diff --git a/docs/backends/bwrap/bubblewrap-backend.md b/docs/backends/bwrap/bubblewrap-backend.md
index 02d9584e1..04f6242c5 100644
--- a/docs/backends/bwrap/bubblewrap-backend.md
+++ b/docs/backends/bwrap/bubblewrap-backend.md
@@ -179,7 +179,16 @@ Common consequences of this default:
   compat symlink, and WSL's `/mnt/wsl/resolv.conf` is bound directly.
   Neither exposes host `/var` or `/mnt` contents. Hosts that point
   `/etc/resolv.conf` at some other custom location still need that target
-  listed in `readonlyPaths`.
+  listed in `readonlyPaths`. Bubblewrap retains a mount-configuration hint
+  for SDK callers, which `lxc-exec` also prints to stderr, when a direct,
+  absolute resolver symlink target has no overlapping known mount
+  destination. The check reads the link but does not resolve or stat its
+  target or policy paths; a missing file or symlink alias can make the hint
+  inapplicable. Check the link and consider listing its containing directory
+  in `readonlyPaths`. Relative targets, uncertain mounts, and synthetic
+  destinations such as `/tmp` and `/var/run` suppress the hint. Silence
+  does not prove DNS is available; the hint never changes mounts or the
+  run's outcome.
 
 Files in `/etc` that contain secrets (`/etc/shadow`, `/etc/sudoers`,
 `/etc/ssh/ssh_host_*_key`) are mode `0400` / `0640` `root` and remain
diff --git a/src/mxc-sdk/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/bwrap_command.rs b/src/mxc-sdk/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/bwrap_command.rs
index 34a023565..b5898895b 100644
--- a/src/mxc-sdk/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/bwrap_command.rs
+++ b/src/mxc-sdk/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/bwrap_command.rs
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
 use std::collections::HashSet;
 
 use crate::mxc_common::filesystem_resolve::FsIntent;
+#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", test))]
+use crate::mxc_common::models::ContainerPolicy;
 use crate::mxc_common::models::{ExecutionRequest, NetworkAction, ProxyAddress};
 use crate::mxc_common::proxy_env::{is_managed_proxy_key, PROXY_SET_KEYS};
 
@@ -94,6 +96,52 @@ const BASELINE_RO_BIND_PATHS: &[&str] = &[
     "/mnt/wsl/resolv.conf",
 ];
 
+/// An absolute resolver target with no overlapping known mount destination.
+/// This lexical check does not resolve host or sandbox symlinks.
+#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", test))]
+pub(crate) fn resolver_target_without_matching_mount(
+    policy: &ContainerPolicy,
+    target: &str,
+) -> bool {
+    if target == "/"
+        || !target.starts_with('/')
+        || target.split('/').any(|part| part == "." || part == "..")
+    {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    let mut policy_mounts = policy
+        .readwrite_paths
+        .iter()
+        .chain(&policy.readonly_paths)
+        .chain(&policy.denied_paths)
+        .map(String::as_str);
+    for mount in BASELINE_RO_BIND_PATHS
+        .iter()
+        .copied()
+        .chain(["/dev", "/proc", "/tmp", "/var/run"])
+        .chain(policy_mounts.clone())
+    {
+        if !mount.starts_with('/')
+            || mount.split('/').any(|part| part == "." || part == "..")
+            || paths_overlap(target, mount)
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // A policy mount at the link (or an ancestor) replaces the host /etc
+    // entry, so the presence of its target alone would not explain DNS.
+    !policy_mounts.any(|mount| paths_overlap("/etc/resolv.conf", mount))
+}
+
+#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", test))]
+fn paths_overlap(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
+    let a = std::path::Path::new(a);
+    let b = std::path::Path::new(b);
+    a.starts_with(b) || b.starts_with(a)
+}
+
 /// The networking behavior Bubblewrap applies for one execution.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub(crate) enum ResolvedNetworkMode {
@@ -445,6 +493,107 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn resolver_target_hint_requires_no_mount_overlap() {
+        let mut policy = ContainerPolicy::default();
+        assert!(resolver_target_without_matching_mount(
+            &policy,
+            "/opt/private/resolv.conf"
+        ));
+        for no_warning in [
+            "/run/systemd/resolve/resolv.conf",
+            "/var/run/NetworkManager/resolv.conf",
+            "/mnt/wsl/resolv.conf",
+            "/etc/resolv.conf",
+            "/tmp/resolv.conf",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                !resolver_target_without_matching_mount(&policy, no_warning),
+                "unexpected advisory for {no_warning}"
+            );
+        }
+        policy.readonly_paths = vec!["/opt/private".into()];
+        assert!(!resolver_target_without_matching_mount(
+            &policy,
+            "/opt/private/resolv.conf"
+        ));
+        for mount in ["/opt/private/", "/opt//private/"] {
+            policy.readonly_paths = vec![mount.into()];
+            assert!(
+                !resolver_target_without_matching_mount(&policy, "/opt/private/resolv.conf"),
+                "{mount}"
+            );
+        }
+        policy.readonly_paths = vec!["/opt/private/resolv.conf/child".into()];
+        assert!(!resolver_target_without_matching_mount(
+            &policy,
+            "/opt/private/resolv.conf"
+        ));
+        policy.readonly_paths = vec!["/opt/private2".into()];
+        assert!(resolver_target_without_matching_mount(
+            &policy,
+            "/opt/private/resolv.conf"
+        ));
+        policy.readonly_paths = vec!["/".into()];
+        assert!(!resolver_target_without_matching_mount(
+            &policy,
+            "/opt/private/resolv.conf"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn resolver_diagnostic_recognizes_every_emitted_mount_destination() {
+        let mut with_policy = base_request();
+        with_policy.policy.readwrite_paths = vec!["/home/user/data".into()];
+        with_policy.policy.readonly_paths = vec!["/opt/private".into()];
+        with_policy.policy.denied_paths = vec!["/srv/blocked".into()];
+        for request in [base_request(), with_policy] {
+            let args = build_args(&request, None);
+            for triple in args.windows(3) {
+                if matches!(
+                    triple[0].as_str(),
+                    "--ro-bind-try" | "--ro-bind" | "--bind" | "--symlink"
+                ) {
+                    assert!(
+                        !resolver_target_without_matching_mount(&request.policy, &triple[2]),
+                        "unrecognized mount destination: {triple:?}"
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+            for pair in args.windows(2) {
+                if matches!(pair[0].as_str(), "--dev" | "--proc" | "--tmpfs") {
+                    assert!(
+                        !resolver_target_without_matching_mount(&request.policy, &pair[1]),
+                        "unrecognized virtual mount destination: {pair:?}"
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ambiguous_resolver_paths_and_shadowed_link_do_not_warn() {
+        let mut policy = ContainerPolicy::default();
+        for target in ["relative/resolv.conf", "/opt/../secret/resolv.conf", "/"] {
+            assert!(!resolver_target_without_matching_mount(&policy, target));
+        }
+        policy.denied_paths = vec!["/etc".into()];
+        assert!(!resolver_target_without_matching_mount(
+            &policy,
+            "/opt/private/resolv.conf"
+        ));
+        policy.denied_paths = vec!["/etc//".into()];
+        assert!(!resolver_target_without_matching_mount(
+            &policy,
+            "/opt/private/resolv.conf"
+        ));
+        policy.denied_paths = vec!["/alias/../etc".into()];
+        assert!(!resolver_target_without_matching_mount(
+            &policy,
+            "/opt/private/resolv.conf"
+        ));
+    }
+
     /// `process.env` resolution, which schema 0.9 gave a default block.
     mod env {
         use super::*;
diff --git a/src/mxc-sdk/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/bwrap_runner.rs b/src/mxc-sdk/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/bwrap_runner.rs
index edbcfaccb..ac262f081 100644
--- a/src/mxc-sdk/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/bwrap_runner.rs
+++ b/src/mxc-sdk/src/backends/bubblewrap/common/bwrap_runner.rs
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ impl SandboxBackend for BubblewrapScriptRunner {
         if let Err(msg) = check_pin_against_denied_hosts(request) {
             return Err(ScriptResponse::error(&msg));
         }
+        warn_resolver_mount_hint(request, logger);
         let child = self.spawn_bwrap(request, &plan.files, egress_plan, logger, stdio)?;
         Ok(Box::new(BubblewrapSandboxProcess::new(child)))
     }
@@ -350,6 +351,32 @@ fn warn_unreachable_v6_targets(plan: &network_rules::EgressPlan, logger: &mut Lo
     ));
 }
 
+fn warn_resolver_mount_hint(request: &ExecutionRequest, logger: &mut Logger) {
+    warn_resolver_mount_hint_with(request, logger, |path| std::fs::read_link(path).ok());
+}
+
+fn warn_resolver_mount_hint_with(
+    request: &ExecutionRequest,
+    logger: &mut Logger,
+    read_link: impl FnOnce(&Path) -> Option<PathBuf>,
+) {
+    let Some(target) = read_link(Path::new("/etc/resolv.conf")) else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let Some(target_str) = target.to_str() else {
+        return;
+    };
+    if !bwrap_command::resolver_target_without_matching_mount(&request.policy, target_str) {
+        return;
+    }
+    logger.warning_line(&format!(
+        "WARNING: Bubblewrap: /etc/resolv.conf points to {target_str:?}, but no known \
+         mount destination overlaps that path. DNS may fail if the link does not \
+         resolve inside the sandbox; check the link and consider listing its \
+         containing directory in filesystem.readonlyPaths."
+    ));
+}
+
 impl BubblewrapScriptRunner {
     /// Set up networking and spawn `bwrap`, returning a [`BwrapChild`] wrapped
     /// by the [`SandboxProcess`] handle. With [`StdioMode::Pipes`] the child's
@@ -1176,6 +1203,97 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn resolver_hint_is_retained_for_unmatched_absolute_targets() {
+        use crate::mxc_common::logger::Mode;
+
+        let mut request = base_request();
+        let mut logger = Logger::new(Mode::Buffer);
+        let target = || Some(PathBuf::from("/opt/private/resolv.conf"));
+        warn_resolver_mount_hint_with(&request, &mut logger, |_| target());
+        assert_eq!(logger.warnings().len(), 1);
+        assert!(logger.warnings()[0].contains("no known mount destination"));
+        assert!(logger.warnings()[0].contains("filesystem.readonlyPaths"));
+        assert!(logger.get_buffer().is_empty());
+
+        let mut logger = Logger::new(Mode::Buffer);
+        warn_resolver_mount_hint_with(&request, &mut logger, |_| None);
+        warn_resolver_mount_hint_with(&request, &mut logger, |_| {
+            Some(PathBuf::from("relative/resolv.conf"))
+        });
+        warn_resolver_mount_hint_with(&request, &mut logger, |_| {
+            Some(PathBuf::from("/run/systemd/resolve/resolv.conf"))
+        });
+        assert!(logger.warnings().is_empty());
+
+        request.policy.readonly_paths = vec!["/other".into()];
+        warn_resolver_mount_hint_with(&request, &mut logger, |_| target());
+        assert_eq!(logger.warnings().len(), 1);
+        let mut logger = Logger::new(Mode::Buffer);
+        request.policy.denied_paths = vec!["/etc".into()];
+        warn_resolver_mount_hint_with(&request, &mut logger, |_| target());
+        assert!(logger.warnings().is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn resolver_hint_checks_real_link_shapes_without_changing_host_etc() {
+        use crate::mxc_common::logger::Mode;
+        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
+
+        let home = PathBuf::from(std::env::var_os("HOME").expect("HOME is required for this test"));
+        assert!(home.is_absolute());
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir_in(home).unwrap();
+        let target = dir.path().join("resolver-target");
+        std::fs::write(&target, "nameserver 127.0.0.1\n").unwrap();
+        let link = dir.path().join("resolv.conf");
+        symlink(&target, &link).unwrap();
+        let warn = |request: &ExecutionRequest, logger: &mut Logger| {
+            warn_resolver_mount_hint_with(request, logger, |_| std::fs::read_link(&link).ok());
+        };
+        let mut request = base_request();
+        let mut logger = Logger::new(Mode::Buffer);
+        warn(&request, &mut logger);
+        assert_eq!(logger.warnings().len(), 1);
+        assert!(logger.warnings()[0].contains(&target.display().to_string()));
+        assert!(logger.warnings()[0].contains("filesystem.readonlyPaths"));
+        assert!(logger.get_buffer().is_empty());
+
+        request.policy.readonly_paths = vec!["/other".into()];
+        let mut unrelated_logger = Logger::new(Mode::Buffer);
+        warn(&request, &mut unrelated_logger);
+        assert_eq!(unrelated_logger.warnings().len(), 1);
+
+        request.policy.readonly_paths = vec![dir.path().display().to_string()];
+        let mut covered_logger = Logger::new(Mode::Buffer);
+        warn(&request, &mut covered_logger);
+        assert!(covered_logger.warnings().is_empty());
+
+        request.policy.readonly_paths.clear();
+        std::fs::remove_file(&link).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(&link, "nameserver 127.0.0.1\n").unwrap();
+        let mut regular_logger = Logger::new(Mode::Buffer);
+        warn(&request, &mut regular_logger);
+        assert!(regular_logger.warnings().is_empty());
+
+        std::fs::remove_file(&link).unwrap();
+        let chained = dir.path().join("chained");
+        symlink(&target, &chained).unwrap();
+        let directory = dir.path().join("directory");
+        std::fs::create_dir(&directory).unwrap();
+        for (name, link_target, expected_hints) in [
+            ("relative", PathBuf::from("resolver-target"), 0),
+            ("chained", chained, 1),
+            ("dangling", dir.path().join("missing"), 1),
+            ("directory", directory, 1),
+        ] {
+            symlink(link_target, &link).unwrap();
+            let mut hint_logger = Logger::new(Mode::Buffer);
+            warn(&request, &mut hint_logger);
+            assert_eq!(hint_logger.warnings().len(), expected_hints, "{name}");
+            std::fs::remove_file(&link).unwrap();
+        }
+    }
+
     /// A request carrying `alice:hunter2@` in its proxy URL, built the way a
     /// programmatic caller would rather than through the JSON parser.
     fn request_with_a_credential_bearing_proxy() -> ExecutionRequest {