This file records deliberate V1 boundaries. An item here is not an accepted workaround and does not weaken the current worker contract. Each capability requires a separate design review, threat model, compatibility proof, and a first rolling-host rollout under production traffic with the documented health checklist before a workflow may depend on it.
The two-host fleet does not need Kubernetes or an Actions Runner Controller
deployment. It also does not accept privileged workers, host Docker-socket
passthrough, a persistent native Windows runner on a daily-use host, Docker
Desktop engine switching, mutable latest deployment, or an external watchdog
that cancels and replays workflow side effects. Reconsidering one of these is an
architecture change, not routine configuration.
Testcontainers, service containers, job containers, Docker actions, and other
Docker-daemon workloads remain GitHub-hosted. A future backend may run them in
a disposable Linux VM whose Docker daemon, filesystem, and runner identity are
destroyed after one job. The host Docker socket must never be mounted or proxied
into a worker. The backend must preserve JIT registration, external diagnostics,
resource admission, and graceful drain. The audited hosted-only cutoff it used
to have to preserve is gone: ci-perf Phase 7 retired the selector, so there is
no eligibility to recompute on a rerun and no routing variable to cut over
with. A backend that cannot serve a job leaves that job queued on the fleet
label until it can. No hostedExceptionReasons member expresses a fleet
outage, so there is no consumer-side escape; a backend whose unavailability
must not block CI needs that case designed in, not waived per repository.
This work is motivated by GitHub's warning that self-hosted runners can be persistently compromised by workflow code and Docker's warning that daemon access is equivalent to highly privileged host access:
Windows-only tests remain on windows-2025. A future Hyper-V adapter may create
a Windows VM and disposable disks from a verified patched base, inject one JIT
runner configuration, execute one job, export diagnostics, and destroy the VM
and its disposable disks. Image licensing, Windows Update, base-image integrity,
host/guest boundaries, and unattended failure recovery must be proven before
adoption. Any alternative reset mechanism remains out of scope until Microsoft
documents it and a separate threat model proves equivalent isolation.
V1 will not register a persistent native Windows runner on a daily-use host and will not switch Docker Desktop between Linux and Windows container engines.
V1 workers require outbound network access for GitHub Actions, source checkout, tool setup, packages, caches, and artifacts. A future network adapter may add audited DNS/egress policy or a proxy, but it must measure action compatibility, fail visibly, keep controller credentials unreachable, and avoid claiming an isolation guarantee the Docker network does not enforce.
No future network layer may justify privileged workers, host devices, host paths, or Docker-socket access.
- GitHub runner communication requirements
- GitHub proxy configuration for runners
- Docker packet filtering and firewalls
The controller now provides optional OTLP trace and metric export, disabled by default, alongside JSON Lines and archived runner diagnostics. Configuration, redaction, failure isolation, lifecycle behavior, and collector guidance are documented in Observability.
Cost reporting may automate the same GitHub billing-usage summary used for the
rollout baseline. It must keep private billing data out of this public
repository and normalize by eligible completed jobs before claiming savings.
There is no longer any selector spend to separate from workload spend: the
selector's two-minute ubuntu-slim control job is retired with the selector
itself.