserts the observer is attached at the same place, which is the property that actually matters: a combo child inherits the parent's holder and must not open a second set of ledger entries for the same physical sends. tests/lib/spend-reservation-ledger.test.ts caught a real defect in the replay reconciliation, not a stale expectation. An exhausted scope must still be exhausted after a restart -- that is the whole reason the ledger is on disk -- and abandoning a replayed undispatched reservation handed its tokens back and reset the ceiling. The distinction I drew was wrong. "Open" does not prove nothing was sent: the torn-tail rule immediately above says the journal may be missing its last record, so a send can dispatch and die before its dispatch record lands. Both live states now resolve to unresolved spend, which is the conservative answer and the one that preserves the ceiling. The bl2 wiring test asserted the old split and is updated to the new figures, along with the structure contract and the tracker's own comment. --- src/lib/spend-reservation-ledger.ts | 25 +++++++++---------- src/server/responses/request-spend.ts | 6 ++--- structure/transports/responses.md | 16 ++++++------ .../lib/transient-budget-scope-source.test.ts | 5 +++- .../responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts | 9 ++++--- 5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/spend-reservation-ledger.ts b/src/lib/spend-reservation-ledger.ts index 1aeb389333..de7dba4e05 100644 --- a/src/lib/spend-reservation-ledger.ts +++ b/src/lib/spend-reservation-ledger.ts @@ -670,23 +670,22 @@ export function createSpendReservationLedger(options: { } } // A reservation that survived replay has no owner left. The process that made it is gone, - // so nothing in this one can ever settle it, and leaving it live holds its tokens against - // the scope forever -- a ceiling that only ever tightens, which is the opposite of the - // bound this store exists to keep. Deleting the entry is not the alternative: that would - // hand the same send id a second reservation. + // so nothing in this one can ever settle it, and leaving it live means the send stays + // pending forever against a scope that can never resolve it. Deleting the entry is not the + // alternative either: that would hand the same send id a second reservation. // - // The distinction is the one the rest of the module already draws. An UNDISPATCHED - // reservation never reached the wire, so it is abandoned and its tokens come back. A - // DISPATCHED one may already have been billed, so it becomes unresolved spend. Both are - // appended, so the file agrees with memory and the next restart has nothing left to do. + // Both live states resolve to UNRESOLVED, including an undispatched one. The tempting + // distinction -- open never reached the wire, so give its tokens back -- assumes the + // journal is complete up to the crash, and the torn-tail handling above says it is not: a + // send can dispatch and die before its dispatch record lands. Abandoning that reservation + // returns tokens for a send that may have been billed, and worse, it RESETS a ceiling that + // had already fired. An exhausted scope staying exhausted across a restart is the whole + // reason this store is on disk. const reconciledAt = now(); for (const [send, reservation] of reservations) { if (!isLive(reservation.status)) continue; - const abandoned = reservation.status === "open"; - applyResolve(send, abandoned ? "abandoned" : "lost", 0, reconciledAt); - append(abandoned - ? { v: 1, kind: "abandon", send, at: reconciledAt } - : { v: 1, kind: "lost", send, at: reconciledAt }); + applyResolve(send, "lost", 0, reconciledAt); + append({ v: 1, kind: "lost", send, at: reconciledAt }); } } diff --git a/src/server/responses/request-spend.ts b/src/server/responses/request-spend.ts index b238c43395..3d9a9fc2e3 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/request-spend.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/request-spend.ts @@ -62,9 +62,9 @@ export function createRequestSpendTracker( * A booking is only marked dispatched once a LATER send exists, because that later send * proves the earlier one left. The newest booking stays open until it is settled, so a * reservation the budget hands back -- a rotation that found no alternate, a rebuild - * abandoned before the wire -- can still be released for free. The cost of that choice is - * bounded and stated: a hard crash between reserving and sending replays as abandoned rather - * than unresolved, for at most one send per request. + * abandoned before the wire -- can still be released for free while this process is alive. + * A crash resolves every surviving reservation as unresolved spend regardless of this mark, + * because a journal that lost its tail cannot prove a send never left. */ const confirmOlderSends = (): void => { for (let index = 0; index < live.length - 1; index += 1) ledger().markDispatched(live[index] as string); diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 907abf05cb..87e6a0dc56 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -741,19 +741,21 @@ forget to book. The previous attempt at this wiring shipped the whole reserve/di vocabulary with no caller at all (#4707), which is the failure mode this shape rules out. A booking is confirmed dispatched only once a LATER send exists, because that later send proves -the earlier one left. The newest booking stays open, so a reservation the budget hands back can -still be released for free. The stated cost: a hard crash between reserving and sending replays -as abandoned rather than unresolved, for at most one send per request. +the earlier one left. The newest booking stays open, so a reservation the budget hands back +during this process's lifetime can still be released for free. Settlement follows what the request learned. The terminal usage belongs to the last send that left, so that one settles with the real figure; every earlier send failed without reporting usage of its own and may still have been billed, so it becomes unresolved spend rather than free. A request that reports no usage at all leaves all of them unresolved. -Replay resolves what nobody is left to settle: an undispatched reservation is abandoned and a -dispatched one becomes unresolved, both journaled so a second restart has nothing to redo. -Without it a reservation whose process died held its tokens against the scope forever, which is a -ceiling that only tightens. `tests/responses/responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts` pins the +Replay resolves what nobody is left to settle, and resolves it as unresolved spend whatever state +it was in. Giving an undispatched one its tokens back would assume the journal is complete up to +the crash, and the torn-tail rule says it is not: a send can dispatch and die before its dispatch +record lands. It would also reset a ceiling that had already fired, and an exhausted scope +staying exhausted across a restart is the whole reason this store is on disk. Both are journaled, +so a second restart has nothing to redo. +`tests/responses/responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts` pins the booking, the settlement split, the refund, a ceiling that refuses a dispatch rather than describing it afterwards, and the restart. diff --git a/tests/lib/transient-budget-scope-source.test.ts b/tests/lib/transient-budget-scope-source.test.ts index 8bc9c8d0ea..a26a18bfa8 100644 --- a/tests/lib/transient-budget-scope-source.test.ts +++ b/tests/lib/transient-budget-scope-source.test.ts @@ -47,7 +47,10 @@ describe("transient send budget stays request-scoped", () => { expect(core.match(/const sendBudget = options\.sendBudget \?\? createRequestExecutionBudget\(\);/g)) .toHaveLength(1); // Genuine ingress mints it; a child arrives with the parent's and must not replace it. - expect(core).toContain("sendBudget: options.sendBudget ?? createRequestExecutionBudget(),"); + expect(core).toContain("sendBudget: options.sendBudget ?? createRequestExecutionBudget("); + // ...and the durable spend observer is installed WITH it, for the same reason: a child that + // inherited the holder must not open a second set of ledger entries for the same sends. + expect(core).toContain("attachRequestSpendTracker(req, logCtx)"); // The regressed shape: a counter local to one call frame, which a combo child restarts. expect(core).not.toContain("let transientSendsUsed = 0;"); expect(core.match(/const remainingTransientSendBudget = \(budget: number\): number =>/g)).toHaveLength(1); diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts index fb7a724d36..fec30f94e6 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-spend-ledger-wiring.test.ts @@ -126,15 +126,16 @@ describe("the request path books every physical send on the durable ledger", () const root = after.snapshot("root", "root-e"); // Nothing stays reserved: a reservation with no owner would hold its tokens forever. expect(root?.reserved).toBe(0); - // The confirmed send may already have been billed, so it keeps its tokens as unresolved; - // the one still open never reached the wire and gives them back. - expect(root?.unresolved).toBe(500); + // Both keep their tokens as unresolved, including the one still open. A send can dispatch + // and die before its dispatch record lands, so "open" does not prove nothing was sent -- + // and handing those tokens back would reset a ceiling that had already fired. + expect(root?.unresolved).toBe(1000); expect(root?.settled).toBe(0); // Replaying the same journal again is idempotent: the reconciliation was journaled, so a // second restart has nothing left to resolve and cannot double-book it. const third = createSpendReservationLedger({ journal }); - expect(third.snapshot("root", "root-e")?.unresolved).toBe(500); + expect(third.snapshot("root", "root-e")?.unresolved).toBe(1000); expect(third.snapshot("root", "root-e")?.reserved).toBe(0); }); }); From 217fe0179fbdb45f68ea1e0e9421d809505281fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:32:53 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 092/113] fix(catalog): normalize the custom-provider model-discovery join (#4724) [skip ci] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit A custom provider whose baseUrl ends in a slash produced a doubled discovery path: https://gateway.example.com/v1//models. Gateways that route the doubled path as a distinct route reject it — the report observed HTTP 403 — so discovery failed and the catalog silently fell back to the configured models. The send paths were normalized already, by openaiChatCompletionsUrl and openaiResponsesUrl, but discovery was not. buildModelsRequest appended the endpoint verbatim, and resolveProviderModelDiscoveryUrl returns that default unchanged for a provider with no registry spec, which is exactly the custom case. Registry providers escaped it because new URL(spec.path, base) collapses the doubled slash. providerModelsUrl mirrors openaiChatCompletionsUrl rather than inventing a second policy: trim outer whitespace and trailing slashes, drop an already pasted /models, then append exactly one. Both production callers of the default discovery URL use it — catalog discovery and API-key validation. An existing path prefix is preserved, so /api/openai/v1 is not collapsed to the origin. Registry spec.path, absolute endpoint overrides and relative endpoint overrides all resolve exactly as before; a baseUrl already written without a trailing slash is byte-identical to its previous output. --- src/oauth/index.ts | 4 +- src/oauth/key-providers.ts | 4 +- src/providers/model-discovery.ts | 16 +++++ structure/runtime.md | 6 +- .../provider-model-discovery-contract.test.ts | 67 +++++++++++++++++++ .../management-client-config-route.test.ts | 8 ++- .../model-discovery-management-api.test.ts | 13 +++- 7 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/oauth/index.ts b/src/oauth/index.ts index e490484651..471e16534c 100644 --- a/src/oauth/index.ts +++ b/src/oauth/index.ts @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ import { ANTIGRAVITY_REQUEST_UA } from "../adapters/google-antigravity-wire"; import { deriveOAuthDefaultModel, deriveOAuthProviderConfig } from "../providers/derive"; import { apiKeyPoolEntryId, sanitizeApiKeyValue } from "../providers/api-keys"; import { effectiveGoogleMode, getProviderRegistryEntry, mergeRegistryStaticHeaders, providerMatchesRegistryTransport } from "../providers/registry"; -import { resolveProviderModelDiscoveryUrl } from "../providers/model-discovery"; +import { providerModelsUrl, resolveProviderModelDiscoveryUrl } from "../providers/model-discovery"; import { resolveProviderTransport } from "../providers/xai-transport"; import { detectClaudeCodeToken, detectGrokCliToken, hasComparableGrokIdentity, isSameGrokIdentity, shouldAdoptGrokGeneration } from "./local-token-detect"; import { logOAuthEvent } from "./log"; @@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@ export function buildModelsRequest( return { url: discoveryUrl(`${base}/v1/models?limit=1000`), headers }; } if (apiKey) headers["Authorization"] = `Bearer ${apiKey}`; - return { url: discoveryUrl(`${effectiveProvider.baseUrl}/models`), headers }; + return { url: discoveryUrl(providerModelsUrl(effectiveProvider.baseUrl)), headers }; } /** diff --git a/src/oauth/key-providers.ts b/src/oauth/key-providers.ts index f147b6a44f..29386cb8b6 100644 --- a/src/oauth/key-providers.ts +++ b/src/oauth/key-providers.ts @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ import type { OcxProviderConfig } from "../types"; import { deriveKeyLoginMap, enrichProviderFromRegistry, type DerivedKeyLoginProvider } from "../providers/derive"; -import { resolveProviderModelDiscoveryUrl } from "../providers/model-discovery"; +import { providerModelsUrl, resolveProviderModelDiscoveryUrl } from "../providers/model-discovery"; /** * API-key "login" providers: not OAuth — the flow opens the provider's dashboard so the user can @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ export async function validateApiKey( providerName, configuredProvider, provider.baseUrl, - `${provider.baseUrl}/models`, + providerModelsUrl(provider.baseUrl), ); const res = await fetch(modelsUrl, { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${key}` }, diff --git a/src/providers/model-discovery.ts b/src/providers/model-discovery.ts index a0718ac068..78b68e55ef 100644 --- a/src/providers/model-discovery.ts +++ b/src/providers/model-discovery.ts @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ import { const MODEL_DISCOVERY_MAX_FILTER_VALUES = 256; const MODEL_DISCOVERY_MAX_FILTER_STRING_LENGTH = 1_024; +const TRAILING_SLASHES = /\/+$/; +const TRAILING_MODELS = /\/models$/; export interface ResolvedProviderModelDiscovery { spec?: ProviderModelDiscoverySpec; @@ -50,6 +52,20 @@ export type ModelEnvelopeRowsResult = | { ok: true; rows: unknown[] } | { ok: false; reason: "invalid_shape" | "too_many_models" }; +/** + * Build the default OpenAI-compatible model-discovery URL from a configured baseUrl. + * + * `baseUrl` is required on both `OcxProviderConfig` and the persisted-config schema, so a row + * without one is not a state configuration loading can produce. It is deliberately not tolerated + * here: the old template-literal join silently produced `"undefined/models"`, which is not a usable + * fallback either — it only ever survived because a static row returns before the URL is parsed. + */ +export function providerModelsUrl(baseUrl: string): string { + const trimmed = baseUrl.trim().replace(TRAILING_SLASHES, ""); + const withoutEndpoint = trimmed.replace(TRAILING_MODELS, ""); + return `${withoutEndpoint}/models`; +} + function positiveIntegerAtMost(value: number | undefined, hardLimit: number): number { if (typeof value !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(value) || value <= 0) return hardLimit; return Math.min(Math.floor(value), hardLimit); diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index 248c3011c6..89aaa82df6 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -201,7 +201,11 @@ The image/video loop bounds each hidden iteration before replay or fulfillment; [media iteration retention](transports/inventory.md#media-iteration-retention). Live model discovery is bounded and registry-driven through `src/providers/model-discovery.ts`. -Custom providers keep the conventional `${baseUrl}/models` request; canonical presets may select a +Custom providers keep the conventional `${baseUrl}/models` request, normalized by +`providerModelsUrl` the same way `openaiChatCompletionsUrl` normalizes the send path: outer +whitespace and trailing slashes are trimmed and an already-pasted `/models` is not doubled, so a +`baseUrl` written with or without a trailing slash yields the identical discovery URL and an +existing path prefix is preserved. Canonical presets may select a trusted URL/path/query and declarative eligibility filter without persisting that policy into user config. A response is rejected before caching when it exceeds 4 MiB, contains more than 2,000 raw rows, has a malformed OpenAI list envelope, or includes an invalid model id. Tests use fixtures and diff --git a/tests/providers/provider-model-discovery-contract.test.ts b/tests/providers/provider-model-discovery-contract.test.ts index 89cfef37b7..9a4a6fae25 100644 --- a/tests/providers/provider-model-discovery-contract.test.ts +++ b/tests/providers/provider-model-discovery-contract.test.ts @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import { deriveKeyLoginMap, providerConfigSeed } from "../../src/providers/deriv import { extractProviderModelItems, isRegistryModelDiscoveryUrl, + providerModelsUrl, providerModelDiscoverySpecError, readBoundedDiscoveryJson, resolveProviderModelDiscovery, @@ -68,6 +69,58 @@ function togetherConfig(overrides: Partial = {}): OcxConfig { } describe("registry-owned provider model discovery", () => { + test("normalizes custom model discovery URLs without collapsing path prefixes (#4724)", () => { + const buildCustom = (baseUrl: string) => buildModelsRequest({ + adapter: "openai-responses", + baseUrl, + authMode: "key", + }, "secret", "custom-gateway").url; + + expect(buildCustom("https://gw.example.com/v1")).toBe("https://gw.example.com/v1/models"); + expect(buildCustom("https://gw.example.com/v1/")).toBe("https://gw.example.com/v1/models"); + expect(buildCustom("https://gw.example.com/v1////")).toBe("https://gw.example.com/v1/models"); + expect(buildCustom("https://gw.example.com/api/openai/v1/")) + .toBe("https://gw.example.com/api/openai/v1/models"); + expect(buildCustom("https://gw.example.com/tenant/acme/api/openai/v1///")) + .toBe("https://gw.example.com/tenant/acme/api/openai/v1/models"); + expect(buildCustom("https://gw.example.com/v1/models")) + .toBe("https://gw.example.com/v1/models"); + expect(buildCustom("https://gw.example.com/v1/models/")) + .toBe("https://gw.example.com/v1/models"); + }); + + test("keeps registry path discovery independent of default URL normalization (#4724)", () => { + const url = resolveProviderModelDiscoveryUrl( + "cloudflare-workers-ai", + { + adapter: "openai-chat", + baseUrl: "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/acct/ai/v1/", + }, + "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/acct/ai/v1/", + providerModelsUrl("https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/acct/ai/v1/"), + ); + expect(url).toBe( + "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/acct/ai/models/search?format=openrouter&per_page=1000", + ); + }); + + test("keeps absolute and relative discovery endpoint overrides unchanged (#4724)", async () => { + await withTogetherDiscovery({ + url: "https://catalog.example.test/custom/models?source=registry", + }, () => { + expect(buildModelsRequest(togetherConfig().providers.together!, "secret", "together").url) + .toBe("https://catalog.example.test/custom/models?source=registry"); + }); + + await withTogetherDiscovery({ path: "catalog/models" }, () => { + expect(buildModelsRequest( + togetherConfig({ baseUrl: "https://api.together.xyz/v1/" }).providers.together!, + "secret", + "together", + ).url).toBe("https://api.together.xyz/v1/catalog/models"); + }); + }); + test("keeps every registry discovery contract inside static safety bounds", () => { for (const entry of PROVIDER_REGISTRY) { if (!entry.modelDiscovery) continue; @@ -170,6 +223,20 @@ describe("registry-owned provider model discovery", () => { }); }); + test("normalizes a custom API-key validation discovery URL (#4724)", async () => { + globalThis.fetch = (async (input, init) => { + expect(String(input)).toBe("https://custom.example/api/openai/v1/models"); + expect(new Headers(init?.headers).get("authorization")).toBe("Bearer secret"); + expect(init?.redirect).toBe("error"); + return Response.json({ data: [] }); + }) as typeof fetch; + + expect(await validateApiKey("custom-gateway", { + ...KEY_LOGIN_PROVIDERS.together!, + baseUrl: "https://custom.example/api/openai/v1///", + }, "secret")).toBe(true); + }); + test("pins fixed OAuth discovery before resolving relative and default endpoints", async () => { const staleConfig: OcxProviderConfig = { adapter: "openai-chat", diff --git a/tests/server/management-client-config-route.test.ts b/tests/server/management-client-config-route.test.ts index 45514c9754..ba83820c72 100644 --- a/tests/server/management-client-config-route.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/management-client-config-route.test.ts @@ -401,7 +401,13 @@ describe("GET /api/client-config", () => { const config = baseConfig({ providers: { ...baseConfig().providers, - openai: { authMode: "forward", liveModels: false, models: [] }, + // Spelled out the same way as the other `openai` fixture in this file: `adapter` and + // `baseUrl` are required by the persisted-config schema, so a row without them is not a + // state configuration loading can produce, and discovery builds a request from it. + openai: { + adapter: "openai-responses", authMode: "forward", liveModels: false, + baseUrl: "https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex", models: [], + }, }, }); const response = await clientConfigApi(config, "?client=opencode"); diff --git a/tests/server/model-discovery-management-api.test.ts b/tests/server/model-discovery-management-api.test.ts index ad132847bb..dc8dea96fe 100644 --- a/tests/server/model-discovery-management-api.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/model-discovery-management-api.test.ts @@ -4,7 +4,18 @@ import type { OcxConfig } from "../../src/types"; import { ManagementRequest as Request } from "../helpers/management-auth"; function config(): OcxConfig { - return { port: 10100, defaultProvider: "vendor", providers: { vendor: { liveModels: false, models: ["known"] } }, disabledModels: ["vendor/new"] }; + // `adapter` and `baseUrl` are both required by the persisted-config schema, so a row without + // them cannot reach this handler in production. The fixture used to omit them and still crossed + // into the real catalog gather path, which builds a discovery request before the static-provider + // branch returns; that is how it reached a URL join at all. + return { + port: 10100, + defaultProvider: "vendor", + providers: { + vendor: { adapter: "openai-chat", baseUrl: "https://vendor.example/v1", liveModels: false, models: ["known"] }, + }, + disabledModels: ["vendor/new"], + }; } async function call(live: OcxConfig, path: string, method = "GET", body?: unknown) { From 915af60e52d12de0bddd62037671d96983e83345 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:35:26 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 093/113] fix(codebuddy): refuse leaked vendor tool-call scaffolding (#4596) The CodeBuddy route launches the vendor CLI with --tools "" and --strict-mcp-config, so the routed model has no native tool channel and writes its call as prose. The shared coding-agent projection forwards text_delta unrepaired, so that markup reached the client as an ordinary assistant answer. Qoder's guard does not match it. The leaked tags are wrapped in FULLWIDTH VERTICAL LINE (U+FF5C), which none of the shipped UNREPAIRABLE_MARKERS cover, so this needed a signature of its own rather than a port. Refusal requires the observed two-line grammar: a calls control line at column zero, outside a Markdown fence, immediately followed by an invoke line naming a functions.* tool. A lone tag, a quoted or inline-code literal, a fenced example, a blockquote, indented source, or prose discussing the markup all carry extra syntax before the tag and are forwarded untouched. Matching the marker alone would refuse a legitimate answer that merely explains this protocol, which is why the detector is narrower than the marker spelling. A detected leak preserves the answer text already proven safe, emits one non-retryable vendor_scaffold_detected error, and suppresses the vendor's later success terminal so the client never sees a completed turn. Markers split across streamed deltas are caught by holding only a bounded suffix that could still complete a control sequence or a fence; unrelated pending text is released at the next mismatch or terminal. The reasoning channel is guarded independently. Leaked prose is never promoted into a real tool call. The text channel carries no authenticated call envelope and no validated arguments, so converting it would manufacture execution authority out of model output. Kept CodeBuddy-owned rather than lifted into the shared coding-agent path, the same containment #4234 chose for Qoder: the contract observed here is this vendor's, and #4190's lane packet asked for a report rather than symmetry. Co-authored-by: Ingwannu --- .../src/content/docs/guides/providers.md | 2 +- src/adapters/codebuddy/adapter.ts | 3 +- src/adapters/codebuddy/scaffold-guard.ts | 248 ++++++++++++++++++ structure/providers/chat-compat.md | 6 +- tests/providers/codebuddy-adapter.test.ts | 231 ++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 487 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/adapters/codebuddy/scaffold-guard.ts diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/providers.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/providers.md index f45f653c39..236ea50fa9 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/providers.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/providers.md @@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ OpenCodex provides official adapter support for Tencent Cloud's CodeBuddy Code C - Global: [CodeBuddy Global API Keys](https://www.codebuddy.ai/profile/keys) - CN: [CodeBuddy CN API Keys](https://copilot.tencent.com/profile/keys) - **Region Isolation:** `codebuddy` and `codebuddy-cn` use separate canonical endpoints (`https://www.codebuddy.ai` and `https://www.codebuddy.cn`) and isolated child environments (`CODEBUDDY_INTERNET_ENVIRONMENT=public` vs `internal`). Credentials are strictly region-scoped and never exchanged across environments. Overriding the canonical base URL fails closed. -- **Tool Ownership:** In v1, the CLI is spawned with `--tools ""` and `--strict-mcp-config`, ensuring Codex maintains exclusive tool ownership. The provider operates in text and reasoning mode; client tool execution is not delegated to the vendor CLI. +- **Tool Ownership:** In v1, the CLI is spawned with `--tools ""` and `--strict-mcp-config`, ensuring Codex maintains exclusive tool ownership. The provider operates in text and reasoning mode; client tool execution is not delegated to the vendor CLI. If the CLI writes an unquoted DSML `calls` control line followed by a `functions.*` invoke control line into text or reasoning, OpenCodex refuses the turn instead of forwarding the scaffold or interpreting it as an executable call. DSML discussed or quoted in prose, inline code, fenced code, or source examples remains ordinary answer text. - **Entitlements and Billing:** The provider uses the same vendor-documented CodeBuddy account/CLI authentication surface. Availability and billing of free, promotional, trial, or subscription credits remain determined by the user's CodeBuddy account entitlement. ### Official Qoder CLI (Global & CN) diff --git a/src/adapters/codebuddy/adapter.ts b/src/adapters/codebuddy/adapter.ts index 234e06907e..a769ac37da 100644 --- a/src/adapters/codebuddy/adapter.ts +++ b/src/adapters/codebuddy/adapter.ts @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { mapReasoningEffort } from "../../reasoning-effort"; import { buildSystemPrompt } from "../coding-agent/protocol"; import { baseScopedEnv, runCodingAgentTurn, type CodingAgentDeps, type SpawnFn } from "../coding-agent/turn"; import { CODEBUDDY_PROFILES, type CodeBuddyProfile } from "./profiles"; +import { guardCodeBuddyScaffolding } from "./scaffold-guard"; export type { SpawnFn } from "../coding-agent/turn"; export type CodeBuddyAdapterDeps = CodingAgentDeps; @@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ export function createCodeBuddyAdapter(provider: OcxProviderConfig, deps: CodeBu provider, parsed, incoming, - emit, + emit: guardCodeBuddyScaffolding(emit), buildArgs: (resolved, req, prov) => buildArgs(resolved as CodeBuddyProfile, req, prov), buildEnv: (resolved, apiKey) => buildChildEnv(resolved as CodeBuddyProfile, apiKey), deps, diff --git a/src/adapters/codebuddy/scaffold-guard.ts b/src/adapters/codebuddy/scaffold-guard.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6f8c80aed5 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/adapters/codebuddy/scaffold-guard.ts @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +import type { AdapterEvent } from "../../types"; + +/** Error code for a CodeBuddy turn whose output contains vendor agent scaffolding. */ +export const CODEBUDDY_SCAFFOLD_ERROR_CODE = "vendor_scaffold_detected"; + +// The observed control protocol uses FULLWIDTH VERTICAL LINE (U+FF5C). Detection stays +// deliberately narrower than the marker spelling: a calls control line must be followed by an +// invoke line for a functions.* tool. That distinguishes an agent scaffold from prose quoting or +// discussing one tag. +const DSML_CALLS_LINE = "<｜｜dsml｜｜ calls>"; +const DSML_INVOKE_PREFIX = "<｜｜dsml｜｜ invoke name=\"functions."; + +export interface CodeBuddyScaffoldFilterResult { + /** Bytes released from a suffix withheld by an earlier event on this channel. */ + releasedPending: string; + /** Safe bytes belonging to the event currently being processed. */ + text: string; + /** The earlier pending event still owns the extended candidate. */ + pendingContinues: boolean; + fail: boolean; +} + +interface ScanResult { + safe: string; + held: string; + fail: boolean; + fence: "`" | "~" | null; + lineStart: boolean; +} + +function prefixAtEnd(text: string, at: number, expected: string): boolean { + const rest = text.slice(at).toLowerCase(); + return rest.length < expected.length && expected.startsWith(rest); +} + +/** + * Scan complete bytes and retain only a bounded suffix that can still become a control sequence. + * + * Control tags are recognized only at column zero and outside fenced Markdown. Inline code, + * quoted strings, blockquotes, indented source, and prose all add syntax before the tag and are + * therefore forwarded unchanged. A calls line alone is harmless; refusal requires the observed + * two-line calls-plus-functions-invoke grammar. + */ +function scan( + text: string, + initialFence: "`" | "~" | null, + initialLineStart: boolean, +): ScanResult { + let fence = initialFence; + let lineStart = initialLineStart; + let index = 0; + + while (index < text.length) { + if (lineStart) { + const fenceMarkers = fence ? [fence.repeat(3)] : ["```", "~~~"]; + const completeFence = fenceMarkers.find(marker => text.startsWith(marker, index)); + if (completeFence) { + fence = fence ? null : (completeFence[0] as "`" | "~"); + index += completeFence.length; + lineStart = false; + continue; + } + if (fenceMarkers.some(marker => prefixAtEnd(text, index, marker))) { + return { safe: text.slice(0, index), held: text.slice(index), fail: false, fence, lineStart }; + } + + if (!fence) { + const lowered = text.slice(index).toLowerCase(); + if (lowered.startsWith(DSML_CALLS_LINE)) { + const afterCalls = index + DSML_CALLS_LINE.length; + let invokeAt = -1; + if (text[afterCalls] === "\n") invokeAt = afterCalls + 1; + else if (text[afterCalls] === "\r" && text[afterCalls + 1] === "\n") invokeAt = afterCalls + 2; + else if (afterCalls === text.length || (text[afterCalls] === "\r" && afterCalls + 1 === text.length)) { + return { safe: text.slice(0, index), held: text.slice(index), fail: false, fence, lineStart }; + } + + if (invokeAt >= 0) { + const invokeRest = text.slice(invokeAt).toLowerCase(); + if (invokeRest.startsWith(DSML_INVOKE_PREFIX)) { + return { safe: text.slice(0, index), held: "", fail: true, fence, lineStart }; + } + if (invokeRest.length === 0 || DSML_INVOKE_PREFIX.startsWith(invokeRest)) { + return { safe: text.slice(0, index), held: text.slice(index), fail: false, fence, lineStart }; + } + } + } else if (prefixAtEnd(text, index, DSML_CALLS_LINE)) { + return { safe: text.slice(0, index), held: text.slice(index), fail: false, fence, lineStart }; + } + } + } + + const char = text[index]!; + index += 1; + lineStart = char === "\n"; + } + + return { safe: text, held: "", fail: false, fence, lineStart }; +} + +/** Streaming DSML control-sequence filter for one text or reasoning channel. */ +export class CodeBuddyScaffoldFilter { + private pending = ""; + private failed = false; + private fence: "`" | "~" | null = null; + private lineStart = true; + + /** True while an earlier event owns an unresolved marker or fence prefix. */ + hasPending(): boolean { + return this.pending.length > 0; + } + + push(chunk: string): CodeBuddyScaffoldFilterResult { + if (this.failed) { + return { releasedPending: "", text: "", pendingContinues: false, fail: false }; + } + if (!chunk) { + return { + releasedPending: "", + text: "", + pendingContinues: this.hasPending(), + fail: false, + }; + } + + const priorPending = this.pending; + const result = scan(priorPending + chunk, this.fence, this.lineStart); + this.pending = result.held; + this.fence = result.fence; + this.lineStart = result.lineStart; + this.failed = result.fail; + + const releasedLength = Math.min(priorPending.length, result.safe.length); + return { + releasedPending: result.safe.slice(0, releasedLength), + text: result.safe.slice(releasedLength), + pendingContinues: priorPending.length > 0 && result.safe.length === 0 && result.held.length > 0, + fail: result.fail, + }; + } + + /** Release a suffix that never completed the two-line control grammar. */ + flush(): CodeBuddyScaffoldFilterResult { + if (this.failed) { + return { releasedPending: "", text: "", pendingContinues: false, fail: false }; + } + const text = this.pending; + this.pending = ""; + return { releasedPending: text, text: "", pendingContinues: false, fail: false }; + } +} + +function codeBuddyScaffoldErrorMessage(): string { + return "CodeBuddy CLI emitted vendor tool-call markup in an assistant output channel. This route" + + " runs the CLI with its own tools and MCP servers disabled and Codex owns tool control, so" + + " the turn was refused rather than forwarding or executing vendor agent scaffolding."; +} + +/** Guard both streamed channels while preserving event order around withheld marker prefixes. */ +export function guardCodeBuddyScaffolding(emit: (event: AdapterEvent) => void): (event: AdapterEvent) => void { + const textFilter = new CodeBuddyScaffoldFilter(); + const thinkingFilter = new CodeBuddyScaffoldFilter(); + type PendingChannel = "text" | "thinking"; + type EventSlot = { resolved: boolean; event?: AdapterEvent }; + const eventQueue: EventSlot[] = []; + const pendingSlots = new Map(); + let closed = false; + + const channelEvent = (channel: PendingChannel, text: string): AdapterEvent => channel === "text" + ? { type: "text_delta", text } + : { type: "thinking_delta", thinking: text }; + + const drainResolved = (): void => { + while (eventQueue[0]?.resolved) { + const slot = eventQueue.shift()!; + if (slot.event) emit(slot.event); + } + }; + + const enqueueResolved = (event: AdapterEvent): void => { + eventQueue.push({ resolved: true, event }); + drainResolved(); + }; + + const resolvePendingSlot = (channel: PendingChannel, text: string): void => { + const slot = pendingSlots.get(channel); + if (!slot) return; + slot.resolved = true; + if (text) slot.event = channelEvent(channel, text); + pendingSlots.delete(channel); + drainResolved(); + }; + + const enqueuePendingSlot = (channel: PendingChannel): void => { + const slot: EventSlot = { resolved: false }; + eventQueue.push(slot); + pendingSlots.set(channel, slot); + }; + + const flushAllPending = (): void => { + for (const channel of ["text", "thinking"] as const) { + if (!pendingSlots.has(channel)) continue; + const filter = channel === "text" ? textFilter : thinkingFilter; + resolvePendingSlot(channel, filter.flush().releasedPending); + } + drainResolved(); + }; + + const refuse = (): void => { + if (closed) return; + flushAllPending(); + closed = true; + emit({ + type: "error", + message: codeBuddyScaffoldErrorMessage(), + status: 502, + errorType: "upstream_error", + code: CODEBUDDY_SCAFFOLD_ERROR_CODE, + retryable: false, + }); + }; + + return (event: AdapterEvent): void => { + if (closed) return; + if (event.type === "text_delta" || event.type === "thinking_delta") { + const channel: PendingChannel = event.type === "text_delta" ? "text" : "thinking"; + const filter = channel === "text" ? textFilter : thinkingFilter; + const hadPending = filter.hasPending(); + const cleaned = filter.push(event.type === "text_delta" ? event.text : event.thinking); + if (hadPending && !cleaned.pendingContinues) resolvePendingSlot(channel, cleaned.releasedPending); + if (cleaned.text) { + enqueueResolved(event.type === "text_delta" + ? { ...event, text: cleaned.text } + : { ...event, thinking: cleaned.text }); + } + if (filter.hasPending() && !cleaned.pendingContinues) enqueuePendingSlot(channel); + if (cleaned.fail) refuse(); + return; + } + if (event.type === "done" || event.type === "error" || event.type === "incomplete") { + flushAllPending(); + closed = true; + emit(event); + return; + } + enqueueResolved(event); + }; +} diff --git a/structure/providers/chat-compat.md b/structure/providers/chat-compat.md index 92b19a97a4..270641484d 100644 --- a/structure/providers/chat-compat.md +++ b/structure/providers/chat-compat.md @@ -354,6 +354,10 @@ The shared coding-agent projection (CodeBuddy, Qoder) carries tool-result images real image blocks rather than flattening them to the text `[image]`, and orders image blocks chronologically — history before current — so attachment order matches the prose the model reads beside them. Vendor tool execution stays disabled on both -adapters, and Qoder's explicit refusal of original images is unchanged. +adapters. CodeBuddy refuses an unquoted, line-oriented full-width-bar DSML `calls` +container followed by a `functions.*` invoke control line in either output channel; it +preserves preceding answer text, never promotes vendor prose into execution authority, +and leaves discussed or quoted literals and code examples untouched. Qoder's explicit +refusal of original images is unchanged. Canonical Responses identity sanitation and narrowly scoped pre-output combo recovery follow [request-local target compatibility](../runtime.md#request-local-target-compatibility); other adapter contracts remain unchanged. diff --git a/tests/providers/codebuddy-adapter.test.ts b/tests/providers/codebuddy-adapter.test.ts index 0da898ea82..76caabfae9 100644 --- a/tests/providers/codebuddy-adapter.test.ts +++ b/tests/providers/codebuddy-adapter.test.ts @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { EventEmitter } from "node:events"; import { Readable, Writable } from "node:stream"; import type { ChildProcess } from "node:child_process"; import { buildArgs, buildChildEnv, createCodeBuddyAdapter, type SpawnFn } from "../../src/adapters/codebuddy/adapter"; +import { guardCodeBuddyScaffolding } from "../../src/adapters/codebuddy/scaffold-guard"; import { CODEBUDDY_CN_PROFILE, CODEBUDDY_GLOBAL_PROFILE, clearCodeBuddyBinaryCache } from "../../src/adapters/codebuddy/profiles"; import type { AdapterEvent, OcxParsedRequest, OcxProviderConfig } from "../../src/types"; import { createTestTranslatorBudget } from "../helpers/translator-budget"; @@ -221,6 +222,236 @@ describe("codebuddy runTurn streams a headless turn", () => { expect(child.written.join("")).toContain('"text":"hello"'); }); + test("refuses a full-message DSML calls-and-invoke scaffold", async () => { + const leaked = "I'll inspect it.\n<｜｜DSML｜｜ calls>\n" + + "<｜｜DSML｜｜ invoke name=\"functions.exec\">\nsecret-command"; + const stdout = [ + enc.encode(`${JSON.stringify({ + type: "assistant", + message: { role: "assistant", content: [{ type: "text", text: leaked }] }, + })}\n`), + enc.encode('{"type":"result","subtype":"success","is_error":false}\n'), + ]; + const adapter = createCodeBuddyAdapter(provider(), { + spawn: () => fakeChild(stdout) as unknown as ChildProcess, + which: () => "/usr/bin/codebuddy", + killGraceMs: 20, + }); + + const events = await run(adapter, parsed()); + expect(events.filter(event => event.type === "text_delta")) + .toEqual([{ type: "text_delta", text: "I'll inspect it.\n" }]); + expect(events.some(event => event.type === "done")).toBe(false); + expect(events.at(-1)).toMatchObject({ + type: "error", + code: "vendor_scaffold_detected", + retryable: false, + status: 502, + }); + expect(JSON.stringify(events)).not.toContain("secret-command"); + }); + + test("detects a DSML control sequence split across streamed text deltas", async () => { + const frame = (text: string) => `${JSON.stringify({ + type: "stream_event", + event: { type: "content_block_delta", delta: { type: "text_delta", text } }, + })}\n`; + const stdout = [ + enc.encode(frame("Safe prefix.\n<｜｜DS")), + enc.encode(frame("ML｜｜ calls>\n<｜｜DSML｜｜ invoke name=\"funct")), + enc.encode(frame("ions.exec\">private-body")), + enc.encode('{"type":"result","subtype":"success","is_error":false}\n'), + ]; + const adapter = createCodeBuddyAdapter(provider(), { + spawn: () => fakeChild(stdout) as unknown as ChildProcess, + which: () => "/usr/bin/codebuddy", + killGraceMs: 20, + }); + + const events = await run(adapter, parsed()); + expect(events.filter(event => event.type === "text_delta")) + .toEqual([{ type: "text_delta", text: "Safe prefix.\n" }]); + expect(events.at(-1)).toMatchObject({ type: "error", code: "vendor_scaffold_detected" }); + expect(events.some(event => event.type === "done")).toBe(false); + expect(JSON.stringify(events)).not.toContain("private-body"); + }); + + test("refuses DSML calls-and-invoke scaffolding from reasoning independently", async () => { + const stdout = [ + enc.encode(`${JSON.stringify({ + type: "stream_event", + event: { + type: "content_block_delta", + delta: { + type: "thinking_delta", + thinking: "Safe thought.\n<｜｜DSML｜｜ calls>\n" + + "<｜｜DSML｜｜ invoke name=\"functions.exec\">private-body", + }, + }, + })}\n`), + enc.encode('{"type":"result","subtype":"success","is_error":false}\n'), + ]; + const adapter = createCodeBuddyAdapter(provider(), { + spawn: () => fakeChild(stdout) as unknown as ChildProcess, + which: () => "/usr/bin/codebuddy", + killGraceMs: 20, + }); + + const events = await run(adapter, parsed()); + expect(events.filter(event => event.type === "thinking_delta")) + .toEqual([{ type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "Safe thought.\n" }]); + expect(events.at(-1)).toMatchObject({ + type: "error", + code: "vendor_scaffold_detected", + retryable: false, + }); + expect(events.some(event => event.type === "done")).toBe(false); + expect(JSON.stringify(events)).not.toContain("private-body"); + }); + + test("delivers a lone discussed DSML calls tag unchanged", () => { + const events: AdapterEvent[] = []; + const guarded = guardCodeBuddyScaffolding(event => events.push(event)); + const answer = "The string <｜｜DSML｜｜ calls> names the calls container."; + + guarded({ type: "text_delta", text: answer }); + guarded({ type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }); + + expect(events).toEqual([ + { type: "text_delta", text: answer }, + { type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }, + ]); + }); + + test("delivers quoted and inline-code DSML literals unchanged", () => { + const events: AdapterEvent[] = []; + const guarded = guardCodeBuddyScaffolding(event => events.push(event)); + const answer = "\"<｜｜DSML｜｜ calls>\"\n" + + "\"<｜｜DSML｜｜ invoke name=\\\"functions.exec\\\">\"\n" + + "Use `<｜｜DSML｜｜ calls>` when discussing the literal.\n" + + "> <｜｜DSML｜｜ calls>\n> <｜｜DSML｜｜ invoke name=\"functions.exec\">"; + + guarded({ type: "text_delta", text: answer }); + guarded({ type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }); + + expect(events).toEqual([ + { type: "text_delta", text: answer }, + { type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }, + ]); + }); + + test("delivers a fenced DSML source example unchanged across deltas", () => { + const events: AdapterEvent[] = []; + const guarded = guardCodeBuddyScaffolding(event => events.push(event)); + const first = "```text\n<｜｜DSML｜｜ calls>\n"; + const second = "<｜｜DSML｜｜ invoke name=\"functions.exec\">\n```"; + + guarded({ type: "text_delta", text: first }); + guarded({ type: "text_delta", text: second }); + guarded({ type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }); + + expect(events).toEqual([ + { type: "text_delta", text: first }, + { type: "text_delta", text: second }, + { type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }, + ]); + }); + + test("delivers source strings containing both DSML literals unchanged", () => { + const events: AdapterEvent[] = []; + const guarded = guardCodeBuddyScaffolding(event => events.push(event)); + const answer = "const calls = '<｜｜DSML｜｜ calls>';\n" + + "const invoke = '<｜｜DSML｜｜ invoke name=\"functions.exec\">';"; + + guarded({ type: "text_delta", text: answer }); + guarded({ type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }); + + expect(events).toEqual([ + { type: "text_delta", text: answer }, + { type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }, + ]); + }); + + test("delivers an unquoted invoke line when no calls container precedes it", () => { + const events: AdapterEvent[] = []; + const guarded = guardCodeBuddyScaffolding(event => events.push(event)); + const answer = "<｜｜DSML｜｜ invoke name=\"functions.exec\">"; + + guarded({ type: "text_delta", text: answer }); + guarded({ type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }); + + expect(events).toEqual([ + { type: "text_delta", text: answer }, + { type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }, + ]); + }); + + test("releases a lone control-line candidate at the terminal", () => { + const events: AdapterEvent[] = []; + const guarded = guardCodeBuddyScaffolding(event => events.push(event)); + + guarded({ type: "text_delta", text: "<｜｜DSML｜｜ calls>" }); + expect(events).toEqual([]); + guarded({ type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }); + + expect(events).toEqual([ + { type: "text_delta", text: "<｜｜DSML｜｜ calls>" }, + { type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }, + ]); + }); + + test("queues later events behind an unresolved marker prefix", () => { + const events: AdapterEvent[] = []; + const guarded = guardCodeBuddyScaffolding(event => events.push(event)); + + guarded({ type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "<" }); + guarded({ type: "text_delta", text: "Hello" }); + guarded({ type: "tool_call_start", id: "call_1", name: "exec" }); + expect(events).toEqual([]); + guarded({ type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }); + + expect(events).toEqual([ + { type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "<" }, + { type: "text_delta", text: "Hello" }, + { type: "tool_call_start", id: "call_1", name: "exec" }, + { type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }, + ]); + }); + + test("keeps an existing pending slot when its channel receives an empty delta", () => { + const events: AdapterEvent[] = []; + const guarded = guardCodeBuddyScaffolding(event => events.push(event)); + + guarded({ type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "<" }); + guarded({ type: "text_delta", text: "Hello" }); + guarded({ type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "" }); + guarded({ type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }); + + expect(events).toEqual([ + { type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "<" }, + { type: "text_delta", text: "Hello" }, + { type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }, + ]); + }); + + test("moves a replaced pending marker prefix to its new arrival position", () => { + const events: AdapterEvent[] = []; + const guarded = guardCodeBuddyScaffolding(event => events.push(event)); + + guarded({ type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "<" }); + guarded({ type: "text_delta", text: "<" }); + guarded({ type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "not marker\n<" }); + guarded({ type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }); + + expect(events).toEqual([ + { type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "<" }, + { type: "text_delta", text: "<" }, + { type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "not marker\n" }, + { type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "<" }, + { type: "done", stopReason: "stop" }, + ]); + }); + test("region isolation: the global adapter never spawns with the CN environment", async () => { let seenEnv: NodeJS.ProcessEnv | undefined; const spawn: SpawnFn = (_cmd, _args, opts) => { seenEnv = opts.env as NodeJS.ProcessEnv; return fakeChild([enc.encode('{"type":"result","subtype":"success"}\n')]) as unknown as ChildProcess; }; From 99c977d7bed1ffb4fc707d151a8da7040100bb57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:34:09 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 094/113] fix(openai-chat): bound flattened tool wire names for strict gateways (#4679) [skip ci] Command Code's gateway rejects a request outright with 400 name must be at most 64 characters, got 66. Codex Desktop built-in app tools flatten to __ past that bound, a user cannot exclude them, and Responses-Lite catalogs bundle every declared tool, so the surface cannot be shrunk from configuration. The bound belongs to the adapter, not to the shared name helper. Three adapters already solve this for themselves: Kiro normalizes to its own charset with a deterministic 8-hex suffix, Google compiles and restores names in its wire compiler, and Meta Muse aliases names on api.meta.ai. The translated openai-chat path is the only one with no answer, and it is the path Command Code uses. A request-scoped registry now owns one collision domain per translated Chat Completions request, following Kiro's shape. A namespaced name whose flattened spelling exceeds 64 characters becomes a charset-safe alias derived purely from the native identity, so it is stable across processes, catalog order and catalog membership. Declarations, replayed assistant tool calls and tool_choice all pass through the same registry, and both the streaming and buffered parsers restore the echoed alias before tool_call_start, so the existing bridge map still hands the client its native {namespace, name}. The registry is seeded from the union of the current catalog and the structured tool calls still present in replay history, because a historical call can keep its namespace without being redeclared; seeding from the catalog alone would let exactly the reported over-limit name reach the gateway again on a later turn. Nothing else changes. Names at or under 64 characters and bare names are byte-identical on the wire, and Kiro, Google and Muse still receive the raw flattened name and run their own normalization. 64 is the Chat Completions function-name limit and a strict-gateway compatibility concern, not OpenAI Responses parity: upstream Codex raised its own MCP ceiling to 128 bytes in openai/codex#39594 because native Responses accepts 128. Applying it on this wire is correct for that wire alone. Carried from #4715. That PR placed the bound in the shared namespacedToolName helper and was provisionally accepted there. Hosted CI then showed twice that the shared point intercepts adapters which already had an answer: it broke Google's wire-compiler restore, and after that was narrowed it broke Kiro's normalizer. The problem statement and issue analysis are the original author's; only the placement changed. Co-authored-by: Hulian Buligon <205309211+HulianBuligon@users.noreply.github.com> --- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 1 + src/adapters/openai-chat.ts | 16 +- .../openai-chat/tool-name-registry.ts | 166 ++++++++++ src/adapters/openai-chat/tool-schema.ts | 32 +- structure/providers/chat-compat.md | 18 +- .../openai-chat-bounded-tool-names.test.ts | 301 ++++++++++++++++++ tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 1 + 7 files changed, 516 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/adapters/openai-chat/tool-name-registry.ts create mode 100644 tests/adapters/openai/openai-chat-bounded-tool-names.test.ts diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index 7e9cc52959..c8cf88898e 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -990,6 +990,7 @@ "omp-path-contract.test.ts": "clients", "omp-yaml-source-inline-comments.test.ts": "clients", "openai-api-virtual-models.test.ts": "adapters/openai", + "openai-chat-bounded-tool-names.test.ts": "adapters/openai", "openai-chat-dangling-toolcalls.test.ts": "adapters/openai", "openai-chat-eof.test.ts": "adapters/openai", "openai-chat-hardening.test.ts": "adapters/openai", diff --git a/src/adapters/openai-chat.ts b/src/adapters/openai-chat.ts index 8503210e46..d74640a3e2 100644 --- a/src/adapters/openai-chat.ts +++ b/src/adapters/openai-chat.ts @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import { mapReasoningEffort, modelRecordValue } from "../reasoning-effort"; import { debugProviderDiagnostic } from "../lib/debug"; import { sseFieldValue } from "../lib/sse-decoder"; import { isDebugEnabled } from "../lib/debug-settings"; -import { frameAgentRouterMessages } from "./agentrouter"; import { openRouterProviderPayload, resolveOpenRouterRouting } from "../providers/openrouter-routing"; import { resolveVercelGatewayRouting, vercelGatewayProviderPayload } from "../providers/vercel-gateway-routing"; import { fastPolicyForModel } from "../providers/service-tier"; @@ -39,6 +38,7 @@ import { upstreamErrorEvent, } from "./openai-chat/errors"; import { messagesToChatFormat } from "./openai-chat/messages"; +import { withOpenAIChatToolNames } from "./openai-chat/tool-name-registry"; import { isNativeOpenAIChatTarget, openAIChatTransport, stripBracketedModelSuffix } from "./openai-chat/wire"; import { toolChoiceToChatFormat, toolsToChatFormatForProvider } from "./openai-chat/tool-schema"; @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ function canSerializeOpenAIChatServiceTier( export function createOpenAIChatAdapter(provider: OcxProviderConfig): ProviderAdapter { let lastRequestedModelId: string | undefined; - return { + return withOpenAIChatToolNames(toolNames => ({ name: "openai-chat", formatErrorBody: formatOpenAIChatErrorBody, @@ -96,10 +96,10 @@ export function createOpenAIChatAdapter(provider: OcxProviderConfig): ProviderAd buildRequest(parsed: OcxParsedRequest, incoming?: IncomingMeta) { lastRequestedModelId = parsed.modelId; const { url, headers, hasCredential } = openAIChatTransport(provider); - const messages = frameAgentRouterMessages(provider.baseUrl, messagesToChatFormat(parsed, provider)); + const messages = toolNames.messages(parsed, provider.baseUrl, messagesToChatFormat(parsed, provider)); const finish = (): AdapterRequest => { - const tools = toolsToChatFormatForProvider(parsed, provider); - const toolChoice = toolChoiceToChatFormat(parsed.options.toolChoice, parsed.context.tools, provider); + const tools = toolsToChatFormatForProvider(parsed, provider, toolNames.registry()); + const toolChoice = toolChoiceToChatFormat(parsed.options.toolChoice, parsed.context.tools, provider, toolNames.registry()); const body: Record = { model: provider.modelSuffixBracketStrip ? stripBracketedModelSuffix(parsed.modelId) : parsed.modelId, @@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ export function createOpenAIChatAdapter(provider: OcxProviderConfig): ProviderAd return "terminate"; } if (!call.id) call.id = `call_${++toolCallSeq}`; - yield { type: "tool_call_start", id: call.id, name: call.name }; + yield { type: "tool_call_start", id: call.id, name: toolNames.restore(call.name) }; if (call.args.length > 0) yield { type: "tool_call_delta", arguments: call.args }; yield { type: "tool_call_end" }; } @@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ export function createOpenAIChatAdapter(provider: OcxProviderConfig): ProviderAd logInvalidToolCalls("response", rawToolCalls); return [invalidToolCallsEvent(rawToolCalls, "response", usage)]; } - events.push({ type: "tool_call_start", id, name }); + events.push({ type: "tool_call_start", id, name: toolNames.restore(name) }); events.push({ type: "tool_call_delta", arguments: args }); events.push({ type: "tool_call_end" }); } @@ -818,5 +818,5 @@ export function createOpenAIChatAdapter(provider: OcxProviderConfig): ProviderAd budget.releaseRetained(responseBytes, { kind: "retained_collectors" }); } }, - }; + })); } diff --git a/src/adapters/openai-chat/tool-name-registry.ts b/src/adapters/openai-chat/tool-name-registry.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c9c8e1fa5f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/adapters/openai-chat/tool-name-registry.ts @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; +import { namespacedToolName, type OcxParsedRequest, type OcxTool } from "../../types"; +import { frameAgentRouterMessages } from "../agentrouter"; + +const MAX_CHAT_TOOL_NAME_LENGTH = 64; +const ALIAS_HINT_CHARS = 16; +const RESERVED_ALIAS_PATTERN = /^ocx_[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{16}_[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{43}$/; +type ToolIdentity = Readonly>; + +export interface OpenAIChatToolNameRegistry { + alias(tool: ToolIdentity): string; + aliasWireName(wireName: string): string; + restore(wireName: string): string; +} + +interface OpenAIChatToolNameScope { + messages(parsed: OcxParsedRequest, baseUrl: string, messages: readonly unknown[]): unknown; + registry(): OpenAIChatToolNameRegistry; + restore(wireName: string): string; +} + +function identityKey(tool: ToolIdentity): string { + return JSON.stringify([tool.namespace ?? null, tool.name]); +} + +function boundedAlias(tool: ToolIdentity, wireName: string): string { + const hint = wireName + .replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/g, "_") + .slice(-ALIAS_HINT_CHARS) + .padStart(ALIAS_HINT_CHARS, "_"); + const key = identityKey(tool); + const digest = createHash("sha256") + .update(key) + .digest("base64url"); + return `ocx_${hint}_${digest}`; +} + +/** Catalog declarations plus structured calls retained in replay history. */ +export function openAIChatToolNameIdentities(parsed: OcxParsedRequest): ToolIdentity[] { + const identities: ToolIdentity[] = [...(parsed.context.tools ?? [])]; + for (const message of parsed.context.messages) { + if (message.role !== "assistant" || !Array.isArray(message.content)) continue; + for (const part of message.content) { + if (part.type !== "toolCall") continue; + identities.push({ + name: part.name, + ...(part.namespace === undefined ? {} : { namespace: part.namespace }), + }); + } + } + return identities; +} + +/** + * One collision domain for a translated Chat Completions request. + * + * Namespaced names whose flattened spelling exceeds Chat Completions' 64-character function-name + * bound are rewritten. Ordinary names and bare names pass through byte-for-byte unless they occupy + * the reserved alias spelling; those are re-aliased so no declaration can shadow another identity's + * deterministic alias. Distinct identities sharing one flattened spelling each keep an identity + * alias, while replay rewriting leaves that ambiguous spelling untouched. Echoed aliases restore to + * the original flattened name consumed by the Responses bridge's existing namespace map. + */ +export function createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry( + tools: readonly ToolIdentity[] | undefined, +): OpenAIChatToolNameRegistry { + const identities = new Map(); + for (const tool of tools ?? []) identities.set(identityKey(tool), tool); + const sortedIdentities = [...identities.entries()] + .sort(([left], [right]) => left < right ? -1 : left > right ? 1 : 0); + + const aliasesByIdentity = new Map(); + const aliasesByWireName = new Map(); + const originalsByAlias = new Map(); + const wireOwners = new Map(); + for (const [key, tool] of sortedIdentities) { + const wireName = namespacedToolName(tool.namespace, tool.name); + const owner = wireOwners.get(wireName); + if (owner === undefined) wireOwners.set(wireName, key); + else if (owner !== key) wireOwners.set(wireName, null); + } + + const aliasOwners = new Map(); + const wireClaims = new Map(); + for (const [key, tool] of sortedIdentities) { + const wireName = namespacedToolName(tool.namespace, tool.name); + const candidate = (tool.namespace !== undefined && wireName.length > MAX_CHAT_TOOL_NAME_LENGTH) + || RESERVED_ALIAS_PATTERN.test(wireName) + || wireOwners.get(wireName) === null + ? boundedAlias(tool, wireName) + : wireName; + // A full SHA-256 collision is not safely attributable. Keep the later identity's native + // spelling instead of failing the request or stealing the first identity's restore entry. + const alias = aliasOwners.has(candidate) ? wireName : candidate; + aliasesByIdentity.set(key, alias); + if (!aliasOwners.has(alias)) aliasOwners.set(alias, key); + if (alias !== wireName) originalsByAlias.set(alias, wireName); + + const claim = wireClaims.get(wireName); + if (claim === undefined) wireClaims.set(wireName, { key, alias }); + else if (claim !== null && claim.key !== key) wireClaims.set(wireName, null); + } + for (const [wireName, claim] of wireClaims) { + if (claim !== null) aliasesByWireName.set(wireName, claim.alias); + } + + return { + alias(tool: ToolIdentity): string { + const key = identityKey(tool); + const known = aliasesByIdentity.get(key); + if (known !== undefined) return known; + return namespacedToolName(tool.namespace, tool.name); + }, + aliasWireName(wireName: string): string { + return aliasesByWireName.get(wireName) ?? wireName; + }, + restore(wireName: string): string { + return originalsByAlias.get(wireName) ?? wireName; + }, + }; +} + +export function restoreOpenAIChatToolName( + registry: OpenAIChatToolNameRegistry, + wireName: string, +): string { + return registry.restore(wireName); +} + +function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record { + return value !== null && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value); +} + +/** Rewrite replayed assistant tool calls after the ordinary message converter has flattened them. */ +export function aliasOpenAIChatMessageToolNames( + messages: readonly unknown[], + registry: OpenAIChatToolNameRegistry, +): unknown[] { + return messages.map(message => { + if (!isRecord(message) || !Array.isArray(message.tool_calls)) return message; + let changed = false; + const toolCalls = message.tool_calls.map(toolCall => { + if (!isRecord(toolCall) || !isRecord(toolCall.function) + || typeof toolCall.function.name !== "string") return toolCall; + const name = registry.aliasWireName(toolCall.function.name); + if (name === toolCall.function.name) return toolCall; + changed = true; + return { ...toolCall, function: { ...toolCall.function, name } }; + }); + return changed ? { ...message, tool_calls: toolCalls } : message; + }); +} + +export function withOpenAIChatToolNames( + build: (scope: OpenAIChatToolNameScope) => T, +): T { + let registry = createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry(undefined); + return build({ + messages(parsed, baseUrl, messages): unknown { + registry = createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry(openAIChatToolNameIdentities(parsed)); + return frameAgentRouterMessages(baseUrl, aliasOpenAIChatMessageToolNames(messages, registry)); + }, + registry: () => registry, + restore: wireName => restoreOpenAIChatToolName(registry, wireName), + }); +} diff --git a/src/adapters/openai-chat/tool-schema.ts b/src/adapters/openai-chat/tool-schema.ts index c056a6a043..23f77121bd 100644 --- a/src/adapters/openai-chat/tool-schema.ts +++ b/src/adapters/openai-chat/tool-schema.ts @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ import { isNativeOpenAIChatTarget } from "./wire"; +import { createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry, type OpenAIChatToolNameRegistry } from "./tool-name-registry"; import { isXaiSchemaTarget, lookupLocalJsonPointer, normalizeXaiToolParameters } from "../xai-tool-schema"; import { stripResponsesOnlyEncryptedMarker, stripUnicodePropertyPatterns } from "../responses-tool-schema"; -import { isAllowedToolChoice, namespacedToolName, resolveToolChoiceWireName, toolChoiceToolPredicate } from "../../types"; +import { isAllowedToolChoice, resolveToolChoiceWireName, toolChoiceToolPredicate } from "../../types"; import type { OcxParsedRequest, OcxProviderConfig } from "../../types"; const ZEN_SCHEMA_MAP_KEYS = new Set(["properties", "$defs", "definitions"]); @@ -409,7 +410,11 @@ function normalizeMoonshotToolParameters(parameters: unknown): Record 0 ? formatted : undefined; } -export function toolsToChatFormatForProvider(parsed: OcxParsedRequest, provider: OcxProviderConfig): unknown[] | undefined { - const base = toolsToChatFormat(parsed, provider); +export function toolsToChatFormatForProvider( + parsed: OcxParsedRequest, + provider: OcxProviderConfig, + registry: OpenAIChatToolNameRegistry = createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry(parsed.context.tools), +): unknown[] | undefined { + const base = toolsToChatFormat(parsed, provider, registry); const azureChat = isAzureOpenAiChatTarget(provider); const zenChat = shouldSanitizeZenToolParameters(provider); if (!base || (!zenChat && !azureChat)) return base; @@ -463,15 +472,24 @@ export function toolChoiceToChatFormat( tc: OcxParsedRequest["options"]["toolChoice"], tools: OcxParsedRequest["context"]["tools"], provider: OcxProviderConfig, + registry: OpenAIChatToolNameRegistry = createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry(tools), ): unknown { if (!tc) return undefined; if (isAllowedToolChoice(tc)) { if (tc.mode === "required" && tc.allowedTools.length === 1 && isNativeOpenAIChatTarget(provider)) { - return { type: "function", function: { name: resolveToolChoiceWireName(tools, tc.allowedTools[0]) } }; + return { + type: "function", + function: { name: registry.aliasWireName(resolveToolChoiceWireName(tools, tc.allowedTools[0])) }, + }; } return tc.mode === "required" ? "required" : "auto"; } if (tc === "auto" || tc === "none" || tc === "required") return tc; - if ("name" in tc) return { type: "function", function: { name: resolveToolChoiceWireName(tools, tc.name) } }; + if ("name" in tc) { + return { + type: "function", + function: { name: registry.aliasWireName(resolveToolChoiceWireName(tools, tc.name)) }, + }; + } return undefined; } diff --git a/structure/providers/chat-compat.md b/structure/providers/chat-compat.md index b2eaadee79..92b19a97a4 100644 --- a/structure/providers/chat-compat.md +++ b/structure/providers/chat-compat.md @@ -62,10 +62,20 @@ request-local alias. Raw API-key continuations deliberately preserve ids because continuation may reference a call stored upstream under its original id; proxy-expanded API-key replays are explicit and receive the same repair. -Separately, Meta Muse Responses (`src/responses/muse-tool-name-alias.ts`) aliases function *tool -names* that exceed 64 characters or contain characters outside `[a-zA-Z0-9_-]` on `api.meta.ai` -only. That map is not the call-id repair: it covers tools, `additional_tools`, history calls, and -`tool_choice`, then restores original names inbound. +Tool-name normalization stays adapter-scoped. The translated Chat Completions path uses a +request-scoped registry in `src/adapters/openai-chat/`: only flattened namespaced names over 64 +characters receive a deterministic, charset-safe alias. Catalog declarations, replayed calls and +`tool_choice` share that registry, and streamed or buffered echoes restore to the original flattened +name before the Responses bridge restores `{namespace, name}`. Names at or below the bound and bare +names pass through unchanged, except declarations matching the reserved alias shape; those are +re-aliased so they cannot shadow an identity-derived alias. + +The 64-character bound is a Chat Completions and strict-gateway compatibility concern: Command Code +rejects a 66-character function name (#4679). Upstream Codex raised its own MCP ceiling to 128 bytes +in `openai/codex#39594` because native Responses accepts 128, so that Responses limit does not govern +this translated wire. Kiro (`src/adapters/kiro-tools.ts`), Google (its wire compiler), and Meta Muse +Responses (`src/responses/muse-tool-name-alias.ts`, gated to `api.meta.ai`) each retain their own +equivalent normalization and restoration. These compatibility guards are covered by focused tests and should stay close to the adapters that need them. diff --git a/tests/adapters/openai/openai-chat-bounded-tool-names.test.ts b/tests/adapters/openai/openai-chat-bounded-tool-names.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f7cdc756a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/adapters/openai/openai-chat-bounded-tool-names.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,301 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { createOpenAIChatAdapter } from "../../../src/adapters/openai-chat"; +import { createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry } from "../../../src/adapters/openai-chat/tool-name-registry"; +import { compileGoogleWireBody } from "../../../src/adapters/google-wire-compiler"; +import { kiroToolName } from "../../../src/adapters/kiro-wire"; +import { buildResponseJSON } from "../../../src/bridge"; +import { parseRequest } from "../../../src/responses/parser"; +import { buildToolBridgeMaps } from "../../../src/server/responses"; +import type { AdapterEvent, OcxParsedRequest, OcxProviderConfig, OcxTool } from "../../../src/types"; +import { namespacedToolName } from "../../../src/types/tools"; +import { createTestTranslatorBudget } from "../../helpers/translator-budget"; + +const LONG_NAMESPACE = "mcp__codex_apps__codex_document_control"; +const REPORTED_NAME = "execute_document_command"; +const OTHER_LONG_NAME = "get_document_tool_schemas"; + +function provider(): OcxProviderConfig { + return { + adapter: "openai-chat", + baseUrl: "https://example.test/v1", + apiKey: "sk-test", + authMode: "key", + }; +} + +function tool(namespace: string | undefined, name: string): OcxTool { + return { namespace, name, description: "Test tool", parameters: { type: "object" } }; +} + +function parsedWith( + tools: OcxTool[], + options: OcxParsedRequest["options"] = {}, + messages: OcxParsedRequest["context"]["messages"] = [{ role: "user", content: "Use the tool", timestamp: 0 }], +): OcxParsedRequest { + return { modelId: "test-model", stream: false, options, context: { tools, messages } }; +} + +describe("bounded OpenAI Chat tool wire names (#4679)", () => { + test("bounds and restores the exact reported identity across request, replay, tool_choice, and response", async () => { + const declared = tool(LONG_NAMESPACE, REPORTED_NAME); + const originalWireName = namespacedToolName(LONG_NAMESPACE, REPORTED_NAME); + const replayMessages: OcxParsedRequest["context"]["messages"] = [ + { + role: "assistant", + content: [{ + type: "toolCall", + id: "call_replay", + namespace: LONG_NAMESPACE, + name: REPORTED_NAME, + arguments: {}, + }], + timestamp: 0, + }, + { role: "toolResult", toolCallId: "call_replay", toolName: REPORTED_NAME, content: "ok", timestamp: 1 }, + { role: "user", content: "Run it again", timestamp: 2 }, + ]; + const parsed = parsedWith([declared], { toolChoice: { name: REPORTED_NAME } }, replayMessages); + const adapter = createOpenAIChatAdapter(provider()); + const request = adapter.buildRequest(parsed, { + headers: new Headers(), + translatorBudget: createTestTranslatorBudget(), + }); + if (request instanceof Promise) throw new Error("OpenAI Chat request unexpectedly became async"); + const body = JSON.parse(request.body) as { + tools: Array<{ function: { name: string } }>; + messages: Array<{ tool_calls?: Array<{ function: { name: string } }> }>; + tool_choice: { function: { name: string } }; + }; + const alias = body.tools[0].function.name; + + expect(new TextEncoder().encode(originalWireName).byteLength).toBeGreaterThan(64); + expect(alias).not.toBe(originalWireName); + expect(alias).toMatch(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$/); + expect(new TextEncoder().encode(alias).byteLength).toBeLessThanOrEqual(64); + expect(body.messages.find(message => message.tool_calls)?.tool_calls?.[0].function.name).toBe(alias); + expect(body.tool_choice.function.name).toBe(alias); + + const events = await adapter.parseResponse!(new Response(JSON.stringify({ + choices: [{ + message: { tool_calls: [{ id: "call_echo", function: { name: alias, arguments: "{}" } }] }, + finish_reason: "tool_calls", + }], + })), createTestTranslatorBudget()); + expect(events.find(event => event.type === "tool_call_start")).toMatchObject({ + type: "tool_call_start", + id: "call_echo", + name: originalWireName, + }); + + const streamed: AdapterEvent[] = []; + const streamBody = `data: ${JSON.stringify({ + choices: [{ + delta: { tool_calls: [{ index: 0, id: "call_stream", function: { name: alias, arguments: "{}" } }] }, + finish_reason: "tool_calls", + }], + })}\n\ndata: [DONE]\n\n`; + for await (const event of adapter.parseStream( + new Response(streamBody), + createTestTranslatorBudget(), + )) streamed.push(event); + expect(streamed.find(event => event.type === "tool_call_start")).toMatchObject({ + type: "tool_call_start", + id: "call_stream", + name: originalWireName, + }); + + const responseRequest = parseRequest({ + model: "test-model", + input: "Use the tool", + tools: [{ + type: "namespace", + name: LONG_NAMESPACE, + tools: [{ type: "function", name: REPORTED_NAME, parameters: { type: "object" } }], + }], + }); + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(responseRequest); + const bridged = buildResponseJSON(events, "test-model", maps); + const call = (bridged.output as Record[])[0]; + if (!call) throw new Error("Expected a bridged function call"); + expect(call).toMatchObject({ + type: "function_call", + namespace: LONG_NAMESPACE, + name: REPORTED_NAME, + }); + + const replayed = parseRequest({ + model: "test-model", + tools: [{ + type: "namespace", + name: LONG_NAMESPACE, + tools: [{ type: "function", name: REPORTED_NAME, parameters: { type: "object" } }], + }], + input: [call], + }); + const replayedCall = replayed.context.messages + .flatMap(message => Array.isArray(message.content) ? message.content : []) + .find(part => part.type === "toolCall"); + expect(replayedCall).toMatchObject({ namespace: LONG_NAMESPACE, name: REPORTED_NAME }); + }); + + test("leaves names at or under 64 characters and ordinary bare names byte-identical", () => { + const exactly64 = tool("n".repeat(30), "x".repeat(32)); + const ordinary = tool("mcp__short", "read"); + const longBare = tool(undefined, "b".repeat(200)); + const registry = createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry([exactly64, ordinary, longBare]); + + expect(new TextEncoder().encode(namespacedToolName(exactly64.namespace, exactly64.name)).byteLength).toBe(64); + expect(registry.alias(exactly64)).toBe(namespacedToolName(exactly64.namespace, exactly64.name)); + expect(registry.alias(ordinary)).toBe(namespacedToolName(ordinary.namespace, ordinary.name)); + expect(registry.alias(longBare)).toBe(longBare.name); + expect(namespacedToolName(undefined, longBare.name)).toBe(longBare.name); + + const adapter = createOpenAIChatAdapter(provider()); + const request = adapter.buildRequest(parsedWith([exactly64, ordinary, longBare]), { + headers: new Headers(), + translatorBudget: createTestTranslatorBudget(), + }); + if (request instanceof Promise) throw new Error("OpenAI Chat request unexpectedly became async"); + const body = JSON.parse(request.body) as { tools: Array<{ function: { name: string } }> }; + expect(body.tools.map(entry => entry.function.name)).toEqual([ + namespacedToolName(exactly64.namespace, exactly64.name), + namespacedToolName(ordinary.namespace, ordinary.name), + longBare.name, + ]); + }); + + test("bounds and restores a replay-only historical call absent from the current catalog", async () => { + const originalWireName = namespacedToolName(LONG_NAMESPACE, REPORTED_NAME); + const replayed = parseRequest({ + model: "test-model", + tools: [], + input: [ + { + type: "function_call", + call_id: "call_historical", + namespace: LONG_NAMESPACE, + name: REPORTED_NAME, + arguments: "{}", + }, + { type: "function_call_output", call_id: "call_historical", output: "ok" }, + { role: "user", content: "Continue" }, + ], + }); + expect(replayed.context.tools ?? []).toHaveLength(0); + + const adapter = createOpenAIChatAdapter(provider()); + const request = adapter.buildRequest(replayed, { + headers: new Headers(), + translatorBudget: createTestTranslatorBudget(), + }); + if (request instanceof Promise) throw new Error("OpenAI Chat request unexpectedly became async"); + const body = JSON.parse(request.body) as { + tools?: unknown; + messages: Array<{ tool_calls?: Array<{ function: { name: string } }> }>; + }; + const alias = body.messages.find(message => message.tool_calls)?.tool_calls?.[0].function.name; + if (!alias) throw new Error("Expected the historical tool call on replay"); + + expect(body.tools).toBeUndefined(); + expect(alias).not.toBe(originalWireName); + expect(alias).toMatch(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$/); + + const events = await adapter.parseResponse!(new Response(JSON.stringify({ + choices: [{ + message: { tool_calls: [{ id: "call_echo", function: { name: alias, arguments: "{}" } }] }, + finish_reason: "tool_calls", + }], + })), createTestTranslatorBudget()); + expect(events.find(event => event.type === "tool_call_start")).toMatchObject({ + type: "tool_call_start", + name: originalWireName, + }); + }); + + test("derives deterministic distinct aliases independent of catalog order", () => { + const catalog = [ + tool(LONG_NAMESPACE, REPORTED_NAME), + tool(LONG_NAMESPACE, OTHER_LONG_NAME), + tool(`${LONG_NAMESPACE}_other`, REPORTED_NAME), + ]; + const forward = createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry(catalog); + const reverse = createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry([...catalog].reverse()); + const forwardAliases = catalog.map(entry => forward.alias(entry)); + + expect(catalog.map(entry => reverse.alias(entry))).toEqual(forwardAliases); + expect(new Set(forwardAliases).size).toBe(catalog.length); + for (const alias of forwardAliases) expect(alias).toMatch(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$/); + + const longTool = catalog[0]!; + const identityAlias = createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry([longTool]).alias(longTool); + const aliasShapedBareTool = tool(undefined, identityAlias); + const collisionCatalog = [longTool, aliasShapedBareTool]; + const collisionRegistry = createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry(collisionCatalog); + const reversedCollisionRegistry = createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry([...collisionCatalog].reverse()); + const reservedNameAlias = collisionRegistry.alias(aliasShapedBareTool); + expect(collisionRegistry.alias(longTool)).toBe(identityAlias); + expect(reversedCollisionRegistry.alias(longTool)).toBe(identityAlias); + expect(reservedNameAlias).not.toBe(identityAlias); + expect(reservedNameAlias).toMatch(/^ocx_[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{16}_[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{43}$/); + expect(collisionRegistry.restore(reservedNameAlias)).toBe(identityAlias); + }); + + test("aliases colliding identities but leaves their ambiguous replay spelling unchanged", () => { + const first = tool("a__b", "c"); + const second = tool("a", "b__c"); + const flattened = namespacedToolName(first.namespace, first.name); + expect(namespacedToolName(second.namespace, second.name)).toBe(flattened); + + const registry = createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry([first, second]); + const reversed = createOpenAIChatToolNameRegistry([second, first]); + const firstAlias = registry.alias(first); + const secondAlias = registry.alias(second); + expect(firstAlias).not.toBe(flattened); + expect(secondAlias).not.toBe(flattened); + expect(firstAlias).not.toBe(secondAlias); + expect(reversed.alias(first)).toBe(firstAlias); + expect(reversed.alias(second)).toBe(secondAlias); + expect(registry.aliasWireName(flattened)).toBe(flattened); + + const adapter = createOpenAIChatAdapter(provider()); + const request = adapter.buildRequest(parsedWith([first, second], {}, [ + { + role: "assistant", + content: [{ type: "toolCall", id: "call_ambiguous", namespace: first.namespace, name: first.name, arguments: {} }], + timestamp: 0, + }, + { role: "user", content: "Continue", timestamp: 1 }, + ]), { + headers: new Headers(), + translatorBudget: createTestTranslatorBudget(), + }); + if (request instanceof Promise) throw new Error("OpenAI Chat request unexpectedly became async"); + const body = JSON.parse(request.body) as { + tools: Array<{ function: { name: string } }>; + messages: Array<{ tool_calls?: Array<{ function: { name: string } }> }>; + }; + expect(body.tools.map(entry => entry.function.name)).toEqual([firstAlias, secondAlias]); + expect(body.messages.find(message => message.tool_calls)?.tool_calls?.[0].function.name).toBe(flattened); + }); + + test("keeps shared naming untouched so Kiro and Google retain adapter-owned normalization", () => { + const original = namespacedToolName(LONG_NAMESPACE, REPORTED_NAME); + expect(original).toBe(`${LONG_NAMESPACE}__${REPORTED_NAME}`); + expect(new TextEncoder().encode(original).byteLength).toBeGreaterThan(64); + + const kiro = kiroToolName(original); + expect(kiro).not.toBe(original); + expect(kiro).toMatch(/_[0-9a-f]{8}$/); + expect(kiro.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(64); + + const google = compileGoogleWireBody({ + tools: [{ functionDeclarations: [{ name: original, parameters: { type: "object" } }] }], + }); + const googleName = (google.body.tools as Array<{ + functionDeclarations: Array<{ name: string }>; + }>)[0].functionDeclarations[0].name; + expect(googleName).not.toBe(original); + expect(googleName).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,63}$/); + expect(google.restoreToolName(googleName)).toBe(original); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index 91a58a6461..ecdb5983b7 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -818,6 +818,7 @@ "omp-path-contract.test.ts": "clients", "omp-yaml-source-inline-comments.test.ts": "clients", "openai-api-virtual-models.test.ts": "adapters/openai", + "openai-chat-bounded-tool-names.test.ts": "adapters/openai", "openai-chat-dangling-toolcalls.test.ts": "adapters/openai", "openai-chat-eof.test.ts": "adapters/openai", "openai-chat-hardening.test.ts": "adapters/openai", From fb282bd136fb3c57c62cf2d1efdcb08baf484c53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 14:29:12 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 095/113] fix(combos): preserve declared targets under the send budget (#4656) (#4763) A long failover combo could exhaust the request allowance after a few providers and return the last 429/502 while later declared targets were never attempted at all. The combo policy and the per-target holdback were already correct. What was missing is that a derived scope never actually observed the request's spend. Aliasing the public used property shared only what callers read from outside: remainingBaseSends, the total check and the reserve test all consult the factory's own private counter, which an overridden property cannot reach. So every derived scope admitted dispatches as though the request had spent nothing, and comboTargetSendBudget's holdback -- expressed against maxTotalModelSends -- had nothing to hold back from. Move the physical-send ledger out of the closure and let a derived scope bind to the parent's exact one. deriveRequestExecutionBudget applies its own policy and keeps its own recovery ledgers while spending the shared ledger, so the holdback that reserves one dispatch for each still-declared target becomes enforceable. Three things travel on that ledger and have to travel together. The spend and the pending externally-counted bookings, because a pending booking is a send already counted in the total and waiting for its reporter, so sharing one without the other would either charge that send twice or never charge it. And the durable-spend observer, which books by watching this counter move: a derived scope that spent the counter without carrying the observer would move it without booking, and a combo child's sends would go missing from the spend ledger entirely. assumeCharge, which an adapter that owns its transport uses to take over a booking, closes it on that same shared ledger, so the adapter handoff and the combo derivation agree. What stays per-scope is deliberate: the reserve, alternate-target and transition ledgers are each target's own recovery decision, while the physical-send total is what binds every target together. A parent that did not come from this factory bridges onto its public used accessor rather than throwing. isRequestExecutionBudget is a shape test, so a stub can reach the derivation, and turning that into a thrown error would convert a routing request into a 500 to report a condition production never produces. The three-target row is asserted as the invariant the layer promises -- every declared target reached, the first target keeping a whole ladder, the total inside the declared policy total -- rather than as an exact per-target vector. A vector also pins how far this harness's adapter climbs inside each allowance, and the local suite is not run on this branch, so a number guessed from reading is a number nobody checked. A thirteen-target row covers the reported shape directly. This changes nothing about when a combo may advance. Another target is selected only after a child failure has been converted to a non-OK response, which the stream preflight does only for a terminal that committed no output. Closes #4656 Co-authored-by: RHODIZ IT --- src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts | 117 ++++++++++--- src/server/responses/core-combo.ts | 32 ++-- structure/transports/responses.md | 21 +++ tests/lib/execution-budget-permits.test.ts | 159 ++++++++++++++++++ .../responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts | 61 ++++--- 5 files changed, 326 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts b/src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts index dc6f2cede9..df27a15613 100644 --- a/src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts +++ b/src/lib/request-execution-budget.ts @@ -168,35 +168,53 @@ const RESERVE_FUNDED_CLASSES: ReadonlySet = new Set([ let logicalRequestSeq = 0; -export function createRequestExecutionBudget( - policy: RequestExecutionBudgetPolicy = CODEX_TEXT_GUARDED_BUDGET_POLICY, - logicalRequestId?: string, - observer?: RequestSendObserver, +/** + * One request's physical-send ledger, held apart from the budget object so a derived policy + * scope can share the exact same one. + * + * `spent` and `pendingExternalSends` belong together: a pending booking is a send that is + * already counted in `spent` and awaiting its reporter, so a scope that shared one without the + * other would either charge that send twice or never charge it at all. + * + * The durable-spend observer belongs here for the same reason. It books one entry per physical + * send by watching this counter move, so a derived scope that spent the counter without + * carrying the observer would move it without booking, and a combo child's sends would go + * missing from the ledger (#4707). + */ +interface SharedSendLedger { + spent: number; + pendingExternalSends: number; + readonly observer?: RequestSendObserver; +} + +const sharedSendLedgers = new WeakMap(); + +function createRequestExecutionBudgetWithLedger( + policy: RequestExecutionBudgetPolicy, + logicalRequestId: string | undefined, + counter: SharedSendLedger, ): RequestExecutionBudget { - let spent = 0; - // Reservations whose physical send is reported by a retry helper rather than by the permit. - // They are already charged; the reporter's first send settles one instead of charging again. - let pendingExternalSends = 0; + const observer = counter.observer; let reserveSpent = false; let alternateTargetSends = 0; let targetTransitions = 0; let lastTargetKey: string | undefined; const budget: RequestExecutionBudget = { - get used(): number { return spent; }, + get used(): number { return counter.spent; }, set used(next: number) { // The retry helpers report their real send count by assigning through this field. A // reservation taken with `countedExternally` has already booked one of those sends, so // the report settles the pending booking first and only the surplus is charged. - const delta = next - spent; + const delta = next - counter.spent; if (delta <= 0) { - spent = Math.max(0, next); + counter.spent = Math.max(0, next); return; } - const settled = Math.min(delta, pendingExternalSends); - pendingExternalSends -= settled; + const settled = Math.min(delta, counter.pendingExternalSends); + counter.pendingExternalSends -= settled; const charged = delta - settled; - spent += charged; + counter.spent += charged; // These sends have already left. The ledger records them even past a ceiling it would // have refused, because refusing after the fact only hides spend that was really // incurred -- the refusal has to happen at the reservation below, or not at all. @@ -211,11 +229,11 @@ export function createRequestExecutionBudget( get lastTargetKey() { return lastTargetKey; }, remainingBaseSends(cap: number): number { const capped = Number.isFinite(cap) ? Math.trunc(cap) : 0; - return Math.max(0, Math.min(capped, policy.baseSendAllowance - spent)); + return Math.max(0, Math.min(capped, policy.baseSendAllowance - counter.spent)); }, reserveDispatch(intent: DispatchIntent): DispatchDecision { if (intent.replaySafe === false) return { allowed: false, reason: "not-replay-safe" }; - if (spent >= policy.maxTotalModelSends) return { allowed: false, reason: "total-exhausted" }; + if (counter.spent >= policy.maxTotalModelSends) return { allowed: false, reason: "total-exhausted" }; const changesTarget = lastTargetKey !== undefined && lastTargetKey !== intent.targetKey; const isAlternateTarget = changesTarget || intent.sendClass === "account-failover" @@ -230,7 +248,7 @@ export function createRequestExecutionBudget( // The base allowance is spent first. Only once it is gone does a recovery class reach // for the single shared reserve -- an account move and a validated rebuild cannot each // take one. - const drawsReserve = policy.baseSendAllowance - spent <= 0; + const drawsReserve = policy.baseSendAllowance - counter.spent <= 0; if (drawsReserve) { if (!RESERVE_FUNDED_CLASSES.has(intent.sendClass)) { return { allowed: false, reason: "base-allowance-exhausted" }; @@ -250,8 +268,8 @@ export function createRequestExecutionBudget( // one remaining send admitted two physical sends, which is the per-request multiplication // this budget exists to stop. Everything is booked now; `release()` is the way back. const previousTargetKey = lastTargetKey; - spent += 1; - if (intent.countedExternally === true) pendingExternalSends += 1; + counter.spent += 1; + if (intent.countedExternally === true) counter.pendingExternalSends += 1; if (drawsReserve) reserveSpent = true; if (isAlternateTarget) alternateTargetSends += 1; if (changesTarget) targetTransitions += 1; @@ -273,8 +291,8 @@ export function createRequestExecutionBudget( // The booking this reservation made for an external reporter is now owned by the // caller. Leaving it pending is not harmless: the next `used` report of this request // would settle against it and one real send would go uncharged. - if (intent.countedExternally === true && pendingExternalSends > 0) { - pendingExternalSends -= 1; + if (intent.countedExternally === true && counter.pendingExternalSends > 0) { + counter.pendingExternalSends -= 1; } return true; }, @@ -284,10 +302,10 @@ export function createRequestExecutionBudget( // An externally counted reservation the reporter already settled paid for a send // that physically happened. Refunding it would hand the request a free send back. if (intent.countedExternally === true) { - if (pendingExternalSends === 0) return; - pendingExternalSends -= 1; + if (counter.pendingExternalSends === 0) return; + counter.pendingExternalSends -= 1; } - spent -= 1; + counter.spent -= 1; observer?.refund(); if (drawsReserve) reserveSpent = false; if (isAlternateTarget) alternateTargetSends -= 1; @@ -298,9 +316,60 @@ export function createRequestExecutionBudget( }; }, }; + sharedSendLedgers.set(budget, counter); return budget; } +export function createRequestExecutionBudget( + policy: RequestExecutionBudgetPolicy = CODEX_TEXT_GUARDED_BUDGET_POLICY, + logicalRequestId?: string, + observer?: RequestSendObserver, +): RequestExecutionBudget { + return createRequestExecutionBudgetWithLedger(policy, logicalRequestId, { + spent: 0, + pendingExternalSends: 0, + ...(observer ? { observer } : {}), + }); +} + +/** + * A budget that applies its own policy and keeps its own recovery ledgers while spending the + * parent's exact physical-send ledger. + * + * Aliasing the public `used` property was not enough, and that is the whole defect. The factory + * reads its own private counter back in `remainingBaseSends`, in the total check, and in the + * reserve test, so an aliased scope answered every admission question from a counter that only + * ever saw its own reservations. A combo's per-target holdback is computed from + * `maxTotalModelSends` and is therefore unenforceable unless the scope actually observes what + * the request has already spent. + */ +export function deriveRequestExecutionBudget( + parent: RequestExecutionBudget, + policy: RequestExecutionBudgetPolicy, +): RequestExecutionBudget { + return createRequestExecutionBudgetWithLedger(policy, parent.logicalRequestId, ledgerFor(parent)); +} + +/** + * A budget that did not come from this factory still honors the public `used` contract, so + * bridge onto it rather than failing the request. `isRequestExecutionBudget` is a shape test, + * so a stub can reach here; turning that into a thrown error would convert a routing request + * into a 500 to report a condition production never produces. Only a factory-backed parent can + * share pending external bookings and a durable-spend observer, which are private by + * construction; a bridged scope keeps the parent's spend accurate and books nothing of its own. + */ +function ledgerFor(parent: RequestExecutionBudget): SharedSendLedger { + const existing = sharedSendLedgers.get(parent); + if (existing) return existing; + let pendingExternalSends = 0; + return { + get spent(): number { return parent.used; }, + set spent(next: number) { parent.used = next; }, + get pendingExternalSends(): number { return pendingExternalSends; }, + set pendingExternalSends(next: number) { pendingExternalSends = next; }, + }; +} + export function isRequestExecutionBudget( value: TransientSendBudget | undefined, ): value is RequestExecutionBudget { diff --git a/src/server/responses/core-combo.ts b/src/server/responses/core-combo.ts index 6a573e4907..31cbc4f6e7 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/core-combo.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/core-combo.ts @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { isDeclaredReasoningEffort } from "../../reasoning-effort"; import { recordAttemptRequestedEffort } from "../request-log"; import { CODEX_TEXT_GUARDED_BUDGET_POLICY, - createRequestExecutionBudget, + deriveRequestExecutionBudget, isRequestExecutionBudget, } from "../../lib/request-execution-budget"; import type { @@ -107,25 +107,27 @@ export function comboExecutionBudgetPolicy(declaredTargets: number): RequestExec /** * A budget scope that keeps its own recovery ledgers but spends the SAME request-wide counter. * - * `used` is redefined as an accessor onto the parent because the factory reads it back off this - * object -- `remainingBaseSends` and the total check both do -- so a copied number would let a - * combo target run its ladder against a stale total, which is precisely the per-layer counting - * this work exists to remove. The reserve, alternate-target and transition ledgers stay - * per-scope on purpose: a combo target's account failover is its own recovery decision, while - * the request total still bounds every target together. + * The sharing has to happen inside the factory. Redefining `used` as an accessor onto the parent + * only shared what callers read from the outside: `remainingBaseSends`, the total check and the + * reserve test all consult the factory's own private counter, which an overridden property + * cannot reach. Each derived scope therefore admitted dispatches as though the request had spent + * nothing, and the per-target holdback below -- expressed against `maxTotalModelSends` -- had + * nothing to hold back from. + * + * `deriveRequestExecutionBudget` binds the scope to the parent's real ledger, including pending + * externally-counted bookings and the durable-spend observer, all of which must travel together. + * A pending booking is a send already counted in the total and waiting for its reporter, and the + * observer books by watching that same counter move (#4707) -- so a scope that spent the counter + * without carrying the observer would move it without booking, and this combo's child sends + * would go missing from the spend ledger. The reserve, alternate-target and transition ledgers + * stay per-scope on purpose: a combo target's account failover is its own recovery decision, + * while the request total still bounds every target together. */ export function deriveSendBudgetScope( parent: RequestExecutionBudget, policy: RequestExecutionBudgetPolicy, ): RequestExecutionBudget { - const scope = createRequestExecutionBudget(policy, parent.logicalRequestId); - Object.defineProperty(scope, "used", { - get: () => parent.used, - set: (value: number) => { parent.used = value; }, - enumerable: true, - configurable: true, - }); - return scope; + return deriveRequestExecutionBudget(parent, policy); } diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index f2f96927c9..da218f05e3 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -779,6 +779,27 @@ later recovery in the same request then cannot have. `tests/lib/execution-budget pins the settlement rule and every ladder shape against exactly that, and `tests/responses/responses-core-modules.test.ts` pins the adapter view's live delegation. +A combo derives a policy scope per target, and that derivation has to happen inside the budget +factory. Overriding the public `used` property shares only what callers read from outside: +`remainingBaseSends`, the total check and the reserve test all consult the factory's own private +counter, which an overridden property cannot reach. Each derived scope therefore admitted +dispatches as though the request had spent nothing, and the per-target holdback in +`comboTargetSendBudget` — expressed against `maxTotalModelSends` — had nothing to hold back from, +so a long failover combo could exhaust the allowance before its later declared targets were ever +attempted. `deriveRequestExecutionBudget` binds the scope to the parent's real ledger instead. + +Three things travel on that shared ledger and have to travel together. The spend and the pending +externally-counted bookings, because a pending booking is a send already counted in the total and +waiting for its reporter, so sharing one without the other would either charge that send twice or +never charge it. And the durable-spend observer below, because it books by watching this counter +move: a derived scope that spent the counter without carrying the observer would move it without +booking, and a combo child's sends would go missing from the ledger. `permit.assumeCharge()` +closes its booking on the same shared ledger, so the adapter handoff above and the combo +derivation agree rather than each settling against a counter the other cannot see. + +What stays per-scope is deliberate: the reserve, alternate-target and transition ledgers are each +target's own recovery decision, while the physical-send total is what binds every target together. + ## Durable spend reservations The request's send budget bounds how many times it may reach upstream; the spend ledger bounds diff --git a/tests/lib/execution-budget-permits.test.ts b/tests/lib/execution-budget-permits.test.ts index 687597e241..f9163860bc 100644 --- a/tests/lib/execution-budget-permits.test.ts +++ b/tests/lib/execution-budget-permits.test.ts @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { CODEX_TEXT_GUARDED_BUDGET_POLICY, createRequestExecutionBudget, + deriveRequestExecutionBudget, type RequestExecutionBudgetPolicy, } from "../../src/lib/request-execution-budget"; @@ -348,3 +349,161 @@ describe("a credential hop is settled by whichever layer dispatches its replay", } }); }); + +describe("derived policy scopes", () => { + const wide: RequestExecutionBudgetPolicy = { + maxTotalModelSends: 8, baseSendAllowance: 7, finalRecoveryAllowance: 1, + maxAlternateTargetSends: 7, maxTargetTransitions: 7, + }; + + test("a derived scope admits against what the REQUEST has spent, not its own history", () => { + // The defect this closes. Aliasing the public `used` property shared only what callers read + // from outside; `remainingBaseSends`, the total check and the reserve test all consulted the + // factory's own private counter, so each derived scope believed the request had spent + // nothing and a per-target holdback had nothing to hold back from. + const parent = createRequestExecutionBudget(wide); + const first = deriveRequestExecutionBudget(parent, { ...wide, maxTotalModelSends: 2 }); + expect(first.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "initial", targetKey: "a/m" }).allowed).toBe(true); + expect(first.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "transient", targetKey: "a/m" }).allowed).toBe(true); + expect(parent.used).toBe(2); + + const second = deriveRequestExecutionBudget(parent, { ...wide, maxTotalModelSends: 2 }); + expect(second.used).toBe(2); + expect(second.remainingBaseSends(99)).toBe(5); + expect(second.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "combo-failover", targetKey: "b/m" })) + .toEqual({ allowed: false, reason: "total-exhausted" }); + }); + + test("recovery ledgers stay per-scope while the send ledger is shared", () => { + // A later target's account failover is its own recovery decision; only the physical-send + // total binds the targets together. + const parent = createRequestExecutionBudget(wide); + const a = deriveRequestExecutionBudget(parent, { ...wide, maxAlternateTargetSends: 1, maxTargetTransitions: 1 }); + const b = deriveRequestExecutionBudget(parent, { ...wide, maxAlternateTargetSends: 1, maxTargetTransitions: 1 }); + expect(a.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "account-failover", targetKey: "a/m" }).allowed).toBe(true); + expect(a.alternateTargetSends).toBe(1); + expect(b.alternateTargetSends).toBe(0); + expect(b.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "account-failover", targetKey: "b/m" }).allowed).toBe(true); + expect(parent.used).toBe(2); + }); + + test("a pending external booking travels with the shared ledger", () => { + // A pending booking is a send already counted in the total and waiting for its reporter, so + // sharing the spend without it would charge that send twice. + const parent = createRequestExecutionBudget(wide); + const scope = deriveRequestExecutionBudget(parent, wide); + const hop = scope.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "initial", targetKey: "a/m", countedExternally: true }); + expect(hop.allowed).toBe(true); + expect(parent.used).toBe(1); + + const target = deriveRequestExecutionBudget(scope, wide); + // The reporter names the send that the booking above already paid for. + target.used += 1; + expect(parent.used).toBe(1); + // Anything beyond it is a genuinely new send. + target.used += 2; + expect(parent.used).toBe(3); + }); + + test("assumeCharge on a derived scope closes the booking on the shared ledger", () => { + // bl1's adapter handoff and this shared ledger have to agree: an adapter that takes over a + // counted-externally reservation must close the booking the whole request can see, or the + // next report would settle against it and one real send would go uncharged. + const parent = createRequestExecutionBudget(wide); + const scope = deriveRequestExecutionBudget(parent, wide); + const hop = scope.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "auth-recovery", targetKey: "a/m", countedExternally: true }); + expect(hop.allowed).toBe(true); + expect(hop.allowed && hop.permit.assumeCharge()).toBe(true); + expect(parent.used).toBe(1); + parent.used += 1; + expect(parent.used).toBe(2); + }); + + test("a scope derived from a foreign budget bridges instead of throwing", () => { + // `isRequestExecutionBudget` is a shape test, so a stub can reach the derivation. Turning + // that into a thrown error would convert a routing request into a 500 to report a condition + // production never produces. + let used = 4; + const foreign = { + get used() { return used; }, + set used(next: number) { used = next; }, + logicalRequestId: "foreign", + policyVersion: "guarded-v1", + policy: wide, + reserveSpent: false, + alternateTargetSends: 0, + targetTransitions: 0, + lastTargetKey: undefined, + remainingBaseSends: () => 0, + reserveDispatch: () => ({ allowed: false, reason: "total-exhausted" }), + } as unknown as Parameters[0]; + const scope = deriveRequestExecutionBudget(foreign, wide); + expect(scope.used).toBe(4); + expect(scope.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "initial", targetKey: "a/m" }).allowed).toBe(true); + expect(used).toBe(5); + }); +}); + +describe("derived scopes and the durable spend observer", () => { + const wide: RequestExecutionBudgetPolicy = { + maxTotalModelSends: 8, baseSendAllowance: 7, finalRecoveryAllowance: 1, + maxAlternateTargetSends: 7, maxTargetTransitions: 7, + }; + const recordingObserver = () => { + const events: string[] = []; + let allow = true; + return { + events, + deny: () => { allow = false; }, + observer: { + charge: () => { events.push(allow ? "charge" : "refused"); return allow; }, + refund: () => { events.push("refund"); }, + }, + }; + }; + + test("a derived scope books its sends on the parent's ledger", () => { + // The observer books by watching the send counter move. A derived scope that spent the + // shared counter without carrying the observer would move it without booking, and every + // combo child send would be missing from the durable ledger. + const spy = recordingObserver(); + const parent = createRequestExecutionBudget(wide, "lr-observer", spy.observer); + const scope = deriveRequestExecutionBudget(parent, wide); + expect(scope.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "combo-failover", targetKey: "b/m" }).allowed).toBe(true); + expect(spy.events).toEqual(["charge"]); + expect(parent.used).toBe(1); + }); + + test("one physical send is booked exactly once across the derivation", () => { + // A combo hop reserves with countedExternally and the child reports the same send. The + // pending booking settles that report, so the ledger must see one entry, not two. + const spy = recordingObserver(); + const parent = createRequestExecutionBudget(wide, "lr-once", spy.observer); + const scope = deriveRequestExecutionBudget(parent, wide); + expect(scope.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "initial", targetKey: "a/m", countedExternally: true }).allowed).toBe(true); + deriveRequestExecutionBudget(scope, wide).used += 1; + expect(spy.events).toEqual(["charge"]); + expect(parent.used).toBe(1); + }); + + test("a released derivation refunds on the parent's ledger", () => { + const spy = recordingObserver(); + const parent = createRequestExecutionBudget(wide, "lr-refund", spy.observer); + const scope = deriveRequestExecutionBudget(parent, wide); + const leg = scope.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "auth-recovery", targetKey: "a/m" }); + expect(leg.allowed).toBe(true); + if (leg.allowed) leg.permit.release(); + expect(spy.events).toEqual(["charge", "refund"]); + expect(parent.used).toBe(0); + }); + + test("a ledger ceiling refuses a derived dispatch rather than describing it afterwards", () => { + const spy = recordingObserver(); + const parent = createRequestExecutionBudget(wide, "lr-ceiling", spy.observer); + const scope = deriveRequestExecutionBudget(parent, wide); + spy.deny(); + expect(scope.reserveDispatch({ sendClass: "combo-failover", targetKey: "b/m" })) + .toEqual({ allowed: false, reason: "spend-exhausted" }); + expect(parent.used).toBe(0); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts index 78f5a42856..1fd7635e86 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; import { clearComboSelectionState, clearComboTargetCooldowns } from "../../src/combos"; import { clearKeyCooldowns } from "../../src/providers/key-failover"; import { handleResponses } from "../../src/server/responses/core"; +import { COMBO_TARGET_BASE_SENDS, comboExecutionBudgetPolicy } from "../../src/server/responses/core-combo"; import type { RequestLogContext } from "../../src/server/request-log"; import type { OcxConfig } from "../../src/types"; @@ -120,7 +121,7 @@ describe("upstream sends per logical request", () => { expect(sendCounts(logCtx)).toEqual([3]); }); - test("a three-target combo fan-out gives every declared target a send and totals six", async () => { + test("a three-target combo fan-out gives every declared target a send and stays bounded", async () => { const upstream = alwaysFailing(502, "upstream busy"); const logCtx: RequestLogContext = { model: "", provider: "" }; @@ -128,34 +129,44 @@ describe("upstream sends per logical request", () => { expect(response.status).toBe(502); await response.text(); - // The measured shape in #4546 was twelve: four sends per target, because each child took a - // fresh full allowance. Sharing one counter alone was not the answer either -- it starved - // the later targets to zero. The first target runs its own ladder, each later target draws - // what is left, and the clamp holds back one send for every target still declared, so the - // last target is still reached. - // Asserted as the INVARIANT the derived policy guarantees rather than as a fixture count. - // An exact per-target vector pins how this harness happens to distribute the ladder, which - // is not what the layer promises and not something this branch can observe: the local suite - // is not run here, so a number guessed from reading is a number nobody checked. + // Asserted as the INVARIANT the derived policy guarantees, not as a fixture vector. An exact + // per-target count also pins how far this harness's adapter happens to climb its own ladder + // inside each allowance, which is not what this layer promises; and the local suite is not + // run on this branch, so a vector guessed from reading is a vector nobody checked. const bearers = upstream.authorizations; - // Every declared target is still reached. Starving the last target is the failure mode that - // sharing one counter WITHOUT a per-target policy produces. + // Every declared target is reached. Starving the last one is the failure mode that sharing a + // counter WITHOUT a per-target policy produces, and #4546 measured the opposite failure -- + // twelve sends, four per target, because each child drew a fresh full allowance. expect(new Set(bearers).size).toBe(3); + expect(bearers[0]).toBe("Bearer sk-t0"); expect(bearers).toContain("Bearer sk-t2"); - // The first target keeps its full ladder, so the first sends are all its own. + // The first target keeps a whole ladder to itself. + expect(sendCounts(logCtx)[0]).toBe(COMBO_TARGET_BASE_SENDS); + // And the request total is the declared policy total, which is what the derived scope can + // now actually enforce: before the shared ledger, each scope admitted against a counter that + // had only ever seen its own reservations. + expect(totalSends(logCtx)).toBeLessThanOrEqual(comboExecutionBudgetPolicy(3).maxTotalModelSends); + expect(totalSends(logCtx)).toBe(bearers.length); + }); + + test("a thirteen-target combo still reaches every declared fallback", async () => { + // The reported shape: a long failover combo exhausted the allowance after a few providers + // and returned the last 502 while later declared targets were never attempted at all. + const upstream = alwaysFailing(502, "upstream busy"); + const logCtx: RequestLogContext = { model: "", provider: "" }; + + const response = await handleResponses(responsesRequest("combo/fan"), comboOverTargets(13), logCtx); + + expect(response.status).toBe(502); + await response.text(); + const bearers = upstream.authorizations; + expect(new Set(bearers).size).toBe(13); + for (let index = 0; index < 13; index += 1) { + expect(bearers).toContain(`Bearer sk-t${index}`); + } expect(bearers[0]).toBe("Bearer sk-t0"); - // Bounded by the derived total: the first target's ladder, one send per further declared - // target, and the single shared final-recovery reserve. The measured regression in #4546 was - // twelve, four per target, because each child drew a fresh full allowance. - // The measured bound is NINE, and saying six here would be describing an intention rather - // than the code. #4546 measured twelve -- four sends per target, each child drawing a fresh - // full allowance -- so sharing one counter removes the per-target reserve and takes it to - // nine. The clamp that was meant to hold back one send for every target still declared is - // NOT yet effective; that is stated in the pull request as the open item rather than hidden - // behind an assertion that passes for the wrong reason. - expect(bearers.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(9); - expect(bearers.length).toBeLessThan(12); - expect(bearers.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3); + expect(sendCounts(logCtx)[0]).toBe(COMBO_TARGET_BASE_SENDS); + expect(totalSends(logCtx)).toBeLessThanOrEqual(comboExecutionBudgetPolicy(13).maxTotalModelSends); }); // REMOVED: "a 401 before the 5xx streak spends one of the same three sends". From cf6e93953443b37696cf2ee793a70ca56720cc36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 14:36:36 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 096/113] fix(routing): wire the pool recovery limiter into production dispatch (#4784) * fix(routing): wire the pool recovery limiter into production dispatch (#4701) No file under src/ imported src/routing/probe-lease.ts. The half-open transient-hold lease and the pool-wide recovery limiter were complete and unit-tested, and bounded nothing at runtime: every hit for resolveHeldAccountDispatch, recordInitialSend and tryPermitRetryDispatch was its own definition or a direct unit test. The defect that reached production sat at the end of both transient-hold branches of resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed. When no sibling could take a request bound to a held account, they returned that held account as "selected" and the caller sent at an account already known to be failing. Under a provider-wide 503 that is every bound request at once, which is the amplification the hold exists to prevent. Those two returns now go through resolveHeldAccountDispatch. One request probes the held account under a lease; the rest are WITHHELD, a new CodexThreadResolution variant that resolveCodexAuthContext turns into CodexRecoveryWithheldError before any upstream I/O, so a refused request reaches the client as 429 with the limiter's own change point in Retry-After. A usable detour is still preferred over the trial: a healthy sibling is a better answer for a live request than an account carrying a failure streak, and the ordering is not what the issue bounds. A granted probe travels on the auth context, is settled by recordCodexUpstreamOutcome under the credential generation the binding held, and is handed back by releaseCodexAuthContextProbeLease -- which now releases both leases, so the ~30 existing "resolved a context, never sent" sites are correct for the new one without re-deriving that set by hand. Explicit releases cover the throw paths inside the resolver itself, and the lease deadline bounds anything that still escapes: a leaked lease can delay the next trial but never cancel it. classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch records demand at the initial passthrough send and gates the alternate-account replay, consulted before the request-local permit is used because reserveDispatch charges at reservation time. A probe is never charged twice; it already paid at selection. Same-account transient retries stay bounded by the per-request send budget alone: refusing inside the retry helper's thunk would surface a pool refusal as a 502 transport failure and record a transient outcome against an account that was never asked. A transient hold and a quota cooldown cannot both describe one account, because isTransientOnlyAffinityBlock refuses to recognise a hold on an account carrying quota health. That is why no request pays two recovery permits for one send. structure/catalog.md described all of this as active. It now says which parts are wired and which seam is deliberately left to the per-request budget. Closes #4701 * fix(routing): extract the transient-hold dispatch seam and type its resolution read Two CI failures on the previous commit, both real. gates reported src/codex/auth-context.ts(1034,5) TS2322: 'unknown' is not assignable to 'TransientProbeGrant | undefined'. The resolution in resolveCodexAuthContext is a conditional expression whose fixed-account and exclude-account branches build their own selected literals, so the inferred union has members carrying neither affinity nor transientProbe. Under that union the "k" in resolution guard widens the read to unknown. Annotating the binding as CodexThreadResolution contextually types every branch to the resolver's own union, which lets both reads use ordinary discriminant narrowing. affinity is optional on all four variants, so it needs no guard at all. The file-size ratchet reported src/codex/routing.ts GREW to 1750 against its 1626 baseline, and the ratchet only ever lowers a cap. The three functions added there have no dependency on anything private to that file, so they move to src/codex/routing/transient-hold-dispatch.ts along with isTransientHoldExpired, which belongs with them. That is a better boundary than the line count forced: everything about what a held binding may do this turn now sits in one module, separate from the quota-cooldown lease one directory away. routing.ts returns to exactly its baseline. The new module takes MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID from ../account-id, which declares it and imports nothing, rather than from ../main-account, which re-exports it from inside the routing/account-lifecycle cycle. Neither reference runs at module load, but a leaf import keeps this module out of that cycle rather than depending on that staying true. The source-oracle test moves with the code: it now asserts the extraction imports src/routing/probe-lease and that routing.ts reaches it through that seam. * fix(routing): keep the recovery-dispatch classifier out of the transport boundary tests/responses/responses-fetch-helpers-boundary.test.ts pins the runtime imports of src/server/responses/fetch-helpers.ts to exactly three transport modules. Adding classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch there gave that file a routing dependency, which is the thing the boundary exists to prevent, and the test caught it. The boundary is right and the placement was wrong. providerFetch cannot classify a send anyway: it sees a URL and an init, while whether this is a conversation's first attempt, its third retry, or the one trial admitted against a held account is knowledge only the caller has. So the classification moves to src/routing/probe-lease.ts beside the window it consults, and the two dispatch call sites name their own class. fetch-helpers.ts returns to its previous contents exactly. structure/catalog.md now records where the classifier lives and why it is not in the transport. The source oracle follows the code: it asserts the passthrough dispatch reaches the window and names its initial send, rather than asserting an import in a file that is not allowed to have one. --- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 1 + src/codex/auth-context.ts | 137 ++++++- src/codex/routing.ts | 40 +- src/codex/routing/cooldown-math.ts | 10 + src/codex/routing/thread-affinity.ts | 52 ++- src/codex/routing/transient-hold-dispatch.ts | 141 +++++++ src/routing/probe-lease.ts | 69 ++++ src/server/responses/compact.ts | 2 + src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts | 26 ++ src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts | 3 +- src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts | 9 + structure/catalog.md | 23 ++ tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 1 + .../probe-lease-dispatch-wiring.test.ts | 359 ++++++++++++++++++ 14 files changed, 843 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/codex/routing/transient-hold-dispatch.ts create mode 100644 tests/routing/probe-lease-dispatch-wiring.test.ts diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index 4b3ccee9d5..be3124c38d 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -1052,6 +1052,7 @@ "privacy-mask-account.test.ts": "lib", "privacy-scan-meta-key.test.ts": "ci-workflows", "probe-lease.test.ts": "routing", + "probe-lease-dispatch-wiring.test.ts": "routing", "process-control-graceful.test.ts": "lib", "process-control.test.ts": "lib", "process-state.test.ts": "service", diff --git a/src/codex/auth-context.ts b/src/codex/auth-context.ts index 54431e0b7c..f476b89f18 100644 --- a/src/codex/auth-context.ts +++ b/src/codex/auth-context.ts @@ -39,7 +39,12 @@ import { pickAlternateCodexAccount, resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed, type CodexAffinityDecision, + type CodexThreadResolution, + type TransientProbeGrant, } from "./routing"; +// The half-open TRANSIENT-HOLD lease (#4701). Not the quota-cooldown probe lease imported from +// ./routing above -- different module, different domain, and a request never holds both. +import { releaseTransientProbe } from "../routing/probe-lease"; import { codexConversationIdentity, recordCodexThreadLineage, @@ -202,6 +207,12 @@ export type CodexAuthContext = affinityDecision?: CodexAffinityDecision; /** Scope that owns `probeLeaseId`, when it is a scoped recovery probe. */ probeQuotaScope?: CodexQuotaScope; + /** + * Set when this request is the ONE dispatch admitted to test an account held under a + * transient 5xx hold (#4701). Echo it into the upstream outcome so the trial is settled + * by the request that ran it, and release it on any path that never reaches upstream. + */ + transientProbe?: TransientProbeGrant; } | { // Main Codex account participating in rotation: token injected from ~/.codex/auth.json @@ -222,6 +233,8 @@ export type CodexAuthContext = probeLeaseId?: string; quotaScope?: CodexQuotaScope; probeQuotaScope?: CodexQuotaScope; + /** See `pool.transientProbe`. */ + transientProbe?: TransientProbeGrant; }; /** Probe lease carried by this context, when it holds one. */ @@ -234,11 +247,24 @@ export function codexProbeQuotaScope(ctx: CodexAuthContext | undefined): CodexQu return ctx?.kind === "pool" || ctx?.kind === "main-pool" ? ctx.probeQuotaScope : undefined; } +/** The transient-hold recovery probe carried by this context, when it holds one (#4701). */ +export function codexTransientProbeGrant(ctx: CodexAuthContext | undefined): TransientProbeGrant | undefined { + return ctx?.kind === "pool" || ctx?.kind === "main-pool" ? ctx.transientProbe : undefined; +} + /** * Hand back a probe lease for a request that will not reach upstream. Safe to * call with a context that holds no lease. + * + * BOTH leases, deliberately. A context can carry the quota-cooldown probe or the transient-hold + * probe, and every one of the ~30 call sites that already hands back the first is a path where + * the second would leak too. Releasing them together is what makes those sites correct for the + * new lease without re-deriving the discard set by hand -- the failure mode being avoided is a + * held account nobody may probe because the request that held the trial went away quietly. */ export function releaseCodexAuthContextProbeLease(ctx: CodexAuthContext | undefined): void { + const transientProbe = codexTransientProbeGrant(ctx); + if (transientProbe) releaseTransientProbe(transientProbe.lease); const leaseId = codexProbeLeaseId(ctx); if (!ctx || ctx.kind === "main" || !leaseId) return; if (ctx.probeQuotaScope) releaseCodexQuotaScopeProbeLease(ctx.accountId!, ctx.probeQuotaScope, leaseId); @@ -424,6 +450,44 @@ export class CodexReserveHelperUnsupportedError extends CodexReserveUnavailableE } } +/** + * Every account bound to this conversation is held after upstream failures, the recovery + * budget for this window is spent, and there is no detour left -- so this request is refused + * BEFORE any upstream I/O (#4701). + * + * This is not a quota cooldown, and the message below says so. It subclasses + * {@link CodexAccountCooldownError} for one reason: the deadline-carrying refusal has exactly + * one representation in this codebase, and roughly a dozen transports already map it to a 429 + * with `Retry-After` and treat it as an expected terminal answer rather than a credential + * fault. Introducing a parallel type would mean either re-deriving that handling in every one + * of them or silently falling through to a 500 in the ones that were missed. + * + * What must NOT be inherited is the quota wording -- "cooling down", `ocx account + * clear-cooldown` -- because none of it describes a 5xx hold and following it would do + * nothing. {@link cooldownErrorMessage} therefore returns this class's own message verbatim, + * the same escape hatch {@link CodexMainAccountHardLockError} and + * {@link CodexReserveUnavailableError} already use. + * + * `cooldownUntil` carries the limiter's own change point, which is strictly in the future: + * either the moment the held account may next be probed or the moment the recovery window + * moves, whichever is later. A refusal that answered `now` would busy-loop the caller into + * the same load it just declined. + */ +export class CodexRecoveryWithheldError extends CodexAccountCooldownError { + /** The sibling still remembered for this thread, when one exists but is itself unusable. */ + readonly detourAccountId?: string; + + constructor(accountId: string, retryAt: number, detourAccountId?: string) { + super(accountId, retryAt); + this.name = "CodexRecoveryWithheldError"; + this.detourAccountId = detourAccountId; + this.message = `Codex account (${cooldownAccountLabel(accountId)}) is held after repeated upstream` + + ` failures and the pool's recovery budget for this window is spent, so nothing was sent` + + ` upstream. Retry after ${new Date(retryAt).toISOString()}.` + + " This clears on its own as the account recovers; no cooldown to lift and no account to switch."; + } +} + export type CodexAuthPolicyConfig = Readonly>; @@ -634,7 +698,12 @@ export function cooldownAccountLabel(accountId: string): string { * injected `openai_base_url` in config.toml. */ export function cooldownErrorMessage(err: CodexAccountCooldownError, accountSelector?: string): string { - if (err instanceof CodexMainAccountHardLockError || err instanceof CodexReserveUnavailableError) return err.message; + if (err instanceof CodexMainAccountHardLockError + || err instanceof CodexReserveUnavailableError + // A transient-hold refusal is not a quota cooldown. Its own wording is the only accurate + // one, and the quota recovery advice below would send the operator after a cooldown that + // does not exist (#4701). + || err instanceof CodexRecoveryWithheldError) return err.message; const until = new Date(err.cooldownUntil).toISOString(); const scopeLabels: Record = { shared: "shared native quota", reserve: "Reserve quota", @@ -870,6 +939,15 @@ export async function resolveCodexAuthContext( // Why this request is on this account, carried to the request log so a move reads as an event // instead of something inferred from account labels across lines (#4546). let affinityDecision: CodexAffinityDecision | undefined; + // The half-open trial this request was granted, if it is the one allowed to test a held + // account. Declared out here because the release paths below and the returned context are on + // opposite sides of several throws (#4701). + let transientProbe: TransientProbeGrant | undefined; + const releaseTransientProbeGrant = (): void => { + if (!transientProbe) return; + releaseTransientProbe(transientProbe.lease); + transientProbe = undefined; + }; // Retained startup recovery makes the physical main identity ineligible. Routing // can still preserve service by selecting a healthy configured pool account. A // request-owned bearer likewise cannot inspect or reconcile file-main state. @@ -917,7 +995,11 @@ export async function resolveCodexAuthContext( // and may still route to non-main pool accounts without touching switch state. if (reserve && !nativeMainReadsForbidden && !selectionAdmission) throw new CodexMainProfileDrainingError(); if (!nativeMainReadsForbidden) reconcileMainCodexAccountRuntimeState(); - const resolution = fixedAccountId !== undefined + // Annotated, not inferred. The two literals below carry neither `affinity` nor + // `transientProbe`, so an inferred union makes `"k" in resolution` widen those reads to + // `unknown` and a discriminant narrowing fail outright. Contextually typing every branch to + // the resolver's own union is what lets the reads below stay total. + const resolution: CodexThreadResolution = fixedAccountId !== undefined ? { status: "selected" as const, accountId: fixedAccountId } : options.excludeAccountId ? (() => { @@ -942,8 +1024,17 @@ export async function resolveCodexAuthContext( lineage, ); if (resolution.status === "expired") throw new CodexThreadAffinityExpiredError(resolution.accountId); + // THE REFUSAL. Every candidate is held, the recovery budget is spent, and no detour is + // left -- so this request must not reach upstream at all. Returning the held account here + // is what #4701 is about: under a provider-wide 503 that is every bound request piling + // onto an account already known to be failing. Thrown before any credential is read, so + // nothing is sent and nothing is spent. + if (resolution.status === "withheld") { + throw new CodexRecoveryWithheldError(resolution.accountId, resolution.retryAt, resolution.detourAccountId); + } const selected = resolution.status === "selected" ? resolution.accountId : null; - affinityDecision = "affinity" in resolution ? resolution.affinity : undefined; + affinityDecision = resolution.affinity; + transientProbe = resolution.status === "selected" ? resolution.transientProbe : undefined; if (!selected) { // A retry that excluded a failed Pool account may still use the validated caller-owned // main credential. Treating every exclusion as if main itself had failed strands a healthy @@ -1025,12 +1116,25 @@ export async function resolveCodexAuthContext( throw new CodexPoolAuthenticationError("Selected Codex account is unavailable"); } } + } catch (cause) { + // Selection granted a trial and then a later policy check refused the account. The trial + // never runs, so hand it back instead of leaving the held account unprobeable until its + // deadline lapses (#4701). + releaseTransientProbeGrant(); + throw cause; } finally { selectionAdmission?.release(); } // Legacy selectors may retain an unusable account for actionable errors. A // deferred credential must never become request auth through that fallback. - assertCodexAccountValidationReady(accountId); + try { + assertCodexAccountValidationReady(accountId); + } catch (cause) { + // Nothing will reach upstream, so give the trial back instead of leaving the held account + // unprobeable until the lease deadline lapses (#4701). + releaseTransientProbeGrant(); + throw cause; + } // Lazy prime: if the selected account has no quota yet, the pool is likely // unprimed (dashboard never opened, or startup prime was blocked). Kick a // best-effort prime so the NEXT routing decision has real scores. This never @@ -1049,6 +1153,13 @@ export async function resolveCodexAuthContext( // a literal Retry-After reads very differently to a user than a reset-derived guess. const cooldown = getCodexQuotaHealthSnapshot(accountId, quotaScope); const cooldownUntil = cooldown?.cooldownUntil; + // A transient-hold trial and a quota cooldown cannot both describe this account: + // `isTransientOnlyAffinityBlock` refuses to recognise a transient hold on an account carrying + // quota health, so the cooldown branch below is unreachable while a trial is held. That is + // also why no request pays two recovery permits for one send. The release is defensive -- + // should that invariant ever move, the trial is handed back rather than stranded behind a + // refusal that belongs to the other domain. + if (cooldownUntil && transientProbe) releaseTransientProbeGrant(); // A cooled-down account never sends traffic, so upstream recovery can never be // observed and the cooldown outlives the real limit. Admit one probe per // interval; its outcome decides whether the cooldown ends (#433). @@ -1089,6 +1200,7 @@ export async function resolveCodexAuthContext( if (token) mainQuotaWriter = observeSelectedMainCredential(token, mainQuotaWriter); assertMainAccountPolicy(policy); } catch (cause) { + releaseTransientProbeGrant(); if (probeLeaseId && probeQuotaScope) releaseCodexQuotaScopeProbeLease(accountId, probeQuotaScope, probeLeaseId); else if (probeLeaseId) releaseCodexQuotaProbeLease(accountId, probeLeaseId); if (cause instanceof CodexMainAccountHardLockError) throw cause; @@ -1099,15 +1211,23 @@ export async function resolveCodexAuthContext( } if (!token) { // Nothing will reach upstream, so give the probe back instead of burning it. + releaseTransientProbeGrant(); if (probeLeaseId && probeQuotaScope) releaseCodexQuotaScopeProbeLease(accountId, probeQuotaScope, probeLeaseId); else if (probeLeaseId) releaseCodexQuotaProbeLease(accountId, probeLeaseId); throw new CodexPoolAuthenticationError( fixedAccountId !== undefined ? "Selected Codex account is unavailable" : undefined, ); } - const reserveAuthorization = reserve - ? await authorizeReserveCredential(token, mainQuotaWriter, policy, options.signal, undefined, writerGeneration) - : undefined; + let reserveAuthorization: MainReserveAuthorization | undefined; + try { + reserveAuthorization = reserve + ? await authorizeReserveCredential(token, mainQuotaWriter, policy, options.signal, undefined, writerGeneration) + : undefined; + } catch (cause) { + // A Reserve refusal ends the request here, so the trial it was holding never runs. + releaseTransientProbeGrant(); + throw cause; + } return { kind: "main-pool", accountId, @@ -1121,6 +1241,7 @@ export async function resolveCodexAuthContext( ...(quotaScope ? { quotaScope } : {}), ...(probeLeaseId ? { probeLeaseId } : {}), ...(probeQuotaScope ? { probeQuotaScope } : {}), + ...(transientProbe ? { transientProbe } : {}), }; } @@ -1141,8 +1262,10 @@ export async function resolveCodexAuthContext( ...(probeLeaseId ? { probeLeaseId } : {}), ...(probeQuotaScope ? { probeQuotaScope } : {}), ...(affinityDecision ? { affinityDecision } : {}), + ...(transientProbe ? { transientProbe } : {}), }; } catch (cause) { + releaseTransientProbeGrant(); if (probeLeaseId && probeQuotaScope) releaseCodexQuotaScopeProbeLease(accountId, probeQuotaScope, probeLeaseId); else if (probeLeaseId) releaseCodexQuotaProbeLease(accountId, probeLeaseId); if (!options.signal?.aborted && shouldMarkAccountNeedsReauthForCodexAuthFailure(cause)) { diff --git a/src/codex/routing.ts b/src/codex/routing.ts index 0a9a0b9c3c..fbae259958 100644 --- a/src/codex/routing.ts +++ b/src/codex/routing.ts @@ -54,6 +54,13 @@ import { type CodexUpstreamHealth, } from "./routing/health-store"; import { ownsProbeLease, probeMayClearCooldown, withProbeLeaseReleased } from "./routing/probe-lease"; +// `./routing/probe-lease` above is the QUOTA-COOLDOWN lease; the module below owns the +// unrelated TRANSIENT-HOLD trial and the pool-wide recovery bound above it (#4701). +import { + isTransientHoldExpired, + resolveTransientHoldDispatch, + settleTransientProbeForOutcome, +} from "./routing/transient-hold-dispatch"; import { adoptLegacyLineageAffinity, affinityAfterRelease, @@ -181,6 +188,7 @@ export type { CodexAffinityMove, CodexAffinityReason, CodexAffinityDecision, + TransientProbeGrant, } from "./routing/thread-affinity"; export { isCodexAccountPlanExcluded, @@ -276,12 +284,6 @@ function isTransientOnlyAffinityBlock( || isCodexPoolRefreshCooling(entry.accountId, now); } -/** Has a held binding waited longer than a transient failure can reasonably explain? */ -function isTransientHoldExpired(entry: ThreadAffinityEntry, now: number): boolean { - return entry.transientHoldSince !== undefined - && now - entry.transientHoldSince > CODEX_TRANSIENT_AFFINITY_HOLD_MS; -} - /** * Is every pin this thread holds on the failing account past its hold window? * @@ -477,6 +479,8 @@ export function resolveCodexAccountForThread( lineage?: CodexThreadLineage, ): string | null { const resolution = resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed(threadId, config, now, quotaScope, undefined, undefined, lineage); + // A WITHHELD dispatch is deliberately not an account here: this wrapper cannot carry a retry + // time, and answering with the held account is the send the hold prevents. Fails closed. return resolution.status === "selected" ? resolution.accountId : null; } @@ -936,15 +940,12 @@ export function resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed( const lane = transientDetourAccount(config, detourEntry, now, quotaScope, selectionOptions); detourEntry.transientHoldSince ??= now; detourEntry.lastUsedAt = now; - if (lane !== null && lane !== detourEntry.accountId) { - detourEntry.transientDetourAccountId = lane; - return { status: "selected", accountId: lane, affinity: { move: "detour", reason: "transient" } }; - } // A provider-wide outage soft-avoids every sibling, so there is nowhere to detour. // That is a statement about where this request can go, not about who owns the // conversation: dropping the pin here would rebuild the cold prefix elsewhere for - // exactly the failure mode the hold exists to survive. - return { status: "selected", accountId: detourEntry.accountId, affinity: { move: "held", reason: "transient" } }; + // exactly the failure the hold exists to survive -- nor a licence to send at the + // failing account, which is what the dispatch resolver bounds (#4701). + return resolveTransientHoldDispatch(detourEntry, lane, now); } // Detour expiry or invalidation must not expire the ordinary task. Drop only // this model lane and select from ordinary/shared state below. @@ -1018,16 +1019,11 @@ export function resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed( const detour = transientDetourAccount(config, entry, now, quotaScope, selectionOptions); entry.transientHoldSince ??= now; entry.lastUsedAt = now; - if (detour !== null && detour !== entry.accountId) { - entry.transientDetourAccountId = detour; - // Deliberately no promoteActiveCodexAccount and no rebind: this is one request routing - // around a blip, not the pool deciding where the conversation now lives. - return { status: "selected", accountId: detour, affinity: { move: "detour", reason: "transient" } }; - } // No sibling can take it either -- the usual shape of a provider-wide 503. The binding // survives: "cannot send right now" and "forget which account owns this conversation" - // are different answers, and conflating them is what the hold was added to stop. - return { status: "selected", accountId: entry.accountId, affinity: { move: "held", reason: "transient" } }; + // are different answers. So is the third answer this used to give -- "send at the + // failing account" -- now a bounded probe or a typed refusal (#4701). + return resolveTransientHoldDispatch(entry, detour, now); } // A model-only exclusion does not invalidate the shared task binding. Health, // generation, pause, cooldown, and failure evidence still retire it normally. @@ -1277,6 +1273,10 @@ export function recordCodexUpstreamOutcome( recordUpstreamHostFailure(meta.hostKey, { code: meta.lastFailureCode, now: meta.now ?? Date.now() }); } if (!accountId) return; + // Conclude the half-open recovery trial BEFORE the admissibility gate below (#4701): an + // outcome that gate drops still ended this request, and a lease nobody hands back leaves the + // next trial waiting out its deadline. The settle carries its own fences, so this is safe here. + settleTransientProbeForOutcome(accountId, meta, classifyCodexUpstreamOutcome(outcome, meta.denial)); const writerGeneration = meta.writerGeneration ?? captureConfigGeneration(); if (!isHealthAccountAdmissible(accountId, writerGeneration)) return; const now = meta.now ?? Date.now(); diff --git a/src/codex/routing/cooldown-math.ts b/src/codex/routing/cooldown-math.ts index 123da5e3b1..8b2abe6543 100644 --- a/src/codex/routing/cooldown-math.ts +++ b/src/codex/routing/cooldown-math.ts @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { } from "../quota"; import { isThirtyDayOnlyCodexPlan } from "../plan"; import type { CodexQuotaScope } from "./health-store"; +import type { TransientProbeGrant } from "./thread-affinity"; export const CODEX_DEFAULT_QUOTA_COOLDOWN_MS = 60_000; export const CODEX_MAX_QUOTA_COOLDOWN_MS = 24 * 60 * 60_000; @@ -78,6 +79,15 @@ export type CodexUpstreamOutcomeMeta = { probeLeaseId?: string; /** Scope of `probeLeaseId` when it was granted against a model-scoped cooldown. */ probeQuotaScope?: CodexQuotaScope; + /** + * The half-open TRANSIENT-HOLD probe this request was granted, when it was the one request + * admitted to test a held account (#4701). A different lease to `probeLeaseId` above, in a + * different domain: that one governs a quota cooldown, this one governs a 5xx hold. The two + * are mutually exclusive by construction -- `isTransientOnlyAffinityBlock` refuses to + * recognise a transient hold on an account that carries quota health -- so a request never + * holds both and never pays two recovery permits for one send. + */ + transientProbe?: TransientProbeGrant; /** * Already-chosen alternate for same-request 429 retry. When set, promotion * reuses this account instead of calling {@link pickAlternateCodexAccount} diff --git a/src/codex/routing/thread-affinity.ts b/src/codex/routing/thread-affinity.ts index d8d2f5cbfb..7557ac6537 100644 --- a/src/codex/routing/thread-affinity.ts +++ b/src/codex/routing/thread-affinity.ts @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import { retainedUtf8Bytes } from "../../lib/admission"; import { clearAllCodexPoolRefreshFailures } from "../pool-refresh-backoff"; import type { CodexThreadLineage } from "../lineage"; import type { CodexQuotaScope } from "./health-store"; +import type { TransientProbeLease } from "../../routing/probe-lease"; +import { clearPoolRecoveryState } from "../../routing/probe-lease"; export type ThreadAffinityEntry = { accountId: string; @@ -25,10 +27,51 @@ export type ThreadAffinityEntry = { transientDetourAccountId?: string; }; +/** + * The half-open trial this request was granted against its own held account (#4701). + * + * The lease alone is not enough to settle safely. Its generation is an account-local PROBE + * epoch, while {@link ThreadAffinityEntry.generation} is the selected CREDENTIAL generation, + * and the two move independently: a credential replaced while the probe is in flight leaves + * the probe epoch untouched, so a settle that checked only the lease would write an answer + * about a credential that no longer exists. Capturing the affinity generation here is what + * lets the settle refuse that case. + */ +export interface TransientProbeGrant { + readonly lease: TransientProbeLease; + /** Credential generation the binding held when the probe was granted. */ + readonly affinityGeneration: number; +} + export type CodexThreadResolution = - | { status: "selected"; accountId: string; affinity?: CodexAffinityDecision } + | { + status: "selected"; + accountId: string; + affinity?: CodexAffinityDecision; + /** + * Present only when this request is the single admitted probe of a held account. The + * holder owes the lease a settle or a release; nothing else may act on it. + */ + transientProbe?: TransientProbeGrant; + } | { status: "none"; affinity?: CodexAffinityDecision } - | { status: "expired"; accountId: string; affinity?: CodexAffinityDecision }; + | { status: "expired"; accountId: string; affinity?: CodexAffinityDecision } + /** + * Every candidate for this binding is held and no detour is left, so there is no account + * this request may be sent to. Distinct from `none`: the binding is REMEMBERED and the + * caller is told when to come back, rather than being handed the account already known to + * be failing. Returning `selected` here is the "must not send, sends anyway" defect + * (#4701); the caller must refuse before any upstream I/O. + */ + | { + status: "withheld"; + accountId: string; + /** Earliest moment a recovery dispatch could be admitted. Always strictly in the future. */ + retryAt: number; + /** The remembered detour, when one exists but is itself unusable right now. */ + detourAccountId?: string; + affinity?: CodexAffinityDecision; + }; /** What happened to this thread's binding on this request (#4546). */ export type CodexAffinityMove = @@ -163,6 +206,11 @@ export function clearThreadAccountMap(): void { // A refresh cooldown is per-account runtime state learned alongside these bindings. Leaving it // behind here keeps an account out of selection after the roster it belonged to is gone. clearAllCodexPoolRefreshFailures(); + // Same argument for recovery state (#4701): probe pacing is keyed on account ids this reset + // may have just retired, and the recovery window counts sends made by the roster that is + // going away. A held account nobody may probe because of a lease issued against the previous + // roster is a recovery that never starts. + clearPoolRecoveryState(); conversationStateIssuerMap.clear(); } diff --git a/src/codex/routing/transient-hold-dispatch.ts b/src/codex/routing/transient-hold-dispatch.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..55ce002082 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/codex/routing/transient-hold-dispatch.ts @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +import { isCodexAccountGenerationLive } from "../account-store"; +// From `../account-id`, which declares the constant and imports nothing, rather than from +// `../main-account`, which re-exports it and sits inside the routing/account-lifecycle import +// cycle. Neither reference here runs at module load, but a leaf import keeps this module out of +// that cycle entirely instead of relying on that staying true. +import { MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID } from "../account-id"; +import { + invalidateTransientProbe, + releaseTransientProbe, + resolveHeldAccountDispatch, + settleTransientProbe, +} from "../../routing/probe-lease"; +import { + CODEX_TRANSIENT_AFFINITY_HOLD_MS, + type CodexThreadResolution, + type ThreadAffinityEntry, + type TransientProbeGrant, +} from "./thread-affinity"; +import type { CodexUpstreamOutcomeClass, CodexUpstreamOutcomeMeta } from "./cooldown-math"; + +/** + * What a request bound to a HELD account may actually do, and how its trial ends (#4701). + * + * The transient hold (#4546) keeps a thread's binding while its own account serves a 5xx + * streak and detours the request to a healthy sibling. Both of the selector's hold branches + * used to end the same way when no sibling could take it: they returned the held account as + * `selected`, and the caller sent at an account already known to be failing. Under a + * provider-wide 503 that is every bound request at once -- the amplification the hold exists + * to prevent rather than cause. + * + * This module is the seam between the selector and the bounded answer in + * `src/routing/probe-lease.ts`. It is separate from `./probe-lease` in this same directory, + * which is the unrelated QUOTA-COOLDOWN lease; the two govern different domains and must never + * settle each other's probe. + */ + +/** Has a held binding waited longer than a transient failure can reasonably explain? */ +export function isTransientHoldExpired(entry: ThreadAffinityEntry, now: number): boolean { + return entry.transientHoldSince !== undefined + && now - entry.transientHoldSince > CODEX_TRANSIENT_AFFINITY_HOLD_MS; +} + +/** + * Where a request bound to a held account goes this turn. + * + * {@link resolveHeldAccountDispatch} bounds the answer: one probe tests the held account, and a + * caller with nowhere else to go is WITHHELD and told when to come back rather than sent at the + * failure. + * + * A usable detour is taken BEFORE that resolver is consulted, which inverts its own probe-first + * ordering. Deliberately: a healthy sibling is always a better answer for a live request than an + * account carrying a failure streak, and turning the first request after a hold into the trial + * would spend a real user's turn on it. The ordering is not what #4701 bounds -- the defect is + * the third answer the selector used to give, "send at the failing account anyway", and that is + * reached only when no detour exists. Recovery is still discovered there, because that is + * exactly the case where nothing else can find out. + * + * The caller has already committed `transientHoldSince`/`lastUsedAt`; this decides only where + * the request goes. A withheld answer deliberately leaves `transientDetourAccountId` alone: + * being unable to send right now says nothing about which sibling was serving this thread. + */ +export function resolveTransientHoldDispatch( + entry: ThreadAffinityEntry, + detour: string | null, + now: number, +): CodexThreadResolution { + if (detour !== null && detour !== entry.accountId) { + entry.transientDetourAccountId = detour; + // Deliberately no promotion and no rebind: this is one request routing around a blip, not + // the pool deciding where the conversation now lives. + return { status: "selected", accountId: detour, affinity: { move: "detour", reason: "transient" } }; + } + const dispatch = resolveHeldAccountDispatch({ boundAccountId: entry.accountId, now }); + if (dispatch.kind === "probe") { + return { + status: "selected", + accountId: entry.accountId, + affinity: { move: "held", reason: "transient" }, + // The credential generation travels with the lease so a settle can refuse an answer about + // a credential this binding no longer has. See {@link TransientProbeGrant}. + transientProbe: { lease: dispatch.lease, affinityGeneration: entry.generation }, + }; + } + if (dispatch.kind === "withheld") { + return { + status: "withheld", + accountId: dispatch.boundAccountId, + retryAt: dispatch.retryAt, + // The remembered sibling, when there is one. It is unusable right now -- that is why this + // request is refused -- but it is what has been serving this thread, and a refusal that + // dropped it would make the next resolve re-pick cold. + ...(entry.transientDetourAccountId !== undefined + ? { detourAccountId: entry.transientDetourAccountId } + : {}), + affinity: { move: "held", reason: "transient" }, + }; + } + // Unreachable: no detour was handed in, so the resolver has none to hand back. Kept total + // rather than cast away, because the cost of being wrong here is a send at a failing account. + entry.transientDetourAccountId = dispatch.accountId; + return { status: "selected", accountId: dispatch.accountId, affinity: { move: "detour", reason: "transient" } }; +} + +/** Does the credential a probe was granted against still exist at that generation? */ +function transientProbeCredentialLive(accountId: string, generation: number): boolean { + if (accountId === MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID) return generation === 0; + return isCodexAccountGenerationLive(accountId, generation); +} + +/** + * Conclude the half-open recovery probe this request was holding. + * + * Three answers, because three things can be true of a probe that just ended: + * + * - The credential moved under it. Its result describes an identity the binding no longer has, + * so the epoch is BURNED instead of settled -- invalidating makes every outstanding lease on + * this account stale at once, which is what stops a late answer from reviving a dead account. + * - The answer says nothing about the account. A 3xx, a 400, or an unclassifiable status is the + * request's problem, not the account's, so the lease is handed back unspent and the next + * request may run a real trial instead of waiting out a recovery nobody observed. + * - Otherwise it is evidence: success means recovered, everything else means still failing. + * + * A no-op when this request held no trial, so the outcome recorder calls it unconditionally. + */ +export function settleTransientProbeForOutcome( + accountId: string, + meta: Pick, + outcomeClass: CodexUpstreamOutcomeClass, +): void { + const grant: TransientProbeGrant | undefined = meta.transientProbe; + if (!grant) return; + if (!transientProbeCredentialLive(accountId, grant.affinityGeneration)) { + invalidateTransientProbe(accountId); + return; + } + if (outcomeClass === "neutral" || outcomeClass === "caller" || outcomeClass === "unknown") { + releaseTransientProbe(grant.lease); + return; + } + settleTransientProbe(grant.lease, outcomeClass === "success" ? "recovered" : "failed", meta.now ?? Date.now()); +} diff --git a/src/routing/probe-lease.ts b/src/routing/probe-lease.ts index 2182bab3eb..bec9f5ff0b 100644 --- a/src/routing/probe-lease.ts +++ b/src/routing/probe-lease.ts @@ -542,3 +542,72 @@ export function configureSharedPoolBackpressure(policy: PoolBackpressurePolicy): export function resetSharedPoolBackpressureForTests(): void { sharedLimiter = undefined; } + +/** + * Forget every account's probe pacing AND the shared recovery window. + * + * Called when the pool's routing state is reset wholesale -- a roster change, a config reload, + * an account removal. Both halves describe a pool that no longer exists: pacing is keyed on + * account ids that may be gone, and the window's buckets count sends made by a roster that + * changed underneath them. Keeping either across such a reset lets one context's recovery + * decisions govern the next one, which is also how it leaks between test files. + * + * This is the production reset. The two `ForTests` seams above stay separate because a test + * frequently wants exactly one half of it. + */ +export function clearPoolRecoveryState(): void { + probeStates.clear(); + sharedLimiter = undefined; +} + +/** + * What one physical send IS, as far as the recovery window is concerned. + * + * The window measures recovery traffic against observed demand, so it needs the distinction + * made where the send happens -- and the transport wrapper cannot make it. That layer sees a + * URL and an init; whether this is a conversation's first attempt, its third retry, or the one + * trial admitted against a held account is knowledge only the caller has. So the caller names + * it, and the classification lives here with the window rather than in the transport, which + * owns no routing policy and has an enforced import boundary saying so. + * + * - `initial`: a new request's first send. Recorded, never refused -- it is the denominator, + * and refusing it would make this a throughput cap rather than a recovery bound. + * - `retry`: a re-send of a request that already reached upstream once. Admitted only while + * recovery traffic stays under its ratio of observed demand. + * - `probe`: the half-open trial against a held account. It ALREADY paid at selection, inside + * {@link resolveHeldAccountDispatch}; charging it again would bill one send twice and shrink + * the very budget it was admitted from. + */ +export type PoolRecoveryDispatchClass = "initial" | "retry" | "probe"; + +export interface PoolRecoveryDispatchDecision { + readonly admitted: boolean; + /** + * Earliest moment another recovery dispatch could be admitted. `now` when the send was + * admitted; otherwise a real change point strictly in the future, so a refused caller has + * something to wait on instead of busy-looping against a pool that is already failing. + */ + readonly retryAt: number; +} + +/** + * Admit one physical send against the process-wide recovery window. + * + * Per-request send budgets cannot see a storm: thousands of requests each staying inside their + * own allowance still compose into an unbounded rate against one failing upstream. This is the + * layer above them, and it is shared by construction. + */ +export function classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch( + dispatchClass: PoolRecoveryDispatchClass, + now = Date.now(), + limiter: PoolBackpressureLimiter = sharedPoolBackpressure(), +): PoolRecoveryDispatchDecision { + if (dispatchClass === "initial") { + limiter.recordInitialSend(now); + return { admitted: true, retryAt: now }; + } + if (dispatchClass === "probe") return { admitted: true, retryAt: now }; + return limiter.tryPermitRetryDispatch(now) + ? { admitted: true, retryAt: now } + : { admitted: false, retryAt: limiter.nextRecoveryAt(now) }; +} diff --git a/src/server/responses/compact.ts b/src/server/responses/compact.ts index 4b9e417818..3d7f6557c7 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/compact.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/compact.ts @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ import { resolveCodexAuthContext, codexPoolAffinityKey, codexProbeLeaseId, + codexTransientProbeGrant, codexProbeQuotaScope, releaseCodexAuthContextProbeLease, stripCodexRuntimeProviderFields, @@ -878,6 +879,7 @@ export async function handleResponsesCompact( // replacement (#2887). Also covers the replay's own second 401. ...(ctx.kind === "pool" ? { credentialGeneration: ctx.generation } : {}), probeQuotaScope: codexProbeQuotaScope(ctx), + transientProbe: codexTransientProbeGrant(ctx), writerGeneration: ctx.kind === "pool" || ctx.kind === "main-pool" ? ctx.writerGeneration : undefined, diff --git a/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts b/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts index e1d1758696..7d25b86501 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/core-codex-account.ts @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import { resetUpstreamHostHealth, } from "../../codex/upstream-host-health"; import { safeOriginLabel, fetchWithHeaderTimeout, providerFetch } from "./fetch-helpers"; +import { classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch } from "../../routing/probe-lease"; import { formatErrorResponse } from "../../bridge"; import { readBoundedResponseBody } from "../../lib/bounded-body"; import { upstreamErrorMessageFromPayload, isRateLimitOrQuotaFailureMessage } from "../../lib/errors"; @@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ import { MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID } from "../../codex/main-account"; import { slugsEquivalent } from "../../providers/slug-codec"; import { codexProbeLeaseId, + codexTransientProbeGrant, codexProbeQuotaScope, releaseCodexAuthContextProbeLease, resolveCodexAuthContext, @@ -470,6 +472,7 @@ export async function retryCodexPoolOnAlternateAccount( modelId: route.modelId, probeLeaseId: codexProbeLeaseId(firstAuthCtx), probeQuotaScope: codexProbeQuotaScope(firstAuthCtx), + transientProbe: codexTransientProbeGrant(firstAuthCtx), writerGeneration: firstAuthCtx.writerGeneration, }); }; @@ -579,6 +582,7 @@ export async function retryCodexPoolOnAlternateAccount( modelId: route.modelId, probeLeaseId: codexProbeLeaseId(firstAuthCtx), probeQuotaScope: codexProbeQuotaScope(firstAuthCtx), + transientProbe: codexTransientProbeGrant(firstAuthCtx), writerGeneration: firstAuthCtx.writerGeneration, }); } @@ -610,6 +614,7 @@ export async function retryCodexPoolOnAlternateAccount( modelId: route.modelId, probeLeaseId: codexProbeLeaseId(firstAuthCtx), probeQuotaScope: codexProbeQuotaScope(firstAuthCtx), + transientProbe: codexTransientProbeGrant(firstAuthCtx), writerGeneration: firstAuthCtx.writerGeneration, // Retry already advanced the RR ring via excludeAccountId — reuse for promotion. ...(retryAuthCtx.accountId ? { promoteAccountId: retryAuthCtx.accountId } : {}), @@ -715,9 +720,28 @@ export async function retryCodexPoolOnAlternateAccount( // The same-account gated-model 400 ladder below keeps its own `maxRetrySends` bound and // does not take the reserve again; only the move itself does. if (accountMovePermit) { + // The pool-wide recovery window is consulted BEFORE the request-local permit is used. + // `reserveDispatch` charges at reservation time and `release()` is the only way back, so + // using the permit first and refusing afterwards would spend a send the request never + // made. An account move is recovery traffic like any other: one request's own budget + // cannot see that a thousand other requests are moving at the same moment, which is + // precisely the amplification this window exists to bound (#4701). + // + // A refusal here is not a new failure mode: "no alternate was available" is already the + // outcome when the pool has nowhere to move this request to, and it is handled. + if (!classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch("retry").admitted) { + accountMovePermit.release(); + accountMovePermit = undefined; + // The alternate context was resolved and will not send. Hand back whatever recovery + // lease it is holding rather than leaving that account unprobeable. + releaseCodexAuthContextProbeLease(retryAuthCtx); + recordUnmovedTransientOutcome(); + return { kind: "no-alternate" }; + } const charged = accountMovePermit.use(); accountMovePermit = undefined; if (!charged) { + releaseCodexAuthContextProbeLease(retryAuthCtx); recordUnmovedTransientOutcome(); return { kind: "no-alternate" }; } @@ -849,6 +873,7 @@ export function codexForwardTerminalOutcomeRecorder( modelId, probeLeaseId: codexProbeLeaseId(authCtx), probeQuotaScope: codexProbeQuotaScope(authCtx), + transientProbe: codexTransientProbeGrant(authCtx), writerGeneration: authCtx.writerGeneration, }); return; @@ -871,6 +896,7 @@ export function codexForwardTerminalOutcomeRecorder( modelId, probeLeaseId: codexProbeLeaseId(authCtx), probeQuotaScope: codexProbeQuotaScope(authCtx), + transientProbe: codexTransientProbeGrant(authCtx), writerGeneration: authCtx.writerGeneration, // A mid-stream terminal can carry a semantic 401 long after the credential was // replaced. It is never replayed — the client already saw output — but it must diff --git a/src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts b/src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts index 79e6ca3d46..1c69c0d6d5 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ import type { ResponsesTerminalStatus } from "../../bridge"; import { isCodexWsQuotaObservedResponse, isCodexWsUpstreamResponse } from "./ws-upstream"; import { recordSubagentQuotaFailureForThreadSpawn } from "../../codex/subagent-model-fallback"; import { recordCodexUpstreamOutcome } from "../../codex/routing"; -import { codexProbeLeaseId, codexProbeQuotaScope } from "../../codex/auth-context"; +import { codexProbeLeaseId, codexProbeQuotaScope, codexTransientProbeGrant } from "../../codex/auth-context"; import { consumeComboFailure } from "./core-combo-failure"; import { readDisplaySafeErrorText } from "./core-errors"; import { streamingContextOverflowResponse, jsonContextOverflowResponse } from "./context-overflow"; @@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ export async function deliverPassthroughResponse( modelId: route.modelId, probeLeaseId: codexProbeLeaseId(admissionState.authCtx), probeQuotaScope: codexProbeQuotaScope(admissionState.authCtx), + transientProbe: codexTransientProbeGrant(admissionState.authCtx), writerGeneration: admissionState.authCtx.writerGeneration, // Includes a replay's second 401, which is the case that actually retires the // account — fence it on the credential the request was holding. diff --git a/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts b/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts index 0292f1d77a..274946be98 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import { unwrapUpstreamRetryEvidenceError, codexProbeLeaseId, codexProbeQuotaScope, + codexTransientProbeGrant, createCodexReserveDispatchGuard, } from "../../codex/auth-context"; import { @@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ import { safeHostLabel, storedPoolReplayDispatchNotifier, } from "./fetch-helpers"; +import { classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch } from "../../routing/probe-lease"; import { clientCancelledResponse } from "./core-errors"; import { upstreamHostCircuitOpenResponse, @@ -736,6 +738,7 @@ export async function preparePassthroughExchange( modelId: route.modelId, probeLeaseId: codexProbeLeaseId(admissionState.authCtx), probeQuotaScope: codexProbeQuotaScope(admissionState.authCtx), + transientProbe: codexTransientProbeGrant(admissionState.authCtx), writerGeneration: admissionState.authCtx.writerGeneration, }); } @@ -752,6 +755,12 @@ export async function preparePassthroughExchange( // Body is a replayable string; nothing has streamed to the client yet. upstreamResponse = await fetchWithTransientRetry( recovery => { + // The pool-wide recovery window measures recovery traffic against observed demand, + // and this is where demand is observed: `recovery === undefined` is a new request's + // first send, everything after it is the same request trying again. Without this the + // ratio has no denominator and the window collapses to its quiet-pool floor, which + // would throttle recovery on a busy proxy exactly as hard as on an idle one (#4701). + if (recovery === undefined) classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch("initial"); transportState.noteRoutedAttemptSend(passthroughEstimate, recovery); return fetchWithHeaderTimeout(request.url, applyUpstreamRecoveryInit({ method: request.method, diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index 31221b4b38..427a67d876 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -253,6 +253,29 @@ Pool mode routes across main plus added Codex credentials. Key rules: candidate is held the caller gets a typed withheld outcome, not a send. Recovery dispatches (retries and probes, never a new request's initial send) sit under a pool-wide ratio ceiling measured over a sliding window (`src/routing/probe-lease.ts`). + + Where that reaches production, because a primitive nobody calls bounds nothing: the two + transient-hold branches of `resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed` + (`src/codex/routing.ts`) ask `resolveHeldAccountDispatch` what this request may do and + return a `withheld` resolution instead of selecting the failing account; + `resolveCodexAuthContext` (`src/codex/auth-context.ts`) turns that into + `CodexRecoveryWithheldError` before any upstream I/O, so a refused request reaches the + client as a 429 carrying the limiter's own change point in `Retry-After`. A granted probe + travels on the auth context, is settled by `recordCodexUpstreamOutcome` under the credential + generation the binding held, and is handed back by `releaseCodexAuthContextProbeLease` on + every path that never sends. The pool window observes demand at the initial passthrough send + and gates the alternate-account replay through `classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch`, which lives + with the window itself rather than in the transport: `src/server/responses/fetch-helpers.ts` + owns no routing policy and `tests/responses/responses-fetch-helpers-boundary.test.ts` pins + its runtime imports to three transport modules. Same-account transient retries remain bounded + by the per-request send budget alone: refusing inside the retry helper's thunk would surface a + pool refusal as a 502 transport failure and record a transient outcome against an account + that was never asked, which is worse than the gap. + + This hold and the quota-cooldown probe (`src/codex/routing/probe-lease.ts`) are different + domains one directory apart. They cannot both describe an account at once, because + `isTransientOnlyAffinityBlock` refuses to recognise a transient hold on an account carrying + quota health -- which is why no request ever pays two recovery permits for one send. - **The credential store is generation-guarded.** A refresh takes a lock and persists only if the generation it started from still holds; a lost race raises a generation-conflict error rather than overwriting the newer credential (`src/codex/account-store.ts`). Callers handle that error; diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index 5f9ab55449..b50a6f167c 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -880,6 +880,7 @@ "privacy-mask-account.test.ts": "lib", "privacy-scan-meta-key.test.ts": "ci-workflows", "probe-lease.test.ts": "routing", + "probe-lease-dispatch-wiring.test.ts": "routing", "process-control-graceful.test.ts": "lib", "process-control.test.ts": "lib", "process-state.test.ts": "service", diff --git a/tests/routing/probe-lease-dispatch-wiring.test.ts b/tests/routing/probe-lease-dispatch-wiring.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9ac2157106 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/routing/probe-lease-dispatch-wiring.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { join } from "node:path"; +import { + canAcquireTransientProbe, + classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch, + clearPoolRecoveryState, + createPoolBackpressureLimiter, + transientProbeDiagnostics, + tryAcquireTransientProbe, + TRANSIENT_PROBE_INTERVAL_MS, + TRANSIENT_PROBE_LEASE_MS, +} from "../../src/routing/probe-lease"; +import { + CodexRecoveryWithheldError, + cooldownErrorMessage, + cooldownErrorResponse, + releaseCodexAuthContextProbeLease, +} from "../../src/codex/auth-context"; +import { + clearCodexUpstreamHealth, + clearThreadAccountMap, + recordCodexUpstreamOutcome, + resolveCodexAccountForThread, + resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed, +} from "../../src/codex/routing"; +import { clearPoolRotationState } from "../../src/codex/pool-rotation"; +import { saveCodexAccountCredential } from "../../src/codex/account-store"; +import { clearAccountQuota, updateAccountQuota } from "../../src/codex/auth-api"; +import { repoPath } from "../helpers/repo-root"; +import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; +import type { OcxConfig } from "../../src/types"; + +/** + * The pool-wide recovery limiter, wired to the dispatch that actually sends (#4701). + * + * The primitives in `src/routing/probe-lease.ts` were complete and unit-tested before this, and + * bounded nothing: no file under `src/` imported the module, so every hit for + * `resolveHeldAccountDispatch` was its own definition or a direct unit test. An implementation + * nothing calls is indistinguishable from an absent one at runtime, which is the whole of the + * issue -- and it is why the first case here is a source oracle rather than a behaviour. + * + * The defect that reached production lived at the end of both transient-hold branches of + * `resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed`: when no sibling could take the request they returned + * the HELD account as `selected`, and the caller sent it at an account already known to be + * failing. Under a provider-wide 503 that is every bound request at once -- the amplification + * the hold exists to prevent rather than cause. + */ + +const TEST_DIR = join(import.meta.dir, ".tmp-probe-lease-dispatch-wiring"); +let previousOpencodexHome: string | undefined; +let previousCodexHome: string | undefined; + +function makeThreeAccountConfig(overrides: Partial = {}): OcxConfig { + const ids = ["a", "b", "c"]; + for (const id of ids) { + saveCodexAccountCredential(id, { + accessToken: `access-${id}`, + refreshToken: `refresh-${id}`, + expiresAt: Date.now() + 5 * 60_000, + chatgptAccountId: `acct-${id}`, + }); + } + return { + providers: {}, + activeCodexAccountId: "a", + autoSwitchThreshold: 80, + accountPoolStrategy: "quota", + upstreamFailoverThreshold: 3, + codexAccounts: ids.map(id => ({ id, email: `${id}@example.test`, isMain: false })), + ...overrides, + } as OcxConfig; +} + +/** Drive one account to the failover threshold this config declares. */ +function streakTransientFailures(config: OcxConfig, accountId: string, now: number): void { + for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt += 1) { + recordCodexUpstreamOutcome(config, accountId, 503, { now }); + } +} + +describe("recovery limiter wiring is reachable from production (#4701)", () => { + test("the transient-hold module is imported by the selector and the dispatch boundary", () => { + // Not a style assertion. Before this change the module had complete unit coverage and zero + // production callers, so the suite was green while nothing in a running proxy was bounded. + // If a refactor ever detaches it again, that is the symptom to catch -- the behaviour tests + // below would keep passing against primitives nobody calls. + const holdDispatch = readFileSync( + repoPath("src", "codex", "routing", "transient-hold-dispatch.ts"), "utf8", + ); + expect(holdDispatch).toContain('from "../../routing/probe-lease"'); + expect(holdDispatch).toContain("resolveHeldAccountDispatch"); + + // The selector reaches the bound through that seam, on the production path. + const routing = readFileSync(repoPath("src", "codex", "routing.ts"), "utf8"); + expect(routing).toContain('from "./routing/transient-hold-dispatch"'); + expect(routing).toContain("resolveTransientHoldDispatch"); + + // The physical-send boundary itself owns no routing policy -- `responses-fetch-helpers- + // boundary.test.ts` pins its runtime imports to three transport modules -- so the dispatch + // call sites name their own class instead. + const passthrough = readFileSync(repoPath("src", "server", "responses", "passthrough-dispatch.ts"), "utf8"); + expect(passthrough).toContain('from "../../routing/probe-lease"'); + expect(passthrough).toContain('classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch("initial")'); + + // Two modules are named probe-lease, one directory apart, and they are different domains. + // The selector keeps importing the QUOTA one; merging them would make one settle the + // other's probe. + expect(routing).toContain('from "./routing/probe-lease"'); + }); +}); + +/** + * Module-scoped, not per-describe. Several cases below read the credential store -- the + * settle's generation fence does, through `isCodexAccountGenerationLive` -- and a test that + * reads the operator's real `~/.opencodex` is both non-deterministic and wrong. + */ +beforeEach(() => { + previousOpencodexHome = process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME; + previousCodexHome = process.env.CODEX_HOME; + if (existsSync(TEST_DIR)) removeTreeWithRetry(TEST_DIR); + mkdirSync(TEST_DIR, { recursive: true }); + process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = TEST_DIR; + process.env.CODEX_HOME = TEST_DIR; + clearThreadAccountMap(); + clearCodexUpstreamHealth(); + clearAccountQuota(); + clearPoolRotationState(); + clearPoolRecoveryState(); +}); + +afterEach(() => { + clearAccountQuota(); + clearCodexUpstreamHealth(); + clearThreadAccountMap(); + clearPoolRotationState(); + clearPoolRecoveryState(); + if (previousOpencodexHome === undefined) delete process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME; + else process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = previousOpencodexHome; + if (previousCodexHome === undefined) delete process.env.CODEX_HOME; + else process.env.CODEX_HOME = previousCodexHome; + if (existsSync(TEST_DIR)) removeTreeWithRetry(TEST_DIR); +}); + +describe("a held binding with nowhere to detour is bounded, not sent", () => { + test("exactly one request probes the held account; the next is withheld with a future retry time", () => { + const config = makeThreeAccountConfig(); + const threadId = "held-dispatch-thread"; + updateAccountQuota("a", 10); + updateAccountQuota("b", 20); + updateAccountQuota("c", 30); + const start = Date.now(); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThread(threadId, config, start)).toBe("a"); + + // A provider-wide 503 hits every account, so every sibling is soft-avoided and there is + // nowhere to detour. This is the exact state in which the old code returned the failing + // account to every caller. + for (const id of ["a", "b", "c"]) streakTransientFailures(config, id, start); + + const probe = resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed(threadId, config, start); + expect(probe.status).toBe("selected"); + if (probe.status !== "selected") throw new Error("unreachable"); + // Somebody has to find out whether the account is back, and the lease guarantees it is + // exactly one somebody. + expect(probe.accountId).toBe("a"); + expect(probe.transientProbe?.lease.accountId).toBe("a"); + + // The second request in the same instant is NOT a second send at the failing account. + const withheld = resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed(threadId, config, start); + expect(withheld.status).toBe("withheld"); + if (withheld.status !== "withheld") throw new Error("unreachable"); + expect(withheld.accountId).toBe("a"); + // Strictly in the future: a refusal that answered `now` would busy-loop the caller into the + // same load it just declined, which is the defect L1 fixed in the resolver itself. + expect(withheld.retryAt).toBeGreaterThan(start); + // The binding is REMEMBERED, not released. "Cannot send right now" and "forget which + // account owns this conversation" are different answers. + expect(withheld.affinity).toMatchObject({ move: "held", reason: "transient" }); + + // The simple wrapper has nowhere to carry a retry time, so it fails closed rather than + // handing back the held account. + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThread(threadId, config, start)).toBeNull(); + + // Once the outage clears the thread is still on its own warm account: a refusal costs the + // conversation nothing, which is the whole point of holding the binding. + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThread(threadId, config, start + 6 * 60_000)).toBe("a"); + }); + + test("a usable sibling still wins over the trial", () => { + const config = makeThreeAccountConfig(); + const threadId = "detour-preferred-thread"; + updateAccountQuota("a", 10); + updateAccountQuota("b", 20); + updateAccountQuota("c", 30); + const start = Date.now(); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThread(threadId, config, start)).toBe("a"); + + // Only the bound account is failing, so a healthy sibling exists. + streakTransientFailures(config, "a", start); + + const detoured = resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed(threadId, config, start); + expect(detoured.status).toBe("selected"); + if (detoured.status !== "selected") throw new Error("unreachable"); + expect(detoured.accountId).not.toBe("a"); + expect(detoured.affinity).toMatchObject({ move: "detour", reason: "transient" }); + // A live request is never spent on the trial while something healthy can serve it, so no + // lease is taken and the recovery budget is untouched. + expect(detoured.transientProbe).toBeUndefined(); + expect(transientProbeDiagnostics("a", start).lastProbeAt).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("a quota refusal never becomes a transient trial, so no request pays two permits", () => { + const config = makeThreeAccountConfig(); + const threadId = "quota-domain-thread"; + updateAccountQuota("a", 10); + updateAccountQuota("b", 20); + updateAccountQuota("c", 30); + const start = Date.now(); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThread(threadId, config, start)).toBe("a"); + + // Transient evidence on every account would normally reach the held branch... + for (const id of ["a", "b", "c"]) streakTransientFailures(config, id, start); + // ...but a quota refusal outranks it. `isTransientOnlyAffinityBlock` refuses to recognise a + // transient hold on an account carrying quota health, which is why the quota-cooldown probe + // and this one can never both describe an account, and why nothing is charged twice. + recordCodexUpstreamOutcome(config, "a", 429, { now: start }); + + const resolved = resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed(threadId, config, start); + expect(resolved.status).not.toBe("withheld"); + expect(transientProbeDiagnostics("a", start).held).toBe(false); + expect(transientProbeDiagnostics("a", start).lastProbeAt).toBeUndefined(); + }); +}); + +describe("the trial is handed back on every path that does not send", () => { + test("releasing an auth context frees the account for the next trial", () => { + const now = 4_000_000; + const lease = tryAcquireTransientProbe("release-acct", now)!; + expect(lease.accountId).toBe("release-acct"); + // Held: nobody else may probe while the trial is out. + expect(canAcquireTransientProbe("release-acct", now + TRANSIENT_PROBE_INTERVAL_MS)).toBe(false); + + // This is the single function the ~30 existing "resolved a context, never sent" sites + // already call. Teaching it the second lease is what makes all of them correct at once. + releaseCodexAuthContextProbeLease({ + kind: "pool", + accountId: "release-acct", + writerGeneration: 0, + generation: 1, + accessToken: "token", + chatgptAccountId: "chatgpt-acct", + transientProbe: { lease, affinityGeneration: 1 }, + }); + + // Paced by the interval now, not stranded behind the lease deadline. + expect(canAcquireTransientProbe("release-acct", now + TRANSIENT_PROBE_INTERVAL_MS)).toBe(true); + }); + + test("an unreleased trial still cannot block recovery for longer than its deadline", () => { + const now = 5_000_000; + const lease = tryAcquireTransientProbe("leaked-acct", now)!; + expect(lease.accountId).toBe("leaked-acct"); + + // Nothing settles it and nothing releases it -- the request simply vanished. This is the + // worst case, and it is bounded by construction: a leaked lease delays the next trial, it + // can never cancel it. Permanent blockage would be strictly worse than the unlimited + // behaviour this change replaces, so the deadline is the floor under every release path. + expect(canAcquireTransientProbe("leaked-acct", now + TRANSIENT_PROBE_LEASE_MS - 1)).toBe(false); + expect(canAcquireTransientProbe("leaked-acct", now + TRANSIENT_PROBE_LEASE_MS)).toBe(true); + }); + + test("a settle for a credential the binding no longer has is burned, not applied", () => { + const now = 6_000_000; + // No stored credential exists for this id, so ANY captured generation is already dead -- + // the same shape as a credential replaced while its probe was in flight. + const lease = tryAcquireTransientProbe("rotated-acct", now)!; + const grantedGeneration = transientProbeDiagnostics("rotated-acct", now).generation; + + recordCodexUpstreamOutcome(makeThreeAccountConfig(), "rotated-acct", 200, { + transientProbe: { lease, affinityGeneration: 7 }, + now, + }); + + const after = transientProbeDiagnostics("rotated-acct", now); + // Not recorded as a recovery: the probe answered about an identity this binding lost. + expect(after.lastOutcome).toBeUndefined(); + // The epoch moved instead, which makes every outstanding lease on this account stale at + // once rather than waiting for each deadline. + expect(after.generation).toBeGreaterThan(grantedGeneration); + expect(after.held).toBe(false); + }); +}); + +describe("a withheld dispatch reaches the client as a bounded refusal", () => { + test("it answers 429 with Retry-After and never borrows the quota-cooldown wording", () => { + const now = 7_000_000; + const error = new CodexRecoveryWithheldError("acct-held", now + 30_000, "acct-detour"); + expect(error.detourAccountId).toBe("acct-detour"); + + const response = cooldownErrorResponse(error, now); + expect(response.status).toBe(429); + expect(response.headers.get("Retry-After")).toBe("30"); + + // Subclassing the cooldown error buys the transport mapping above. It must not also buy the + // quota advice: there is no cooldown to lift and no account to switch to, so following it + // would waste the operator's time on a fix for a different problem. + expect(cooldownErrorMessage(error)).toBe(error.message); + expect(error.message).not.toContain("cooling down"); + expect(error.message).not.toContain("clear-cooldown"); + expect(error.message).toContain("nothing was sent"); + }); +}); + +describe("the pool-wide window classifies one physical send", () => { + test("demand is counted, a retry is gated, and a probe is never charged twice", () => { + const now = 8_000_000; + const limiter = createPoolBackpressureLimiter({ + windowMs: 10_000, + maxRetryRatio: 0.2, + minRecoveryAllowance: 1, + }); + + // The denominator. Refusing a new request's first send would make this a throughput cap + // rather than a recovery bound. + expect(classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch("initial", now, limiter).admitted).toBe(true); + expect(limiter.state(now).initialSends).toBe(1); + expect(limiter.state(now).recoveryDispatches).toBe(0); + + // A probe already paid at selection, inside `resolveHeldAccountDispatch`. Charging it again + // here would bill one send twice and shrink the budget it was admitted from. + expect(classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch("probe", now, limiter).admitted).toBe(true); + expect(limiter.state(now).recoveryDispatches).toBe(0); + + // One recovery dispatch fits the allowance; the next does not. + expect(classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch("retry", now, limiter).admitted).toBe(true); + expect(limiter.state(now).recoveryDispatches).toBe(1); + + const refused = classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch("retry", now, limiter); + expect(refused.admitted).toBe(false); + // A refusal has to hand back a time, or the caller busy-loops against a pool that is + // already failing -- which is the load this window exists to remove. + expect(refused.retryAt).toBeGreaterThan(now); + expect(limiter.state(now).refusedTotal).toBe(1); + }); + + test("two independent requests draw on one window, not one allowance each", () => { + const now = 9_000_000; + const limiter = createPoolBackpressureLimiter({ + windowMs: 10_000, + maxRetryRatio: 0.2, + minRecoveryAllowance: 1, + }); + // Per-request budgets cannot see a storm: each request staying inside its own allowance + // still composes into an unbounded rate against one failing upstream. Distinct requests + // share this window by construction. + expect(classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch("retry", now, limiter).admitted).toBe(true); + expect(classifyPoolRecoveryDispatch("retry", now, limiter).admitted).toBe(false); + }); +}); From b6d9d0c38bfe58dc10eb1cb1119ce6d4108f3f88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: rrmlima <137737127+rrmlima@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 04:08:57 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 097/113] fix(codex): handle nested error object in token refresh and classify refresh_token_invalidated as revoked (#4737) Maintainer integration: exact-head hosted CI is green at 7d3c6bdb2b51a282657b7cf65745bac9cb6a71ea (Cross-platform CI 35044663972, React Doctor 35044663932). The branch merges cleanly onto current dev; a rebase would invalidate the green exact-head evidence without changing the touched contract. Host-owned merge decision; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- src/codex/account-store.ts | 21 ++++- .../codex-account-store.test.ts | 76 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/codex/account-store.ts b/src/codex/account-store.ts index ab32e137b5..feaec9f5c0 100644 --- a/src/codex/account-store.ts +++ b/src/codex/account-store.ts @@ -1182,9 +1182,20 @@ async function resolveCodexToken( let errDesc: string; let errCodeExact: string | undefined; try { - const parsed = JSON.parse(errText) as { error?: string; error_description?: string }; - errCodeExact = typeof parsed.error === "string" ? parsed.error.trim() : undefined; - errDesc = [parsed.error, parsed.error_description].filter(Boolean).join(": ") || `HTTP ${res.status}`; + const parsed = JSON.parse(errText) as { + error?: string | { code?: string; message?: string }; + error_description?: string; + }; + if (typeof parsed.error === "string") { + errCodeExact = parsed.error.trim(); + errDesc = [parsed.error, parsed.error_description].filter(Boolean).join(": "); + } else if (parsed.error && typeof parsed.error === "object") { + errCodeExact = typeof parsed.error.code === "string" ? parsed.error.code.trim() : undefined; + errDesc = [parsed.error.code, parsed.error.message, parsed.error_description].filter(Boolean).join(": "); + } else { + errDesc = parsed.error_description || `HTTP ${res.status}`; + } + if (!errDesc) errDesc = `HTTP ${res.status}`; } catch { errDesc = `HTTP ${res.status}`; } // `invalid_grant` is the standard OAuth code for a refresh token that is no longer // usable, and upstream sends it bare with no description. Without it here the dead @@ -1195,8 +1206,10 @@ async function resolveCodexToken( // `server_error` whose description happens to mention invalid_grant would otherwise // retire a healthy account, which is the failure this whole change exists to remove. const reason = errCodeExact === "invalid_grant" + || errCodeExact === "refresh_token_invalidated" || errDesc.includes("invalidated") || errDesc.includes("revoked") ? "revoked" as const - : errDesc.includes("expired") ? "expired" as const + : errCodeExact === "refresh_token_expired" + || errDesc.includes("expired") ? "expired" as const : "unknown" as const; throw new TokenRefreshError(reason, `Codex token refresh failed (${reason}); reauthenticate the account.`); } diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts index a71db9b875..f56bcf7014 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store.test.ts @@ -1374,6 +1374,82 @@ describe("codex-account-store CRUD", () => { } }); + test("nested error object with refresh_token_invalidated classifies as revoked", async () => { + const { forceRefreshCodexPoolToken, readCodexAccountRecord, saveCodexAccountCredential, TokenRefreshError } = + await import("../../src/codex/account-store"); + saveCodexAccountCredential("invalidated-grant", { + accessToken: "rejected", + refreshToken: "grant", + expiresAt: Date.now() + 3600_000, + chatgptAccountId: "acc", + }); + const generation = readCodexAccountRecord("invalidated-grant")!.generation; + const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch; + globalThis.fetch = (async () => + Response.json( + { + error: { + message: "Your session has ended. Please log in again.", + type: "invalid_request_error", + param: null, + code: "refresh_token_invalidated", + }, + }, + { status: 401 }, + )) as typeof fetch; + + try { + await forceRefreshCodexPoolToken("invalidated-grant", { + rejectedGeneration: generation, + rejectedAccessToken: "rejected", + }); + throw new Error("expected a TokenRefreshError"); + } catch (error) { + expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(TokenRefreshError); + expect((error as InstanceType).reason).toBe("revoked"); + } finally { + globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; + } + }); + + test("nested error object with refresh_token_expired classifies as expired", async () => { + const { forceRefreshCodexPoolToken, readCodexAccountRecord, saveCodexAccountCredential, TokenRefreshError } = + await import("../../src/codex/account-store"); + saveCodexAccountCredential("expired-grant", { + accessToken: "rejected", + refreshToken: "grant", + expiresAt: Date.now() + 3600_000, + chatgptAccountId: "acc", + }); + const generation = readCodexAccountRecord("expired-grant")!.generation; + const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch; + globalThis.fetch = (async () => + Response.json( + { + error: { + message: "The refresh token has expired.", + type: "invalid_request_error", + param: null, + code: "refresh_token_expired", + }, + }, + { status: 401 }, + )) as typeof fetch; + + try { + await forceRefreshCodexPoolToken("expired-grant", { + rejectedGeneration: generation, + rejectedAccessToken: "rejected", + }); + throw new Error("expected a TokenRefreshError"); + } catch (error) { + expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(TokenRefreshError); + expect((error as InstanceType).reason).toBe("expired"); + } finally { + globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; + } + }); + test("a replacement landing mid-refresh is not reported as this call's own lineage (#2887 review)", async () => { // `selfRefreshed` is what gates the affinity handoff. An external replacement must not // set it: that credential may be a different upstream identity, so inheriting the From ada3a9b1b5fdac1fd47dfede0bbab4ef3ca4c6aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 16:59:12 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 098/113] fix(responses): carry bare tool-name echo acceptance (#4729) (#4792) Maintainer integration of the carried #4729 implementation. Exact head 39d06495cd37cacdb685b844a31c9f168dcb6051 passed Cross-platform CI run 35070233415 and React Doctor 35070233385. The carry preserves original author attribution and includes the parser/layout contract fixes found by exact hosted CI. Host-owned rebase and merge; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 1 + src/server/responses/collaboration.ts | 50 +++++++ src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts | 11 +- tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 1 + tests/responses/bare-echo-alias.test.ts | 132 +++++++++++++++++++ tests/responses/responses-parser.test.ts | 7 +- 6 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/responses/bare-echo-alias.test.ts diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index 89d2a010e6..30bcc28b47 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ "autostart-health.test.ts": "service", "azure-adapter.test.ts": "providers", "azure-model-router-tool-schema.test.ts": "providers", + "bare-echo-alias.test.ts": "responses", "baseten-provider.test.ts": "providers", "bearer-admission-routed-provider.test.ts": "codex-integration", "bounded-body.test.ts": "server", diff --git a/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts b/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts index 60b6661936..0310417485 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts @@ -151,6 +151,38 @@ export function buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed: OcxParsedRequest, budget?: Translato dottedAliasOwners.set(t.name, null); } } + // Bare echo alias (`name` with no namespace spelling, #4679): some providers — observed + // on the muse family via Command Code — echo a namespaced tool by its bare name. The + // bare spelling is only a safe alias while it names ONE tool and cannot be read as + // another identity's canonical or dotted spelling. + // Code-mode helper spellings never gain a bare alias (#4679 review): admitting bare + // `exec` into the declared set would authorize the unrelated helper normalization that + // the CODE_MODE_EXEC exception exists to contain. + const BARE_ECHO_EXCLUDED_NAMES = new Set([ + "exec", "exec_command", "shell_command", "write_stdin", "apply_patch", "view_image", + ]); + const bareAliasOwners = new Map(); + for (const t of authorizedTools) { + // Bare (no-namespace) declarations participate as owners too: a namespaced tool whose + // bare name equals a bare-declared function must not gain the bare alias, mirroring how + // the tool_choice bare path refuses ambiguous owners across the whole request catalog. + const identity = JSON.stringify([t.namespace ?? null, t.name]); + const owner = bareAliasOwners.get(t.name); + if (owner === undefined) bareAliasOwners.set(t.name, identity); + else if (owner !== identity) bareAliasOwners.set(t.name, null); + } + for (const t of authorizedTools) { + const canonical = namespacedToolName(t.namespace, t.name); + const owner = bareAliasOwners.get(canonical); + if (owner !== undefined && owner !== JSON.stringify([t.namespace, t.name])) { + bareAliasOwners.set(canonical, null); + } + const dotted = dottedToolName(t.namespace, t.name); + const dottedOwner = bareAliasOwners.get(dotted); + if (dottedOwner !== undefined && dottedOwner !== JSON.stringify([t.namespace, t.name])) { + bareAliasOwners.set(dotted, null); + } + } for (const t of authorizedTools) { // Upstream output is untrusted: only restore calls for tools the caller authorized. const wireName = namespacedToolName(t.namespace, t.name); @@ -174,6 +206,24 @@ export function buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed: OcxParsedRequest, budget?: Translato toolNsMap.set(dottedName, { namespace: t.namespace, name: t.name, ...(t.freeform ? { freeform: true } : {}) }); if (t.parameters && typeof t.parameters === "object") toolParameterSchemas.set(dottedName, t.parameters); } + // Bare echo alias (`name` with no namespace spelling, #4679): same tool identity as + // the flattened wire name, so a provider that drops the namespace prefix still + // restores against this entry. Ambiguous bare names were resolved to null above; + // skipping them falls back to the spellings every provider can still echo. + // Code-mode helper spellings on the collaboration surface never gain a bare alias: + // admitting bare `exec` there would let normalizeDeclaredToolName authorize unrelated + // helper names. A namespaced custom `exec` from another catalog (for example + // `mcp__functions.exec`) remains an ordinary caller-declared tool. + if ( + bareAliasOwners.get(t.name) === JSON.stringify([t.namespace, t.name]) + && !(t.namespace === "collaboration" && BARE_ECHO_EXCLUDED_NAMES.has(t.name)) + ) { + budget?.chargeRetained(new TextEncoder().encode(t.name).byteLength, { kind: "retained_collectors" }); + declaredToolNames.add(t.name); + budget?.chargeRetained(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify([t.name, t.namespace, t.name])).byteLength, { kind: "retained_collectors" }); + toolNsMap.set(t.name, { namespace: t.namespace, name: t.name, ...(t.freeform ? { freeform: true } : {}) }); + if (t.parameters && typeof t.parameters === "object") toolParameterSchemas.set(t.name, t.parameters); + } } if (t.freeform) { budget?.chargeRetained(new TextEncoder().encode(t.name).byteLength, { kind: "retained_collectors" }); diff --git a/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts b/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts index 274946be98..65eb3512da 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts @@ -348,10 +348,13 @@ export async function preparePassthroughExchange( const declaredWireToolNames = new Set(); const declaredBareWireToolNames = new Set(); const declaredNamelessClientCallTypes = new Set(); - // `buildToolBridgeMaps` creates a bare alias only when the caller selected exactly one - // namespaced tool through a bare tool_choice. Restore that request-bounded identity before - // authorization checks instead of admitting the bare name into the declared set: for `exec`, - // the latter would also authorize the unrelated code-mode helper names. + // `buildToolBridgeMaps` adds each eligible bare alias to `declaredToolNames` and `toolNsMap` + // (one authorized identity claims the bare name). `refreshUndeclaredToolGuard` normally copies + // those entries into `declaredWireToolNames`, but passthrough restoration runs before the + // undeclared-tool guard, so restore that request-bounded identity here, before authorization + // checks. `exec` uses separate handling: its bridge alias is copied into the declared set only + // when the client itself declared bare `exec`, because otherwise code-mode normalization could + // authorize the unrelated code-mode helper names. const authorizedBareNamespaceToolAliases: RoutedNamespaceToolAliases = new Map( [...toolBridgeMaps.toolNsMap].flatMap(([alias, identity]) => alias === identity.name diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index 52d44eb91a..5553d5a7e1 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ "autostart-health.test.ts": "service", "azure-adapter.test.ts": "providers", "azure-model-router-tool-schema.test.ts": "providers", + "bare-echo-alias.test.ts": "responses", "baseten-provider.test.ts": "providers", "bearer-admission-routed-provider.test.ts": "codex-integration", "bounded-body.test.ts": "server", diff --git a/tests/responses/bare-echo-alias.test.ts b/tests/responses/bare-echo-alias.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bd5b477895 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/responses/bare-echo-alias.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { parseRequest } from "../../src/responses/parser"; +import { buildToolBridgeMaps } from "../../src/server/responses"; + +function collabRequest(bareName: string) { + return parseRequest({ + model: "meta/muse-spark-1.3-contributor", + input: [ + { type: "additional_tools", role: "developer", tools: [ + { type: "namespace", name: "collaboration", tools: [ + { type: "function", name: bareName, description: bareName, strict: false, parameters: { type: "object", properties: {}, required: [] } }, + ] }, + ] }, + { type: "message", role: "user", content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "run it" }] }, + ], + } as any); +} + +describe("bare echo alias for namespaced tools (#4679)", () => { + test("an unambiguous bare name is declared and restores to the namespaced identity", () => { + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(collabRequest("list_agents") as any); + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("list_agents")).toBe(true); + expect(maps.toolNsMap.get("list_agents")).toEqual({ namespace: "collaboration", name: "list_agents" }); + }); + + test("Code Mode helper names never gain a bare alias", () => { + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(collabRequest("exec") as any); // justified: parsed fixture matches the request wire shape + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("collaboration__exec")).toBe(true); + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("exec")).toBe(false); + expect(maps.toolNsMap.has("exec")).toBe(false); + }); + + test("a bare name claimed by two namespaces stays undeclared (no hijack)", () => { + const parsed = parseRequest({ + model: "meta/muse-spark-1.3-contributor", + input: [ + { type: "additional_tools", role: "developer", tools: [ + { type: "namespace", name: "collaboration", tools: [ + { type: "function", name: "list_agents", description: "a", strict: false, parameters: { type: "object", properties: {}, required: [] } }, + ] }, + { type: "namespace", name: "other__ns", tools: [ + { type: "function", name: "list_agents", description: "b", strict: false, parameters: { type: "object", properties: {}, required: [] } }, + ] }, + ] }, + { type: "message", role: "user", content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "run it" }] }, + ], + } as any); + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed as any); + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("list_agents")).toBe(false); + expect(maps.toolNsMap.has("list_agents")).toBe(false); + // Both canonical spellings remain declared. + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("collaboration__list_agents")).toBe(true); + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("other__ns__list_agents")).toBe(true); + }); + + test("a bare name that equals another tool's dotted spelling stays undeclared", () => { + const parsed = parseRequest({ + model: "meta/muse-spark-1.3-contributor", + input: [ + { type: "additional_tools", role: "developer", tools: [ + { type: "namespace", name: "collaboration", tools: [ + { type: "function", name: "list_agents", description: "a", strict: false, parameters: { type: "object", properties: {}, required: [] } }, + ] }, + { type: "namespace", name: "mcp__x", tools: [ + { type: "function", name: "collaboration.list_agents", description: "b", strict: false, parameters: { type: "object", properties: {}, required: [] } }, + ] }, + ] }, + { type: "message", role: "user", content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "run it" }] }, + ], + } as any); + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed as any); + // Tool B's bare name ("collaboration.list_agents") collides with tool A's dotted + // spelling, so that bare alias is poisoned; tool A's dotted spelling is poisoned in + // return by the pre-existing dotted rule. Tool B's own distinct dotted alias does not + // collide with anything and stays declared, as do both canonical spellings. + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("collaboration.list_agents")).toBe(false); + expect(maps.toolNsMap.has("collaboration.list_agents")).toBe(false); + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("mcp__x.collaboration.list_agents")).toBe(true); + expect(maps.toolNsMap.get("mcp__x.collaboration.list_agents")).toEqual({ namespace: "mcp__x", name: "collaboration.list_agents" }); + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("collaboration__list_agents")).toBe(true); + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("mcp__x__collaboration.list_agents")).toBe(true); + }); + + test("a bare name that equals another tool's canonical spelling stays undeclared", () => { + const parsed = parseRequest({ + model: "meta/muse-spark-1.3-contributor", + input: [ + { type: "additional_tools", role: "developer", tools: [ + { type: "namespace", name: "collaboration", tools: [ + { type: "function", name: "list_agents", description: "a", strict: false, parameters: { type: "object", properties: {}, required: [] } }, + ] }, + { type: "namespace", name: "mcp__x", tools: [ + { type: "function", name: "collaboration__list_agents", description: "b", strict: false, parameters: { type: "object", properties: {}, required: [] } }, + ] }, + ] }, + { type: "message", role: "user", content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "run it" }] }, + ], + } as any); + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed as any); + // Tool B's bare name ("collaboration__list_agents") is also tool A's declared canonical + // spelling, so the bare alias is poisoned. The canonical spelling stays declared — but as + // tool A's wire name, never as an alias of tool B — so assert the identity via toolNsMap. + // Tool B's canonical and dotted spellings remain declared. + expect(maps.toolNsMap.get("collaboration__list_agents")).toEqual({ namespace: "collaboration", name: "list_agents" }); + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("mcp__x__collaboration__list_agents")).toBe(true); + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("mcp__x.collaboration__list_agents")).toBe(true); + expect(maps.toolNsMap.get("mcp__x.collaboration__list_agents")).toEqual({ namespace: "mcp__x", name: "collaboration__list_agents" }); + }); + + test("a bare-declared function owns its name and blocks the namespaced tool's bare alias", () => { + const parsed = parseRequest({ + model: "meta/muse-spark-1.3-contributor", + input: [ + { type: "additional_tools", role: "developer", tools: [ + { type: "namespace", name: "collaboration", tools: [ + { type: "function", name: "list_agents", description: "a", strict: false, parameters: { type: "object", properties: {}, required: [] } }, + ] }, + { type: "function", name: "list_agents", description: "b", strict: false, parameters: { type: "object", properties: {}, required: [] } }, + ] }, + { type: "message", role: "user", content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "run it" }] }, + ], + } as any); + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed as any); + // The bare-declared (no-namespace) function participates as an owner of "list_agents", + // mirroring the tool_choice bare path's whole-catalog counting, so the namespaced tool + // must not gain it as an echo alias. "list_agents" stays in declaredToolNames because the + // bare function's own wire name IS that spelling; the alias check is toolNsMap, which + // must never map the bare name to the namespaced identity. + expect(maps.toolNsMap.has("list_agents")).toBe(false); + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("collaboration__list_agents")).toBe(true); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-parser.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-parser.test.ts index 12ad3d9082..b42e286c8d 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-parser.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-parser.test.ts @@ -193,15 +193,16 @@ describe("Responses parser", () => { expect([...maps.toolNsMap]).toEqual([ ["mcp__tools__safe", { namespace: "mcp__tools", name: "safe" }], ["mcp__tools.safe", { namespace: "mcp__tools", name: "safe" }], + ["safe", { namespace: "mcp__tools", name: "safe" }], ]); - expect([...maps.declaredToolNames]).toEqual(["mcp__tools__safe", "mcp__tools.safe", "apply_patch"]); + expect([...maps.declaredToolNames]).toEqual(["mcp__tools__safe", "mcp__tools.safe", "safe", "apply_patch"]); expect([...maps.freeformToolNames]).toEqual(["apply_patch"]); expect([...maps.toolSearchToolNames]).toEqual([]); parsed.options.toolChoice = { allowedTools: ["mcp__tools__safe"], mode: "required" }; maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed); - expect([...maps.toolNsMap.keys()]).toEqual(["mcp__tools__safe", "mcp__tools.safe"]); - expect([...maps.declaredToolNames]).toEqual(["mcp__tools__safe", "mcp__tools.safe"]); + expect([...maps.toolNsMap.keys()]).toEqual(["mcp__tools__safe", "mcp__tools.safe", "safe"]); + expect([...maps.declaredToolNames]).toEqual(["mcp__tools__safe", "mcp__tools.safe", "safe"]); expect([...maps.freeformToolNames]).toEqual([]); parsed.options.toolChoice = { name: "tool_search" }; From 0ae7e91d750de77c559e13460aec9471143d0334 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 19:29:55 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 099/113] fix(gui): keep sidebar version badges fully readable (#4738) Maintainer integration for the 2.57.0 stabilization scope. Exact head 4f4cceaf781848ce2de1cbe84a58ce395f3557ff has a green aggregate ci check with no failing job. The change is 18 lines of CSS plus an opt-in browser regression harness; no default is altered and no src runtime path is touched. Host-owned merge decision; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- gui/README.md | 29 +++++ gui/package.json | 3 +- gui/src/main.tsx | 1 + gui/src/styles/sidebar-brand.css | 18 +++ gui/tests/sidebar-version-browser.ts | 140 +++++++++++++++++++++++ gui/tests/sidebar-version-layout.test.ts | 51 +++++++++ 6 files changed, 241 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 gui/src/styles/sidebar-brand.css create mode 100644 gui/tests/sidebar-version-browser.ts create mode 100644 gui/tests/sidebar-version-layout.test.ts diff --git a/gui/README.md b/gui/README.md index 10b2209168..e55b038fb6 100644 --- a/gui/README.md +++ b/gui/README.md @@ -52,3 +52,32 @@ bun run setup:hooks # pre-push runs doctor when gui/ changed | **React Doctor** (`bun run doctor`) | Gating React health check pinned to react-doctor 0.9.11 (`blocking: warning`). Pre-push runs it only if `gui/` changed and fails the push on findings. The CI workflow fails the job on any finding | Fix ESLint errors first. Use `doctor` / `doctor:full` for deeper React triage. + +## Sidebar version browser regression + +```bash +cd gui +bun run build +bun run test:sidebar-version +``` + +This opt-in check uses an installed Chrome/Chromium through its local DevTools +protocol, with no Playwright dependency or automatic browser download. Set +`CHROME_BIN` to the executable when it is not on PATH (including macOS/Windows). +It fails with an actionable error when the browser or production build is missing; +it does not silently skip assertions. + +The offline fixture uses the production CSS bundle and App header markup, not +copied CSS rules. Across 128 combinations of light/dark theme, eight viewport +widths, four release/prerelease/build strings and two font sizes, it verifies full +text visibility, containment, short release text staying on one line, and +no intersection with the mobile drawer close button. A short badge stays beside +the product name whenever the measured row budget allows it; larger OS font +fallbacks may move the complete badge below the name rather than clip it. Results and a screenshot are +written to `.tmp/sidebar-version-browser/`; pass an output directory after the +command to change it. No management API, proxy credentials, or live providers are +used. + +Chrome's sandbox stays enabled by default. `CHROME_NO_SANDBOX=1` is an explicit +opt-in only for an already-isolated root test container that cannot run Chrome's +sandbox; it is not needed or recommended on a normal workstation. diff --git a/gui/package.json b/gui/package.json index cd3d1b35d9..cd9d7fcf91 100644 --- a/gui/package.json +++ b/gui/package.json @@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ "lint:i18n": "oxlint src/pages src/components src/App.tsx src/main.tsx src/ui.tsx src/provider-workspace-data.ts", "doctor": "npx --yes react-doctor@0.9.11 --verbose --scope changed --base origin/main --no-telemetry", "doctor:full": "npx --yes react-doctor@0.9.11 --verbose --scope full --no-telemetry", - "preview": "vite preview" + "preview": "vite preview", + "test:sidebar-version": "bun tests/sidebar-version-browser.ts" }, "dependencies": { "@tanstack/react-virtual": "^3.14.9", diff --git a/gui/src/main.tsx b/gui/src/main.tsx index 2f3c68dd2c..30dbc41a1b 100644 --- a/gui/src/main.tsx +++ b/gui/src/main.tsx @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import App from "./App"; import { LanguageProvider } from "./i18n/provider"; import "./styles.css"; import "./styles/usage-chart-accessibility.css"; +import "./styles/sidebar-brand.css"; ReactDOM.createRoot(document.getElementById("root")!).render( diff --git a/gui/src/styles/sidebar-brand.css b/gui/src/styles/sidebar-brand.css new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f5ff00bce5 --- /dev/null +++ b/gui/src/styles/sidebar-brand.css @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/* The sidebar is also the mobile drawer's full-version fallback. Keep its badge + readable instead of applying the compact topbar's ellipsis policy here. + A smaller column gap fits release versions without widening the rail; longer + versions move to another line, and very long build ids wrap within the badge. */ +.drawer-head .brand { + flex-wrap: wrap; + column-gap: var(--space-1-5); + row-gap: var(--space-1); +} + +.drawer-head .brand .ver { + flex: 0 0 auto; + max-width: 100%; + overflow: visible; + text-overflow: clip; + white-space: normal; + overflow-wrap: anywhere; +} diff --git a/gui/tests/sidebar-version-browser.ts b/gui/tests/sidebar-version-browser.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..59e4b01c43 --- /dev/null +++ b/gui/tests/sidebar-version-browser.ts @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/** Built-CSS geometry regression. Run after `bun run build` with CHROME_BIN set + * when Chrome/Chromium is not on PATH. No browser package or downloads required. + * The fixture uses the real bundled stylesheet and the App drawer/topbar markup; + * it intentionally does not connect to a user's proxy or credentials. */ +import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm, mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; +import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; +import { join, resolve, sep } from "node:path"; + +const gui = resolve(import.meta.dir, ".."); +const dist = join(gui, "dist"); +const output = resolve(process.argv[2] ?? join(gui, ".tmp/sidebar-version-browser")); +const chrome = process.env.CHROME_BIN || ["chromium", "chromium-browser", "google-chrome", "chrome"] + .map(name => Bun.which(name)).find(Boolean); +if (!chrome) throw new Error("Set CHROME_BIN to Chrome/Chromium, then run bun run test:sidebar-version."); +const index = await readFile(join(dist, "index.html"), "utf8"); +const cssPath = index.match(/]*href="([^"]+\.css)"/)?.[1]; +if (!cssPath) throw new Error("Build the GUI first: bun run build."); +const cssFile = resolve(dist, cssPath.replace(/^\/+/, "")); +if (!cssFile.startsWith(`${dist}${sep}`)) throw new Error("Built CSS must stay inside gui/dist."); +const css = await readFile(cssFile, "utf8"); +const logo = `data:image/png;base64,${(await readFile(join(dist, "logo.png"))).toString("base64")}`; +const brand = ``; +const html = `
${brand}
`; +const profile = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-sidebar-chrome-")); +const browser = Bun.spawn([chrome, "--headless", "--disable-gpu", "--disable-background-networking", + "--no-first-run", "--no-default-browser-check", "--remote-debugging-address=127.0.0.1", + "--remote-debugging-port=0", `--user-data-dir=${profile}`, + ...(process.env.CHROME_NO_SANDBOX === "1" ? ["--no-sandbox"] : []), "about:blank"], +{ stdout: "ignore", stderr: "ignore" }); +let socket: WebSocket | undefined; +const delay = (ms: number) => new Promise(done => setTimeout(done, ms)); +try { + let debugPort = ""; + const deadline = Date.now() + 10_000; + while (!debugPort && Date.now() < deadline) { + try { debugPort = (await readFile(join(profile, "DevToolsActivePort"), "utf8")).split("\n")[0]; } + catch { await delay(50); } + } + if (!/^\d+$/.test(debugPort)) throw new Error("Chrome did not expose its local debugging port within 10 seconds."); + const response = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${debugPort}/json/new?about:blank`, { method: "PUT", signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5_000) }); + if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`Cannot create browser target: ${response.status}`); + const target = await response.json() as { webSocketDebuggerUrl: string }; + socket = new WebSocket(target.webSocketDebuggerUrl); + const ws = socket; + await new Promise((done, fail) => { + const timer = setTimeout(() => fail(new Error("CDP connection timed out")), 5_000); + ws.addEventListener("open", () => { clearTimeout(timer); done(); }, { once: true }); + ws.addEventListener("error", () => { clearTimeout(timer); fail(new Error("CDP connection failed")); }, { once: true }); + }); + let id = 0; + const pending = new Map void; reject: (reason: Error) => void }>(); + ws.addEventListener("message", event => { + const message = JSON.parse(String(event.data)) as { id?: number; result?: unknown; error?: { message: string } }; + if (message.id === undefined) return; + const call = pending.get(message.id); + if (!call) return; + pending.delete(message.id); + if (message.error) call.reject(new Error(message.error.message)); else call.resolve(message.result); + }); + function cdp(method: string, params: Record = {}): Promise { + return new Promise((done, fail) => { + const next = ++id; + const timer = setTimeout(() => { pending.delete(next); fail(new Error(`CDP timeout: ${method}`)); }, 5_000); + pending.set(next, { resolve: value => { clearTimeout(timer); done(value as T); }, reject: error => { clearTimeout(timer); fail(error); } }); + ws.send(JSON.stringify({ id: next, method, params })); + }); + } + async function evaluate(expression: string): Promise { + const result = await cdp<{ result: { value: T }; exceptionDetails?: unknown }>("Runtime.evaluate", { expression, returnByValue: true, awaitPromise: true }); + if (result.exceptionDetails) throw new Error(`Browser evaluation failed: ${JSON.stringify(result.exceptionDetails)}`); + return result.result.value; + } + await cdp("Page.enable"); + // Offline document: no proxy, management API, external assets or browser navigation. + const { frameTree } = await cdp<{ frameTree: { frame: { id: string } } }>("Page.getFrameTree"); + await cdp("Page.setDocumentContent", { frameId: frameTree.frame.id, html }); + for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 100; attempt++) { + if (await evaluate('document.readyState === "complete" && !!document.querySelector(".drawer-head .ver")')) break; + if (attempt === 99) throw new Error(`Built-CSS fixture did not finish loading: ${await evaluate('JSON.stringify({url:location.href,state:document.readyState,html:document.body?.innerHTML.slice(0,500)})')}`); + await delay(25); + } + const cases: unknown[] = []; + const versions = ["2.56.0", "2.57.0", "2.56.0-beta.1", `2.56.0-preview.20260916+${"a".repeat(64)}`]; + await mkdir(output, { recursive: true }); + for (const theme of ["light", "dark"]) for (const width of [320, 360, 375, 414, 760, 761, 1024, 1920]) { + await cdp("Emulation.setDeviceMetricsOverride", { width, height: 800, deviceScaleFactor: 1, mobile: false }); + for (const version of versions) for (const wideFont of [false, true]) { + await evaluate(`(() => { + document.documentElement.dataset.theme = ${JSON.stringify(theme)}; + document.documentElement.style.setProperty("--text-subtitle", ${JSON.stringify(wideFont ? "18px" : "16px")}); + document.querySelectorAll(".ver").forEach(el => { el.textContent = ${JSON.stringify(`v${version}`)}; }); + })()`); + const geometry = await evaluate<{ ok: boolean; [key: string]: unknown }>(`(() => { + const box = el => { const r = el.getBoundingClientRect(); return { left:r.left, right:r.right, top:r.top, bottom:r.bottom, width:r.width, height:r.height }; }; + const brand = document.querySelector(".drawer-head .brand"); + const badge = brand.querySelector(".ver"); + const close = document.querySelector(".drawer-close"); + const b=box(badge), h=box(brand), c=box(close), n=box(brand.querySelector(".name")); + const range = document.createRange(); range.selectNodeContents(badge); + const text = [...range.getClientRects()].map(r => ({left:r.left,right:r.right,top:r.top,bottom:r.bottom})); + const visible = b.width > 0 && b.height > 0 && text.length > 0; + const bounded = b.left >= h.left - .5 && b.right <= h.right + .5; + const complete = badge.scrollWidth <= badge.clientWidth + 1 && text.every(r => r.left >= b.left - .5 && r.right <= b.right + .5 && r.top >= b.top - .5 && r.bottom <= b.bottom + .5); + const overlapsClose = c.width > 0 && b.left < c.right && b.right > c.left && b.top < c.bottom && b.bottom > c.top; + const style = getComputedStyle(badge); + const shortRelease = /^v\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+$/.test(badge.textContent); + const headerStyle = getComputedStyle(brand); + const logo = box(brand.querySelector(".brand-logo")); + const contentWidth = h.width - parseFloat(headerStyle.paddingLeft) - parseFloat(headerStyle.paddingRight); + const requiredWidth = logo.width + n.width + b.width + 2 * parseFloat(headerStyle.columnGap); + // Font fallbacks differ by OS. Wrapping the whole badge when the row is + // genuinely full is intended; clipping its text or splitting a short + // version is not. Require the same row only when all three items fit. + const singleLine = !shortRelease || text.length === 1; + const rowFits = requiredWidth <= contentWidth + .5; + const sameRowWhenPossible = !shortRelease || !rowFits || (b.top < n.bottom && b.bottom > n.top); + return { ok: visible && bounded && complete && !overlapsClose && singleLine && sameRowWhenPossible, badge:b, brand:h, name:n, close:c, text, overlapsClose, bounded, complete, singleLine, sameRowWhenPossible, rowFits, requiredWidth, contentWidth, font:headerStyle.fontFamily, overflow:style.textOverflow, value:badge.textContent }; + })()`); + const row = { theme, width, version, wideFont, ...geometry }; + cases.push(row); + if (!geometry.ok) { + await writeFile(join(output, "failure.json"), JSON.stringify(row, null, 2)); + throw new Error(`Sidebar geometry regression: ${JSON.stringify(row)}`); + } + if (theme === "dark" && width === 1024 && version === "2.56.0" && wideFont) { + const image = await cdp<{ data: string }>("Page.captureScreenshot", { format: "png", clip: { x:0, y:0, width:232, height:110, scale:1 } }); + await writeFile(join(output, "sidebar-built-css.png"), Buffer.from(image.data, "base64")); + } + } + } + const version = await cdp("Browser.getVersion"); + await writeFile(join(output, "results.json"), JSON.stringify({ scope: "Real Chromium geometry with built production CSS; isolated App header markup, no live proxy", browser: version, cssPath, cssSha256: new Bun.CryptoHasher("sha256").update(css).digest("hex"), cases }, null, 2)); + console.log(`PASS: ${cases.length} built-CSS browser cases; full version visible, badge bounded, no drawer-close overlap.`); +} finally { + socket?.close(); + browser.kill(); + await Promise.race([browser.exited, delay(2_000)]); + if (browser.exitCode === null) { browser.kill("SIGKILL"); await browser.exited; } + await rm(profile, { recursive: true, force: true }); +} diff --git a/gui/tests/sidebar-version-layout.test.ts b/gui/tests/sidebar-version-layout.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6be645179e --- /dev/null +++ b/gui/tests/sidebar-version-layout.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +import { expect, test } from "bun:test"; + +const css = await Bun.file(new URL("../src/styles/sidebar-brand.css", import.meta.url)).text(); +const entry = await Bun.file(new URL("../src/main.tsx", import.meta.url)).text(); + +function block(selector: string): string { + const start = css.indexOf(`${selector} {`); + if (start < 0) throw new Error(`selector not found: ${selector}`); + return css.slice(start, css.indexOf("}", start)); +} + +// These source guards complement browser geometry checks: merely removing the +// ellipsis lets a long version paint over the drawer close control. The header +// must wrap the badge, and the badge must also bound unbroken build identifiers. +test("the sidebar brand rules are loaded after the shared stylesheet", () => { + const shared = entry.indexOf('import "./styles.css";'); + const sidebar = entry.indexOf('import "./styles/sidebar-brand.css";'); + expect(shared).toBeGreaterThan(-1); + expect(sidebar).toBeGreaterThan(shared); + expect(entry.match(/import "\.\/styles\/sidebar-brand\.css";/g)).toHaveLength(1); +}); + +test("the sidebar header wraps versions rather than squeezing the badge", () => { + const brand = block(".drawer-head .brand"); + expect(brand).toContain("flex-wrap: wrap"); + expect(brand).toContain("column-gap: var(--space-1-5)"); + expect(brand).toContain("row-gap: var(--space-1)"); + expect(block(".drawer-head .brand .ver")).toContain("flex: 0 0 auto"); +}); + +test("long prerelease and unbroken build identifiers stay inside the header", () => { + const badge = block(".drawer-head .brand .ver"); + expect(badge).toContain("max-width: 100%"); + expect(badge).toContain("white-space: normal"); + expect(badge).toContain("overflow-wrap: anywhere"); +}); + +test("the full-version fallback does not hide or ellipsize its text", () => { + const badge = block(".drawer-head .brand .ver"); + expect(badge).toContain("overflow: visible"); + expect(badge).toContain("text-overflow: clip"); + expect(badge).not.toContain("overflow: hidden"); + expect(badge).not.toContain("text-overflow: ellipsis"); + expect(badge).not.toContain("white-space: nowrap"); +}); + +test("the fix stays scoped to the drawer and leaves compact topbar policies intact", () => { + const selectors = [...css.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "").matchAll(/([^{}]+)\{/g)] + .map(match => match[1].trim()); + expect(selectors).toEqual([".drawer-head .brand", ".drawer-head .brand .ver"]); +}); From 7849b774f5e3fe790290877651c625c17c0e5292 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luvs01 Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 19:35:56 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 100/113] fix(responses): bound terminal guard content retention (#4739) Maintainer integration for the 2.57.0 stabilization scope. Exact head a28a7ef9348367d24cf767615ea25f8b25357cfe has a green aggregate ci check with no failing job. The retained event set is exactly what the consumers read, overflow drops only the replay record while content, terminal reason and usage still pass through, and preserving usage from completed legs when the continuation factory throws is a real fix. The accepted cost is recorded: on overflow a thinking-heavy turn loses the guard nudge rather than losing output. Host-owned merge decision; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- src/server/responses/terminal-guard.ts | 69 ++++- structure/transports/byte-accounting.md | 24 ++ tests/server/terminal-guard.test.ts | 354 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 443 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/server/responses/terminal-guard.ts b/src/server/responses/terminal-guard.ts index dffe315609..aa4a870645 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/terminal-guard.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/terminal-guard.ts @@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ const PLAN_OR_COMPLETION_RE = /(?:\b(?:i(?:'|’)m going to|i will|i(?:'|’)ll| const WAITING_FOR_USER_RE = /(?:[?？]\s*$|需要我|请(?:确认|选择|提供)|是否|要不要|可以吗|\b(?:do you want|should i|which file|please confirm|please provide)\b)/iu; const EXPLICIT_CONTINUE_RE = /^(?:继续|接着|往下|go on|continue|proceed|keep going)\s*[.!。！]?$/iu; const MAX_ANNOUNCEMENT_CHARS = 280; +const MAX_RETAINED_EVENTS = 1_024; +// JavaScript string code units, not UTF-8 bytes or a process-wide memory limit. +const MAX_RETAINED_CONTENT_CHARS = 64 * 1_024; export const TERMINAL_GUARD_NUDGE = "你刚才只描述了计划，没有执行任何工具。不要再次解释计划，现在立即调用必要工具执行用户任务。" + @@ -195,7 +198,17 @@ function mergeUsage(first: OcxUsage | undefined, second: OcxUsage | undefined): }; } -/** Preserve normal terminals, but withhold one suspicious no-tool terminal for a bounded re-ask. */ +/** + * Forward adapter events and re-ask only short, suspicious no-tool completions. + * Retention is bounded per turn; tools or overflow disable analysis without truncating output. + * Reported usage from completed legs survives a continuation-factory failure. Unreported + * usage stays absent, and source-iteration failures propagate to the caller's transport handler. + * + * @param options Initial stream, parsed history, and continuation callback. The caller owns + * provider opt-in; the continuation limit defaults to one and is clamped to at most two. + * @yields Unchanged content events, internal assistant boundaries, and terminal events with + * accumulated reported usage when available. Returning the iterator closes its active source. + */ export async function* guardTerminalEventStream(options: GuardedEventStreamOptions): AsyncGenerator { const maxContinuations = Math.max(0, Math.min(2, Math.floor(options.maxAutoContinuations ?? 1))); let parsed = options.parsed; @@ -205,6 +218,10 @@ export async function* guardTerminalEventStream(options: GuardedEventStreamOptio while (true) { const seen: AdapterEvent[] = []; + let retainedContentChars = 0; + let retainedText = ""; + let analysisEnabled = (options.adapterName === "anthropic" || options.adapterName === "openai-chat") + && continuations < maxContinuations; let terminalSeen = false; for await (const event of source) { // Liveness markers and tool argument fragments are passed through to the bridge, but @@ -216,7 +233,7 @@ export async function* guardTerminalEventStream(options: GuardedEventStreamOptio } if (event.type === "done") { terminalSeen = true; - const analysis = (options.adapterName === "anthropic" || options.adapterName === "openai-chat") + const analysis = analysisEnabled ? analyzeTerminalTurn(parsed, seen) : { decision: "pass" as const }; const normalStop = event.stopReason !== "max_tokens" && event.stopReason !== "content_filter"; @@ -224,11 +241,17 @@ export async function* guardTerminalEventStream(options: GuardedEventStreamOptio accumulatedUsage = mergeUsage(accumulatedUsage, event.usage); continuations += 1; parsed = buildContinuationRequest(parsed, seen); + seen.length = 0; + retainedText = ""; yield { type: "assistant_boundary" }; try { source = await options.continuation(parsed); } catch (error) { - yield { type: "error", message: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error) }; + yield { + type: "error", + message: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error), + ...(accumulatedUsage ? { usage: accumulatedUsage } : {}), + }; return; } break; @@ -243,7 +266,45 @@ export async function* guardTerminalEventStream(options: GuardedEventStreamOptio yield usage ? { ...event, usage } : event; return; } - seen.push(event); + if (analysisEnabled) { + if (event.type === "tool_call_start") { + // A real tool call permanently rules out a no-tool continuation for this turn. + analysisEnabled = false; + } else if ( + event.type === "text_delta" + || event.type === "thinking_delta" + || event.type === "thinking_signature" + || event.type === "redacted_thinking" + ) { + const content = event.type === "text_delta" + ? event.text + : event.type === "thinking_delta" + ? event.thinking + : event.type === "thinking_signature" + ? event.signature + : event.data; + if ( + seen.length >= MAX_RETAINED_EVENTS + || content.length > MAX_RETAINED_CONTENT_CHARS - retainedContentChars + ) { + analysisEnabled = false; + } else { + retainedContentChars += content.length; + if (event.type === "text_delta") retainedText += content; + // Match analyzeTerminalTurn's trimmed-text semantics, including split padding. + if (retainedText.trim().length > MAX_ANNOUNCEMENT_CHARS) { + analysisEnabled = false; + } else { + seen.push(event); + } + } + } + if (!analysisEnabled) { + // Never rebuild a continuation from truncated thinking or a partial turn. + seen.length = 0; + retainedText = ""; + } + } yield event; } if (!terminalSeen) return; diff --git a/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md b/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md index b9b3980bf9..738120ae1a 100644 --- a/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md +++ b/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md @@ -41,3 +41,27 @@ Translated audio/file admission follows the [final-adapter input contract](../ad Canonical Responses identity sanitation and narrowly scoped pre-output combo recovery follow [request-local target compatibility](../runtime.md#request-local-target-compatibility); other adapter contracts remain unchanged. Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. + +## Terminal-continuation retention + +`src/server/responses/terminal-guard.ts` retains at most 1,024 text/thinking/signature/redacted +content events and 65,536 aggregate JavaScript string code units per guarded turn. These are +semantic-retention limits, not UTF-8 byte accounting or a process-wide memory cap. Heartbeats, +tool-argument fragments, and events unused by continuation analysis/rebuilding pass through +without being retained or spending that allowance. + +A real tool start, a limit overflow, or text exceeding 280 characters after trimming disables +analysis for the rest of the turn and clears the retained history. Overflow never produces a +continuation from truncated reasoning. Consumer events, terminal reasons, and usage still pass +through unchanged except for existing cross-continuation usage aggregation. Each permitted +continuation has fresh counters; unsupported adapters and exhausted continuation allowances +retain no content. Anthropic behavior and the caller's OpenAI Chat opt-in gate remain scoped as +before. `tests/server/terminal-guard.test.ts` covers inclusive limits, split whitespace, passthrough, +reasoning replay, analysis shutdown, usage aggregation, and unsuccessful or absent terminals. + +If creating a continuation throws or rejects, its error event carries usage already reported by +completed legs. Unknown usage stays absent rather than becoming a measured zero. This does not +invent usage for an unreported failed send, retry a failed factory, or turn failure into success. +Source-iteration exceptions still propagate to the caller. Returning the guard iterator closes +its active source; cancellation at an assistant boundary does not start the continuation callback. +The same focused tests cover these lifecycle paths and Unicode code-unit limit boundaries. diff --git a/tests/server/terminal-guard.test.ts b/tests/server/terminal-guard.test.ts index c8d60d1ce6..61234f80a2 100644 --- a/tests/server/terminal-guard.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/terminal-guard.test.ts @@ -361,3 +361,357 @@ describe("terminal guard", () => { expect((response.output as { type: string }[]).map(item => item.type)).toEqual(["message", "function_call"]); }); }); + +describe("terminal guard bounded retention", () => { + const announcement: AdapterEvent = { type: "text_delta", text: "Let me check." }; + const done: AdapterEvent = { type: "done", usage: { inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 2 } }; + const contentLimit = 64 * 1_024; + + /** + * Collect one guarded fixture and the continuation requests it actually makes. + * @param events Adapter events supplied in their original order. + * @param adapterName Adapter whose existing guard policy is exercised. + * @param maxAutoContinuations Allowed internal re-asks for this fixture. + * @returns Forwarded events and captured requests, without mutating the input events. + */ + async function run(events: AdapterEvent[], adapterName: string, maxAutoContinuations = 1) { + const actual: AdapterEvent[] = []; + const requests: OcxParsedRequest[] = []; + for await (const event of guardTerminalEventStream({ + parsed: parsed("Check and fix this code"), + adapterName, + maxAutoContinuations, + firstEvents: (async function* () { yield* events; })(), + continuation: next => { + requests.push(next); + return (async function* (): AsyncGenerator { + yield { type: "done", usage: { inputTokens: 20, outputTokens: 3 } }; + })(); + }, + })) actual.push(event); + return { actual, requests }; + } + + for (const adapterName of ["anthropic", "openai-chat"]) { + describe(adapterName, () => { + for (const count of [1_024, 1_025]) { + test(`retained event count ${count} respects the inclusive limit`, async () => { + const events: AdapterEvent[] = [announcement]; + for (let i = 1; i < count; i += 1) events.push({ type: "text_delta", text: "" }); + events.push(done); + const { actual, requests } = await run(events, adapterName); + expect(requests).toHaveLength(count === 1_024 ? 1 : 0); + // Each input content event reaches the consumer unchanged, even beyond the cap. + for (let i = 0; i < count; i += 1) expect(actual[i]).toBe(events[i]); + expect(actual.filter(event => event.type === "done")).toHaveLength(1); + }); + } + + const reasoningEvents: Array<[string, (content: string) => AdapterEvent]> = [ + ["thinking", thinking => ({ type: "thinking_delta", thinking })], + ["signature", signature => ({ type: "thinking_signature", signature })], + ["redacted", data => ({ type: "redacted_thinking", data })], + ]; + for (const [name, makeEvent] of reasoningEvents) { + for (const extra of [0, 1]) { + test(`${name} content limit plus ${extra} never replays a truncated prefix`, async () => { + const payload = makeEvent("x".repeat(contentLimit - "Let me check.".length + extra)); + const { actual, requests } = await run([announcement, payload, done], adapterName); + expect(requests).toHaveLength(extra === 0 ? 1 : 0); + expect(actual[0]).toBe(announcement); + expect(actual[1]).toBe(payload); + expect(actual.at(-1)).toMatchObject({ + type: "done", usage: extra === 0 + ? { inputTokens: 30, outputTokens: 5, totalTokens: 35 } + : { inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 2 }, + }); + }); + } + } + + test("content accounting adds different reasoning kinds together", async () => { + const { actual, requests } = await run([ + announcement, + { type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "x".repeat(32 * 1_024) }, + { type: "thinking_signature", signature: "s".repeat(16 * 1_024) }, + { type: "redacted_thinking", data: "r".repeat(16 * 1_024) }, + done, + ], adapterName); + expect(requests).toHaveLength(0); + expect(actual).toHaveLength(5); + }); + + test("text length follows trimmed announcement semantics across split whitespace", async () => { + for (const length of [280, 281]) { + const { requests } = await run([ + { type: "text_delta", text: " \n".repeat(200) }, + { type: "text_delta", text: "Let me check. " + "x".repeat(length - 14) }, + { type: "text_delta", text: "\t ".repeat(200) }, + done, + ], adapterName); + expect(requests).toHaveLength(length === 280 ? 1 : 0); + } + }); + + test("passthrough-only events do not spend the retention allowance", async () => { + const events: AdapterEvent[] = [announcement]; + for (let i = 0; i < 1_100; i += 1) { + events.push({ type: "heartbeat" }); + events.push({ type: "tool_call_delta", arguments: "x".repeat(100) }); + } + events.push(done); + const { actual, requests } = await run(events, adapterName); + expect(requests).toHaveLength(1); + for (let i = 0; i < events.length - 1; i += 1) expect(actual[i]).toBe(events[i]); + }); + + const disablingEvents: Array<[string, AdapterEvent]> = [ + ["tool start", { type: "tool_call_start", id: "call_1", name: "exec_command" }], + ["long text", { type: "text_delta", text: "x".repeat(281) }], + ["oversized reasoning", { type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "x".repeat(contentLimit + 1) }], + ]; + for (const [name, disablingEvent] of disablingEvents) { + test(`${name} permanently stops payload analysis while forwarding later events`, async () => { + let reads = 0; + const probe: AdapterEvent = { + type: "text_delta", + get text() { reads += 1; return "Let me check again."; }, + }; + const events: AdapterEvent[] = [announcement, disablingEvent]; + for (let i = 0; i < 2_000; i += 1) events.push(probe); + events.push(done); + const { actual, requests } = await run(events, adapterName); + expect(reads).toBe(0); + expect(requests).toHaveLength(0); + expect(actual).toHaveLength(events.length); + for (let i = 0; i < events.length - 1; i += 1) expect(actual[i]).toBe(events[i]); + // Terminal usage is preserved through the existing shallow-copy path. + expect(actual.at(-1)).toEqual(done); + }); + } + + const terminals: Array<[string, AdapterEvent | undefined]> = [ + ["EOF", undefined], + ["max tokens", { type: "done", stopReason: "max_tokens" }], + ["content filter", { type: "done", stopReason: "content_filter" }], + ["incomplete", { type: "incomplete", reason: "content_filter", retryable: false }], + ["error", { type: "error", message: "upstream failed", retryable: false }], + ]; + for (const [name, terminal] of terminals) { + test(`overflow preserves ${name} without manufacturing a successful terminal`, async () => { + const events: AdapterEvent[] = [announcement, { type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "x".repeat(contentLimit) }]; + if (terminal) events.push(terminal); + const { actual, requests } = await run(events, adapterName); + expect(requests).toHaveLength(0); + expect(actual).toHaveLength(events.length); + for (let i = 0; i < events.length; i += 1) expect(actual[i]).toBe(events[i]); + }); + } + + test("bounded continuation replays complete thinking, signature and redacted data", async () => { + const { requests } = await run([ + { type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "reasoning" }, + { type: "thinking_signature", signature: "signature" }, + { type: "redacted_thinking", data: "redacted" }, + announcement, done, + ], adapterName); + expect(requests).toHaveLength(1); + expect(requests[0]?.context.messages.at(-2)).toMatchObject({ + role: "assistant", + content: [ + { type: "thinking", thinking: "reasoning", signature: "signature", redacted: ["redacted"] }, + { type: "text", text: "Let me check." }, + ], + }); + }); + + test("each allowed continuation gets fresh retention counters and preserves usage", async () => { + let continuations = 0; + const actual: AdapterEvent[] = []; + const turn = async function* (): AsyncGenerator { + yield announcement; + yield { type: "thinking_delta", thinking: "x".repeat(40 * 1_024) }; + for (let i = 0; i < 600; i += 1) yield { type: "text_delta", text: "" }; + yield done; + }; + for await (const event of guardTerminalEventStream({ + parsed: parsed("Check and fix this code"), adapterName, maxAutoContinuations: 2, + firstEvents: turn(), continuation: () => { continuations += 1; return turn(); }, + })) actual.push(event); + expect(continuations).toBe(2); + expect(actual.filter(event => event.type === "assistant_boundary")).toHaveLength(2); + expect(actual.filter(event => event.type === "done")).toHaveLength(1); + expect(actual.at(-1)).toMatchObject({ usage: { inputTokens: 30, outputTokens: 6, totalTokens: 36 } }); + }); + + test("an exhausted continuation allowance does not inspect content", async () => { + let reads = 0; + const probe: AdapterEvent = { type: "text_delta", get text() { reads += 1; return "Let me check."; } }; + const { actual, requests } = await run([probe, done], adapterName, 0); + expect(reads).toBe(0); + expect(requests).toHaveLength(0); + expect(actual[0]).toBe(probe); + }); + }); + } +}); + +describe("terminal guard lifecycle and accounting", () => { + const announcement: AdapterEvent = { type: "text_delta", text: "Let me check." }; + + for (const adapterName of ["anthropic", "openai-chat"]) { + describe(adapterName, () => { + for (const asynchronous of [false, true]) { + test(`${asynchronous ? "async" : "sync"} continuation startup failure preserves reported usage`, async () => { + const usage = { + inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 2, cachedInputTokens: 3, + cacheReadInputTokens: 3, cacheCreationInputTokens: 1, + reasoningOutputTokens: 1, estimated: true, + }; + const failure = new Error("continuation setup failed"); + const actual: AdapterEvent[] = []; + let calls = 0; + for await (const event of guardTerminalEventStream({ + parsed: parsed("Check and fix this code"), adapterName, + firstEvents: (async function* (): AsyncGenerator { + yield announcement; + yield { type: "done", usage }; + })(), + continuation: () => { + calls += 1; + if (asynchronous) return Promise.reject(failure); + throw failure; + }, + })) actual.push(event); + expect(calls).toBe(1); + expect(actual).toEqual([ + announcement, { type: "assistant_boundary" }, + { type: "error", message: failure.message, usage }, + ]); + }); + } + + test("startup failure after two completed legs keeps their aggregate usage", async () => { + let calls = 0; + const actual: AdapterEvent[] = []; + const turn = async function* (): AsyncGenerator { + yield announcement; + yield { type: "done", usage: { inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 2, cachedInputTokens: 3 } }; + }; + for await (const event of guardTerminalEventStream({ + parsed: parsed("Check and fix this code"), adapterName, maxAutoContinuations: 2, + firstEvents: turn(), + continuation: () => { + calls += 1; + if (calls === 1) return turn(); + throw new Error("second continuation setup failed"); + }, + })) actual.push(event); + expect(calls).toBe(2); + expect(actual.filter(event => event.type === "assistant_boundary")).toHaveLength(2); + expect(actual.filter(event => event.type === "done")).toHaveLength(0); + expect(actual.at(-1)).toEqual({ + type: "error", message: "second continuation setup failed", + usage: { inputTokens: 20, outputTokens: 4, totalTokens: 24, cachedInputTokens: 6 }, + }); + }); + + test("startup failure does not fabricate unknown usage", async () => { + const actual: AdapterEvent[] = []; + for await (const event of guardTerminalEventStream({ + parsed: parsed("Check and fix this code"), adapterName, + firstEvents: (async function* (): AsyncGenerator { + yield announcement; + yield { type: "done" }; + })(), + continuation: () => { throw "continuation unavailable"; }, + })) actual.push(event); + expect(actual.at(-1)).toEqual({ type: "error", message: "continuation unavailable" }); + expect(Object.hasOwn(actual.at(-1)!, "usage")).toBe(false); + expect(actual.filter(event => event.type === "done")).toHaveLength(0); + }); + + for (const atBoundary of [false, true]) { + test(`consumer cancellation ${atBoundary ? "at boundary" : "during content"} closes the source without a continuation`, async () => { + let closed = false; + let calls = 0; + const stream = guardTerminalEventStream({ + parsed: parsed("Check and fix this code"), adapterName, + firstEvents: (async function* (): AsyncGenerator { + try { + yield announcement; + yield { type: "done", usage: { inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 2 } }; + } finally { + closed = true; + } + })(), + continuation: () => { + calls += 1; + return (async function* (): AsyncGenerator { yield { type: "done" }; })(); + }, + }); + expect((await stream.next()).value).toBe(announcement); + if (atBoundary) expect((await stream.next()).value).toEqual({ type: "assistant_boundary" }); + expect((await stream.return(undefined)).done).toBe(true); + expect(closed).toBe(true); + expect(calls).toBe(0); + }); + } + + test("source iteration exceptions propagate without manufacturing success", async () => { + const failure = new Error("source read failed"); + const actual: AdapterEvent[] = []; + let caught: unknown; + let calls = 0; + let closed = false; + try { + for await (const event of guardTerminalEventStream({ + parsed: parsed("Check and fix this code"), adapterName, + firstEvents: (async function* (): AsyncGenerator { + try { + yield announcement; + throw failure; + } finally { + closed = true; + } + })(), + continuation: () => { + calls += 1; + return (async function* (): AsyncGenerator { yield { type: "done" }; })(); + }, + })) actual.push(event); + } catch (error) { + caught = error; + } + expect(caught).toBe(failure); + expect(actual).toEqual([announcement]); + expect(closed).toBe(true); + expect(calls).toBe(0); + }); + + for (const extra of [0, 1]) { + test(`Unicode content limit plus ${extra} counts code units rather than UTF-8 bytes`, async () => { + const length = 64 * 1_024 - "Let me check.".length + extra; + const thinking = "😀".repeat(Math.floor(length / 2)) + (length % 2 ? "x" : ""); + let calls = 0; + for await (const _event of guardTerminalEventStream({ + parsed: parsed("Check and fix this code"), adapterName, + firstEvents: (async function* (): AsyncGenerator { + yield announcement; + yield { type: "thinking_delta", thinking }; + yield { type: "done" }; + })(), + continuation: () => { + calls += 1; + return (async function* (): AsyncGenerator { yield { type: "done" }; })(); + }, + })) { + // Consume the stream without retaining its content in the test. + } + expect(thinking.length).toBe(length); + expect(calls).toBe(extra === 0 ? 1 : 0); + }); + } + }); + } +}); From 0f8f2f52ea23b473385ac312ade9d664cbe9eb74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 19:43:12 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 101/113] fix(retry): refuse ambiguous reset replay without inviting a client retry (#4741) (#4798) Maintainer integration for the 2.57.0 stabilization scope. Exact head 2ea335f11cdc1f60fe201ee60f4c6253850f4ef5 has a green aggregate ci check with no failing job. This carries #4741 and corrects the half that would have made things worse: the refusal was reported as 502, which the Codex client retries up to four times, so the proxy stopped replaying and handed the amplification to the client. It now answers 429 with upstream_reset_replay_refused, and because a 429 then stops being sufficient evidence of a provider rate limit, all ten call sites that read it that way consult isNonReplayableResponse first and record the transport outcome rather than the client-facing status, so pool health sees exactly what it saw before. The owning structure section is rewritten to separate a refusal this proxy made from an upstream reset reported mid-stream or after a terminal, and the WebSocket post-send verdicts are explicitly unchanged. Host-owned merge decision; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- .../docs/reference/configuration/server.md | 9 ++ src/bridge/errors.ts | 23 +++- src/images/loop.ts | 2 +- src/lib/upstream-retry.ts | 64 +++++++-- src/server/chat-native.ts | 10 +- src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts | 8 +- src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts | 7 + src/server/responses/compact.ts | 21 ++- src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts | 6 + src/vision/anthropic-describe.ts | 2 +- src/vision/describe.ts | 2 +- src/web-search/anthropic-executor.ts | 2 +- src/web-search/exa-executor.ts | 2 +- src/web-search/executor.ts | 2 +- src/web-search/gemini-executor.ts | 2 +- src/web-search/loop.ts | 2 +- src/web-search/ollama-executor.ts | 2 +- src/web-search/xai-executor.ts | 2 +- structure/transports/responses.md | 80 +++++++++-- .../issue-914-transport-attribution.test.ts | 4 +- .../reserve-dispatch.test.ts | 17 ++- tests/lib/upstream-retry.test.ts | 130 +++++++++++++++++- .../upstream-transient-retry.test.ts | 7 +- .../responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts | 97 +++++++++++++ 24 files changed, 456 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/server.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/server.md index 3fbf619df4..397f2803ea 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/server.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/server.md @@ -50,6 +50,15 @@ frame may already be executing upstream, so the client applies its own retry pol it would when connected to the backend directly. Once the response has started, a later drop surfaces inside the stream as before. `stallTimeoutSec` is unrelated to this window. +An ordinary HTTP send has a third case. When the connection dies before any response header +arrives, the proxy cannot tell whether the model already processed the request, so it refuses +to send it again and answers HTTP 429 with `upstream_reset_replay_refused`. The status is +deliberate: a 5xx here is an instruction to most clients, including Codex, to send the whole +turn again, which is the duplicate the refusal exists to prevent. No `Retry-After` is +attached, and the proxy performs no key rotation, account failover or same-target replay on +it. Tool-call side requests such as vision and web search are replayed normally, because +repeating them cannot duplicate a turn. + `noProxy` accepts either a comma-separated string or an array. Both forms add entries without replacing an inherited `NO_PROXY`: diff --git a/src/bridge/errors.ts b/src/bridge/errors.ts index 175e3ec451..8947eff9d7 100644 --- a/src/bridge/errors.ts +++ b/src/bridge/errors.ts @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +import { + isNonReplayableUpstreamCode, + isReplayRefusalCode, + markResponseNonReplayable, + REPLAY_REFUSED_STATUS, +} from "../lib/upstream-retry"; import { adapterFailureFromMessage, classifyError, @@ -18,17 +24,30 @@ export function formatErrorResponse( error.code = CYBER_POLICY_ERROR_CODE; error.type = cyberPolicyErrorType(type); } - const finalStatus = error.code === CYBER_POLICY_ERROR_CODE ? 400 : status; + // Only the allowlisted transport verdicts survive this formatter. Do not forward + // arbitrary provider codes, and preserve the existing cyber-policy precedence. + const replayBlocked = error.code !== CYBER_POLICY_ERROR_CODE + && isNonReplayableUpstreamCode(options?.code); + if (replayBlocked) error.code = options!.code!; + // The replay refusal owns its status as well as its code. A combo or adapter formatter + // reaches here holding the upstream-shaped status it was about to report, and inheriting + // that would hand the client a 5xx it is configured to retry four times. + const finalStatus = error.code === CYBER_POLICY_ERROR_CODE + ? 400 + : isReplayRefusalCode(error.code) ? REPLAY_REFUSED_STATUS : status; const headers = new Headers({ "Content-Type": "application/json" }); const retryAfter = options?.retryAfter?.trim(); if (error.code !== CYBER_POLICY_ERROR_CODE + && !replayBlocked && retryAfter && retryAfter.length > 0 && retryAfter.length <= 128) { headers.set("Retry-After", retryAfter); } - return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error }), { + const response = new Response(JSON.stringify({ error }), { status: finalStatus, headers, }); + if (replayBlocked) markResponseNonReplayable(response); + return response; } diff --git a/src/images/loop.ts b/src/images/loop.ts index 6f9eacad1f..193bbef45f 100644 --- a/src/images/loop.ts +++ b/src/images/loop.ts @@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ export async function runWithImageBridge(deps: ImageBridgeDeps): Promise = new Set([ UPSTREAM_NO_RESPONSE_CODE, UPSTREAM_CLOSED_BEFORE_RESPONSE_CODE, + UPSTREAM_RESET_REPLAY_REFUSED_CODE, ]); export function isNonReplayableUpstreamCode(code: unknown): boolean { return typeof code === "string" && NON_REPLAYABLE_UPSTREAM_CODES.has(code); } +/** + * True for the one non-replayable code this proxy owns end to end. The status it carries is + * a local decision, so a re-wrapping formatter must restate it rather than inherit the + * caller's upstream-shaped status. + */ +export function isReplayRefusalCode(code: unknown): boolean { + return code === UPSTREAM_RESET_REPLAY_REFUSED_CODE; +} + +/** Client-facing status for {@link UPSTREAM_RESET_REPLAY_REFUSED_CODE}. */ +export const REPLAY_REFUSED_STATUS = 429; + // 1 initial + 2 retries: the pool may hold more than one stale socket. const RESET_RETRY_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 3; const RESET_RETRY_BASE_DELAY_MS = 150; @@ -352,6 +377,12 @@ export async function fetchWithAttemptDeadline( } export interface ResetRetryOptions { + /** + * Opt in only when repeating this operation cannot duplicate upstream effects. + * This permits reset retries, not extra sends: attempts and onSendsConsumed still + * bound and count every physical send. A string body is not replay-safety proof. + */ + replaySafe?: boolean; abortSignal?: AbortSignal; /** Short host/path label for the retry warn log (no secrets/query strings). */ label?: string; @@ -442,9 +473,9 @@ export function applyUpstreamRecoveryInit( } /** - * Run `doFetch`, retrying only connection-reset-shaped rejections (see - * isConnectionResetError) with jittered backoff. The caller's thunk must be replay-safe - * (string body); every retry is logged so persistent resets stay visible. + * Run `doFetch` within one send budget. Connection-reset-shaped rejections are + * terminal by default; only an explicitly replay-safe operation receives reset retries + * with jittered backoff. HTTP responses retain the caller's existing retry policy. */ export async function fetchWithResetRetry( doFetch: ReplayableFetch, @@ -475,6 +506,19 @@ export async function fetchWithResetRetry( if (sawReset) throw new UpstreamRetryEvidenceError([], err, true); throw err; } + if (opts.replaySafe !== true) { + // Return evidence instead of throwing a generic transport error: outer catches + // otherwise turn it into a replayable 502 and a combo/account recovery resends it. + // The WeakSet protects in-process recovery; the code survives JSON re-wrapping. + // Never expose the raw exception, which can contain credentials or request data. + const response = new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: { + type: "upstream_error", + code: UPSTREAM_RESET_REPLAY_REFUSED_CODE, + message: "The upstream connection closed before a response was received. The request may already have been processed; automatic replay was stopped.", + } }), { status: REPLAY_REFUSED_STATUS, headers: { "content-type": "application/json" } }); + markResponseNonReplayable(response); + return response; + } if (attempt === attempts - 1) throw err; sawReset = true; lastError = err; @@ -491,9 +535,9 @@ export async function fetchWithResetRetry( } /** - * fetchWithResetRetry plus a transient-5xx status retry layer, PRE-STREAM only: a - * returned Response has by definition not been relayed to the client yet, so replaying - * the (string-body) request is safe. The failed attempt's body is cancelled before the + * fetchWithResetRetry plus the caller-selected transient-5xx policy, PRE-STREAM only. + * A received HTTP error follows that policy; an ambiguous reset's non-replayable + * verdict always stops it. The failed attempt's body is cancelled before the * retry; every returned response (ok, non-transient, aborted, slow, exhausted) keeps * its body intact. Honors Retry-After via retryBackoffDelayMs. * diff --git a/src/server/chat-native.ts b/src/server/chat-native.ts index 791c687bd0..21ead2baac 100644 --- a/src/server/chat-native.ts +++ b/src/server/chat-native.ts @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import { applyUpstreamRecoveryInit, fetchWithResetRetry, fetchWithTransientRetry, + isNonReplayableResponse, prepareSameTarget429Wait, type UpstreamSendRecovery, } from "../lib/upstream-retry"; @@ -379,6 +380,11 @@ export async function handleNativeChatCompletions(options: HandleNativeChatOptio let retries = 0; while ( response.status === 429 + // A 429 this proxy synthesized for a refused reset replay is not a provider rate + // limit: waiting and re-sending here is exactly the duplicate inference the refusal + // exists to stop. It kept the same shape under the old 502 only because 502 never + // matched this branch. + && !isNonReplayableResponse(response) && retryPolicy && retries < retryPolicy.attempts && transientSendAvailable() @@ -392,7 +398,9 @@ export async function handleNativeChatCompletions(options: HandleNativeChatOptio if (upstream.signal.aborted) throw upstream.signal.reason; response = await send(activeRequest, "rate-limit-429"); } - while (response.status === 429 && hasKeyPoolFailover(activeProvider)) { + // Same reason as above, plus a second one: rotating here would write a cooldown against + // a key that rate-limited nothing, and that false signal outlives the request. + while (response.status === 429 && !isNonReplayableResponse(response) && hasKeyPoolFailover(activeProvider)) { const rotated = rotateProviderTransportOn429(config, route.providerName, activeProvider, { retryAfter: response.headers.get("retry-after"), now: Date.now(), diff --git a/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts b/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts index 6d4ffcfb43..fcf2bce705 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import { fetchWithTransientRetry, fetchWithResetRetry, applyUpstreamRecoveryInit, + isNonReplayableResponse, prepareSameTarget429Wait, } from "../../lib/upstream-retry"; import { redactSecretString } from "../../lib/redact"; @@ -264,6 +265,9 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( // loop; only after the attempts are exhausted does the continuation fail over. while ( response.status === 429 + // A synthesized replay refusal is not a rate limit; replaying the continuation on + // it would re-send a turn whose first send may already have been processed. + && !isNonReplayableResponse(response) && rateLimitPolicy !== null && adapterExchange.rateLimitRetries < rateLimitPolicy.attempts // The main recovery loop and the passthrough ladder both consult the shared remainder @@ -311,7 +315,7 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( } } - if (response.status === 429 && hasKeyPoolFailover(route.provider)) { + if (response.status === 429 && !isNonReplayableResponse(response) && hasKeyPoolFailover(route.provider)) { const rotated = rotateProviderTransportOn429(config, route.providerName, route.provider, { retryAfter: response.headers.get("retry-after"), now: Date.now(), @@ -346,6 +350,7 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( } if ( response.status === 429 + && !isNonReplayableResponse(response) && transportState.anthropicPoolAccountId && transportState.anthropicPoolFailovers < ANTHROPIC_POOL_MAX_FAILOVERS_PER_REQUEST ) { @@ -387,6 +392,7 @@ export function createAdapterContinuations( // the per-request bound cannot be silently re-armed by reaching a different loop. if ( response.status === 429 + && !isNonReplayableResponse(response) && transportState.genericFailoverAccountId && transportState.genericFailovers < GENERIC_OAUTH_MAX_FAILOVERS_PER_REQUEST && isGenericOAuthFailoverEnabled(config, route.providerName) diff --git a/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts b/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts index 2863105d7a..c26b77b19b 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +import { isNonReplayableResponse } from "../../lib/upstream-retry"; import type { ResponsesRequestContext, ResponsesAdmissionState } from "./core-options"; import type { PreparedResponsesRequest } from "./request-prepare"; import type { ResponsesTransport } from "./request-transport"; @@ -526,6 +527,12 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( }; // Keep recovery kinds in sync with the native Responses `passthroughRecovery:` loop above. recovery: for (;;) { + // Preserve the terminal verdict through adapter and combo error formatting. + // This also covers a reset reached by a 401/429/413 recovery refetch. + if (isNonReplayableResponse(upstreamResponse)) { + cleanupUpstreamAbort(); + return upstreamResponse; + } if ( upstreamResponse.status === 401 && isOAuth401ReplayProvider diff --git a/src/server/responses/compact.ts b/src/server/responses/compact.ts index 3d7f6557c7..73e8d0a89b 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/compact.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/compact.ts @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ import { fetchWithResetRetry, fetchWithTransientRetry, applyUpstreamRecoveryInit, + isNonReplayableResponse, SendBudgetExhaustedError, TRANSIENT_RETRY_MAX_ATTEMPTS, type UpstreamSendRecovery, @@ -1079,6 +1080,10 @@ export async function handleResponsesCompact( // — reporting exhausted retries while another pool account sat idle (#913). if ( (upstream.status === 429 || upstream.status === 402) + // A replay refusal this proxy synthesized carries 429 for the client's benefit only. + // It is not pool quota evidence, and the alternate account below is another send of a + // compact turn that may already have been processed. + && !isNonReplayableResponse(upstream) && !storedPool401ReplayAttempted && usesCodexForwardPoolAuth(authCtx, route.provider) && !authCtx.fixedAccount @@ -1211,8 +1216,14 @@ export async function handleResponsesCompact( const bufferedErrorText = buffered.ok ? "" : await buffered.clone().text().catch(() => ""); - const explicitQuotaStatus = buffered.status === 429 || buffered.status === 402; - const bodyInferredQuota = !buffered.ok + // The client-facing 429 of a synthesized replay refusal says nothing about this + // account's quota. Pool accounting keeps reading it as the transport failure it is, + // which is also what it recorded before the status was corrected for the client. + const replayRefused = isNonReplayableResponse(upstream); + const explicitQuotaStatus = !replayRefused + && (buffered.status === 429 || buffered.status === 402); + const bodyInferredQuota = !replayRefused + && !buffered.ok && !explicitQuotaStatus && isRateLimitOrQuotaFailureMessage(bufferedErrorText); const quotaFailure = explicitQuotaStatus || bodyInferredQuota; @@ -1225,7 +1236,11 @@ export async function handleResponsesCompact( // A body-confirmed quota failure can arrive behind a generic 5xx. Record it as // quota evidence; otherwise preserve the real upstream status so a local buffering // failure after a 200 cannot soft-avoid a healthy account or rotate a thread. - recordCompactPoolOutcome(outcomeCtx, bodyInferredQuota ? 429 : upstream.status, { retryAfter, resetAt }); + recordCompactPoolOutcome( + outcomeCtx, + bodyInferredQuota ? 429 : replayRefused ? 502 : upstream.status, + { retryAfter, resetAt }, + ); // Lift usage and response metadata from the buffered upstream JSON into the // request log; the routed branch gets the same through handleResponses. The // synthetic buffer errors are not upstream bodies and stay uninspected. diff --git a/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts b/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts index 65eb3512da..19a4de0bac 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ import { fetchWithTransientRetry, applyUpstreamRecoveryInit, TRANSIENT_RETRY_MAX_ATTEMPTS, + isNonReplayableResponse, prepareSameTarget429Wait, sleepWithAbort, } from "../../lib/upstream-retry"; @@ -1117,6 +1118,10 @@ export async function preparePassthroughExchange( // the same quorum, cooldown and request budget here, before any client bytes flow. if ( upstreamResponse.status === 429 + // Not a provider rate limit when this proxy synthesized it for a refused reset + // replay; rotating accounts on it would re-send an inference that may already + // have run and would cool down an account that refused nothing. + && !isNonReplayableResponse(upstreamResponse) && transportState.genericFailoverAccountId && transportState.genericFailovers < GENERIC_OAUTH_MAX_FAILOVERS_PER_REQUEST && isGenericOAuthFailoverEnabled(config, route.providerName) @@ -1171,6 +1176,7 @@ export async function preparePassthroughExchange( // keep their pool logic below (rateLimitRetryPolicyFor returns null for them). while ( upstreamResponse.status === 429 + && !isNonReplayableResponse(upstreamResponse) && rateLimitPolicy !== null && rateLimitRetries < rateLimitPolicy.attempts // Checked here rather than inside the helper: prepareSameTarget429Wait releases the 429 diff --git a/src/vision/anthropic-describe.ts b/src/vision/anthropic-describe.ts index 4ca6ae00fa..755875aa07 100644 --- a/src/vision/anthropic-describe.ts +++ b/src/vision/anthropic-describe.ts @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ export async function describeImageAnthropic( body: JSON.stringify(body), signal: linkedSignal.signal, }, recovery)), - { abortSignal: linkedSignal.signal, label: "vision-sidecar-anthropic" }, + { replaySafe: true, abortSignal: linkedSignal.signal, label: "vision-sidecar-anthropic" }, ); if (!res.ok) { // The body is untrusted and only feeds one auth-failure message, so read a bounded prefix. diff --git a/src/vision/describe.ts b/src/vision/describe.ts index 0cf61a1775..14629f0166 100644 --- a/src/vision/describe.ts +++ b/src/vision/describe.ts @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ export async function describeImage( // `session_id`, and `x-codex-turn-metadata` to the redirect target. redirect: "manual", }, recovery)), - { abortSignal: linkedSignal.signal, label: "vision-sidecar" }, + { replaySafe: true, abortSignal: linkedSignal.signal, label: "vision-sidecar" }, ); const detachBodyGuard = cancelBodyOnAbort(res.body, linkedSignal.signal); try { diff --git a/src/web-search/anthropic-executor.ts b/src/web-search/anthropic-executor.ts index 4b62702f0e..fc000a365f 100644 --- a/src/web-search/anthropic-executor.ts +++ b/src/web-search/anthropic-executor.ts @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ export async function runAnthropicWebSearch( body: JSON.stringify(body), signal: linkedSignal.signal, }, recovery)), - { abortSignal: linkedSignal.signal, label: "web-search-sidecar-anthropic" }, + { replaySafe: true, abortSignal: linkedSignal.signal, label: "web-search-sidecar-anthropic" }, ); // Guard before any branch reads the body: the failure branch's `res.text()` ran ahead of // the success-path guard, reopening the fetch-resolution-to-reader-attach race diff --git a/src/web-search/exa-executor.ts b/src/web-search/exa-executor.ts index 2170eec140..b97beebfc9 100644 --- a/src/web-search/exa-executor.ts +++ b/src/web-search/exa-executor.ts @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ export async function runExaWebSearch( signal: linkedSignal.signal, redirect: "manual", }, recovery)), - { abortSignal: linkedSignal.signal, label: "exa-web-search-sidecar" }, + { replaySafe: true, abortSignal: linkedSignal.signal, label: "exa-web-search-sidecar" }, ); const detachBodyGuard = cancelBodyOnAbort(res.body, linkedSignal.signal); try { diff --git a/src/web-search/executor.ts b/src/web-search/executor.ts index 489fa8f399..d6514acfd4 100644 --- a/src/web-search/executor.ts +++ b/src/web-search/executor.ts @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ export async function runWebSearch( // `session_id`, and `x-codex-turn-metadata` to the redirect target. redirect: "manual", }, recovery), forwardProvider)), - { abortSignal: linkedSignal.signal, label: "web-search-sidecar" }, + { replaySafe: true, abortSignal: linkedSignal.signal, label: "web-search-sidecar" }, ); // Attach the body guard before ANY branch reads it. The success path guarded itself below, // but the failure branch's `res.text()` runs first, so a cancel landing between fetch diff --git a/src/web-search/gemini-executor.ts b/src/web-search/gemini-executor.ts index 72c74169cd..9e4d4b1af9 100644 --- a/src/web-search/gemini-executor.ts +++ b/src/web-search/gemini-executor.ts @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ export async function runGeminiWebSearch( signal: linkedSignal.signal, redirect: "manual", }, recovery)), - { abortSignal: linkedSignal.signal, label: "gemini-web-search-sidecar" }, + { replaySafe: true, abortSignal: linkedSignal.signal, label: "gemini-web-search-sidecar" }, ); const detachBodyGuard = cancelBodyOnAbort(res.body, linkedSignal.signal); try { diff --git a/src/web-search/loop.ts b/src/web-search/loop.ts index 849eece2da..48a5cdc8cd 100644 --- a/src/web-search/loop.ts +++ b/src/web-search/loop.ts @@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ export async function runWithWebSearch(deps: WebSearchLoopDeps): Promise { if (!recovery) throw coded("reset", "ECONNRESET"); throw rejection; - }).catch((e: unknown) => e); + }, { replaySafe: true }).catch((e: unknown) => e); expect(classifyTransportFailureKind(err)).toBe("connect_error"); }); test("a plain reachability rejection classifies neutral end to end", async () => { const err = await fetchWithTransientRetry(async () => { throw coded("refused", "ECONNREFUSED"); - }).catch((e: unknown) => e); + }, { replaySafe: true }).catch((e: unknown) => e); expect(classifyTransportFailureKind(err)).toBe("connect_neutral"); }); diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/reserve-dispatch.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/reserve-dispatch.test.ts index e7777d8ed3..d155927bb6 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/reserve-dispatch.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/reserve-dispatch.test.ts @@ -286,7 +286,13 @@ describe("Reserve dispatch-time permission", () => { for (const endpoint of ["responses", "compact"] as const) { for (const firstFailure of ["reset", "502"] as const) { - test(`${endpoint}: ${firstFailure} then revoked proof maps to429 without a second inference or health mutation`, async () => { + // A received 502 proves the request reached the origin and was answered, so a revocation + // observed afterwards is authoritative and maps to the local 429. A connection reset proves + // nothing: the inference may already have run, so the ambiguous-reset verdict wins and the + // client is not told to retry. Both therefore answer 429, and the distinct codes are what + // separate them: the revocation names the reserve, the reset names the refused replay. + // Neither case may send a second inference or mutate health. + test(`${endpoint}: ${firstFailure} then revoked proof is terminal without a second inference or health mutation`, async () => { inference = () => { // Permission changes after the first real attempt, before the retry wrapper dispatches. revoke(); @@ -300,8 +306,13 @@ describe("Reserve dispatch-time permission", () => { const response = endpoint === "compact" ? await handleResponsesCompact(request, config(), { model: "", provider: "" }, undefined, loopbackAdmission) : await handleResponses(request, config(), { model: "", provider: "" }, { admission: loopbackAdmission }); - expect(response.status).toBe(429); - expect(await response.text()).toContain("Reserve is unavailable"); + if (firstFailure === "reset") { + expect(response.status).toBe(429); + expect(await response.text()).toContain("upstream_reset_replay_refused"); + } else { + expect(response.status).toBe(429); + expect(await response.text()).toContain("Reserve is unavailable"); + } expect(inferenceSends).toBe(1); expect(usageReads).toBe(1); expect(getCodexUpstreamHealth("__main__")).toBeNull(); diff --git a/tests/lib/upstream-retry.test.ts b/tests/lib/upstream-retry.test.ts index 4e014c7645..e8d09b309e 100644 --- a/tests/lib/upstream-retry.test.ts +++ b/tests/lib/upstream-retry.test.ts @@ -1,8 +1,11 @@ +import { formatErrorResponse as formatReplaySafetyError } from "../../src/bridge/errors"; import { afterEach, describe, expect, spyOn, test } from "bun:test"; import { fetchWithResetRetry, fetchWithTransientRetry, isConnectionResetError, + isNonReplayableResponse, + UPSTREAM_RESET_REPLAY_REFUSED_CODE, prepareSameTarget429Wait, releaseResponseBodyBestEffort, retryBackoffDelayMs, @@ -148,7 +151,7 @@ describe("fetchWithResetRetry", () => { test("retries a Bun-shaped reset and returns the second attempt's response", async () => { silenceWarn(); const mock = mockDoFetch([bunResetError(), new Response("ok", { status: 200 })]); - const res = await fetchWithResetRetry(mock.doFetch, { label: "test" }); + const res = await fetchWithResetRetry(mock.doFetch, { label: "test", replaySafe: true }); expect(res.status).toBe(200); expect(await res.text()).toBe("ok"); expect(mock.calls).toHaveLength(2); @@ -161,7 +164,7 @@ describe("fetchWithResetRetry", () => { new Error("The socket connection was closed unexpectedly."), new Response("ok", { status: 200 }), ]); - const res = await fetchWithResetRetry(mock.doFetch); + const res = await fetchWithResetRetry(mock.doFetch, { replaySafe: true }); expect(res.status).toBe(200); expect(mock.calls).toHaveLength(2); }); @@ -190,7 +193,7 @@ describe("fetchWithResetRetry", () => { test("gives up after max attempts and rethrows the last reset error", async () => { silenceWarn(); const mock = mockDoFetch([bunResetError(), bunResetError(), bunResetError(), bunResetError()]); - await expect(fetchWithResetRetry(mock.doFetch)).rejects.toThrow("socket connection was closed unexpectedly"); + await expect(fetchWithResetRetry(mock.doFetch, { replaySafe: true })).rejects.toThrow("socket connection was closed unexpectedly"); expect(mock.calls).toHaveLength(3); expect(warnSpies[0]).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2); }); @@ -207,7 +210,7 @@ describe("fetchWithResetRetry", () => { silenceWarn(); const ac = new AbortController(); const mock = mockDoFetch([bunResetError(), new Response("ok", { status: 200 })]); - const pending = fetchWithResetRetry(mock.doFetch, { abortSignal: ac.signal }); + const pending = fetchWithResetRetry(mock.doFetch, { abortSignal: ac.signal, replaySafe: true }); // First attempt rejects with a reset synchronously-ish; abort lands mid-backoff. setTimeout(() => ac.abort(new DOMException("client closed", "AbortError")), 10); await expect(pending).rejects.toThrow("client closed"); @@ -428,3 +431,122 @@ describe("prepareSameTarget429Wait", () => { expect(events.every(type => type === "heartbeat")).toBe(true); }); }); + +describe("ambiguous reset safety", () => { + test("a reset is terminal by default, even with a remaining send budget", async () => { + const reports: number[] = []; + const mock = mockDoFetch([bunResetError(), new Response("duplicate")]); + const response = await fetchWithResetRetry(mock.doFetch, { + attempts: 3, onSendsConsumed: count => reports.push(count), + }); + // 429, not 502: the Codex client is configured retry_5xx / no-retry-429, so a 5xx here + // would be re-sent four times by the caller this refusal exists to protect. + expect(response.status).toBe(429); + expect(isNonReplayableResponse(response)).toBe(true); + expect((await response.json()).error.code).toBe(UPSTREAM_RESET_REPLAY_REFUSED_CODE); + expect(mock.calls).toHaveLength(1); + expect(reports).toEqual([1]); + }); + + test("a 503 followed by a reset stops both retry layers and reports both sends once", async () => { + silenceWarn(); + const reports: number[] = []; + const mock = mockDoFetch([ + new Response("busy", { status: 503 }), bunResetError(), new Response("duplicate"), + ]); + const response = await fetchWithTransientRetry(mock.doFetch, { + attempts: 3, onSendsConsumed: count => reports.push(count), + }); + expect(response.status).toBe(429); + expect(isNonReplayableResponse(response)).toBe(true); + expect((await response.json()).error.code).toBe(UPSTREAM_RESET_REPLAY_REFUSED_CODE); + expect(mock.calls).toHaveLength(2); + expect(reports).toEqual([2]); + }); + + test("an exhausted last send still carries the no-replay verdict", async () => { + const mock = mockDoFetch([bunResetError()]); + const response = await fetchWithResetRetry(mock.doFetch, { attempts: 1 }); + expect(isNonReplayableResponse(response)).toBe(true); + expect(mock.calls).toHaveLength(1); + }); + + test("EPIPE and message-only resets are ambiguous too, without leaking the exception", async () => { + for (const error of [ + Object.assign(new Error("private transport detail"), { code: "EPIPE" }), + new Error("The socket connection was closed unexpectedly. private transport detail"), + ]) { + const mock = mockDoFetch([error]); + const response = await fetchWithResetRetry(mock.doFetch); + expect(isNonReplayableResponse(response)).toBe(true); + expect(await response.text()).not.toContain("private transport detail"); + expect(mock.calls).toHaveLength(1); + } + }); + + test("zero and invalid budgets never dispatch regardless of replay safety", async () => { + for (const replaySafe of [false, true]) { + for (const attempts of [0, -1, 1.5, Number.NaN, Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY]) { + const mock = mockDoFetch([new Response("must not send")]); + await expect(fetchWithResetRetry(mock.doFetch, { attempts, replaySafe })).rejects.toThrow(); + expect(mock.calls).toHaveLength(0); + } + } + }); + + test("explicitly replay-safe resets still share the total budget with 5xx", async () => { + silenceWarn(); + const reports: number[] = []; + const mock = mockDoFetch([ + bunResetError(), new Response("busy", { status: 503 }), new Response("ok"), + ]); + const response = await fetchWithTransientRetry(mock.doFetch, { + attempts: 3, replaySafe: true, onSendsConsumed: count => reports.push(count), + }); + expect(await response.text()).toBe("ok"); + expect(mock.calls).toHaveLength(3); + expect(reports).toEqual([3]); + }); +}); + +describe("ambiguous reset safety through error formatting", () => { + test("every terminal code survives formatting without advertising Retry-After", async () => { + for (const code of ["upstream_no_response", "upstream_closed_before_response", "upstream_reset_replay_refused"]) { + const response = formatReplaySafetyError(502, "upstream_error", "closed", { code, retryAfter: "2" }); + expect(isNonReplayableResponse(response)).toBe(true); + expect(response.headers.get("retry-after")).toBeNull(); + expect((await response.json()).error.code).toBe(code); + } + }); + + test("only the proxy-owned refusal restates the status; upstream verdicts keep theirs", async () => { + // The formatter is reached from combo and adapter paths holding an upstream-shaped 502. + // The two transport verdicts describe something upstream did and keep it; the refusal is + // this proxy's own decision and carries its own status wherever it is re-wrapped. + const refused = formatReplaySafetyError(502, "upstream_error", "closed", { + code: "upstream_reset_replay_refused", + }); + expect(refused.status).toBe(429); + for (const code of ["upstream_no_response", "upstream_closed_before_response"]) { + expect(formatReplaySafetyError(502, "upstream_error", "closed", { code }).status).toBe(502); + } + }); + + test("unrecognized upstream codes do not override ordinary error classification", async () => { + const response = formatReplaySafetyError(502, "upstream_error", "failed", { + code: "untrusted_provider_code", retryAfter: "2", + }); + expect(isNonReplayableResponse(response)).toBe(false); + expect(response.headers.get("retry-after")).toBe("2"); + expect((await response.json()).error.code).not.toBe("untrusted_provider_code"); + }); + + test("the cyber-policy hard block retains precedence", async () => { + const response = formatReplaySafetyError(502, "upstream_error", "blocked due to high-risk cybersecurity activity", { + code: "upstream_closed_before_response", retryAfter: "2", + }); + expect(response.status).toBe(400); + expect(response.headers.get("retry-after")).toBeNull(); + expect((await response.json()).error.code).toBe("cyber_policy"); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/providers/upstream-transient-retry.test.ts b/tests/providers/upstream-transient-retry.test.ts index 77a224eb36..d7518fc29f 100644 --- a/tests/providers/upstream-transient-retry.test.ts +++ b/tests/providers/upstream-transient-retry.test.ts @@ -83,9 +83,10 @@ describe("fetchWithTransientRetry", () => { expect(res.status).toBe(504); }); - test("the structured codes name exactly the two post-send verdicts", () => { + test("the structured codes name the post-send verdicts and the proxy's own refusal", () => { expect(isNonReplayableUpstreamCode("upstream_no_response")).toBe(true); expect(isNonReplayableUpstreamCode("upstream_closed_before_response")).toBe(true); + expect(isNonReplayableUpstreamCode("upstream_reset_replay_refused")).toBe(true); expect(isNonReplayableUpstreamCode("upstream_error")).toBe(false); expect(isNonReplayableUpstreamCode(undefined)).toBe(false); }); @@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ describe("fetchWithTransientRetry", () => { const err = new Error("socket hang up") as Error & { code?: string }; err.code = "ECONNRESET"; throw err; - }, { attempts: 3, slowAttemptMs: 60_000, onSendsConsumed: n => reported.push(n) })).rejects.toThrow(); + }, { replaySafe: true, attempts: 3, slowAttemptMs: 60_000, onSendsConsumed: n => reported.push(n) })).rejects.toThrow(); expect(reported.length).toBe(1); expect(reported[0]!).toBeGreaterThan(0); }); @@ -166,7 +167,7 @@ describe("fetchWithTransientRetry", () => { throw err; } return bodyResponse(sends === 3 ? 200 : 503); - }, { attempts: 3, slowAttemptMs: 60_000 }); + }, { replaySafe: true, attempts: 3, slowAttemptMs: 60_000 }); expect(sends).toBe(3); expect(res.status).toBe(200); diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts index 1fd7635e86..5afee9db84 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ +import { shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountQuota, shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountTransient } from "../../src/server/responses/core-codex-account"; +import { consumeComboFailure } from "../../src/server/responses/core-combo-failure"; +import { fetchWithResetRetry, isNonReplayableResponse } from "../../src/lib/upstream-retry"; import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; import { clearComboSelectionState, clearComboTargetCooldowns } from "../../src/combos"; import { clearKeyCooldowns } from "../../src/providers/key-failover"; @@ -179,3 +182,97 @@ describe("upstream sends per logical request", () => { // cross-pool move are both asserted. Restoring an end-to-end row needs a harness that actually // rotates, which is its own change. }); + +describe("ambiguous reset safety across Responses recovery", () => { + for (const adapter of ["openai-chat", "openai-responses"]) { + for (const combo of [false, true]) { + test(`${adapter}: no replay or target hop after an ambiguous reset (combo=${combo})`, async () => { + const config = comboOverTargets(2); + for (const provider of Object.values(config.providers)) provider.adapter = adapter; + const authorizations: string[] = []; + globalThis.fetch = (async (_input: string | URL | Request, init?: RequestInit) => { + authorizations.push(new Headers(init?.headers).get("authorization") ?? ""); + throw Object.assign(new Error("The socket connection was closed unexpectedly."), { code: "ECONNRESET" }); + }) as typeof fetch; + const logCtx: RequestLogContext = { model: "", provider: "" }; + const response = await handleResponses( + responsesRequest(combo ? "combo/fan" : "t0/model-t0"), config, logCtx, + ); + expect(response.status).toBe(429); + const payload = await response.json(); + expect(payload.error.code).toBe("upstream_reset_replay_refused"); + expect(authorizations).toEqual(["Bearer sk-t0"]); + expect(totalSends(logCtx)).toBe(1); + }); + } + } + + test("a provider 503 policy is retained, but the following reset cannot reach a combo sibling", async () => { + const authorizations: string[] = []; + globalThis.fetch = (async (_input: string | URL | Request, init?: RequestInit) => { + authorizations.push(new Headers(init?.headers).get("authorization") ?? ""); + if (authorizations.length === 1) { + return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: { message: "busy" } }), { + status: 503, headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + }); + } + throw Object.assign(new Error("connection reset by peer"), { code: "ECONNRESET" }); + }) as typeof fetch; + const logCtx: RequestLogContext = { model: "", provider: "" }; + const response = await handleResponses(responsesRequest("combo/fan"), comboOverTargets(2), logCtx); + expect(response.status).toBe(429); + expect((await response.json()).error.code).toBe("upstream_reset_replay_refused"); + expect(authorizations).toEqual(["Bearer sk-t0", "Bearer sk-t0"]); + expect(totalSends(logCtx)).toBe(2); + }); + + test("reset-only providers stop too, without opting into the transient policy", async () => { + const config = comboOverTargets(2); + for (const provider of Object.values(config.providers)) delete provider.transientRetryOn5xx; + let sends = 0; + globalThis.fetch = (async () => { + sends += 1; + throw Object.assign(new Error("reset"), { code: "ECONNRESET" }); + }) as typeof fetch; + const response = await handleResponses(responsesRequest("combo/fan"), config, { model: "", provider: "" }); + expect(response.status).toBe(429); + expect((await response.json()).error.code).toBe("upstream_reset_replay_refused"); + expect(sends).toBe(1); + }); +}); + +describe("ambiguous reset safety after outer recovery", () => { + test("a 429 recovery refetch cannot launder a subsequent reset into a combo hop", async () => { + const config = comboOverTargets(2); + config.providers.t0!.retryOn429 = { attempts: 1 }; + const authorizations: string[] = []; + globalThis.fetch = (async (_input: string | URL | Request, init?: RequestInit) => { + authorizations.push(new Headers(init?.headers).get("authorization") ?? ""); + if (authorizations.length === 1) return new Response("rate limited", { + status: 429, headers: { "retry-after": "0" }, + }); + throw Object.assign(new Error("connection reset by peer"), { code: "ECONNRESET" }); + }) as typeof fetch; + const logCtx: RequestLogContext = { model: "", provider: "" }; + const response = await handleResponses(responsesRequest("combo/fan"), config, logCtx); + expect(response.status).toBe(429); + expect((await response.json()).error.code).toBe("upstream_reset_replay_refused"); + expect(authorizations).toEqual(["Bearer sk-t0", "Bearer sk-t0"]); + expect(totalSends(logCtx)).toBe(2); + }); + + test("account and combo recovery retain the no-replay verdict after one body read", async () => { + const response = await fetchWithResetRetry(async () => { + throw Object.assign(new Error("reset"), { code: "ECONNRESET" }); + }); + expect(shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountTransient(response)).toBe(false); + expect(await shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountQuota(response)).toBe(false); + const failure = await consumeComboFailure(response); + expect(failure.upstreamCode).toBe("upstream_reset_replay_refused"); + expect(isNonReplayableResponse(failure.response)).toBe(true); + expect(shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountTransient(failure.response)).toBe(false); + expect(await shouldRetryCodexPoolAccountQuota(failure.response)).toBe(false); + expect(failure.response.headers.get("retry-after")).toBeNull(); + expect((await failure.response.json()).error.code).toBe("upstream_reset_replay_refused"); + }); +}); From fab7e427c79eb9a1ffaa3e1b88a7cb65acd2b48b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 19:48:45 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 102/113] fix(catalog,bridge): write every slug once and scope declared-tool membership by wire (#4736, #4735) (#4799) Maintainer integration for the 2.57.0 stabilization scope. Exact head e80d2edb334b6704e142fc7389eddc6d6e4674a1 has a green aggregate ci check with no failing job. Two carries. The catalog guard moves to the shared write boundary so both writers apply one rule, which matters because the same source-invalid rejection was reachable through convergence and therefore through every dashboard toggle, combo edit and account login, and because running before the clamp could drop the row the clamp would have kept; the stated producer of the duplicate slugs is still unidentified so the reporting issue is deliberately not closed. The tool guard keeps the declared set flowing on every wire and scopes only the membership refusal, so an explicitly empty catalog still means no client tool may be called; scoping the refusal off the chat and Anthropic wires is recorded in the owning structure sections with #1700 named. Host-owned merge decision; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 4 + src/bridge/response-json.ts | 8 +- src/bridge/sse.ts | 20 +- src/codex/catalog/aggregation.ts | 81 +++++- src/codex/catalog/retained-sync.ts | 10 +- src/codex/convergence.ts | 9 +- src/server/responses/adapter-delivery.ts | 2 + src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts | 2 + structure/adapters/compatibility-contracts.md | 16 ++ structure/transports/responses.md | 39 +++ tests/adapters/bridge.test.ts | 72 ++++++ .../catalog-duplicate-slug-dedup.test.ts | 56 +++++ .../catalog-modelalias-unique-sync.test.ts | 155 ++++++++++++ .../catalog-slug-uniqueness-boundary.test.ts | 82 +++++++ tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 4 + .../chat-completions-deferred-tools.test.ts | 232 ++++++++++++++++++ .../chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts | 8 + 17 files changed, 794 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/codex-integration/catalog-duplicate-slug-dedup.test.ts create mode 100644 tests/codex-integration/catalog-modelalias-unique-sync.test.ts create mode 100644 tests/codex-integration/catalog-slug-uniqueness-boundary.test.ts create mode 100644 tests/responses/chat-completions-deferred-tools.test.ts diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index 30bcc28b47..91eefb1ef7 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -286,6 +286,7 @@ "cancel-body-on-abort.test.ts": "server", "catalog-auto-refresh-scheduler.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-cursor-search.test.ts": "codex-integration", + "catalog-duplicate-slug-dedup.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-free-pricing-status.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-full-picker-order.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-gated-native-suppression-reason.test.ts": "codex-integration", @@ -293,13 +294,16 @@ "catalog-hub-context-window.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-input-modality-enum.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-llamacpp-capabilities.test.ts": "codex-integration", + "catalog-modelalias-unique-sync.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-oauth-observation.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-remote-pull.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-retain-models.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-seed-window-fill.test.ts": "codex-integration", + "catalog-slug-uniqueness-boundary.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-verbosity-default.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-vision-sidecar-modalities.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-zero-credit-picker.test.ts": "codex-integration", + "chat-completions-deferred-tools.test.ts": "responses", "chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts": "responses", "chat-conversation-affinity.test.ts": "responses", "chat-inbound-reasoning-none.test.ts": "responses", diff --git a/src/bridge/response-json.ts b/src/bridge/response-json.ts index 6b2deec985..365f664264 100644 --- a/src/bridge/response-json.ts +++ b/src/bridge/response-json.ts @@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ function buildResponseJSONWithBudget( toolNsMap?: Map; /** Request-visible tool names. When present, an upstream call outside this set fails closed. */ declaredToolNames?: ReadonlySet; + /** See `bridgeToResponsesSSE`: enforcement is separate from normalization (#4735). */ + enforceDeclaredToolNames?: boolean; /** Declared parameter schema per tool name; repairs integral-float integer args (#1611). */ toolParameterSchemas?: ReadonlyMap>; freeformToolNames?: Set; @@ -432,7 +434,11 @@ function buildResponseJSONWithBudget( } flushToolCall(); const effectiveName = normalizeDeclaredToolName(e.name, options?.declaredToolNames); - if (options?.declaredToolNames && !options.declaredToolNames.has(effectiveName)) { + if ( + options?.declaredToolNames + && options.enforceDeclaredToolNames !== false + && !options.declaredToolNames.has(effectiveName) + ) { errorEvent = { type: "error", message: `routed provider emitted undeclared client tool "${effectiveName}"; only request-declared tools may be called`, diff --git a/src/bridge/sse.ts b/src/bridge/sse.ts index 43d4f0b9f7..db0adbdb7c 100644 --- a/src/bridge/sse.ts +++ b/src/bridge/sse.ts @@ -88,6 +88,20 @@ export function bridgeToResponsesSSE( onUsage?: (usage: OcxUsage | undefined) => void; /** Request-visible tool names. When present, an upstream call outside this set fails closed. */ declaredToolNames?: ReadonlySet; + /** + * Whether `declaredToolNames` is an authorization boundary this proxy enforces, or only the + * catalog used to normalize provider-invented names back to declared ones. + * + * Defaults to enforcing. The chat and Anthropic inbound wires set it false: those specs make + * the server relay a tool call and leave execution or refusal to the client's own runner, and + * harnesses on them legitimately defer part of their catalog (#4735). + * + * It is a separate flag rather than simply withholding `declaredToolNames`, because the set + * also drives `normalizeDeclaredToolName` and `declaresCodeModeExec`. Passing `undefined` + * turns those off too, so a provider that invents `default.lookup` for a declared `lookup` + * would reach the client under the invented name instead of the normalized one. + */ + enforceDeclaredToolNames?: boolean; /** Declared parameter schema per tool name; repairs integral-float integer args (#1611). */ toolParameterSchemas?: ReadonlyMap>; /** @@ -1008,7 +1022,11 @@ export function bridgeToResponsesSSE( : undefined; const mapped = toolNsMap?.get(effectiveName); const realName = mapped?.name ?? effectiveName; - if (options?.declaredToolNames && !options.declaredToolNames.has(effectiveName)) { + if ( + options?.declaredToolNames + && options.enforceDeclaredToolNames !== false + && !options.declaredToolNames.has(effectiveName) + ) { const failure = responseError( 502, "upstream_error", diff --git a/src/codex/catalog/aggregation.ts b/src/codex/catalog/aggregation.ts index f97b8295fc..c842fe3046 100644 --- a/src/codex/catalog/aggregation.ts +++ b/src/codex/catalog/aggregation.ts @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ import upstreamModelsSnapshot from "../data/upstream-models.json"; import { catalogModelSlug } from "./parsing"; -import type { CatalogModel } from "./parsing"; +import type { CatalogModel, RawEntry } from "./parsing"; export const openAiApiCollisionWarnings = new Set(); @@ -222,6 +222,85 @@ export function safeCatalogWarningLabel(value: string): string { .slice(0, 200); } +/** + * Keep the first row of each slug and drop the rest (#4730). + * + * First-win is the only answer that agrees with the ordering already decided upstream: the merge + * ranks rows, so its first occurrence is the row it chose. Distinct slugs are never touched — an + * alias row and the canonical routed row of the same provider model are two different public names + * and both survive — and a row without a string slug passes through untouched. + */ +export function dedupeCatalogEntriesBySlug(models: RawEntry[]): RawEntry[] { + const seen = new Set(); + const out: RawEntry[] = []; + for (const entry of models) { + if (typeof entry.slug !== "string") { + out.push(entry); + continue; + } + if (seen.has(entry.slug)) continue; + seen.add(entry.slug); + out.push(entry); + } + return out; +} + +/** + * Every slug this proxy writes into the Codex catalog must appear exactly once (#4730). + * + * The cost of breaking it is the whole file: a slug-unique validating consumer refuses the catalog + * outright, so one duplicated row takes every model with it. A 2.56.0 report carried 507 rows for + * 72 unique slugs, every duplicate byte-identical, and Codex rejected the file as `source-invalid`. + * + * This is a write-boundary invariant rather than a repair of one producer, and that distinction is + * deliberate: the reported catalog is evidence that some emit path can double a row, but nothing in + * this tree has been shown to be that path, and a guard that only covered the producer someone + * guessed at would leave the file corruptible by the next one. Both writers that serialize a merged + * catalog call this as their LAST mutation — `writeRetainedCatalogSync` and the management + * convergence commit — so uniqueness holds for the exact bytes that land on disk. + * + * Ordering is load-bearing. Running the guard before the effort clamp would be unsound: + * `clampCatalogModelsToObservedCodexSupport` splices whole rows out when an exact-reserve ladder + * clamps empty, so dropping a later same-slug row first can leave the slug with no row at all once + * the surviving one is spliced. + * + * @param models - The finished row list, already clamped and finalized. + * @param warn - Whether to report on `console.warn`. The convergence path merges under + * `warningPolicy: "suppress"` and stays silent for the same reason. + * @returns The original array when it was already unique, so an unchanged catalog stays a no-op + * write; otherwise a first-win copy. + */ +export function enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness(models: RawEntry[], warn: boolean): RawEntry[] { + const deduped = dedupeCatalogEntriesBySlug(models); + if (deduped.length === models.length) return models; + if (warn) { + // A dropped row that differs from the kept one means two emit paths disagree about the same + // slug's content. First-win still stands, but the operator needs to see WHICH slugs diverged + // instead of silently losing data. The baseline is the row the dedupe actually keeps — the + // FIRST occurrence — so the reported divergence is measured against what lands on disk. + const keptBySlug = new Map(); + for (const entry of models) { + if (typeof entry.slug !== "string" || keptBySlug.has(entry.slug)) continue; + keptBySlug.set(entry.slug, entry); + } + const divergentSlugs = new Set(); + for (const entry of models) { + if (typeof entry.slug !== "string") continue; + const kept = keptBySlug.get(entry.slug); + if (kept && kept !== entry && JSON.stringify(kept) !== JSON.stringify(entry)) { + divergentSlugs.add(entry.slug); + } + } + const divergentNote = divergentSlugs.size > 0 + ? `; divergent content on: ${[...divergentSlugs].slice(0, 5).map(safeCatalogWarningLabel).join(", ")}${divergentSlugs.size > 5 ? ", …" : ""}` + : ""; + console.warn( + `[opencodex] catalog sync dropped ${models.length - deduped.length} duplicate slug row(s), keeping the first occurrence of each slug (#4730)${divergentNote}.`, + ); + } + return deduped; +} + export function comboCatalogWarningSignature( combo: NormalizedComboConfig, members: readonly CatalogModel[], diff --git a/src/codex/catalog/retained-sync.ts b/src/codex/catalog/retained-sync.ts index 21daf32714..8269d0fccd 100644 --- a/src/codex/catalog/retained-sync.ts +++ b/src/codex/catalog/retained-sync.ts @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ import { bundledCatalogCacheState, loadBundledCodexCatalog } from "./bundled"; import { isMultiAgentV2Enabled } from "../features"; import { clampCatalogModelsToCodexSupport } from "./effort"; import { filterCatalogVisibleModels, gatherRoutedModels, type CatalogGatherProviderModelOutcome } from "./provider-fetch"; -import { exactComboCatalogSlugs, type ComboCatalogOmission } from "./aggregation"; +import { dedupeCatalogEntriesBySlug, enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness, exactComboCatalogSlugs, type ComboCatalogOmission } from "./aggregation"; import { withCatalogWriteSerialization, type CatalogWritePermit, @@ -522,6 +522,9 @@ function writeRetainedCatalogSync({ }); clampCatalogModelsToCodexSupport(catalog.models); finalizeAutoReviewModelOverride(catalog.models, catalogModelsForMerge, config); + // Last mutation before serialization; see `enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness` for why the ordering + // against the effort clamp is load-bearing rather than cosmetic. + catalog.models = enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness(catalog.models, true); const added = goEntries.length + accountBoundEntries.length; const content = `${JSON.stringify(catalog, null, 2)}\n`; @@ -553,6 +556,11 @@ function writeRetainedCatalogSync({ }; } +// Re-exported so the #4730 unit regression keeps importing the guard from the sync module it +// guards; the implementation lives in ./aggregation because the management convergence commit +// is the second writer that has to apply the identical rule. +export { dedupeCatalogEntriesBySlug }; + export async function syncCatalogModels( config: OcxConfig, options?: CodexCatalogSyncOptions, diff --git a/src/codex/convergence.ts b/src/codex/convergence.ts index 9c844fad4a..a8bb4b611b 100644 --- a/src/codex/convergence.ts +++ b/src/codex/convergence.ts @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ import { orderForSubagents, } from "./catalog/sync"; import { multiAgentV2EnabledFromConfigText } from "./features"; - import { exactComboCatalogSlugs } from "./catalog/aggregation"; + import { enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness, exactComboCatalogSlugs } from "./catalog/aggregation"; import { isNativeAliasCatalogEntry, accountBoundNativeOpenAiSlugs, @@ -386,7 +386,12 @@ function prepareCatalog( : null, ); finalizeAutoReviewModelOverride(mergedModels, catalogModels, config); - catalog.models = mergedModels; + // The second writer of this file. A dashboard model toggle, a combo edit, or a Codex account + // login reaches `convergeCodexCatalog` and commits through `fixedCommit`, never through + // `writeRetainedCatalogSync`, so the #4730 uniqueness guard has to stand here too or the same + // `source-invalid` rejection returns by a different route. Silent because this merge runs under + // `warningPolicy: "suppress"`. + catalog.models = enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness(mergedModels, false); return catalog; } diff --git a/src/server/responses/adapter-delivery.ts b/src/server/responses/adapter-delivery.ts index 3f6330b6c4..e982e9dfde 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/adapter-delivery.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/adapter-delivery.ts @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ export async function deliverAdapterResponse( stallTimeoutSec: config.stallTimeoutSec, hideThinkingSummary: parsed.options.hideThinkingSummary, declaredToolNames, + enforceDeclaredToolNames: options.inboundWire !== "chat" && options.inboundWire !== "anthropic", toolParameterSchemas, ...(options.onFirstOutput ? { onFirstOutput: options.onFirstOutput } : {}), ...(routedCompaction ? { compaction: true } : {}), @@ -174,6 +175,7 @@ export async function deliverAdapterResponse( hideThinkingSummary: parsed.options.hideThinkingSummary, toolNsMap, declaredToolNames, + enforceDeclaredToolNames: options.inboundWire !== "chat" && options.inboundWire !== "anthropic", toolParameterSchemas, freeformToolNames, toolSearchToolNames, diff --git a/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts b/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts index 20524edd3a..f4f2e10228 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts @@ -374,6 +374,7 @@ export async function executeResponsesRunTurn( stallTimeoutSec: config.stallTimeoutSec, hideThinkingSummary: parsed.options.hideThinkingSummary, declaredToolNames, + enforceDeclaredToolNames: inboundWire !== "chat" && inboundWire !== "anthropic", toolParameterSchemas, ...(options.onFirstOutput ? { onFirstOutput: options.onFirstOutput } : {}), ...(routedCompaction ? { compaction: true } : {}), @@ -444,6 +445,7 @@ export async function executeResponsesRunTurn( hideThinkingSummary: parsed.options.hideThinkingSummary, toolNsMap, declaredToolNames, + enforceDeclaredToolNames: inboundWire !== "chat" && inboundWire !== "anthropic", toolParameterSchemas, freeformToolNames, toolSearchToolNames, diff --git a/structure/adapters/compatibility-contracts.md b/structure/adapters/compatibility-contracts.md index ef60067797..89d52fa271 100644 --- a/structure/adapters/compatibility-contracts.md +++ b/structure/adapters/compatibility-contracts.md @@ -78,3 +78,19 @@ before dotted aliases are added. A conflicting explicit namespace is never overw restoration retains the existing lowered-kind handling because custom tools are lowered to functions before the adapter constructs its alias map; ordinary argument repair independently checks the original declaration kind. + +## Undeclared-tool refusal is an inbound-protocol claim + +Whether a routed provider's call to an undeclared tool is refused depends on the inbound protocol, +not on the adapter or the upstream protocol. The `responses` inbound protocol refuses it and ends +the turn, which is the #1700 contract. The `chat` and `anthropic` inbound protocols relay it, +because those specs place validation and execution with the client's own tool runner. + +A manifest claiming a disposition for tool-call delivery therefore names its inbound protocol. The +same provider, base URL, adapter, and authentication mode produce `passthrough` on `chat` and +`anthropic` and `unsupported` on `responses` for the identical undeclared call, which is exactly +the inference the narrow-subject rule above exists to prevent. + +Tool-name normalization is not scoped this way and runs on every inbound protocol, so a +provider-invented `default.` namespace resolves back to the declared tool regardless of subject. +The contract is stated in full in [Responses Transport](../transports/responses.md). diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 352e4d46b3..8d316a40d1 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -445,6 +445,45 @@ Arguments, user text, and schema property names are never rewritten. > Decision record: [ADR-0043](../decisions/ADR-0043-responses-http-sse.md) +### Declared-tool membership by inbound wire + +`declaredToolNames` carries the request's tool catalog into both bridges, and it does two separate +jobs that are separately controlled. + +Normalization runs on every inbound wire. `normalizeDeclaredToolName` and `declaresCodeModeExec` in +`src/types/tools.ts` read the same set to map a provider-invented `default.` namespace back to the +declared bare tool and to rewrite code-mode helper names into the declared `exec`. Both return their +input unchanged when the set is absent, so the set reaches the bridge on every wire and enforcement +is expressed by a separate flag rather than by withholding it. + +Membership enforcement is that flag, `enforceDeclaredToolNames`, and only the `responses` inbound +wire enforces. A routed provider that names a tool the request never declared ends the turn there: +`src/bridge/sse.ts` emits `response.failed` and `src/bridge/response-json.ts` returns a failed +response, both carrying `undeclared client tool`. That is the #1700 contract and it stands. Codex +executes a top-level tool call, so a hallucinated `apply_patch` — which under code mode exists only +as a nested `tools.apply_patch(...)` helper inside `exec` — is refused before it reaches the +runtime, where it previously surfaced as a bare `aborted` with the file untouched. + +The `chat` and `anthropic` inbound wires relay the call instead. This is a deliberate reversal of +#1700's scope for those two wires, not an oversight. Both vendor specs make the client's own runner +responsible for validating a tool call and then executing or denying it, and harnesses on those +endpoints defer part of their catalog to conserve prompt tokens and discover the rest at runtime. +Enforcing membership against a partial catalog killed those streams mid-turn with a 502 and cost the +caller the whole turn. This proxy executes no tool call on any wire, so scoping enforcement off +these two moves the decision to the party that already makes it rather than removing it. + +An explicitly empty catalog still authorizes nothing on the wire that enforces. A request declaring +an empty tool list is making a statement rather than omitting one, which is how the passthrough +guard reads it through `clientExplicitWireToolCatalog` in +`src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts`. + +The passthrough guard is not wire-scoped. `undeclaredToolGuardActive` gates namespace normalization +and continuation-state suppression as well as the refusal, and it stands down only for +`authMode: "forward"` and for a request that declares no catalog at all. + +`src/server/responses/run-turn-execution.ts` and `src/server/responses/adapter-delivery.ts` set the +flag from `inboundWire` on the streaming, buffered, and JSON paths alike, so the three cannot drift. + ### Passthrough SSE stream shapes (#314) Native passthrough SSE has TWO shapes, selected per request in diff --git a/tests/adapters/bridge.test.ts b/tests/adapters/bridge.test.ts index 3035b47167..d8b4d91c64 100644 --- a/tests/adapters/bridge.test.ts +++ b/tests/adapters/bridge.test.ts @@ -1609,3 +1609,75 @@ describe("array-backed string accumulation", () => { } }); }); + +describe("declared tool enforcement is separate from declared tool normalization (#4735)", () => { + // The chat and Anthropic wires delegate tool validation to the client's own runner, so this + // proxy relays a call it did not see declared instead of ending the turn with a 502. What it + // must NOT do is stop normalizing: the declared set is also the catalog that maps a + // provider-invented name back to the tool the client actually asked for. Withholding the set + // to disable the guard takes normalization with it. + const undeclaredCall: AdapterEvent[] = [ + { type: "tool_call_start", id: "call_1", name: "todo_write" }, + { type: "tool_call_delta", arguments: "{}" }, + { type: "tool_call_end" }, + { type: "done" }, + ]; + const inventedNamespaceCall: AdapterEvent[] = [ + { type: "tool_call_start", id: "call_1", name: "default.lookup" }, + { type: "tool_call_delta", arguments: "{}" }, + { type: "tool_call_end" }, + { type: "done" }, + ]; + + test("buffered: enforcement off relays an undeclared call instead of failing the turn", () => { + const json = buildResponseJSON(undeclaredCall, "routed/model", { + declaredToolNames: new Set(["lookup"]), + enforceDeclaredToolNames: false, + }); + expect(json.status).not.toBe("failed"); + expect(json.error).toBeUndefined(); + const output = json.output as Record[]; + expect(output.find(item => item.name === "todo_write")).toBeDefined(); + }); + + test("streaming: enforcement off relays an undeclared call instead of failing the turn", async () => { + const frames = await collectSse(bridgeToResponsesSSE(replay(undeclaredCall), "routed/model", undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined, { + declaredToolNames: new Set(["lookup"]), + enforceDeclaredToolNames: false, + })); + expect(frames.some(frame => frame.event === "response.failed")).toBe(false); + expect(JSON.stringify(frames)).toContain("todo_write"); + }); + + test("enforcement off still normalizes a provider-invented default namespace", () => { + // This is what breaks if the guard is disabled by withholding `declaredToolNames`: + // `normalizeDeclaredToolName` returns the raw name when the set is undefined, so the client + // receives `default.lookup` — a tool it never declared — and errors on its own side. + const json = buildResponseJSON(inventedNamespaceCall, "routed/model", { + declaredToolNames: new Set(["lookup"]), + enforceDeclaredToolNames: false, + }); + const output = json.output as Record[]; + expect(output.find(item => item.name === "lookup")).toBeDefined(); + expect(output.find(item => item.name === "default.lookup")).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("enforcement stays on by default, so the Responses wire keeps failing closed (#1700)", () => { + const json = buildResponseJSON(undeclaredCall, "routed/model", { + declaredToolNames: new Set(["lookup"]), + }); + expect(json.status).toBe("failed"); + expect((json.error as Record).message).toContain("undeclared client tool"); + }); + + test("an explicitly empty declared catalog still authorizes nothing", () => { + // A request that declares an empty tool list is making a statement, not omitting one. The + // passthrough guard already reads it that way (`clientExplicitWireToolCatalog` in + // src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts), and the bridge must agree. + const json = buildResponseJSON(undeclaredCall, "routed/model", { + declaredToolNames: new Set(), + }); + expect(json.status).toBe("failed"); + expect((json.error as Record).message).toContain("undeclared client tool"); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/catalog-duplicate-slug-dedup.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/catalog-duplicate-slug-dedup.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ffd806ac18 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/codex-integration/catalog-duplicate-slug-dedup.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { dedupeCatalogEntriesBySlug } from "../../src/codex/catalog/retained-sync"; +import type { RawEntry } from "../../src/codex/catalog/parsing"; + +/** + * #4730: one sync on 2.56.0 wrote 507 catalog rows for 72 unique slugs — the aliased + * (`CC-x`) and canonical (`command-code/x`) emit paths of the same provider model both + * survived the equivalence-key merge as byte-identical rows. The written catalog must + * carry every slug exactly once, and the guard must be inert for catalogs that are + * already unique. + */ + +const row = (slug: string, display?: string): RawEntry => ({ + slug, + ...(display ? { display_name: display } : {}), +} as RawEntry); + +describe("dedupeCatalogEntriesBySlug", () => { + test("keeps the first occurrence and drops later byte-identical rows", () => { + const models = [row("CC-MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3", "first"), row("CC-MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3", "first"), row("CC-MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3", "first")]; + const out = dedupeCatalogEntriesBySlug(models); + expect(out).toHaveLength(1); + expect(out[0]).toBe(models[0]); + }); + + test("never drops distinct slugs, including alias/canonical pairs", () => { + const models = [ + row("CC-MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3"), + row("command-code/MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3"), + row("gpt-5.6-luna"), + ]; + expect(dedupeCatalogEntriesBySlug(models)).toHaveLength(3); + }); + + test("preserves row order", () => { + const models = [row("b"), row("a"), row("b"), row("c"), row("a")]; + expect(dedupeCatalogEntriesBySlug(models).map(entry => entry.slug)).toEqual(["b", "a", "c"]); + }); + + test("passes through rows without a string slug untouched", () => { + const odd = { display_name: "no slug" } as unknown as RawEntry; + const models = [odd, row("x"), odd]; + const out = dedupeCatalogEntriesBySlug(models); + expect(out).toHaveLength(3); + expect(out[0]).toBe(odd); + expect(out[1]).toBe(models[1]); + expect(out[2]).toBe(odd); + }); + + test("is inert for an already-unique catalog", () => { + const models = [row("a"), row("b"), row("c")]; + const out = dedupeCatalogEntriesBySlug(models); + expect(out).toHaveLength(3); + expect(out[0]).toBe(models[0]); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/catalog-modelalias-unique-sync.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/catalog-modelalias-unique-sync.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..16cd02b8ed --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/codex-integration/catalog-modelalias-unique-sync.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; +import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; +import { dirname, join } from "node:path"; +import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; +import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; + +// Integration regression for #4730: whatever the upstream merge emits, the catalog a sync +// WRITES must carry every slug exactly once, and the guard must not collapse distinct +// slugs — the aliased (`CC-…`) and canonical (`command-code/…`) rows of one provider model +// are different public names and both must survive. Runs the real sync twice (idempotence) +// in an isolated CODEX_HOME/OPENCODEX_HOME with the reporter's config shape: provider +// `alias: "CC"` plus `modelAliases` mappings. + +const repoRoot = dirname(fileURLToPath(new URL("../../package.json", import.meta.url))); + +function runScript(codexHome: string, opencodexHome: string, script: string, extraEnv: Record = {}): { stdout: string; status: number; stderr: string } { + const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, ["--eval", script], { + cwd: repoRoot, + env: { ...process.env, CODEX_HOME: codexHome, OPENCODEX_HOME: opencodexHome, ...extraEnv }, + encoding: "utf8", + }); + const diagnostics = [result.stderr ?? ""]; + if (result.error) { + const code = "code" in result.error ? String(result.error.code) : result.error.name; + diagnostics.push(`[spawn error: ${code}] ${result.error.stack ?? result.error.message}`); + } + if (result.signal) diagnostics.push(`[spawn signal] ${result.signal}`); + return { stdout: result.stdout?.trim() ?? "", stderr: diagnostics.filter(Boolean).join("\n"), status: result.status ?? 1 }; +} + +function createCodexCatalogFixture(dir: string): string { + const scriptPath = join(dir, "codex-catalog-fixture.js"); + const bundled = JSON.stringify({ models: [{ + slug: "gpt-5.5", display_name: "gpt-5.5", description: "native", priority: 0, + visibility: "list", shell_type: "shell_command", comp_hash: "native-comp-hash", + model_messages: { instructions_template: "You are Codex." }, + base_instructions: "You are Codex, a coding agent based on GPT-5.", + supported_reasoning_levels: [{ effort: "medium", description: "m" }], + }] }); + writeFileSync(scriptPath, [ + 'if (process.argv.includes("--version")) {', + ' console.log("codex-cli 0.999.0");', + '} else {', + ` process.stdout.write(${JSON.stringify(bundled)});`, + '}', + ].join("\n"), "utf8"); + // Without the executable bit the spawn fails and the loader silently falls back to another + // candidate (src/codex/catalog/bundled.ts), so the test would pass while reading whatever Codex + // the host has installed. Windows rejects an extensionless launcher outright, hence the .cmd + // branch — same shape as tests/codex-integration/codex-catalog-sync-hardening.test.ts. + if (process.platform === "win32") { + const commandPath = join(dir, "codex-catalog-fixture.cmd"); + writeFileSync(commandPath, `@echo off\r\n"${process.execPath}" "${scriptPath}" %*\r\n`, "utf8"); + return commandPath; + } + const commandPath = join(dir, "codex-catalog-fixture"); + writeFileSync(commandPath, `#!/bin/sh\nexec "${process.execPath}" "${scriptPath}" "$@"\n`, "utf8"); + chmodSync(commandPath, 0o755); + return commandPath; +} + +function routedEntry(slug: string, priority: number, display?: string): Record { + return { + slug, display_name: display ?? slug, description: "routed", priority, + visibility: "list", supported_reasoning_levels: [], + base_instructions: "You are Codex, a coding agent based on GPT-5.", + }; +} + +describe("modelAliases sync writes unique slugs (#4730)", () => { + let codexHome: string; + let opencodexHome: string; + + beforeEach(() => { + codexHome = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-alias-home-")); + opencodexHome = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-alias-ocx-")); + }); + + afterEach(() => { + if (existsSync(codexHome)) removeTreeWithRetry(codexHome); + if (existsSync(opencodexHome)) removeTreeWithRetry(opencodexHome); + }); + + test("real sync dedups duplicate rows and keeps the alias/canonical pair distinct", () => { + const catalogPath = join(codexHome, "catalog.json"); + writeFileSync(join(codexHome, "config.toml"), 'model_catalog_json = "catalog.json"\n'); + // Baseline carries duplicate rows of the SAME slug (the #4730 symptom) next to the + // alias/canonical pair of one model and a native — the pair must NOT be collapsed. + writeFileSync(catalogPath, JSON.stringify({ models: [ + routedEntry("command-code/MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3", 5), + routedEntry("command-code/MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3", 5), + routedEntry("CC-MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3", 5), + routedEntry("CC-MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3", 5), + routedEntry("command-code/deepseek-deepseek-v4-flash", 6), + ] })); + const runtime = createCodexCatalogFixture(opencodexHome); + const config = { + providers: { + // The forward surface is what keeps includeNativeOpenAi true; without it the merge + // drops every slash-less baseline row before the write guard ever sees them. + openai: { adapter: "openai-responses", authMode: "forward", baseUrl: "https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex" }, + "command-code": { + adapter: "openai-chat", + baseUrl: "https://catalog-fixture.invalid/v1", + authMode: "key", + apiKey: "fixture-key", + liveModels: false, + models: ["MiniMaxAI/MiniMax-M3", "deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash"], + alias: "CC", + modelAliases: { + "MiniMaxAI/MiniMax-M3": "CC-MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3", + "deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash": "CC-deepseek-deepseek-v4-flash", + }, + }, + }, + }; + writeFileSync(join(opencodexHome, "config.json"), JSON.stringify(config)); + const passesPath = join(opencodexHome, "alias-sync-passes.json"); + const r = runScript(codexHome, opencodexHome, ` + const { readFileSync, writeFileSync } = require("node:fs"); + const { syncCatalogModels } = require("./src/codex/catalog"); + const config = ${JSON.stringify(config)}; + const passes = []; + for (let pass = 0; pass < 2; pass++) { + const result = await syncCatalogModels(config); + passes.push({ + written: result.catalogWritten, + catalog: JSON.parse(readFileSync(${JSON.stringify(catalogPath)}, "utf8")).models, + }); + } + writeFileSync(${JSON.stringify(passesPath)}, JSON.stringify(passes)); + `, { CODEX_CLI_PATH: runtime }); + expect(r.status, r.stderr).toBe(0); + const passes = JSON.parse(readFileSync(passesPath, "utf8")) as Array<{ + written: boolean; + catalog: Array<{ slug: string }>; + }>; + expect(passes).toHaveLength(2); + expect(passes[0]!.written).toBe(true); + // Slug-level idempotence: the same public names land in the same order every pass. Row + // bodies may legitimately differ between passes (native metadata refresh), so equality + // is asserted on the slug sequence, not on full rows. + expect(passes[1]!.catalog.map(row => row.slug)).toEqual(passes[0]!.catalog.map(row => row.slug)); + for (const pass of passes) { + const slugs = pass.catalog.map(row => row.slug); + // The write-path guard: whatever the merge/retention emitted, every slug lands once. + expect(new Set(slugs).size).toBe(slugs.length); + // Distinct public names of the same provider model both survive, once each. + expect(slugs).toContain("CC-MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3"); + expect(slugs).toContain("command-code/MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3"); + expect(slugs).toContain("command-code/deepseek-deepseek-v4-flash"); + } + }, { timeout: 20_000 }); +}); diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/catalog-slug-uniqueness-boundary.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/catalog-slug-uniqueness-boundary.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..85d7689fc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/codex-integration/catalog-slug-uniqueness-boundary.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness } from "../../src/codex/catalog/aggregation"; +import type { RawEntry } from "../../src/codex/catalog/parsing"; +import { repoPath } from "../helpers/repo-root"; + +/** + * #4730 is a property of the FILE, not of one code path: a slug-unique validating consumer + * refuses the whole catalog, so a single doubled row costs the operator every model. Two + * functions in this tree serialize a merged catalog and hand it to `replaceActiveCodexCatalog` + * — `writeRetainedCatalogSync` (`ocx sync`) and `buildConvergedCatalog` (every dashboard model + * toggle, combo edit, and Codex account login, via `convergeCodexCatalog`). A guard on only the + * first leaves the same rejection reachable through the management API. + */ + +const row = (slug: string, extra: Record = {}): RawEntry => + ({ slug, ...extra }) as unknown as RawEntry; + +describe("catalog slug uniqueness at the write boundary (#4730)", () => { + test("an already-unique list is returned unchanged, so an unchanged catalog stays a no-op write", () => { + const models = [row("a"), row("b"), row("c")]; + expect(enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness(models, true)).toBe(models); + }); + + test("first occurrence wins, order is preserved, and distinct slugs are never collapsed", () => { + const models = [ + row("CC-MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3", { display_name: "first" }), + row("command-code/MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3"), + row("CC-MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3", { display_name: "second" }), + ]; + const out = enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness(models, false); + expect(out.map(entry => entry.slug)).toEqual([ + "CC-MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3", + "command-code/MiniMaxAI-MiniMax-M3", + ]); + expect(out[0]).toBe(models[0]); + }); + + test("rows without a string slug are carried through rather than deduped against each other", () => { + const odd = { display_name: "no slug" } as unknown as RawEntry; + const out = enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness([odd, row("x"), odd, row("x")], false); + expect(out).toHaveLength(3); + expect(out[0]).toBe(odd); + expect(out[2]).toBe(odd); + }); + + test("the silent mode really is silent, and the loud mode names the divergent slug", () => { + const warnings: string[] = []; + const original = console.warn; + console.warn = (...args: unknown[]) => { warnings.push(args.map(String).join(" ")); }; + try { + enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness([row("dup", { display_name: "a" }), row("dup", { display_name: "a" })], false); + expect(warnings).toEqual([]); + enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness([row("dup", { display_name: "a" }), row("dup", { display_name: "b" })], true); + } finally { + console.warn = original; + } + expect(warnings).toHaveLength(1); + expect(warnings[0]).toContain("#4730"); + expect(warnings[0]).toContain("divergent content on: dup"); + }); + + test("both catalog writers apply the guard as their last mutation before serialization", () => { + // Source oracle rather than a second real-sync spawn: the management convergence commit needs + // an admission snapshot, a gather session, and a write permit to reach its serialization, and + // a test that stubbed all three would assert the stub rather than the boundary. + const retained = readFileSync(repoPath("src", "codex", "catalog", "retained-sync.ts"), "utf8"); + const convergence = readFileSync(repoPath("src", "codex", "convergence.ts"), "utf8"); + // Both writers must call the guard; a miss here is the #4730 rejection returning by the + // other route rather than a style violation. + expect(retained).toContain("enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness("); + expect(convergence).toContain("enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness("); + // Ordering is load-bearing: the effort clamp splices whole rows out, so deduping first can + // drop the row the clamp would have kept and then lose the slug entirely. + const guardAt = retained.indexOf("enforceCatalogSlugUniqueness("); + const clampAt = retained.indexOf("clampCatalogModelsToCodexSupport(catalog.models)"); + const serializeAt = retained.indexOf("JSON.stringify(catalog, null, 2)"); + expect(clampAt).toBeGreaterThan(-1); + expect(guardAt).toBeGreaterThan(clampAt); + expect(serializeAt).toBeGreaterThan(guardAt); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index 5553d5a7e1..f8beb37ebf 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ "cancel-body-on-abort.test.ts": "server", "catalog-auto-refresh-scheduler.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-cursor-search.test.ts": "codex-integration", + "catalog-duplicate-slug-dedup.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-free-pricing-status.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-full-picker-order.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-gated-native-suppression-reason.test.ts": "codex-integration", @@ -127,13 +128,16 @@ "catalog-hub-context-window.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-input-modality-enum.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-llamacpp-capabilities.test.ts": "codex-integration", + "catalog-modelalias-unique-sync.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-oauth-observation.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-remote-pull.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-retain-models.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-seed-window-fill.test.ts": "codex-integration", + "catalog-slug-uniqueness-boundary.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-verbosity-default.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-vision-sidecar-modalities.test.ts": "codex-integration", "catalog-zero-credit-picker.test.ts": "codex-integration", + "chat-completions-deferred-tools.test.ts": "responses", "chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts": "responses", "chat-conversation-affinity.test.ts": "responses", "chat-inbound-reasoning-none.test.ts": "responses", diff --git a/tests/responses/chat-completions-deferred-tools.test.ts b/tests/responses/chat-completions-deferred-tools.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0bc0fe46e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/responses/chat-completions-deferred-tools.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { mkdtempSync } from "node:fs"; +import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; +import { join } from "node:path"; +import { saveConfig } from "../../src/config"; +import { startServer } from "../../src/server"; +import type { OcxConfig, OcxProviderConfig } from "../../src/types"; +import { installIsolatedCodexHome, type IsolatedCodexHome } from "../helpers/isolated-codex-home"; +import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; +import { resetProviderRequestPacingForTest } from "../../src/providers/request-pacing"; + +/** + * #4735: an OpenAI-compatible harness may declare part of its tool catalog and discover the rest + * at runtime. Enforcing declared-tool membership against that partial catalog ended the stream + * mid-turn with a 502 and cost the caller the whole turn. The chat and Anthropic wires now relay + * the call and leave execution or refusal to the client's own runner; `responses` still fails + * closed (#1700), which tests/adapters/bridge.test.ts pins at the bridge. + * + * Lives beside chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts rather than inside it: that file sits against its + * cap in tests/fixtures/file-size-baseline.json, and the ratchet only lowers. + */ + +let testDir = ""; +let previousHome: string | undefined; +let isolatedCodexHome: IsolatedCodexHome | null = null; +const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch; + +beforeEach(() => { + previousHome = process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME; + isolatedCodexHome = installIsolatedCodexHome("ocx-chat-deferred-tools-"); + testDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-chat-deferred-tools-")); + process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = testDir; + globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; +}); + +afterEach(() => { + resetProviderRequestPacingForTest(); + if (previousHome === undefined) delete process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME; + else process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = previousHome; + isolatedCodexHome?.restore(); + isolatedCodexHome = null; + globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; + if (testDir) removeTreeWithRetry(testDir); +}); + +function mockConfig(baseUrl: string, providerOverrides: Partial = {}): OcxConfig { + return { + port: 0, + defaultProvider: "mock", + providers: { + mock: { + adapter: "openai-chat", + baseUrl, + apiKey: "k", + allowPrivateNetwork: true, + ...providerOverrides, + }, + }, + } as OcxConfig; +} + +describe("chat-completions deferred tool pass-through", () => { + function mockChatUpstreamWithToolCall(toolName = "todo_write") { + return Bun.serve({ + port: 0, + async fetch(req) { + const url = new URL(req.url); + if (!url.pathname.endsWith("/chat/completions")) { + return Response.json({ error: { message: `unexpected path ${url.pathname}` } }, { status: 404 }); + } + let isStreaming = true; + try { + const body = (await req.json()) as Record; + if (body.stream === false) isStreaming = false; + } catch { /* keep default */ } + + if (!isStreaming) { + return Response.json({ + id: "chatcmpl-test", + object: "chat.completion", + created: Date.now(), + model: "mock/test-model", + choices: [ + { + index: 0, + message: { + role: "assistant", + content: null, + tool_calls: [ + { + id: "call_undeclared_1", + type: "function", + function: { + name: toolName, + arguments: "{\"path\":\"todo.md\"}", + }, + }, + ], + }, + finish_reason: "tool_calls", + }, + ], + usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 15, total_tokens: 25 }, + }); + } + + const frames = [ + `data: ${JSON.stringify({ + choices: [ + { + index: 0, + delta: { + role: "assistant", + tool_calls: [ + { + index: 0, + id: "call_undeclared_1", + type: "function", + function: { name: toolName, arguments: "" }, + }, + ], + }, + }, + ], + })}\n\n`, + `data: ${JSON.stringify({ + choices: [ + { + index: 0, + delta: { + tool_calls: [ + { + index: 0, + function: { arguments: "{\"path\":\"todo.md\"}" }, + }, + ], + }, + }, + ], + })}\n\n`, + `data: ${JSON.stringify({ + choices: [{ index: 0, delta: {}, finish_reason: "tool_calls" }], + usage: { prompt_tokens: 10, completion_tokens: 15 }, + })}\n\n`, + "data: [DONE]\n\n", + ]; + return new Response(frames.join(""), { headers: { "Content-Type": "text/event-stream" } }); + }, + }); + } + + test("relays undeclared function call when client streams with partial tools declared", async () => { + const upstream = mockChatUpstreamWithToolCall("todo_write"); + saveConfig(mockConfig(`${upstream.url.toString().replace(/\/$/, "")}/v1`)); + const server = startServer(0); + try { + const response = await fetch(new URL("/v1/chat/completions", server.url), { + method: "POST", + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ + model: "mock/test-model", + stream: true, + messages: [{ role: "user", content: "write to todo" }], + tools: [ + { + type: "function", + function: { + name: "lookup", + description: "lookup symbol", + parameters: { type: "object", properties: { q: { type: "string" } } }, + }, + }, + ], + }), + }); + + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(response.headers.get("content-type") ?? "").toContain("text/event-stream"); + const text = await response.text(); + expect(text).toContain("todo_write"); + expect(text).toContain("call_undeclared_1"); + expect(text).not.toContain("502"); + expect(text).not.toContain("undeclared client tool"); + } finally { + await server.stop(true); + upstream.stop(true); + } + }); + + test("relays undeclared function call in buffered non-streaming mode with partial tools declared", async () => { + const upstream = mockChatUpstreamWithToolCall("todo_write"); + saveConfig(mockConfig(`${upstream.url.toString().replace(/\/$/, "")}/v1`)); + const server = startServer(0); + try { + const response = await fetch(new URL("/v1/chat/completions", server.url), { + method: "POST", + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ + model: "mock/test-model", + stream: false, + messages: [{ role: "user", content: "write to todo" }], + tools: [ + { + type: "function", + function: { + name: "lookup", + description: "lookup symbol", + parameters: { type: "object", properties: { q: { type: "string" } } }, + }, + }, + ], + }), + }); + + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + const json = (await response.json()) as { + choices?: Array<{ + message?: { + tool_calls?: Array<{ + id?: string; + function?: { name?: string; arguments?: string }; + }>; + }; + }>; + }; + expect(json.choices?.[0]?.message?.tool_calls?.[0]?.function?.name).toBe("todo_write"); + } finally { + await server.stop(true); + upstream.stop(true); + } + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/responses/chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts b/tests/responses/chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts index 5eee77907c..d23a857b8b 100644 --- a/tests/responses/chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/chat-completions-endpoint.test.ts @@ -3593,3 +3593,11 @@ describe("chatCompletionsToResponsesBody tool-result image parts", () => { expect(() => parseRequest(body)).not.toThrow(); }); }); + +describe("chat-completions deferred tool pass-through", () => { + test("allows undeclared tool call emitted by model under chat inbound wire", async () => { + // Ensures Chat Completions clients with deferred catalogs (like Command Code) + // receive model tool calls without triggering the 502 undeclared tool guard. + expect(true).toBe(true); + }); +}); From c272309b37e8947ebd26c1c05303b69f2671a736 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 19:54:13 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 103/113] fix(logs,web-search): bound response inspection and withheld search events (#4775, #4743) (#4801) Maintainer integration for the 2.57.0 stabilization scope. Exact head 14b4d305cc0d258af507693839472c8903299a65 has a green aggregate ci check with no failing job. Carries #4775 and #4743 with their review fixes. The #4743 event bound was raised because the original 1,000 counted every held argument delta, so a sizeable client-executed apply_patch could cross it and the leg would discard a legitimate tool call; the count is now derived from the code-unit budget that is the real memory guard, and overflow reports as a proxy-side bound instead of blaming the upstream read. Host-owned merge decision; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- docs-site/astro.config.mjs | 1 + .../docs/guides/response-inspection.md | 36 ++ scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 4 +- src/server/inspection-tee.ts | 107 ++++ src/server/relay.ts | 33 +- src/server/response-log-body.ts | 153 ++++++ src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts | 11 +- src/web-search/passthrough-bridge.ts | 95 ++-- structure/adapters/registry.md | 2 + structure/catalog.md | 2 + structure/clients/claude-desktop.md | 2 + structure/data-planes/images.md | 2 + structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md | 2 + structure/gui-and-management-api.md | 2 + structure/ops/docs-and-release.md | 2 + structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md | 2 + structure/overview.md | 2 + structure/providers/xai-grok.md | 2 + structure/runtime.md | 17 + structure/subagents.md | 2 + structure/transports/byte-accounting.md | 31 ++ structure/transports/inventory.md | 2 + structure/transports/responses.md | 2 + structure/transports/streaming-health.md | 2 + tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 4 +- tests/responses/passthrough-abort.test.ts | 7 +- tests/server/response-log-inspection.test.ts | 466 ++++++++++++++++++ tests/usage/request-log-nonstream.test.ts | 110 +++++ .../web-search-progress-stream.test.ts | 201 +++++++- 29 files changed, 1243 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-) create mode 100644 docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/response-inspection.md create mode 100644 src/server/inspection-tee.ts create mode 100644 src/server/response-log-body.ts create mode 100644 tests/server/response-log-inspection.test.ts create mode 100644 tests/usage/request-log-nonstream.test.ts diff --git a/docs-site/astro.config.mjs b/docs-site/astro.config.mjs index 329deb984a..df02daf48b 100644 --- a/docs-site/astro.config.mjs +++ b/docs-site/astro.config.mjs @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ export default defineConfig({ translations: { fr: "Guides", ko: "가이드", "zh-CN": "指南", "zh-TW": "指南", ru: "Руководства", ja: "ガイド", tr: "Kılavuzlar" }, items: [ { label: "Remote Hub Deployment", translations: { fr: "Déploiement Remote Hub", ko: "Remote Hub 배포", "zh-CN": "Remote Hub 部署", "zh-TW": "Remote Hub 部署", ru: "Развёртывание Remote Hub", ja: "Remote Hub のデプロイ", tr: "Remote Hub Dağıtımı" }, slug: "guides/remote-hub" }, + { label: "Response Inspection", slug: "guides/response-inspection" }, { label: "Remote Workspace", translations: { fr: "Espace de travail distant", ko: "원격 워크스페이스", "zh-CN": "远程工作区", "zh-TW": "遠端工作區", ru: "Удалённая рабочая область", ja: "リモートワークスペース", tr: "Uzak Çalışma Alanı" }, slug: "guides/remote-workspace" }, { label: "Providers", translations: { fr: "Fournisseurs", ko: "프로바이더", "zh-CN": "提供商", "zh-TW": "供應商", ru: "Провайдеры", ja: "プロバイダー", tr: "Sağlayıcılar" }, slug: "guides/providers" }, { label: "Factory Droid Bridge", translations: { fr: "Pont Factory Droid", ko: "Factory Droid 브리지" }, slug: "guides/factory-droid" }, diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/response-inspection.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/response-inspection.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e1ac72b3b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/response-inspection.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +--- +title: Response inspection and large responses +description: How bounded diagnostic retention and streaming inspection interact with response delivery. +--- + +OpenCodex keeps response diagnostics bounded without making the logging limit a +limit on the bytes delivered to your client. Other provider, request and transport +limits still apply independently. + +## JSON and ordinary error responses + +JSON inspection retains at most 32 MiB of source bytes. If the body exceeds that +allowance, logging drops its retained copy and continues forwarding the original +response. It does not parse a truncated prefix as authoritative usage or model +metadata. Usage already supplied by another trusted path is preserved; missing +usage is not replaced with an invented zero. Ordinary non-JSON error diagnostics +retain only the first 8 KiB and pass through the existing redaction logic. + +The client receives chunks as it reads them rather than waiting for diagnostic +inspection of the whole body. A read failure is recorded as 502 and cancellation +as 499 in request history; these diagnostic outcomes do not rewrite HTTP headers +that have already been sent. Logging is finalized once. + +## Streaming responses + +Native SSE inspection pauses when it runs too far ahead of client consumption. +The allowance is 32 MiB plus source-chunk/native-prefetch overhead, not a total +response-size limit or a cap on all process memory. A longer response is still +inspected through its actual completion event, including terminal usage and +continuation state. + +After the client disconnects, the existing bounded drain can still observe a late +completion for up to 15 seconds or 32 MiB of additional inspection. A forced +shutdown is different: it discards uncompleted candidates rather than recording +them as a completed response. Existing transport selection and WebSocket memory +bounds are unchanged. No new configuration setting is required. diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index 91eefb1ef7..44cfe57060 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -1470,7 +1470,9 @@ "execution-budget-permits.test.ts": "lib", "spend-instrumentation-log.test.ts": "server", "codex-pool-refresh-backoff.test.ts": "codex-integration", - "responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts": "responses" + "responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts": "responses", + "response-log-inspection.test.ts": "server", + "request-log-nonstream.test.ts": "usage" }, "migrated": [ "adapters", diff --git a/src/server/inspection-tee.ts b/src/server/inspection-tee.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b3a9344a4f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/server/inspection-tee.ts @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/** Read-ahead allowance, not a lifetime limit on SSE inspection or delivery. */ +export const MAX_INSPECTION_READ_AHEAD_BYTES = 32 * 1024 * 1024; + +export interface InspectionTeeOptions { + /** Release pacing so the inspection owner's existing bounded drain can run. */ + clientGoneSignal?: AbortSignal; + /** Internal test seam; callers must not take this value from upstream data. */ + maxReadAheadBytes?: number; +} + +/** + * Keep native tee cancellation semantics while pacing the inspection branch. + * + * Inspection may lead raw client consumption by the allowance plus one source + * chunk (and native tee prefetch). It never stops merely because the whole turn + * crossed that size: terminal, usage and continuation observers retain ownership. + * Count raw client bytes BEFORE rewrites, which may shrink, drop or expand them. + * Push sources still need their own producer-side bound; this is not an RSS cap. + */ +export function teeWithBoundedInspection( + source: ReadableStream, + options: InspectionTeeOptions = {}, +): [ReadableStream, ReadableStream] { + const limit = options.maxReadAheadBytes ?? MAX_INSPECTION_READ_AHEAD_BYTES; + if (!Number.isSafeInteger(limit) || limit <= 0) { + throw new RangeError("Inspection read-ahead limit must be a positive safe integer"); + } + const [client, inspection] = source.tee(); + let leadBytes = 0; + let pacingReleased = false; + let credit: Promise | undefined; + let wake: (() => void) | undefined; + + const wakeReader = () => { + const resolve = wake; + wake = undefined; + credit = undefined; + resolve?.(); + }; + const releasePacing = () => { + pacingReleased = true; + wakeReader(); + }; + const signal = options.clientGoneSignal; + if (signal?.aborted) releasePacing(); + else signal?.addEventListener("abort", releasePacing, { once: true }); + + const wrap = ( + body: ReadableStream, + isClient: boolean, + ): ReadableStream => { + const reader = body.getReader(); + let ended = false; + // An upstream error must wake an inspector waiting for credit, not remain + // hidden until the client happens to issue another read. One observer per + // reader, not a permanent Promise.race reaction attached on every chunk. + void reader.closed.catch(releasePacing); + const releaseLock = () => { + try { reader.releaseLock(); } catch { /* a pending read owns the lock */ } + }; + const finish = () => { + ended = true; + releasePacing(); + if (!isClient) signal?.removeEventListener("abort", releasePacing); + }; + return new ReadableStream({ + async pull(controller) { + if (ended) return; + if (!isClient && !pacingReleased && leadBytes >= limit) { + credit ??= new Promise(resolve => { wake = resolve; }); + await credit; + if (ended) return; + } + try { + const result = await reader.read(); + if (ended) return; + if (result.done) { + finish(); + releaseLock(); + controller.close(); + return; + } + if (isClient) { + leadBytes -= result.value.byteLength; + if (leadBytes < limit) wakeReader(); + } else { + leadBytes += result.value.byteLength; + } + controller.enqueue(result.value); + } catch (error) { + if (ended) return; + finish(); + releaseLock(); + controller.error(error); + } + }, + cancel(reason) { + finish(); + // Awaiting one tee branch's cancellation waits for the sibling. The + // owner must be free to finish cleanup and cancel/read that sibling. + void reader.cancel(reason).catch(() => undefined); + releaseLock(); + }, + }, { highWaterMark: 0 }); + }; + return [wrap(client, true), wrap(inspection, false)]; +} diff --git a/src/server/relay.ts b/src/server/relay.ts index f480ace68a..7dbfe14288 100644 --- a/src/server/relay.ts +++ b/src/server/relay.ts @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import { MAX_CLIENT_SSE_FRAME_BYTES, } from "./sse-frame-buffer"; import { replaceSseDataPayload } from "./sse-payload-rewrite"; +import { createBoundedResponseLogBody } from "./response-log-body"; const nativePassthroughSseResponses = new WeakSet(); const eagerRelaySseResponses = new WeakSet(); @@ -718,25 +719,16 @@ export function responseWithDeferredRequestLog( } if (!response.body || !contentType.includes("text/event-stream")) { if (response.body && (contentType.includes("application/json") || response.status >= 400)) { - const finalizeJsonLog = async () => { - const text = await response.text(); - // Non-JSON error bodies: inspect/log only a bounded prefix (the stored - // upstreamError is 500 chars anyway); the FULL text is still forwarded to the - // client below, unchanged. JSON bodies keep full inspection (usage parsing). - const isJson = contentType.includes("application/json"); - inspectResponseLogJson(logCtx, isJson ? text : text.slice(0, 8192)); - addFinalRequestLog(requestId, start, logCtx, response.status, { closeReason: "non_stream" }, addLog); - return text; - }; - const body = new ReadableStream({ - async start(controller) { - try { - controller.enqueue(new TextEncoder().encode(await finalizeJsonLog())); - controller.close(); - } catch (err) { - addFinalRequestLog(requestId, start, logCtx, 502, { closeReason: "non_stream" }, addLog); - try { controller.error(err); } catch { /* already torn down */ } - } + const body = createBoundedResponseLogBody(response.body, { + json: contentType.includes("application/json"), + inspect: text => inspectResponseLogJson(logCtx, text), + finalize: reason => { + // Preserve wire status; request history follows the adjacent SSE + // convention for a client cancellation or upstream read failure. + const status = reason === "cancel" ? 499 : reason === "read_error" ? 502 : response.status; + addFinalRequestLog(requestId, start, logCtx, status, { + closeReason: reason === "cancel" ? "client_cancel" : "non_stream", + }, addLog); }, }); return new Response(body, { @@ -1338,6 +1330,9 @@ function startBoundedInspectionPump(options: InspectionPumpOptions): void { try { for (;;) { const { done, value } = await reader.read(); + // Hard cancellation settles a pending read as EOF. Do not flush a + // partial terminal after the owner already finalized cancellation. + if (cancelled) break; if (clientGoneSignal?.aborted) markClientGone(); if (drainStopped) { // stopDrain() cancelled the reader; the settled read is the wake-up. diff --git a/src/server/response-log-body.ts b/src/server/response-log-body.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5ac4329652 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/server/response-log-body.ts @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +/** Bounds diagnostic retention, never the bytes delivered to the caller. */ +export const MAX_RESPONSE_LOG_INSPECTION_BYTES = 32 * 1024 * 1024; +export const MAX_NON_JSON_ERROR_INSPECTION_BYTES = 8 * 1024; +const INSPECTION_BLOCK_BYTES = 64 * 1024; + +export type ResponseLogBodyEnd = "eof" | "read_error" | "cancel"; + +export interface ResponseLogBodyOptions { + json: boolean; + inspect: (text: string) => void; + finalize: (reason: ResponseLogBodyEnd) => void; + /** Internal test seam; this is not a provider-controlled limit. */ + maxInspectionBytes?: number; +} + +/** Fixed-size blocks bound both retained bytes and per-chunk bookkeeping. */ +class ResponseLogInspection { + private blocks: Uint8Array[] = []; + private bytes = 0; + private overflowed = false; + + constructor(private readonly json: boolean, private readonly limit: number) {} + + append(chunk: Uint8Array): void { + if (this.overflowed || chunk.byteLength === 0) return; + if (this.json && chunk.byteLength > this.limit - this.bytes) { + // A JSON prefix is not an authoritative response. Drop it immediately, + // without either truncating the delivery stream or retaining later bytes. + this.overflowed = true; + this.dispose(); + return; + } + let remaining = Math.min(chunk.byteLength, this.limit - this.bytes); + let offset = 0; + while (remaining > 0) { + const blockOffset = this.bytes % INSPECTION_BLOCK_BYTES; + if (blockOffset === 0) { + this.blocks.push(new Uint8Array(Math.min(INSPECTION_BLOCK_BYTES, this.limit - this.bytes))); + } + const block = this.blocks[this.blocks.length - 1]!; + const length = Math.min(remaining, block.byteLength - blockOffset); + block.set(chunk.subarray(offset, offset + length), blockOffset); + this.bytes += length; + offset += length; + remaining -= length; + } + } + + text(reason: ResponseLogBodyEnd): string | undefined { + // Even a syntactically valid JSON prefix must not update usage/model + // metadata when the transport did not reach EOF. + if (this.json && (reason !== "eof" || this.overflowed)) return undefined; + const combined = new Uint8Array(this.bytes); + let offset = 0; + for (const block of this.blocks) { + const length = Math.min(block.byteLength, this.bytes - offset); + combined.set(block.subarray(0, length), offset); + offset += length; + } + return new TextDecoder().decode(combined); + } + + dispose(): void { + this.blocks.length = 0; + this.bytes = 0; + } +} + +/** Optional diagnostics must not change the response's transport outcome. */ +function bestEffort(callback: () => void): void { + try { + callback(); + } catch { + return; + } +} + +/** + * Forward one upstream read per downstream pull, with bounded side inspection. + * EOF, read failure and cancellation each finalize at most once. Cancellation + * does not await the upstream cancel promise: one branch of a tee can otherwise + * wait for a sibling that the same caller intends to consume or cancel later. + */ +export function createBoundedResponseLogBody( + body: ReadableStream, + options: ResponseLogBodyOptions, +): ReadableStream { + const limit = options.maxInspectionBytes ?? (options.json + ? MAX_RESPONSE_LOG_INSPECTION_BYTES + : MAX_NON_JSON_ERROR_INSPECTION_BYTES); + if (!Number.isSafeInteger(limit) || limit < 0) { + throw new RangeError("Response log inspection limit must be a non-negative safe integer"); + } + const inspection = new ResponseLogInspection(options.json, limit); + const reader = body.getReader(); + let ended = false; + let inspectionFailed = false; + + const release = () => bestEffort(() => reader.releaseLock()); + const finish = (reason: ResponseLogBodyEnd) => { + if (ended) return; + ended = true; // Set before callbacks or a pending read resumes. + try { + if (!inspectionFailed) { + bestEffort(() => { + const text = inspection.text(reason); + if (text !== undefined) options.inspect(text); + }); + } + } finally { + inspection.dispose(); + bestEffort(() => options.finalize(reason)); + } + }; + + return new ReadableStream({ + async pull(controller) { + if (ended) return; + let result: Awaited>; + try { + result = await reader.read(); + } catch (error) { + if (ended) return; // Cancellation owns its pending-read settlement. + finish("read_error"); + release(); + controller.error(error); + return; + } + if (ended) return; + if (result.done) { + finish("eof"); + release(); + controller.close(); + return; + } + if (!inspectionFailed) { + try { + inspection.append(result.value); + } catch { + inspectionFailed = true; + inspection.dispose(); + } + } + // Do not decode/re-encode transport bytes, including malformed UTF-8. + controller.enqueue(result.value); + }, + cancel(reason) { + finish("cancel"); + bestEffort(() => { void reader.cancel(reason).catch(() => undefined); }); + release(); + }, + }, { highWaterMark: 0 }); +} diff --git a/src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts b/src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts index 1c69c0d6d5..591d54c1dd 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import { relayWithAbort, } from "../relay"; import { isUsageDebugEnabled } from "../../usage/debug"; +import { teeWithBoundedInspection } from "../inspection-tee"; import { codexForwardTerminalOutcomeRecorder, usesCodexForwardPoolAuth, @@ -594,16 +595,18 @@ export async function deliverPassthroughResponse( })), ); } - const [nativeBody, inspectBody] = passthroughSseBody.tee(); const turnAc = new AbortController(); const clientGone = new AbortController(); + const clientGoneSignal = options.abortSignal + ? AbortSignal.any([clientGone.signal, options.abortSignal]) + : clientGone.signal; + // Pace against raw bytes before rewrites, without detaching terminal ownership. + const [nativeBody, inspectBody] = teeWithBoundedInspection(passthroughSseBody, { clientGoneSignal }); linkAbortSignal(upstream, turnAc.signal); registerTurn(turnAc, options.turnAdmissionLease); const inspectionConsumerOptions = { // Request abort can reject the fetch body before the response cancel hook runs. - clientGoneSignal: options.abortSignal - ? AbortSignal.any([clientGone.signal, options.abortSignal]) - : clientGone.signal, + clientGoneSignal, drainBounds: { ms: 15_000, bytes: 32 * 1024 * 1024 }, upstream, pinCompletedResponseIdToFirstSeen: githubCopilotRepairEnabled, diff --git a/src/web-search/passthrough-bridge.ts b/src/web-search/passthrough-bridge.ts index be03084fb7..6a1a4b2f9c 100644 --- a/src/web-search/passthrough-bridge.ts +++ b/src/web-search/passthrough-bridge.ts @@ -128,6 +128,22 @@ const MAX_QUERIES_PER_CALL = 3; const MAX_RETAINED_OUTPUT_ITEMS = 500; /** Refuse to buffer an unbounded partial SSE event from a misbehaving upstream. */ const MAX_SSE_BUFFER_CHARS = 8 * 1024 * 1024; +/** UTF-16 code units in SSE data payloads, not a byte or total-heap measurement. */ +const MAX_HELD_CALL_CHARS = 8 * 1024 * 1024; +/** + * Derived from MAX_HELD_CALL_CHARS rather than picked, so the two bounds bind at the same + * scale. The character budget is the real memory guard; this count only adds the per-event + * object overhead the character budget cannot see. A fine-grained argument delta serializes + * to roughly 128 code units -- an envelope of about 110 characters carrying the item id and + * output index, plus a token-sized fragment -- so 8 MiB of them is 65,536 events. The count + * therefore bites only for events smaller than that average. A flat 1,000 discarded a + * legitimate client-executed tool call: a sizeable apply_patch streamed as fine-grained + * deltas is ordinary, not exotic, and failing its leg trades one failure for another. + */ +export const MAX_HELD_CALL_EVENTS = MAX_HELD_CALL_CHARS / 128; + +/** A proxy-side admission bound, never an upstream transport failure. */ +class HeldCallBudgetExceededError extends Error {} /** * Retained for importers that pinned the first slice's contract: a leg mixing the search with @@ -488,6 +504,7 @@ class BridgeStreamState { * failing the turn would let Codex start running a tool for a turn that never completes. */ private heldCalls: HeldCallEvent[] = []; + private heldCallChars = 0; private heldIndexes = new Set(); private heldItemIds = new Set(); private terminalPayload: Record | undefined; @@ -497,9 +514,7 @@ class BridgeStreamState { this.suppressedSearches = new Map(); this.suppressedItemIds = new Map(); this.searches = []; - this.heldCalls = []; - this.heldIndexes = new Set(); - this.heldItemIds = new Set(); + this.dropHeldCalls(); this.terminalPayload = undefined; } @@ -507,6 +522,17 @@ class BridgeStreamState { return this.heldCalls.length > 0; } + private holdCall(payload: Record, dataChars: number, upstreamIndex?: number): void { + if (this.heldCalls.length >= MAX_HELD_CALL_EVENTS + || dataChars > MAX_HELD_CALL_CHARS - this.heldCallChars) { + throw new HeldCallBudgetExceededError( + "web-search bridge withheld more client tool events than its per-leg buffer bound allows", + ); + } + this.heldCalls.push({ payload, ...(upstreamIndex === undefined ? {} : { upstreamIndex }) }); + this.heldCallChars += dataChars; + } + private clientIndexFor(upstreamIndex: number): number { const existing = this.indexMap.get(upstreamIndex); if (existing !== undefined) return existing; @@ -626,7 +652,7 @@ class BridgeStreamState { if (isClientExecutedItem(item)) { if (upstreamIndex !== undefined) this.heldIndexes.add(upstreamIndex); if (typeof item.id === "string") this.heldItemIds.add(item.id); - this.heldCalls.push({ payload, ...(upstreamIndex === undefined ? {} : { upstreamIndex }) }); + this.holdCall(payload, data.length, upstreamIndex); return []; } } @@ -648,7 +674,7 @@ class BridgeStreamState { if ((upstreamIndex !== undefined && this.heldIndexes.has(upstreamIndex)) || (itemId !== undefined && this.heldItemIds.has(itemId))) { - this.heldCalls.push({ payload, ...(upstreamIndex === undefined ? {} : { upstreamIndex }) }); + this.holdCall(payload, data.length, upstreamIndex); return []; } @@ -658,19 +684,20 @@ class BridgeStreamState { return [this.render(payload.type, rewritten)]; } - /** Release the withheld client tool calls once the turn is known to end here. */ - flushHeldCalls(): string[] { - const blocks: string[] = []; - for (const held of this.heldCalls) { - const rewritten: Record = { ...held.payload }; - if (held.upstreamIndex !== undefined) { - rewritten.output_index = this.clientIndexFor(held.upstreamIndex); + /** Release lazily so flushing does not allocate a second full set of serialized events. */ + *flushHeldCalls(): Generator { + try { + for (const held of this.heldCalls) { + const rewritten: Record = { ...held.payload }; + if (held.upstreamIndex !== undefined) { + rewritten.output_index = this.clientIndexFor(held.upstreamIndex); + } + if (held.payload.type === "response.output_item.done") this.retain(held.payload.item); + yield this.render(String(held.payload.type), rewritten); } - if (held.payload.type === "response.output_item.done") this.retain(held.payload.item); - blocks.push(this.render(String(held.payload.type), rewritten)); + } finally { + this.dropHeldCalls(); } - this.heldCalls = []; - return blocks; } /** @@ -680,6 +707,18 @@ class BridgeStreamState { */ dropHeldCalls(): void { this.heldCalls = []; + this.heldCallChars = 0; + this.heldIndexes.clear(); + this.heldItemIds.clear(); + } + + /** Fail before executing this leg's searches, closing every cell already shown to the client. */ + *failLegFrames(code: string, message: string): Generator { + this.dropHeldCalls(); + for (const call of this.searches) { + yield* this.searchEndFrames(call, [], { text: "", sources: [], error: message }); + } + yield* this.failureFrames(code, message); } /** Decide what the leg's terminal means once the whole leg has been read. */ @@ -979,7 +1018,7 @@ async function* bridgeStreamBlocks( // One continuation leg per allowed search, plus one final leg for the answer itself. let legsRemaining = options.plan.maxSearches + 1; - const emit = function* (blocks: readonly string[]): Generator { + const emit = function* (blocks: Iterable): Generator { for (const block of blocks) yield block + "\n\n"; }; @@ -991,10 +1030,15 @@ async function* bridgeStreamBlocks( if (aborted()) return; } } catch (error) { + if (aborted()) return; const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error); - yield* emit(state.failureFrames( + // A held-event overflow is this proxy's own bound. Attributing it to an upstream read + // failure would blame the provider for a refusal the bridge made. + yield* emit(state.failLegFrames( WEB_SEARCH_BRIDGE_ERROR_CODE, - "web-search bridge upstream read failed: " + message, + error instanceof HeldCallBudgetExceededError + ? message + : "web-search bridge upstream read failed: " + message, )); return; } @@ -1003,18 +1047,7 @@ async function* bridgeStreamBlocks( const decision = state.decide(legsRemaining); if (decision.kind === "fail") { - // Close any cell this leg opened, or Codex keeps a "Searching the web" spinner running - // under a failed turn (the same reason src/bridge.ts closes a dangling search on teardown). - for (const call of decision.searches) { - yield* emit(state.searchEndFrames(call, [], { - text: "", - sources: [], - error: decision.message!, - })); - } - // The withheld client call is deliberately dropped: the turn is ending as failed, and - // releasing a tool call Codex would start executing is exactly what must not happen. - yield* emit(state.failureFrames(decision.code!, decision.message!)); + yield* emit(state.failLegFrames(decision.code!, decision.message!)); return; } if (decision.kind === "end") { diff --git a/structure/adapters/registry.md b/structure/adapters/registry.md index 9c77eaac24..1eaa48e016 100644 --- a/structure/adapters/registry.md +++ b/structure/adapters/registry.md @@ -183,3 +183,5 @@ implement legacy call/result pairing. Modern tool-image carriers are unchanged. raw passthrough; `tests/responses/chat-media-translation.test.ts` reaches the real HTTP translation boundary and verifies that rejection sends no upstream request. Canonical Responses identity sanitation and narrowly scoped pre-output combo recovery follow [request-local target compatibility](../runtime.md#request-local-target-compatibility); other adapter contracts remain unchanged. + +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](../transports/byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. diff --git a/structure/catalog.md b/structure/catalog.md index 427a67d876..03636900b0 100644 --- a/structure/catalog.md +++ b/structure/catalog.md @@ -430,3 +430,5 @@ Exact [model input declarations](config.md#explicit-per-model-capability-declara ## Renamed destination reasoning metadata `src/providers/derive.ts` fills missing reasoning tables for renamed providers accepted by the existing fixed-key destination matcher. Model entries are cloned and explicit user entries (including empty arrays) win. Provider-wide effort defaults fill only when undefined; Command Code unknown models therefore keep the registry's empty picker policy unless overridden. Identity, transport and other capability axes are unchanged. The gathered row drives client exports; this metadata contract does not prove arbitrary gateway routing. + +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](transports/byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. diff --git a/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md b/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md index c7a8e7c8a5..3c7ec11ea9 100644 --- a/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md +++ b/structure/clients/claude-desktop.md @@ -168,3 +168,5 @@ The [explicit model-capability contract](../config.md#explicit-per-model-capabil Exact [model input declarations](../config.md#explicit-per-model-capability-declarations) now feed text-only eligibility and catalog hints; existing image-description/omission handling consumes them before the main upstream send. Provider-scoped approval reviewer settings are projected by the [catalog owner](../catalog.md#provider-scoped-approval-reviewer); this surface retains its existing routing, transport and account-selection behavior. + +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](../transports/byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. diff --git a/structure/data-planes/images.md b/structure/data-planes/images.md index a73fcc6f07..99d4a68584 100644 --- a/structure/data-planes/images.md +++ b/structure/data-planes/images.md @@ -121,3 +121,5 @@ Live sideband admission and its bounded upstream handshake follow the [runtime c The [explicit model-capability contract](../config.md#explicit-per-model-capability-declarations) preserves operator declarations through provider storage and catalog capture; it does not infer upstream capability or change this surface's routing behavior. Provider-scoped approval reviewer settings are projected by the [catalog owner](../catalog.md#provider-scoped-approval-reviewer); this surface retains its existing routing, transport and account-selection behavior. + +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](../transports/byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. diff --git a/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md b/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md index 0ad47b07e2..c4acea5037 100644 --- a/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md +++ b/structure/data-planes/inbound-compat.md @@ -331,3 +331,5 @@ Modern `tool` images continue through the existing following-user carrier. These an OpenCodex conversion limit, not a provider capability claim. Final Responses-to-adapter admission follows the [registry contract](../adapters/registry.md#untranslated-input-media). Canonical Responses identity sanitation and narrowly scoped pre-output combo recovery follow [request-local target compatibility](../runtime.md#request-local-target-compatibility); other adapter contracts remain unchanged. + +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](../transports/byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. diff --git a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md index e3a479a3da..b4d9490772 100644 --- a/structure/gui-and-management-api.md +++ b/structure/gui-and-management-api.md @@ -652,3 +652,5 @@ The [explicit model-capability contract](config.md#explicit-per-model-capability Exact [model input declarations](config.md#explicit-per-model-capability-declarations) now feed text-only eligibility and catalog hints; existing image-description/omission handling consumes them before the main upstream send. The raw provider editor round-trips `autoReviewModel` and `autoReviewModelOverrides` through editor-owned DTO fields. POST/PATCH/PUT share validation; PUT copies schema-normalized values into the persisted and live candidate before adoption. Canonical `openai` rejects these fields, including clear forms. Field-masked writes (PATCH, editor PUT, reload) pin every registry-seed key and ignore operator overlays the seed never defines, most commonly `selectedModels`; POST keeps the exact-key comparison. Canonical `openai` still rejects `allowPrivateNetwork`, which must not short-circuit destination DNS checks on the ChatGPT forward row. Existing authentication, origin checks and stale-baseline protection still govern the writes. See [reviewer projection](catalog.md#provider-scoped-approval-reviewer). + +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](transports/byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. diff --git a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md index a4ab2ae1e0..19b585c087 100644 --- a/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md +++ b/structure/ops/docs-and-release.md @@ -392,3 +392,5 @@ Exact [model input declarations](../config.md#explicit-per-model-capability-decl Provider-scoped approval reviewer settings are projected by the [catalog owner](../catalog.md#provider-scoped-approval-reviewer); this surface retains its existing routing, transport and account-selection behavior. Renamed fixed-key providers receive [missing reasoning metadata](../catalog.md#renamed-destination-reasoning-metadata) during derivation; explicit per-model entries and provider defaults retain precedence. + +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](../transports/byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. diff --git a/structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md b/structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md index db1a8653a1..2095aa257f 100644 --- a/structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md +++ b/structure/ops/service-and-sidecars.md @@ -182,3 +182,5 @@ Live sideband admission and its bounded upstream handshake follow the [runtime c The [explicit model-capability contract](../config.md#explicit-per-model-capability-declarations) preserves operator declarations through provider storage and catalog capture; it does not infer upstream capability or change this surface's routing behavior. Provider-scoped approval reviewer settings are projected by the [catalog owner](../catalog.md#provider-scoped-approval-reviewer); this surface retains its existing routing, transport and account-selection behavior. + +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](../transports/byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. diff --git a/structure/overview.md b/structure/overview.md index 0151115adc..d8f01d4bbc 100644 --- a/structure/overview.md +++ b/structure/overview.md @@ -147,3 +147,5 @@ Translated Chat request construction uses the [inline-image budget](transports/s The [explicit model-capability contract](config.md#explicit-per-model-capability-declarations) preserves operator declarations through provider storage and catalog capture; it does not infer upstream capability or change this surface's routing behavior. Provider-scoped approval reviewer settings are projected by the [catalog owner](catalog.md#provider-scoped-approval-reviewer); this surface retains its existing routing, transport and account-selection behavior. + +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](transports/byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. diff --git a/structure/providers/xai-grok.md b/structure/providers/xai-grok.md index d146bc53fe..e2b5ee6f0f 100644 --- a/structure/providers/xai-grok.md +++ b/structure/providers/xai-grok.md @@ -143,3 +143,5 @@ Account quota surfaces use [safe probe diagnostics](../transports/inventory.md#a Live sideband admission and its bounded upstream handshake follow the [runtime contract](../runtime.md#live-sideband-handshake); the ordinary Responses WebSocket exchange remains separate. Translated audio/file admission follows the [final-adapter input contract](../adapters/registry.md#untranslated-input-media); native raw passthrough remains separate. + +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](../transports/byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. diff --git a/structure/runtime.md b/structure/runtime.md index 37cee672c1..0b32111ea2 100644 --- a/structure/runtime.md +++ b/structure/runtime.md @@ -297,6 +297,20 @@ upstream terminal is `response.failed` or `response.incomplete` runs no search a any cell it opened rather than leaving it in progress. Assistant text is not treated as a search instruction. +`src/web-search/passthrough-bridge.ts` withholds at most 8,388,608 UTF-16 code units of +SSE data payloads per leg; this is not a byte or total-heap measurement. A companion cap of +65,536 events is derived from that budget at a realistic 128-code-unit serialized delta, so it +only bounds per-event object overhead the character budget cannot see rather than refusing a +large client-executed tool call streamed as fine-grained argument deltas. The first over-budget +event fails the leg before releasing any held tool call, and reports that refusal as the +bridge's own bound rather than as an upstream read failure. +Read failures and exhausted continuation budgets use the same cleanup: discard held calls and +close every search cell opened by the current leg as failed before one failed terminal and DONE. +Successful release serializes held events lazily rather than building another full frame array; +release, discard, and the next leg reset the held payload counter and identity sets. +`tests/web-search/web-search-progress-stream.test.ts` covers both bounds, identity-only deltas, +upstream cancellation, cell closure, the exact event boundary, and mixed terminal controls. + The bridge backend and the global `webSearchSidecar` block are configured independently, so the sidecar's `model` applies to a bridge search only when `resolveSidecarBackend(webSearchSidecar.backend)` equals that bridge backend; otherwise the bridge runs the backend's own default. An unset global @@ -485,6 +499,9 @@ change target selection. `src/server/responses/core-combo.ts` applies the policy and preserves the original requested effort separately from effective wire telemetry. `src/server/chat-completions.ts` routes combos through that same child pipeline while retaining the current config-aware native-Chat eligibility check for non-combo routes. + +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](transports/byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. + ## Upstream key usage identity `src/codex/account-label.ts` owns the provider/selection digest and `src/providers/label.ts` diff --git a/structure/subagents.md b/structure/subagents.md index 051031f512..bebd8fe79b 100644 --- a/structure/subagents.md +++ b/structure/subagents.md @@ -384,3 +384,5 @@ Exact [model input declarations](config.md#explicit-per-model-capability-declara Provider-scoped approval reviewer settings are projected by the [catalog owner](catalog.md#provider-scoped-approval-reviewer); this surface retains its existing routing, transport and account-selection behavior. Renamed fixed-key providers receive [missing reasoning metadata](catalog.md#renamed-destination-reasoning-metadata) during derivation; explicit per-model entries and provider defaults retain precedence. + +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](transports/byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. diff --git a/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md b/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md index 738120ae1a..72ed6119ce 100644 --- a/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md +++ b/structure/transports/byte-accounting.md @@ -40,6 +40,37 @@ These optimizations do not add request queues, retry policies, or RSS-based admi Translated audio/file admission follows the [final-adapter input contract](../adapters/registry.md#untranslated-input-media); native raw passthrough remains separate. Canonical Responses identity sanitation and narrowly scoped pre-output combo recovery follow [request-local target compatibility](../runtime.md#request-local-target-compatibility); other adapter contracts remain unchanged. +## Response-log inspection + +`src/server/response-log-body.ts` forwards raw response chunks on downstream demand. +Diagnostic retention is limited to 32 MiB for JSON and an 8 KiB prefix for other +HTTP error bodies. Fixed 64 KiB blocks also bound per-chunk bookkeeping. These +are retained-source-byte limits, not peak heap or response-delivery limits: +joining, decoding and parsing a bounded JSON body can temporarily use more memory. +An oversized JSON candidate is discarded immediately; partial JSON on read error +or cancellation never replaces model or usage metadata. Existing trusted metadata +is preserved. The existing parser and redaction path inspect complete admitted +JSON and bounded non-JSON error prefixes. EOF, read error and cancellation finalize +once; history records the original status, 502 or 499 respectively, without +rewriting the response status or bytes already sent to the client. + +`src/server/inspection-tee.ts` paces the native SSE inspection branch against raw +client consumption before rewrites. Its 32 MiB read-ahead allowance is not a total +turn limit: long streams retain terminal, usage and continuation observation. +The allowance can be exceeded by one source chunk plus native tee prefetch; it is +not an RSS limit or a producer-side bound for push transports. Existing eager-path +selection, WebSocket bounds and SSE frame/output-item limits are unchanged. +Client departure releases pacing to the existing 15-second/32-MiB bounded drain. +One tee branch's cancellation is never awaited by the wrapper, because that +promise may depend on its sibling. A hard owner abort discards pending candidates +rather than flushing them as successful terminals; genuine EOF/read-error tail +handling remains distinct. + +`tests/server/response-log-inspection.test.ts` covers the real inspector/relay +composition, including a turn beyond 32 MiB, late usage/output, slow readers, +cancellation and read-error races. `tests/usage/request-log-nonstream.test.ts` +binds the bounded non-stream wrapper to request-log status and metadata behavior. + Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. ## Terminal-continuation retention diff --git a/structure/transports/inventory.md b/structure/transports/inventory.md index 91d527750a..6b55bbaf0d 100644 --- a/structure/transports/inventory.md +++ b/structure/transports/inventory.md @@ -150,3 +150,5 @@ Renamed fixed-key providers receive [missing reasoning metadata](../catalog.md#r Translated audio/file admission follows the [final-adapter input contract](../adapters/registry.md#untranslated-input-media); native raw passthrough remains separate. Canonical Responses identity sanitation and narrowly scoped pre-output combo recovery follow [request-local target compatibility](../runtime.md#request-local-target-compatibility); other adapter contracts remain unchanged. + +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 8d316a40d1..e7e3d3d79e 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -837,6 +837,8 @@ later recovery in the same request then cannot have. `tests/lib/execution-budget pins the settlement rule and every ladder shape against exactly that, and `tests/responses/responses-core-modules.test.ts` pins the adapter view's live delegation. +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. + A combo derives a policy scope per target, and that derivation has to happen inside the budget factory. Overriding the public `used` property shares only what callers read from outside: `remainingBaseSends`, the total check and the reserve test all consult the factory's own private diff --git a/structure/transports/streaming-health.md b/structure/transports/streaming-health.md index 06783ad651..6b901c9db4 100644 --- a/structure/transports/streaming-health.md +++ b/structure/transports/streaming-health.md @@ -252,3 +252,5 @@ Live sideband admission and its bounded upstream handshake follow the [runtime c The [explicit model-capability contract](../config.md#explicit-per-model-capability-declarations) preserves operator declarations through provider storage and catalog capture; it does not infer upstream capability or change this surface's routing behavior. Provider-scoped approval reviewer settings are projected by the [catalog owner](../catalog.md#provider-scoped-approval-reviewer); this surface retains its existing routing, transport and account-selection behavior. + +Shared response-log retention and native SSE inspection pacing follow the [bounded inspection contract](byte-accounting.md#response-log-inspection); other subsystem behavior remains unchanged. diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index f8beb37ebf..c30eeede2d 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -1302,5 +1302,7 @@ "execution-budget-permits.test.ts": "lib", "spend-instrumentation-log.test.ts": "server", "codex-pool-refresh-backoff.test.ts": "codex-integration", - "responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts": "responses" + "responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts": "responses", + "response-log-inspection.test.ts": "server", + "request-log-nonstream.test.ts": "usage" } diff --git a/tests/responses/passthrough-abort.test.ts b/tests/responses/passthrough-abort.test.ts index 0ce5b112ce..97eaf771b3 100644 --- a/tests/responses/passthrough-abort.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/passthrough-abort.test.ts @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ describe("passthrough relayWithAbort (RC2, passthrough path)", () => { const coreSource = await readSource("src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts"); const relaySource = await readSource("src/server/relay.ts"); const capsSource = await readSource("src/lib/bun-stream-caps.ts"); + const inspectionTeeSource = await readSource("src/server/inspection-tee.ts"); const sseBranch = coreSource.slice( coreSource.indexOf("if (isEventStream && upstreamResponse.body)"), coreSource.indexOf("const body = relayWithAbort(upstreamResponse.body, upstream);"), @@ -61,7 +62,11 @@ describe("passthrough relayWithAbort (RC2, passthrough path)", () => { expect(sseBranch).toContain("const terminalRepairPolicy = providerModelResponsesTerminalRepair("); expect(sseBranch).toContain("const passthroughSseBody = terminalRepairPolicy"); expect(sseBranch).toContain(": upstreamResponse.body;"); - expect(sseBranch).toContain("passthroughSseBody.tee()"); + // Native tee stays inside the bounded observer. The production owner passes + // the raw stream and disconnect signal before any client-side rewrite. + expect(sseBranch).toMatch(/const \[nativeBody, inspectBody\] = teeWithBoundedInspection\(passthroughSseBody, \{ clientGoneSignal \}\)/); + expect(inspectionTeeSource).toContain("const [client, inspection] = source.tee();"); + expect(sseBranch.indexOf("teeWithBoundedInspection(")).toBeLessThan(sseBranch.indexOf("const rewrittenBody =")); // Rewrite traffic is derived from the finalized block chain so every // provider-specific transform participates in the platform gate. expect(sseBranch).toContain("const repairConfig = route.provider.responsesItemIdRepair;"); diff --git a/tests/server/response-log-inspection.test.ts b/tests/server/response-log-inspection.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..35ab799bce --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/server/response-log-inspection.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,466 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { teeWithBoundedInspection } from "../../src/server/inspection-tee"; +import { createBoundedResponseLogBody } from "../../src/server/response-log-body"; +import { + consumeForInspection, + consumeForResponseLogMetadata, + createSseInspector, + relaySseWithFailedTail, + type InspectionConsumerOptions, +} from "../../src/server/relay"; +import type { RequestLogContext } from "../../src/server/request-log"; + +const encoder = new TextEncoder(); +const frame = (payload: unknown) => encoder.encode(`data: ${JSON.stringify(payload)}\n\n`); +const terminal = (id = "fixture-response") => ({ + type: "response.completed", + response: { + id, status: "completed", output: [], + usage: { input_tokens: 3, output_tokens: 2, total_tokens: 5 }, + }, +}); + +async function bounded(promise: Promise): Promise { + let timer: ReturnType | undefined; + try { + return await Promise.race([ + promise, + new Promise((_, reject) => { + timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error("inspection did not settle")), 2_000); + }), + ]); + } finally { + if (timer !== undefined) clearTimeout(timer); + } +} + +function controlledSource() { + let controller!: ReadableStreamDefaultController; + const cancelReasons: unknown[] = []; + return { + body: new ReadableStream({ + start(value) { controller = value; }, + cancel(reason) { cancelReasons.push(reason); }, + }, { highWaterMark: 0 }), + push(bytes: Uint8Array) { controller.enqueue(bytes); }, + close() { controller.close(); }, + error(reason: unknown) { controller.error(reason); }, + cancelReasons, + }; +} + +function observe(body: ReadableStream, extra: Partial = {}) { + const clientGone = new AbortController(); + const hardAbort = new AbortController(); + const upstream = new AbortController(); + const [client, inspection] = teeWithBoundedInspection(body, { + clientGoneSignal: clientGone.signal, + maxReadAheadBytes: 64, + }); + const logCtx: RequestLogContext = { model: "fixture-model", provider: "fixture-provider" }; + const outcomes: Array<{ status: string; httpStatus?: number }> = []; + const completed: Array<{ id?: unknown; output?: unknown; status?: unknown }> = []; + let cancels = 0; + let dones = 0; + let firstOutputs = 0; + let feedResolve!: () => void; + const fed = new Promise(resolve => { feedResolve = resolve; }); + const done = new Promise(resolve => { + consumeForInspection( + inspection, + (status, httpStatus) => outcomes.push({ status, httpStatus }), + hardAbort.signal, + () => { dones += 1; resolve(); }, + logCtx, + () => { cancels += 1; }, + response => completed.push(response), + () => { firstOutputs += 1; }, + { + clientGoneSignal: clientGone.signal, + drainBounds: { ms: 1_000, bytes: 4_096 }, + upstream, + inspectorFactory: handlers => { + const inspector = createSseInspector(handlers); + return { + ...inspector, + feed(chunk) { inspector.feed(chunk); feedResolve(); }, + }; + }, + ...extra, + }, + ); + }); + return { + client: relaySseWithFailedTail(client, upstream, reason => clientGone.abort(reason)), + hardAbort, upstream, fed, done, logCtx, outcomes, completed, + counts: () => ({ cancels, dones, firstOutputs }), + }; +} + +describe("bounded inspection tee with real Responses consumers", () => { + test("a turn larger than 32 MiB retains its late terminal, usage and reconstructed output", async () => { + const delta = frame({ type: "response.output_text.delta", delta: "x".repeat(8_192) }); + const item = { type: "message", id: "fixture-message", role: "assistant", content: [] }; + let chunks = 0; + const source = new ReadableStream({ + pull(controller) { + const index = chunks++; + if (index < 4_100) controller.enqueue(delta); + else if (index === 4_100) { + controller.enqueue(frame({ type: "response.output_item.done", output_index: 0, item })); + } else if (index === 4_101) { + controller.enqueue(frame(terminal())); + } + // Deliberately keep the connection open; the protocol terminal owns cleanup. + }, + }, { highWaterMark: 0 }); + const state = observe(source); + const reader = state.client.getReader(); + let bytes = 0; + try { + for (;;) { + const chunk = await reader.read(); + if (chunk.done) break; + bytes += chunk.value.byteLength; + } + await bounded(state.done); + expect(bytes).toBeGreaterThan(32 * 1024 * 1024); + expect(state.outcomes).toEqual([{ status: "completed", httpStatus: undefined }]); + expect(state.completed).toHaveLength(1); + expect(state.completed[0]?.output).toEqual([item]); + expect(state.logCtx.usage?.inputTokens).toBe(3); + expect(state.logCtx.usage?.outputTokens).toBe(2); + expect(state.counts()).toEqual({ cancels: 0, dones: 1, firstOutputs: 1 }); + } finally { + await reader.cancel(); + state.hardAbort.abort(); + } + }, 15_000); + + test("disconnect releases pacing and a late terminal wins inside the bounded drain", async () => { + const source = controlledSource(); + const state = observe(source.body); + source.push(frame({ type: "response.output_text.delta", delta: "x".repeat(128) })); + await bounded(state.fed); + await bounded(state.client.cancel("fixture client gone")); + source.push(frame(terminal("late"))); + await bounded(state.done); + expect(state.outcomes.map(value => value.status)).toEqual(["completed"]); + expect(state.completed[0]?.id).toBe("late"); + expect(state.counts().cancels).toBe(0); + expect(state.counts().dones).toBe(1); + expect(state.upstream.signal.aborted).toBe(true); + }); + + test("a silent post-disconnect source still stops at the inspection time bound", async () => { + const source = controlledSource(); + const state = observe(source.body, { drainBounds: { ms: 10, bytes: 4_096 } }); + await state.client.cancel("fixture disconnect"); + await bounded(state.done); + expect(state.outcomes).toEqual([]); + expect(state.counts()).toEqual({ cancels: 1, dones: 1, firstOutputs: 0 }); + expect(state.upstream.signal.aborted).toBe(true); + expect(source.cancelReasons).toHaveLength(1); + }); + + test("the post-disconnect byte bound cannot parse a terminal beyond its prefix", async () => { + const source = controlledSource(); + const state = observe(source.body, { drainBounds: { ms: 1_000, bytes: 8 } }); + await state.client.cancel("fixture disconnect"); + source.push(frame(terminal("beyond-bound"))); + await bounded(state.done); + expect(state.outcomes).toEqual([]); + expect(state.completed).toEqual([]); + expect(state.counts().cancels).toBe(1); + expect(state.counts().dones).toBe(1); + }); + + test("hard abort must not flush an unterminated completed candidate as success", async () => { + const source = controlledSource(); + const state = observe(source.body); + source.push(encoder.encode(`data: ${JSON.stringify(terminal("aborted"))}`)); + await bounded(state.fed); + state.hardAbort.abort("fixture shutdown"); + await bounded(state.done); + expect(state.outcomes).toEqual([]); + expect(state.completed).toEqual([]); + expect(state.counts().cancels).toBe(1); + expect(state.counts().dones).toBe(1); + await state.client.cancel("cleanup"); + }); + + test("source error wakes a credit-blocked inspector and preserves synthetic 502 provenance", async () => { + const source = controlledSource(); + const state = observe(source.body); + source.push(frame({ type: "response.output_text.delta", delta: "x".repeat(128) })); + await bounded(state.fed); + source.error(new Error("fixture source reset")); + await bounded(state.done); + expect(state.outcomes).toEqual([{ status: "failed", httpStatus: 502 }]); + expect(state.logCtx.transportPhase).toBe("mid_stream"); + expect(state.logCtx.terminalSource).toBe("synthetic"); + expect(state.counts().dones).toBe(1); + await state.client.cancel("cleanup").catch(() => undefined); + }); + + test("an actual read error still flushes a real terminal lacking a final delimiter", async () => { + const source = controlledSource(); + const state = observe(source.body); + source.push(encoder.encode(`data: ${JSON.stringify(terminal("tail"))}`)); + await bounded(state.fed); + source.error(new Error("fixture reset after terminal")); + await bounded(state.done); + expect(state.outcomes.map(value => value.status)).toEqual(["completed"]); + expect(state.completed[0]?.id).toBe("tail"); + expect(state.counts().cancels).toBe(0); + await state.client.cancel("cleanup").catch(() => undefined); + }); + + test("the metadata-only consumer also retains late usage and releases exactly once", async () => { + const clientGone = new AbortController(); + const upstream = new AbortController(); + const source = new ReadableStream({ + start(controller) { + controller.enqueue(frame({ type: "response.output_text.delta", delta: "x".repeat(128) })); + controller.enqueue(frame(terminal("metadata"))); + }, + }); + const [client, inspection] = teeWithBoundedInspection(source, { + maxReadAheadBytes: 16, clientGoneSignal: clientGone.signal, + }); + const logCtx: RequestLogContext = { model: "fixture-model", provider: "fixture-provider" }; + const completed: unknown[] = []; + let dones = 0; + const done = new Promise(resolve => { + consumeForResponseLogMetadata(inspection, logCtx, undefined, + () => { dones += 1; resolve(); }, response => completed.push(response), undefined, + { clientGoneSignal: clientGone.signal, upstream, drainBounds: { ms: 1_000, bytes: 4_096 } }); + }); + const delivery = relaySseWithFailedTail(client, upstream, reason => clientGone.abort(reason)); + expect(await new Response(delivery).text()).toContain("response.completed"); + await bounded(done); + expect(logCtx.usage?.inputTokens).toBe(3); + expect(logCtx.usage?.outputTokens).toBe(2); + expect(completed).toHaveLength(1); + expect(dones).toBe(1); + }); +}); + +describe("inspection pacing boundary", () => { + test("invalid allowances are rejected before locking the source", () => { + for (const limit of [0, -1, NaN, Infinity, 1.5]) { + const source = controlledSource(); + expect(() => teeWithBoundedInspection(source.body, { maxReadAheadBytes: limit })).toThrow(RangeError); + expect(source.body.locked).toBe(false); + } + }); + + test("a slow client bounds inspection progress until raw client bytes are consumed", async () => { + const source = new ReadableStream({ + start(controller) { + controller.enqueue(encoder.encode("12345678")); + controller.enqueue(encoder.encode("abcdefgh")); + controller.close(); + }, + }); + const [client, inspection] = teeWithBoundedInspection(source, { maxReadAheadBytes: 8 }); + const reader = inspection.getReader(); + expect((await reader.read()).value).toEqual(encoder.encode("12345678")); + let settled = false; + const next = reader.read().then(result => { settled = true; return result; }); + await Bun.sleep(5); + expect(settled).toBe(false); + const clientReader = client.getReader(); + await clientReader.read(); + expect((await bounded(next)).value).toEqual(encoder.encode("abcdefgh")); + await reader.cancel("inspection done"); + await clientReader.cancel("client done"); + }); + + test("cancelling only inspection settles promptly and leaves all client bytes intact", async () => { + const payload = encoder.encode("unmodified client response"); + const source = new Response(payload).body!; + const [client, inspection] = teeWithBoundedInspection(source, { maxReadAheadBytes: 8 }); + await bounded(inspection.cancel("inspection detached")); + expect(new Uint8Array(await new Response(client).arrayBuffer())).toEqual(payload); + }); + + test("already-aborted client signal releases pacing for the bounded drain owner", async () => { + const signal = AbortSignal.abort("already gone"); + const source = new Response("abcdefghijklmnop").body!; + const [client, inspection] = teeWithBoundedInspection(source, { maxReadAheadBytes: 1, clientGoneSignal: signal }); + expect(await bounded(new Response(inspection).text())).toBe("abcdefghijklmnop"); + await client.cancel(); + }); +}); + +describe("non-stream inspection boundary", () => { + test.each(["eof", "read_error", "cancel", "cancel_rejected"] as const)("releases its source reader after %s", async outcome => { + let controller!: ReadableStreamDefaultController; + const source = new ReadableStream({ + start(value) { controller = value; }, + cancel() { if (outcome === "cancel_rejected") return Promise.reject(new Error("fixture cancel rejection")); }, + }, { highWaterMark: 0 }); + const ended: string[] = []; + const reader = createBoundedResponseLogBody(source, { + json: false, inspect() {}, finalize: reason => ended.push(reason), + }).getReader(); + const pending = reader.read(); + if (outcome === "eof") { controller.close(); await bounded(pending); } + else if (outcome === "read_error") { + const failure = new Error("fixture reader failure"); + controller.error(failure); + await expect(pending).rejects.toBe(failure); + } else { await bounded(reader.cancel("fixture cancellation")); await bounded(pending); } + expect(source.locked).toBe(false); + expect(ended).toEqual([outcome === "cancel_rejected" ? "cancel" : outcome]); + }); + + test("a bounded body can cancel one native tee branch without waiting for or truncating its sibling", async () => { + const source = controlledSource(); + const [left, right] = source.body.tee(); + const ended: string[] = []; + const reader = createBoundedResponseLogBody(left, { + json: false, inspect() {}, finalize: reason => ended.push(reason), + }).getReader(); + const sibling = right.getReader(); + const first = reader.read(), siblingFirst = sibling.read(); + source.push(encoder.encode("first")); + await bounded(Promise.all([first, siblingFirst])); + await bounded(reader.cancel("inspection finished")); + expect(left.locked).toBe(false); + expect(ended).toEqual(["cancel"]); + expect(source.cancelReasons).toEqual([]); + const next = sibling.read(); + source.push(encoder.encode("second")); + expect((await bounded(next)).value).toEqual(encoder.encode("second")); + source.close(); + expect((await bounded(sibling.read())).done).toBe(true); + sibling.releaseLock(); + }); + + test("diagnostic bytes do not alias mutable chunks delivered to the client", async () => { + const source = controlledSource(); + const inspected: string[] = []; + const reader = createBoundedResponseLogBody(source.body, { + json: false, inspect: text => inspected.push(text), finalize() {}, + }).getReader(); + const original = encoder.encode("original"); + const pending = reader.read(); + source.push(original); + await bounded(pending); + original.fill(120); + source.close(); + await bounded(reader.read()); + expect(inspected).toEqual(["original"]); + }); + + test("multibyte error inspection ends at the byte prefix while delivery remains whole", async () => { + const payload = "한".repeat(10_000); + const inspected: string[] = []; + const body = createBoundedResponseLogBody(new Response(payload).body!, { + json: false, inspect: text => inspected.push(text), finalize() {}, + }); + expect(await new Response(body).text()).toBe(payload); + expect(inspected).toEqual([new TextDecoder().decode(encoder.encode(payload).subarray(0, 8_192))]); + }); + + test("cancel wins a racing source error without finalizing twice", async () => { + const source = controlledSource(); + const ended: string[] = []; + const reader = createBoundedResponseLogBody(source.body, { + json: true, inspect() { throw new Error("partial JSON must not be inspected"); }, finalize: reason => ended.push(reason), + }).getReader(); + const pending = reader.read(); + await Promise.resolve(); + source.error(new Error("fixture source failure")); + await bounded(reader.cancel("fixture cancellation")); + await bounded(pending); + expect(ended).toEqual(["cancel"]); + expect(source.body.locked).toBe(false); + }); + + test("JSON over its inspection allowance is delivered intact but never inspected", async () => { + const inspected: string[] = []; + const ended: string[] = []; + const payload = '{"value":"too large"}'; + const body = createBoundedResponseLogBody(new Response(payload).body!, { + json: true, maxInspectionBytes: 8, + inspect: text => inspected.push(text), finalize: reason => ended.push(reason), + }); + expect(await new Response(body).text()).toBe(payload); + expect(inspected).toEqual([]); + expect(ended).toEqual(["eof"]); + }); + + test("JSON exactly at its byte allowance is inspected once", async () => { + const payload = '{"x":1}'; + const inspected: string[] = []; + const body = createBoundedResponseLogBody(new Response(payload).body!, { + json: true, maxInspectionBytes: encoder.encode(payload).byteLength, + inspect: text => inspected.push(text), finalize() { return; }, + }); + expect(await new Response(body).text()).toBe(payload); + expect(inspected).toEqual([payload]); + }); + + test("non-JSON retains an exact byte prefix across one-byte source chunks", async () => { + let sent = 0; + const inspected: string[] = []; + const source = new ReadableStream({ + pull(controller) { + if (sent++ < 10_000) controller.enqueue(new Uint8Array([120])); + else controller.close(); + }, + }, { highWaterMark: 0 }); + const body = createBoundedResponseLogBody(source, { + json: false, inspect: text => inspected.push(text), finalize() { return; }, + }); + expect((await new Response(body).text()).length).toBe(10_000); + expect(inspected).toEqual(["x".repeat(8_192)]); + }); + + test("no downstream pull means no logging-driven upstream read", async () => { + let reads = 0; + const source = new ReadableStream({ + pull(controller) { reads += 1; controller.enqueue(new Uint8Array([120])); }, + }, { highWaterMark: 0 }); + const body = createBoundedResponseLogBody(source, { + json: false, inspect() { return; }, finalize() { return; }, + }); + await Bun.sleep(5); + expect(reads).toBe(0); + await body.cancel(); + }); + + test("diagnostic callback exceptions cannot corrupt transport or duplicate finalization", async () => { + let finals = 0; + const payload = new Uint8Array([255, 0, 128]); + const body = createBoundedResponseLogBody(new Response(payload).body!, { + json: false, + inspect() { throw new Error("fixture diagnostic exception"); }, + finalize() { finals += 1; throw new Error("fixture finalizer exception"); }, + }); + expect(new Uint8Array(await new Response(body).arrayBuffer())).toEqual(payload); + expect(finals).toBe(1); + }); + + test("cancellation wins a pending read and never inspects a valid-looking JSON prefix", async () => { + const source = controlledSource(); + const inspected: string[] = []; + const ended: string[] = []; + const body = createBoundedResponseLogBody(source.body, { + json: true, inspect: text => inspected.push(text), finalize: reason => ended.push(reason), + }); + const reader = body.getReader(); + const first = reader.read(); + source.push(encoder.encode('{"model":"not-complete"}')); + await first; + const pending = reader.read(); + await bounded(reader.cancel("fixture cancel")); + await bounded(pending); + expect(inspected).toEqual([]); + expect(ended).toEqual(["cancel"]); + expect(source.cancelReasons).toEqual(["fixture cancel"]); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/usage/request-log-nonstream.test.ts b/tests/usage/request-log-nonstream.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ac2608a1ca --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/usage/request-log-nonstream.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { responseWithDeferredRequestLog } from "../../src/server/relay"; +import { MAX_RESPONSE_LOG_INSPECTION_BYTES } from "../../src/server/response-log-body"; +import type { RequestLogContext, RequestLogEntry } from "../../src/server/request-log"; + +const encoder = new TextEncoder(); +function tracked(response: Response, context?: RequestLogContext) { + const entries: RequestLogEntry[] = []; + const logCtx = context ?? { model: "requested-model", provider: "fixture-provider" }; + const result = responseWithDeferredRequestLog(response, "ocx-test-bounded-nonstream", Date.now(), logCtx, + entry => { entries.push(entry); }); + return { result, entries, logCtx }; +} +function pendingSource() { + let controller!: ReadableStreamDefaultController; + const cancellations: unknown[] = []; + const body = new ReadableStream({ + start(value) { controller = value; }, + cancel(reason) { cancellations.push(reason); }, + }, { highWaterMark: 0 }); + return { body, controller, cancellations }; +} + +describe("deferred non-stream request log integration", () => { + test("keeps original response status, statusText, headers and invalid UTF-8 bytes", async () => { + const payload = new Uint8Array([255, 0, 128, 13, 10]); + const { result, entries } = tracked(new Response(payload, { + status: 503, statusText: "Fixture Unavailable", + headers: { "content-type": "text/plain", "x-fixture": "preserved" }, + })); + expect(result.status).toBe(503); + expect(result.statusText).toBe("Fixture Unavailable"); + expect(result.headers.get("x-fixture")).toBe("preserved"); + expect(new Uint8Array(await result.arrayBuffer())).toEqual(payload); + expect(entries).toHaveLength(1); + expect(entries[0]?.status).toBe(503); + }); + + test("inspects complete small JSON using the existing metadata parser", async () => { + const payload = JSON.stringify({ model: "resolved-model", usage: { input_tokens: 3, output_tokens: 2, total_tokens: 5 } }); + const { result, entries } = tracked(new Response(payload, { headers: { "content-type": "application/json" } })); + expect(await result.text()).toBe(payload); + expect(entries).toHaveLength(1); + expect(entries[0]?.resolvedModel).toBe("resolved-model"); + expect(entries[0]?.status).toBe(200); + }); + + test("does not overwrite routed model/usage context from oversized JSON", async () => { + const payload = JSON.stringify({ model: "do-not-inspect", padding: "x".repeat(MAX_RESPONSE_LOG_INSPECTION_BYTES) }); + const { result, entries, logCtx } = tracked(new Response(payload, { headers: { "content-type": "application/json" } })); + expect(await result.text()).toBe(payload); + expect(entries).toHaveLength(1); + expect(logCtx.resolvedModel).toBeUndefined(); + expect(logCtx.model).toBe("requested-model"); + expect(logCtx.usage).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("non-JSON diagnostic text still uses the existing redaction/parser path", async () => { + const payload = "synthetic provider failed: " + "x".repeat(12000); + const { result, entries } = tracked(new Response(payload, { status: 502, headers: { "content-type": "text/plain" } })); + expect(await result.text()).toBe(payload); + expect(entries).toHaveLength(1); + expect(entries[0]?.upstreamError?.startsWith("synthetic provider failed:")).toBe(true); + expect(entries[0]?.upstreamError?.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(500); + }); + + test("cancellation follows the existing 499 convention without changing wire status", async () => { + const source = pendingSource(); + const { result, entries } = tracked(new Response(source.body, { status: 200, headers: { "content-type": "application/json" } })); + const reader = result.body!.getReader(); + const pending = reader.read(); + await reader.cancel("fixture client left"); + await pending; + expect(result.status).toBe(200); + expect(entries).toHaveLength(1); + expect(entries[0]?.status).toBe(499); + expect(source.cancellations).toEqual(["fixture client left"]); + }); + + test("a read failure is logged once as 502 and rejects the consumer", async () => { + const source = pendingSource(); + const { result, entries, logCtx } = tracked(new Response(source.body, { headers: { "content-type": "application/json" } })); + const reader = result.body!.getReader(); + const first = reader.read(); + source.controller.enqueue(encoder.encode('{"model":"not-complete"}')); + await first; + const failed = reader.read(); + source.controller.error(new Error("fixture transport reset")); + await expect(failed).rejects.toThrow("fixture transport reset"); + expect(entries).toHaveLength(1); + expect(entries[0]?.status).toBe(502); + expect(logCtx.resolvedModel).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("a bodyless response is unaffected", () => { + const original = new Response(null, { status: 204 }); + const { result, entries } = tracked(original); + expect(result).toBe(original); + expect(entries).toHaveLength(1); + expect(entries[0]?.status).toBe(204); + }); + + test("an unrelated non-error binary response is unaffected", async () => { + const original = new Response(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]), { headers: { "content-type": "application/octet-stream" } }); + const { result, entries } = tracked(original); + expect(result).toBe(original); + expect(entries).toHaveLength(1); + expect(new Uint8Array(await result.arrayBuffer())).toEqual(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3])); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/web-search/web-search-progress-stream.test.ts b/tests/web-search/web-search-progress-stream.test.ts index d36bb42594..1b2c1215dc 100644 --- a/tests/web-search/web-search-progress-stream.test.ts +++ b/tests/web-search/web-search-progress-stream.test.ts @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ import { RoutedModelInactivityError, WebSearchStreamProtocolError, } from "../../src/web-search/progress-stream"; +import { + createPassthroughWebSearchBridgeStream, + MAX_HELD_CALL_EVENTS, + WEB_SEARCH_BRIDGE_ERROR_CODE, +} from "../../src/web-search/passthrough-bridge"; import type { AdapterEvent } from "../../src/types"; type ParseStream = ProviderAdapter["parseStream"]; @@ -170,12 +175,12 @@ describe("web-search streamed-body progress collector", () => { test("semantic delivery is ordered and acknowledged one event at a time", async () => { const marks: string[] = []; - const parser: ParseStream = async function* () { - yield { type: "text_delta", text: "a" }; + const parser = async function* () { + yield { type: "text_delta", text: "a" } as AdapterEvent; marks.push("requested-second"); - yield { type: "text_delta", text: "b" }; + yield { type: "text_delta", text: "b" } as AdapterEvent; marks.push("requested-done"); - yield { type: "done" }; + yield { type: "done" } as AdapterEvent; }; const iterator = parseStreamWithProgress(new Response(chunkStream([])), parser, { inactivityTimeoutMs: 200 }); expect(await iterator.next()).toEqual({ done: false, value: { type: "text_delta", text: "a" } }); @@ -431,3 +436,191 @@ describe("web-search streamed-body progress collector", () => { } }); }); + +describe("web-search passthrough withheld-event stream lifecycle", () => { + type Payload = Record; + type Event = { + type: string; + sequence_number: number; + output_index?: number; + item?: { type: string; id: string; status?: string; arguments?: string }; + delta?: string; + response?: { error?: { code: string; message: string }; output?: unknown[] }; + }; + + function* legEvents( + deltas: number, + delta = "x", + searches = 0, + itemIdOnly = false, + terminal = "response.completed", + ): Generator { + for (let index = 0; index < searches; index++) { + yield { + type: "response.output_item.added", output_index: index, + item: { + type: "function_call", id: "search-" + index, call_id: "search-call-" + index, + name: "web_search", arguments: '{"query":"test"}', + }, + }; + } + const item = { type: "function_call", id: "client-tool", call_id: "client-call", name: "exec", arguments: "" }; + yield { type: "response.output_item.added", output_index: 7, item }; + const identity = itemIdOnly ? { item_id: item.id } : { output_index: 7 }; + for (let index = 0; index < deltas; index++) { + yield { type: "response.function_call_arguments.delta", ...identity, delta }; + } + const argumentsText = delta.repeat(deltas); + yield { type: "response.function_call_arguments.done", ...identity, arguments: argumentsText }; + yield { type: "response.output_item.done", output_index: 7, item: { ...item, arguments: argumentsText } }; + yield { type: terminal, response: { output: [{ ...item, arguments: argumentsText }] } }; + } + + async function runLeg(events: Iterable) { + const iterator = events[Symbol.iterator](); + const probe = { reads: 0, cancelled: false, executions: 0, sends: 0 }; + // One frame per pull: a cumulative-limit test must not trip the unrelated single-SSE bound. + const firstLeg = new ReadableStream({ + pull(controller) { + probe.reads++; + const next = iterator.next(); + if (next.done) controller.close(); + else controller.enqueue(bytes("data: " + JSON.stringify(next.value) + "\n\n")); + }, + cancel() { + probe.cancelled = true; + iterator.return?.(); + }, + }, { highWaterMark: 0 }); + const body = createPassthroughWebSearchBridgeStream({ + plan: { backend: "ollama", endpoint: "https://example.com/search", maxSearches: 3, timeoutMs: 1_000 }, + firstLeg, + requestBody: '{"input":[],"stream":true}', + execute: async () => { + probe.executions++; + return { text: "result", sources: [] }; + }, + send: async () => { + probe.sends++; + throw new Error("a mixed or failed test leg must not continue"); + }, + }); + const wire = await new Response(body).text(); + const output: Event[] = wire.split("\n") + .filter(line => line.startsWith("data: ") && line !== "data: [DONE]") + .map(line => JSON.parse(line.slice(6)) as Event); + return { wire, output, probe }; + } + + function expectFailedClosed(result: Awaited>): void { + const failures = result.output.filter(event => event.type === "response.failed"); + expect(failures).toHaveLength(1); + expect(failures[0]!.response?.error?.code).toBe(WEB_SEARCH_BRIDGE_ERROR_CODE); + expect(result.wire.includes('"name":"exec"')).toBe(false); + expect(result.output.some(event => event.type.startsWith("response.function_call_arguments."))).toBe(false); + expect(result.probe.executions).toBe(0); + expect(result.probe.sends).toBe(0); + expect(result.wire.split("data: [DONE]").length - 1).toBe(1); + expect(result.wire.endsWith("data: [DONE]\n\n")).toBe(true); + expect(result.output.map(event => event.sequence_number)).toEqual(result.output.map((_, index) => index)); + } + + /** Overflow is the bridge's own admission bound, so it must not be blamed on the upstream. */ + function expectBridgeOwnedOverflow(result: Awaited>): void { + const message = result.output.at(-1)?.response?.error?.message ?? ""; + expect(message).toContain("web-search bridge withheld more client tool events"); + expect(message).not.toContain("upstream read failed"); + } + + test.each([false, true])("bounds tiny delta events matched by item id only: %s", async itemIdOnly => { + // Minimal delta frames are far below the derived 128-code-unit average, so the event + // count is what stops this leg, not the character budget. + const result = await runLeg(legEvents(MAX_HELD_CALL_EVENTS, "x", 0, itemIdOnly)); + expectFailedClosed(result); + expectBridgeOwnedOverflow(result); + expect(result.probe.reads).toBe(MAX_HELD_CALL_EVENTS + 1); + expect(result.probe.cancelled).toBe(true); + }); + + test("bounds repeated client-call added events as well as deltas", async () => { + function* additions(): Generator { + for (let index = 0; index < MAX_HELD_CALL_EVENTS; index++) { + yield { + type: "response.output_item.added", output_index: index, + item: { type: "function_call", id: "tool-" + index, call_id: "call-" + index, name: "exec", arguments: "" }, + }; + } + } + const result = await runLeg(additions()); + expectFailedClosed(result); + // An added frame serializes well above the 128-code-unit average the event cap is derived + // from, so the character budget binds first here. Both bounds still fail the leg cleanly. + expect(result.probe.reads).toBeLessThan(MAX_HELD_CALL_EVENTS); + expect(result.probe.reads).toBeGreaterThan(1); + expect(result.probe.cancelled).toBe(true); + }); + + test("bounds cumulative payload characters while individual frames and event count remain small", async () => { + const result = await runLeg(legEvents(140, "x".repeat(64 * 1024), 0, true)); + expectFailedClosed(result); + expectBridgeOwnedOverflow(result); + expect(result.probe.reads).toBeLessThan(140); + expect(result.probe.cancelled).toBe(true); + }); + + test("closes every opened search before failing a withheld-event budget overflow", async () => { + const result = await runLeg(legEvents(140, "x".repeat(64 * 1024), 2)); + expectFailedClosed(result); + const opened = result.output.filter(event => event.type === "response.output_item.added"); + const closed = result.output.filter(event => event.type === "response.output_item.done"); + expect(opened).toHaveLength(2); + expect(closed).toHaveLength(2); + expect(closed.map(event => [event.item?.id, event.output_index])).toEqual( + opened.map(event => [event.item?.id, event.output_index]), + ); + expect(closed.map(event => event.item?.status)).toEqual(["failed", "failed"]); + expect(result.output.slice(-3).map(event => event.type)).toEqual([ + "response.output_item.done", "response.output_item.done", "response.failed", + ]); + expect(result.probe.cancelled).toBe(true); + }); + + test("also closes opened searches when reading the upstream leg throws", async () => { + function* broken(): Generator { + yield* Array.from(legEvents(0, "", 2)).slice(0, 3); + throw new Error("synthetic read failure"); + } + const result = await runLeg(broken()); + expectFailedClosed(result); + const closed = result.output.filter(event => event.type === "response.output_item.done"); + expect(closed.map(event => event.item?.status)).toEqual(["failed", "failed"]); + expect(result.output.at(-1)?.response?.error?.message).toContain("synthetic read failure"); + }); + + test("releases exactly the held-event limit without loss and preserves remapped order", async () => { + // added + deltas + arguments.done + item.done = exactly MAX_HELD_CALL_EVENTS withheld events. + const deltasAtLimit = MAX_HELD_CALL_EVENTS - 3; + const result = await runLeg(legEvents(deltasAtLimit, "x", 1)); + expect(result.output.some(event => event.type === "response.failed")).toBe(false); + const deltas = result.output.filter(event => event.type === "response.function_call_arguments.delta"); + expect(deltas).toHaveLength(deltasAtLimit); + expect(deltas.map(event => event.delta).join("")).toBe("x".repeat(deltasAtLimit)); + expect(deltas.every(event => event.output_index === 1)).toBe(true); + const toolDone = result.output.find(event => event.type === "response.output_item.done" && event.item?.type === "function_call"); + expect(toolDone?.item?.arguments).toBe("x".repeat(deltasAtLimit)); + expect(result.output.at(-1)?.type).toBe("response.completed"); + expect(result.output.at(-1)?.response?.output).toHaveLength(2); + expect(result.probe.executions).toBe(1); + expect(result.probe.sends).toBe(0); + expect(result.output.map(event => event.sequence_number)).toEqual(result.output.map((_, index) => index)); + }); + + test.each(["response.failed", "response.incomplete"])("preserves mixed-leg terminal handling for %s", async terminal => { + const result = await runLeg(legEvents(2, "x", 1, false, terminal)); + expect(result.output.at(-1)?.type).toBe(terminal); + expect(result.probe.executions).toBe(0); + expect(result.probe.sends).toBe(0); + expect(result.wire.includes('"name":"exec"')).toBe(terminal === "response.incomplete"); + expect(result.output.find(event => event.item?.type === "web_search_call" && event.type === "response.output_item.done")?.item?.status).toBe("failed"); + }); +}); From f35fbe8ef6cf7a6922ec5bd603e2d7f6e22f11e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 19:54:36 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 104/113] fix(codex): stop selecting accounts that cannot serve the request (#4768, #4778) (#4797) Maintainer integration for the 2.57.0 stabilization scope. The exact head has a green aggregate ci check with no failing job. Selection now drops only accounts whose own confirmed roster definitively omits the requested model, inside the existing eligibility gate and ahead of the priority tier, restoring the full list whenever filtering would leave no candidate; unknown and expired rosters stay unknown, so this cannot make a model vanish the way a fail-closed gate would. A conversation carrying uploaded files keeps its issuing account, which is the one documented invariant change and is recorded in the owning structure section. The operator pin is exempt, because filtering it out beforehand would have re-enabled the tiers the operator excluded rather than merely demoting the account. Host-owned merge decision; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- .../031_openai_tiers_split.md | 28 ++ scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 1 + src/codex/account-usability.ts | 21 + src/codex/auth-context.ts | 16 + src/codex/model-entitlements.ts | 88 +++- src/codex/routing.ts | 38 +- src/codex/routing/cache-affinity.ts | 70 ++++ src/codex/routing/selection.ts | 81 +++- src/server/responses/core-auth.ts | 2 + src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts | 38 +- structure/manifest.json | 1 + structure/providers/openai-tiers.md | 51 ++- structure/transports/responses.md | 6 +- ...odex-account-selection-preferences.test.ts | 378 ++++++++++++++++++ .../codex-model-entitlements.test.ts | 72 ++++ tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 1 + ...subagent-fallback-handle-responses.test.ts | 10 +- 17 files changed, 857 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) create mode 100644 devlog/_plan/260916_release_2570_stabilization/031_openai_tiers_split.md create mode 100644 src/codex/routing/cache-affinity.ts create mode 100644 tests/codex-integration/codex-account-selection-preferences.test.ts diff --git a/devlog/_plan/260916_release_2570_stabilization/031_openai_tiers_split.md b/devlog/_plan/260916_release_2570_stabilization/031_openai_tiers_split.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5b6a3bd54a --- /dev/null +++ b/devlog/_plan/260916_release_2570_stabilization/031_openai_tiers_split.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +# Planned split: structure/providers/openai-tiers.md + +## Why there is a grace entry + +`openai-tiers.md` sat at 597 lines on `dev` against a 600-line budget, so it had +room for three lines. Any real contract addition fails the gate, which is what +happened when the account-selection work recorded the uploaded-file retention +invariant and the flagship roster polarity. The doc is now 638 lines and carries +a `grace.oversizeDocs` entry, which `structure/AGENTS.md` reserves for a split +that is already planned. This is that plan. + +## The topic boundary + +The file has held two subjects for a while. One is account identity and wire +shape: Pool and Direct modes, API-key separation, the ChatGPT wire identity, and +the entitlement rosters. The other is selection and quota behaviour: eligibility +guards, priority tiers, cache affinity, reset-first ordering, observed capacity, +and now uploaded-file retention. The split runs on that line, leaving +`providers/openai-tiers.md` with identity and wire shape and moving selection and +quota behaviour into a sibling doc with its own manifest entry. + +## Why it is not done in this release + +Splitting an invariant doc renumbers nothing but does move every anchor other +documents link to, and `structure:check` resolves those references. Doing that +while five behaviour changes are landing would mix a documentation refactor into +the release candidate for no user benefit. The grace entry states the debt +honestly and the gate drops it again once the doc is back under budget. diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index 44cfe57060..e09bbf3a39 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ "codex-account-label.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-account-mode-state.test.ts": "gui", "codex-account-namespaces.test.ts": "codex-integration", + "codex-account-selection-preferences.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-account-store.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-account-unusable-reason.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-admission-primitives.test.ts": "codex-integration", diff --git a/src/codex/account-usability.ts b/src/codex/account-usability.ts index 5427fed841..973ae5cd45 100644 --- a/src/codex/account-usability.ts +++ b/src/codex/account-usability.ts @@ -18,6 +18,27 @@ export interface CodexAccountUsabilityOptions { isMainAccountTokenLive?: typeof isMainAccountTokenLive; /** Confirmed account ids for an account-gated model; omitted for ordinary native models. */ modelEligibleAccountIds?: ReadonlySet; + /** + * Accounts whose own confirmed roster definitively omits the requested model (#4768). + * + * Deliberately NOT read by this module. `modelEligibleAccountIds` is an eligibility boundary and + * produces `model_not_entitled`; this is an ORDERING preference applied once, in + * `getEligiblePoolAccounts`, and dropped whenever honouring it would leave no candidate. Reading + * it here would turn a preference into a refusal and re-create the fail-closed behaviour the + * flagships were deliberately taken out of. + */ + deniedModelAccountIds?: ReadonlySet; + /** + * This request's conversation carries live uploaded-file references (#4778). + * + * Also not read by this module, and for the same reason: it is a retention preference, never an + * eligibility boundary. Uploaded files are scoped to the account that issued them, so moving + * such a conversation orphans the reference and every later turn is refused with + * `409 account_change_file_scope` -- the reference stays in history, so the conversation is + * effectively dead. Retention makes that refusal rarer; it can never replace it, because an + * account can always become unable to serve. + */ + retainAccountForUploadedFiles?: boolean; } /** diff --git a/src/codex/auth-context.ts b/src/codex/auth-context.ts index f476b89f18..2c693a50b9 100644 --- a/src/codex/auth-context.ts +++ b/src/codex/auth-context.ts @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ import { type CodexThreadLineage, } from "./lineage"; import { + cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel, entitledCodexAccountIdsForModel, isDirectCallerEntitledToCodexModel, resolveCodexModelEntitlements, @@ -786,6 +787,11 @@ export interface ResolveCodexAuthContextOptions { requestScopedMainCredential?: boolean; /** Test seam for a Direct request's own forwarded ChatGPT credential. */ isDirectCallerEntitledToCodexModel?: (headers: Headers, modelId: string) => Promise; + /** + * This request's conversation carries live uploaded-file references (#4778). Retains the bound + * account across a VOLUNTARY quota move; involuntary release is untouched. + */ + retainAccountForUploadedFiles?: boolean; } export interface CodexAccountSelectionAdmission { @@ -978,6 +984,12 @@ export async function resolveCodexAuthContext( const modelEligibleAccountIds = entitledAccountIds ? new Set([...entitledAccountIds].filter(candidate => !excludeAccountIds?.has(candidate))) : undefined; + // #4768: the flagships stay visible and never fail closed, so this is evidence routing may + // ORDER by, not evidence it may refuse on. Read synchronously from rosters discovery has + // already gathered -- no upstream fetch joins the request path for the most commonly + // requested models in the product -- and passed to selection as a preference that is dropped + // whenever honouring it would leave no candidate. + const deniedModelAccountIds = cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(options.modelId); const selectionOptions = { // Temporary switch drain keeps the candidate until the atomic claim rejects // it. Retained recovery makes main wholly ineligible so pool routing continues. @@ -989,6 +1001,10 @@ export async function resolveCodexAuthContext( ? () => preserveRequestOwnedMainPin : options.isMainAccountTokenLive, modelEligibleAccountIds, + deniedModelAccountIds, + // Request-scoped and deliberately absent from `sharedStateSelectionOptions`: one + // conversation's attachments say nothing about where unrelated threads should be served. + retainAccountForUploadedFiles: options.retainAccountForUploadedFiles === true, }; // A pre-drain selector reserves the native identity while reconciliation and // routing inspect it. Selectors arriving after the fence skip reconciliation diff --git a/src/codex/model-entitlements.ts b/src/codex/model-entitlements.ts index 790d598eaf..99c6d1427d 100644 --- a/src/codex/model-entitlements.ts +++ b/src/codex/model-entitlements.ts @@ -9,7 +9,10 @@ import { MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID, type NativeMainRefreshDependencies, } from "./main-account"; -import { ACCOUNT_GATED_NATIVE_OPENAI_MODELS } from "./catalog/native-models"; +import { + ACCOUNT_GATED_NATIVE_OPENAI_MODELS, + NATIVE_GPT6_ASTRA_MODEL, +} from "./catalog/native-models"; import { loadPersistedCodexRuntime } from "./runtime"; import { codexRuntimeStateEpoch } from "./runtime"; import upstreamModelsSnapshot from "./data/upstream-models.json"; @@ -1159,6 +1162,89 @@ export function availableAccountGatedNativeModels( ))); } +/** + * Native models that stay unconditionally VISIBLE while their per-account availability still + * varies. + * + * This is deliberately not `ACCOUNT_GATED_NATIVE_OPENAI_MODELS` and must never become it. That set + * fails closed on ABSENCE of evidence: membership hides the row from the catalog and refuses the + * request before dispatch, which is exactly what the owner decision of 2026-09-04 removed the + * flagships from. A timed-out fetch or a shard that has not caught up would make the model vanish + * from the picker, and "opencodex lost my model" is a worse failure than one upstream 400. + * + * This set carries the opposite polarity. It admits only a CONFIRMED DENIAL as evidence, and it + * feeds an ordering preference rather than a refusal, so absent or stale evidence changes nothing. + * That is the distinction #4768 asked for: a pool holding a Plus account and a Free account should + * stop handing Sol/Astra to the Free account whose own authenticated roster already says it cannot + * serve them, without gating the model on evidence that may never arrive. + */ +export const ENTITLEMENT_PREFERRED_NATIVE_OPENAI_MODELS: ReadonlySet = new Set([ + "gpt-5.6-sol", + "gpt-5.6-terra", + "gpt-5.6-luna", + NATIVE_GPT6_ASTRA_MODEL, +]); + +/** + * Accounts whose OWN authenticated roster definitively omits `modelId`, read synchronously from + * evidence discovery has already gathered. + * + * Synchronous and cache-only by contract. The gated path may await `resolveCodexModelEntitlements` + * because a gated model is rare and already pays a bounded discovery call; the flagships are the + * most commonly requested models in the product, and putting an authenticated upstream fetch per + * account on that request path would trade one occasional 400 for latency on every turn. The cache + * this reads is warmed anyway: `modelsForCredential` stores each account's FULL roster, and + * background catalog sync (`src/codex/catalog/retained-sync.ts`) and convergence already resolve + * entitlements for every pool account. + * + * Returns `undefined` rather than an empty set when nothing is denied, so a caller cannot confuse + * "no account is denied" with "no evidence exists" — both mean the same thing here, which is that + * selection must be left exactly as it was. + * + * Only `denied` counts. `unknown` covers an unconfirmed account, a roster fetched under a client + * version too old to return the model, and an expired or credential-stale entry; none of those is + * proof that the account lacks the model, and treating them as proof is how 2.36.0 removed + * sol/terra/luna from accounts that owned them (#3022). + */ +export function cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel( + modelId: string | undefined, + now = Date.now(), +): ReadonlySet | undefined { + if (!modelId || !ENTITLEMENT_PREFERRED_NATIVE_OPENAI_MODELS.has(modelId)) return undefined; + const denied = new Set(); + const granted = new Set(); + for (const [key, entry] of accountModelsCache) { + const accountId = accountIdOfCacheKey(key); + // A forwarded Direct credential is one request's caller, never a pool candidate. + if (accountId.startsWith(DIRECT_CALLER_ACCOUNT_PREFIX)) continue; + if (entry.expiresAt <= now) continue; + // A credential we can currently read AND that differs is proof the entry answers for a + // different account than this id now names, so its denial is not evidence about the current + // one. An UNREADABLE credential is not proof of anything, and the same unknown-is-not-denied + // discipline that governs rosters governs identities: it leaves the entry in place rather + // than manufacturing a reason to ignore it. + const identity = currentCredentialIdentity(accountId); + if (identity !== undefined && identity !== entry.credentialIdentity) continue; + const state = codexModelEntitlementStateForRoster( + entry.models, + entry.confirmed, + entry.clientVersion, + modelId, + ); + if (state === "granted") granted.add(accountId); + else if (state === "denied") denied.add(accountId); + } + // One account holds one entry per client version, and upstream filters the roster by that + // version. So the same account can legitimately carry a granted entry under a current client + // and a denied one under an older client that predates the model. Positive evidence is + // authoritative regardless of which version asked for it -- the same rule + // `codexModelEntitlementStateForRoster` applies within a single entry -- so a grant anywhere + // clears the denial rather than being outvoted by whichever entry the map happened to yield + // last. + for (const accountId of granted) denied.delete(accountId); + return denied.size > 0 ? denied : undefined; +} + /** Synchronous projection for management/catalog readers after a discovery pass. */ export function cachedAvailableAccountGatedNativeModels( now = Date.now(), diff --git a/src/codex/routing.ts b/src/codex/routing.ts index fbae259958..5f768f554b 100644 --- a/src/codex/routing.ts +++ b/src/codex/routing.ts @@ -92,7 +92,6 @@ import { getPoolAccountPlanForSelection, hasCodexQuotaHeadroom, isCodexAccountPlanExcluded, - isCacheAffinityEnabled, isCodexAccountSelectable, isHealthySharedCodexSelection, isUnknownUsage, @@ -103,11 +102,13 @@ import { pickPriorityPreemption, pickResetFirstCodexAccount, pickUnboundStrategyAccount, + preferModelEntitledAccount, sharedStateSelectionOptions, strategySelectionOptionsForModelDetour, shouldFailover, peekAlternateCodexAccount, } from "./routing/selection"; +import { mayRebindAffinityForQuota } from "./routing/cache-affinity"; import { clearAllManualPreferences, consumeManualPreference, @@ -587,34 +588,6 @@ function previewReusableAffinityAccount( return entry.accountId; } -/** - * May a LIVE binding be moved for quota reasons? - * - * Default: no. The bar is genuine exhaustion, because moving a bound conversation discards - * the prompt cache warmed on its account and a threshold crossing is a hint that the account - * is getting busy rather than evidence it cannot serve (#4546). Deliberately NOT - * `hasCodexQuotaHeadroom`, which reads `usage < autoSwitchThreshold` and would reproduce the - * old rule under a new name. - * - * With `pool.cacheAffinity: false` the historical rule comes back: a crossing of - * `autoSwitchThreshold` is enough. That is capacity-first routing, and an operator who wants - * it keeps it -- but it is no longer what an install gets by never having heard of the flag. - */ -function mayRebindAffinityForQuota( - config: OcxConfig, - accountId: string, - usage: number, - threshold: number, - selectionOptions?: CodexAccountUsabilityOptions, -): boolean { - const overThreshold = threshold > 0 && !isUnknownUsage(usage) && usage >= threshold; - if (!isCacheAffinityEnabled(config)) return overThreshold; - // The usable half is already guaranteed by both callers, which gate on - // isCodexAccountSelectable; kept explicit so the predicate reads correctly on its own. - return !isCodexAccountUsable(config, accountId, selectionOptions) - || (!isUnknownUsage(usage) && usage >= 100); -} - /** Reset ordering may move a binding only under the existing cache-affinity release policy. */ function resetFirstAffinityReplacement( entry: ThreadAffinityEntry, @@ -847,6 +820,9 @@ export function previewCodexAccountForRequest( const best = pickLowestUsageCodexAccount(config, active, now, quotaScope, selectionOptions); if (best) active = best; } + // Same correction resolve applies, for the same reason: preview must name the account the + // request will actually use, or subagent fallback scores a model against the wrong one. + active = preferModelEntitledAccount(config, active, now, quotaScope, selectionOptions); if (!isCodexAccountUsable(config, active, selectionOptions)) { return hasConfiguredPoolAccount(config, active, selectionOptions) ? active : null; } @@ -1237,6 +1213,10 @@ export function resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed( selectionOptions, !preserveSharedSelectionForModelDetour, ); + // The shared cursor can name an account whose own roster denies this model, and an active + // account never passes through the eligible list. Correct it for THIS request only -- nothing + // is persisted -- and only toward an account eligibility already admitted (#4768). + active = preferModelEntitledAccount(config, active, now, quotaScope, selectionOptions); if (!isCodexAccountUsable(config, active, selectionOptions)) { return hasConfiguredPoolAccount(config, active, selectionOptions) ? { status: "selected", accountId: active, affinity: affinityAfterRelease(threadId, releaseReason) } diff --git a/src/codex/routing/cache-affinity.ts b/src/codex/routing/cache-affinity.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6147577689 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/codex/routing/cache-affinity.ts @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +import type { OcxConfig } from "../../types"; +import type { CodexAccountUsabilityOptions } from "../account-usability"; +import { isCodexAccountUsable } from "../account-usability"; +import { isCacheAffinityEnabled, isUnknownUsage } from "./selection"; + +/** + * Does a healthy bound account keep its conversation when quota re-evaluation looks at it? + * + * Two independent reasons say yes, and they are not the same claim. `pool.cacheAffinity` is an + * operator preference about COST: provider prompt caches are account-isolated, so handing a bound + * conversation from account to account re-sends the whole prefix, and #4546 measured 7k-token + * turns becoming 150k-token ones. Setting it false restores capacity-first routing, and an + * operator who wants that keeps it. + * + * Uploaded-file retention is a claim about CORRECTNESS, so it does not take that instruction + * (#4778). Uploaded files are scoped to the account that issued them. Moving a conversation that + * carries live `file_id` references does not cost a cold prefix -- it orphans the reference, and + * because the reference stays in conversation history EVERY later turn is refused with + * `409 account_change_file_scope` until the user re-uploads under the serving account or starts + * over. That is a dead conversation rather than an expensive one, and `pool.cacheAffinity: false` + * was never asking to accept it: the flag trades cache locality for capacity, not correctness for + * capacity. + * + * This answers the VOLUNTARY move only. Its caller still releases the binding on genuine + * exhaustion or an unusable account, and every involuntary release that runs earlier in + * `resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed` -- quota refusal, failover streak, pause, cooldown, lost + * generation, affinity expiry -- never reaches here at all. So retention can never wedge a + * conversation on an account that cannot serve it, which is exactly why the #4710 refusal remains + * required: this makes that refusal rarer and does not replace it. + * + * It lives beside selection rather than inside `routing.ts` because it is a policy question two + * call sites ask -- the live path in `reevaluateAffinityQuota` and the side-effect-free + * `previewReusableAffinityAccount` that subagent fallback reads -- and those two must answer + * identically or preview hands fallback a different account than the request uses. + */ +export function retainsBoundAccountForQuota( + config: OcxConfig, + selectionOptions?: CodexAccountUsabilityOptions, +): boolean { + return isCacheAffinityEnabled(config) + || selectionOptions?.retainAccountForUploadedFiles === true; +} + +/** + * May a LIVE binding be moved for quota reasons? + * + * Default: no. The bar is genuine exhaustion, because moving a bound conversation discards the + * prompt cache warmed on its account and a threshold crossing is a hint that the account is + * getting busy rather than evidence it cannot serve (#4546). Deliberately NOT + * `hasCodexQuotaHeadroom`, which reads `usage < autoSwitchThreshold` and would reproduce the old + * rule under a new name. + * + * When nothing retains, the historical rule comes back: a crossing of `autoSwitchThreshold` is + * enough. That is capacity-first routing, and an operator who asks for it keeps it -- it is just + * not what an install gets by never having heard of the flag. + */ +export function mayRebindAffinityForQuota( + config: OcxConfig, + accountId: string, + usage: number, + threshold: number, + selectionOptions?: CodexAccountUsabilityOptions, +): boolean { + const overThreshold = threshold > 0 && !isUnknownUsage(usage) && usage >= threshold; + if (!retainsBoundAccountForQuota(config, selectionOptions)) return overThreshold; + // The usable half is already guaranteed by both callers, which gate on + // isCodexAccountSelectable; kept explicit so the predicate reads correctly on its own. + return !isCodexAccountUsable(config, accountId, selectionOptions) + || (!isUnknownUsage(usage) && usage >= 100); +} diff --git a/src/codex/routing/selection.ts b/src/codex/routing/selection.ts index 9272636e99..2720a5eaaf 100644 --- a/src/codex/routing/selection.ts +++ b/src/codex/routing/selection.ts @@ -123,6 +123,39 @@ export function codexAccountBlockReason( return undefined; } +/** + * Drop accounts a confirmed roster says cannot serve this model, unless that leaves nothing. + * + * The restore-on-empty is the whole safety argument, not a defensive afterthought. Roster + * evidence can be wrong in the direction that matters: a shard that has not caught up reports a + * denial for a model the account genuinely owns, and #3022 is what happens when absence is + * allowed to remove a model outright. Because this can only ever return a non-empty subset of a + * list the caller already computed, no pool that would have found a working account can be left + * without one — the worst case is the selection that ships today. + * + * It is an ordering rule rather than an eligibility one for the same reason. Nothing below + * reports `model_not_entitled`, nothing refuses before dispatch, and the existing bounded + * alternate-account retry on an exact unsupported-model 400 stays exactly where it is as the + * safety net. This only stops the pool from CHOOSING an account that has already told us it + * cannot serve the model (#4768). + * + * An operator's manual pin is never dropped. Roster evidence orders the pool's own discretion; + * it does not overrule an explicit human choice, and removing the pinned account here would do + * more than demote it -- `selectPriorityTier` reads the pin to lower the tier ceiling, so a pin + * filtered out beforehand stops acting as a ceiling at all and silently re-enables tiers the + * operator had excluded. An operator who pins an account upstream will refuse still gets the + * alternate-account retry; what they do not get is the pool quietly deciding they were wrong. + */ +export function withoutModelDeniedAccounts( + ids: readonly string[], + denied: ReadonlySet | undefined, + pinned?: string, +): readonly string[] { + if (denied === undefined || ids.length === 0) return ids; + const remaining = ids.filter(id => !denied.has(id) || id === pinned); + return remaining.length > 0 ? remaining : ids; +} + export function getEligiblePoolAccounts( config: OcxConfig, excludeId?: string, @@ -168,11 +201,16 @@ export function getEligiblePoolAccounts( // Single choke point for selection order: every strategy, failover, and preview // reaches the pool through here, so tiering applies once rather than per picker. // Eligibility above is unchanged — this only narrows an already-eligible list. + // + // Model entitlement is applied BEFORE the priority tier, because a tier is a quota-ordering + // question and an account that cannot serve the model at all should not be the reason a tier + // is selected. Both steps narrow an already-eligible list and neither can empty it. + const pinned = pinnedCodexAccountId(config); return selectPriorityTier( - ids, + withoutModelDeniedAccounts(ids, selectionOptions?.deniedModelAccountIds, pinned), codexAccountPriorityLookup(config), id => hasCodexQuotaHeadroom(config, id, selectionOptions, now), - pinnedCodexAccountId(config), + pinned, ); } @@ -563,6 +601,45 @@ export function isUnknownUsage(usage: number): boolean { return usage >= CODEX_UNKNOWN_USAGE_SCORE; } +/** + * Correct a shared cursor that names an account this model's own roster denies (#4768). + * + * {@link getEligiblePoolAccounts} is not the only door into selection. An account that is already + * ACTIVE is served straight from {@link isCodexAccountSelectable} and never passes through the + * eligible list, so ordering that list alone left the exact case the issue reports: once the Free + * account becomes the cursor, every Sol/Astra request keeps going to it and keeps taking the + * upstream unsupported-model 400. {@link pickPriorityPreemption} does not cover it either -- it + * refuses to move toward a tier that does not strictly outrank the active one, which is the usual + * shape here. + * + * Three properties keep this inside "order the already-eligible set" rather than widening it. + * It admits nothing: the replacement comes from {@link getEligiblePoolAccounts}, so every + * eligibility guard has already passed on it. It cannot fail: with no entitled alternative the + * active account is returned unchanged, so this can never turn a served request into `none`. + * And it changes nothing without evidence: absent `deniedModelAccountIds`, or an active account + * nobody denied, it is the identity function. + * + * The caller must NOT persist the result. This is one request's correction for one model, in the + * same spirit as a model detour; the operator's cursor is theirs. A pinned active account is + * exempt outright, for the reason {@link withoutModelDeniedAccounts} gives. + */ +export function preferModelEntitledAccount( + config: OcxConfig, + active: string, + now: number, + quotaScope?: CodexQuotaScope, + selectionOptions?: CodexAccountUsabilityOptions, +): string { + const denied = selectionOptions?.deniedModelAccountIds; + if (denied === undefined || !denied.has(active)) return active; + if (pinnedCodexAccountId(config) === active) return active; + // The eligible list restores denied members when filtering would empty it, so re-filter here: + // moving from one denied account to another buys nothing and costs the warm prefix. + const entitled = getEligiblePoolAccounts(config, active, now, quotaScope, selectionOptions) + .filter(id => !denied.has(id)); + return pickLowestUsageAmong(config, entitled, selectionOptions, now) ?? active; +} + /** * Move an unbound request back up when a higher tier regains headroom — the * weekly-reset case. Returns null when nothing should change. diff --git a/src/server/responses/core-auth.ts b/src/server/responses/core-auth.ts index b8d62be240..f8a5f2826b 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/core-auth.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/core-auth.ts @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ export async function resolveResponsesCodexAuth( route: RouteResult, options: HandleResponsesOptions, credentialDomainWasRewritten = false, + retainAccountForUploadedFiles = false, ): Promise { try { let authInputHeaders = codexRouteCredentialDomainHeaders( @@ -232,6 +233,7 @@ export async function resolveResponsesCodexAuth( resolveCodexModelEntitlements: options.resolveCodexModelEntitlements, signal: options.abortSignal, nativeMainRefreshDependencies: options.nativeMainRefreshDependencies, + retainAccountForUploadedFiles, }); options.onCodexAuthContextResolved?.(authCtx); } else { diff --git a/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts b/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts index 4e7040f33a..8162a3d8e7 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts @@ -84,7 +84,10 @@ import { canPassThroughEncryptedV2AgentTask, applyFinalRouteRequestNormalization, } from "./core-normalize"; -import { resolveCodexModelEntitlements } from "../../codex/model-entitlements"; +import { + cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel, + resolveCodexModelEntitlements, +} from "../../codex/model-entitlements"; import { previewCodexAccountForRequest, codexQuotaScopeForModel, @@ -116,6 +119,7 @@ import { conversationStateBindingFromAuth, applyAccountChangeConversationStateScrub, accountChangeFileReferenceRefusal, + conversationCarriesUploadedFiles, } from "./account-change-state"; /** Parses, selects, and admits one request without changing the dispatch policy. */ @@ -457,6 +461,10 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( const previewSelectionOptions = { nativeMainSelectionOnly: !nativeMainRecoveryBlocked && previewSelectionAdmission?.mainProfileDraining === true, + // Preview must reach the same answer as the final resolution, including the uploaded-file + // retention (#4778): a preview that reported a quota move the request will not make would + // hand subagent fallback a different account than the one that actually serves. + retainAccountForUploadedFiles: conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(parsed._rawBody), }; let selectedForwardHeaders = req.headers; let subagentFallbackAccountId = config.activeCodexAccountId ?? null; @@ -528,7 +536,14 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( config, previewNow, codexQuotaScopeForModel(modelId), - { ...previewSelectionOptions, modelEligibleAccountIds }, + { + ...previewSelectionOptions, + modelEligibleAccountIds, + // Per CANDIDATE model, like the scope and the eligible set above: the preference is + // model-specific, so hoisting it out of the closure would score every fallback + // candidate against the requested model's evidence and diverge from final auth (#4768). + deniedModelAccountIds: cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(modelId, previewNow), + }, modelId, poolLineage, ); @@ -674,7 +689,11 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( config, previewNow, codexQuotaScopeForModel(modelId), - { ...recoverySelectionOptions, modelEligibleAccountIds }, + { + ...recoverySelectionOptions, + modelEligibleAccountIds, + deniedModelAccountIds: cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(modelId, previewNow), + }, modelId, poolLineage, ); @@ -915,7 +934,18 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( let substituteMainCredential = false; let callerAuthHeaders: Headers; { - const finalAuth = await resolveResponsesCodexAuth(req, config, route, options, credentialDomainWasRewritten); + // #4778: uploaded files are scoped to the account that issued them, so a conversation + // carrying live references must retain its binding across a voluntary quota move. Answered + // from the body alone, by the same predicate the refusal guard uses, so the two can never + // disagree about which conversations are in scope. + const finalAuth = await resolveResponsesCodexAuth( + req, + config, + route, + options, + credentialDomainWasRewritten, + conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(parsed._rawBody), + ); if (!finalAuth.ok) return finalAuth.response; admissionState.authCtx = finalAuth.authCtx; selectedForwardHeaders = withClaudeNativeSession(finalAuth.headers, route.provider, options.claudeNativeSessionId); diff --git a/structure/manifest.json b/structure/manifest.json index 13fb93884e..1a39530539 100644 --- a/structure/manifest.json +++ b/structure/manifest.json @@ -423,6 +423,7 @@ ], "oversizeDocs": [ "gui-and-management-api.md", + "providers/openai-tiers.md", "transports/responses.md" ], "staleRefs": [] diff --git a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md index 6466685e1b..38f72878ab 100644 --- a/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md +++ b/structure/providers/openai-tiers.md @@ -288,7 +288,9 @@ drains a tier, and every tier drained leaves the eligible list untouched. Orderi account that pause, cooldown, health, or reauth already excluded, and never overrides those exclusions. It adds no new rebind cause for a bound thread, which still moves only for the reasons it already had: a quota-strategy re-evaluation when `pool.cacheAffinity` is off (threshold) or the bound -account cannot serve (the default), an account that stopped being selectable, or affinity expiry. +account cannot serve (the default), an account that stopped being selectable, or affinity expiry. A +conversation carrying live uploaded-file references raises that bar to the default one regardless of +`pool.cacheAffinity`; see [uploaded-file account retention](#uploaded-file-account-retention). A transient-failure streak does not delete a live binding. A bound move requires genuine quota headroom and strictly lower usage on the destination. The stable `__main__` alias carries an order on equal terms with added accounts, which is what lets the Desktop login be ordered last. An absent or @@ -391,6 +393,26 @@ Native Spark membership and its model-specific request/tool exceptions are remov exact rejection and fresh grant before each later send; otherwise ordinary eligible-account failover applies. +- The always-visible flagships (`gpt-5.6-sol`, `gpt-5.6-terra`, `gpt-5.6-luna`, `gpt-6-astra`) + use the same rosters with the opposite polarity, and are never gated on them. Only a CONFIRMED + DENIAL counts: `cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel` reads rosters discovery already gathered, + synchronously and with no upstream fetch on the request path, and `getEligiblePoolAccounts` drops + those accounts ahead of the priority tier. If that would leave no candidate the full list is + restored, so evidence can never remove a model the way a fail-closed gate would (#3022). Unknown, + unconfirmed, expired and too-old-client rosters stay unknown and change nothing; a grant under any + client version clears a denial recorded under another. Nothing refuses before dispatch, and the + bounded alternate-account retry on an exact unsupported-model 400 remains the safety net (#4768). + `getEligiblePoolAccounts` is not the only door, so `preferModelEntitledAccount` applies the same + evidence to an already-active shared cursor: the replacement is drawn from the eligible list, the + active account is returned unchanged when no entitled alternative exists, and the correction is + request-scoped and never persisted, so the operator's cursor is unchanged for the next request. + An operator's manual pin is exempt: evidence orders the pool's own discretion and never overrules + an explicit selection, and because `selectPriorityTier` reads the pin to lower the tier ceiling, + filtering it out beforehand would re-enable the tiers the operator excluded rather than merely + demote the account. Eligibility itself is untouched — `isCodexAccountSelectable` remains the sole + authority for pause, plan exclusion, quota cooldown and avoidance, soft avoidance, refresh cooling + and usability, and `codexAccountBlockReason` still reports which of those guards fired. + - `gpt-daybreak-blue-latest` remains the catalog and entitlement identity, but the canonical ChatGPT wire uses `gpt-5.6-sol`, the serving id reported by successful Daybreak responses. Daybreak compaction uses the existing synthetic `/responses` compaction path instead of the @@ -562,7 +584,7 @@ The history read API reports a median effective token estimate and interval samp `src/codex/routing/selection.ts` supports Codex-only `accountPoolStrategy: "reset-first"`. For new shared-quota assignments it chooses the earliest future short/weekly reset after existing eligibility, priority and usage-threshold filtering; ties and absent/elapsed deadlines use the existing usage order. Seconds and milliseconds are normalized with `resetAtToMs`. Threshold zero disables usage filtering while retaining reset ordering. Monthly deadlines do not order this strategy. -Live bindings obey the cache-affinity release policy: `pool.cacheAffinity` is on by default, so threshold crossing alone retains a healthy account. A bound thread that does leave may move only onto an account with genuine quota headroom and strictly lower usage. Manual preference, scoped health and shared-cursor guards remain authoritative. Set the flag false to restore threshold rebinding of bound tasks. Independent `spark`/`reserve` quota scopes resolve reset-first to existing quota selection because shared reset timestamps do not describe those windows. The configured value stays unchanged. +Live bindings obey the cache-affinity release policy: `pool.cacheAffinity` is on by default, so threshold crossing alone retains a healthy account. A bound thread that does leave may move only onto an account with genuine quota headroom and strictly lower usage. Manual preference, scoped health and shared-cursor guards remain authoritative. Set the flag false to restore threshold rebinding of bound tasks, except for a conversation carrying live uploaded-file references. Independent `spark`/`reserve` quota scopes resolve reset-first to existing quota selection because shared reset timestamps do not describe those windows. The configured value stays unchanged. The Codex parser in `src/oauth/pool-kernel.ts` is reexported by the compatibility facade and used by both `/api/pool/settings` and the legacy Codex settings route. Generic and Anthropic parsers reject reset-first. The dashboard offers it only for Codex; API, CLI and translated guides preserve the same contract. @@ -593,5 +615,30 @@ Two call sites need the rule — the live path in `reevaluateAffinityQuota` and than restating it, because the suite asserts the two answer identically and a preview that disagreed would hand fallback a different account than the request actually uses. +## Uploaded-file account retention + +Uploaded files are scoped to the account that issued them, so a conversation carrying live +`file_id` references is the one case where a voluntary move is not merely expensive. It orphans the +reference, and because the reference stays in conversation history every later turn is refused with +`409 account_change_file_scope` until the user re-uploads under the serving account or restarts the +conversation. Pool rotation is automatic, so any conversation with an attachment is otherwise one +rotation away from being permanently blocked (#4778). + +`conversationCarriesUploadedFiles` answers that question from the request body alone — the same +predicate the refusal guard uses, so routing and refusal can never disagree about which +conversations are in scope — and `resolveResponsesCodexAuth` carries the answer into +`CodexAccountUsabilityOptions.retainAccountForUploadedFiles`. `src/codex/routing/cache-affinity.ts` +owns the rule: `retainsBoundAccountForQuota` names every reason a healthy bound account is kept, +and `mayRebindAffinityForQuota` applies the default cache-affinity bar whenever one of them holds, +even with `pool.cacheAffinity` false. That flag trades cache locality for capacity, not +correctness for capacity. + +The retention is a preference over the VOLUNTARY move only, and it is not an eligibility boundary. +Genuine exhaustion and an unusable account still release the binding, and every involuntary release +that runs earlier in `resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed` — quota refusal, failover streak, pause, +cooldown, lost generation, affinity expiry — is untouched. A pinned conversation therefore cannot be +wedged on an account that cannot serve it, which is why the refusal remains required: it reduces how +often that refusal fires and can never replace it. + Upstream API-key usage follows the [physical-attempt account attribution contract](../gui-and-management-api.md#upstream-key-account-attribution), independently of subscription quota observations. `src/codex/auth-api/login-flow.ts` distinguishes HTTP 429 from an attempted warmup as `codex_warmup_rate_limited` and preserves that code in OAuth status. Failed attempted warmup does not persist replacement credentials; quota-confirmed deferred registration and HTTP 401/403 handling remain separate. `src/codex/warmup.ts` retains a known 429 when bounded error-body draining times out. diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index e7e3d3d79e..91cfb84d6d 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -249,8 +249,10 @@ so both the Responses retry helper and the compact retry ask before resolving an send is reserved, the first response is never cancelled, and the caller returns the original upstream rejection. A same-account replay such as the gated-model 400 ladder is unaffected, and a single-account install never reaches any of this because serving and issuing accounts cannot -differ. Pinning a file-carrying conversation to its issuing account is routing-affinity work and -is tracked separately. +differ. Pinning a file-carrying conversation to its issuing account is routing-affinity work and is +specified in [uploaded-file account retention](../providers/openai-tiers.md#uploaded-file-account-retention); +it reduces how often this refusal fires and does not replace it, because the issuing account can +always become unable to serve. > Decision record: [ADR-0039](../decisions/ADR-0039-responses-http-sse.md) diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-selection-preferences.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-selection-preferences.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..db5d61c0e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-selection-preferences.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,378 @@ +import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { mkdtempSync } from "node:fs"; +import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; +import { join } from "node:path"; +import { + CODEX_THREAD_AFFINITY_REEVAL_INTERVAL_MS, + clearCodexUpstreamHealth, + clearThreadAccountMap, + resolveCodexAccountForThread, + resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed, +} from "../../src/codex/routing"; +import { clearPoolRotationState } from "../../src/codex/pool-rotation"; +import { saveCodexAccountCredential } from "../../src/codex/account-store"; +import { + clearAccountNeedsReauth, + clearAccountQuota, + updateAccountQuota, +} from "../../src/codex/auth-api"; +import { MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID } from "../../src/codex/main-account"; +import { flushConfigDirHardeningForTests } from "../../src/config/paths"; +import { setAsyncIcaclsRunnerForTests, setIcaclsRunnerForTests } from "../../src/lib/windows-secret-acl"; +import type { OcxConfig } from "../../src/types"; +import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; + +/** + * Selection PREFERENCES, as distinct from selection ELIGIBILITY. + * + * `isCodexAccountSelectable` stays the sole authority for whether an account may serve at all -- + * pause, plan exclusion, quota cooldown and avoidance, soft avoidance, refresh cooling, usability + * -- and `codexAccountBlockReason` reports which of those guards fired. Nothing in this file + * touches that. What these cases pin is the layer above it: given a list those guards already + * produced, which member does routing prefer, and what must a preference never be allowed to do. + * + * Two preferences are covered, and they share one obligation. Neither may empty a candidate set + * that the old behaviour would have served from, and neither may overrule an explicit operator + * control. Every positive case below is therefore paired with the negative that would make the + * preference dangerous if it were missing. + * + * They live here rather than in `codex-routing.test.ts` because that file is at its file-size + * ratchet cap. + */ + +let TEST_DIR = ""; +let previousOpencodexHome: string | undefined; +let previousCodexHome: string | undefined; + +const ICACLS_OK = { success: true, exitCode: 0, timedOut: false, stdout: "" }; + +function installRoutingScratchHome(): void { + previousOpencodexHome = process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME; + previousCodexHome = process.env.CODEX_HOME; + TEST_DIR = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-selection-pref-")); + // These cases exercise account state, not the operating system ACL implementation. + setIcaclsRunnerForTests(() => ICACLS_OK); + setAsyncIcaclsRunnerForTests(async () => ICACLS_OK); + process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = TEST_DIR; + process.env.CODEX_HOME = TEST_DIR; +} + +async function removeRoutingScratchHome(): Promise { + const ownedDirectory = TEST_DIR; + TEST_DIR = ""; + try { + await flushConfigDirHardeningForTests(); + } finally { + setIcaclsRunnerForTests(null); + setAsyncIcaclsRunnerForTests(null); + if (previousOpencodexHome === undefined) delete process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME; + else process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = previousOpencodexHome; + if (previousCodexHome === undefined) delete process.env.CODEX_HOME; + else process.env.CODEX_HOME = previousCodexHome; + if (ownedDirectory) removeTreeWithRetry(ownedDirectory); + } +} + +function saveTestCredential(id: string): void { + saveCodexAccountCredential(id, { + accessToken: `access-${id}`, + refreshToken: `refresh-${id}`, + expiresAt: Date.now() + 5 * 60_000, + chatgptAccountId: `acct-${id}`, + }); +} + +function makeConfig(overrides: Partial = {}): OcxConfig { + return { + providers: {}, + codexAccounts: [ + { id: "a", email: "a@test", isMain: false }, + { id: "b", email: "b@test", isMain: false }, + ], + activeCodexAccountId: "a", + autoSwitchThreshold: 80, + upstreamFailoverThreshold: 3, + ...overrides, + } as OcxConfig; +} + +function installScratchState(): void { + installRoutingScratchHome(); + clearThreadAccountMap(); + clearCodexUpstreamHealth(); + clearAccountQuota(); + clearPoolRotationState(); + clearAccountNeedsReauth("a"); + clearAccountNeedsReauth("b"); + saveTestCredential("a"); + saveTestCredential("b"); +} + +async function removeScratchState(): Promise { + try { + clearAccountQuota(); + clearCodexUpstreamHealth(); + clearThreadAccountMap(); + clearPoolRotationState(); + clearAccountNeedsReauth("a"); + clearAccountNeedsReauth("b"); + } finally { + await removeRoutingScratchHome(); + } +} + +describe("model entitlement ordering (#4768)", () => { + beforeEach(installScratchState); + afterEach(removeScratchState); + + /** `a` is ordered above `b`; the persisted operator selection is the lower tier. */ + function orderedConfig(overrides: Partial = {}): OcxConfig { + return makeConfig({ + activeCodexAccountId: "b", + codexAccountPriorities: { a: 1 }, + ...overrides, + } as Partial); + } + + /** + * A pool holding a Plus account and a Free account handed Sol/Astra to whichever account + * rotation reached first, and the Free account answered with the upstream unsupported-model + * 400. The roster evidence to avoid that already existed; selection never consulted it. + * + * Ordering, not eligibility. `a` is the higher priority tier here and still loses the pick, + * which is the point: an account that cannot serve the model at all should not be the reason + * a tier is selected. + */ + test("a confirmed roster denial removes an account from selection", () => { + const config = orderedConfig(); + updateAccountQuota("a", 10); + updateAccountQuota("b", 10); + + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThread(null, config)).toBe("a"); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed( + null, + config, + Date.now(), + "shared", + { deniedModelAccountIds: new Set(["a"]) }, + )).toMatchObject({ status: "selected", accountId: "b" }); + }); + + /** + * The negative case, and the one that decides whether this rule is safe to ship. + * + * Roster evidence can be wrong in the direction that matters -- a shard that has not caught up + * reports a denial for a model the account genuinely owns -- so a rule that let evidence empty + * the candidate set would turn a stale shard into a total outage for the model. Honouring the + * denial is a preference; having somewhere to send the request is not. + * + * Unlike `modelEligibleAccountIds`, which is an eligibility boundary and legitimately resolves + * to nothing, this may never reach `status: "none"`. + */ + test("denials never empty the candidate set", () => { + const config = orderedConfig(); + updateAccountQuota("a", 10); + updateAccountQuota("b", 10); + + const resolution = resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed( + null, + config, + Date.now(), + "shared", + { deniedModelAccountIds: new Set(["a", "b", MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID]) }, + ); + + expect(resolution.status).toBe("selected"); + expect(["a", "b", MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID]) + .toContain((resolution as { accountId: string }).accountId); + }); + + /** + * Evidence about an account this pool does not hold must not perturb the pick. Same + * configuration and the same expectation as the tier case above, which selects `a`. + */ + test("a denial naming an account outside the pool changes nothing", () => { + const config = orderedConfig(); + updateAccountQuota("a", 10); + updateAccountQuota("b", 10); + + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed( + null, + config, + Date.now(), + "shared", + { deniedModelAccountIds: new Set(["not-in-this-pool"]) }, + )).toMatchObject({ status: "selected", accountId: "a" }); + }); + + /** + * Roster evidence orders the pool's own discretion; it does not overrule an operator. Dropping + * a pinned account would do more than demote it -- `selectPriorityTier` reads the pin to lower + * the tier ceiling, so a pin filtered out beforehand stops acting as a ceiling and silently + * re-enables the tiers the operator excluded. An operator who pins an account upstream will + * refuse still gets the alternate-account retry; the pool does not decide they were wrong. + */ + test("a denial never drops the operator's pinned account", () => { + const config = orderedConfig({ activeCodexAccountPinned: "b" }); + updateAccountQuota("a", 10); + updateAccountQuota("b", 10); + + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed( + null, + config, + Date.now(), + "shared", + { deniedModelAccountIds: new Set(["b"]) }, + )).toMatchObject({ status: "selected", accountId: "b" }); + }); + + /** + * The path that actually broke, and the reason it is pinned separately. + * + * `getEligiblePoolAccounts` is not the only door into selection: an already-ACTIVE account is + * served straight from `isCodexAccountSelectable` and never passes through the eligible list. + * So a rule that only orders that list left the reported case unfixed -- once the denied + * account becomes the shared cursor, every request keeps going to it -- and + * `pickPriorityPreemption` does not rescue it, because it refuses to move toward a tier that + * does not strictly outrank the active one, which is exactly the shape here. + * + * The first resolution below promotes the cursor to `a` through preemption. The second asks + * again with `a` denied, so it exercises the cursor path rather than the unbound one. + */ + test("a denial moves a request off the shared cursor without persisting the move", () => { + const config = orderedConfig(); + updateAccountQuota("a", 10); + updateAccountQuota("b", 10); + + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThread(null, config)).toBe("a"); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed( + null, + config, + Date.now(), + "shared", + { deniedModelAccountIds: new Set(["a"]) }, + )).toMatchObject({ status: "selected", accountId: "b" }); + + // One request's correction for one model. The operator's persisted selection is untouched, + // and the very next request without that evidence is back on the cursor. + expect(config.activeCodexAccountId).toBe("b"); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThread(null, config)).toBe("a"); + }); + + /** + * The companion negative, and the gap that let the case above ship broken: every other case + * here supplies evidence, so none of them pinned what happens with NONE. Unknown must change + * nothing, and "nothing" has to include the shared-cursor path, not just the eligible list. + */ + test("no denial evidence leaves the shared-cursor path exactly as it was", () => { + const config = orderedConfig(); + updateAccountQuota("a", 10); + updateAccountQuota("b", 10); + + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThread(null, config)).toBe("a"); + + // Absent evidence, and evidence about an account the cursor does not name, are both inert. + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed(null, config, Date.now(), "shared")) + .toMatchObject({ status: "selected", accountId: "a" }); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed( + null, + config, + Date.now(), + "shared", + { deniedModelAccountIds: new Set(["b"]) }, + )).toMatchObject({ status: "selected", accountId: "a" }); + }); +}); + +describe("uploaded-file account retention (#4778)", () => { + beforeEach(installScratchState); + afterEach(removeScratchState); + + /** + * Uploaded files are scoped to the account that issued them, so moving a conversation that + * carries live references does not cost a cold prefix -- it orphans the reference, and because + * the reference stays in conversation history every later turn is refused with + * `409 account_change_file_scope` until the user re-uploads or restarts. + * + * `pool.cacheAffinity: false` is pinned here because that is the configuration where the + * voluntary move still happens; the flag trades cache locality for capacity, and it was never + * asking to trade correctness for capacity. Both halves are asserted against the same starting + * state, on separate thread ids so neither resolution disturbs the other's binding. + */ + test("a conversation carrying uploaded files keeps its issuing account", () => { + const config = makeConfig({ pool: { cacheAffinity: false } }); + const now = 1_800_000_000_000; + updateAccountQuota("a", 10); + updateAccountQuota("b", 10); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThread("plain-thread", config, now)).toBe("a"); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThread("file-thread", config, now)).toBe("a"); + + updateAccountQuota("a", 95); + updateAccountQuota("b", 5); + const later = now + 1_000; + + // Control: without the evidence this is the ordinary over-threshold move (#584). + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed("plain-thread", config, later)) + .toMatchObject({ status: "selected", accountId: "b" }); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed( + "file-thread", + config, + later, + undefined, + { retainAccountForUploadedFiles: true }, + )).toMatchObject({ status: "selected", accountId: "a" }); + }); + + /** + * The negative case. Retention covers the VOLUNTARY move only: it must never wedge a + * conversation on an account that cannot serve it, because the issuing account can always + * become exhausted and the #4710 refusal is the correct answer in that corner rather than a + * pin that keeps sending at a dead account. + */ + test("uploaded-file retention still yields to genuine exhaustion", () => { + const config = makeConfig({ pool: { cacheAffinity: false } }); + const now = 1_800_000_000_000; + updateAccountQuota("a", 10); + updateAccountQuota("b", 10); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThread("file-thread", config, now)).toBe("a"); + + updateAccountQuota("a", 100); + updateAccountQuota("b", 5); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed( + "file-thread", + config, + now + 1_000, + undefined, + { retainAccountForUploadedFiles: true }, + )).toMatchObject({ status: "selected", accountId: "b" }); + }); + + /** + * On the default configuration the retention is already implied by `pool.cacheAffinity`, so + * the evidence must be inert rather than a second, differently-shaped rule. This is the + * happy-path claim: an install that never attaches a file and an install that does resolve + * identically. + */ + test("uploaded-file retention changes nothing under the default cache affinity", () => { + const config = makeConfig(); + const now = 1_800_000_000_000; + updateAccountQuota("a", 10); + updateAccountQuota("b", 10); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThread("plain-thread", config, now)).toBe("a"); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThread("file-thread", config, now)).toBe("a"); + + updateAccountQuota("a", 95); + updateAccountQuota("b", 5); + const later = now + CODEX_THREAD_AFFINITY_REEVAL_INTERVAL_MS + 1; + + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed("plain-thread", config, later)) + .toMatchObject({ status: "selected", accountId: "a" }); + expect(resolveCodexAccountForThreadDetailed( + "file-thread", + config, + later, + undefined, + { retainAccountForUploadedFiles: true }, + )).toMatchObject({ status: "selected", accountId: "a" }); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-model-entitlements.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-model-entitlements.test.ts index 926f1994a7..e0a529d148 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-model-entitlements.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-model-entitlements.test.ts @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import { ACCOUNT_GATED_NATIVE_MODEL_MINIMUM_CLIENT_VERSIONS, availableAccountGatedNativeModels, cachedAvailableAccountGatedNativeModels, + cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel, codexModelEntitlementStateForAccount, composeGatedClientVersionFloorForTests, compareClientVersionsForTests, @@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ const DAYBREAK = "gpt-daybreak-blue-latest"; const SOL = "gpt-5.6-sol"; const TERRA = "gpt-5.6-terra"; const LUNA = "gpt-5.6-luna"; +const ASTRA = "gpt-6-astra"; function credential(accountId: string): CodexModelEntitlementCredentialSnapshot { return { @@ -1793,3 +1795,73 @@ describe("entitlement client version (#2886)", () => { expect(fetches).toBe(2); }); }); + +/** + * #4768. The flagships stay unconditionally visible, so their routing evidence has to have the + * opposite polarity from the account-gated set: only a CONFIRMED DENIAL counts, and it feeds an + * ordering preference rather than a refusal. These tests pin that polarity, because the failure + * mode of getting it wrong is #3022 -- a model disappearing from accounts that own it. + */ +describe("cached per-account denials for always-visible natives", () => { + test("an account whose confirmed roster omits the model is denied", () => { + const now = 1_800_000_000_000; + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("plus", [SOL, ASTRA], now, TEST_CLIENT_VERSION); + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("free", ["gpt-5.5"], now, TEST_CLIENT_VERSION); + + expect([...(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, now) ?? [])]).toEqual(["free"]); + }); + + test("no evidence and no denial both answer undefined, never an empty set", () => { + const now = 1_800_000_000_000; + // Nothing cached at all. + expect(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, now)).toBeUndefined(); + + // Cached, confirmed, and granting: still undefined, so a caller cannot read "no denials" + // as "no candidates". + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("plus", [ASTRA], now, TEST_CLIENT_VERSION); + expect(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, now)).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("an expired entry is unknown rather than a denial", () => { + const now = 1_800_000_000_000; + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("free", ["gpt-5.5"], now, TEST_CLIENT_VERSION); + + expect([...(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, now) ?? [])]).toEqual(["free"]); + // Five-minute roster TTL. Past it the entry answers for a window that has closed. + expect(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, now + 5 * 60_000 + 1)).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + /** + * Sol carries a measured minimum client version, so a roster fetched under an older client + * legitimately omits it without that being a denial. This is the #3022 guard, reached through + * the new reader: it must inherit the tri-state rule rather than restate a simpler one. + */ + test("a roster fetched under too old a client is unknown, not denied", () => { + const now = 1_800_000_000_000; + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("free", ["gpt-5.5"], now, "0.143.0"); + + expect(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(SOL, now)).toBeUndefined(); + // Astra has no measured minimum, so the same roster IS a denial for it. Asserted here so the + // test above proves the version rule rather than the roster simply being ignored. + expect([...(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, now) ?? [])]).toEqual(["free"]); + }); + + test("a grant under one client version clears a denial recorded under another", () => { + const now = 1_800_000_000_000; + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("plus", ["gpt-5.5"], now, "0.143.0"); + expect([...(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, now) ?? [])]).toEqual(["plus"]); + + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("plus", [ASTRA], now, TEST_CLIENT_VERSION); + expect(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, now)).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("a model outside the always-visible set is not this reader's business", () => { + const now = 1_800_000_000_000; + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("free", ["gpt-5.5"], now, TEST_CLIENT_VERSION); + + // Daybreak is account-gated: it fails closed through the eligibility path instead. + expect(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(DAYBREAK, now)).toBeUndefined(); + expect(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel("gpt-5.5", now)).toBeUndefined(); + expect(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(undefined, now)).toBeUndefined(); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index c30eeede2d..6c0291cf95 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ "codex-account-label.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-account-mode-state.test.ts": "gui", "codex-account-namespaces.test.ts": "codex-integration", + "codex-account-selection-preferences.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-account-store.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-account-unusable-reason.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-admission-primitives.test.ts": "codex-integration", diff --git a/tests/routing/subagent-fallback-handle-responses.test.ts b/tests/routing/subagent-fallback-handle-responses.test.ts index be6ec1d6cb..32bb643008 100644 --- a/tests/routing/subagent-fallback-handle-responses.test.ts +++ b/tests/routing/subagent-fallback-handle-responses.test.ts @@ -1595,12 +1595,12 @@ describe("native fallback account preview", () => { } // And both must actually forward it into the preview call, not merely accept it. - // The guarantee is that BOTH sites forward the eligible set, which is what recovery lost. - // `modelId` is no longer the final argument -- #4546 appends the resolved pool lineage so - // preview and final resolution agree on a child's first turn -- so anything after it is - // allowed here rather than pinning the argument count. + // Neither the argument list nor the options object is pinned to an exact shape: #4546 + // appended the pool lineage after `modelId`, #4768 added `deniedModelAccountIds` beside the + // eligible set, and pinning either would fail on unrelated growth while still not catching + // the regression this exists for -- a site dropping `modelEligibleAccountIds` on the way in. const forwarded = source.match( - /\{ \.\.\.(previewSelectionOptions|recoverySelectionOptions), modelEligibleAccountIds \},\s*modelId,[^)]*\)/g, + /\{\s*\.\.\.(previewSelectionOptions|recoverySelectionOptions),[^}]*\bmodelEligibleAccountIds\b[^}]*\},\s*modelId,[^)]*\)/g, ) ?? []; expect(forwarded).toHaveLength(2); }); From dc9d1fabc83e3ffed249cd4641bf1cef4fdbf50f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 19:54:54 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 105/113] fix(test): contain and reclaim Windows temporary roots (#4785, #4789) (#4796) Maintainer integration for the 2.57.0 stabilization scope. The exact head has a green aggregate ci check with no failing job. Carries #4785 and folds #4789. The containment half closes the leak in #4762 for future runs. The reclamation half needed correcting before it could ship: as authored, an absent ownership marker fell through to removal, and every directory users have accumulated today was written by a version that stamped nothing, so the rule would have deleted TEMP trees the tool cannot show it created. Reclamation now treats a missing marker as disqualifying and requires the owning pid to be dead. An already-affected workstation is not cleaned by this change; those roots are scanned, skipped and left to the user. Host-owned merge decision; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- scripts/test-temp.ts | 342 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ scripts/test.ts | 33 ++- tests/ci-workflows/test-runner.test.ts | 233 ++++++++++++++++- tests/helpers/home-destruction-scan.ts | 2 +- tests/helpers/isolated-codex-home.ts | 7 +- tests/helpers/remove-tree.ts | 26 +- tests/lib/remove-tree-helper.test.ts | 42 ++- tests/preload.ts | 19 +- 8 files changed, 665 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) create mode 100644 scripts/test-temp.ts diff --git a/scripts/test-temp.ts b/scripts/test-temp.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3915fafffa --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/test-temp.ts @@ -0,0 +1,342 @@ +import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; +import { + existsSync, + lstatSync, + mkdirSync, + readFileSync, + readdirSync, + realpathSync, + renameSync, + rmSync, + statSync, + writeFileSync, +} from "node:fs"; +import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; +import { dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path"; + +export const TEST_TEMP_OWNER_FILE = ".opencodex-test-owner.json"; +export const TEST_TEMP_RECOVERY_AGE_MS = 48 * 60 * 60 * 1000; + +const TEST_TEMP_OWNER_VERSION = 1; +const TEST_TEMP_OWNER_KIND = "opencodex-test-root"; +const WRAPPED_TEST_ROOT = /^opencodex-test-[A-Za-z0-9]{6}$/; +const TRANSIENT_REMOVE_CODES = new Set(["EPERM", "EBUSY", "ENOTEMPTY"]); +const DEFAULT_MAX_CANDIDATES = 10_000; +const DEFAULT_MAX_TREE_ENTRIES = 250_000; +const DEFAULT_MAX_DURATION_MS = 30_000; + +/** The first wait after a transient failure. Most release races clear on the first retry. */ +export const REMOVE_RETRY_BASE_DELAY_MS = 50; +/** The ceiling for a single wait, so a long tail never becomes a long stall between attempts. */ +export const REMOVE_RETRY_MAX_DELAY_MS = 250; +/** The total time the schedule may spend waiting on one tree. */ +export const REMOVE_RETRY_BUDGET_MS = 15_000; +/** Reclaiming a stale root is opportunistic: a root that resists briefly is left for a later run. */ +export const RECOVERY_REMOVE_BUDGET_MS = 150; + +interface TestTempOwner { + schemaVersion: 1; + kind: typeof TEST_TEMP_OWNER_KIND; + root: string; + createdAtMs: number; + pid: number; + runId?: string; +} + +export interface TestTempRecoveryResult { + scanned: number; + removed: number; + skipped: number; + errors: number; + truncated: boolean; +} + +type RemoveTreeOptions = Readonly<{ + budgetMs?: number; + delays?: readonly number[]; + remove?: (path: string) => void; + sleep?: (milliseconds: number) => void; +}>; + +type RecoveryOptions = Readonly<{ + tempRoot?: string; + platform?: NodeJS.Platform; + nowMs?: number; + minimumAgeMs?: number; + maxCandidates?: number; + maxTreeEntries?: number; + maxDurationMs?: number; + /** Liveness seam. A recovery test must not depend on which pids the host happens to have. */ + processIsAlive?: (pid: number) => boolean; +}>; + +let automaticRecoveryAttempted = false; + +function errorCode(error: unknown): string { + return error && typeof error === "object" && "code" in error ? String(error.code) : ""; +} + +function samePath(left: string, right: string, platform: NodeJS.Platform): boolean { + const normalizedLeft = resolve(left); + const normalizedRight = resolve(right); + return platform === "win32" + ? normalizedLeft.toLowerCase() === normalizedRight.toLowerCase() + : normalizedLeft === normalizedRight; +} + +/** + * The only name shape a reclaimable root can have. + * + * A broader `ocx-*` class was considered and dropped: those directories never carried an + * ownership marker, so under the marker requirement below they could only ever be scanned and + * skipped, and the regex wide enough to catch them was also wide enough to put an unrelated + * tool's directory on the candidate list. + */ +function isTestTempName(name: string): boolean { + return WRAPPED_TEST_ROOT.test(name); +} + +function processIsAlive(pid: number): boolean { + if (pid === process.pid) return true; + try { + process.kill(pid, 0); + return true; + } catch (error) { + return errorCode(error) !== "ESRCH"; + } +} + +function parseOwner(path: string): TestTempOwner | null | undefined { + const markerPath = join(path, TEST_TEMP_OWNER_FILE); + if (!existsSync(markerPath)) return undefined; + try { + const marker = lstatSync(markerPath); + if (!marker.isFile() || marker.isSymbolicLink()) return null; + const parsed = JSON.parse(readFileSync(markerPath, "utf8")) as Partial; + if ( + parsed.schemaVersion !== TEST_TEMP_OWNER_VERSION + || parsed.kind !== TEST_TEMP_OWNER_KIND + || typeof parsed.root !== "string" + || typeof parsed.createdAtMs !== "number" + || !Number.isFinite(parsed.createdAtMs) + || typeof parsed.pid !== "number" + || !Number.isSafeInteger(parsed.pid) + || parsed.pid <= 0 + || (parsed.runId !== undefined && typeof parsed.runId !== "string") + ) return null; + return parsed as TestTempOwner; + } catch { + return null; + } +} + +function inspectTree( + root: string, + budget: { entries: number; deadlineMs: number; now: () => number }, +): { safe: boolean; latestMtimeMs: number } { + const pending = [root]; + let latestMtimeMs = 0; + while (pending.length > 0) { + if (budget.entries <= 0 || budget.now() > budget.deadlineMs) { + return { safe: false, latestMtimeMs }; + } + const current = pending.pop()!; + let entry: ReturnType; + try { + entry = lstatSync(current); + } catch { + return { safe: false, latestMtimeMs }; + } + budget.entries -= 1; + latestMtimeMs = Math.max(latestMtimeMs, entry.mtimeMs); + if (entry.isSymbolicLink()) return { safe: false, latestMtimeMs }; + if (!entry.isDirectory()) continue; + let children: string[]; + try { + children = readdirSync(current); + } catch { + return { safe: false, latestMtimeMs }; + } + for (const child of children) pending.push(join(current, child)); + } + return { safe: true, latestMtimeMs }; +} + +/** + * The waits between removal attempts: exponential from the base delay, capped, bounded by budget. + * + * The predecessor was flat -- 50 attempts at 50ms, so 2.5 seconds total. That budget was tuned on + * a lightly loaded machine and six concurrent Windows shards exceed it, at which point the helper + * rethrows the EPERM it exists to absorb and fails a test that had already finished asserting + * (#4789). Growing the wait instead of the attempt count is what buys a long tail without paying + * for it in the common case: the first retry still lands at 50ms, and a removal that succeeds on + * its first attempt never sleeps at all, so nothing on the passing path gets slower. + */ +export function removeRetrySchedule(budgetMs: number = REMOVE_RETRY_BUDGET_MS): number[] { + const delays: number[] = []; + let spent = 0; + let delay = REMOVE_RETRY_BASE_DELAY_MS; + while (spent + delay <= budgetMs) { + delays.push(delay); + spent += delay; + delay = Math.min(delay * 2, REMOVE_RETRY_MAX_DELAY_MS); + } + return delays; +} + +/** Remove a test-owned tree while tolerating only transient Windows release races. */ +export function removeTestTempTree(path: string, options: RemoveTreeOptions = {}): void { + const delays = options.delays ?? removeRetrySchedule(options.budgetMs); + const remove = options.remove ?? (target => rmSync(target, { recursive: true, force: true })); + const sleep = options.sleep ?? Bun.sleepSync; + + for (let attempt = 0; attempt <= delays.length; attempt += 1) { + try { + remove(path); + return; + } catch (error) { + if (!TRANSIENT_REMOVE_CODES.has(errorCode(error)) || attempt === delays.length) throw error; + sleep(delays[attempt]!); + } + } +} + +/** Stamp a newly created root so future runs can prove its OpenCodex test ownership. */ +export function writeTestTempOwner(root: string, runId?: string): void { + const owner: TestTempOwner = { + schemaVersion: TEST_TEMP_OWNER_VERSION, + kind: TEST_TEMP_OWNER_KIND, + root: realpathSync(root), + createdAtMs: Date.now(), + pid: process.pid, + ...(runId ? { runId } : {}), + }; + const temporary = join(root, `.${TEST_TEMP_OWNER_FILE}.${process.pid}.${randomUUID()}.tmp`); + writeFileSync(temporary, JSON.stringify(owner) + "\n", { encoding: "utf8", mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" }); + renameSync(temporary, join(root, TEST_TEMP_OWNER_FILE)); +} + +/** + * Reclaim stale Windows test roots this tool can PROVE it owns. + * + * Ownership is the marker, not the name. A directory that merely looks like ours is scanned and + * skipped: the accumulation already on a user's machine was written by versions that stamped + * nothing, and deleting it on a name match would be this tool cleaning a TEMP tree it cannot + * show it created. This release therefore changes future runs -- a root stamped by the code + * below is reclaimable, everything older is left alone. + * + * On top of the marker: an exact mkdtemp-shaped name, a 48-hour grace period, direct-parent + * containment, a dead owning pid, and a full no-link walk are all required before removal. + * Invalid ownership metadata fails closed. + */ +export function recoverStaleTestTempArtifacts(options: RecoveryOptions = {}): TestTempRecoveryResult { + const result: TestTempRecoveryResult = { + scanned: 0, + removed: 0, + skipped: 0, + errors: 0, + truncated: false, + }; + const platform = options.platform ?? process.platform; + if (platform !== "win32") return result; + + const nowMs = options.nowMs ?? Date.now(); + const isAlive = options.processIsAlive ?? processIsAlive; + const minimumAgeMs = options.minimumAgeMs ?? TEST_TEMP_RECOVERY_AGE_MS; + const maxCandidates = options.maxCandidates ?? DEFAULT_MAX_CANDIDATES; + const deadlineMs = Date.now() + (options.maxDurationMs ?? DEFAULT_MAX_DURATION_MS); + const budget = { + entries: options.maxTreeEntries ?? DEFAULT_MAX_TREE_ENTRIES, + deadlineMs, + now: Date.now, + }; + + let tempRoot: string; + try { + tempRoot = realpathSync(options.tempRoot ?? tmpdir()); + } catch { + result.errors += 1; + return result; + } + + let names: string[]; + try { + names = readdirSync(tempRoot).sort(); + } catch { + result.errors += 1; + return result; + } + + for (const name of names) { + if (!isTestTempName(name)) continue; + if (result.scanned >= maxCandidates || Date.now() > deadlineMs || budget.entries <= 0) { + result.truncated = true; + break; + } + result.scanned += 1; + const candidate = join(tempRoot, name); + try { + const rootEntry = lstatSync(candidate); + if (!rootEntry.isDirectory() || rootEntry.isSymbolicLink()) { + result.skipped += 1; + continue; + } + const canonicalCandidate = realpathSync(candidate); + if (!samePath(dirname(canonicalCandidate), tempRoot, platform)) { + result.skipped += 1; + continue; + } + + // An absent marker is as disqualifying as a corrupt one. `undefined` used to mean "no + // evidence either way, proceed on the name", which is exactly the name match this must not + // be. + const owner = parseOwner(candidate); + if (!owner || !samePath(owner.root, canonicalCandidate, platform)) { + result.skipped += 1; + continue; + } + if (isAlive(owner.pid)) { + result.skipped += 1; + continue; + } + const rootActivityMs = Math.max(statSync(candidate).mtimeMs, owner.createdAtMs); + if (nowMs - rootActivityMs < minimumAgeMs) { + result.skipped += 1; + continue; + } + const tree = inspectTree(candidate, budget); + if (!tree.safe) { + result.skipped += 1; + if (Date.now() > deadlineMs || budget.entries <= 0) result.truncated = true; + continue; + } + if (nowMs - Math.max(rootActivityMs, tree.latestMtimeMs) < minimumAgeMs) { + result.skipped += 1; + continue; + } + + removeTestTempTree(candidate, { budgetMs: RECOVERY_REMOVE_BUDGET_MS }); + result.removed += 1; + } catch (error) { + if (errorCode(error) !== "ENOENT") result.errors += 1; + } + } + + return result; +} + +/** Run automatic recovery once per process, before the process creates its own test root. */ +export function recoverStaleTestTempArtifactsOnce( + options: RecoveryOptions = {}, +): TestTempRecoveryResult | null { + if (automaticRecoveryAttempted) return null; + automaticRecoveryAttempted = true; + return recoverStaleTestTempArtifacts(options); +} + +/** Create the contained temp subtree used by every os.tmpdir() call in the child test process. */ +export function createContainedTestTemp(root: string): string { + const contained = join(root, "tmp"); + mkdirSync(contained, { recursive: true }); + return contained; +} diff --git a/scripts/test.ts b/scripts/test.ts index c2c331f5fc..4406b08086 100644 --- a/scripts/test.ts +++ b/scripts/test.ts @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; -import { existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync } from "node:fs"; +import { existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync } from "node:fs"; import { homedir, tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { basename, join } from "node:path"; import { @@ -9,6 +9,12 @@ import { TEST_RUN_LOCK_PATH_ENV, TEST_RUN_LOCK_TOKEN_ENV, } from "./test-run-lock"; +import { + createContainedTestTemp, + recoverStaleTestTempArtifactsOnce, + removeTestTempTree, + writeTestTempOwner, +} from "./test-temp"; export interface IsolatedTestEnvironment { root: string; @@ -19,9 +25,20 @@ export interface IsolatedTestEnvironment { export function createIsolatedTestEnvironment( baseEnv: Record = process.env, ): IsolatedTestEnvironment { - const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "opencodex-test-")); + const hostTemp = tmpdir(); + const recovery = recoverStaleTestTempArtifactsOnce({ tempRoot: hostTemp }); + if (recovery && (recovery.removed > 0 || recovery.errors > 0 || recovery.truncated)) { + console.warn( + `[test] stale TEMP recovery removed ${recovery.removed} OpenCodex test root(s)` + + (recovery.errors > 0 ? `; ${recovery.errors} could not be reclaimed` : "") + + (recovery.truncated ? "; the bounded scan will continue on a later run" : "") + + ".", + ); + } + const root = mkdtempSync(join(hostTemp, "opencodex-test-")); const opencodexHome = join(root, ".opencodex"); const codexHome = join(root, ".codex"); + const containedTemp = createContainedTestTemp(root); mkdirSync(opencodexHome, { recursive: true }); mkdirSync(codexHome, { recursive: true }); if (process.platform === "win32") { @@ -35,6 +52,7 @@ export function createIsolatedTestEnvironment( mkdirSync(join(root, "AppData", "Local"), { recursive: true }); mkdirSync(join(root, "AppData", "Roaming"), { recursive: true }); } + writeTestTempOwner(root, baseEnv[TEST_RUN_ID_ENV]); return { root, @@ -60,9 +78,12 @@ export function createIsolatedTestEnvironment( USERPROFILE: root, OPENCODEX_HOME: opencodexHome, CODEX_HOME: codexHome, + TEMP: containedTemp, + TMP: containedTemp, + TMPDIR: containedTemp, }, cleanup() { - rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); + removeTestTempTree(root); }, }; } @@ -527,7 +548,11 @@ export async function runTestLane( } finally { process.off("SIGINT", onInterrupt); process.off("SIGTERM", onTerminate); - isolated.cleanup(); + try { + isolated.cleanup(); + } catch { + console.error("[test] deferred cleanup of one test root after Windows kept a handle open; a later run will retry it."); + } } } diff --git a/tests/ci-workflows/test-runner.test.ts b/tests/ci-workflows/test-runner.test.ts index 9efa54eb1e..eaa711fa81 100644 --- a/tests/ci-workflows/test-runner.test.ts +++ b/tests/ci-workflows/test-runner.test.ts @@ -1,6 +1,17 @@ import { describe, expect, spyOn, test } from "bun:test"; import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; -import { existsSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { + existsSync, + mkdirSync, + mkdtempSync, + readFileSync, + readdirSync, + realpathSync, + statSync, + symlinkSync, + utimesSync, + writeFileSync, +} from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join, posix, win32 } from "node:path"; import { @@ -28,6 +39,12 @@ import { TEST_RUN_NO_QUEUE_ENV, type TestRunRuntimeFileSystem, } from "../../scripts/test-run-lock"; +import { + recoverStaleTestTempArtifacts, + removeTestTempTree, + TEST_TEMP_OWNER_FILE, + TEST_TEMP_RECOVERY_AGE_MS, +} from "../../scripts/test-temp"; import { decodeWindowsIdentityPowerShellOutputForTests, windowsIdentityPowerShellCommandForTests, @@ -254,9 +271,29 @@ describe("test runner isolation", () => { USERPROFILE: isolated.root, OPENCODEX_HOME: join(isolated.root, ".opencodex"), CODEX_HOME: join(isolated.root, ".codex"), + TEMP: join(isolated.root, "tmp"), + TMP: join(isolated.root, "tmp"), + TMPDIR: join(isolated.root, "tmp"), }); expect(existsSync(isolated.env.OPENCODEX_HOME!)).toBe(true); expect(existsSync(isolated.env.CODEX_HOME!)).toBe(true); + expect(existsSync(isolated.env.TEMP!)).toBe(true); + const owner = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(isolated.root, TEST_TEMP_OWNER_FILE), "utf8")); + // The marker stores the CANONICAL root, and this assertion has to spell it the same way. + // Both halves of the ownership check resolve: `writeTestTempOwner` stamps + // `realpathSync(root)` and recovery compares it against `realpathSync(candidate)`. That + // agreement is what the reclamation decision rests on, so it is worth pinning rather than + // assuming -- on macOS `tmpdir()` hands back a /var path that resolves to /private/var, + // and a marker written with one spelling and read with the other would make a run fail to + // recognise the root it just created. + expect(owner.root).toBe(realpathSync(isolated.root)); + expect(owner).toMatchObject({ + schemaVersion: 1, + kind: "opencodex-test-root", + root: realpathSync(isolated.root), + pid: process.pid, + }); + expect(typeof owner.createdAtMs).toBe("number"); } finally { isolated.cleanup(); } @@ -305,6 +342,151 @@ describe("test runner isolation", () => { ); }); +describe("Windows test TEMP recovery", () => { + const age = (path: string, milliseconds: number) => { + const date = new Date(milliseconds); + utimesSync(path, date, date); + }; + + /** Stamp a candidate the way `writeTestTempOwner` does, then age the marker and the directory. */ + const ownRoot = (path: string, createdAtMs: number, pid = 4_294_967_295) => { + writeFileSync(join(path, TEST_TEMP_OWNER_FILE), JSON.stringify({ + schemaVersion: 1, + kind: "opencodex-test-root", + root: realpathSync(path), + createdAtMs, + pid, + }) + "\n"); + age(join(path, TEST_TEMP_OWNER_FILE), createdAtMs); + age(path, createdAtMs); + }; + + test("removes a root it can prove it owns and leaves an unstamped look-alike alone", () => { + // The distinction this pins is the whole safety property: reclamation is decided by the + // ownership marker, never by the name. The thousands of directories already sitting in a + // user's TEMP were written by versions that stamped nothing, so they are scanned, skipped, + // and left for the user to clear. This release changes future runs. + const tempRoot = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "opencodex-recovery-fixture-")); + const nowMs = Date.now(); + const stale = nowMs - TEST_TEMP_RECOVERY_AGE_MS - 1_000; + const owned = join(tempRoot, "opencodex-test-Ab12Cd"); + const unstamped = join(tempRoot, "opencodex-test-Zx98Yw"); + const young = join(tempRoot, "opencodex-test-Qq11Ww"); + const legacyName = join(tempRoot, "ocx-runtime-Rr22Tt"); + const unrelated = join(tempRoot, "application-cache-Ab12Cd"); + for (const path of [owned, unstamped, young, legacyName, unrelated]) mkdirSync(path); + ownRoot(owned, stale); + ownRoot(young, nowMs - TEST_TEMP_RECOVERY_AGE_MS + 60_000); + age(unstamped, stale); + age(legacyName, stale); + age(unrelated, stale); + + try { + const result = recoverStaleTestTempArtifacts({ + tempRoot, + platform: "win32", + nowMs, + processIsAlive: () => false, + }); + // Only the three `opencodex-test-*` names are candidates at all; the legacy `ocx-*` shape + // never carried a marker, so widening the scan to it could only ever produce skips. + expect(result).toMatchObject({ scanned: 3, removed: 1, skipped: 2, errors: 0 }); + expect(existsSync(owned)).toBe(false); + expect(existsSync(unstamped)).toBe(true); + expect(existsSync(young)).toBe(true); + expect(existsSync(legacyName)).toBe(true); + expect(existsSync(unrelated)).toBe(true); + } finally { + removeTreeWithRetry(tempRoot); + } + }); + + test("fails closed for invalid ownership metadata and linked trees", () => { + const tempRoot = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "opencodex-recovery-fixture-")); + const nowMs = Date.now(); + const invalidOwner = join(tempRoot, "opencodex-test-Aa11Bb"); + const linked = join(tempRoot, "opencodex-test-Cc22Dd"); + const liveOwner = join(tempRoot, "opencodex-test-Ee33Ff"); + const linkTarget = join(tempRoot, "link-target"); + mkdirSync(invalidOwner); + mkdirSync(linked); + mkdirSync(liveOwner); + mkdirSync(linkTarget); + writeFileSync(join(invalidOwner, TEST_TEMP_OWNER_FILE), JSON.stringify({ schemaVersion: 1 })); + writeFileSync(join(liveOwner, TEST_TEMP_OWNER_FILE), JSON.stringify({ + schemaVersion: 1, + kind: "opencodex-test-root", + root: realpathSync(liveOwner), + createdAtMs: nowMs - TEST_TEMP_RECOVERY_AGE_MS - 1_000, + pid: process.pid, + })); + symlinkSync(linkTarget, join(linked, "redirect"), process.platform === "win32" ? "junction" : "dir"); + // Stamped and long dead, so the only thing left to refuse it is the link in its tree. + ownRoot(linked, nowMs - TEST_TEMP_RECOVERY_AGE_MS - 1_000); + age(invalidOwner, nowMs - TEST_TEMP_RECOVERY_AGE_MS - 1_000); + age(join(liveOwner, TEST_TEMP_OWNER_FILE), nowMs - TEST_TEMP_RECOVERY_AGE_MS - 1_000); + age(liveOwner, nowMs - TEST_TEMP_RECOVERY_AGE_MS - 1_000); + + try { + const result = recoverStaleTestTempArtifacts({ + tempRoot, + platform: "win32", + nowMs, + processIsAlive: pid => pid === process.pid, + }); + expect(result).toMatchObject({ scanned: 3, removed: 0, skipped: 3, errors: 0 }); + expect(existsSync(invalidOwner)).toBe(true); + expect(existsSync(linked)).toBe(true); + expect(existsSync(liveOwner)).toBe(true); + expect(existsSync(linkTarget)).toBe(true); + } finally { + removeTreeWithRetry(tempRoot); + } + }); + + test("bounds recovery and leaves remaining candidates for a later run", () => { + const tempRoot = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "opencodex-recovery-fixture-")); + const nowMs = Date.now(); + for (const name of ["opencodex-test-Aa11Bb", "opencodex-test-Cc22Dd"]) { + const path = join(tempRoot, name); + mkdirSync(path); + ownRoot(path, nowMs - TEST_TEMP_RECOVERY_AGE_MS - 1_000); + } + + try { + const result = recoverStaleTestTempArtifacts({ + tempRoot, + platform: "win32", + nowMs, + maxCandidates: 1, + processIsAlive: () => false, + }); + expect(result).toMatchObject({ scanned: 1, removed: 1, errors: 0, truncated: true }); + expect(readdirSync(tempRoot)).toHaveLength(1); + } finally { + removeTreeWithRetry(tempRoot); + } + }); + + test("retries transient release races and preserves terminal failures", () => { + let attempts = 0; + const sleeps: number[] = []; + removeTestTempTree("fixture", { + delays: [7, 7], + remove: () => { + attempts += 1; + if (attempts < 3) throw Object.assign(new Error("busy"), { code: "EBUSY" }); + }, + sleep: milliseconds => { sleeps.push(milliseconds); }, + }); + expect(attempts).toBe(3); + expect(sleeps).toEqual([7, 7]); + expect(() => removeTestTempTree("fixture", { + remove: () => { throw Object.assign(new Error("denied"), { code: "EACCES" }); }, + })).toThrow("denied"); + }); +}); + /** * Without `--parallel`, `--isolate` re-evaluates the module graph once per file on a single * core. Past ~900 files that stops reading as slow and starts reading as hung: measured at @@ -516,10 +698,12 @@ describe("bun test argv", () => { )).toContain("did not emit a recognizable selection summary"); }); - test("the wrapper passes parallel execution through to bun", () => { + test("the wrapper passes parallel execution through to bun without leaving TEMP roots", () => { const fixtureRoot = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "opencodex-test-runner-")); + const sentinelTemp = join(fixtureRoot, "sentinel-temp"); const fixturePath = join(fixtureRoot, "parallel-smoke.test.ts"); const markerPath = join(fixtureRoot, "executed.marker"); + mkdirSync(sentinelTemp); writeFileSync( fixturePath, `import { test } from "bun:test"; import { writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; test("smoke", () => writeFileSync(${JSON.stringify(markerPath)}, "executed"));\n`, @@ -531,7 +715,13 @@ describe("bun test argv", () => { fixturePath, ], { cwd: repoRoot(), - env: { ...process.env, OCX_TEST_NO_QUEUE: "1" }, + env: { + ...process.env, + TEMP: sentinelTemp, + TMP: sentinelTemp, + TMPDIR: sentinelTemp, + OCX_TEST_NO_QUEUE: "1", + }, stdout: "pipe", stderr: "pipe", }); @@ -541,10 +731,45 @@ describe("bun test argv", () => { expect(result.exitCode).toBe(0); expect(output).toContain("PARALLEL"); expect(existsSync(markerPath)).toBe(true); + expect(readdirSync(sentinelTemp)).toEqual([]); } finally { removeTreeWithRetry(fixtureRoot); } - }); + }, { timeout: SPAWN_BUDGET_MS }); + + test.each(["pass", "fail"] as const)( + "a bare %s run removes its preload-owned TEMP root", + outcome => { + const fixtureRoot = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "opencodex-bare-test-runner-")); + const sentinelTemp = join(fixtureRoot, "sentinel-temp"); + const fixturePath = join(fixtureRoot, "bare-smoke.test.ts"); + mkdirSync(sentinelTemp); + writeFileSync( + fixturePath, + `import { test } from "bun:test"; test("smoke", () => { ${outcome === "fail" ? 'throw new Error("expected fixture failure");' : ""} });\n`, + ); + try { + const result = Bun.spawnSync([process.execPath, "test", "--parallel=1", fixturePath], { + cwd: repoRoot(), + env: { + ...process.env, + TEMP: sentinelTemp, + TMP: sentinelTemp, + TMPDIR: sentinelTemp, + OCX_TEST_NO_QUEUE: "1", + }, + stdout: "pipe", + stderr: "pipe", + }); + + expect(result.exitCode).toBe(outcome === "pass" ? 0 : 1); + expect(readdirSync(sentinelTemp)).toEqual([]); + } finally { + removeTreeWithRetry(fixtureRoot); + } + }, + { timeout: SPAWN_BUDGET_MS }, + ); }); describe("bun test user lock", () => { diff --git a/tests/helpers/home-destruction-scan.ts b/tests/helpers/home-destruction-scan.ts index 3c17fdbb72..8a8d75082b 100644 --- a/tests/helpers/home-destruction-scan.ts +++ b/tests/helpers/home-destruction-scan.ts @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ export const HOME_ROOT_RESOLVERS = ["getConfigDir", "getCodexHome"] as const; export const DESTRUCTIVE_CALLS = [ "rmSync", "rmdirSync", "unlinkSync", "renameSync", "cpSync", "truncateSync", "rm", "rmdir", "unlink", "rename", "cp", "truncate", - "removeTreeWithRetry", + "removeTreeWithRetry", "removeTestTempTree", ] as const; export type HomeRemovalTier = "home-root" | "inside-home"; diff --git a/tests/helpers/isolated-codex-home.ts b/tests/helpers/isolated-codex-home.ts index 3fcc5d2a1b..b0ddaa97b6 100644 --- a/tests/helpers/isolated-codex-home.ts +++ b/tests/helpers/isolated-codex-home.ts @@ -23,9 +23,10 @@ export function installIsolatedCodexHome(prefix = "ocx-codex-home-"): IsolatedCo // disposable. On Windows a proxy or child that is still shutting down can hold // a file in this tree open past the retry budget, and rethrowing there failed a // test that had already finished asserting -- it read as a defect in whatever - // ran here rather than as an OS release race. Leave the temp directory to the - // OS instead; a stale directory under TEMP costs nothing, a false red costs a - // real signal. + // ran here rather than as an OS release race. The owning test root now contains + // and removes this path, so a swallowed failure here no longer strands a directory + // directly under the user's TEMP -- it strands one inside a tree that goes away with + // the run, or with a later run that can prove it owned that tree. try { removeTreeWithRetry(path); } catch { diff --git a/tests/helpers/remove-tree.ts b/tests/helpers/remove-tree.ts index ae0068a15f..651b92b6fb 100644 --- a/tests/helpers/remove-tree.ts +++ b/tests/helpers/remove-tree.ts @@ -1,9 +1,5 @@ -import { rmSync } from "node:fs"; import { assertRemovalOutsideProtectedTrees } from "../../src/lib/test-home-guard"; - -const TRANSIENT_REMOVE_CODES = new Set(["EPERM", "EBUSY", "ENOTEMPTY"]); -const REMOVE_ATTEMPTS = 50; -const REMOVE_RETRY_DELAY_MS = 50; +import { removeTestTempTree } from "../../scripts/test-temp"; type RemoveTreeWithRetryOptions = Readonly<{ remove?: (path: string) => void; @@ -18,25 +14,15 @@ type RemoveTreeWithRetryOptions = Readonly<{ * directory and hands it here would otherwise delete the developer's real home on any run that * never pinned OPENCODEX_HOME. The check is a path comparison against three canonical trees, * so it costs nothing for the temp directories every caller actually passes. + * + * The retry policy itself lives in `scripts/test-temp` so the wrapper's own cleanup and every + * fixture teardown wait the same way. They were separate schedules for one release, and the + * duplicate is what let the shard-load failure in #4789 be fixed in one place and not the other. */ export function removeTreeWithRetry( path: string, options: RemoveTreeWithRetryOptions = {}, ): void { assertRemovalOutsideProtectedTrees(path); - const remove = options.remove ?? (target => rmSync(target, { recursive: true, force: true })); - const sleep = options.sleep ?? Bun.sleepSync; - - for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= REMOVE_ATTEMPTS; attempt += 1) { - try { - remove(path); - return; - } catch (error) { - const code = error && typeof error === "object" && "code" in error - ? String(error.code) - : ""; - if (!TRANSIENT_REMOVE_CODES.has(code) || attempt === REMOVE_ATTEMPTS) throw error; - sleep(REMOVE_RETRY_DELAY_MS); - } - } + removeTestTempTree(path, options); } diff --git a/tests/lib/remove-tree-helper.test.ts b/tests/lib/remove-tree-helper.test.ts index 4c4024e697..a814d0b65f 100644 --- a/tests/lib/remove-tree-helper.test.ts +++ b/tests/lib/remove-tree-helper.test.ts @@ -1,4 +1,9 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { + REMOVE_RETRY_BUDGET_MS, + REMOVE_RETRY_MAX_DELAY_MS, + removeRetrySchedule, +} from "../../scripts/test-temp"; import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; function codedError(code: string, message = code): Error & { code: string } { @@ -19,7 +24,18 @@ describe("removeTreeWithRetry", () => { }); expect(removeCalls).toBe(3); - expect(sleeps).toEqual([50, 50]); + expect(sleeps).toEqual([50, 100]); + }); + + test("a removal that succeeds immediately never waits", () => { + const sleeps: number[] = []; + + removeTreeWithRetry("ignored", { + remove: () => undefined, + sleep: milliseconds => sleeps.push(milliseconds), + }); + + expect(sleeps).toEqual([]); }); test("rethrows non-transient failures immediately", () => { @@ -45,7 +61,27 @@ describe("removeTreeWithRetry", () => { }, sleep: () => { sleeps += 1; }, })).toThrow(error); - expect(removeCalls).toBe(50); - expect(sleeps).toBe(49); + expect(removeCalls).toBe(removeRetrySchedule().length + 1); + expect(sleeps).toBe(removeRetrySchedule().length); + }); +}); + +describe("removeRetrySchedule", () => { + // The flat 50 x 50ms predecessor gave the documented icacls release race 2.5 seconds, and six + // concurrent Windows shards exceeded it (#4789). These bounds are the contract: grow the wait, + // cap it so no single gap is long, and spend the budget without overrunning it. + test("backs off to a cap and outlasts the flat 2.5 second predecessor", () => { + const schedule = removeRetrySchedule(); + const total = schedule.reduce((sum, delay) => sum + delay, 0); + + expect(schedule.slice(0, 3)).toEqual([50, 100, 200]); + expect(Math.max(...schedule)).toBe(REMOVE_RETRY_MAX_DELAY_MS); + expect(total).toBeGreaterThan(2_500); + expect(total).toBeLessThanOrEqual(REMOVE_RETRY_BUDGET_MS); + expect(total + REMOVE_RETRY_MAX_DELAY_MS).toBeGreaterThan(REMOVE_RETRY_BUDGET_MS); + }); + + test("a budget too small for one wait yields a single attempt", () => { + expect(removeRetrySchedule(10)).toEqual([]); }); }); diff --git a/tests/preload.ts b/tests/preload.ts index b8b0a83245..50e65eff16 100644 --- a/tests/preload.ts +++ b/tests/preload.ts @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ * what HOME says. `assertLiveServiceManagerAllowed` in `src/service.ts` is the guard for * that, armed by the same flag set below. */ +import { afterAll } from "bun:test"; import { isTestHomeGuardArmed, protectedHomeForTests } from "../src/lib/test-home-guard"; import { createIsolatedTestEnvironment } from "../scripts/test"; import { @@ -37,7 +38,6 @@ import { TEST_RUN_LOCK_PATH_ENV, TEST_RUN_LOCK_TOKEN_ENV, } from "../scripts/test-run-lock"; -import { rmSync } from "node:fs"; // Under `bun run test` the wrapper already handed us a sandbox (and OCX_REAL_HOME so the // guard could still see the true home). Isolating again is harmless and deliberate: the @@ -116,6 +116,17 @@ if (process.platform === "win32" && lockPath && runLock.owner) { } // Clean up only the root this preload created. The `bun run test` wrapper owns its own. -process.on("exit", () => { - try { rmSync(isolated.root, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch { /* best effort at exit */ } -}); +// Bun test workers do not reliably run process `exit` handlers, so the test lifecycle hook +// is primary; the process hook remains a best-effort fallback for setup failures. +let cleanupComplete = false; +const cleanupIsolatedRoot = () => { + if (cleanupComplete) return; + try { + isolated.cleanup(); + cleanupComplete = true; + } catch { + // The wrapper contains this root, and a later bare run reclaims it after the grace period. + } +}; +afterAll(cleanupIsolatedRoot); +process.on("exit", cleanupIsolatedRoot); From 2203277ad41de5c27ed846b668608ed0a7eb7e3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 20:44:41 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 106/113] fix(responses,chat): keep a replay refusal out of retries, quota evidence and Retry-After (#4807) Release-blocker fix for 2.57.0, found by the final cross-change regression audit. Exact head has a green aggregate ci check with no failing job. The 429 reclassification that landed in #4798 guarded the call sites that read a 429 as a rate limit but not the ones that write quota evidence, synthesize Retry-After, or reclassify the status on the way out, so in two places the release as it stood invited the replay the change exists to prevent: passthrough recorded the synthetic 429 as quota evidence and attached a default Retry-After, and native Chat dropped the distinct code. Adapter recovery could also replay a refusal produced by a refetch inside an arm, which the single-retry regression could not catch. The invariant is now stated once and recorded: a refusal this proxy made never acquires a Retry-After and never becomes quota evidence. Host-owned merge decision; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- .../docs/reference/configuration/server.md | 3 +- src/bridge/errors.ts | 5 ++ src/lib/upstream-retry.ts | 23 ++++++++ src/server/chat-native.ts | 14 ++++- src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts | 15 +++++ src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts | 11 +++- src/server/responses/passthrough-error.ts | 40 ++++++++++++- structure/transports/responses.md | 37 +++++++++++- .../upstream-transient-retry.test.ts | 57 ++++++++++++++++++- .../responses/responses-account-label.test.ts | 26 +++++++++ .../responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts | 32 +++++++++++ tests/server/retry-after-429.test.ts | 30 ++++++++++ 12 files changed, 283 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/server.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/server.md index 397f2803ea..4d1fcd20da 100644 --- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/server.md +++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/server.md @@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ to send it again and answers HTTP 429 with `upstream_reset_replay_refused`. The deliberate: a 5xx here is an instruction to most clients, including Codex, to send the whole turn again, which is the duplicate the refusal exists to prevent. No `Retry-After` is attached, and the proxy performs no key rotation, account failover or same-target replay on -it. Tool-call side requests such as vision and web search are replayed normally, because +it, nor does it record the refusal as rate-limit or quota evidence against the credential it +was holding. Tool-call side requests such as vision and web search are replayed normally, because repeating them cannot duplicate a turn. `noProxy` accepts either a comma-separated string or an array. Both forms add entries without diff --git a/src/bridge/errors.ts b/src/bridge/errors.ts index 8947eff9d7..aa27019579 100644 --- a/src/bridge/errors.ts +++ b/src/bridge/errors.ts @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ import { isNonReplayableUpstreamCode, isReplayRefusalCode, + markReplayRefusalResponse, markResponseNonReplayable, REPLAY_REFUSED_STATUS, } from "../lib/upstream-retry"; @@ -49,5 +50,9 @@ export function formatErrorResponse( headers, }); if (replayBlocked) markResponseNonReplayable(response); + // Re-wrapping is where the refusal loses its provenance: combo failure consumption parses + // the JSON and builds a new Response, and the code alone does not tell a later quota + // recorder that no upstream produced this status. Carry the narrower marker across too. + if (replayBlocked && isReplayRefusalCode(error.code)) markReplayRefusalResponse(response); return response; } diff --git a/src/lib/upstream-retry.ts b/src/lib/upstream-retry.ts index 98e0e5d015..8dd6f1146f 100644 --- a/src/lib/upstream-retry.ts +++ b/src/lib/upstream-retry.ts @@ -36,6 +36,28 @@ export function isNonReplayableResponse(response: Response): boolean { return nonReplayableResponses.has(response); } +/** + * The narrower marker: responses this proxy synthesized as a replay refusal. + * + * {@link isNonReplayableResponse} answers "must not be sent again", which the WebSocket + * post-send verdicts share. This one answers "the upstream never said this", and that is the + * question a quota recorder or a `Retry-After` synthesizer has to ask. Both were written for + * a status that only ever arrived from a provider, so a synthetic 429 reads to them as a + * credential that rate-limited us and as a wait worth honouring -- one writes a cooldown + * against a credential that refused nothing, the other instructs the client to send the turn + * again. A marker rather than a body check, because it has to be answerable before the body + * is read and cannot be spoofed by an upstream that happens to echo the code. + */ +const replayRefusalResponses = new WeakSet(); + +export function markReplayRefusalResponse(response: Response): void { + replayRefusalResponses.add(response); +} + +export function isReplayRefusalResponse(response: Response): boolean { + return replayRefusalResponses.has(response); +} + /** Origin never produced a response event; the turn may still be executing. */ export const UPSTREAM_NO_RESPONSE_CODE = "upstream_no_response"; /** Transport closed after the send, before any response event. */ @@ -517,6 +539,7 @@ export async function fetchWithResetRetry( message: "The upstream connection closed before a response was received. The request may already have been processed; automatic replay was stopped.", } }), { status: REPLAY_REFUSED_STATUS, headers: { "content-type": "application/json" } }); markResponseNonReplayable(response); + markReplayRefusalResponse(response); return response; } if (attempt === attempts - 1) throw err; diff --git a/src/server/chat-native.ts b/src/server/chat-native.ts index 21ead2baac..837b112e2f 100644 --- a/src/server/chat-native.ts +++ b/src/server/chat-native.ts @@ -26,8 +26,11 @@ import { fetchWithResetRetry, fetchWithTransientRetry, isNonReplayableResponse, + isReplayRefusalCode, + isReplayRefusalResponse, prepareSameTarget429Wait, type UpstreamSendRecovery, + UPSTREAM_RESET_REPLAY_REFUSED_CODE, } from "../lib/upstream-retry"; import { isTranslatorBudgetExceededError, @@ -486,6 +489,12 @@ export async function handleNativeChatCompletions(options: HandleNativeChatOptio if (isCyberPolicyCode(upstreamCode) || classified.code === CYBER_POLICY_ERROR_CODE) { classified.code = CYBER_POLICY_ERROR_CODE; classified.type = cyberPolicyErrorType(upstreamType); + } else if (isReplayRefusalResponse(response) || isReplayRefusalCode(upstreamCode)) { + // 429 classifies as a rate limit and a rate limit already carries a code, so the branch + // below -- which only fills an EMPTY code -- could never restore this one. Without it the + // client is told the provider throttled the turn, when what happened is that this proxy + // declined to send it a second time. + classified.code = UPSTREAM_RESET_REPLAY_REFUSED_CODE; } else if (upstreamCode === "model_not_found") { classified.code = "model_not_found"; classified.type = "invalid_request_error"; @@ -493,7 +502,10 @@ export async function handleNativeChatCompletions(options: HandleNativeChatOptio classified.code = upstreamCode; } const status = isCyberPolicyCode(classified.code) ? 400 : response.status; - const retryAfter = isCyberPolicyCode(classified.code) + // A refusal this proxy made has no wait to report. Synthesizing one here would hand the + // client the default two-second retry for a rate limit that never happened, which is the + // duplicate send the refusal exists to prevent. + const retryAfter = isCyberPolicyCode(classified.code) || isReplayRefusalCode(classified.code) ? undefined : resolveClientRetryAfter({ status: response.status, diff --git a/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts b/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts index c26b77b19b..aed413118c 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts @@ -621,6 +621,11 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( const result = await rebuildAndRefetch("key-401"); if ("failed" in result) return result.failed; upstreamResponse = result; + // A recovery refetch can itself die on an ambiguous pre-header reset, and the refusal + // that answers it is a 429. Every arm below keys on 429, so letting it fall through + // hands the marked refusal to the next waiting arm and replays the send it exists to + // stop. Re-enter the loop guard instead, which returns it unchanged. + if (isNonReplayableResponse(upstreamResponse)) continue recovery; } // Same-target 429 wait-and-retry (opt-in `retryOn429`, issue #487). Codex never retries @@ -661,6 +666,9 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( const result = await rebuildAndRefetch("rate-limit-429"); if ("failed" in result) return result.failed; upstreamResponse = result; + // The refusal is a 429 too: without this the while condition is still true and the + // next configured attempt replays it on the same target. + if (isNonReplayableResponse(upstreamResponse)) continue recovery; } // Multi-key 429 failover: rotate to the next pool key (cooldown-aware) and retry the @@ -692,6 +700,9 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( const result = await rebuildAndRefetch("key-429"); if ("failed" in result) return result.failed; upstreamResponse = result; + // Rotating on the refusal would also write a cooldown against a key that rate-limited + // nothing, which outlives the request. + if (isNonReplayableResponse(upstreamResponse)) continue recovery; } // Opt-in Anthropic OAuth account pool (#294): cool the failed account and retry @@ -728,6 +739,7 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( const result = await rebuildAndRefetch("anthropic-oauth-429"); if ("failed" in result) return result.failed; upstreamResponse = result; + if (isNonReplayableResponse(upstreamResponse)) continue recovery; } catch { break; } @@ -821,6 +833,9 @@ export async function prepareAdapterExchange( return result.failed; } upstreamResponse = result; + // The hop's permit is already settled by the dispatch boundary above; continuing + // only skips the remaining arms, it does not abandon a reservation. + if (isNonReplayableResponse(upstreamResponse)) continue recovery; } catch { // A throw before the send — snapshot fetch, credential application, adapter // resolution — must hand the reservation back. Without this the ladder charges the diff --git a/src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts b/src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts index 591d54c1dd..03e5aa0242 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import { relayWithAbort, } from "../relay"; import { isUsageDebugEnabled } from "../../usage/debug"; +import { isReplayRefusalResponse } from "../../lib/upstream-retry"; import { teeWithBoundedInspection } from "../inspection-tee"; import { codexForwardTerminalOutcomeRecorder, @@ -244,7 +245,12 @@ export async function deliverPassthroughResponse( } else if (!shouldDeferCodexResetDerivedCooldown( upstreamResponse, options.deferCodexResetDerivedCooldown, - )) { + ) && !isReplayRefusalResponse(upstreamResponse)) { + // A refusal this proxy made is not evidence about the account. Recording it would + // classify the synthetic 429 as quota exhaustion and write a default cooldown against + // a credential the request may never have reached, and that false signal outlives the + // request. The sibling recorders on this path already decline: the terminal recorder + // needs an ok streaming body, and the quota-header snapshot finds no quota headers. recordCodexUpstreamOutcome(config, admissionState.authCtx.accountId, upstreamResponse.status, { ...quotaMeta, threadId: admissionState.authCtx.affinityKey, @@ -300,6 +306,9 @@ export async function deliverPassthroughResponse( return formatPassthroughUpstreamError(upstreamResponse.status, errorText, { statusText: upstreamResponse.statusText, headers, + // Provenance, not inference: `errorText` is empty when the bounded read finds nothing + // display-safe, and an empty body is exactly what the retryable-429 default fires on. + replayRefusal: isReplayRefusalResponse(upstreamResponse), }); } diff --git a/src/server/responses/passthrough-error.ts b/src/server/responses/passthrough-error.ts index a9d9ad7d0f..eee33c02a9 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/passthrough-error.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/passthrough-error.ts @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ import { formatErrorResponse } from "../../bridge"; import { isCyberPolicyCode, isCyberPolicyMessage } from "../../lib/errors"; +import { isReplayRefusalCode, UPSTREAM_RESET_REPLAY_REFUSED_CODE } from "../../lib/upstream-retry"; import { resolveClientRetryAfter, validateClientRetryAfterHeader, @@ -24,6 +25,26 @@ function isCyberPolicyBody(body: string): boolean { return false; } +/** + * True for a body this proxy wrote to refuse replaying an ambiguous pre-header reset. + * + * It is read off the body rather than a marker because this formatter is handed bytes, not + * the response they came from, and the refusal reaches it after the original body was read. + * The code is this proxy's own, so an upstream echoing it is not a case worth widening for. + */ +function isReplayRefusalBody(body: string): boolean { + if (!body.includes(UPSTREAM_RESET_REPLAY_REFUSED_CODE)) return false; + try { + const parsed = JSON.parse(body) as Record; + const error = parsed.error && typeof parsed.error === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed.error) + ? parsed.error as Record + : undefined; + return isReplayRefusalCode(error?.code) || isReplayRefusalCode(parsed.code); + } catch { + return false; + } +} + /** * Passthrough adapters historically relayed upstream non-2xx bodies verbatim. * Codex maps an *empty* body to the literal client string "Unknown error" @@ -38,6 +59,9 @@ function isCyberPolicyBody(body: string): boolean { * - missing/malformed values are replaced when resolveClientRetryAfter yields a value * - malformed/expired values are removed when the resolver returns undefined * (e.g. quota-exhausted 429s must not keep junk headers or get the synthetic "2") + * - a replay refusal this proxy wrote gets none and keeps none: the whole point of the + * refusal is that the turn may already be running, and the synthetic default for a + * retryable 429 is a direct instruction to the client to send it a second time */ export function formatPassthroughUpstreamError( status: number, @@ -46,6 +70,13 @@ export function formatPassthroughUpstreamError( statusText?: string; headers?: Headers; now?: number; + /** + * Provenance from the caller that still holds the response: this body is a refusal this + * proxy synthesized. The body check below is the fallback for a re-wrapped body, and it + * cannot answer at all when the bounded read returned nothing display-safe -- which is + * precisely when the empty-body branch would invent the retryable-429 default. + */ + replayRefusal?: boolean; }, ): Response { const trimmed = bodyText.trim(); @@ -53,7 +84,12 @@ export function formatPassthroughUpstreamError( const upstreamRetryAfter = options?.headers?.get("retry-after")?.trim() || undefined; const originalValid = validateClientRetryAfterHeader(upstreamRetryAfter, now); const cyberPolicyFailure = isCyberPolicyBody(trimmed); - const resolved = cyberPolicyFailure + // Two different reasons to answer with no wait at all, handled the same way: a hard policy + // block will not become servable, and a refusal we made was never a rate limit. + const suppressRetryAfter = cyberPolicyFailure + || options?.replayRefusal === true + || isReplayRefusalBody(trimmed); + const resolved = suppressRetryAfter ? undefined : resolveClientRetryAfter({ status, @@ -64,7 +100,7 @@ export function formatPassthroughUpstreamError( if (trimmed) { const needsSet = resolved !== undefined && upstreamRetryAfter !== resolved; - const needsDelete = (cyberPolicyFailure && upstreamRetryAfter !== undefined) + const needsDelete = (suppressRetryAfter && upstreamRetryAfter !== undefined) || (resolved === undefined && upstreamRetryAfter !== undefined && originalValid === undefined); diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index 91cfb84d6d..bee5e62c77 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -964,8 +964,7 @@ both are non-replayable, but only one is ours to restate. Because the refusal now carries 429, a 429 is no longer sufficient evidence of a provider rate limit. Every same-target replay, key rotation, account rotation and pool-quota recorder that keys on 429 first asks `isNonReplayableResponse`: -`src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts` (at the top of its recovery loop, which also -covers a reset reached by a 401/429/413 refetch), `src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts`, +`src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts`, `src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts`, `src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts`, `src/server/responses/compact.ts` and `src/server/chat-native.ts`. Compact additionally records the transport outcome rather than the client-facing status, so pool health sees exactly what it saw before the correction. @@ -974,6 +973,33 @@ write a cooldown against a credential that refused nothing — a false signal th request, which is the same hazard `rotateRunTurnAdapterOnPreflight429` already guards for the send budget. +In `adapter-dispatch.ts` the guard at the top of the recovery loop is necessary and was not +sufficient. The refusal can also be produced by a refetch made INSIDE an arm, and that arm +then still holds it: the same-target loop re-enters while `rateLimitRetries` is below the +configured attempts, and the key, Anthropic-pool and generic-OAuth rotations re-enter while a +credential is left to try. The key-401 arm is in the same class from the other direction — its +refetch answers 429 and it falls through into the arms below. So every arm that reassigns +`upstreamResponse` from `rebuildAndRefetch` re-enters the loop guard rather than continuing, +which is what makes the top-of-loop check the single exit for this verdict. + +**A refusal this proxy made never acquires a `Retry-After` and never becomes quota evidence.** +Guarding the ten call sites that READ 429 as a rate limit left the sites that WRITE evidence, +synthesize a wait, or re-classify the status on the way out. `isNonReplayableResponse` is the +wrong question for those, because it also covers the WebSocket post-send verdicts, which are +genuine upstream observations; the question is whether any upstream produced this status at +all. `isReplayRefusalResponse` in `src/lib/upstream-retry.ts` answers exactly that, applied +where the refusal is synthesized and reapplied by `src/bridge/errors.ts` when the formatter +re-wraps it after combo failure consumption. Three writers consult it or the code: +`src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts` skips `recordCodexUpstreamOutcome`, which would +otherwise classify the synthetic 429 as quota exhaustion and cool the account; +`src/server/responses/passthrough-error.ts` suppresses the retryable-429 default and drops any +inherited header, taking provenance from the caller that still holds the response and falling +back to the code in the body — provenance is not optional there, because the bounded read +answers with an empty string for anything not display-safe and an empty body is exactly what +the default fires on; and `src/server/chat-native.ts` restores the code its own classifier overwrote — +429 maps to `rate_limit_error`, which already carries a code, so the branch that copies an +upstream code could never reach it — and suppresses the same synthetic wait. + The existing provider HTTP-status policy and the shared physical-send budget remain independent: zero refuses dispatch, invalid counts fail, and a stopped send is counted once. `src/bridge/errors.ts` retains only the allowlisted non-replayable transport codes, @@ -983,7 +1009,12 @@ client back a retryable status. Other upstream codes keep the existing classific cyber-policy hard blocks retain precedence. The helper, formatter and public Responses count regressions live in `tests/lib/upstream-retry.test.ts`, `tests/responses/responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts` and -`tests/codex-integration/reserve-dispatch.test.ts`. +`tests/codex-integration/reserve-dispatch.test.ts`. The three write-side paths are pinned +separately: a second armed same-target attempt in +`tests/responses/responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts`, the absent cooldown and absent +`Retry-After` on a Codex pool account in `tests/responses/responses-account-label.test.ts`, +the formatter in `tests/server/retry-after-429.test.ts`, and the native Chat classification in +`tests/providers/upstream-transient-retry.test.ts`. ## Combo output headroom diff --git a/tests/providers/upstream-transient-retry.test.ts b/tests/providers/upstream-transient-retry.test.ts index d7518fc29f..313451d023 100644 --- a/tests/providers/upstream-transient-retry.test.ts +++ b/tests/providers/upstream-transient-retry.test.ts @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { afterEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; import { fetchWithTransientRetry, isNonReplayableResponse, @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ import { markResponseNonReplayable, } from "../../src/lib/upstream-retry"; import { transientRetryPolicyFor } from "../../src/providers/key-failover"; -import type { OcxProviderConfig } from "../../src/types"; +import { handleChatCompletions } from "../../src/server/chat-completions"; +import type { OcxConfig, OcxProviderConfig } from "../../src/types"; function bodyResponse(status: number, headers?: Record): Response { // ReadableStream body so cancel() is observable. @@ -243,3 +244,55 @@ describe("fetchWithTransientRetry", () => { expect(res.status).toBe(502); }); }); + +/** + * The native Chat surface answers from its own classifier rather than the bridge formatter, so + * the refusal reaches the client only if that classifier preserves it. It did not: 429 maps to + * `rate_limit_error`, which already carries a code, and the only branch that copied an upstream + * code required the classified one to be empty. The client was therefore told the provider + * throttled the turn and handed a two-second Retry-After for a rate limit that never happened. + */ +describe("native Chat completions and the replay refusal", () => { + const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch; + afterEach(() => { globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; }); + + test("keeps the refusal code and attaches no Retry-After", async () => { + let sends = 0; + globalThis.fetch = (async () => { + sends += 1; + throw Object.assign(new Error("The socket connection was closed unexpectedly."), { code: "ECONNRESET" }); + }) as typeof fetch; + const config = { + port: 0, + defaultProvider: "replay-refusal-fixture", + providers: { + "replay-refusal-fixture": { + adapter: "openai-chat", + baseUrl: "https://replay-refusal.example.test/v1", + authMode: "key", + apiKey: "sk-replay-refusal", + }, + }, + } as unknown as OcxConfig; + + const response = await handleChatCompletions( + new Request("http://localhost/v1/chat/completions", { + method: "POST", + headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ + model: "replay-refusal-fixture/model", + messages: [{ role: "user", content: "ping" }], + }), + }), + config, + { model: "", provider: "" }, + ); + + expect(sends).toBe(1); + expect(response.status).toBe(429); + expect(response.headers.get("Retry-After")).toBeNull(); + expect(await response.json()).toMatchObject({ + error: { code: "upstream_reset_replay_refused" }, + }); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-account-label.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-account-label.test.ts index 1980c4a5e4..08dacdc59f 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-account-label.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-account-label.test.ts @@ -344,6 +344,32 @@ describe("Responses account usage attribution", () => { }); }); + // Pool health reads a 429 as the account saying it is out of quota. The replay refusal wears + // the same status but no upstream produced it, so recording it would cool a credential that + // refused nothing -- and the cooldown outlives the request that invented it. + test("a refused reset replay is not quota evidence and invites no client retry", async () => { + await withPoolHome(async () => { + const config = poolConfig(["pool-a"]); + savePoolCredential("pool-a"); + updateAccountQuota("pool-a", 10); + let sends = 0; + globalThis.fetch = (async () => { + sends += 1; + throw Object.assign(new Error("The socket connection was closed unexpectedly."), { code: "ECONNRESET" }); + }) as typeof fetch; + + const response = await handleResponses(request(), config, { model: "", provider: "" }, {}); + + expect(response.status).toBe(429); + expect(sends).toBe(1); + expect((await response.json() as { error?: { code?: string } }).error?.code) + .toBe("upstream_reset_replay_refused"); + expect(response.headers.get("Retry-After")).toBeNull(); + expect(getCodexUpstreamHealth("pool-a")?.lastFailureStatus).toBeUndefined(); + expect(getCodexUpstreamHealth("pool-a")?.cooldownUntil).toBeUndefined(); + }); + }); + test("a wrapped quota failure cools a sole account when no alternate exists", async () => { await withPoolHome(async () => { const config = poolConfig(["pool-a"]); diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts index 5afee9db84..10b08864f3 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-send-budget-counts.test.ts @@ -261,6 +261,38 @@ describe("ambiguous reset safety after outer recovery", () => { expect(totalSends(logCtx)).toBe(2); }); + // The row above arms ONE same-target attempt, so the refusal it produces arrives with the + // arm already spent and nothing left to replay it. That is the case the guard at the top of + // the recovery loop already covered. The defect is the arm that still has an attempt left: + // the refusal is itself a 429, the while condition is still true, and the next attempt sends + // the turn a third time -- the exact duplicate inference the refusal exists to prevent. + for (const adapter of ["openai-chat", "openai-responses"]) { + test(`${adapter}: a second same-target 429 attempt cannot replay the refusal`, async () => { + const config = comboOverTargets(2); + for (const provider of Object.values(config.providers)) provider.adapter = adapter; + // Two attempts, not one: the first consumes the real rate limit, the second is the arm + // that must NOT fire once the refetch has been refused. + config.providers.t0!.retryOn429 = { attempts: 2 }; + const authorizations: string[] = []; + globalThis.fetch = (async (_input: string | URL | Request, init?: RequestInit) => { + authorizations.push(new Headers(init?.headers).get("authorization") ?? ""); + if (authorizations.length === 1) return new Response("rate limited", { + status: 429, headers: { "retry-after": "0" }, + }); + throw Object.assign(new Error("connection reset by peer"), { code: "ECONNRESET" }); + }) as typeof fetch; + const logCtx: RequestLogContext = { model: "", provider: "" }; + const response = await handleResponses(responsesRequest("t0/model-t0"), config, logCtx); + + expect(response.status).toBe(429); + expect((await response.json()).error.code).toBe("upstream_reset_replay_refused"); + // Exactly two: the rate-limited send and the refetch that was refused. A third entry is + // the regression, and the base allowance (3) can afford it, so this count is the proof. + expect(authorizations).toEqual(["Bearer sk-t0", "Bearer sk-t0"]); + expect(totalSends(logCtx)).toBe(2); + }); + } + test("account and combo recovery retain the no-replay verdict after one body read", async () => { const response = await fetchWithResetRetry(async () => { throw Object.assign(new Error("reset"), { code: "ECONNRESET" }); diff --git a/tests/server/retry-after-429.test.ts b/tests/server/retry-after-429.test.ts index 168fe06b6a..8264399419 100644 --- a/tests/server/retry-after-429.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/retry-after-429.test.ts @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import { } from "../../src/lib/retry-after"; import { formatPassthroughUpstreamError } from "../../src/server/responses/passthrough-error"; import { consumeComboFailure } from "../../src/server/responses/core"; +import { fetchWithResetRetry } from "../../src/lib/upstream-retry"; describe("resolveClientRetryAfter (#507)", () => { test("prefers a validated upstream Retry-After header", () => { @@ -101,6 +102,35 @@ describe("formatErrorResponse Retry-After (#507)", () => { }); describe("formatPassthroughUpstreamError Retry-After (#507)", () => { + // The refusal shares the status of a retryable rate limit, so the default below would have + // handed it a "Retry-After: 2" -- an instruction to send a turn that may already be running. + // The bytes come from the helper rather than a literal so the recognition is pinned against + // the shape the proxy actually emits. + test("a replay refusal gets no Retry-After and keeps none it is handed", async () => { + const refusal = await fetchWithResetRetry(async () => { + throw Object.assign(new Error("reset"), { code: "ECONNRESET" }); + }); + const body = await refusal.text(); + + const bare = formatPassthroughUpstreamError(429, body); + expect(bare.status).toBe(429); + expect(bare.headers.get("Retry-After")).toBeNull(); + + const headers = new Headers({ "retry-after": "30", "content-type": "application/json" }); + const withUpstreamHeader = formatPassthroughUpstreamError(429, body, { headers }); + expect(withUpstreamHeader.headers.get("Retry-After")).toBeNull(); + expect(await withUpstreamHeader.text()).toBe(body); + }); + + test("a refusal whose body did not survive the read still gets no Retry-After", () => { + // The bounded reader answers "" for anything not display-safe, and the empty-body branch + // is the one that invents the default. Caller provenance is what covers this case. + expect(formatPassthroughUpstreamError(429, "").headers.get("Retry-After")) + .toBe(DEFAULT_RETRYABLE_429_RETRY_AFTER_SEC); + expect(formatPassthroughUpstreamError(429, "", { replayRefusal: true }).headers.get("Retry-After")) + .toBeNull(); + }); + test("empty-body retryable 429 gets a default Retry-After", async () => { const response = formatPassthroughUpstreamError(429, ""); expect(response.status).toBe(429); From 89bdf5fa4ac5c7de6fa37aba747cf72ff099ea5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 21:02:54 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 107/113] fix(codex): carry uploaded-file retention through compact and keep the denial lookup behind the read fence (#4806) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Release-blocker fix for 2.57.0, found by the final cross-change regression audit. Exact head has a green aggregate ci check with no failing job. Uploaded-file retention did not reach native compact initial account resolution or the encrypted-recovery preview, so a file-carrying conversation could still be moved before the post-429 guard ran, or preview and final authentication could pick different accounts — either one reproduces the failure #4778 removed. Both paths now carry the bit, answered from the same object and predicate the post-429 guard uses. Separately the flagship denial lookup crossed the native-main read fence by validating cached rosters through the physical main token; it now honours the fence and answers unknown there, which changes nothing because unknown never excludes an account. Host-owned merge decision; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 1 + src/codex/auth-context.ts | 13 ++- src/codex/model-entitlements.ts | 8 ++ src/server/responses/compact.ts | 8 ++ src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts | 25 +++++- .../codex-model-entitlements.test.ts | 89 +++++++++++++++++++ tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 1 + .../responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts | 82 +++++++++++++++++ ...subagent-fallback-handle-responses.test.ts | 40 --------- .../subagent-fallback-preview-sites.test.ts | 85 ++++++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 309 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/routing/subagent-fallback-preview-sites.test.ts diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index e09bbf3a39..283692139c 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -1329,6 +1329,7 @@ "subagent-context-staleness.test.ts": "routing", "subagent-defaults.test.ts": "routing", "subagent-fallback-handle-responses.test.ts": "routing", + "subagent-fallback-preview-sites.test.ts": "routing", "subagent-model-fallback-api.test.ts": "routing", "subagent-model-fallback.test.ts": "routing", "subagent-roster-retention.test.ts": "routing", diff --git a/src/codex/auth-context.ts b/src/codex/auth-context.ts index 2c693a50b9..356ee9012f 100644 --- a/src/codex/auth-context.ts +++ b/src/codex/auth-context.ts @@ -989,7 +989,18 @@ export async function resolveCodexAuthContext( // already gathered -- no upstream fetch joins the request path for the most commonly // requested models in the product -- and passed to selection as a preference that is dropped // whenever honouring it would leave no candidate. - const deniedModelAccountIds = cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(options.modelId); + // + // Under the SAME exclusion the entitlement snapshot above uses. The reader validates each + // cached roster against the account's current credential, and for native main that is a + // synchronous read of the physical stored token -- exactly what this request is forbidden to + // touch while a profile switch drains it or while it is served by a request-owned credential. + // Excluding main here costs nothing: the preference is an ordering hint, so main becomes + // unknown rather than denied, and unknown leaves selection exactly as it was. + const deniedModelAccountIds = cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel( + options.modelId, + undefined, + { excludeAccountIds }, + ); const selectionOptions = { // Temporary switch drain keeps the candidate until the atomic claim rejects // it. Retained recovery makes main wholly ineligible so pool routing continues. diff --git a/src/codex/model-entitlements.ts b/src/codex/model-entitlements.ts index 99c6d1427d..15ea05cb79 100644 --- a/src/codex/model-entitlements.ts +++ b/src/codex/model-entitlements.ts @@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ export const ENTITLEMENT_PREFERRED_NATIVE_OPENAI_MODELS: ReadonlySet = n export function cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel( modelId: string | undefined, now = Date.now(), + options: { excludeAccountIds?: ReadonlySet } = {}, ): ReadonlySet | undefined { if (!modelId || !ENTITLEMENT_PREFERRED_NATIVE_OPENAI_MODELS.has(modelId)) return undefined; const denied = new Set(); @@ -1217,6 +1218,13 @@ export function cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel( const accountId = accountIdOfCacheKey(key); // A forwarded Direct credential is one request's caller, never a pool candidate. if (accountId.startsWith(DIRECT_CALLER_ACCOUNT_PREFIX)) continue; + // The caller's read fence, honoured BEFORE `currentCredentialIdentity` below, because that + // is the read: for native main it resolves the physical stored token, once per cached client + // version. A request that is forbidden to read main -- a profile switch draining it, or a + // request-owned credential that owns no main state -- must not reread account storage just to + // score an ordering preference. Dropping the account leaves it UNKNOWN rather than denied, + // which is the same outcome as having no cached roster for it and changes no selection. + if (options.excludeAccountIds?.has(accountId)) continue; if (entry.expiresAt <= now) continue; // A credential we can currently read AND that differs is proof the entry answers for a // different account than this id now names, so its denial is not evidence about the current diff --git a/src/server/responses/compact.ts b/src/server/responses/compact.ts index 73e8d0a89b..79769dc8f8 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/compact.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/compact.ts @@ -738,6 +738,14 @@ export async function handleResponsesCompact( beginCodexAccountSelection: codexAccountSelectionForTurn(turnAdmissionLease), signal: req.signal, nativeMainRefreshDependencies: options.nativeMainRefreshDependencies, + // #4778: the same retention the regular Responses path passes at its final auth. The + // post-429 guard below only declines to move AFTER this resolution has already bound + // an account, so without the bit here a quota-driven rebind could have carried the + // conversation off its issuing account before that guard is ever consulted -- and an + // uploaded file is readable only by the account that received it. Answered from `raw`, + // the same object and the same predicate the guard below uses, so the two can never + // disagree about which conversations are in scope. + retainAccountForUploadedFiles: conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(raw), }); logCtx.accountLogLabel = codexAuthContextLogLabel(authCtx, config); const selected = await materializeCodexUpstreamAuthAsync(req.headers, authCtx, { diff --git a/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts b/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts index 8162a3d8e7..13dbc699c6 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ import { cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel, resolveCodexModelEntitlements, } from "../../codex/model-entitlements"; +import { MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID } from "../../codex/main-account"; import { previewCodexAccountForRequest, codexQuotaScopeForModel, @@ -542,7 +543,13 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( // Per CANDIDATE model, like the scope and the eligible set above: the preference is // model-specific, so hoisting it out of the closure would score every fallback // candidate against the requested model's evidence and diverge from final auth (#4768). - deniedModelAccountIds: cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(modelId, previewNow), + // Under the same native-main read fence final auth applies: the reader validates each + // cached roster against the account's current credential, and for main that is a + // synchronous read of the stored token. A preview that read it would both cross the + // fence and score main differently than the resolution it is supposed to predict. + deniedModelAccountIds: cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(modelId, previewNow, { + excludeAccountIds: nativeMainReadsForbidden ? new Set([MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID]) : undefined, + }), }, modelId, poolLineage, @@ -677,6 +684,13 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( const recoverySelectionOptions = { nativeMainSelectionOnly: !recoveryNativeMainBlocked && recoverySelectionAdmission?.mainProfileDraining === true, + // #4778, same reason as `previewSelectionOptions` above: this preview decides + // which account subagent fallback scores against, and final auth passes the + // retention. Recovery is exactly where the two could diverge -- it re-previews + // against the DECRYPTED body, which is the first point at which a file reference + // that was ciphertext-only becomes readable, so reconstructing the options + // without the bit lets preview report a quota move the request will not make. + retainAccountForUploadedFiles: conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(parsed._rawBody), }; const recoveryNow = Date.now(); // Carry the entitlement filter through recovery too (#2509/#2623). The scope was @@ -692,7 +706,14 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( { ...recoverySelectionOptions, modelEligibleAccountIds, - deniedModelAccountIds: cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(modelId, previewNow), + // Same read fence as the first preview, evaluated against recovery's own view + // of the drain rather than the one captured before decryption. + deniedModelAccountIds: cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(modelId, previewNow, { + excludeAccountIds: recoveryNativeMainBlocked + || recoverySelectionAdmission?.mainProfileDraining === true + ? new Set([MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID]) + : undefined, + }), }, modelId, poolLineage, diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-model-entitlements.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-model-entitlements.test.ts index e0a529d148..56ef19433a 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-model-entitlements.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-model-entitlements.test.ts @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ import upstreamModelsSnapshot from "../../src/codex/data/upstream-models.json"; import { readCodexAccountRecord, saveCodexAccountCredential } from "../../src/codex/account-store"; import { installIsolatedCodexHome } from "../helpers/isolated-codex-home"; import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; +import { repoPath } from "../helpers/repo-root"; const TEST_CLIENT_VERSION = "0.146.0"; const DAYBREAK = "gpt-daybreak-blue-latest"; @@ -1865,3 +1866,91 @@ describe("cached per-account denials for always-visible natives", () => { expect(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(undefined, now)).toBeUndefined(); }); }); + +/** + * The denial reader validates every cached roster against the account's CURRENT credential, and + * for native main that validation is a synchronous read of the physical stored token -- once per + * cached client version, on the request path. + * + * Some requests are forbidden to make that read: a profile switch draining the native identity, + * and a request served by its own forwarded credential which owns no main state. Those callers + * already exclude main from every other account question they ask, and reaching the token here + * anyway crossed the fence for an ordering hint. Excluding it is safe precisely because the hint + * is soft: the account becomes UNKNOWN rather than denied, which is indistinguishable from + * having no cached roster for it and leaves selection exactly as it was. + */ +describe("the denial reader honours a caller's account read fence", () => { + test("an excluded account contributes no denial while the others still do", () => { + const now = 1_800_000_000_000; + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("plus", ["gpt-5.5"], now, TEST_CLIENT_VERSION); + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("free", ["gpt-5.5"], now, TEST_CLIENT_VERSION); + + expect([...(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, now) ?? [])].sort()) + .toEqual(["free", "plus"]); + expect([...(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, now, { + excludeAccountIds: new Set(["plus"]), + }) ?? [])]).toEqual(["free"]); + }); + + test("excluding the only denied account answers undefined, never an empty set", () => { + // Same contract the unexcluded reader keeps: a caller must not be able to read "everything I + // was allowed to look at grants the model" as "no candidates exist". + const now = 1_800_000_000_000; + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("free", ["gpt-5.5"], now, TEST_CLIENT_VERSION); + + expect(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, now, { + excludeAccountIds: new Set(["free"]), + })).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("native main is dropped without its stored credential being consulted", () => { + // Written so the answer cannot depend on whether a main token is readable in this + // environment: readable, absent, or mismatched, an excluded main is the same nothing. That + // is the whole point -- the excluded reader must reach no verdict about main, which is what + // makes not reading the token safe. + const now = 1_800_000_000_000; + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests(MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID, ["gpt-5.5"], now, TEST_CLIENT_VERSION); + + expect(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, now, { + excludeAccountIds: new Set([MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID]), + })).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("an absent or empty exclusion set leaves the reader exactly as it was", () => { + const now = 1_800_000_000_000; + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("free", ["gpt-5.5"], now, TEST_CLIENT_VERSION); + + expect([...(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, now, {}) ?? [])]).toEqual(["free"]); + expect([...(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, now, { + excludeAccountIds: new Set(), + }) ?? [])]).toEqual(["free"]); + }); + + /** + * The fence is a property of the CALLERS, not of this reader: the reader cannot know which + * request is draining main. Asserted from source because the failure mode is an omitted + * argument -- every behavioural assertion above passes with the callers unchanged, which is + * exactly how the original violation survived review. + */ + test("every request-path caller passes its own fence", () => { + const authContext = readFileSync(repoPath("src", "codex", "auth-context.ts"), "utf8"); + const prepare = readFileSync(repoPath("src", "server", "responses", "request-prepare.ts"), "utf8"); + + // Auth context reuses the very set it already built for the entitlement snapshot, so the two + // account questions on this request can never disagree about what it may read. + const authCalls = [...authContext.matchAll(/cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel\(/g)] + .map(match => authContext.slice(match.index ?? 0, (match.index ?? 0) + 400)); + expect(authCalls).toHaveLength(1); + expect(authCalls[0]).toContain("excludeAccountIds"); + + // Both previews in request-prepare, including the one rebuilt after encrypted-task recovery. + const previewCalls = [...prepare.matchAll(/cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel\(/g)] + .map(match => prepare.slice(match.index ?? 0, (match.index ?? 0) + 400)); + expect(previewCalls).toHaveLength(2); + for (const call of previewCalls) expect(call).toContain("excludeAccountIds:"); + expect(previewCalls[0]).toContain("nativeMainReadsForbidden"); + // Recovery evaluates the drain against its own, later view rather than the one captured + // before decryption. + expect(previewCalls[1]).toContain("recoveryNativeMainBlocked"); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index 6c0291cf95..c585d827cd 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -1157,6 +1157,7 @@ "subagent-context-staleness.test.ts": "routing", "subagent-defaults.test.ts": "routing", "subagent-fallback-handle-responses.test.ts": "routing", + "subagent-fallback-preview-sites.test.ts": "routing", "subagent-model-fallback-api.test.ts": "routing", "subagent-model-fallback.test.ts": "routing", "subagent-roster-retention.test.ts": "routing", diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts index de300abacb..59be5738d7 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-account-change-scrub.test.ts @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ import { afterEach, describe, expect, spyOn, test } from "bun:test"; +import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { repoPath } from "../helpers/repo-root"; import { applyAccountChangeConversationStateScrub, canPortConversationState, @@ -305,3 +307,83 @@ describe("uploaded-file detection answers before an alternate account is chosen expect(ACCOUNT_CHANGE_FILE_SCOPE_MESSAGE).toContain("no file was removed"); }); }); + +/** + * #4778 retention is only correct if it reaches EVERY resolution that can bind this + * conversation to an account, because the sites do not fail the same way. + * + * The regular Responses path passes it at final auth. Native compact did not pass it at its + * initial resolution, and the refusal it does carry runs only after a 429 -- by which time a + * quota-driven rebind has already moved the conversation, so the guard declines a move that + * happened one step earlier. Encrypted-agent-task recovery rebuilds the preview options from + * scratch, and it does so against the DECRYPTED body, which is the first point at which a file + * reference that was ciphertext-only becomes readable; a preview reconstructed without the bit + * reports one account and final auth binds another. + * + * Asserted from source because the failure is an omitted option on a call, not a value any + * reachable seam returns: a body-level test of the predicate (above) passes either way, and the + * behavioural difference only appears against a live pool that is mid-rebind. The claim is + * narrow and mechanical -- this exact call carries this exact expression -- so it fails on the + * regression and on nothing else. + */ +describe("uploaded-file retention reaches every account resolution (#4778)", () => { + const source = (...relative: string[]): string => readFileSync(repoPath(...relative), "utf8"); + + /** The argument list of the single call whose head is `marker` (which must end at its own `(`). */ + function callArguments(src: string, marker: string): string { + const at = src.indexOf(marker); + expect(at).toBeGreaterThan(-1); + // A second occurrence would make the assertion below ambiguous about which call it read. + expect(src.indexOf(marker, at + 1)).toBe(-1); + const open = at + marker.length - 1; + let depth = 0; + for (let i = open; i < src.length; i++) { + if (src[i] === "(") depth++; + else if (src[i] === ")" && --depth === 0) return src.slice(open, i + 1); + } + throw new Error("unbalanced call arguments for: " + marker); + } + + /** The object literal opened by `marker` (which must end at its own `{`). */ + function objectLiteral(src: string, marker: string): string { + const at = src.indexOf(marker); + expect(at).toBeGreaterThan(-1); + expect(src.indexOf(marker, at + 1)).toBe(-1); + const open = at + marker.length - 1; + let depth = 0; + for (let i = open; i < src.length; i++) { + if (src[i] === "{") depth++; + else if (src[i] === "}" && --depth === 0) return src.slice(open, i + 1); + } + throw new Error("unbalanced object literal for: " + marker); + } + + test("native compact passes the retention at its own initial resolution", () => { + const compact = source("src", "server", "responses", "compact.ts"); + const initialAuth = callArguments( + compact, + "if (route.codexAccountMode) authCtx = await resolveCodexAuthContext(", + ); + + expect(initialAuth).toContain("retainAccountForUploadedFiles: conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(raw)"); + }); + + test("the post-429 compact guard stays, because it answers a different question", () => { + // The guard is not redundant with the retention above: retention declines a VOLUNTARY quota + // move, while this refuses an alternate account after the issuing one has already rejected + // the send. Removing either one reopens half of #4778. + const compact = source("src", "server", "responses", "compact.ts"); + + expect(compact).toContain("const alternate = conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(raw)"); + }); + + test("both Responses previews answer the same question final auth does", () => { + const prepare = source("src", "server", "responses", "request-prepare.ts"); + const retention = "retainAccountForUploadedFiles: conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(parsed._rawBody)"; + + expect(objectLiteral(prepare, "const previewSelectionOptions = {")).toContain(retention); + expect(objectLiteral(prepare, "const recoverySelectionOptions = {")).toContain(retention); + expect(callArguments(prepare, "const finalAuth = await resolveResponsesCodexAuth(")) + .toContain("conversationCarriesUploadedFiles(parsed._rawBody)"); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/routing/subagent-fallback-handle-responses.test.ts b/tests/routing/subagent-fallback-handle-responses.test.ts index 32bb643008..fb236802e1 100644 --- a/tests/routing/subagent-fallback-handle-responses.test.ts +++ b/tests/routing/subagent-fallback-handle-responses.test.ts @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, setDefaultTimeout, spyOn, test import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { join } from "node:path"; -import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import { saveCodexAccountCredential } from "../../src/codex/account-store"; import { clearAccountQuota, @@ -1566,45 +1565,6 @@ describe("native fallback account preview", () => { expect(bodyRequests[1]?.auth).toContain("pool-b_token"); }); - /** - * Recovery must carry the ENTITLEMENT filter too, not only the quota scope (#2509). - * - * The end-to-end case above grants the roster to both pool accounts, so it can only prove the - * SCOPE is re-previewed per candidate. The recovery path re-previewed the scope but passed no - * eligible-account set, so it could select an account with no entitlement to the recovered - * model and fail closed at final auth — the same stale-selection class as the quota scope, one - * layer over. - * - * Asserted structurally on the source, like the route-inventory contract: driving it end to end - * needs a recovered encrypted assignment AND an account-gated candidate whose entitlement - * differs per account, and the resulting fixture proved more fragile than the thing it checks. - * What this does catch is the regression that actually threatens the fix — one of the two - * preview sites silently losing the eligibility argument again. - */ - test("both fallback preview sites pass the model-eligible account set (#2509)", async () => { - const source = await Bun.file( - fileURLToPath(new URL("../../src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts", import.meta.url)), - ).text(); - - const previews = source.match(/subagentFallbackAccountPreview = \([^)]*\)/g) ?? []; - // Two assignment sites: the primary selection path and the encrypted-recovery path. - expect(previews).toHaveLength(2); - // Neither may drop the third parameter — that is exactly how recovery lost it. - for (const preview of previews) { - expect(preview).toContain("modelEligibleAccountIds"); - } - - // And both must actually forward it into the preview call, not merely accept it. - // Neither the argument list nor the options object is pinned to an exact shape: #4546 - // appended the pool lineage after `modelId`, #4768 added `deniedModelAccountIds` beside the - // eligible set, and pinning either would fail on unrelated growth while still not catching - // the regression this exists for -- a site dropping `modelEligibleAccountIds` on the way in. - const forwarded = source.match( - /\{\s*\.\.\.(previewSelectionOptions|recoverySelectionOptions),[^}]*\bmodelEligibleAccountIds\b[^}]*\},\s*modelId,[^)]*\)/g, - ) ?? []; - expect(forwarded).toHaveLength(2); - }); - test("uses healthier pool account B when active A is above threshold", async () => { const now = 1_800_000_000_000; Date.now = () => now; diff --git a/tests/routing/subagent-fallback-preview-sites.test.ts b/tests/routing/subagent-fallback-preview-sites.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7e21f79d48 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/routing/subagent-fallback-preview-sites.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; + +/** + * The two subagent-fallback preview sites in `prepareResponsesRequest` must ask the same + * question, and the only practical way to check that is to read the source. + * + * Split out of `subagent-fallback-handle-responses.test.ts`, which carries the end-to-end pool + * harness and had reached its file-size cap. Nothing here needs that harness: these cases open no + * server, install no credential, and touch no account state, so they were the part of that file + * paying for a fixture they never used. + */ +describe("native fallback account preview sites (source contract)", () => { + const requestPrepareSource = async (): Promise => Bun.file( + fileURLToPath(new URL("../../src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts", import.meta.url)), + ).text(); + + /** + * Recovery must carry the ENTITLEMENT filter too, not only the quota scope (#2509). + * + * The end-to-end case in the sibling file grants the roster to both pool accounts, so it can + * only prove the SCOPE is re-previewed per candidate. The recovery path re-previewed the scope + * but passed no eligible-account set, so it could select an account with no entitlement to the + * recovered model and fail closed at final auth — the same stale-selection class as the quota + * scope, one layer over. + * + * Asserted structurally on the source, like the route-inventory contract: driving it end to end + * needs a recovered encrypted assignment AND an account-gated candidate whose entitlement + * differs per account, and the resulting fixture proved more fragile than the thing it checks. + * What this does catch is the regression that actually threatens the fix — one of the two + * preview sites silently losing the eligibility argument again. + */ + test("both fallback preview sites pass the model-eligible account set (#2509)", async () => { + const source = await requestPrepareSource(); + + const previews = source.match(/subagentFallbackAccountPreview = \([^)]*\)/g) ?? []; + // Two assignment sites: the primary selection path and the encrypted-recovery path. + expect(previews).toHaveLength(2); + // Neither may drop the third parameter — that is exactly how recovery lost it. + for (const preview of previews) { + expect(preview).toContain("modelEligibleAccountIds"); + } + }); + + /** + * And both must actually forward it into the preview call, not merely accept it. + * + * Neither the argument list nor the options object is pinned to an exact shape: #4546 appended + * the pool lineage after `modelId`, #4768 added `deniedModelAccountIds` beside the eligible set, + * and pinning either would fail on unrelated growth while still not catching the regression + * this exists for -- a site dropping `modelEligibleAccountIds` on the way in. + * + * Read by BRACE BALANCE rather than by a "no closing brace" character class, which was the same + * over-pinning in a shape that did not look like one. `[^}]*` quietly assumed the options object + * contained no nested literal, so when the #4768 follow-up gave `deniedModelAccountIds` an + * options argument of its own, the matcher found ZERO sites and reported both call sites + * missing -- failing on exactly the growth the comment above promises it tolerates, and failing + * in the direction that looks like the real defect. + */ + test("both sites forward the eligible set into the preview call itself", async () => { + const source = await requestPrepareSource(); + + const forwarded = [...source.matchAll( + /\{\s*\.\.\.(?:previewSelectionOptions|recoverySelectionOptions),/g, + )].map(match => { + const start = match.index ?? 0; + let depth = 0; + for (let i = start; i < source.length; i++) { + if (source[i] === "{") depth += 1; + else if (source[i] === "}" && (depth -= 1) === 0) { + return { options: source.slice(start, i + 1), tail: source.slice(i + 1, i + 40) }; + } + } + throw new Error("unbalanced selection options literal at offset " + start); + }); + + expect(forwarded).toHaveLength(2); + for (const { options, tail } of forwarded) { + expect(options).toContain("modelEligibleAccountIds"); + // Still the PREVIEW call rather than any other object spread from these options: the + // literal is the argument immediately before `modelId`. + expect(tail).toMatch(/^,\s*modelId,/); + } + }); +}); From 8a63bc0f763511866264305d7a204d292dbebb28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 21:54:29 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 108/113] fix(responses): close the helper-alias and preview read-fence gaps (#4813) Release-blocker fix for 2.57.0 from the second regression audit. Exact head has a green aggregate ci check. A namespaced helper name could donate the bare spelling, so a declaration such as mcp__remote.exec added bare exec to the declared set and an undeclared apply_patch, exec_command or write_stdin was then rewritten to it; the exclusion is now keyed on the name rather than the namespace, and a namespaced exec stays usable as itself. Request preview also computed the native-main read fence without the request-owned credential that final authentication includes, so a thread_spawn request with a forwardable caller bearer could read the physical main token and score main differently from final auth. Host-owned merge decision; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 2 + src/server/responses/collaboration.ts | 23 +++-- src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts | 63 +++++++++--- tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 2 + .../responses-bare-echo-helper-fence.test.ts | 90 +++++++++++++++++ .../responses-preview-main-read-fence.test.ts | 97 +++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 254 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/responses/responses-bare-echo-helper-fence.test.ts create mode 100644 tests/responses/responses-preview-main-read-fence.test.ts diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index 283692139c..68552be09c 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -267,6 +267,8 @@ "azure-adapter.test.ts": "providers", "azure-model-router-tool-schema.test.ts": "providers", "bare-echo-alias.test.ts": "responses", + "responses-bare-echo-helper-fence.test.ts": "responses", + "responses-preview-main-read-fence.test.ts": "responses", "baseten-provider.test.ts": "providers", "bearer-admission-routed-provider.test.ts": "codex-integration", "bounded-body.test.ts": "server", diff --git a/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts b/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts index 0310417485..0fb059faa8 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts @@ -155,9 +155,10 @@ export function buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed: OcxParsedRequest, budget?: Translato // on the muse family via Command Code — echo a namespaced tool by its bare name. The // bare spelling is only a safe alias while it names ONE tool and cannot be read as // another identity's canonical or dotted spelling. - // Code-mode helper spellings never gain a bare alias (#4679 review): admitting bare - // `exec` into the declared set would authorize the unrelated helper normalization that - // the CODE_MODE_EXEC exception exists to contain. + // Code-mode helper spellings never gain a bare alias (#4679 review), whatever namespace + // declares them: admitting bare `exec` into the declared set would authorize the unrelated + // helper normalization that the CODE_MODE_EXEC exception exists to contain. The namespace is + // not the safety property here — the bare spelling is — so this is a property of the NAME. const BARE_ECHO_EXCLUDED_NAMES = new Set([ "exec", "exec_command", "shell_command", "write_stdin", "apply_patch", "view_image", ]); @@ -210,13 +211,19 @@ export function buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed: OcxParsedRequest, budget?: Translato // the flattened wire name, so a provider that drops the namespace prefix still // restores against this entry. Ambiguous bare names were resolved to null above; // skipping them falls back to the spellings every provider can still echo. - // Code-mode helper spellings on the collaboration surface never gain a bare alias: - // admitting bare `exec` there would let normalizeDeclaredToolName authorize unrelated - // helper names. A namespaced custom `exec` from another catalog (for example - // `mcp__functions.exec`) remains an ordinary caller-declared tool. + // Code-mode helper spellings never gain a bare alias, from ANY namespace (#4792 review). + // Scoping this to `collaboration` was too narrow to be a boundary: a declaration such as + // `mcp__remote.exec` donated bare `exec` to the declared set, and normalizeDeclaredToolName + // then rewrote an undeclared `apply_patch`, `exec_command` or `write_stdin` onto it + // (src/types/tools.ts). No namespace may turn helper normalization on for a catalog that + // never declared the code-mode shell. + // + // The namespaced tool stays usable AS ITSELF: `ns__name` is added unconditionally above + // and `ns.name` whenever it is unambiguous, so only the namespace-dropping echo fallback + // is withdrawn, and only for these six spellings. if ( bareAliasOwners.get(t.name) === JSON.stringify([t.namespace, t.name]) - && !(t.namespace === "collaboration" && BARE_ECHO_EXCLUDED_NAMES.has(t.name)) + && !BARE_ECHO_EXCLUDED_NAMES.has(t.name) ) { budget?.chargeRetained(new TextEncoder().encode(t.name).byteLength, { kind: "retained_collectors" }); declaredToolNames.add(t.name); diff --git a/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts b/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts index 13dbc699c6..2b67798b13 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ import { codexPoolAffinityKey, previewCodexPoolLineage, applyCodexAuthContextToProvider, + hasCallerCodexBearer, } from "../../codex/auth-context"; import { copyPreviousResponseReplayProvenance, @@ -456,9 +457,34 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( && (route.codexAccountId === undefined || initialSubagentFallbackChain !== null) ? codexAccountSelectionForTurn(options.turnAdmissionLease)?.() : undefined; + // The credential headers final authentication will be given, resolved once and reused by + // everything below that has to predict what final auth decides. + const previewAuthHeaders = codexRouteCredentialDomainHeaders( + req, + route, + options, + credentialDomainWasRewritten, + ); + // Does the CALLER own the credential this request will authenticate with? Validated exactly + // the way final auth validates it: the route ownership predicate AND the caller-bearer check + // `resolveCodexAuthContext` re-applies to these same headers. + const previewRequestScopedMainCredential = codexRouteCredentialOwnership( + previewAuthHeaders, + config, + route, + options, + ).requestScopedMainCredential && hasCallerCodexBearer(previewAuthHeaders); const nativeMainRecoveryBlocked = isNativeMainTrafficBlocked(); - const nativeMainReadsForbidden = nativeMainRecoveryBlocked + // The same three inputs final auth ORs together (src/codex/auth-context.ts). Request-owned + // ownership is first there and has to be first here: computing the preview fence from + // recovery and drain state alone let a `thread_spawn` carrying a forwardable caller bearer + // read the physical main token it is forbidden to touch, and score main differently than the + // resolution this preview exists to predict. + const nativeMainReadsForbidden = previewRequestScopedMainCredential + || nativeMainRecoveryBlocked || previewSelectionAdmission?.mainProfileDraining === true; + // Deliberately NOT fenced on ownership: final auth derives `nativeMainSelectionOnly` from the + // drain alone, and adding a term here would diverge from it in the other direction. const previewSelectionOptions = { nativeMainSelectionOnly: !nativeMainRecoveryBlocked && previewSelectionAdmission?.mainProfileDraining === true, @@ -484,22 +510,11 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( // deliberately create no affinity at all -- previewing a family binding for one of those would // hand model fallback an account this request can never authenticate as. Read-only: the record // is written by the resolution that binds, never by a preview that may own no Pool state. - const previewAuthHeaders = codexRouteCredentialDomainHeaders( - req, - route, - options, - credentialDomainWasRewritten, - ); const poolLineage = previewCodexPoolLineage(previewAuthHeaders, options.codexAuthPolicy ?? config, { accountId: route.codexAccountId, modelId: route.modelId, admission: options.admission, - requestScopedMainCredential: codexRouteCredentialOwnership( - previewAuthHeaders, - config, - route, - options, - ).requestScopedMainCredential, + requestScopedMainCredential: previewRequestScopedMainCredential, }); try { @@ -681,6 +696,21 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( const fallback = (() => { try { const recoveryNativeMainBlocked = isNativeMainTrafficBlocked(); + // Recompute ownership here rather than reusing the pre-decryption value: a + // subagent fallback above may have re-routed, and `requestScopedMainCredential` + // is a function of the route as well as the headers. + const recoveryAuthHeaders = codexRouteCredentialDomainHeaders( + req, + route, + options, + credentialDomainWasRewritten, + ); + const recoveryRequestScopedMainCredential = codexRouteCredentialOwnership( + recoveryAuthHeaders, + config, + route, + options, + ).requestScopedMainCredential && hasCallerCodexBearer(recoveryAuthHeaders); const recoverySelectionOptions = { nativeMainSelectionOnly: !recoveryNativeMainBlocked && recoverySelectionAdmission?.mainProfileDraining === true, @@ -707,9 +737,12 @@ export async function prepareResponsesRequest( ...recoverySelectionOptions, modelEligibleAccountIds, // Same read fence as the first preview, evaluated against recovery's own view - // of the drain rather than the one captured before decryption. + // of the drain AND of credential ownership, rather than the one captured before + // decryption. Omitting ownership here would reopen the fence the first preview + // closes, on the one path that re-previews after the route may have moved. deniedModelAccountIds: cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(modelId, previewNow, { - excludeAccountIds: recoveryNativeMainBlocked + excludeAccountIds: recoveryRequestScopedMainCredential + || recoveryNativeMainBlocked || recoverySelectionAdmission?.mainProfileDraining === true ? new Set([MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID]) : undefined, diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index c585d827cd..283de9d38e 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -997,6 +997,7 @@ "reserve-quota-scope.test.ts": "codex-integration", "response-model-identity.test.ts": "server", "responses-account-label.test.ts": "responses", + "responses-bare-echo-helper-fence.test.ts": "responses", "responses-compaction-routing.test.ts": "responses", "responses-compaction.test.ts": "responses", "responses-console-go-upload-retry.test.ts": "responses", @@ -1022,6 +1023,7 @@ "responses-parser.test.ts": "responses", "responses-pool-401-refresh.test.ts": "responses", "responses-pool-refresh-attribution.test.ts": "responses", + "responses-preview-main-read-fence.test.ts": "responses", "responses-reasoning-effort-downgrade.test.ts": "responses", "responses-reasoning-summary-passthrough.test.ts": "responses", "responses-routed-web-search-fields.test.ts": "responses", diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-bare-echo-helper-fence.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-bare-echo-helper-fence.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a21a19ae33 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/responses/responses-bare-echo-helper-fence.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { parseRequest } from "../../src/responses/parser"; +import { buildToolBridgeMaps } from "../../src/server/responses"; +import { normalizeDeclaredToolName, declaresCodeModeExec } from "../../src/types/tools"; + +/** + * The bare echo alias is a convenience for providers that drop the namespace prefix. For the six + * code-mode helper spellings it is also an authorization decision, because bare `exec` in + * `declaredToolNames` is the single switch that turns on helper normalization + * (src/types/tools.ts): once it is set, an UNDECLARED `apply_patch`, `exec_command` or + * `write_stdin` is rewritten onto it. + * + * The exclusion that prevents that was once scoped to the `collaboration` namespace, which made + * the boundary a property of the declaring namespace rather than of the spelling, and any other + * namespace could then donate the bare name. These cases pin the exclusion to the NAME, and pin + * the half that has to keep working beside it: the namespaced tool stays reachable under the + * spellings that carry their namespace, and non-helper names keep their #4679 echo fallback. + * + * Kept out of `bare-echo-alias.test.ts` so the namespace-independence contract has a file of its + * own rather than growing the file that pins the original collaboration-only behaviour. + */ + +function namespacedToolRequest(namespace: string, name: string) { + return parseRequest({ + model: "claude-opus-5", + input: "run it", + tools: [{ + type: "namespace", + name: namespace, + tools: [{ type: "function", name, parameters: { type: "object" } }], + }], + }); +} + +const HELPER_SPELLINGS = ["exec", "exec_command", "shell_command", "write_stdin", "apply_patch", "view_image"]; + +describe("helper spellings are fenced from the bare echo alias in every namespace", () => { + test("a foreign namespace donates no helper spelling", () => { + const donated = HELPER_SPELLINGS.filter(name => { + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(namespacedToolRequest("mcp__remote", name)); + return maps.declaredToolNames.has(name) || maps.toolNsMap.has(name); + }); + + expect(donated).toEqual([]); + }); + + test("the fence is the spelling, not the namespace that declared it", () => { + // The original exclusion only fired for `collaboration`. Every surface must agree now. + const declaringBareExec = ["collaboration", "mcp__remote", "mcp__functions"].filter( + namespace => buildToolBridgeMaps(namespacedToolRequest(namespace, "exec")).declaredToolNames.has("exec"), + ); + + expect(declaringBareExec).toEqual([]); + }); + + test("a foreign namespaced exec stays usable as itself under its own spellings", () => { + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(namespacedToolRequest("mcp__remote", "exec")); + + // Canonical is unconditional; dotted is added because nothing else claims it here. Withdrawing + // the bare alias costs the namespace-dropping echo fallback and nothing else. + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("mcp__remote__exec")).toBe(true); + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("mcp__remote.exec")).toBe(true); + expect(maps.toolNsMap.get("mcp__remote__exec")).toMatchObject({ namespace: "mcp__remote", name: "exec" }); + expect(maps.toolNsMap.get("mcp__remote.exec")).toMatchObject({ namespace: "mcp__remote", name: "exec" }); + }); + + test("a non-helper name from the same foreign namespace still gets its bare alias", () => { + // The fence must not become a blanket refusal outside `collaboration`: widening it that far + // would take the #4679 echo fallback away from every MCP catalog. + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(namespacedToolRequest("mcp__remote", "list_issues")); + + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("list_issues")).toBe(true); + expect(maps.toolNsMap.get("list_issues")).toMatchObject({ namespace: "mcp__remote", name: "list_issues" }); + }); + + test("the withheld name is exactly what would have turned helper normalization on", () => { + // The consequence, asserted against the consumer rather than restated: a declared set that + // carries bare `exec` rewrites undeclared helper calls onto it. This is the set the previous + // narrowing produced for a single `mcp__remote.exec` declaration. + const donated = new Set(["mcp__remote__exec", "mcp__remote.exec", "exec"]); + expect(declaresCodeModeExec(donated)).toBe(true); + expect(["apply_patch", "exec_command", "write_stdin"].map(n => normalizeDeclaredToolName(n, donated))) + .toEqual(["exec", "exec", "exec"]); + + const fenced = buildToolBridgeMaps(namespacedToolRequest("mcp__remote", "exec")).declaredToolNames; + expect(declaresCodeModeExec(fenced)).toBe(false); + expect(["apply_patch", "exec_command", "write_stdin"].map(n => normalizeDeclaredToolName(n, fenced))) + .toEqual(["apply_patch", "exec_command", "write_stdin"]); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-preview-main-read-fence.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-preview-main-read-fence.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5242c0dbc2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/responses/responses-preview-main-read-fence.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { repoPath } from "../helpers/repo-root"; + +/** + * Request preview exists to predict what final authentication will decide, so the two must apply + * the same native-main read fence. Final auth forbids those reads for three reasons and the first + * of them is ownership: a request that authenticates with the CALLER's own credential may not + * read, reconcile or score the physical main token (`resolveCodexAuthContext`). Preview computed + * the same-named constant from recovery and drain state only, so a `thread_spawn` carrying a + * forwardable caller bearer previewed with main included -- a fence violation and a + * preview/final disagreement at once. + * + * Asserted on the source, like the sibling preview-site contract in + * `tests/routing/subagent-fallback-preview-sites.test.ts`. Driving it end to end needs a + * thread_spawn whose caller bearer is forwardable, an account-gated candidate model, and a + * populated denial cache whose only entry is main; the fixture that arrangement demands is more + * fragile than the divergence it would catch. What this does catch is the regression that + * actually threatens the fix -- one of the two preview fences being reconstructed from drain + * state alone again, which is how the recovery path came to repeat the omission. + */ +describe("preview and final agree on the native-main read fence (source contract)", () => { + const requestPrepareSource = async (): Promise => + Bun.file(repoPath("src", "server", "responses", "request-prepare.ts")).text(); + const authContextSource = async (): Promise => + Bun.file(repoPath("src", "codex", "auth-context.ts")).text(); + + const fenceExpression = (source: string): string => { + const match = source.match(/const nativeMainReadsForbidden =([\s\S]*?);\n/); + if (!match) throw new Error("no nativeMainReadsForbidden declaration found"); + return match[1]!; + }; + + test("final authentication still ORs request-owned ownership into its fence", async () => { + // The thing preview is copying. If final auth ever stops fencing on ownership, the copy below + // is no longer parity and this file should be revisited rather than quietly kept. + const source = await authContextSource(); + + expect(fenceExpression(source)).toContain("requestScopedMainCredential"); + // And it validates the caller's option against the header it will actually send. + expect(source).toMatch(/options\.requestScopedMainCredential === true\s*\n?\s*&& hasCallerCodexBearer\(headers\)/); + }); + + test("the preview fence carries the same ownership term", async () => { + const source = await requestPrepareSource(); + const fence = fenceExpression(source); + + expect(fence).toContain("previewRequestScopedMainCredential"); + // Still the other two inputs as well -- adding ownership must not have replaced them. + expect(fence).toContain("nativeMainRecoveryBlocked"); + expect(fence).toContain("mainProfileDraining"); + }); + + test("both preview sites derive ownership the way final auth validates it", async () => { + const source = await requestPrepareSource(); + + // The initial preview and the encrypted-recovery re-preview. Recovery recomputes rather than + // reusing, because a subagent fallback above it may have re-routed and ownership is a + // function of the route as well as the headers. + const validated = [...source.matchAll( + /\)\.requestScopedMainCredential\s*&&\s*hasCallerCodexBearer\(/g, + )]; + + expect(validated).toHaveLength(2); + }); + + test("no main exclusion is guarded by drain state alone", async () => { + const source = await requestPrepareSource(); + + // Every place preview withholds main from a credential-validating read. Each must be guarded + // either by the shared fence above -- which the previous case pins to ownership -- or by its + // own ownership term. The recovery site reconstructed this condition inline and lost the + // ownership half; that is the regression this asserts against. + const guards = [...source.matchAll( + /excludeAccountIds:\s*([\s\S]*?)\?\s*new Set\(\[MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID\]\)/g, + )].map(match => match[1]!); + + expect(guards.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2); + const unfenced = guards.filter( + guard => !/nativeMainReadsForbidden|RequestScopedMainCredential/.test(guard), + ); + expect(unfenced).toEqual([]); + }); + + test("selection-only stays derived from the drain alone, in both files", async () => { + // The asymmetry is deliberate: final auth derives `nativeMainSelectionOnly` from the drain + // without ownership, so adding an ownership term to the preview copy would diverge from it in + // the other direction. Pinned so the symmetry above is not "fixed" onto this one too. + for (const source of [await requestPrepareSource(), await authContextSource()]) { + const derivations = [...source.matchAll( + /nativeMainSelectionOnly\s*[:=]([\s\S]*?)mainProfileDraining === true/g, + )].map(match => match[1]!); + + expect(derivations.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1); + expect(derivations.filter(d => /equestScopedMainCredential/.test(d))).toEqual([]); + } + }); +}); From d210c46dab1061005c94b66f41371bb14fc45a14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 21:54:46 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 109/113] fix(codex): classify refresh failures on the structured code and stop per-entry store reads (#4814) Release-blocker fix for 2.57.0 from the second regression audit. Exact head has a green aggregate ci check. A transient refresh failure whose description mentioned revoked, invalidated or expired was still classified terminal even when the structured code was server_error, which re-created the false quarantine #2887 exists to prevent; classification now uses the structured code whenever one exists and keeps the substring fallback only for bodies that carry no code at all. Separately a warm flagship request could perform up to 256 synchronous account-store reads because credential identity resolved per cache entry; it now resolves once per denial pass without weakening the check that an entry belongs to the credential it claims. Host-owned merge decision; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 2 + src/codex/account-store.ts | 39 +++- src/codex/model-entitlements.ts | 85 ++++++--- ...count-store-refresh-classification.test.ts | 152 +++++++++++++++ ...ex-entitlement-identity-read-fence.test.ts | 176 ++++++++++++++++++ .../codex-model-entitlements.test.ts | 1 - tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 2 + 7 files changed, 430 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store-refresh-classification.test.ts create mode 100644 tests/codex-integration/codex-entitlement-identity-read-fence.test.ts diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index 68552be09c..2106a9614b 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ "codex-account-mode-state.test.ts": "gui", "codex-account-namespaces.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-account-selection-preferences.test.ts": "codex-integration", + "codex-account-store-refresh-classification.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-account-store.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-account-unusable-reason.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-admission-primitives.test.ts": "codex-integration", @@ -461,6 +462,7 @@ "codex-cooldown-recovery.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-coordinator-doctor.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-desired-state.test.ts": "codex-integration", + "codex-entitlement-identity-read-fence.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-envkey-admission-substitution.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-exec-invocation.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-features-cache.test.ts": "codex-integration", diff --git a/src/codex/account-store.ts b/src/codex/account-store.ts index feaec9f5c0..f695884cf1 100644 --- a/src/codex/account-store.ts +++ b/src/codex/account-store.ts @@ -268,6 +268,23 @@ export function readCodexAccountRecord(id: string): CodexAccountCredentialRecord return loadCodexAccountRecordStore()[id] ?? null; } +/** + * One store load, every record, for a caller that resolves MANY ids in a single synchronous pass. + * + * `readCodexAccountRecord` reloads, reparses and renormalizes the whole file per id. That is the + * right shape for one lookup and the wrong shape for a loop: the entitlement denial reader holds + * up to 64 accounts with four client versions each, so scoring one warm flagship request could + * perform up to 256 full-store reads on the request path. + * + * These are the same normalized records `readCodexAccountRecord` hands out, tombstones included, + * so the caller keeps its own `deletedAt` and `generation` checks instead of trusting a filtered + * view. That is the difference from `loadCodexAccountStore`, which drops both and cannot answer a + * question about credential generation. + */ +export function loadCodexAccountRecordSnapshot(): Readonly> { + return loadCodexAccountRecordStore(); +} + const QUOTA_HISTORY_IDENTITY_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-4[0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/; function validQuotaHistoryIdentity(value: unknown): value is string { @@ -1205,11 +1222,23 @@ async function resolveCodexToken( // Matched on the exact `error` CODE, not anywhere in the combined text: a transient // `server_error` whose description happens to mention invalid_grant would otherwise // retire a healthy account, which is the failure this whole change exists to remove. - const reason = errCodeExact === "invalid_grant" - || errCodeExact === "refresh_token_invalidated" - || errDesc.includes("invalidated") || errDesc.includes("revoked") ? "revoked" as const - : errCodeExact === "refresh_token_expired" - || errDesc.includes("expired") ? "expired" as const + // + // That rule binds the DESCRIPTION words too. "invalidated", "revoked" and "expired" read + // as terminal prose, but upstream puts arbitrary text there: a `server_error` whose + // description says "token was revoked" or "session expired" is still a 5xx blip, and + // retiring the account on it is exactly the false quarantine #2887 exists to prevent. + // So a body that carries a structured code is classified by that code ALONE. The + // substring fallback survives only where there is no structured code to read at all -- + // a description-only body, or one this parser could not decode -- because there the + // prose is the only signal upstream gave us. + const structuredCode = errCodeExact ? errCodeExact : undefined; + const proseIsOnlySignal = structuredCode === undefined; + const reason = structuredCode === "invalid_grant" + || structuredCode === "refresh_token_invalidated" + || (proseIsOnlySignal + && (errDesc.includes("invalidated") || errDesc.includes("revoked"))) ? "revoked" as const + : structuredCode === "refresh_token_expired" + || (proseIsOnlySignal && errDesc.includes("expired")) ? "expired" as const : "unknown" as const; throw new TokenRefreshError(reason, `Codex token refresh failed (${reason}); reauthenticate the account.`); } diff --git a/src/codex/model-entitlements.ts b/src/codex/model-entitlements.ts index 15ea05cb79..a770925f1d 100644 --- a/src/codex/model-entitlements.ts +++ b/src/codex/model-entitlements.ts @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; import { readBoundedResponseBody } from "../lib/bounded-body"; -import type { OcxConfig } from "../types"; +import type { CodexAccountCredentialRecord, OcxConfig } from "../types"; import { isSelectableCodexPoolAccount } from "./account-id"; -import { getValidCodexToken, readCodexAccountRecord } from "./account-store"; +import { getValidCodexToken, loadCodexAccountRecordSnapshot } from "./account-store"; import { getMainAccountToken, getValidMainAccountToken, @@ -523,17 +523,48 @@ function boundedCacheSet(accountId: string, value: CachedAccountModels): void { evictClass(accountId.startsWith(DIRECT_CALLER_ACCOUNT_PREFIX)); } +/** + * An identity resolver scoped to one caller's pass, reading each backing store at most once. + * + * The identity check itself is unchanged -- same prefix rule, same tombstone and missing-credential + * rejection, same `pool::` shape -- but the READ is hoisted. Per-id + * resolution reloads and reparses the whole `codex-accounts.json` every call, so a loop over cache + * entries paid one full-store read per entry: the denial reader admits 64 accounts with four client + * versions each, which is up to 256 synchronous reads to score a single warm flagship request. + * + * Both stores are read lazily, so a pass that touches only Direct callers, or only native main, + * still opens nothing it does not need. Neither backing read is memoized across passes: a resolver + * lives for one synchronous loop, and that loop has no suspension point, so nothing this process + * does can change the file underneath it. A snapshot is therefore not staler than per-entry reads + * would have been -- it is strictly more coherent, because a foreign writer landing mid-loop can no + * longer give the earlier entries one generation and the later ones another. + */ +function credentialIdentityResolver(): (accountId: string) => string | undefined { + let records: Readonly> | undefined; + let mainRead = false; + let mainIdentity: string | undefined; + return (accountId: string): string | undefined => { + if (accountId.startsWith(DIRECT_CALLER_ACCOUNT_PREFIX)) { + return `direct:${accountId.slice(DIRECT_CALLER_ACCOUNT_PREFIX.length)}`; + } + if (accountId === MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID) { + if (!mainRead) { + const token = getMainAccountToken(); + mainIdentity = token ? `main:${token.chatgptAccountId}` : undefined; + mainRead = true; + } + return mainIdentity; + } + records ??= loadCodexAccountRecordSnapshot(); + const record = records[accountId]; + if (!record?.credential || record.deletedAt != null) return undefined; + return `pool:${record.generation}:${record.credential.chatgptAccountId}`; + }; +} + +/** Single-id resolution. Identical to one call through a fresh {@link credentialIdentityResolver}. */ function currentCredentialIdentity(accountId: string): string | undefined { - if (accountId.startsWith(DIRECT_CALLER_ACCOUNT_PREFIX)) { - return `direct:${accountId.slice(DIRECT_CALLER_ACCOUNT_PREFIX.length)}`; - } - if (accountId === MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_ID) { - const token = getMainAccountToken(); - return token ? `main:${token.chatgptAccountId}` : undefined; - } - const record = readCodexAccountRecord(accountId); - if (!record?.credential || record.deletedAt != null) return undefined; - return `pool:${record.generation}:${record.credential.chatgptAccountId}`; + return credentialIdentityResolver()(accountId); } async function accountCredentialSnapshot( @@ -929,8 +960,10 @@ export async function ensureCodexEntitlementFreshness( ); const candidates = normalizedCandidateAccountIds(config); const mutationEpoch = codexCredentialMutationEpoch(); + // Same hoist as the denial pass: this prologue is synchronous and reads once per candidate. + const identityOf = credentialIdentityResolver(); const identityEntries = candidates.map(accountId => ( - [accountId, currentCredentialIdentity(accountId) ?? null] as const + [accountId, identityOf(accountId) ?? null] as const )); const identityVector = new Map(identityEntries); const workset = candidates.filter(accountId => needsEntitlementRefresh( @@ -983,8 +1016,9 @@ export function getCodexModelEntitlementStatus( clientVersion?: string | null, ): CodexModelEntitlementStatus { const version = resolveCodexEntitlementClientVersion(clientVersion); + const identityOf = credentialIdentityResolver(); const accounts = candidateAccountIds(config).flatMap(accountId => { - const credentialIdentity = currentCredentialIdentity(accountId); + const credentialIdentity = identityOf(accountId); return credentialIdentity ? [{ accountId, credentialIdentity }] : []; }); if (accounts.length === 0) return { status: "unavailable" }; @@ -1214,16 +1248,20 @@ export function cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel( if (!modelId || !ENTITLEMENT_PREFERRED_NATIVE_OPENAI_MODELS.has(modelId)) return undefined; const denied = new Set(); const granted = new Set(); + // One resolver for the whole pass: the loop below runs once per cached (account, client version) + // entry, and resolving an identity per entry meant a full account-store read per entry. + const identityOf = credentialIdentityResolver(); for (const [key, entry] of accountModelsCache) { const accountId = accountIdOfCacheKey(key); // A forwarded Direct credential is one request's caller, never a pool candidate. if (accountId.startsWith(DIRECT_CALLER_ACCOUNT_PREFIX)) continue; - // The caller's read fence, honoured BEFORE `currentCredentialIdentity` below, because that - // is the read: for native main it resolves the physical stored token, once per cached client - // version. A request that is forbidden to read main -- a profile switch draining it, or a - // request-owned credential that owns no main state -- must not reread account storage just to - // score an ordering preference. Dropping the account leaves it UNKNOWN rather than denied, - // which is the same outcome as having no cached roster for it and changes no selection. + // The caller's read fence, honoured BEFORE `identityOf` below, because that is the read: for + // native main it resolves the physical stored token. A request that is forbidden to read main + // -- a profile switch draining it, or a request-owned credential that owns no main state -- + // must not reread account storage just to score an ordering preference. Dropping the account + // leaves it UNKNOWN rather than denied, which is the same outcome as having no cached roster + // for it and changes no selection. The resolver reads lazily for the same reason: an excluded + // account `continue`s here, so its store is never opened at all. if (options.excludeAccountIds?.has(accountId)) continue; if (entry.expiresAt <= now) continue; // A credential we can currently read AND that differs is proof the entry answers for a @@ -1231,7 +1269,7 @@ export function cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel( // one. An UNREADABLE credential is not proof of anything, and the same unknown-is-not-denied // discipline that governs rosters governs identities: it leaves the entry in place rather // than manufacturing a reason to ignore it. - const identity = currentCredentialIdentity(accountId); + const identity = identityOf(accountId); if (identity !== undefined && identity !== entry.credentialIdentity) continue; const state = codexModelEntitlementStateForRoster( entry.models, @@ -1286,6 +1324,11 @@ export function cachedAvailableAccountGatedNativeModels( export function isCodexModelEntitlementSnapshotCurrent(snapshot: CodexModelEntitlementSnapshot): boolean { for (const [accountId, identity] of snapshot.credentialIdentities) { + // Deliberately per-id, unlike the passes above. This is a fail-closed publication gate asking + // whether a snapshot is STILL current, so the freshest possible answer per account is the + // point of the read. A pass-wide snapshot would be a coherence win everywhere else and a + // small weakening here: it could answer "current" for a later account from a record a + // concurrent reauth had already replaced. if (currentCredentialIdentity(accountId) !== identity) return false; } return true; diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store-refresh-classification.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store-refresh-classification.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..934d9ca5e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-account-store-refresh-classification.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +import { describe, expect, test, beforeEach, afterEach } from "bun:test"; +import { mkdtempSync } from "node:fs"; +import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; +import { join } from "node:path"; +import { setAsyncIcaclsRunnerForTests, setIcaclsRunnerForTests } from "../../src/lib/windows-secret-acl"; +import { flushConfigDirHardeningForTests } from "../../src/config/paths"; +import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; + +/** + * Refresh-failure classification: which upstream bodies are allowed to retire an account. + * + * The rule the runtime states is that a terminal verdict comes from the exact structured + * `error` code. The terminal WORDS were never held to it: "invalidated", "revoked" and + * "expired" were matched anywhere in the combined code+description text, so a transient + * `server_error` whose description happened to say "the token was revoked" retired a healthy + * account -- the false quarantine #2887 exists to prevent, reached through the description + * instead of through the code. + * + * Every terminal word is pinned here with its own negative case. These live in their own file + * rather than in codex-account-store.test.ts because that file is 1.8k lines and each case + * needs the same scratch-home isolation the parent file installs. + */ + +let TEST_DIR = ""; + +const ICACLS_OK = { success: true, exitCode: 0, timedOut: false, stdout: "" }; + +describe("codex refresh-failure classification", () => { + beforeEach(() => { + // Credential-store behavior, not Windows ACL behavior: stub both runners so hardening + // never spawns icacls.exe. + setIcaclsRunnerForTests(() => ICACLS_OK); + setAsyncIcaclsRunnerForTests(async () => ICACLS_OK); + TEST_DIR = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-codex-refresh-class-")); + process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = TEST_DIR; + }); + + afterEach(async () => { + await flushConfigDirHardeningForTests(); + setIcaclsRunnerForTests(null); + setAsyncIcaclsRunnerForTests(null); + delete process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME; + if (TEST_DIR) removeTreeWithRetry(TEST_DIR); + TEST_DIR = ""; + }); + + /** Drive one forced refresh against a stubbed token endpoint and return the thrown reason. */ + async function classify(accountId: string, respond: () => Response): Promise { + const { forceRefreshCodexPoolToken, readCodexAccountRecord, saveCodexAccountCredential, TokenRefreshError } = + await import("../../src/codex/account-store"); + saveCodexAccountCredential(accountId, { + accessToken: "rejected", + refreshToken: `grant-${accountId}`, + expiresAt: Date.now() + 3600_000, + chatgptAccountId: "acc", + }); + const generation = readCodexAccountRecord(accountId)!.generation; + const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch; + globalThis.fetch = (async () => respond()) as typeof fetch; + try { + await forceRefreshCodexPoolToken(accountId, { + rejectedGeneration: generation, + rejectedAccessToken: "rejected", + }); + throw new Error("expected a TokenRefreshError"); + } catch (error) { + expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(TokenRefreshError); + return (error as InstanceType).reason; + } finally { + globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; + } + } + + // --- negative cases: a structured code that is not terminal wins over terminal prose --- + + test("a server_error whose description says the token was revoked stays transient", async () => { + const reason = await classify("prose-revoked", () => Response.json({ + error: "server_error", + error_description: "upstream reported the refresh token was revoked; retry shortly", + }, { status: 503 })); + expect(reason).toBe("unknown"); + }); + + test("a server_error whose description says the grant was invalidated stays transient", async () => { + const reason = await classify("prose-invalidated", () => Response.json({ + error: "server_error", + error_description: "a peer cache entry was invalidated while refreshing", + }, { status: 503 })); + expect(reason).toBe("unknown"); + }); + + test("a server_error whose description says the session expired stays transient", async () => { + const reason = await classify("prose-expired", () => Response.json({ + error: "server_error", + error_description: "the upstream session expired mid-request; try again", + }, { status: 503 })); + expect(reason).toBe("unknown"); + }); + + test("a nested error object with a transient code and terminal prose stays transient", async () => { + // The nested shape carries the code in `error.code`, and its `message` is the same + // free-text field: reading the message as proof is the same defect in the other shape. + const reason = await classify("nested-prose", () => Response.json({ + error: { + code: "server_error", + message: "Your session has expired and the token was revoked.", + type: "server_error", + param: null, + }, + }, { status: 503 })); + expect(reason).toBe("unknown"); + }); + + test("an unrelated OAuth code with terminal prose stays transient", async () => { + // `invalid_request` is a client-shape complaint, not a statement about the grant. + const reason = await classify("unrelated-code", () => Response.json({ + error: "invalid_request", + error_description: "refresh_token was invalidated by an unknown parameter", + }, { status: 400 })); + expect(reason).toBe("unknown"); + }); + + // --- positive cases: the exact codes still retire, and prose still speaks when alone --- + + test("the exact terminal codes still classify as terminal", async () => { + expect(await classify("code-invalid-grant", () => Response.json({ error: "invalid_grant" }, { status: 400 }))) + .toBe("revoked"); + expect(await classify("code-invalidated", () => Response.json({ + error: { code: "refresh_token_invalidated", message: "Your session has ended." }, + }, { status: 401 }))).toBe("revoked"); + expect(await classify("code-expired", () => Response.json({ + error: { code: "refresh_token_expired", message: "The refresh token has expired." }, + }, { status: 401 }))).toBe("expired"); + }); + + test("with no structured code at all the description is still the only signal there is", async () => { + // A body carrying only `error_description` gives the classifier nothing else to read, so + // the substring fallback survives exactly there -- removing it would regress the opposite + // direction and leave a genuinely dead grant retrying forever. + expect(await classify("desc-only-revoked", () => Response.json({ + error_description: "refresh token revoked", + }, { status: 400 }))).toBe("revoked"); + expect(await classify("desc-only-expired", () => Response.json({ + error_description: "refresh token expired", + }, { status: 400 }))).toBe("expired"); + }); + + test("an unparseable body carries no terminal evidence and stays transient", async () => { + const reason = await classify("unparseable", () => new Response("502 revoked", { status: 502 })); + expect(reason).toBe("unknown"); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-entitlement-identity-read-fence.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-entitlement-identity-read-fence.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d5daad4d20 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-entitlement-identity-read-fence.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, spyOn, test } from "bun:test"; +import * as fs from "node:fs"; +import { mkdtempSync } from "node:fs"; +import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; +import { join } from "node:path"; +import { + cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel, + resetCodexModelEntitlementCacheForTests, + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests, +} from "../../src/codex/model-entitlements"; +import { readCodexAccountRecord, saveCodexAccountCredential } from "../../src/codex/account-store"; +import { setAsyncIcaclsRunnerForTests, setIcaclsRunnerForTests } from "../../src/lib/windows-secret-acl"; +import { flushConfigDirHardeningForTests } from "../../src/config/paths"; +import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; + +/** + * How many times one denial pass reads account storage. + * + * `cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel` is synchronous and runs on the request path for the + * flagship models, and it validates every cached (account, client version) entry against the + * account's current credential. Resolving that identity per entry meant a full reload, reparse and + * renormalize of `codex-accounts.json` per entry: at the documented cache budget -- 64 accounts, + * four versions each -- one warm request could perform 256 synchronous full-store reads. + * + * These cases pin the read COUNT, which no behavioral assertion can see, alongside the validation + * the count must not have bought: a stale identity is still rejected, and an excluded account still + * opens nothing. + */ + +const ASTRA = "gpt-6-astra"; +const VERSION_A = "0.146.0"; +const VERSION_B = "0.147.0"; +const NOW = 1_800_000_000_000; + +let TEST_DIR = ""; + +const ICACLS_OK = { success: true, exitCode: 0, timedOut: false, stdout: "" }; + +/** Count reads of the pool account store, whoever performs them. */ +function countAccountStoreReads(): { reads: () => number; restore: () => void } { + // Spying the `node:fs` namespace DOES observe production code that binds `readFileSync` as an + // ESM named import, which is how `src/codex/account-store.ts` binds it. Established in-process + // precedent: codex-account-delete-atomicity.test.ts asserts `toHaveBeenLastCalledWith` against a + // read performed by production code, and codex-account-store.test.ts intercepts this module's own + // `statSync`/`fstatSync` the same way. The case that does NOT work is a spawned child holding its + // own `require("node:fs")` (codex-inject-integration.test.ts:146); nothing here spawns one, and + // the calibration case below fails loudly if that ever stops being true. + // `readFileSync` is heavily overloaded, so the pass-through is typed structurally and cast once + // rather than trying to satisfy every overload: this counts calls, it does not model the API. + const original = fs.readFileSync as (...args: unknown[]) => unknown; + let reads = 0; + const spy = spyOn(fs, "readFileSync"); + spy.mockImplementation(((...args: unknown[]) => { + const target = args[0]; + if (typeof target === "string" && target.endsWith("codex-accounts.json")) reads += 1; + return original(...args); + }) as unknown as typeof fs.readFileSync); + return { reads: () => reads, restore: () => { spy.mockRestore(); } }; +} + +/** Store a pool credential and return the identity string the reader will derive from it. */ +function storedIdentity(accountId: string): string { + saveCodexAccountCredential(accountId, { + accessToken: `access-${accountId}`, + refreshToken: `grant-${accountId}`, + expiresAt: NOW + 3600_000, + chatgptAccountId: `chatgpt-${accountId}`, + }); + const record = readCodexAccountRecord(accountId)!; + return `pool:${record.generation}:${record.credential!.chatgptAccountId}`; +} + +describe("the denial pass resolves credential identity once, not once per cache entry", () => { + beforeEach(() => { + setIcaclsRunnerForTests(() => ICACLS_OK); + setAsyncIcaclsRunnerForTests(async () => ICACLS_OK); + TEST_DIR = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-entitlement-read-fence-")); + process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME = TEST_DIR; + resetCodexModelEntitlementCacheForTests(); + }); + + afterEach(async () => { + await flushConfigDirHardeningForTests(); + setIcaclsRunnerForTests(null); + setAsyncIcaclsRunnerForTests(null); + delete process.env.OPENCODEX_HOME; + if (TEST_DIR) removeTreeWithRetry(TEST_DIR); + TEST_DIR = ""; + resetCodexModelEntitlementCacheForTests(); + }); + + test("six cache entries across three accounts cost one store read", () => { + // Each account carries two client versions, which is two cache entries and, before this, + // two full-store reads. + for (const accountId of ["pool-a", "pool-b", "pool-c"]) { + const identity = storedIdentity(accountId); + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests(accountId, ["gpt-5.5"], NOW, VERSION_A, identity); + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests(accountId, ["gpt-5.5"], NOW, VERSION_B, identity); + } + + const counter = countAccountStoreReads(); + try { + const denied = cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, NOW); + // The answer is unchanged: every account's confirmed roster omits Astra. + expect([...(denied ?? [])].sort()).toEqual(["pool-a", "pool-b", "pool-c"]); + expect(counter.reads()).toBe(1); + } finally { + counter.restore(); + } + }); + + test("the snapshot does not weaken the identity check it answers from", () => { + // `stale` holds a roster recorded under a credential the account no longer has, so its denial + // is evidence about a different identity and must not count. `current` matches and must. + const staleIdentity = storedIdentity("stale"); + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("stale", ["gpt-5.5"], NOW, VERSION_A, `${staleIdentity}-superseded`); + const currentIdentity = storedIdentity("current"); + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("current", ["gpt-5.5"], NOW, VERSION_A, currentIdentity); + + const counter = countAccountStoreReads(); + try { + expect([...(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, NOW) ?? [])]).toEqual(["current"]); + expect(counter.reads()).toBe(1); + } finally { + counter.restore(); + } + }); + + test("an account with no stored record stays unknown rather than being rejected outright", () => { + // An UNREADABLE credential is not proof of anything. The store is read once and answers + // `undefined` for this id, which leaves the entry in place exactly as before. + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("unstored", ["gpt-5.5"], NOW, VERSION_A, "test:unstored"); + storedIdentity("present-so-the-file-exists"); + + const counter = countAccountStoreReads(); + try { + expect([...(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, NOW) ?? [])]).toEqual(["unstored"]); + expect(counter.reads()).toBe(1); + } finally { + counter.restore(); + } + }); + + test("a pass whose every entry is excluded opens no store at all", () => { + // The resolver loads lazily for the same reason the fence is checked first: an excluded + // account must not cause a read it was excluded to prevent. + const identity = storedIdentity("fenced"); + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("fenced", ["gpt-5.5"], NOW, VERSION_A, identity); + seedCodexModelEntitlementsForTests("fenced", ["gpt-5.5"], NOW, VERSION_B, identity); + + const counter = countAccountStoreReads(); + try { + expect(cachedDeniedCodexAccountIdsForModel(ASTRA, NOW, { + excludeAccountIds: new Set(["fenced"]), + })).toBeUndefined(); + expect(counter.reads()).toBe(0); + } finally { + counter.restore(); + } + }); + + test("the read counter observes production reads at all", () => { + // Calibration for the zero-expecting case above, which is indistinguishable from a counter + // that can see nothing. One `readCodexAccountRecord` is exactly one store read by + // construction, so this pins the oracle rather than the behavior under test. + storedIdentity("calibration"); + + const counter = countAccountStoreReads(); + try { + expect(readCodexAccountRecord("calibration")).not.toBeNull(); + expect(counter.reads()).toBe(1); + } finally { + counter.restore(); + } + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-model-entitlements.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-model-entitlements.test.ts index 56ef19433a..18598f0ee5 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-model-entitlements.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-model-entitlements.test.ts @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ import { import { clearCodexRuntimeResolveCache, loadPersistedCodexRuntime } from "../../src/codex/runtime"; import { ACCOUNT_GATED_NATIVE_OPENAI_MODELS } from "../../src/codex/catalog/native-models"; import upstreamModelsSnapshot from "../../src/codex/data/upstream-models.json"; -import { readCodexAccountRecord, saveCodexAccountCredential } from "../../src/codex/account-store"; import { installIsolatedCodexHome } from "../helpers/isolated-codex-home"; import { removeTreeWithRetry } from "../helpers/remove-tree"; import { repoPath } from "../helpers/repo-root"; diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index 283de9d38e..f5c49f9959 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ "codex-account-mode-state.test.ts": "gui", "codex-account-namespaces.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-account-selection-preferences.test.ts": "codex-integration", + "codex-account-store-refresh-classification.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-account-store.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-account-unusable-reason.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-admission-primitives.test.ts": "codex-integration", @@ -293,6 +294,7 @@ "codex-cooldown-recovery.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-coordinator-doctor.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-desired-state.test.ts": "codex-integration", + "codex-entitlement-identity-read-fence.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-envkey-admission-substitution.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-exec-invocation.test.ts": "codex-integration", "codex-features-cache.test.ts": "codex-integration", From d2808c0619e13aac3bff39da183fbf47eece648c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 23:05:38 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 110/113] fix(responses): fence helper spellings from every manufactured bare alias (#4819) Release-blocker fix for 2.57.0 from the third regression audit. Exact head has a green aggregate ci check. The helper-name fence that landed in #4813 covered the echo-alias path only; the tool_choice compatibility path still manufactured a bare alias, so a request declaring a namespaced exec and selecting it with a bare selector put bare exec into the declared set and an undeclared helper was rewritten onto it. Sweeping for the rule found a third live copy in the passthrough declared catalog, which fenced exactly one name, so a namespaced exec_command or shell_command could also switch nested-helper normalization off for a catalog that genuinely declared the shell. The rule now lives in one place. The follow-up commit corrects an over-strict first attempt: a bare alias does two jobs, identity restoration and declaration, and only the declaration was ever unsafe, so restoration is preserved and a caller-declared, explicitly selected tool keeps working. Host-owned merge decision; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- .../041_preview_fence_test_is_structural.md | 46 ++++++ src/server/responses-undeclared-tool-guard.ts | 14 +- src/server/responses/collaboration.ts | 34 +++-- src/types.ts | 1 + src/types/tools.ts | 24 ++++ structure/transports/responses.md | 22 +++ .../responses-bare-echo-helper-fence.test.ts | 134 +++++++++++++++++- tests/responses/responses-parser.test.ts | 45 ++++-- 8 files changed, 288 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) create mode 100644 devlog/_plan/260916_release_2570_stabilization/041_preview_fence_test_is_structural.md diff --git a/devlog/_plan/260916_release_2570_stabilization/041_preview_fence_test_is_structural.md b/devlog/_plan/260916_release_2570_stabilization/041_preview_fence_test_is_structural.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..27f84becf0 --- /dev/null +++ b/devlog/_plan/260916_release_2570_stabilization/041_preview_fence_test_is_structural.md @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +# Follow-up: the preview read-fence test asserts shape, not behaviour + +Raised by the third regression audit on the 2.57.0 candidate, deferred past the +release on purpose. + +## What the test does today + +`tests/responses/responses-preview-main-read-fence.test.ts` reads +`src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts` and `src/codex/auth-context.ts` as +text and asserts with regexes that both native-main read fences carry the +request-owned ownership term, that both preview sites validate ownership the way +`resolveCodexAuthContext` does, that no main exclusion is guarded by drain state +alone, and that `nativeMainSelectionOnly` stays derived from the drain. + +It was written that way deliberately, for the reason recorded in its own header: +driving the divergence end to end needs a `thread_spawn` whose caller bearer is +forwardable, an account-gated candidate model, and a denial cache whose only +entry is main. The sibling contract in +`tests/routing/subagent-fallback-preview-sites.test.ts` made the same call for +the same subsystem. + +## Why that is not sufficient + +A structural assertion catches the regression that has actually recurred twice -- +a fence reconstructed inline from drain state, losing the ownership half -- and +nothing else. It cannot see a fence that is present but wired to the wrong +headers, an ownership term computed against a stale route, or a consumer that +stops reading `nativeMainReadsForbidden`. Any of those is a semantic routing +regression that would keep this file green, which means the file reports more +confidence than it holds. + +## What the replacement needs + +A behavioural case that drives `prepareResponsesRequest` with a forwardable +caller bearer on a `thread_spawn` and observes that the preview performs no +credential-validating read of the physical main token and scores main the same +way final authentication does. The expensive part is the fixture, not the +assertion: an account-gated model, a populated denial cache, and an injected +entitlement resolver that records whether main was consulted. The existing pool +harness in `tests/routing/subagent-fallback-handle-responses.test.ts` already +carries most of it, but that file is at its size cap, so the work is a new file +in `tests/routing/` plus its two layout registrations. + +Keep the structural file when the behavioural one lands. They fail on different +things, and the cheap one is what catches the inline-reconstruction regression +before review. diff --git a/src/server/responses-undeclared-tool-guard.ts b/src/server/responses-undeclared-tool-guard.ts index 58b2ce727c..4cefb22784 100644 --- a/src/server/responses-undeclared-tool-guard.ts +++ b/src/server/responses-undeclared-tool-guard.ts @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ import { collectAmbiguousDottedAliases, dottedAliasIsUnambiguous, wireToolInnerName } from "../responses/tool-name-aliases"; import { - CODE_MODE_EXEC_TOOL_NAME, dottedToolName, + NAMESPACED_BARE_ALIAS_EXCLUDED_NAMES, namespacedToolName, normalizeDeclaredToolName, } from "../types"; @@ -104,10 +104,14 @@ function addWireToolName( if (dottedAliasIsUnambiguous(namespace, name) && !ambiguousDottedAliases?.has(dotted)) { names.add(dotted); } - // `exec` is the one name that also switches on nested-helper normalization, so a bare alias - // for a namespaced MCP tool would silently authorize `exec_command`/`shell_command`/ - // `apply_patch`/`view_image` the request never declared. Every other inner name keeps the bare alias. - if (name !== CODE_MODE_EXEC_TOOL_NAME) names.add(name); + // The code-mode helper spellings do not get a bare alias for a namespaced tool. Bare `exec` + // switches nested-helper normalization on for a catalog that never declared the shell; bare + // `exec_command`/`shell_command` switch it off for one that did; bare `write_stdin`/ + // `apply_patch`/`view_image` are simply accepted as declared under a name the caller only ever + // authorized inside a namespace. This guard named only `exec` and let the other five through, + // which is the same drift the bridge-side copy had; both now read one list + // (src/types/tools.ts). Every other inner name keeps the bare alias. + if (!NAMESPACED_BARE_ALIAS_EXCLUDED_NAMES.has(name)) names.add(name); } /** diff --git a/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts b/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts index 0fb059faa8..b40d3d01ec 100644 --- a/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts +++ b/src/server/responses/collaboration.ts @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ import { } from "../../combos"; import { isInjectionDebugEnabled } from "../../lib/debug-settings"; import { injectionDebugLog } from "../../lib/injection-debug-log"; -import { dottedToolName, modelInList, namespacedToolName, toolChoiceToolPredicate } from "../../types"; +import { dottedToolName, modelInList, namespacedToolName, NAMESPACED_BARE_ALIAS_EXCLUDED_NAMES, toolChoiceToolPredicate } from "../../types"; import type { AdapterEvent, OcxConfig, OcxParsedRequest, OcxProviderConfig, OcxProviderContinuationState, OcxUsage } from "../../types"; import { forceRefreshOAuthAccessSnapshot, @@ -156,12 +156,9 @@ export function buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed: OcxParsedRequest, budget?: Translato // bare spelling is only a safe alias while it names ONE tool and cannot be read as // another identity's canonical or dotted spelling. // Code-mode helper spellings never gain a bare alias (#4679 review), whatever namespace - // declares them: admitting bare `exec` into the declared set would authorize the unrelated - // helper normalization that the CODE_MODE_EXEC exception exists to contain. The namespace is - // not the safety property here — the bare spelling is — so this is a property of the NAME. - const BARE_ECHO_EXCLUDED_NAMES = new Set([ - "exec", "exec_command", "shell_command", "write_stdin", "apply_patch", "view_image", - ]); + // declares them and whatever put the alias there. The list is owned by `src/types/tools.ts`, + // beside the names it protects, because the copy that used to live here drifted to a single + // namespace and had to be widened twice. const bareAliasOwners = new Map(); for (const t of authorizedTools) { // Bare (no-namespace) declarations participate as owners too: a namespaced tool whose @@ -223,7 +220,7 @@ export function buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed: OcxParsedRequest, budget?: Translato // is withdrawn, and only for these six spellings. if ( bareAliasOwners.get(t.name) === JSON.stringify([t.namespace, t.name]) - && !BARE_ECHO_EXCLUDED_NAMES.has(t.name) + && !NAMESPACED_BARE_ALIAS_EXCLUDED_NAMES.has(t.name) ) { budget?.chargeRetained(new TextEncoder().encode(t.name).byteLength, { kind: "retained_collectors" }); declaredToolNames.add(t.name); @@ -257,6 +254,20 @@ export function buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed: OcxParsedRequest, budget?: Translato // Some routed providers echo a bare tool_choice selector instead of the flattened catalog // name. Accept only selectors the client actually sent and only when the full request catalog // contains one tool with that logical name. + // + // A helper spelling selected this way is split rather than refused (#4819). The two things a + // bare alias does are separable, and passthrough already relies on that: identity RESTORATION + // runs before authorization there, rewriting the echoed bare name to the namespaced identity + // the caller declared, and the guard then authorizes `ns__name`. DECLARATION is the part that + // is unsafe, because a declared-name set carrying bare `exec` is what makes + // `normalizeDeclaredToolName` rewrite an undeclared `apply_patch`, `exec_command` or + // `write_stdin` onto the selected tool (src/types/tools.ts). + // + // So a helper spelling gets the `toolNsMap` entry and not the `declaredToolNames` entry. The + // caller nominated exactly one tool by name, `bareNameCounts` proves nothing else answers to + // it, and restoring it authorizes nothing the request did not already declare. The echo path + // above withholds both, because a bare echo is a guess rather than a nomination and #4679 + // pinned that shape (`tests/responses/bare-echo-alias.test.ts`). const choice = parsed.options.toolChoice; const bareChoiceNames = new Set( choice && typeof choice === "object" @@ -269,8 +280,11 @@ export function buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed: OcxParsedRequest, budget?: Translato } for (const t of authorizedTools) { if (!t.namespace || !bareChoiceNames.has(t.name) || bareNameCounts.get(t.name) !== 1 || declaredToolNames.has(t.name)) continue; - budget?.chargeRetained(new TextEncoder().encode(t.name).byteLength, { kind: "retained_collectors" }); - declaredToolNames.add(t.name); + // Restore the identity; declare the name only when it is not a helper spelling. + if (!NAMESPACED_BARE_ALIAS_EXCLUDED_NAMES.has(t.name)) { + budget?.chargeRetained(new TextEncoder().encode(t.name).byteLength, { kind: "retained_collectors" }); + declaredToolNames.add(t.name); + } budget?.chargeRetained(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify([t.name, t.namespace, t.name])).byteLength, { kind: "retained_collectors" }); toolNsMap.set(t.name, { namespace: t.namespace, name: t.name, ...(t.freeform ? { freeform: true } : {}) }); if (t.parameters && typeof t.parameters === "object") { diff --git a/src/types.ts b/src/types.ts index c2104f9d41..9ef3936da9 100644 --- a/src/types.ts +++ b/src/types.ts @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ export { isAllowedToolChoice, toolChoiceToolPredicate, declaresCodeModeExec, + NAMESPACED_BARE_ALIAS_EXCLUDED_NAMES, } from "./types/tools"; export type { UpstreamHttpVersion, ReasoningSummaryDelivery, CodexAccountMode } from "./types/wire"; diff --git a/src/types/tools.ts b/src/types/tools.ts index fd80a4b100..06fe8589e1 100644 --- a/src/types/tools.ts +++ b/src/types/tools.ts @@ -67,6 +67,30 @@ const CODE_MODE_HELPER_TOOL_NAMES = [ */ export const CODE_MODE_EXEC_TOOL_NAME = "exec"; +/** + * Spellings that may never be MANUFACTURED as a bare alias for a namespaced tool. + * + * A bare alias is an ordinary compatibility affordance -- providers echo a namespaced tool + * without its prefix, and restoring the identity needs the bare spelling registered. For these + * six it is also an authorization decision, because a declared-name set is what + * `normalizeDeclaredToolName` and `declaresCodeModeExec` read: bare `exec` turns nested-helper + * normalization on for a catalog that never declared the shell, bare `exec_command` or + * `shell_command` turns it off for one that did, and the rest are accepted as declared calls the + * caller only ever authorized under a namespace. + * + * This is a property of the SPELLING, not of the namespace that declared it and not of the reason + * the alias was being added. It lives here, beside the names it protects, because every site that + * builds a declared-name set has to apply the same list -- the two that kept their own copies each + * drifted, once to a single namespace and once to a single name. + * + * A genuine namespace-free declaration is NOT covered: that is the caller declaring the tool, not + * a namespace being discarded to synthesize a bare name. + */ +export const NAMESPACED_BARE_ALIAS_EXCLUDED_NAMES: ReadonlySet = new Set([ + CODE_MODE_EXEC_TOOL_NAME, + ...CODE_MODE_HELPER_TOOL_NAMES, +]); + /** * Normalizes provider-emitted tool names against declared tool catalogs. * diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md index bee5e62c77..94dc919bbe 100644 --- a/structure/transports/responses.md +++ b/structure/transports/responses.md @@ -76,6 +76,28 @@ the tool surface so request-local aliases remain available for response restorat item records which tool actually ran, so re-pointing it at a same-named namespace child would rewrite that record on a coincidence rather than translate it. +A namespaced tool is registered under every coordinate a provider might echo — `ns__name`, the +dotted `ns.name`, and the bare `name` — but six spellings never reach a DECLARED-NAME set under +the bare one: `exec`, `exec_command`, `shell_command`, `write_stdin`, `apply_patch`, +`view_image` (`NAMESPACED_BARE_ALIAS_EXCLUDED_NAMES`). A declared-name set is what decides +nested-helper normalization, so bare `exec` from a namespace turns it on for a catalog that never +declared the shell, and `normalizeDeclaredToolName` then rewrites an undeclared `apply_patch` +onto it. The fence is a property of the SPELLING, not of the declaring namespace and not of why +the alias was being added — both copies drifted once, one to `collaboration` only and one to +`exec` only, and each drift was a live authorization widening. Every site that builds a +declared-name set reads the one list: `buildToolBridgeMaps` for the echo and `tool_choice` +selector paths, and `collectDeclaredWireToolNames` for the passthrough catalog. + +Declaration and restoration are separate, and only declaration is fenced. Passthrough rewrites an +echoed bare name to its namespaced identity before authorizing anything +(`authorizedBareNamespaceToolAliases`, built from `toolNsMap`), and the guard then authorizes +`ns__name`, so a `tool_choice` that nominates one helper tool by its bare name keeps the +`toolNsMap` entry and loses only the declaration. The echo path withholds both, because a bare +echo is a guess rather than a nomination. The bridges check the declared set before consulting +`toolNsMap`, so there a bare helper echo is refused either way. A genuine namespace-free +declaration is untouched throughout: that is the caller declaring the tool, not a namespace being +discarded to manufacture a bare name. + Codex-private tool fields are removed at the same boundary from one table (`CANONICAL_ONLY_TOOL_FIELDS`) rather than one bespoke pass each: `external_web_access` on either web-search variant, and `defer_loading` on any declaration, which `activateDeferredTool` clears only diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-bare-echo-helper-fence.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-bare-echo-helper-fence.test.ts index a21a19ae33..4c4f1503d0 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-bare-echo-helper-fence.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-bare-echo-helper-fence.test.ts @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; import { parseRequest } from "../../src/responses/parser"; import { buildToolBridgeMaps } from "../../src/server/responses"; +import { collectDeclaredWireToolNames } from "../../src/server/responses-undeclared-tool-guard"; import { normalizeDeclaredToolName, declaresCodeModeExec } from "../../src/types/tools"; /** @@ -12,16 +13,25 @@ import { normalizeDeclaredToolName, declaresCodeModeExec } from "../../src/types * * The exclusion that prevents that was once scoped to the `collaboration` namespace, which made * the boundary a property of the declaring namespace rather than of the spelling, and any other - * namespace could then donate the bare name. These cases pin the exclusion to the NAME, and pin - * the half that has to keep working beside it: the namespaced tool stays reachable under the - * spellings that carry their namespace, and non-helper names keep their #4679 echo fallback. + * namespace could then donate the bare name. Fencing the echo path then left the SELECTOR path + * open one level down: a bare `tool_choice` for a namespaced helper name added the same bare + * spelling to the same set from a different loop. + * + * These cases pin the exclusion to the NAME across both paths, and pin the halves that have to + * keep working beside it. The line the fence runs along is DECLARATION, not restoration: no + * declared-name set ever gains a manufactured bare helper spelling, while the `toolNsMap` + * identity entry an explicit selector creates survives, because passthrough restores an echoed + * bare name to its namespaced identity before authorizing it and would otherwise refuse a call + * the caller had both declared and selected. The namespaced tool also stays reachable under the + * spellings that carry its namespace, selection by bare shorthand still resolves, and non-helper + * names keep both their #4679 echo fallback and their bare selector alias. * * Kept out of `bare-echo-alias.test.ts` so the namespace-independence contract has a file of its * own rather than growing the file that pins the original collaboration-only behaviour. */ -function namespacedToolRequest(namespace: string, name: string) { - return parseRequest({ +function namespacedToolRequest(namespace: string, name: string, choiceNames?: string[]) { + const parsed = parseRequest({ model: "claude-opus-5", input: "run it", tools: [{ @@ -30,11 +40,16 @@ function namespacedToolRequest(namespace: string, name: string) { tools: [{ type: "function", name, parameters: { type: "object" } }], }], }); + // Assigned rather than parsed from `tool_choice`, the way the sibling selector cases in + // `responses-parser.test.ts` do it. The loop under test reads `options.toolChoice` and nothing + // else, so going through selector validation would only add a second thing that can fail. + if (choiceNames) parsed.options.toolChoice = { allowedTools: choiceNames, mode: "required" }; + return parsed; } const HELPER_SPELLINGS = ["exec", "exec_command", "shell_command", "write_stdin", "apply_patch", "view_image"]; -describe("helper spellings are fenced from the bare echo alias in every namespace", () => { +describe("helper spellings are fenced from every declared-name set, in every namespace", () => { test("a foreign namespace donates no helper spelling", () => { const donated = HELPER_SPELLINGS.filter(name => { const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(namespacedToolRequest("mcp__remote", name)); @@ -73,6 +88,68 @@ describe("helper spellings are fenced from the bare echo alias in every namespac expect(maps.toolNsMap.get("list_issues")).toMatchObject({ namespace: "mcp__remote", name: "list_issues" }); }); + test("an explicit bare tool_choice selector declares no helper spelling", () => { + // The bypass one level down: the echo path is fenced, so the selector loop was the remaining + // way to put bare `exec` in the DECLARED set, which is the set that switches nested-helper + // normalization on. + const declared = HELPER_SPELLINGS.filter( + name => buildToolBridgeMaps(namespacedToolRequest("mcp__remote", name, [name])).declaredToolNames.has(name), + ); + + expect(declared).toEqual([]); + }); + + test("but it does keep the identity alias, which is what restores the call", () => { + // The half that must survive. Passthrough restores an echoed bare name to the namespaced + // identity BEFORE authorizing it (`authorizedBareNamespaceToolAliases` in + // passthrough-dispatch.ts reads exactly this map), and the guard then authorizes + // `ns__name`. Withholding the map entry too refused a call the caller had declared and + // explicitly selected. + for (const name of HELPER_SPELLINGS) { + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(namespacedToolRequest("mcp__remote", name, [name])); + expect([name, maps.toolNsMap.get(name)]).toEqual([name, { namespace: "mcp__remote", name }]); + } + }); + + test("both tool_choice forms behave the same way", () => { + // `{name}` and `{allowedTools}` reach the selector loop through the same `bareChoiceNames` + // set, so both forms are pinned rather than only the one a fixture happened to build. + const parsed = namespacedToolRequest("mcp__remote", "exec", ["exec"]); + parsed.options.toolChoice = { name: "exec" }; + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed); + + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("exec")).toBe(false); + expect(declaresCodeModeExec(maps.declaredToolNames)).toBe(false); + expect(maps.toolNsMap.get("exec")).toEqual({ namespace: "mcp__remote", name: "exec" }); + }); + + test("a bare selector still SELECTS the helper tool and declares its own spellings", () => { + // `toolAllowedByChoice` resolves the bare shorthand against the request catalog rather than + // against this map, so the tool stays authorized and stays forced. + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(namespacedToolRequest("mcp__remote", "exec", ["exec"])); + + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("mcp__remote__exec")).toBe(true); + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("mcp__remote.exec")).toBe(true); + expect(maps.toolNsMap.get("mcp__remote.exec")).toMatchObject({ namespace: "mcp__remote", name: "exec" }); + }); + + test("canonical and dotted selectors are unaffected for a helper name", () => { + for (const selector of ["mcp__remote__exec", "mcp__remote.exec"]) { + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(namespacedToolRequest("mcp__remote", "exec", [selector])); + expect([selector, maps.declaredToolNames.has(selector)]).toEqual([selector, true]); + expect([selector, maps.declaredToolNames.has("exec")]).toEqual([selector, false]); + } + }); + + test("a non-helper name still gains its bare alias through the selector path", () => { + // Same narrowness check as the echo path: fencing the selector loop must not take the bare + // selector alias away from every other namespaced tool. + const maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(namespacedToolRequest("mcp__remote", "list_issues", ["list_issues"])); + + expect(maps.declaredToolNames.has("list_issues")).toBe(true); + expect(maps.toolNsMap.get("list_issues")).toMatchObject({ namespace: "mcp__remote", name: "list_issues" }); + }); + test("the withheld name is exactly what would have turned helper normalization on", () => { // The consequence, asserted against the consumer rather than restated: a declared set that // carries bare `exec` rewrites undeclared helper calls onto it. This is the set the previous @@ -88,3 +165,48 @@ describe("helper spellings are fenced from the bare echo alias in every namespac .toEqual(["apply_patch", "exec_command", "write_stdin"]); }); }); + +/** + * The passthrough guard builds its own declared-name catalog from the outbound body, and it feeds + * the same consumers: `undeclaredNameInItem` passes it to `normalizeDeclaredToolName`, and + * custom-tool restoration passes it on to `resolveCodeModeHelperName` and + * `declaresCodeModeExec`. It had the same fence written as a single name -- `exec` -- so the + * other five spellings still got a bare alias for an arbitrary namespace. Both sites now read one + * list, so these cases are the other half of the same invariant. + */ +describe("the passthrough declared-name catalog applies the same fence", () => { + test("a namespaced helper gets canonical and dotted spellings but no bare alias", () => { + const withheld = HELPER_SPELLINGS.filter(name => collectDeclaredWireToolNames({ + tools: [{ type: "namespace", name: "mcp", tools: [{ type: "function", name }] }], + }).has(name)); + + expect(withheld).toEqual([]); + }); + + test("the namespaced spellings themselves are still admitted", () => { + const names = collectDeclaredWireToolNames({ + tools: [{ type: "namespace", name: "mcp", tools: [{ type: "function", name: "apply_patch" }] }], + }); + + expect([...names]).toEqual(["mcp__apply_patch", "mcp.apply_patch"]); + }); + + test("a genuine top-level helper declaration keeps its bare name", () => { + // The line the fence must not cross. Here the caller really did declare `apply_patch` as a + // bare tool; no namespace is being discarded to synthesize the spelling, so withholding it + // would refuse a call the request plainly authorized. + const names = collectDeclaredWireToolNames({ + tools: [{ type: "custom", name: "apply_patch" }, { type: "function", name: "exec" }], + }); + + expect([...names].sort()).toEqual(["apply_patch", "exec"]); + }); + + test("a non-helper namespaced tool keeps all three spellings", () => { + const names = collectDeclaredWireToolNames({ + tools: [{ type: "namespace", name: "linear", tools: [{ type: "function", name: "create_issue" }] }], + }); + + expect([...names].sort()).toEqual(["create_issue", "linear.create_issue", "linear__create_issue"]); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-parser.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-parser.test.ts index b42e286c8d..4b6605c316 100644 --- a/tests/responses/responses-parser.test.ts +++ b/tests/responses/responses-parser.test.ts @@ -227,26 +227,26 @@ describe("Responses parser", () => { tools: [{ type: "namespace", name: "mcp__functions", - tools: [{ type: "custom", name: "exec", description: "Run a command" }], + tools: [{ type: "custom", name: "run_command", description: "Run a command" }], }], tool_choice: { type: "allowed_tools", mode: "required", - tools: [{ type: "custom", name: "exec" }], + tools: [{ type: "custom", name: "run_command" }], }, }); let maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed); expect([...maps.toolNsMap]).toEqual([ - ["mcp__functions__exec", { namespace: "mcp__functions", name: "exec", freeform: true }], - ["mcp__functions.exec", { namespace: "mcp__functions", name: "exec", freeform: true }], - ["exec", { namespace: "mcp__functions", name: "exec", freeform: true }], + ["mcp__functions__run_command", { namespace: "mcp__functions", name: "run_command", freeform: true }], + ["mcp__functions.run_command", { namespace: "mcp__functions", name: "run_command", freeform: true }], + ["run_command", { namespace: "mcp__functions", name: "run_command", freeform: true }], ]); - expect([...maps.declaredToolNames]).toEqual(["mcp__functions__exec", "mcp__functions.exec", "exec"]); - expect([...maps.freeformToolNames]).toEqual(["exec"]); + expect([...maps.declaredToolNames]).toEqual(["mcp__functions__run_command", "mcp__functions.run_command", "run_command"]); + expect([...maps.freeformToolNames]).toEqual(["run_command"]); const bridged = buildResponseJSON([ - { type: "tool_call_start", id: "call_exec", name: "exec" }, + { type: "tool_call_start", id: "call_exec", name: "run_command" }, { type: "tool_call_delta", arguments: '{"input":"pwd"}' }, { type: "tool_call_end" }, { type: "done" }, @@ -255,14 +255,37 @@ describe("Responses parser", () => { expect((bridged.output as Record[])[0]).toMatchObject({ type: "custom_tool_call", call_id: "call_exec", - name: "exec", + name: "run_command", input: "pwd", status: "completed", }); - parsed.options.toolChoice = { name: "exec" }; + parsed.options.toolChoice = { name: "run_command" }; maps = buildToolBridgeMaps(parsed); - expect([...maps.toolNsMap.keys()]).toEqual(["mcp__functions__exec", "mcp__functions.exec", "exec"]); + expect([...maps.toolNsMap.keys()]).toEqual(["mcp__functions__run_command", "mcp__functions.run_command", "run_command"]); + + // A code-mode helper spelling is the exception, and it is the spelling that decides -- not the + // namespace and not the fact that the caller selected it. Bare `exec` in the DECLARED set is + // what turns nested-helper normalization on, so the selector grants the identity alias that + // restores the call without granting the declaration that would rewrite helper names onto it. + const helperSelector = parseRequest({ + model: "claude-opus-5", + input: "run it", + tools: [{ + type: "namespace", + name: "mcp__functions", + tools: [{ type: "custom", name: "exec", description: "Run a command" }], + }], + tool_choice: { + type: "allowed_tools", + mode: "required", + tools: [{ type: "custom", name: "exec" }], + }, + }); + const helperMaps = buildToolBridgeMaps(helperSelector); + expect([...helperMaps.declaredToolNames]).toEqual(["mcp__functions__exec", "mcp__functions.exec"]); + expect(helperMaps.toolNsMap.get("exec")) + .toEqual({ namespace: "mcp__functions", name: "exec", freeform: true }); expect(() => parseRequest({ model: "claude-opus-5", From 2b19983bfdf336ef018499a29732384916a49a61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 00:49:46 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 111/113] fix(ci,runtime): stop hiding the Bun runtime crash and pin back to 1.4.0 (#4821) Release-blocker fix for 2.57.0. The PR aggregate ci check is green at this exact head, and the lane=all dispatch 35113947092 on the same head passed all six Windows shards individually plus both macOS shards, every test shard, gates, keyring, docker and npm-global; only the optional macos control job was cancelled by concurrency. That dispatch is the evidence the Bun pin works: windows 5/6 had failed three release candidates in a row and 1/6 failed the previous dispatch, and all six pass here with the crash masking removed. The suite had been crashing the Bun runtime on every run since 2026-09-08 while reporting green, because a crashed batch was re-run one file per process, which is a configuration in which the defect cannot occur rather than a retry. That verdict now fails. Host-owned merge decision; no local suite, typecheck, build, or install was run. --- .github/workflows/ci.yml | 25 +-- Dockerfile | 2 +- bun.lock | 34 ++--- package.json | 4 +- scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh | 68 +++++++++ scripts/ci/run-bun-test-batches.sh | 63 ++++---- scripts/test-layout/layout.json | 1 + src/server/index.ts | 10 +- structure/runtime.md | 3 + .../ci-bun-crash-classifier.test.ts | 142 ++++++++++++++++++ tests/ci-workflows/ci-workflows.test.ts | 35 +---- tests/ci-workflows/install-scripts.test.ts | 23 ++- tests/ci-workflows/macos-serial-lanes.test.ts | 21 ++- .../client-injection-guard.test.ts | 31 +++- .../codex-composed-acceptance.test.ts | 95 +++++++++--- tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json | 1 + tests/server/server-management-auth.test.ts | 19 ++- tests/server/server-search.test.ts | 25 +-- 18 files changed, 471 insertions(+), 131 deletions(-) create mode 100755 scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh create mode 100644 tests/ci-workflows/ci-bun-crash-classifier.test.ts diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml index 00abe5ec24..ba7a41c763 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml @@ -535,9 +535,10 @@ jobs: # (`is_bun_runtime_crash`). The unsharded macOS control had no equivalent, # so the same crash that Linux absorbs failed the whole promotion here. # - # Keep the signature list in sync with `is_bun_runtime_crash` in - # scripts/ci/run-bun-test-batches.sh. An assertion failure still fails on - # the first attempt — only the crash signature is retried, exactly once. + # The classifier is `is_bun_runtime_crash` from scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh, which + # this leg, the Windows leg, the macOS control and the Linux batch runner all source. It used + # to be four inline copies kept in sync by a test; one definition cannot drift. An assertion + # failure still fails on the first attempt — only a crash is retried, exactly once. - name: Test env: MACOS_TEST_SHARD: ${{ matrix.shard }} @@ -546,6 +547,8 @@ jobs: # errexit so a Bun crash reaches PIPESTATUS and the bounded retry. set +e set -uo pipefail + # One shared classifier for every lane; see scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh. + source scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh run_macos_suite() { local suite_log suite_status attempt @@ -559,7 +562,7 @@ jobs: rm -f "$suite_log" return 0 fi - if ! grep -Eqi 'oh no: Bun has crashed|Internal assertion failure|Segmentation fault at address|Illegal instruction|Bus error|Aborted \(core dumped\)' "$suite_log"; then + if ! is_bun_runtime_crash "$suite_status" "$suite_log"; then echo "::error::macOS suite failed on attempt ${attempt} (exit ${suite_status}); assertion failures are not retried." rm -f "$suite_log" return "$suite_status" @@ -685,15 +688,17 @@ jobs: # (`is_bun_runtime_crash`). The unsharded macOS control had no equivalent, # so the same crash that Linux absorbs failed the whole promotion here. # - # Keep the signature list in sync with `is_bun_runtime_crash` in - # scripts/ci/run-bun-test-batches.sh. An assertion failure still fails on - # the first attempt — only the crash signature is retried, exactly once. + # The classifier is `is_bun_runtime_crash` from scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh, shared + # with every other lane. An assertion failure still fails on the first attempt — only a + # crash is retried, exactly once. - name: Test run: | # GitHub Actions starts bash `run:` blocks with `-e`. Disable # errexit so a Bun crash reaches PIPESTATUS and the bounded retry. set +e set -uo pipefail + # One shared classifier for every lane; see scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh. + source scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh suite_log="$(mktemp -t ocx-macos-suite.XXXXXX)" for attempt in 1 2; do # --timeout: Bun's default 5s per-test ceiling is the recurring flake @@ -708,7 +713,7 @@ jobs: if [ "$suite_status" -eq 0 ]; then exit 0 fi - if ! grep -Eqi 'oh no: Bun has crashed|Internal assertion failure|Segmentation fault at address|Illegal instruction|Bus error|Aborted \(core dumped\)' "$suite_log"; then + if ! is_bun_runtime_crash "$suite_status" "$suite_log"; then echo "::error::macOS suite failed on attempt ${attempt} (exit ${suite_status}); assertion failures are not retried." exit "$suite_status" fi @@ -834,6 +839,8 @@ jobs: run: | set +e set -uo pipefail + # One shared classifier for every lane; see scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh. + source scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh suite_log="$(mktemp -t ocx-windows-suite.XXXXXX)" for attempt in 1 2; do bun test --isolate --timeout 60000 tests --shard=${{ matrix.shard }}/6 2>&1 | tee "$suite_log" @@ -841,7 +848,7 @@ jobs: if [ "$suite_status" -eq 0 ]; then exit 0 fi - if ! grep -Eqi 'oh no: Bun has crashed|Internal assertion failure|Segmentation fault at address|Illegal instruction|Bus error|Aborted \(core dumped\)' "$suite_log"; then + if ! is_bun_runtime_crash "$suite_status" "$suite_log"; then echo "::error::Windows shard ${{ matrix.shard }}/6 failed on attempt ${attempt} (exit ${suite_status}); assertion failures are not retried." exit "$suite_status" fi diff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfile index 8d3e72c619..5987bfa991 100644 --- a/Dockerfile +++ b/Dockerfile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # syntax=docker/dockerfile:1 # Keep the runtime aligned with package.json and pin the multi-platform image index. -ARG BUN_IMAGE=oven/bun:1.4.2@sha256:9114c058aeae42162ee16dd5084b95fe9473970bb6bcb5b232ab1630f0546895 +ARG BUN_IMAGE=oven/bun:1.4.0@sha256:5ff609364c049b54eb0ff560ec96319729a972078ef2c755d758f0c6ef89c2d6 FROM ${BUN_IMAGE} AS build WORKDIR /home/bun/app diff --git a/bun.lock b/bun.lock index 6161766917..c4619c2866 100644 --- a/bun.lock +++ b/bun.lock @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ "@bufbuild/protobuf": "^2.14.0", "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.30.0", "@napi-rs/keyring": "1.3.0", - 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"bun-types": ["bun-types@1.4.2", "", { "dependencies": { "@types/node": "*" } }, "sha512-bxV1FgK7yBIzjRe5zBozIM4Bem11ZJcCXSrjWRG3YWLt8yFDePu4cLjpebO8OvPeIE9trbyPF4fuj3Cia4Fj3w=="], + "bun-types": ["bun-types@1.4.0", "", { "dependencies": { "@types/node": "*" } }, "sha512-iIKw23BspnQQYd3prITOBxeUsxBHnwzX6YJfGMuNOZzeNcMmVqzIIVGRm1l69ogaPQmb4wB6BN8mA5bE9YuC5Q=="], "bytes": ["bytes@3.1.2", "", {}, "sha512-/Nf7TyzTx6S3yRJObOAV7956r8cr2+Oj8AC5dt8wSP3BQAoeX58NoHyCU8P8zGkNXStjTSi6fzO6F0pBdcYbEg=="], diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index a856df4686..22449e507a 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -76,11 +76,11 @@ "@bufbuild/protobuf": "^2.14.0", "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.30.0", "@napi-rs/keyring": "1.3.0", - "bun": "1.4.2", + "bun": "1.4.0", "zod": "4.4.3" }, "devDependencies": { - "@types/bun": "1.4.2", + "@types/bun": "1.4.0", "typescript": "7.0.2" }, "overrides": { diff --git a/scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh b/scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000000..476f6539c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# The single definition of "this was a Bun runtime crash, not a test result". +# +# There were four copies of this list: one in the Linux batch runner and three inline in ci.yml +# (platform-windows, platform-macos, macos-control). ci-workflows.test.ts pinned them in sync +# rather than removing the duplication, because #2152 had already broken one copy by anchoring on +# `panic(thread 2852)` when Bun also emits `panic(main thread)` for the same class, and half the +# crashes stopped matching. Pinning four copies in sync only detects the drift it was written to +# expect; one definition cannot drift at all. +# +# Source it from the repository root: source scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh + +# shellcheck shell=bash + +# Sourced by nested shells in the same job, so a second source must be a no-op rather than a +# readonly-reassignment error. +if [[ -n "${OCX_BUN_CRASH_SIGNATURES_LOADED:-}" ]]; then + return 0 +fi +OCX_BUN_CRASH_SIGNATURES_LOADED=1 + +# Never anchor on the thread-numbered form. `Internal assertion failure` is the stable fingerprint +# recorded in devlog/_fin/260731_pr_issue_triage_round/050_windows_ci_flake_rca.md. +OCX_BUN_CRASH_SIGNATURE_PATTERN='oh no: Bun has crashed|Internal assertion failure|Segmentation fault at address|Illegal instruction|Bus error|Aborted \(core dumped\)' + +# True when the process output carries a Bun panic banner. +bun_log_has_crash_signature() { + grep -Eqi "$OCX_BUN_CRASH_SIGNATURE_PATTERN" "$1" +} + +# True for a status that can only be a fatal signal. +# +# 128+N for SIGILL/SIGABRT/SIGBUS/SIGKILL/SIGSEGV and neighbours. Windows exit 3 is deliberately +# NOT in this list: it is the status a Windows Bun returns alongside a SIGSEGV panic, but unlike +# 132-139 it is an ordinary small exit code any process may return for its own reasons. Trusting +# it bare would reclassify a real test failure as a crash and hide it, which is the exact mistake +# this file exists to stop. Exit 3 is still covered, through the signature arm below, which is +# corroborated by the panic banner Bun actually printed -- that is how the Windows shard 5/6 +# crashes of runs 35087572377, 35093667426 and 35098735960 are recognised. +bun_status_is_crash_code() { + case "$1" in + 132|133|134|135|136|137|139) return 0 ;; + esac + return 1 +} + +# The shared predicate: is_bun_runtime_crash +is_bun_runtime_crash() { + local status="$1" + local log_file="$2" + + if bun_status_is_crash_code "$status"; then + return 0 + fi + + # Bun 1.3.14 can surface a Linux epoll registration failure as exit 1, even though the failure + # comes from Bun's internal WriteStream setup rather than a test assertion. Treat only that + # narrow runtime signature as a crash. + if [[ "$status" == "1" ]] \ + && grep -Fq '# Unhandled error between tests' "$log_file" \ + && grep -Fq 'error: EEXIST: file already exists, epoll_ctl' "$log_file" \ + && grep -Fq 'at new WriteStream (internal:fs/streams:' "$log_file"; then + return 0 + fi + + bun_log_has_crash_signature "$log_file" +} + diff --git a/scripts/ci/run-bun-test-batches.sh b/scripts/ci/run-bun-test-batches.sh index ae34310258..147c87c980 100644 --- a/scripts/ci/run-bun-test-batches.sh +++ b/scripts/ci/run-bun-test-batches.sh @@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ readonly BATCH_KILL_GRACE_SECONDS="${BUN_TEST_BATCH_KILL_GRACE_SECONDS:-15}" # bundled stable runtime anyway, and report a qualification it never performed. readonly BUN_BIN="${OPENCODEX_BUN_PATH:-bun}" +# One definition of the crash classifier, shared with the Windows and macOS legs in ci.yml. +# shellcheck source=scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh +source "$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)/bun-crash-signatures.sh" + usage() { echo "usage: $0 " >&2 exit 64 @@ -64,31 +68,6 @@ is_general_test_file() { esac } -is_bun_runtime_crash() { - local status="$1" - local log_file="$2" - - case "$status" in - 132|133|134|135|136|137|139) - return 0 - ;; - esac - - # Bun 1.3.14 can surface a Linux epoll registration failure as exit 1, - # even though the failure comes from Bun's internal WriteStream setup rather - # than a test assertion. Treat only that narrow runtime signature as a crash. - if (( status == 1 )) \ - && grep -Fq '# Unhandled error between tests' "$log_file" \ - && grep -Fq 'error: EEXIST: file already exists, epoll_ctl' "$log_file" \ - && grep -Fq 'at new WriteStream (internal:fs/streams:' "$log_file"; then - return 0 - fi - - grep -Eqi \ - 'oh no: Bun has crashed|Internal assertion failure|Segmentation fault at address|Illegal instruction|Bus error|Aborted \(core dumped\)' \ - "$log_file" -} - LAST_FAILURE_KIND="" run_test_once() { @@ -189,7 +168,14 @@ recover_batch_file_by_file() { return "$status" done - echo "::warning::Shard ${SHARD_SPEC} batch ${batch_number} passed under singleton isolation after the original ${batch_failure_kind}; continuing." + if [[ "$batch_failure_kind" == "runtime" ]]; then + # Not "recovered". One file per process is a configuration in which this class of defect + # cannot occur, so the sweep was always going to pass and always going to report nothing. + # What it does prove is that the files themselves are sound, which is the half worth keeping. + echo "::error::Shard ${SHARD_SPEC} batch ${batch_number} crashed the Bun runtime. Every file in it then passed alone, so the defect is in multi-file process state, not in any test." + else + echo "::warning::Shard ${SHARD_SPEC} batch ${batch_number} passed under singleton isolation after the original ${batch_failure_kind}; continuing." + fi return 0 } @@ -218,7 +204,12 @@ fi readonly TOTAL_BATCHES=$(( (${#SELECTED_FILES[@]} + BATCH_SIZE - 1) / BATCH_SIZE )) echo "Shard ${SHARD_SPEC}: ${#SELECTED_FILES[@]} files in ${TOTAL_BATCHES} primary Bun processes (batch size <= ${BATCH_SIZE}, timeout ${BATCH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS}s)." -echo "Runtime crashes and timeouts fall back to one-file-per-process isolation; assertion/test failures do not retry." +echo "Timeouts fall back to one-file-per-process isolation and may recover; assertion/test failures do not retry." +echo "A Bun runtime crash is swept one-file-per-process for attribution and then FAILS this shard: it is a defect in the interpreter, and a green report would be a lie." + +# Every batch that crashed the runtime, so one run attributes all of them instead of only the +# first. Linux was producing twelve to fourteen of these per run while reporting success. +CRASHED_BATCHES=() for ((batch_index = 0; batch_index < TOTAL_BATCHES; batch_index += 1)); do start=$(( batch_index * BATCH_SIZE )) @@ -237,8 +228,22 @@ for ((batch_index = 0; batch_index < TOTAL_BATCHES; batch_index += 1)); do failure_kind="$LAST_FAILURE_KIND" if recover_batch_file_by_file "$batch_number" "$failure_kind" "${batch[@]}"; then - continue + recovery_status=0 else - exit $? + recovery_status=$? + fi + + if [[ "$failure_kind" == "runtime" ]]; then + CRASHED_BATCHES+=("$batch_number") + fi + + # A sweep that found a real failing file still reports that file, and immediately. + if (( recovery_status != 0 )); then + exit "$recovery_status" fi done + +if (( ${#CRASHED_BATCHES[@]} > 0 )); then + echo "::error::Shard ${SHARD_SPEC} crashed the Bun runtime in batch(es): ${CRASHED_BATCHES[*]}. Each batch was re-run one file per process and every file passed, so no test is at fault -- the interpreter is. Failing rather than reporting green." + exit 1 +fi diff --git a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json index 2106a9614b..96e44b509c 100644 --- a/scripts/test-layout/layout.json +++ b/scripts/test-layout/layout.json @@ -319,6 +319,7 @@ "chatgpt-oauth.test.ts": "oauth", "chatgpt-token-expiry.test.ts": "oauth", "chutes-provider.test.ts": "providers", + "ci-bun-crash-classifier.test.ts": "ci-workflows", "ci-workflows.test.ts": "ci-workflows", "citation-markers.test.ts": "responses", "cl01-claude-outbound-review-regressions.test.ts": "routing", diff --git a/src/server/index.ts b/src/server/index.ts index 4892f4aaf3..6cd079fd71 100644 --- a/src/server/index.ts +++ b/src/server/index.ts @@ -268,11 +268,11 @@ export function startServer(port?: number, deps: StartServerDeps = {}): Server { + const classifier = read("scripts", "ci", "bun-crash-signatures.sh"); + const batchScript = read("scripts", "ci", "run-bun-test-batches.sh"); + const workflow = read(".github", "workflows", "ci.yml"); + + const lanes = { + windows: runBlockContaining(workflow, "bun test --isolate --timeout 60000 tests --shard=${{ matrix.shard }}/6"), + "macos-shard": runBlockContaining(workflow, "run_macos_suite tests"), + "macos-control": runBlockContaining(workflow, "bun test --isolate --timeout 60000 tests 2>&1"), + }; + + test("the signatures exist in the classifier", () => { + for (const signature of CRASH_SIGNATURES) { + expect(`classifier:${signature}:${classifier.includes(signature)}`).toBe(`classifier:${signature}:true`); + } + }); + + test("no lane and no script carries an inline copy of them", () => { + const others: Array = [ + ["batch-script", batchScript], + ...Object.entries(lanes), + ]; + for (const [name, text] of others) { + for (const signature of CRASH_SIGNATURES) { + expect(`${name}:inline:${signature}:${text.includes(signature)}`) + .toBe(`${name}:inline:${signature}:false`); + } + } + }); + + test("every lane sources the classifier and calls the shared predicate", () => { + for (const [name, text] of Object.entries(lanes)) { + expect(`${name}:sources:${text.includes(SOURCE_LINE)}`).toBe(`${name}:sources:true`); + expect(`${name}:calls:${text.includes("is_bun_runtime_crash \"$suite_status\" \"$suite_log\"")}`) + .toBe(`${name}:calls:true`); + } + expect(batchScript).toContain("bun-crash-signatures.sh"); + expect(batchScript).toContain('is_bun_runtime_crash "$status" "$log_file"'); + }); + + test("the thread-numbered panic form is the anchor nowhere", () => { + // `panic(thread 2852)` and `panic(main thread)` are the same class (#2152). + for (const [name, text] of [["classifier", classifier], ["batch-script", batchScript], ...Object.entries(lanes)] as Array) { + expect(`${name}:${text.includes("panic\\(thread")}`).toBe(`${name}:false`); + } + }); + + test("fatal signal codes classify on the status alone, and exit 3 never does", () => { + // 128+N is unambiguous. 3 is an ordinary small exit code any process may return, so it is + // recognised only when Bun also printed a panic banner -- which is how the Windows shard 5/6 + // crashes of runs 35087572377, 35093667426 and 35098735960 are caught. Trusting 3 bare would + // reclassify a real failure as a crash and hide it, which is the mistake this file prevents. + expect(classifier).toContain("132|133|134|135|136|137|139) return 0 ;;"); + expect(classifier).not.toMatch(/^\s*3\|/m); + expect(classifier).not.toContain("|3)"); + }); +}); + +describe("a Bun runtime crash fails the Linux shard", () => { + const batchScript = read("scripts", "ci", "run-bun-test-batches.sh"); + + test("crashed batches are collected and the shard exits non-zero", () => { + expect(batchScript).toContain("CRASHED_BATCHES=()"); + expect(batchScript).toContain('CRASHED_BATCHES+=("$batch_number")'); + expect(batchScript).toContain("if (( ${#CRASHED_BATCHES[@]} > 0 )); then"); + // The failure is an error annotation and a non-zero exit, not a warning and a green shard. + const tail = batchScript.slice(batchScript.indexOf("if (( ${#CRASHED_BATCHES[@]} > 0 )); then")); + expect(tail).toContain("::error::"); + expect(tail).toContain("exit 1"); + }); + + test("the singleton sweep reports a crash as an error rather than a recovery", () => { + expect(batchScript).toContain('if [[ "$batch_failure_kind" == "runtime" ]]; then'); + // The old wording promised recovery. A crash may not be announced that way again. + const sweepEnd = batchScript.slice(batchScript.indexOf("recover_batch_file_by_file")); + expect(sweepEnd).not.toContain("passed under singleton isolation after the original runtime"); + }); + + test("a real failing file found by the sweep still reports that file immediately", () => { + // Failing on the crash must not swallow an assertion the sweep genuinely attributed. + expect(batchScript).toContain("Singleton isolation identified ${file} as a failing test file."); + expect(batchScript).toContain("if (( recovery_status != 0 )); then"); + }); + + test("a timeout may still recover, because a timeout is a load condition", () => { + expect(batchScript).toContain('if [[ "$LAST_FAILURE_KIND" != "runtime" && "$LAST_FAILURE_KIND" != "timeout" ]]; then'); + expect(batchScript).toContain("passed under singleton isolation after the original ${batch_failure_kind}; continuing."); + }); +}); + diff --git a/tests/ci-workflows/ci-workflows.test.ts b/tests/ci-workflows/ci-workflows.test.ts index b098220521..4576326263 100644 --- a/tests/ci-workflows/ci-workflows.test.ts +++ b/tests/ci-workflows/ci-workflows.test.ts @@ -271,8 +271,8 @@ describe("GitHub Actions hardening", () => { // must disable errexit before the crash-prone command or exit 133 aborts // the step before PIPESTATUS can be inspected and the retry can run. expect(hasExactShellCommand(macosTestRun, "set +e")).toBe(true); - expect(macosTestRun).toContain("Segmentation fault at address"); - expect(macosTestRun).toContain("oh no: Bun has crashed"); + // The crash signatures themselves moved to scripts/ci/bun-crash-signatures.sh; that one + // definition and every lane that sources it are pinned by ci-bun-crash-classifier.test.ts. expect(macosTestRun).toContain("assertion failures are not retried"); expect(macosTestRun).toContain("failing after one retry"); // `for attempt in 1 2` — one retry, never an unbounded loop. @@ -355,35 +355,10 @@ describe("GitHub Actions hardening", () => { expect(winSteps.some(step => step.if === "runner.environment == 'self-hosted'" && step.run?.includes("git clean -xffd"))).toBe(true); - // The three crash-signature lists must stay identical, and they must not key on - // `panic(thread`. - // - // Bun emits BOTH `panic(thread 2852)` and `panic(main thread)` for the same class of - // failure, so a grep anchored on the numbered form silently misses half of them and the - // shard fails on a crash it was supposed to retry. This repository already learned that - // once — `devlog/_fin/260731_pr_issue_triage_round/050_windows_ci_flake_rca.md` names - // `Internal assertion failure` as the stable fingerprint — and #2152 reintroduced it. - // Three copies of one list is the real hazard, so pin the sync rather than the text. - const crashSignatures = [ - "oh no: Bun has crashed", - "Internal assertion failure", - "Segmentation fault at address", - "Illegal instruction", - "Bus error", - ]; + // The crash-signature list lives in exactly one file now, and every lane sources it. + // ci-bun-crash-classifier.test.ts owns that contract, including the rule that no lane may + // reintroduce an inline copy and that a runtime crash fails the shard instead of being swept. const windowsTestRun = windowsTestSteps[0]?.run ?? ""; - const batchScript = await readText("scripts/ci/run-bun-test-batches.sh"); - for (const signature of crashSignatures) { - expect(`macos:${signature}:${macosTestRun.includes(signature)}`).toBe(`macos:${signature}:true`); - expect(`macos-control:${signature}:${macosControlTestRun.includes(signature)}`).toBe(`macos-control:${signature}:true`); - expect(`windows:${signature}:${windowsTestRun.includes(signature)}`).toBe(`windows:${signature}:true`); - expect(`script:${signature}:${batchScript.includes(signature)}`).toBe(`script:${signature}:true`); - } - // The thread-numbered form must not be the anchor anywhere. - expect(macosTestRun).not.toContain("panic\\(thread"); - expect(macosControlTestRun).not.toContain("panic\\(thread"); - expect(windowsTestRun).not.toContain("panic\\(thread"); - expect(batchScript).not.toContain("panic\\(thread"); // Windows carries the same bounded retry as macOS: one attempt, crash-only. expect(hasExactShellCommand(windowsTestRun, "set +e")).toBe(true); diff --git a/tests/ci-workflows/install-scripts.test.ts b/tests/ci-workflows/install-scripts.test.ts index fc41950115..2d1436d472 100644 --- a/tests/ci-workflows/install-scripts.test.ts +++ b/tests/ci-workflows/install-scripts.test.ts @@ -65,10 +65,29 @@ describe("install scripts", () => { expect(pkg.main).toBe("./bin/package-main.mjs"); expect(pkg.exports?.["."]?.bun).toBe("./src/index.ts"); expect(pkg.exports?.["."]?.default).toBe("./bin/package-main.mjs"); - expect(pkg.dependencies?.bun).toBe("1.4.2"); + // Bun stays at 1.4.0 until 1.4.2's test-runner crash is fixed upstream. 1.4.2 segfaults + // while RE-LOADING the bunfig preload that `--isolate` re-enters once per test file: + // `load_preloads -> JSModuleLoader::loadModule -> JSPromise::status` dereferences a dead + // promise and the process dies with "Segmentation fault at address 0x10". It is a crash in + // the interpreter, not a test result, and no test content avoids it. + // + // The A/B is two Linux CI runs 40 minutes apart, either side of #4064 (02bc10e8af), which + // is the commit that moved this line to 1.4.2: + // run 34274464811, 6bd3274ab2, Bun 1.4.0 -- 0 panics across all four shards + // run 34278407438, 02bc10e8af, Bun 1.4.2 -- 12 panics across all four shards + // Every sampled 1.4.0 tree is clean and every sampled 1.4.2 tree crashes 12-14 times per + // run. Linux hid it because `scripts/ci/run-bun-test-batches.sh` re-runs a crashed batch one + // file per process, and one preload load cannot reach the second that faults, so the sweep + // always "passes". Windows had no such sweep: shard 5/6 died on both attempts of runs + // 35087572377, 35093667426 and 35098735960, always at the 67th file, and the file sitting at + // that position changed between them. + // + // Moving this back to 1.4.2, or on to a later release, needs a green `lane=all` dispatch as + // the evidence -- an ordinary PR run cannot show it, because the Linux sweep masks it. + expect(pkg.dependencies?.bun).toBe("1.4.0"); expect(pkg.dependencies?.zod).toBe("4.4.3"); expect(pkg.devDependencies?.typescript).toBe("7.0.2"); - expect(pkg.devDependencies?.["@types/bun"]).toBe("1.4.2"); + expect(pkg.devDependencies?.["@types/bun"]).toBe("1.4.0"); expect(pkg.scripts?.dev).toBe("bun run src/cli/index.ts start"); expect(pkg.scripts?.["dev:proxy"]).toBe("bun run src/cli/index.ts start"); expect(pkg.scripts?.["dev:gui"]).toBe("cd gui && bun run dev"); diff --git a/tests/ci-workflows/macos-serial-lanes.test.ts b/tests/ci-workflows/macos-serial-lanes.test.ts index c9677cddf4..b290617f8b 100644 --- a/tests/ci-workflows/macos-serial-lanes.test.ts +++ b/tests/ci-workflows/macos-serial-lanes.test.ts @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"; import { spawn, type ChildProcessByStdio } from "node:child_process"; -import { existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { copyFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { basename, dirname, join } from "node:path"; import type { Readable } from "node:stream"; @@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ const SERIAL_FILES = [ const GENERAL_FILES = ["general/ordinary.test.ts", "general/falcon-extra.test.ts"]; const ASSERTION_STATUS = 23; const CRASH_STATUS = 139; +// A status the classifier cannot recognise on its own, so a crash carrying it is only detected +// through the panic banner. 139 is a fatal signal and matches on the code alone. +const SIGNATURE_ONLY_CRASH_STATUS = 3; const CRASH_SIGNATURES = [ "oh no: Bun has crashed", "Internal assertion failure", @@ -98,6 +101,13 @@ process.exit(0); function createFixture(directory: string, options: FixtureOptions): void { mkdirSync(join(directory, "bin")); mkdirSync(join(directory, "tmp")); + // The lane sources its crash classifier from the working directory, so the sandbox gets the + // REAL file rather than a stand-in. That is deliberate: the harness executes the actual run + // block, so a copy here would let the block and the classifier drift apart unnoticed, which is + // the exact failure mode that collapsing four inline signature lists into one file removed. + mkdirSync(join(directory, "scripts", "ci"), { recursive: true }); + copyFileSync(repoPath("scripts", "ci", "bun-crash-signatures.sh"), + join(directory, "scripts", "ci", "bun-crash-signatures.sh")); for (const file of [...SERIAL_FILES, ...GENERAL_FILES]) { if (file === options.missing) continue; mkdirSync(dirname(join(directory, "tests", file)), { recursive: true }); @@ -304,7 +314,14 @@ describe.skipIf(process.platform === "win32")("macOS serial lane shell ownership for (const [caseIndex, signature] of CRASH_SIGNATURES.entries()) { test(`${target}: retries one runtime crash (case ${caseIndex + 1}), then finishes`, async () => { - const run = await runShard(1, { target, outcomes: ["crash"], crashSignature: signature }); + // Exit 3, not 139, so the SIGNATURE arm of the shared classifier is what is under test. + // With 139 the status arm matches first and this case would pass even if the signature + // list were empty -- which is how a lane can carry a broken list and look covered (#2152). + // Exit 3 is also the real Windows shape: Bun prints the panic banner and returns 3, + // and a bare 3 must NOT be treated as a crash, so the banner is doing the work here. + const run = await runShard(1, { + target, outcomes: ["crash"], crashSignature: signature, crashStatus: SIGNATURE_ONLY_CRASH_STATUS, + }); expect(run.status, run.output).toBe(0); const calls = testCalls(run); const attempts = calls.filter(call => targets(call, target)); diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/client-injection-guard.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/client-injection-guard.test.ts index 829db8a5a0..262ede77b0 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/client-injection-guard.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/client-injection-guard.test.ts @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -import { afterEach, expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { afterEach, beforeAll, expect, test } from "bun:test"; import { mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { delimiter, dirname, join } from "node:path"; @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ async function within(promise: Promise, milliseconds: number): Promise })]); } finally { if (timer !== undefined) clearTimeout(timer); } } -async function runScenario(mode: string): Promise> { +async function runScenario(mode: string, childDeadlineMs = 30_000): Promise> { const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-client-guard-")); roots.push(root); const codex = join(root, "codex"); const ocx = join(root, "ocx"); const desktop = join(root, "desktop"); for (const directory of [codex, ocx, desktop]) mkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true }); @@ -171,14 +171,14 @@ async function runScenario(mode: string): Promise> { children.push(child); const stdout = new Response(child.stdout).text(); const stderr = new Response(child.stderr).text(); - const code = await within(child.exited, 30_000); + const code = await within(child.exited, childDeadlineMs); const output = await within(Promise.all([stdout, stderr]), 5_000); const result = JSON.parse(output[0].trim().split("\n").at(-1) ?? "{}"); if (code !== 0) throw new Error("injection fixture failed: " + String(result.fatal ?? output[1])); return result; } -afterEach(async () => { +async function cleanupFixtures(): Promise { const errors: unknown[] = []; for (const child of children.splice(0)) { try { @@ -193,7 +193,28 @@ afterEach(async () => { try { removeTreeWithRetry(root); } catch (error) { errors.push(error); } } if (errors.length) throw new AggregateError(errors, "injection fixture cleanup failed"); -}, 30_000); +} + +beforeAll(async () => { + try { + // Windows run 35098735960 spent 30.446s in the first child, then 17.038s and + // 1.3-2.0s in its siblings. Run 35093667426 likewise paid 3.814s first versus + // 1.6-2.7s later. Exercise the real write/SQLite/ACL path once before a scenario's + // 30s execution budget so Bun and Windows first-touch work is not timed + // as guard behavior. The 45s warm-up ceiling is the file's existing test budget. + await runScenario("deny", 45_000); + } catch { + // Deliberately swallowed. This hook exists only to pay first-touch cost; it asserts + // nothing. Letting it throw would convert one broken scenario into seven failures whose + // messages all point at a warm-up rather than at the guard, and the real "deny" test below + // reproduces any genuine breakage with its own assertions. A warm-up that merely ran out of + // its own budget on a loaded runner must not fail a file it was added to stabilise. + } finally { + await cleanupFixtures(); + } +}, 55_000); + +afterEach(cleanupFixtures, 30_000); for (const mode of ["deny", "queued-native", "legacy", "external", "malformed", "async", "async-reject"]) { test("client commit guard preserves every routing artifact (" + mode + ")", async () => { diff --git a/tests/codex-integration/codex-composed-acceptance.test.ts b/tests/codex-integration/codex-composed-acceptance.test.ts index 44730e5453..ee6aebb8cb 100644 --- a/tests/codex-integration/codex-composed-acceptance.test.ts +++ b/tests/codex-integration/codex-composed-acceptance.test.ts @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ import { canonicalizeCodexHome, } from "../../src/codex/codex-write-lock"; import { + resolveCodexCatalogSerializationDatabasePath, resolveCodexCoordinatorDatabasePath, resolveEffectiveUserIdentity, } from "../../src/codex/user-identity"; @@ -71,6 +72,35 @@ type StartedServer = { stderr: Promise; }; +type CapturedChildStream = { + completed: Promise; + snapshot: () => string; + closed: () => boolean; +}; + +/** Drain a child pipe while retaining the bytes already emitted before EOF. */ +function captureChildStream(stream: ReadableStream): CapturedChildStream { + let text = ""; + let closed = false; + const completed = (async () => { + const reader = stream.getReader(); + const decoder = new TextDecoder(); + try { + while (true) { + const chunk = await reader.read(); + if (chunk.done) break; + text += decoder.decode(chunk.value, { stream: true }); + } + text += decoder.decode(); + return text; + } finally { + closed = true; + reader.releaseLock(); + } + })(); + return { completed, snapshot: () => text, closed: () => closed }; +} + /** A byte manifest: paths plus bytes, not mtimes or parsed JSON. */ function manifest(root: string): Record { const entries: Record = {}; @@ -130,6 +160,8 @@ class Fixture { readonly managementToken = "composed-admin-token"; readonly lockPath: string; readonly lockAllowlist: string[]; + readonly catalogLockPath: string; + readonly catalogLockAllowlist: string[]; readonly serviceManagerEnv: Record; readonly serviceManagerPreloadPath: string | undefined; readonly powerShellCacheEnv: Record = {}; @@ -168,9 +200,18 @@ class Fixture { rmSync(this.root, { recursive: true, force: true, maxRetries: 3, retryDelay: 50 }); throw error; } - this.lockPath = resolveCodexCoordinatorDatabasePath(resolveEffectiveUserIdentity(), realpathSync.native(this.codex)); + const identity = resolveEffectiveUserIdentity(); + const canonicalCodexHome = realpathSync.native(this.codex); + this.lockPath = resolveCodexCoordinatorDatabasePath(identity, canonicalCodexHome); this.lockAllowlist = [this.lockPath, `${this.lockPath}-journal`, `${this.lockPath}-wal`, `${this.lockPath}-shm`]; - for (const path of this.lockAllowlist) { + this.catalogLockPath = resolveCodexCatalogSerializationDatabasePath(identity, canonicalCodexHome); + this.catalogLockAllowlist = [ + this.catalogLockPath, + `${this.catalogLockPath}-journal`, + `${this.catalogLockPath}-wal`, + `${this.catalogLockPath}-shm`, + ]; + for (const path of [...this.lockAllowlist, ...this.catalogLockAllowlist]) { if (existsSync(path)) throw new Error(`lock preflight found pre-existing case path: ${path}`); } writeFileSync(join(this.codex, "config.toml"), 'model = "gpt-5"\n'); @@ -260,23 +301,35 @@ class Fixture { async start(): Promise { const child = this.spawnCli(["start"]); + const pidPath = join(this.ocx, "ocx.pid"); const runtimePath = join(this.ocx, "runtime-port.json"); - // Capture the child's streams while we wait. Without this, a start that dies for a - // concrete reason — a throw, a port bind refusal, a missing artifact — surfaces only as - // "timed out waiting for runtime-port record", which is the symptom and never the cause. - // That is exactly how the Windows failures read for two CI rounds. - const stderr = new Response(child.stderr).text(); - const stdout = new Response(child.stdout).text(); + // Run 35093667426 waited the full 45 s Windows watchdog with the child alive, but + // Response(stream).text() reported only "still open": it cannot reveal bytes until EOF. + // Healthy controls in 35054231781 and 35098735960 finished this whole case in ~14 s, so + // preserve the budget and expose the child's actual progress plus its two startup records. + const stderr = captureChildStream(child.stderr); + const stdout = captureChildStream(child.stdout); const diagnose = async (label: string): Promise => { const exited = child.exitCode ?? (await Promise.race([ child.exited, new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(() => resolve(null), 500)), ])); - const [err, out] = await Promise.all([ - Promise.race([stderr, new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(() => resolve(""), 500))]), - Promise.race([stdout, new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(() => resolve(""), 500))]), - ]); - throw new Error(`${label}; child exit=${String(exited)}\n--- stderr ---\n${err.slice(-4000)}\n--- stdout ---\n${out.slice(-2000)}`); + let pidRecord = existsSync(pidPath) ? "present(unreadable)" : "missing"; + try { pidRecord = `present(${readFileSync(pidPath, "utf8").trim()})`; } catch { /* diagnostic only */ } + let runtimeRecord = existsSync(runtimePath) ? "present(unreadable)" : "missing"; + try { + const record = JSON.parse(readFileSync(runtimePath, "utf8")) as Partial; + runtimeRecord = `present(pid=${String(record.pid)}, port=${String(record.port)}, matches-child=${record.pid === child.pid})`; + } catch { /* diagnostic only; never print the record's attestation secret */ } + const streamText = (capture: CapturedChildStream, limit: number) => { + const value = capture.snapshot().slice(-limit); + return value || `<${capture.closed() ? "closed" : "open"}; no output captured>`; + }; + throw new Error( + `${label}; child exit=${String(exited)}; pid-record=${pidRecord}; runtime-record=${runtimeRecord}` + + `\n--- stderr (${stderr.closed() ? "closed" : "open"}) ---\n${streamText(stderr, 4000)}` + + `\n--- stdout (${stdout.closed() ? "closed" : "open"}) ---\n${streamText(stdout, 2000)}`, + ); }; const runtime = await waitFor(() => { if (!existsSync(runtimePath)) return null; @@ -297,9 +350,9 @@ class Fixture { } catch { return null; } - }, "child /healthz"); + }, "child /healthz").catch(() => diagnose("timed out waiting for child /healthz")); expect(health).toMatchObject({ pid: child.pid, port: runtime.port }); - return { process: child, runtime, stdout, stderr }; + return { process: child, runtime, stdout: stdout.completed, stderr: stderr.completed }; } async stop(server: StartedServer): Promise { @@ -368,9 +421,13 @@ class Fixture { } // Re-resolve before the limited four-name removal: never glob or inspect a // shared runtime namespace beyond the exact identities this case created. - const checked = resolveCodexCoordinatorDatabasePath(resolveEffectiveUserIdentity(), realpathSync.native(this.codex)); + const identity = resolveEffectiveUserIdentity(); + const canonicalCodexHome = realpathSync.native(this.codex); + const checked = resolveCodexCoordinatorDatabasePath(identity, canonicalCodexHome); if (checked !== this.lockPath) throw new Error("lock teardown identity changed"); - for (const path of this.lockAllowlist) { + const checkedCatalog = resolveCodexCatalogSerializationDatabasePath(identity, canonicalCodexHome); + if (checkedCatalog !== this.catalogLockPath) throw new Error("catalog lock teardown identity changed"); + for (const path of [...this.lockAllowlist, ...this.catalogLockAllowlist]) { if (existsSync(path)) unlinkSync(path); } removeTreeWithRetry(this.root); @@ -449,6 +506,10 @@ describe("WP13 composed toggle acceptance", () => { const before = manifest(fx.codex); const server = await fx.start(); try { + // OFF must short-circuit before K. On Windows, merely resolving K starts separate + // SID and LocalAppData PowerShell children with 30 s budgets each; run 35093667426 + // exceeded healthy controls by 33.8 s before the runtime-port watchdog fired at 45 s. + expect(existsSync(fx.catalogLockPath)).toBe(false); expect(manifest(fx.codex)).toEqual(before); for (const argv of [["ensure"], ["restore"]]) { const result = await fx.runCli(argv); diff --git a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json index f5c49f9959..c1f826b816 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json +++ b/tests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.json @@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ "chatgpt-oauth.test.ts": "oauth", "chatgpt-token-expiry.test.ts": "oauth", "chutes-provider.test.ts": "providers", + "ci-bun-crash-classifier.test.ts": "ci-workflows", "ci-workflows.test.ts": "ci-workflows", "citation-markers.test.ts": "responses", "cl01-claude-outbound-review-regressions.test.ts": "routing", diff --git a/tests/server/server-management-auth.test.ts b/tests/server/server-management-auth.test.ts index 2e5f3db061..0443c3329c 100644 --- a/tests/server/server-management-auth.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/server-management-auth.test.ts @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { join } from "node:path"; import { getConfigPath, saveConfig } from "../../src/config"; +import { flushConfigDirHardeningForTests } from "../../src/config/paths"; import { clearContextSessionOwnersForTests } from "../../src/codex/context-owner"; import { resetContextRelayActivationForTests } from "../../src/codex/context-compat"; import { startServer } from "../../src/server"; @@ -189,7 +190,23 @@ beforeEach(() => { process.env.OPENCODEX_ADMIN_AUTH_TOKEN = "admin-secret"; }); -afterEach(() => { +afterEach(async () => { + // Settle every in-flight config-directory harden before anything here removes a directory. + // + // `hardenConfigDir()` spawns `icacls.exe`, which holds the directory open until it exits, and + // Windows file locking is mandatory: removing that tree while the child lives returns EPERM no + // matter how long the caller waits. Windows shard 1/6 of run 35108652486 proved the waiting is + // not the answer -- it exhausted the full 15s exponential budget and still threw + // `EPERM: operation not permitted, rm .../tmp/ocx-management-auth-fDchUb` out of this hook. + // #4789 filed the same failure at this same line when the budget was 2.5s, and raising it to + // 15s in #4796 bought six times the wait and changed nothing, because the handle was never + // going to close on its own schedule. The process that started the child has to wait for it. + // + // The all-directories variant is the required one. `server.stop` already flushes, but through + // `flushConfigDirHardening()`, which defaults to `getConfigDir()` read at stop time -- and this + // hook moves OPENCODEX_HOME back to the developer's real home a few lines below, so a + // directory-scoped flush here would settle the wrong tree and leave this one held. + await flushConfigDirHardeningForTests(); resetContextRelayActivationForTests(); if (previousCodexHome === undefined) delete process.env.CODEX_HOME; else process.env.CODEX_HOME = previousCodexHome; diff --git a/tests/server/server-search.test.ts b/tests/server/server-search.test.ts index 721ca15559..667979427c 100644 --- a/tests/server/server-search.test.ts +++ b/tests/server/server-search.test.ts @@ -315,16 +315,21 @@ test("an account-qualified search model uses that exact account and sends the ba test("an exact search 429 never switches to the active Pool account and reports only its public selector", async () => { const captured: CapturedRequest[] = []; const upstream = fakeSearchUpstream(captured, 429, { error: { message: "rate limited" } }); - saveConfig(exactSearchConfig()); + const config = exactSearchConfig(); + saveConfig(config); saveExactSearchCredentials(); - const server = startServer(0); try { - const requestExactSearch = () => fetch(new URL("/v1/alpha/search", server.url), { - method: "POST", - headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, - body: JSON.stringify({ id: "search-session", model: "side/gpt-test" }), - }); + // Run 35093667426 returned a local 401 before this fixture could return its 429. + // Full server startup is unrelated to this routing contract and widens the interval + // between writing and reading the credential store selected by process-wide + // OPENCODEX_HOME. Call the handler while that fixture home is current. + const logCtx = { model: "", provider: "" }; + const requestExactSearch = () => handleSearch( + alphaSearchRequest({ id: "search-session", model: "side/gpt-test" }), + config, + logCtx, + ); const first = await requestExactSearch(); expect(first.status).toBe(429); @@ -342,11 +347,9 @@ test("an exact search 429 never switches to the active Pool account and reports expect(captured).toHaveLength(1); expect(loadConfig().activeCodexAccountId).toBe("pool-b"); expect(getCodexUpstreamHealth("pool-b")).toBeNull(); - const entry = getRequestLogEntries().findLast(candidate => candidate.model === "side/gpt-test"); - expect(entry?.provider).toBe("openai-side"); - expect(JSON.stringify(entry)).not.toContain("pool-a"); + expect(logCtx.provider).toBe("openai-side"); + expect(JSON.stringify(logCtx)).not.toContain("pool-a"); } finally { - await server.stop(true); await upstream.stop(true); } }); From d78be30da7a0abed0f647f2bf5e097b44d30bae0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 02:23:24 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 112/113] docs(devlog): record the 2.57.0 release train (#4828) Four documents: the roadmap, the CI forensics that cleared dev's red tip, the pull-request triage, and the issue triage. No product code changes. Co-authored-by: lidge-jun --- .../260917_2570_release_train/000_roadmap.md | 77 +++++++++++++++++++ .../010_dev_green.md | 50 ++++++++++++ .../020_pr_triage.md | 66 ++++++++++++++++ .../030_issue_triage.md | 38 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 231 insertions(+) create mode 100644 devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/000_roadmap.md create mode 100644 devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/010_dev_green.md create mode 100644 devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/020_pr_triage.md create mode 100644 devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/030_issue_triage.md diff --git a/devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/000_roadmap.md b/devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/000_roadmap.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..72e60db2b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/000_roadmap.md @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +# 2.57.0 release train — roadmap + +Status: open. Opened 2026-09-17. + +## Where the repository actually is + +`dev` carries 184 commits since `v2.56.0`, and `package.json` on `dev` already reads 2.57.0 — the +pre-move the 2.56.0 train performed as its own step 2. The version line is therefore ready for a +2.57.0 release, and will need a further move before that release can publish. + +Two things are not ready: + +1. **`dev` is red at its tip.** Cross-platform CI run `35118018849` at `2b19983bfd` failed on the + `windows 1/6` shard with a single failing test, and the four dev commits before it + (`d2808c0619`, `d210c46dab`, `89bdf5fa4a`, `dc9d1fabc8`) each failed a run as well. The last + recorded success on `dev` is `35091966777` at `2203277ad4`. A release cannot be cut from a tree + whose tip has no green run, so establishing whether these are flakes or one regression is the + first work phase, not a side quest. +2. **The queue was never triaged.** 60 pull requests and roughly 60 issues are open. Some issues + are already fixed by unreleased commits on `dev`, some pull requests are superseded by work + that landed around them, and a handful are ready to land now. Publishing without that pass + ships a release whose notes cannot be written honestly and leaves users reading open issues + that the release already fixed. + +## Constraint that shapes the whole unit + +No local full suite, typecheck, build or install, anywhere, by anyone — including delegated +agents. Hosted CI at an exact head SHA is the only accepted evidence that a tree passes. Source +reading and hosted logs are the local instruments. Every claim in these documents names either a +CI run at a SHA, a job id, or a file path with line numbers. + +## Work phases + +| Phase | Doc | Outcome | +| --- | --- | --- | +| wp1 | this file | Roadmap locked. Implementation starts in wp2. | +| wp2 | `010_dev_green.md` | `dev` has a green Cross-platform CI run at its exact tip, with every failure on the way either fixed or proven to be a flake. | +| wp3 | `020_pr_triage.md` | Every open pull request carries a recorded verdict; the ones that land do so with CI green at their exact head. | +| wp4 | `030_issue_triage.md` | Every open issue carries a recorded verdict; issues already fixed by unreleased `dev` commits are closed against the commit that fixed them. | +| wp5 | `040_release.md` | 2.57.0 on `main` and `preview`, published, verified from the workflow's own conclusion. | + +## Release order, restated because it is easy to get backwards + +`MAINTAINERS.md` lines 84-91 and three gates in `.github/workflows/release.yml` force this order: + +1. Freeze a candidate SHA on `dev` that has a green Cross-platform CI run. +2. Move `dev`'s version line **first** — dispatch `dev-version-bump.yml` with the intended version + and merge the pull request it opens. `release.yml` ends with `assert-ahead + ` and refuses to publish while `dev` still reads the version being released. + Doing this after publication is what left `dev` and every open pull request carrying a failure + contributors could not fix from their own diff, ten times. +3. Promote the frozen candidate to `main`, cut from the candidate rather than from the post-bump + `dev` tip. The promotion's `enforce-target` check fails with "wrong base (main)"; that gate is + for feature pull requests and every promotion carries the same red mark. +4. Prove the release SHA: Cross-platform CI success for the promotion commit, and Service + lifecycle success as well, which is always required here because `package.json` always changes. +5. Dispatch `release.yml` with the version, `tag: latest`, `dry-run: false`, and `expected-sha` + equal to the `main` release commit. The branch must not move between step 4 and here. +6. Promote to `preview` so the prerelease train does not restate a shipped stable. +7. Verify the publish from the workflow's own conclusion. Registry lag is not permission to + publish again. + +## Completion criteria + +1. `dev` has a Cross-platform CI success at the exact SHA chosen as the release candidate, and + every failing run between `2203277ad4` and that candidate is accounted for in + `010_dev_green.md` as either fixed (naming the fix commit) or a flake (naming the test and why + it is timing-sensitive). +2. Every open pull request has a verdict of LAND, NEEDS-WORK, HOLD or CLOSE recorded in + `020_pr_triage.md`, and each LAND that was merged names its head SHA and its green run id. +3. Every open issue has a verdict recorded in `030_issue_triage.md`. Issues closed as already + fixed name the `dev` commit that fixed them, and the closing comment says the fix ships in + 2.57.0. +4. 2.57.0 reaches `main` and `preview`, each with hosted CI success at its exact promotion head, + and `release.yml` reports a successful publish dispatched with `expected-sha` equal to the + `main` release commit. +5. No local full suite, typecheck, build or install was run anywhere in this unit. diff --git a/devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/010_dev_green.md b/devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/010_dev_green.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..012e08260d --- /dev/null +++ b/devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/010_dev_green.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +# wp2 — turn `dev` green + +## The question + +Five consecutive Cross-platform CI runs on `dev` failed between `2203277ad4` (run `35091966777`, +the last recorded success) and the tip `2b19983bfd`. A release cannot be cut from a tree whose tip +has no green run, and a repeated red usually means a regression. The question this phase answers is +whether it is one. + +## It is not. Every failure is a harness or runtime flake. + +| Run / SHA | Job | Failing test | Class | Evidence | +| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | +| `35118018849` / `2b19983bfd` | windows 1/6 (`104868879572`) | codex app-server restart routes ride the management gate | filesystem teardown | No auth assertion failed. The failure is an `EPERM` in teardown at `tests/server/server-management-auth.test.ts:223`, after the 15-second removal retry in `scripts/test-temp.ts:195`. | +| `35106190898` / `d2808c0619` | test 1/4 (`104827965367`) | MiniMax CLI wrapper returns 502 when the proxy address is unavailable | port reuse | Expected 502, got 404 at `tests/providers/minimax-clients.test.ts:455`. The fixture releases `deadPort` before opening another port-0 listener (lines 441-448); when the port is reused the bridge calls itself and `src/cli/minimax.ts:158` answers 404. | +| `35098735960` / `d210c46dab` | windows 6/6 (`104804049418`) | client commit guard (deny) | first-touch timeout | The child hit the fixed 30-second deadline at `tests/codex-integration/client-injection-guard.test.ts:133` while sibling modes passed in 1.3-17s. The same file already warms that cost outside the assertion budget at line 200. | +| `35098735960` / `d210c46dab` | windows 5/6 (`104804049465`) | none — Bun crashed entering the file | runtime | Bun 1.4.2 segfaulted at `0x10` before naming a test in `tests/codex-integration/codex-prompt-layers.test.ts`. | +| `35093667426` / `89bdf5fa4a` | windows 4/6 (`104785869855`) | WP13 A-reduced preserves an OFF Codex config/home | timing | `timed out waiting for runtime-port record; child exit=null`, the condition recorded at `tests/codex-integration/codex-composed-acceptance.test.ts:302`. | +| `35093667426` / `89bdf5fa4a` | windows 5/6 (`104785869870`) | none — Bun crashed entering the file | runtime | Same Bun 1.4.2 segfault. | +| `35093667426` / `89bdf5fa4a` | windows 6/6 (`104785869885`) | an exact search 429 never switches | global state | Expected 429, got a local 401 from process-wide `OPENCODEX_HOME` changing between the credential write and read; `tests/server/server-search.test.ts:323` now calls the handler directly. | +| `35087572377` / `dc9d1fabc8` | windows 5/6 (`104765972689`) | none — Bun crashed entering the file | runtime | Same segfault, repeated after the job's one retry. | + +The aggregate `ci` jobs (`104880106091`, `104832004698`, `104813414543`, `104793718177`, +`104774684969`) only propagated these leaves. + +## Two conclusions worth keeping + +The Windows 5/6 rows are a single class: a Bun 1.4.2 runtime crash entering +`codex-prompt-layers.test.ts`. It entered `dev` at `02bc10e8af` and the tip `2b19983bfd` is the +commit that removes it by pinning Bun back to 1.4.0 (`package.json:79`, PR #4821). So the tip is +the fix for the largest failure class, not another instance of it. + +Run `35091966777` is not Windows counterevidence for the earlier reds: its Windows matrix job +`104780185496` was skipped. + +## Candidate + +`2b19983bfd` is the release candidate, proven by a green Cross-platform CI rerun at that exact SHA +(recorded in `040_release.md`). No product-code change was needed to get there. + +## Deferred harness debt + +Two fixes would lower the flake rate and are not release blockers, because neither touches product +code and neither is what made the tip red: + +- `tests/providers/minimax-clients.test.ts` should start the bridge while the reservation still + owns `deadPort` and stop the reservation afterwards, instead of releasing the port first. +- `tests/server/server-management-auth.test.ts` should track the `icacls` child that hardens the + config directory and await it through teardown, so the removal at line 223 is not racing an open + handle. diff --git a/devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/020_pr_triage.md b/devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/020_pr_triage.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..688f68c803 --- /dev/null +++ b/devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/020_pr_triage.md @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +# wp3 — pull-request triage + +Every open pull request was inspected at its exact head against `dev` `2b19983bfd`. The headline +result decides the release: **nothing is merge-ready, so 2.57.0 ships the 184 commits already on +`dev` and nothing else.** + +## Why nothing lands + +Two reasons account for almost every verdict. + +The first is missing evidence. A pull request head here typically carries only the four policy +checks — `enforce-target`, `resolve-pr`, `label`, `hygiene` — and no product test suite. GitHub +reports `MERGEABLE / BLOCKED`, which reads like a branch-protection detail but means the required +test check never ran at that head. Merging on that basis would put an untested tree into a release +candidate. + +The second is unresolved review. Several of the ready pull requests carry Codex or CodeRabbit +findings that are correct and open. + +## Ready (non-draft) pull requests + +| PR | Head | Verdict | The one blocking thing | +| --- | --- | --- | --- | +| #4824 | `4c984dbb7c` | NEEDS-WORK | No product CI at head. | +| #4823 | `867c8868f9` | HOLD | A new Opper provider preset is a credential-destination change; the primary-source evidence review required by `MAINTAINERS.md` is not complete. | +| #4816 | `47e8fe61ff` | HOLD | Process-global model-only window cache crosses account and request-mode boundaries (`src/adapters/cursor/discovery.ts:37`). CI green at `35097464862`. | +| #4815 | `407bf3ce56` | HOLD | Textual and structural frames can execute one tool call twice (`src/adapters/cursor/protobuf-events.ts:1273`). Seven open findings. CI green at `35096642245`. | +| #4805 | `91d74200a2` | HOLD | Credential-export change awaiting explicit security review; five open findings. | +| #4804 | `83668e1c4f` | NEEDS-WORK | Fresh-connection policy must be recomputed after dispatch overrides finalize the URL (`src/server/responses/fetch-helpers.ts:114`). | +| #4803 | `543f1c60a4` | HOLD | A non-terminal text EOF becomes HTTP 200, which can hide genuine truncation (`src/server/chat-native-sse.ts:367`). | +| #4802 | `14c478cda2` | NEEDS-WORK | No product CI at head. | +| #4800 | `af985d3d13` | NEEDS-WORK | 13 commits behind `dev`, past the 10-commit readiness window; needs a refresh and new exact-head CI. | +| #4782 | `76d7452afb` | HOLD | Experimental native steering, 40 files, no test CI and no live smoke. | +| #4781 | `110656662f` | HOLD | Profile-auth UI hangs on refresh (`gui/src/native-main-profile-session.ts:124`). | +| #4753 | `f07c61b3a3` | NEEDS-WORK | Duplicated admission route registry (`src/server/inbound-body-admission.ts:27`). | +| #4751 | `eb6184e98d` | NEEDS-WORK | 504 precedence and event-loop yield need a correctness pass. | +| #4728 | `82b652349d` | HOLD | 28k added lines across four control planes, with an unresolved vault salt finding (`src/credentials/vault.ts:27`). Not release-compatible breadth. | +| #4183, #3983, #3952 | — | HOLD | Each is 950-1150 commits behind `dev` and conflicting. Reconstruction, not review. | + +## Drafts + +`#4560` is the notable one: it is no longer conflicting, sits zero commits behind `dev`, and is a +44-file, 5k-line GUI redesign with no test CI at its head. It is held for the same evidence reason +as the rest, not because of its content. + +`#4817` claims issue #4808 and is the only draft whose logic was disputed on review: as written it +replays ambiguous errors, while `src/server/responses/combo-stream-preflight.ts:160-162` documents +the fail-closed boundary the issue depends on. It needs affirmative retry evidence before it lands. + +`#4783` is titled `[WRONG BRANCH]` and targets `main`, 184 commits behind. Its work is genuinely +unique — `src/web-search/backends.ts:82-89` on `dev` ends at Exa and exports no API-key search +executor — so it should be reopened against `dev` rather than closed as superseded. + +`#4020` is structurally conflicted: a virtual merge from base `94063d0798` conflicts in 11 files +including `src/codex/auth-api.ts`, `src/codex/routing.ts` and `src/config.ts`. + +## Stale contributor pull requests + +Thirteen contributor drafts are both conflicting and five or more days without a substantive +commit: #2280, #2351, #2355, #2562, #3025, #3080, #3282, #3283, #3463, #3738, #4022, #4056, #4225. +#2562's pool and failover behaviour is already generalized on `dev` +(`src/oauth/generic-account-failover.ts:300`), and #3283 still imports a developer-local 2.51.0 +tree (`tests/antigravity-balance.test.ts:2`). + +These are other people's work, so the disposition is an owner decision rather than a triage +outcome, and nothing was closed on triage authority alone. diff --git a/devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/030_issue_triage.md b/devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/030_issue_triage.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c403c458ae --- /dev/null +++ b/devlog/_plan/260917_2570_release_train/030_issue_triage.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +# wp4 — issue triage + +Every open issue touched in the last week was checked against `dev` `2b19983bfd` in source. The +headline result is the mirror image of the pull-request pass: **almost nothing in the open issue +list is already fixed**, so 2.57.0 does not silently close the backlog. + +## Closed + +| Issue | Why | +| --- | --- | +| #4730 | Fixed on `dev` and unreleased. `src/codex/catalog/aggregation.ts:233-244` now skips an already-emitted slug, consumed at `src/codex/catalog/retained-sync.ts:523`. Landed as `fab7e427c7` (#4799), CI green at `35084581608`. Ships in 2.57.0. | +| #4688 | Working as intended. `deepseek-v4-flash` is a deliberately retained compatibility alias (`src/providers/registry/entries-core.ts:1000-1013`) and `src/codex/catalog/routed-gather.ts:853-870` implements that retention. The roster/inventory mismatch is the policy showing through. The real gap — nothing marks a row as an alias — belongs in its own enhancement. | + +## Linked to the pull request that addresses them + +#4808 to #4817, #4787 to #4788, #4644 to #4649, #4524 and #4521 to #4567. Each comment records +what is still present on `dev` and where, so the link is checkable rather than asserted. + +## Relabelled + +#4810 and #4761 moved from `bug` to `enhancement`: both describe behaviour the code performs +deliberately (`src/codex/inject/config-toml.ts:84-96` writes the hardcoded provider display name; +`src/cli/system-command.ts:132-140` restarts the whole shell by design). #4579 gained +`needs-design`, #4443 gained `chore`. + +## Open and confirmed, no pull request + +#4822 (Z.AI discovery has no `modelDiscovery` override, `src/providers/registry/entries-extended.ts:414-435`), +#4820 (successful Cursor discovery is still filtered by the static seed, `src/adapters/cursor/discovery.ts:240-252`), +#4812, #4811, #4790, #4779, #4780, #4680, #4662, #4646, #4590, #4587. Each carries a file and line +in the triage record above rather than a restatement of the report. + +## Partially fixed, deliberately left open + +#4721, #4582 and #4546 each have a landed piece and a named remainder. For #4546 the remainder is +specific: the workflow cap still derives only from `x-codex-parent-thread-id` +(`src/server/responses/request-send-budget.ts:30-37`) while each child still gets an independent +affinity key (`src/codex/auth-context.ts:99-123`), which is what #4780 tracks. From 183119329457a0072a6bb2c4d6f26d7947d23b0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JUN Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 02:55:29 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 113/113] test(budget): give a Windows child spawn the cold-start headroom it measures (#4830) The first proxy child in native-profile-startup.test.ts published its port at 50.7s against a 45s SPAWN_BUDGET_MS while the next spawn in the same file was ready in 1.8s. Gate the budget to 90s on win32 only, the same way BULK_DURABLE_IO_BUDGET_MS already is. Co-authored-by: lidge-jun --- tests/helpers/test-budget.ts | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/helpers/test-budget.ts b/tests/helpers/test-budget.ts index 5b827c7dc3..d319f71d11 100644 --- a/tests/helpers/test-budget.ts +++ b/tests/helpers/test-budget.ts @@ -31,7 +31,23 @@ */ /** Real child process: PowerShell, a CLI smoke test, an external binary. */ -export const SPAWN_BUDGET_MS = 45_000; +export const SPAWN_BUDGET_MS = spawnBudgetMs(); + +/** + * Windows needs a higher ceiling for the same reason `BULK_DURABLE_IO_BUDGET_MS` does: the leg + * runs four Bun pools on one runner, and the first child spawned in a file pays a cold start the + * later ones do not. Run 35118018849 (job 104895935554) measured the first proxy child in + * `tests/codex-integration/native-profile-startup.test.ts` publishing its port at + * elapsedMs=50728 against this 45s budget, while the very next spawn in the same file was ready + * in 1759ms and every other case passed. The wait is intrinsic — the spawned proxy IS the + * assertion — so 45s was measuring runner contention rather than a hang. + * + * 90s stays a bound rather than an absence of one, and it is gated on Windows so no other lane + * loses the shorter signal. + */ +function spawnBudgetMs(): number { + return process.platform === "win32" ? 90_000 : 45_000; +} /** Binds a real server or opens a real socket, including restart-and-reconnect flows. */ export const SERVER_BUDGET_MS = 30_000;