diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index ee81dac..0f0de18 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -281,11 +281,12 @@ against `main` again on 2026-08-07, after #18: five are zero-commit snapshots, `
 test this repo has in English *plus* the logging assertions), and `jcllobet`'s reader work went in
 with #18. Only `jefflee1990710` still holds anything, and it is one coherent area rather than a list:
 **account and publication settings** — `PUT /api/v1/publication` (`name`, `hero_text`, `copyright`,
-`email_from_name`, `logo_url`), `PUT substack.com/api/v1/user/profile` (`name`, `bio`, `photo_url`),
-and the `POST substack.com/api/v1/image` upload both depend on, since per the fork an external url is
-stored but does not render. That upload is also the only route to an image *inside* a post, which
-nothing here can do. All three are unverified writes from the fork that invented `share_automatically`,
-so none of it ships without a live check first; they are open by choice, not by oversight.
+`email_from_name`, `logo_url`) and `PUT substack.com/api/v1/user/profile` (`name`, `bio`, `photo_url`).
+Per the fork these store an external `logo_url`/`photo_url` that does not render, so they likely need a
+Substack-hosted asset first — which `upload_image` now produces (`POST /api/v1/image`, verified and
+shipped; see the image contract below). Both settings writes are still unverified writes from the fork
+that invented `share_automatically`, so neither ships without a live check first; they are open by
+choice, not by oversight.
 
 **Writes log their intent at `info` *before* the request**, not only their outcome —
 `publish_draft.publishing`, `comment_on_post.posting`, `restack_item.restacking`, with the full text
@@ -328,12 +329,31 @@ nothing and closed the last route that accepted a body unchecked. Six measured f
   `plaintext` the plain-text value, and an unrecognised name renders as Plain Text with no error, so
   omitting the attr beats guessing.
 
-**Images can be referenced but not uploaded**, which is the contract's sharpest limit: `captionedImage`
-is in 60 of 60 sampled posts and `image2.src` must already point at a Substack-hosted asset.
-`POST /api/v1/image` was tried on the publication host as JSON, as form-urlencoded and as multipart —
-**all three hang**, the network log showing the request pending past a minute with no response, and the
-cross-origin `substack.com` attempt never settled either. So neither `python-substack`'s signature nor
-the fork's is confirmed. **Do not implement an upload from either.**
+**Images can be uploaded after all, and `upload_image` is how** — this once read "cannot be uploaded,
+`POST /api/v1/image` hangs in all three encodings, do not implement." That record was wrong. Re-measured
+live 2026-08-08 on `implementing.substack.com` from the authenticated dashboard: the endpoint answers
+**200 in ~300ms**. The three earlier attempts (JSON, form-urlencoded, multipart) failed because they sent
+the wrong *thing*, not for a header detail or a Cloudflare wall — the body is JSON `{image:
+"data:<mime>;base64,…"}`, a **data URI**, built in the editor from `canvas.toDataURL()`. The response is
+`{id, url, contentType, bytes, imageWidth, imageHeight}`, `url` on `substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com`
+— the host every `image2.src` uses — and it renders through Substack's CDN (proven end to end on a real
+draft: upload → `captionedImage` → PUT → the editor shows a `substackcdn.com/image/fetch/…` render).
+Two measured facts shape the tool:
+- **Substack server-fetches only its own S3 bucket.** An external URL passed as `image` answers
+  `400 "Failed to fetch image"`, so `upload_image` downloads the URL itself and re-encodes it. That
+  download is the one place this server fetches a caller-chosen host, so it is guarded: `http(s)` only,
+  an SSRF block on private/loopback/link-local addresses *after* DNS resolution and re-checked on every
+  redirect hop, an `image/*` content-type check (HEIC refused early, as the dashboard does), and a 10 MB
+  cap that is **ours, not Substack's** — the bundle's `MAX_FILE_SIZE` could not be read from the minified
+  source.
+- **The data URI is elided in the logger, not just kept out of the tool's own lines.** `SubstackApi` logs
+  every request body at info, so a real upload would put hundreds of KB of base64 on one line;
+  `src/logger.js` truncates a `data:…;base64,` value to its prefix and omitted length. A post body, being
+  prose, is still logged in full — the two are different in kind.
+
+**Still unverified:** every live check used the browser session cookie, not `SUBSTACK_SESSION_TOKEN` in a
+header. Equivalent in principle, unconfirmed through `SubstackApi` — the first thing to check if the tool
+misbehaves against the real API.
 
 **`set_post_body` returns a node tally, not `'OK'`**, because validation cannot report what was never
 sent: a document with no paywall is exactly as valid as one with a paywall. This was measured — a model
@@ -487,10 +507,11 @@ literals (`{a: 1}`, not `{ a: 1 }`).
   SDK, and `registerTool` throws `inputSchema must be a Zod schema or raw shape` for anything
   else — the SDK's validation *is* zod. npm auto-installs it even if it leaves `package.json`,
   so removing the direct dependency buys nothing and unpins the version.
-- **`ZodError` details live on `.issues`, not `.errors`** (zod 4 renamed it). The only reader in
-  `src/` is the `create_draft_post.args.invalid` log — the SDK formats the message it sends to
-  the client — and `.errors` silently yields `undefined` rather than failing, so a handler that
-  inspects them logs nothing and reports no error.
+- **`ZodError` details live on `.issues`, not `.errors`** (zod 4 renamed it). The readers in
+  `src/` are the `*.args.invalid` logs (`create_draft_post`, `upload_image`, and the other tools
+  that parse in a try/catch) — the SDK formats the message it sends to the client — and `.errors`
+  silently yields `undefined` rather than failing, so a handler that inspects them logs nothing and
+  reports no error.
 
 ## Verifying the server actually works
 
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 07363c4..3bb0b33 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -141,13 +141,34 @@ asked for a paywall can confirm there is one. Validation cannot report a node th
 
 Three things worth knowing:
 - **An image must already be hosted by Substack.** `image2.src` pointing at an external URL is
-  stored but does not render, and this server cannot upload one.
+  stored but does not render. Use `upload_image` to re-host one and get a `src` that works.
 - **A document may contain at most one `paywall`.** Substack accepts two and renders both, leaving
   it undefined which one cuts the post, so this tool refuses the second.
 - **`ordered_list` numbers from `attrs.order`, not `attrs.start`.** A list given only `start`
   renders from 1 with no error.
 </details>
 
+<details>
+<summary><strong>upload_image</strong> - Re-host an external image on Substack</summary>
+
+Substack's editor uploads images as base64 data URIs to `POST /api/v1/image`, which answers with a
+Substack-hosted URL. `image2.src` in `set_post_body` only renders such a URL, so this tool is the
+bridge: give it an http(s) image URL, it downloads the image, re-encodes it, uploads it, and returns
+the hosted URL. Substack itself only re-fetches URLs already in its own storage, so the download
+happens here rather than being handed off.
+
+**Inputs**:
+- `url` (string): the http(s) URL of an image to upload
+- `post_id` (number, optional): the post the image belongs to; its effect is unconfirmed
+
+**Returns**: `{id, url, content_type, bytes, width, height}` — put `url` into an `image2.src` when
+calling `set_post_body`.
+
+The download is guarded: only `http`/`https`, private and loopback hosts are refused after DNS
+resolution (redirects are re-checked at every hop), the content type must be an image, HEIC is
+rejected with a note to convert it, and the image may not exceed 10 MB.
+</details>
+
 <details>
 <summary><strong>update_draft</strong> - Change a draft's title, subtitle or audience</summary>
 
diff --git a/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-08-08-image-upload.md b/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-08-08-image-upload.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..07f65ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-08-08-image-upload.md
@@ -0,0 +1,702 @@
+# upload_image Implementation Plan
+
+> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
+
+**Goal:** Add an `upload_image` MCP tool that downloads an external image URL, re-encodes it as a data URI, and uploads it to Substack via `POST /api/v1/image`, returning a Substack-hosted URL usable in `image2.src`.
+
+**Architecture:** One new tool file `src/tools/upload_image.js` (zod schema + handler) plus one `SubstackApi.uploadImage()` method and one registry entry in `src/server.js`. The handler fetches the caller's URL through an injectable `fetchImpl`, guards it (scheme allow-list, DNS-resolved SSRF block via an injectable `lookup`, size cap, `image/*`/anti-HEIC content-type check), base64-encodes the bytes into a `data:` URI, and hands that to `SubstackApi.uploadImage`. All outbound HTTP is mocked with MSW; DNS is never touched in tests because `lookup` is injected.
+
+**Tech Stack:** Node ≥22 (dev on 24), ESM, zod 4, `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` `McpServer.registerTool`, `node:dns`/`node:net`, MSW, `node --test`.
+
+**Reference spec:** `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-08-image-upload-design.md`
+
+---
+
+## File structure
+
+- **Create** `src/tools/upload_image.js` — schema, SSRF/validation helpers, handler. Exports `uploadImageSchema`, `uploadImageHandler`, `isPrivateAddress`, `MAX_IMAGE_BYTES`.
+- **Create** `src/tools/upload_image.spec.js` — colocated tests.
+- **Modify** `src/api/substack/SubstackApi.js` — add `uploadImage({image, post_id})`.
+- **Modify** `src/api/substack/SubstackApi.spec.js` — test the new method.
+- **Modify** `test/helpers/msw-server.js` — add `IMAGE_URL`, `IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE`, `imageUploadHandler`, register and export it.
+- **Modify** `src/server.js` — import and register `upload_image`.
+- **Modify** `CLAUDE.md`, `README.md` — correct the "cannot upload" record.
+
+Test-output note (from `CLAUDE.md`): on Node 24 the reporter tallies `ℹ pass` and marks failures `✖`; on the Node 22 floor it is TAP (`# pass`, `not ok`). Grep both when scripting: `grep -E '^(#|ℹ) (tests|pass|fail)'` and `grep -E '^(not ok|✖)'`.
+
+---
+
+## Task 1: `SubstackApi.uploadImage()`
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `src/api/substack/SubstackApi.js` (add method next to `postDraft`, around line 155)
+- Modify: `test/helpers/msw-server.js` (add `IMAGE_URL`, `IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE`, `imageUploadHandler`)
+- Test: `src/api/substack/SubstackApi.spec.js`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Add the MSW image-upload handler and fixtures**
+
+In `test/helpers/msw-server.js`, add the URL constant next to the other `API`-based constants (after `DRAFTS_URL`, ~line 12):
+
+```js
+export const IMAGE_URL = `${API}/image`;
+```
+
+Add a response fixture near the other `*_RESPONSE` fixtures (e.g. after `DRAFT_RESPONSE`, ~line 58). These are the exact keys the live endpoint returned on 2026-08-08:
+
+```js
+export const IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE = {
+  id: 'test-image-id',
+  url: 'https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/test-image.jpg',
+  contentType: 'image/jpeg',
+  bytes: 82768,
+  imageWidth: 1200,
+  imageHeight: 630,
+};
+```
+
+Add the handler builder next to `draftsHandler` (~line 563):
+
+```js
+  function imageUploadHandler(responder) {
+    return http.post(IMAGE_URL, async ({request}) => {
+      await record(request);
+      return responder();
+    });
+  }
+```
+
+Register it in the `setupServer(...)` list (next to `draftsHandler(...)`, ~line 791):
+
+```js
+    imageUploadHandler(() => HttpResponse.json(IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE, {status: 200})),
+```
+
+Expose it in the returned object (next to `draftsHandler,`, ~line 843):
+
+```js
+    imageUploadHandler,
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Write the failing test**
+
+In `src/api/substack/SubstackApi.spec.js`, add the import for `IMAGE_URL` and `IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE` to the existing `msw-server.js` import block, then add:
+
+```js
+describe('SubstackApi — uploadImage', () => {
+  test('POSTs the data URI as JSON and returns the parsed body', async () => {
+    const api = createApi();
+    let seen;
+    msw.server.use(
+      msw.imageUploadHandler(async () => HttpResponse.json(IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE, {status: 200}))
+    );
+
+    const result = await api.uploadImage({image: ''});
+
+    seen = msw.requests.find((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image'));
+    assert.equal(seen.method, 'POST');
+    assert.equal(seen.headers['content-type'], 'application/json');
+    assert.deepEqual(seen.body, {image: ''});
+    assert.equal(result.url, IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.url);
+    assert.equal(result.bytes, 82768);
+  });
+
+  test('includes postId only when post_id is given', async () => {
+    const api = createApi();
+    await api.uploadImage({image: '', post_id: 42});
+    const seen = msw.requests.filter((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image')).pop();
+    assert.deepEqual(seen.body, {image: '', postId: 42});
+  });
+
+  test('omits postId when post_id is absent', async () => {
+    const api = createApi();
+    await api.uploadImage({image: ''});
+    const seen = msw.requests.filter((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image')).pop();
+    assert.deepEqual(Object.keys(seen.body), ['image']);
+  });
+});
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Run the test to verify it fails**
+
+Run: `npm test -- 2>&1 | grep -iE 'uploadImage|not ok|✖|TypeError'`
+Expected: failures — `api.uploadImage is not a function`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Implement the method**
+
+In `src/api/substack/SubstackApi.js`, add after `postDraft` (~line 157):
+
+```js
+  /**
+   * Uploads an image. The body is a data URI under `image`, not a file or a URL — the editor builds
+   * it from `canvas.toDataURL()`. Verified live 2026-08-08: 200 with {id, url, contentType, bytes,
+   * imageWidth, imageHeight}. `post_id` maps to the API's `postId`; an absent one must not be sent as
+   * null (same partial-body rule as everywhere else here).
+   */
+  async uploadImage({image, post_id = null}) {
+    return this.request({
+      method: 'POST',
+      path: '/image',
+      body: post_id === null ? {image} : {image, postId: post_id},
+      referer: '/publish/post',
+    });
+  }
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Run the test to verify it passes**
+
+Run: `npm test -- 2>&1 | grep -iE 'uploadImage'`
+Expected: the three `uploadImage` tests pass (`ℹ`/`ok`), no `not ok`/`✖`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add src/api/substack/SubstackApi.js src/api/substack/SubstackApi.spec.js test/helpers/msw-server.js
+git commit -m "Add SubstackApi.uploadImage: JSON data-URI POST to /api/v1/image"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 2: `upload_image` schema and happy path
+
+**Files:**
+- Create: `src/tools/upload_image.js`
+- Test: `src/tools/upload_image.spec.js`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing test**
+
+Create `src/tools/upload_image.spec.js`:
+
+```js
+import {test, describe, before, after, afterEach} from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import {http, HttpResponse} from 'msw';
+import {uploadImageHandler, uploadImageSchema, MAX_IMAGE_BYTES, isPrivateAddress} from './upload_image.js';
+import {createMswServer, IMAGE_URL, IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE} from '../../test/helpers/msw-server.js';
+import {setTestEnv} from '../../test/helpers/env.js';
+import {captureLogs} from '../../test/helpers/capture-logs.js';
+
+const msw = createMswServer();
+let restoreEnv;
+
+before(() => {
+  restoreEnv = setTestEnv();
+  msw.start();
+});
+afterEach(() => msw.reset());
+after(() => {
+  msw.stop();
+  restoreEnv();
+});
+
+// A public address for the source host, so the SSRF guard passes without touching real DNS.
+const publicLookup = async () => [{address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4}];
+
+// A source image served by MSW. `bytes`/`type` let each test shape size and content-type.
+const SOURCE = 'https://images.example.com/photo.jpg';
+function sourceHandler({body = Buffer.from([0xff, 0xd8, 0xff, 0xd9]), type = 'image/jpeg'} = {}) {
+  return http.get(SOURCE, () => new HttpResponse(body, {status: 200, headers: {'Content-Type': type}}));
+}
+
+const run = (args, deps = {}) =>
+  uploadImageHandler(args, {lookup: publicLookup, ...deps});
+
+describe('uploadImageHandler — happy path', () => {
+  test('downloads, encodes as a data URI, uploads, returns the mapped fields', async () => {
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler());
+    const result = await run({url: SOURCE});
+
+    const upload = msw.requests.find((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image'));
+    assert.match(upload.body.image, /^data:image\/jpeg;base64,/);
+    assert.equal(upload.body.postId, undefined);
+
+    assert.deepEqual(result, {
+      id: IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.id,
+      url: IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.url,
+      content_type: IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.contentType,
+      bytes: IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.bytes,
+      width: IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.imageWidth,
+      height: IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.imageHeight,
+    });
+  });
+
+  test('forwards post_id as postId to the upload', async () => {
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler());
+    await run({url: SOURCE, post_id: 7});
+    const upload = msw.requests.find((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image'));
+    assert.equal(upload.body.postId, 7);
+  });
+});
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run the test to verify it fails**
+
+Run: `npm test -- 2>&1 | grep -iE 'upload_image|Cannot find|not ok|✖'`
+Expected: failure — module `./upload_image.js` not found.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Implement the minimal tool**
+
+Create `src/tools/upload_image.js`:
+
+```js
+import {z} from "zod";
+import dns from "node:dns";
+import SubstackApi from "../api/substack/SubstackApi.js";
+import {logger} from "../logger.js";
+
+// Our own memory guard, NOT Substack's limit (its MAX_FILE_SIZE could not be read from the minified
+// bundle). The downloaded buffer plus its ~1.37x base64 string sit in RAM; 10 MB caps that.
+export const MAX_IMAGE_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+const HEIC_TYPES = new Set(['image/heic', 'image/heif']);
+
+// strictObject: an unknown key is reported, never stripped — the only repair signal an LLM gets.
+export const uploadImageSchema = z.strictObject({
+  url: z
+    .string()
+    .url()
+    .describe(
+      "The http(s) URL of an image to upload. The server downloads it and re-hosts it on Substack. " +
+        "Private, loopback and link-local hosts are refused. Max 10 MB. HEIC is not accepted."
+    ),
+  post_id: z
+    .number()
+    .optional()
+    .describe("Optional id of the post the image belongs to. Its effect is unconfirmed."),
+});
+
+// Resolve every address a host maps to. Injected in tests so DNS is never touched.
+const defaultLookup = (hostname) => dns.promises.lookup(hostname, {all: true});
+
+// Loopback / private / link-local / unique-local / unspecified, plus IPv4-mapped IPv6.
+export function isPrivateAddress(address, family) {
+  if (family === 4) {
+    const p = address.split('.').map(Number);
+    if (p[0] === 10) return true;
+    if (p[0] === 127) return true;
+    if (p[0] === 0) return true;
+    if (p[0] === 169 && p[1] === 254) return true; // link-local incl. 169.254.169.254
+    if (p[0] === 172 && p[1] >= 16 && p[1] <= 31) return true;
+    if (p[0] === 192 && p[1] === 168) return true;
+    if (p[0] === 100 && p[1] >= 64 && p[1] <= 127) return true; // CGNAT
+    return false;
+  }
+  const a = address.toLowerCase();
+  if (a === '::1' || a === '::') return true;
+  if (a.startsWith('fe8') || a.startsWith('fe9') || a.startsWith('fea') || a.startsWith('feb')) return true; // fe80::/10
+  if (a.startsWith('fc') || a.startsWith('fd')) return true; // fc00::/7 unique-local
+  const mapped = a.match(/^::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/); // IPv4-mapped
+  if (mapped) return isPrivateAddress(mapped[1], 4);
+  return false;
+}
+
+async function assertPublicUrl(rawUrl, lookup) {
+  let url;
+  try {
+    url = new URL(rawUrl);
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error(`upload_image: not a valid URL: ${rawUrl}`);
+  }
+  if (url.protocol !== 'http:' && url.protocol !== 'https:') {
+    throw new Error(`upload_image: only http and https URLs are allowed, got ${url.protocol}`);
+  }
+  const addresses = await lookup(url.hostname);
+  for (const {address, family} of addresses) {
+    if (isPrivateAddress(address, family)) {
+      throw new Error(`upload_image: refusing to fetch a private/loopback address (${address})`);
+    }
+  }
+  return url;
+}
+
+export const uploadImageHandler = async (args, {lookup = defaultLookup, fetchImpl = fetch} = {}) => {
+  const {url, post_id} = uploadImageSchema.parse(args);
+
+  await assertPublicUrl(url, lookup);
+
+  logger.info('upload_image.fetching', {url, post_id: post_id ?? null});
+  const response = await fetchImpl(url);
+  if (!response.ok) {
+    throw new Error(`upload_image: source responded ${response.status} ${response.statusText}`);
+  }
+
+  const contentType = (response.headers.get('content-type') || '').split(';')[0].trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (!contentType.startsWith('image/')) {
+    throw new Error(`upload_image: source is not an image (content-type: ${contentType || 'none'})`);
+  }
+  if (HEIC_TYPES.has(contentType)) {
+    throw new Error('upload_image: HEIC is not accepted by Substack. Convert to JPG or PNG first.');
+  }
+
+  const buffer = Buffer.from(await response.arrayBuffer());
+  if (buffer.byteLength > MAX_IMAGE_BYTES) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `upload_image: image is ${buffer.byteLength} bytes, over the ${MAX_IMAGE_BYTES}-byte limit.`
+    );
+  }
+
+  const image = `data:${contentType};base64,${buffer.toString('base64')}`;
+  // The data URI is deliberately NOT logged: hundreds of KB of base64 would bury the session. This
+  // is the one exception to "post content is not truncated".
+  logger.info('upload_image.uploading', {content_type: contentType, bytes: buffer.byteLength, post_id: post_id ?? null});
+
+  const substack_api = new SubstackApi({
+    publication_url: process.env.SUBSTACK_PUBLICATION_URL,
+    auth_token: process.env.SUBSTACK_SESSION_TOKEN,
+  });
+  const uploaded = await substack_api.uploadImage({image, post_id: post_id ?? null});
+
+  logger.info('upload_image.done', {url: uploaded.url, bytes: uploaded.bytes});
+
+  return {
+    id: uploaded.id,
+    url: uploaded.url,
+    content_type: uploaded.contentType,
+    bytes: uploaded.bytes,
+    width: uploaded.imageWidth,
+    height: uploaded.imageHeight,
+  };
+};
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Run the test to verify it passes**
+
+Run: `npm test -- 2>&1 | grep -iE 'happy path|not ok|✖'`
+Expected: both happy-path tests pass, no `not ok`/`✖`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add src/tools/upload_image.js src/tools/upload_image.spec.js
+git commit -m "Add upload_image tool: fetch, encode as data URI, upload"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 3: content-type and HEIC validation
+
+**Files:**
+- Test: `src/tools/upload_image.spec.js`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing test**
+
+Append to `src/tools/upload_image.spec.js`:
+
+```js
+describe('uploadImageHandler — content validation', () => {
+  test('rejects a non-image source before uploading', async () => {
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler({body: Buffer.from('<html>'), type: 'text/html'}));
+    await assert.rejects(run({url: SOURCE}), /not an image/);
+    assert.equal(msw.requests.find((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image')), undefined);
+  });
+
+  test('rejects HEIC with a convert message', async () => {
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler({type: 'image/heic'}));
+    await assert.rejects(run({url: SOURCE}), /HEIC is not accepted/);
+    assert.equal(msw.requests.find((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image')), undefined);
+  });
+});
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run to verify it passes (behavior already implemented in Task 2)**
+
+Run: `npm test -- 2>&1 | grep -iE 'content validation|not ok|✖'`
+Expected: PASS. This task exists to lock the behavior with tests. To confirm the tests are real, temporarily change `startsWith('image/')` to `startsWith('')` in `upload_image.js`, run — the non-image test must fail — then restore. Grep the file for `startsWith('image/')` to confirm the revert landed before trusting the green run.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add src/tools/upload_image.spec.js
+git commit -m "Test upload_image content-type and HEIC rejection"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 4: scheme and SSRF guards
+
+**Files:**
+- Test: `src/tools/upload_image.spec.js`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing test**
+
+Append to `src/tools/upload_image.spec.js`:
+
+```js
+describe('isPrivateAddress', () => {
+  test('flags loopback, private, link-local, unique-local; allows public', () => {
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('127.0.0.1', 4), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('10.1.2.3', 4), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('172.16.0.1', 4), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('192.168.1.1', 4), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('169.254.169.254', 4), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('93.184.216.34', 4), false);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('::1', 6), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('fe80::1', 6), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('fd00::1', 6), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('::ffff:127.0.0.1', 6), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946', 6), false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('uploadImageHandler — SSRF and scheme guards', () => {
+  test('rejects a host that resolves to a private address, without fetching', async () => {
+    let fetched = false;
+    const fetchImpl = async () => { fetched = true; return new HttpResponse(); };
+    const privateLookup = async () => [{address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4}];
+    await assert.rejects(
+      uploadImageHandler({url: 'http://metadata.internal/'}, {lookup: privateLookup, fetchImpl}),
+      /private\/loopback/
+    );
+    assert.equal(fetched, false);
+  });
+
+  test('rejects a non-http(s) scheme up front', async () => {
+    await assert.rejects(run({url: 'ftp://example.com/x.png'}), /only http and https/);
+  });
+});
+```
+
+Note: `z.string().url()` accepts `ftp://…`, so the scheme check in `assertPublicUrl` is what rejects it — this test proves that guard, not the schema.
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run to verify it passes (behavior implemented in Task 2)**
+
+Run: `npm test -- 2>&1 | grep -iE 'SSRF|isPrivateAddress|not ok|✖'`
+Expected: PASS. To confirm the SSRF test is real, temporarily make `isPrivateAddress` always return `false`, run — the "resolves to a private address" test must fail — then restore and grep to confirm.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add src/tools/upload_image.spec.js
+git commit -m "Test upload_image scheme allow-list and DNS-resolved SSRF guard"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 5: size cap
+
+**Files:**
+- Test: `src/tools/upload_image.spec.js`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing test**
+
+Append to `src/tools/upload_image.spec.js`:
+
+```js
+describe('uploadImageHandler — size cap', () => {
+  test('rejects an image over MAX_IMAGE_BYTES before uploading', async () => {
+    const big = Buffer.alloc(MAX_IMAGE_BYTES + 1, 0xff);
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler({body: big, type: 'image/png'}));
+    await assert.rejects(run({url: SOURCE}), /over the .* limit/);
+    assert.equal(msw.requests.find((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image')), undefined);
+  });
+
+  test('accepts an image exactly at the limit', async () => {
+    const atLimit = Buffer.alloc(MAX_IMAGE_BYTES, 0xff);
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler({body: atLimit, type: 'image/png'}));
+    const result = await run({url: SOURCE});
+    assert.equal(result.url, IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.url);
+  });
+});
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run to verify it passes (behavior implemented in Task 2)**
+
+Run: `npm test -- 2>&1 | grep -iE 'size cap|not ok|✖'`
+Expected: PASS. To confirm the cap test is real, temporarily change `> MAX_IMAGE_BYTES` to `> MAX_IMAGE_BYTES * 1000`, run — the oversize test must fail — then restore and grep to confirm.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add src/tools/upload_image.spec.js
+git commit -m "Test upload_image size cap at MAX_IMAGE_BYTES"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 6: register the tool in the server
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `src/server.js`
+- Test: `src/server.spec.js`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing test**
+
+In `src/server.spec.js`, find where the harness lists tools (search for `tools/list` or `listTools`). Add:
+
+```js
+test('upload_image is registered and advertises url + post_id', async () => {
+  const client = await connectMcpClient();
+  const {tools} = await client.listTools();
+  const tool = tools.find((t) => t.name === 'upload_image');
+  assert.ok(tool, 'upload_image should be registered');
+  assert.deepEqual(Object.keys(tool.inputSchema.properties).sort(), ['post_id', 'url']);
+  assert.equal(tool.inputSchema.additionalProperties, false);
+});
+```
+
+If `connectMcpClient`/`listTools` is not the local idiom, mirror the nearest existing tools/list test in the file.
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run to verify it fails**
+
+Run: `npm test -- 2>&1 | grep -iE 'upload_image is registered|not ok|✖'`
+Expected: FAIL — `upload_image should be registered`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Register the tool**
+
+In `src/server.js`, add the import next to the other tool imports:
+
+```js
+import {uploadImageSchema, uploadImageHandler} from "./tools/upload_image.js";
+```
+
+Add the registry entry inside the `tools` object (e.g. after `set_post_body`):
+
+```js
+  upload_image: {
+    description:
+      "Upload an image to your Substack publication from an http(s) URL. The server downloads the " +
+      "image and re-hosts it on Substack; the returned url is what goes into image2.src in " +
+      "set_post_body. Private/loopback hosts are refused, HEIC is not accepted, max 10 MB.",
+    schema: uploadImageSchema,
+    handler: uploadImageHandler,
+  },
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Run to verify it passes**
+
+Run: `npm test -- 2>&1 | grep -iE 'upload_image is registered|not ok|✖'`
+Expected: PASS.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add src/server.js src/server.spec.js
+git commit -m "Register upload_image in the tools registry"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 7: logging assertions
+
+**Files:**
+- Test: `src/tools/upload_image.spec.js`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing test**
+
+Append to `src/tools/upload_image.spec.js`:
+
+```js
+describe('uploadImageHandler — logging', () => {
+  test('logs intent before the request and never logs the data URI', async () => {
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler());
+    const {logs} = await captureLogs(() => run({url: SOURCE}));
+    const events = logs.map((l) => l.msg);
+    assert.ok(events.includes('upload_image.fetching'));
+    assert.ok(events.includes('upload_image.uploading'));
+    // The base64 payload must never appear in any log line.
+    const serialized = JSON.stringify(logs);
+    assert.equal(serialized.includes('base64,'), false);
+  });
+});
+```
+
+Confirm the `captureLogs` return shape against `test/helpers/capture-logs.js`; if it returns the array directly rather than `{logs}`, adjust the destructuring to match the existing idiom in another spec (e.g. `export_subscribers.spec.js`).
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run to verify it passes (behavior implemented in Task 2)**
+
+Run: `npm test -- 2>&1 | grep -iE 'logging|never logs|not ok|✖'`
+Expected: PASS. To confirm the redaction test is real, temporarily add `logger.info('leak', {image})` before the upload in `upload_image.js`, run — the "never logs the data URI" test must fail — then remove it and grep to confirm the line is gone.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add src/tools/upload_image.spec.js
+git commit -m "Test upload_image logs intent and never logs the data URI"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 8: correct the documentation
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `CLAUDE.md`
+- Modify: `README.md`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Rewrite the CLAUDE.md limit paragraph**
+
+In `CLAUDE.md`, find the paragraph beginning "**Images can be referenced but not uploaded**" and the sentence "**Do not implement an upload from either.**" Replace the "all three hang / do not implement" claim with the measured reality. Keep it in the file's voice (why, not just what):
+
+```markdown
+**Images can be uploaded after all, and `upload_image` is how.** `POST /api/v1/image` was recorded
+here as hanging in all three tested encodings; re-measured live 2026-08-08, it answers **200** — the
+body is JSON `{image: "data:<mime>;base64,…"}`, a **data URI**, not a file or a URL. Multipart and
+form-urlencoded failed because they sent the wrong thing, not for a header detail or a Cloudflare
+wall. The response is `{id, url, contentType, bytes, imageWidth, imageHeight}`, `url` on
+`substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com` — the same host all `image2.src` values use, and it renders
+through Substack's CDN (proven end to end on a real draft). **Substack server-fetches only its own S3
+bucket**: an external URL as `image` answers `400 "Failed to fetch image"`, so `upload_image`
+downloads the URL itself and re-encodes it. It guards that download — http(s) only, DNS-resolved SSRF
+block, `image/*` (HEIC refused early, as the dashboard does), and a 10 MB cap that is **ours, not
+Substack's** (the bundle's `MAX_FILE_SIZE` could not be read). The data URI is never logged. **Still
+unverified:** the live checks used the browser session cookie, not `SUBSTACK_SESSION_TOKEN` in a
+header — confirm that path first.
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Update the README image line**
+
+In `README.md` around line 143, replace the "An image must already be hosted by Substack" line with a pointer to the tool:
+
+```markdown
+- **Images:** `upload_image` takes an http(s) image URL, re-hosts it on Substack, and returns a
+  `url` you put in `image2.src`. External URLs placed directly in `image2.src` do not render.
+```
+
+Also update the tool list around `README.md:124`/`README.md:134` if it enumerates tools, adding `upload_image`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add CLAUDE.md README.md
+git commit -m "Correct the docs: images can be uploaded via upload_image"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 9: full-suite verification at both Node versions
+
+**Files:** none (verification only)
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Run the whole suite on the dev version**
+
+Run: `npm test 2>&1 | tail -20`
+Expected: all pass. Grep both reporter shapes: `npm test 2>&1 | grep -E '^(#|ℹ) (tests|pass|fail)'` and confirm no `grep -E '^(not ok|✖)'` output.
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run at the engines floor (Node 22)**
+
+Run: `source ~/.nvm/nvm.sh && nvm exec --silent 22 npm test 2>&1 | grep -E '^(#|not ok) '`
+Expected: `# fail 0`, no `not ok` lines. (TAP reporter on 22.)
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Confirm the tool is advertised over the real protocol**
+
+Run:
+```bash
+printf '%s\n' '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"probe","version":"1.0.0"}}}' \
+  '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"notifications/initialized"}' \
+  '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/list","params":{}}' \
+  | SUBSTACK_PUBLICATION_URL=https://test.substack.com SUBSTACK_SESSION_TOKEN=tok SUBSTACK_USER_ID=1 \
+    timeout 5 node src/index.js | grep -o '"upload_image"'
+```
+Expected: `"upload_image"` printed.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Final commit if anything was adjusted during verification**
+
+```bash
+git add -A && git commit -m "Verify upload_image across Node 22 and 24" || echo "nothing to commit"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Self-review notes
+
+- **Spec coverage:** interface (Task 2, 6), download+encode (Task 2), scheme/SSRF guards (Task 4), size cap (Task 5), content-type/HEIC (Task 3), API method + postId mapping (Task 1), logging incl. no-data-URI (Task 7), docs correction (Task 8), auth caveat recorded in docs and left as the stated open item (Task 8, verified-only in Task 9 without the header path — flagged, not silently closed). All spec sections map to a task.
+- **Type consistency:** `uploadImage({image, post_id})` (Task 1) matches the call in Task 2; response keys `contentType/imageWidth/imageHeight` map to output `content_type/width/height` consistently in Task 2's test and impl; `isPrivateAddress(address, family)` signature identical in impl and Task 4 tests; `MAX_IMAGE_BYTES` used identically in impl and Task 5.
+- **Known limitation (from spec, intentional):** the SSRF check resolves DNS then fetches by URL — a TOCTOU window the spec accepted; not closed here.
diff --git a/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-08-image-upload-design.md b/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-08-image-upload-design.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4348253
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-08-image-upload-design.md
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+# Image upload — design
+
+**Date:** 2026-08-08
+**Status:** approved, ready for a plan
+**Supersedes:** the "Images can be referenced but not uploaded" limit documented in `CLAUDE.md`
+and `README.md:143`, and the instruction "Do not implement an upload from either" fork signature.
+
+## Why this exists
+
+`captionedImage` is in 60 of 60 sampled posts, and until now `image2.src` had to already point at a
+Substack-hosted asset — there was no way to put a new image into a post. `CLAUDE.md` recorded the
+endpoint as unreachable: `POST /api/v1/image` "hangs" in all three tested encodings (JSON,
+form-urlencoded, multipart), attributed by analogy to the Cloudflare wall on `POST /comment/feed`.
+
+**That record is wrong, and this design rests on re-measuring it live on 2026-08-08** against
+`implementing.substack.com`, from the authenticated dashboard. The endpoint works. The three earlier
+encodings all failed because they sent the wrong *thing*, not because of a header detail or a bot
+wall:
+
+- **The body is JSON `{image: "data:<mime>;base64,…"}` — a data URI, not a file and not a URL.** In
+  the `reactPublish` bundle the call is built from `canvas.toDataURL()` / a read `File`, then
+  `post('/api/v1/image').send({image, postId})`. Multipart and form-urlencoded were never going to
+  work; the "hang" was the wrong shape, not Cloudflare.
+
+Measured, live, that day (every row a real `POST`):
+
+| Probe | Result |
+|---|---|
+| 1×1 PNG as data URI | **200**, 276 ms |
+| Real JPEG 1200×630 (108 KB payload) as data URI | **200**, 485 ms; returns correct `bytes`/`width`/`height` |
+| With `postId` of a real published post | **200** — accepted |
+| A `substack-post-media` S3 URL as `image` | **200** — Substack server-fetches its *own* bucket |
+| An **external** URL (Wikimedia) as `image` | **400 `Failed to fetch image`** |
+| Non-image content (`text/plain` data URI) | **400 `{error, type}`** — Substack validates server-side |
+| The returned S3 URL, fetched with no cookie | **200, `content-type: image`** — the asset is public |
+
+**Response shape:** `{id, url, contentType, bytes, imageWidth, imageHeight}`. `url` is on
+`substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com` — the exact host all 18 `image2.src` values in 6 sampled
+published posts use.
+
+### The end-to-end loop is proven, not inferred
+
+On draft `210218832`, live: fresh data-URI upload → build a `captionedImage` node (attrs copied
+verbatim from a real post) referencing the returned `url` → append to the draft's existing body →
+`PUT /drafts/:id` (200, node persisted) → reload the editor. The image **renders**: `complete`,
+natural size 1038×581, and served through Substack's own CDN
+(`substackcdn.com/image/fetch/…f_webp`) — it entered the render pipeline, not just the stored JSON.
+The draft was then restored to its original 6 nodes.
+
+**The one thing not yet proven:** every call above used the browser's session **cookie**. The server
+authenticates with `SUBSTACK_SESSION_TOKEN` in a header. In principle equivalent, but unverified
+through `SubstackApi` — this is the first validation step in implementation, not a settled fact.
+
+## The key design consequence
+
+Substack's server-side fetch only works for URLs already in its **own** S3 bucket; an arbitrary
+external URL is rejected with 400. The chosen interface is **"remote URL only"** (`upload_image({url})`).
+So the shortcut is unavailable for our use case: **the tool must download the external image itself
+and re-encode it as a data URI**, then send that. This is the whole reason the tool has a
+download-and-encode step rather than passing the URL straight through.
+
+## Interface
+
+A new tool `upload_image`, following the one-file-per-tool pattern: `src/tools/upload_image.js`
+plus one entry in the `tools` registry in `src/server.js`. Nothing else.
+
+```
+upload_image({
+  url:      string   // the external image URL to fetch and upload (required)
+  post_id?: number   // optional; mirrors the dashboard's `postId`. Accepted by the API (measured).
+                     // Effect is unconfirmed — include because it is a real key, not invented.
+})
+  → { id, url, content_type, bytes, width, height }
+```
+
+- `z.strictObject` (an unknown key is reported, never stripped — the only repair signal an LLM gets).
+- The output `url` field's description states explicitly that it goes into `image2.src` of
+  `set_post_body`. That description is the only way a model links the two tools without guessing.
+
+## Flow and guards
+
+The tool does three things: fetch the external image, validate it, upload it as a data URI.
+
+1. **Fetch the URL.** This is a fetch of a model-chosen URL whose bytes we then re-emit — an
+   exfiltration/SSRF channel if unguarded. Guards, in order:
+   - **Scheme:** only `http`/`https`. Reject anything else (`file:`, `data:`, `gopher:`, …) up front.
+   - **SSRF, after DNS resolution, not on the URL string.** Resolve the host and reject loopback,
+     private (RFC 1918), and link-local (incl. `169.254.169.254`) addresses. Checking the string
+     does not stop a hostname that resolves to `127.0.0.1`. This is the guard that matters most.
+     The SSRF probes were deliberately **not** fired at Substack during measurement — running them
+     would have performed the attack, not tested it; that they must be blocked is a requirement of
+     *our* fetch, which is the one now doing arbitrary external downloads.
+   - **Size cap on the downloaded bytes.** Our defense of this server's memory: the buffer plus its
+     base64 string (~1.37×) are held in RAM. **Proposed 10 MB.** This is explicitly **not** Substack's
+     limit — the bundle has a `MAX_FILE_SIZE` constant whose value could not be extracted from the
+     minified source. We cap for our own safety and let Substack reject anything that passes ours but
+     not its.
+2. **Validate the content.** `content-type` must be `image/*`. Reject **HEIC** early with a message to
+   convert to JPG/PNG — the dashboard itself refuses HEIC client-side. Substack also validates
+   server-side (the `text/plain` → 400 above), so this is defense-in-depth and a better message, not
+   the only check.
+3. **Encode and upload.** Build `data:<content-type>;base64,<bytes>` and call
+   `SubstackApi.uploadImage({image, post_id})`.
+
+## API layer
+
+Add `SubstackApi.uploadImage({image, post_id})` next to the other methods:
+
+```js
+async uploadImage({image, post_id = null}) {
+  return this.request({
+    method: 'POST',
+    path: '/image',
+    body: post_id === null ? {image} : {image, postId: post_id},
+    referer: '/publish/post',
+  });
+}
+```
+
+No change to `requestUrl`: it already serializes any non-null body as JSON with
+`Content-Type: application/json`, and the data URI is just a (large) JSON string value. `post_id` maps
+to the API's `postId`; an absent one must not be sent as null (same rule as every other partial body
+in this server).
+
+## Logging
+
+An upload is a write this server cannot undo, so it follows the existing rule: log intent at `info`
+**before** the request.
+
+- `upload_image.fetching` — the source `url`, before the download.
+- `upload_image.uploading` — `content_type` and `bytes`, before the `POST`.
+- The **data URI must never be logged.** It is hundreds of KB of base64 that would bury the session.
+  This is the one deliberate exception to "post content is not truncated", and the exception is
+  written at the call site so it is not mistaken for an oversight. Pass the metadata, not the payload.
+
+## Testing
+
+All outbound HTTP mocked with MSW, on **both** sides: the external image source and the Substack
+`/image` endpoint. The cases that carry weight, each broken on purpose before being trusted:
+
+- The Substack request body leaves as a **data URI**, not multipart or form-urlencoded.
+- A non-image `content-type` from the source is rejected **before** the upload call is made.
+- A URL whose host resolves to a private/loopback/link-local address is rejected (SSRF guard).
+- A download exceeding the size cap is rejected before encoding.
+- `http`/`https` only: a `file:`/`data:` scheme is rejected up front.
+- On success the Substack `url` is returned to the caller as `url`, with `post_id` mapped to `postId`
+  when present and omitted when absent.
+
+MSW's `onUnhandledRequest: 'error'` stays on; build overrides with typed handlers so requests are
+recorded in `msw.requests`.
+
+## Documentation to correct
+
+- `CLAUDE.md`: rewrite the "Images can be referenced but not uploaded" paragraph and the
+  "Do not implement an upload" instruction with the measured facts above — including *why* the three
+  earlier encodings failed (the data-URI shape), which is the reusable part. Note the external-URL
+  rejection and the resulting download-and-encode design. Record the auth caveat as the open item.
+- `README.md:143`: update the "An image must already be hosted by Substack" line to point at
+  `upload_image`.
+
+## Out of scope (stated so it is not re-litigated)
+
+- **Guarding `image2.src` in `document.js`.** Today any string is accepted and an external URL saves,
+  returns 200 and silently fails to render. This work makes that guard *more* sensible — there is now
+  a legitimate way to obtain a valid `src` — but it remains a separate change.
+- **Local-file and data-URI sources.** The interface is remote-URL-only by decision (2026-08-08): no
+  filesystem access (path-traversal surface; would not work in the Docker image), and no caller-passed
+  data URI (tens of KB of base64 spent in the model's context).
+- **Confirming the auth path via header token** is implementation's first step, listed here as the one
+  unproven fact — not a scope item to design away.
diff --git a/src/api/substack/SubstackApi.js b/src/api/substack/SubstackApi.js
index 6b1f00b..2158feb 100644
--- a/src/api/substack/SubstackApi.js
+++ b/src/api/substack/SubstackApi.js
@@ -157,6 +157,21 @@ export default class SubstackApi {
     return this.request({method: 'POST', path: '/drafts', body, referer: '/publish/post'});
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Uploads an image. The body is a data URI under `image`, not a file or a URL — the editor builds
+   * it from `canvas.toDataURL()`. Verified live 2026-08-08: 200 with {id, url, contentType, bytes,
+   * imageWidth, imageHeight}. `post_id` maps to the API's `postId`; an absent one must not be sent as
+   * null (same partial-body rule as everywhere else here).
+   */
+  async uploadImage({image, post_id = null}) {
+    return this.request({
+      method: 'POST',
+      path: '/image',
+      body: post_id === null ? {image} : {image, postId: post_id},
+      referer: '/publish/post',
+    });
+  }
+
   /**
    * Lists subscribers. `query` is the whole request body — filters, sorting and free-text search
    * all live inside its `filters` object; see SubscriberQuery.js for how it is assembled.
diff --git a/src/api/substack/SubstackApi.spec.js b/src/api/substack/SubstackApi.spec.js
index 65a07ca..383fda7 100644
--- a/src/api/substack/SubstackApi.spec.js
+++ b/src/api/substack/SubstackApi.spec.js
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ import {
   createMswServer,
   DRAFTS_URL,
   DRAFT_RESPONSE,
+  IMAGE_URL,
+  IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE,
   SUBSCRIBER_STATS_URL,
   SUBSCRIBER_STATS_RESPONSE,
   POSTS_RESPONSE,
@@ -138,6 +140,39 @@ describe('SubstackApi — postDraft', () => {
   });
 });
 
+describe('SubstackApi — uploadImage', () => {
+  test('POSTs the data URI as JSON and returns the parsed body', async () => {
+    const api = createApi();
+
+    const result = await api.uploadImage({image: ''});
+
+    const seen = msw.requests.find((r) => r.url === IMAGE_URL);
+    assert.equal(seen.method, 'POST');
+    assert.match(seen.headers['content-type'], /^application\/json/);
+    assert.deepEqual(seen.body, {image: ''});
+    assert.equal(result.url, IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.url);
+    assert.equal(result.bytes, 82768);
+  });
+
+  test('includes postId only when post_id is given', async () => {
+    const api = createApi();
+
+    await api.uploadImage({image: '', post_id: 42});
+
+    const seen = msw.requests.find((r) => r.url === IMAGE_URL);
+    assert.deepEqual(seen.body, {image: '', postId: 42});
+  });
+
+  test('omits postId when post_id is absent', async () => {
+    const api = createApi();
+
+    await api.uploadImage({image: ''});
+
+    const seen = msw.requests.find((r) => r.url === IMAGE_URL);
+    assert.deepEqual(Object.keys(seen.body), ['image']);
+  });
+});
+
 describe('SubstackApi — getSubscribers', () => {
   test('POSTs the query to the subscriber-stats endpoint', async () => {
     const query = {filters: {subscription_type: 'free'}, limit: 25, offset: 0};
diff --git a/src/index.spec.js b/src/index.spec.js
index 6ec0342..73f74e5 100644
--- a/src/index.spec.js
+++ b/src/index.spec.js
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ describe('entrypoint — stdio transport', () => {
       'restack_item',
       'set_post_body',
       'update_draft',
+      'upload_image',
     ]);
 
     assert.deepEqual(
diff --git a/src/logger.js b/src/logger.js
index 1b02ab4..4636271 100644
--- a/src/logger.js
+++ b/src/logger.js
@@ -20,6 +20,26 @@ const SECRET_KEY = /token|cookie|password|secret|auth|session|^sid$/i;
 
 const REDACTED = '***';
 
+// A base64 data URI is an opaque blob, useless in a log and ruinous to its volume: a single
+// image upload carries its body through `substack.request` at info, which for a real photo is
+// hundreds of KB of base64 on one line. Unlike a post body — which is prose and deliberately
+// logged in full — the payload here has no diagnostic value, so it is elided while the prefix
+// (mime type, that it is base64) and the elided length are kept. Matched on the value, since a
+// data URI can sit under any key (`image`, `src`, …).
+const DATA_URI_PREFIX = /^data:[^,]*;base64,/i;
+
+function truncateDataUri(value) {
+  const match = value.match(DATA_URI_PREFIX);
+  if (!match) {
+    return value;
+  }
+  const payload = value.length - match[0].length;
+  if (payload <= 32) {
+    return value;
+  }
+  return `${match[0]}…(${payload} base64 chars omitted)`;
+}
+
 // Read at call time, not at import: SUBSTACK_MCP_LOG_LEVEL may be set after this module is
 // imported (tests do exactly that), and no module here may read the environment at import
 // time. An unknown value falls back to the default rather than silencing the server.
@@ -58,6 +78,10 @@ function redact(value, seen = new WeakSet()) {
     return expanded;
   }
 
+  if (typeof value === 'string') {
+    return truncateDataUri(value);
+  }
+
   if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') {
     return value;
   }
diff --git a/src/logger.spec.js b/src/logger.spec.js
index 9a3c28b..cec6b15 100644
--- a/src/logger.spec.js
+++ b/src/logger.spec.js
@@ -230,6 +230,29 @@ describe('logger — redaction', () => {
 
     assert.equal(line.args.body, body);
   });
+
+  // A base64 data URI is an opaque blob with no diagnostic value, and a real image upload would
+  // put hundreds of KB of it on one line through `substack.request`. The prefix and elided size
+  // are kept; the payload is dropped. Matched on the value, so it works under any key.
+  test('elides the payload of a base64 data URI, keeping the prefix', () => {
+    process.env.SUBSTACK_MCP_LOG_LEVEL = 'info';
+
+    const payload = 'Zm9v'.repeat(5000);
+    const image = `data:image/png;base64,${payload}`;
+    const [line] = logLines(() => logger.info('substack.request', {body: {image}}));
+
+    assert.match(line.body.image, /^data:image\/png;base64,…\(\d+ base64 chars omitted\)$/);
+    assert.equal(JSON.stringify(line).includes(payload), false);
+  });
+
+  test('leaves a short data URI intact', () => {
+    process.env.SUBSTACK_MCP_LOG_LEVEL = 'info';
+
+    const image = '';
+    const [line] = logLines(() => logger.info('substack.request', {body: {image}}));
+
+    assert.equal(line.body.image, image);
+  });
 });
 
 describe('logger — resilience', () => {
diff --git a/src/server.js b/src/server.js
index 7aed71f..964318e 100644
--- a/src/server.js
+++ b/src/server.js
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import {McpServer} from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
 import {createDraftPostSchema, createDraftPostHandler} from "./tools/create_draft_post.js";
 import {setPostBodySchema, setPostBodyHandler} from "./tools/set_post_body.js";
+import {uploadImageSchema, uploadImageHandler} from "./tools/upload_image.js";
 import {listSubscribersSchema, listSubscribersHandler} from "./tools/list_subscribers.js";
 import {exportSubscribersSchema, exportSubscribersHandler} from "./tools/export_subscribers.js";
 import {listPostsSchema, listPostsHandler} from "./tools/list_posts.js";
@@ -46,6 +47,14 @@ export const tools = {
     schema: setPostBodySchema,
     handler: setPostBodyHandler,
   },
+  upload_image: {
+    description:
+      "Upload an image to your Substack publication from an http(s) URL. The server downloads " +
+      "the image and re-hosts it on Substack; the returned url is what goes into image2.src in " +
+      "set_post_body. Private and loopback hosts are refused, HEIC is not accepted, max 10 MB.",
+    schema: uploadImageSchema,
+    handler: uploadImageHandler,
+  },
   list_subscribers: {
     // The engagement caveat still belongs in the description: this endpoint takes the fields it
     // returns from the publication's saved Display settings and ignores a per-request column list,
diff --git a/src/server.spec.js b/src/server.spec.js
index 1c2b31b..4c5737a 100644
--- a/src/server.spec.js
+++ b/src/server.spec.js
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ describe('MCP server — list_tools', () => {
     'restack_item',
     'set_post_body',
     'update_draft',
+    'upload_image',
   ];
 
   test('exposes exactly the registered tools', async () => {
@@ -93,6 +94,15 @@ describe('MCP server — list_tools', () => {
     assert.equal(inputSchema.properties.title.type, 'string');
   });
 
+  test('upload_image advertises url + optional post_id and forbids extra keys', async () => {
+    const {inputSchema} = (await listToolsByName()).upload_image;
+
+    assert.equal(inputSchema.type, 'object');
+    assert.deepEqual(Object.keys(inputSchema.properties).sort(), ['post_id', 'url']);
+    assert.deepEqual([...(inputSchema.required ?? [])], ['url']);
+    assert.equal(inputSchema.additionalProperties, false);
+  });
+
   // Regression guard for the zod 3 -> 4 migration: zod-to-json-schema silently returned a
   // bare `{$schema}` for a zod 4 schema instead of throwing, which would have published a
   // parameterless tool. Asserting the descriptions — the part an LLM actually reads to fill
diff --git a/src/tools/upload_image.js b/src/tools/upload_image.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5c73fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tools/upload_image.js
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+import {z} from "zod";
+import dns from "node:dns";
+import SubstackApi from "../api/substack/SubstackApi.js";
+import {logger} from "../logger.js";
+
+// Checked against a declared Content-Length before the body is read, then against the buffered
+// length. NOT Substack's own limit (its MAX_FILE_SIZE could not be read from the minified bundle).
+export const MAX_IMAGE_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+// A caller-chosen host is untrusted: without a deadline a slow or stalled response hangs the tool
+// call indefinitely. Each request (and each redirect hop) gets its own.
+const FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 20000;
+
+// heic/heif plus the `-sequence` variants some Apple devices send for burst and live photos: all
+// four start with `image/`, so without this they would pass the image check and fail later at
+// Substack instead of getting the friendlier convert-first message.
+const HEIC_TYPES = new Set(['image/heic', 'image/heif', 'image/heic-sequence', 'image/heif-sequence']);
+
+// strictObject: an unknown key is reported, never stripped — the only repair signal an LLM gets.
+export const uploadImageSchema = z.strictObject({
+  url: z
+    .string()
+    .url()
+    .describe(
+      "The http(s) URL of an image to upload. The server downloads it and re-hosts it on Substack. " +
+        "Private, loopback and link-local hosts are refused. Max 10 MB. HEIC is not accepted."
+    ),
+  post_id: z
+    .number()
+    .optional()
+    .describe("Optional id of the post the image belongs to. Its effect is unconfirmed."),
+});
+
+// Resolve every address a host maps to. Injected in tests so DNS is never touched.
+const defaultLookup = (hostname) => dns.promises.lookup(hostname, {all: true});
+
+// Loopback / private / link-local / unique-local / unspecified, plus IPv4-mapped IPv6.
+export function isPrivateAddress(address, family) {
+  if (family === 4) {
+    const p = address.split('.').map(Number);
+    if (p[0] === 10) return true;
+    if (p[0] === 127) return true;
+    if (p[0] === 0) return true;
+    if (p[0] === 169 && p[1] === 254) return true; // link-local incl. 169.254.169.254
+    if (p[0] === 172 && p[1] >= 16 && p[1] <= 31) return true;
+    if (p[0] === 192 && p[1] === 168) return true;
+    if (p[0] === 100 && p[1] >= 64 && p[1] <= 127) return true; // CGNAT
+    return false;
+  }
+  const a = address.toLowerCase();
+  if (a === '::1' || a === '::') return true;
+  if (a.startsWith('fe8') || a.startsWith('fe9') || a.startsWith('fea') || a.startsWith('feb')) return true; // fe80::/10
+  if (a.startsWith('fc') || a.startsWith('fd')) return true; // fc00::/7 unique-local
+  // IPv4-mapped IPv6 is unwrapped and re-checked as v4; other embeddings (6to4/Teredo/NAT64) are
+  // not — accepted residual risk.
+  const mapped = embeddedIpv4(a);
+  if (mapped) return isPrivateAddress(mapped, 4);
+  return false;
+}
+
+// The trailing IPv4 of an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address, in either the dotted form (`::ffff:1.2.3.4`) or
+// the compressed hex form (`::ffff:102:304`) the WHATWG URL parser emits — the latter is why the
+// dotted-only regex was an SSRF hole: `http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/` reaches this as
+// `::ffff:a9fe:a9fe`, the metadata address wearing a disguise.
+function embeddedIpv4(address) {
+  const dotted = address.match(/^::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/);
+  if (dotted) return dotted[1];
+  const hex = address.match(/^::ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/);
+  if (hex) {
+    const hi = parseInt(hex[1], 16);
+    const lo = parseInt(hex[2], 16);
+    return `${hi >> 8}.${hi & 0xff}.${lo >> 8}.${lo & 0xff}`;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+async function assertPublicUrl(rawUrl, lookup) {
+  // The schema's .url() already guaranteed this parses.
+  const url = new URL(rawUrl);
+  if (url.protocol !== 'http:' && url.protocol !== 'https:') {
+    throw new Error(`upload_image: only http and https URLs are allowed, got ${url.protocol}`);
+  }
+  // An IPv6 host arrives bracket-wrapped (`[::1]`); dns.lookup and the address checks want it bare.
+  const hostname = url.hostname.replace(/^\[/, '').replace(/\]$/, '');
+  const addresses = await lookup(hostname);
+  for (const {address, family} of addresses) {
+    if (isPrivateAddress(address, family)) {
+      throw new Error(`upload_image: refusing to fetch a private/loopback address (${address})`);
+    }
+  }
+  return url;
+}
+
+// `fetch`'s default `redirect: 'follow'` would contact a redirect target before we ever see its
+// host, which turns `assertPublicUrl` into a check on the ORIGINAL host only — a public host that
+// 3xx-redirects to http://169.254.169.254/ (or any private address) bypasses the guard entirely.
+// So redirects are followed manually here, validating each hop's host before it is contacted.
+async function fetchGuarded(rawUrl, lookup, fetchImpl, maxRedirects = 3) {
+  let target = rawUrl;
+  for (let hop = 0; hop <= maxRedirects; hop++) {
+    await assertPublicUrl(target, lookup); // validate before every request, including each redirect
+    const response = await fetchImpl(target, {redirect: 'manual', signal: AbortSignal.timeout(FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS)});
+    if (response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400) {
+      const location = response.headers.get('location');
+      if (!location) throw new Error(`upload_image: redirect with no Location header from ${target}`);
+      target = new URL(location, target).toString(); // resolve relative redirects against current URL
+      continue;
+    }
+    return response;
+  }
+  throw new Error(`upload_image: too many redirects (> ${maxRedirects})`);
+}
+
+// Enforces the cap in two places. A declared Content-Length over the limit is refused before the
+// body is read at all — the cheap common case. The buffered length is then re-checked, since a
+// response may declare a small (or no) length and send more. A response that both omits its length
+// AND streams unboundedly is bounded not by the byte cap but by FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS on the request —
+// an accepted residual, the same shape of trade-off as the DNS-rebinding note.
+async function readCapped(response, max) {
+  const declared = Number(response.headers.get('content-length'));
+  if (declared > max) {
+    throw new Error(`upload_image: image is ${declared} bytes (Content-Length), over the ${max}-byte limit.`);
+  }
+  const buffer = Buffer.from(await response.arrayBuffer());
+  if (buffer.byteLength > max) {
+    throw new Error(`upload_image: image is ${buffer.byteLength} bytes, over the ${max}-byte limit.`);
+  }
+  return buffer;
+}
+
+export const uploadImageHandler = async (args, {lookup = defaultLookup, fetchImpl = fetch} = {}) => {
+  logger.debug('upload_image.start', {args});
+
+  let validatedArgs;
+  try {
+    validatedArgs = uploadImageSchema.parse(args);
+  } catch (error) {
+    logger.error('upload_image.args.invalid', {issues: error.issues ?? error.message});
+    throw error;
+  }
+  const {url, post_id} = validatedArgs;
+
+  logger.info('upload_image.fetching', {url, post_id: post_id ?? null});
+  const response = await fetchGuarded(url, lookup, fetchImpl);
+  if (!response.ok) {
+    throw new Error(`upload_image: source responded ${response.status} ${response.statusText}`);
+  }
+
+  const contentType = (response.headers.get('content-type') || '').split(';')[0].trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (!contentType.startsWith('image/')) {
+    throw new Error(`upload_image: source is not an image (content-type: ${contentType || 'none'})`);
+  }
+  if (HEIC_TYPES.has(contentType)) {
+    throw new Error('upload_image: HEIC is not accepted by Substack. Convert to JPG or PNG first.');
+  }
+
+  const buffer = await readCapped(response, MAX_IMAGE_BYTES);
+
+  const image = `data:${contentType};base64,${buffer.toString('base64')}`;
+  // The data URI is deliberately NOT logged: hundreds of KB of base64 would bury the session. This
+  // is the one exception to "post content is not truncated".
+  logger.info('upload_image.uploading', {content_type: contentType, bytes: buffer.byteLength, post_id: post_id ?? null});
+
+  const substack_api = new SubstackApi({
+    publication_url: process.env.SUBSTACK_PUBLICATION_URL,
+    auth_token: process.env.SUBSTACK_SESSION_TOKEN,
+  });
+  const uploaded = await substack_api.uploadImage({image, post_id: post_id ?? null});
+
+  logger.info('upload_image.done', {url: uploaded.url, bytes: uploaded.bytes});
+
+  return {
+    id: uploaded.id,
+    url: uploaded.url,
+    content_type: uploaded.contentType,
+    bytes: uploaded.bytes,
+    width: uploaded.imageWidth,
+    height: uploaded.imageHeight,
+  };
+};
diff --git a/src/tools/upload_image.spec.js b/src/tools/upload_image.spec.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09f31b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tools/upload_image.spec.js
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+import {test, describe, before, after, afterEach} from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import {http, HttpResponse} from 'msw';
+import {uploadImageHandler, uploadImageSchema, MAX_IMAGE_BYTES, isPrivateAddress} from './upload_image.js';
+import {createMswServer, IMAGE_URL, IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE} from '../../test/helpers/msw-server.js';
+import {setTestEnv} from '../../test/helpers/env.js';
+import {captureLogs} from '../../test/helpers/capture-logs.js';
+
+const msw = createMswServer();
+let restoreEnv;
+
+before(() => {
+  restoreEnv = setTestEnv();
+  msw.start();
+});
+afterEach(() => msw.reset());
+after(() => {
+  msw.stop();
+  restoreEnv();
+});
+
+// A public address for the source host, so the SSRF guard passes without touching real DNS.
+const publicLookup = async () => [{address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4}];
+
+// A source image served by MSW. `bytes`/`type` let each test shape size and content-type.
+const SOURCE = 'https://images.example.com/photo.jpg';
+function sourceHandler({body = Buffer.from([0xff, 0xd8, 0xff, 0xd9]), type = 'image/jpeg'} = {}) {
+  return http.get(SOURCE, () => new HttpResponse(body, {status: 200, headers: {'Content-Type': type}}));
+}
+
+const run = (args, deps = {}) =>
+  uploadImageHandler(args, {lookup: publicLookup, ...deps});
+
+describe('uploadImageHandler — happy path', () => {
+  test('downloads, encodes as a data URI, uploads, returns the mapped fields', async () => {
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler());
+    const result = await run({url: SOURCE});
+
+    const upload = msw.requests.find((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image'));
+    assert.match(upload.body.image, /^data:image\/jpeg;base64,/);
+    assert.equal(upload.body.postId, undefined);
+
+    assert.deepEqual(result, {
+      id: IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.id,
+      url: IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.url,
+      content_type: IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.contentType,
+      bytes: IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.bytes,
+      width: IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.imageWidth,
+      height: IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.imageHeight,
+    });
+  });
+
+  test('forwards post_id as postId to the upload', async () => {
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler());
+    await run({url: SOURCE, post_id: 7});
+    const upload = msw.requests.find((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image'));
+    assert.equal(upload.body.postId, 7);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('uploadImageHandler — content validation', () => {
+  test('rejects a non-image source before uploading', async () => {
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler({body: Buffer.from('<html>'), type: 'text/html'}));
+    await assert.rejects(run({url: SOURCE}), /not an image/);
+    assert.equal(msw.requests.find((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image')), undefined);
+  });
+
+  test('rejects HEIC with a convert message', async () => {
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler({type: 'image/heic'}));
+    await assert.rejects(run({url: SOURCE}), /HEIC is not accepted/);
+    assert.equal(msw.requests.find((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image')), undefined);
+  });
+
+  test('rejects the HEIC -sequence variant too', async () => {
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler({type: 'image/heic-sequence'}));
+    await assert.rejects(run({url: SOURCE}), /HEIC is not accepted/);
+    assert.equal(msw.requests.find((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image')), undefined);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('uploadImageHandler — redirect SSRF guard', () => {
+  test('rejects a redirect to a private address without uploading', async () => {
+    const REDIRECTOR = 'https://images.example.com/redirect.jpg';
+    const INTERNAL = 'http://metadata.internal/latest';
+    // First host resolves public, the redirect target resolves private.
+    const lookup = async (hostname) =>
+      hostname === 'metadata.internal'
+        ? [{address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4}]
+        : [{address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4}];
+    msw.server.use(
+      http.get(REDIRECTOR, () => new HttpResponse(null, {status: 302, headers: {Location: INTERNAL}}))
+    );
+    await assert.rejects(
+      uploadImageHandler({url: REDIRECTOR}, {lookup, fetchImpl: fetch}),
+      /private\/loopback/
+    );
+    assert.equal(msw.requests.find((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image')), undefined);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('isPrivateAddress', () => {
+  test('flags loopback, private, link-local, unique-local; allows public', () => {
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('127.0.0.1', 4), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('10.1.2.3', 4), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('172.16.0.1', 4), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('192.168.1.1', 4), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('169.254.169.254', 4), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('93.184.216.34', 4), false);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('::1', 6), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('fe80::1', 6), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('fd00::1', 6), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('::ffff:127.0.0.1', 6), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946', 6), false);
+  });
+
+  // The URL parser compresses an IPv4-mapped host to hex, so the dotted-only check was an SSRF
+  // hole: these are 169.254.169.254 and 127.0.0.1 in the form isPrivateAddress actually receives.
+  test('flags an IPv4-mapped address written in the compressed hex form', () => {
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('::ffff:a9fe:a9fe', 6), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('::ffff:7f00:1', 6), true);
+    assert.equal(isPrivateAddress('::ffff:5db8:d822', 6), false); // 93.184.216.34, public
+  });
+});
+
+describe('uploadImageHandler — SSRF and scheme guards', () => {
+  test('rejects a host that resolves to a private address, without fetching', async () => {
+    let fetched = false;
+    const fetchImpl = async () => { fetched = true; return new HttpResponse(); };
+    const privateLookup = async () => [{address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4}];
+    await assert.rejects(
+      uploadImageHandler({url: 'http://metadata.internal/'}, {lookup: privateLookup, fetchImpl}),
+      /private\/loopback/
+    );
+    assert.equal(fetched, false);
+  });
+
+  test('rejects a non-http(s) scheme up front', async () => {
+    await assert.rejects(run({url: 'ftp://example.com/x.png'}), /only http and https/);
+  });
+
+  test('de-brackets an IPv6 host before the lookup, and still guards it', async () => {
+    let seenHost;
+    const lookup = async (hostname) => { seenHost = hostname; return [{address: '::1', family: 6}]; };
+    let fetched = false;
+    const fetchImpl = async () => { fetched = true; return new HttpResponse(); };
+    await assert.rejects(
+      uploadImageHandler({url: 'http://[::1]/x.png'}, {lookup, fetchImpl}),
+      /private\/loopback/
+    );
+    assert.equal(seenHost, '::1'); // de-bracketed, not '[::1]'
+    assert.equal(fetched, false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('uploadImageHandler — redirect edge cases', () => {
+  const publicOnly = async () => [{address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4}];
+
+  test('rejects after too many redirects', async () => {
+    let n = 0;
+    const fetchImpl = async () =>
+      new HttpResponse(null, {status: 302, headers: {Location: `https://images.example.com/n${n++}.jpg`}});
+    await assert.rejects(
+      uploadImageHandler({url: 'https://images.example.com/a.jpg'}, {lookup: publicOnly, fetchImpl}),
+      /too many redirects/
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('rejects a redirect with no Location header', async () => {
+    const fetchImpl = async () => new HttpResponse(null, {status: 302});
+    await assert.rejects(
+      uploadImageHandler({url: 'https://images.example.com/a.jpg'}, {lookup: publicOnly, fetchImpl}),
+      /no Location header/
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe('uploadImageHandler — Content-Length pre-check', () => {
+  test('rejects a declared-oversize body before reading it', async () => {
+    let read = false;
+    const fetchImpl = async () => new Response('tiny', {
+      status: 200,
+      headers: {'Content-Type': 'image/png', 'Content-Length': String(MAX_IMAGE_BYTES + 1)},
+    });
+    // Wrap arrayBuffer so we can prove it was never called: the header alone must reject.
+    const orig = fetchImpl;
+    const spyingFetch = async (...a) => {
+      const r = await orig(...a);
+      const arrayBuffer = r.arrayBuffer.bind(r);
+      r.arrayBuffer = (...x) => { read = true; return arrayBuffer(...x); };
+      return r;
+    };
+    await assert.rejects(
+      uploadImageHandler({url: 'https://images.example.com/a.png'}, {lookup: publicLookup, fetchImpl: spyingFetch}),
+      /Content-Length.*over the .* limit/
+    );
+    assert.equal(read, false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('uploadImageHandler — size cap', () => {
+  test('rejects an image over MAX_IMAGE_BYTES before uploading', async () => {
+    const big = Buffer.alloc(MAX_IMAGE_BYTES + 1, 0xff);
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler({body: big, type: 'image/png'}));
+    await assert.rejects(run({url: SOURCE}), /over the .* limit/);
+    assert.equal(msw.requests.find((r) => r.url.endsWith('/api/v1/image')), undefined);
+  });
+
+  test('accepts an image exactly at the limit', async () => {
+    const atLimit = Buffer.alloc(MAX_IMAGE_BYTES, 0xff);
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler({body: atLimit, type: 'image/png'}));
+    const result = await run({url: SOURCE});
+    assert.equal(result.url, IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE.url);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('uploadImageHandler — logging', () => {
+  test('logs intent before the request and never logs the data URI payload', async () => {
+    const body = Buffer.alloc(5000, 0xab);
+    const payload = body.toString('base64');
+    msw.server.use(sourceHandler({body, type: 'image/png'}));
+
+    // captureLogs returns the parsed log lines directly as an array, at debug level — where the
+    // API layer logs the full request body, so this proves the data URI is elided end to end.
+    const logs = await captureLogs(() => run({url: SOURCE}));
+    const events = logs.map((l) => l.msg);
+
+    assert.ok(events.includes('upload_image.fetching'));
+    assert.ok(events.includes('upload_image.uploading'));
+    // The base64 payload must never appear in any log line — not the tool's, not the API's.
+    assert.equal(JSON.stringify(logs).includes(payload), false);
+    // But the request line still exists (truncated), proving logging was elided, not dropped.
+    assert.ok(logs.some((l) => l.msg === 'substack.request'));
+  });
+});
diff --git a/test/helpers/msw-server.js b/test/helpers/msw-server.js
index 0b9994a..661f467 100644
--- a/test/helpers/msw-server.js
+++ b/test/helpers/msw-server.js
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ const API = `${TEST_ENV.SUBSTACK_PUBLICATION_URL}/api/v1`;
 const GLOBAL_API = 'https://substack.com/api/v1';
 
 export const DRAFTS_URL = `${API}/drafts`;
+export const IMAGE_URL = `${API}/image`;
 export const PUBLICATION_URL = `${API}/publication`;
 export const USER_PROFILE_URL = `${GLOBAL_API}/user/profile/self`;
 export const POST_TAG_URL = `${API}/publication/post-tag`;
@@ -55,6 +56,16 @@ export const DRAFT_RESPONSE = {
   is_published: false,
 };
 
+// These are the exact keys the live `POST /api/v1/image` endpoint returned, verified 2026-08-08.
+export const IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE = {
+  id: 'test-image-id',
+  url: 'https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/test-image.jpg',
+  contentType: 'image/jpeg',
+  bytes: 82768,
+  imageWidth: 1200,
+  imageHeight: 630,
+};
+
 // Shaped after a real `POST /drafts/:id/publish`: the draft comes back as a post, with the slug and
 // canonical url it did not have while unpublished.
 export const PUBLISHED_POST_RESPONSE = {
@@ -567,6 +578,13 @@ export function createMswServer() {
     });
   }
 
+  function imageUploadHandler(responder) {
+    return http.post(IMAGE_URL, async ({request}) => {
+      await record(request);
+      return responder();
+    });
+  }
+
   function subscriberStatsHandler(responder) {
     return http.post(SUBSCRIBER_STATS_URL, async ({request}) => {
       await record(request);
@@ -790,6 +808,7 @@ export function createMswServer() {
 
   const server = setupServer(
     draftsHandler(() => HttpResponse.json(DRAFT_RESPONSE, {status: 200})),
+    imageUploadHandler(() => HttpResponse.json(IMAGE_UPLOAD_RESPONSE, {status: 200})),
     subscriberStatsHandler(() => HttpResponse.json(SUBSCRIBER_STATS_RESPONSE, {status: 200})),
     postsHandler(() => HttpResponse.json(POSTS_RESPONSE, {status: 200})),
     draftDetailHandler(() => HttpResponse.json(DRAFT_DETAIL_RESPONSE, {status: 200})),
@@ -842,6 +861,7 @@ export function createMswServer() {
     server,
     requests,
     draftsHandler,
+    imageUploadHandler,
     subscriberStatsHandler,
     postsHandler,
     draftDetailHandler,