diff --git a/.changeset/adr-anchors-authz-sweep.md b/.changeset/adr-anchors-authz-sweep.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4e3005a614
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.changeset/adr-anchors-authz-sweep.md
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+---
+
+Tooling-only: expand `scripts/adr-anchors.json` from 8 to 15 anchors — the bounded authz/security ADR sweep promised in #4575. Releases nothing.
+
+The first 8 anchors covered only #3723's blast radius. This sweep audited the decisions in ADR-0057 / 0066 / 0068 / 0090 / 0091 / 0095 / 0105 for other load-bearing realizations — places where a reasonable engineer could "fix" the code and be reverting a decision. Seven files added, each with its reversal story:
+
+- `posture-ladder.ts` (0095) — posture derives from capability grants; re-reading the better-auth role reopens the #2836 dual-track class.
+- `grant-validity.ts` (0091) — window enforcement lives at resolution time; "optimize it into a cleanup job" is the banned move (ADR-0049).
+- `tenant-layer.ts` (0095 D1) — Layer 0 shares no compiler/merge/bypass with business RLS; "deduplicate into the RLS compiler" would let a Layer-1 change weaken tenant isolation.
+- `auto-org-admin-grant.ts` (0105) — wall-less postures get `organization_admin_no_bypass`; "why two sets?" collapses into an environment-wide superuser (the F2 finding).
+- `invitation-placement.ts` (0105 D8) — issuance dry-runs the gate; "acceptance re-checks anyway" is false (acceptance runs under system context) and skipping it is an escalation hole.
+- `position.zod.ts` (0090 D3) — positions are flat; adding `parent` is the exact mistake ADR-0057 D5 retired.
+- `permission-evaluator.ts` (0066 D2 + 0057 D1) — superuser bypass derives from the wildcard grant, no stored boolean and no role fast-path.
+
+Plus one extension: the existing `resolve-authz-context.ts` anchor gains ADR-0068 (`platform_admin` is derived from an unscoped grant — no trusted stored boolean, the classic "add an `is_admin` column" reversal target).
+
+All 15 pass as-is — every anchored file already cited its governing ADRs — so this changes zero code, only registers what must not be silently un-cited. Negative-tested by stripping `ADR-0091` from `grant-validity.ts` (fails, printing the invariant).
diff --git a/scripts/adr-anchors.json b/scripts/adr-anchors.json
index 6d9b6e1077..09d154078d 100644
--- a/scripts/adr-anchors.json
+++ b/scripts/adr-anchors.json
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@
     },
     {
       "file": "packages/core/src/security/resolve-authz-context.ts",
-      "adrs": ["ADR-0095"],
-      "invariant": "No enforcement-time code path may consult the better-auth role directly. `mapMembershipRole` is a grant-PROVISIONING concern here; posture and adjudication run off the resulting capability grants."
+      "adrs": ["ADR-0068", "ADR-0095"],
+      "invariant": "No enforcement-time code path may consult the better-auth role directly — `mapMembershipRole` is a grant-PROVISIONING concern here; posture and adjudication run off the resulting capability grants (ADR-0095 D3). `platform_admin` is DERIVED from an unscoped `admin_full_access` user grant — there is no trusted stored boolean (ADR-0068 D2)."
     },
     {
       "file": "packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/delegated-admin-gate.ts",
@@ -40,6 +40,41 @@
       "file": "packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/invitation-role-cap.ts",
       "adrs": ["ADR-0105"],
       "invariant": "An invitation may add a person, never authority above the issuer's own grade. An issuer below admin grade may invite as plain `member` only."
+    },
+    {
+      "file": "packages/core/src/security/posture-ladder.ts",
+      "adrs": ["ADR-0095"],
+      "invariant": "Posture DERIVES from held capability grants, never from a better-auth role (D3) — re-reading the role here reopens the #2836 dual-track class. The ladder is monotonic: each rung's visible set contains the rung below's, one rung maps to exactly one injection rule, and EXTERNAL is deny-by-default (explicit shares only; OWD never widens it)."
+    },
+    {
+      "file": "packages/core/src/security/grant-validity.ts",
+      "adrs": ["ADR-0091"],
+      "invariant": "A grant row outside its validity window must not resolve, and correctness lives at RESOLUTION time — never in a cleanup job (ADR-0049: no unenforced security properties). Half-open `[from, until)` in UTC; absent bounds are unbounded; a present-but-unparseable bound disables the grant, fail closed."
+    },
+    {
+      "file": "packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/tenant-layer.ts",
+      "adrs": ["ADR-0095"],
+      "invariant": "Layer 0 (the tenant wall) is an independent, always-first, AND-composed filter sharing no compiler, no merge step and no bypass bit with business RLS (D1). Merging it into the RLS compiler would let a Layer-1 change weaken tenant isolation and the superuser business-RLS bypass cross the wall."
+    },
+    {
+      "file": "packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/auto-org-admin-grant.ts",
+      "adrs": ["ADR-0105"],
+      "invariant": "The one provisioning bridge from an admin-grade membership to the `organization_admin` capability grant — idempotent, and revoked on demotion. Under a wall-less posture it hands out `organization_admin_no_bypass` instead: blanket record visibility must be granted deliberately, never as a side effect of a membership role (the ADR-0105 F2 finding)."
+    },
+    {
+      "file": "packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/invitation-placement.ts",
+      "adrs": ["ADR-0105"],
+      "invariant": "Placement intent is authorized at ISSUANCE by dry-running `DelegatedAdminGate` against the very `sys_user_position` rows acceptance would write — an invitation can never place what its issuer could not have assigned directly. Acceptance runs under system context, so skipping the issuance check ('acceptance re-checks anyway') would be an escalation hole, not a simplification."
+    },
+    {
+      "file": "packages/spec/src/identity/position.zod.ts",
+      "adrs": ["ADR-0090"],
+      "invariant": "Positions are deliberately FLAT — no `parent`, no hierarchy (D3). Visibility rollup lives on the business-unit tree; adding a second tree here is the mistake ADR-0057 D5 retired and D3 bans, and the word 'role' is reserved-forbidden in this vocabulary."
+    },
+    {
+      "file": "packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/permission-evaluator.ts",
+      "adrs": ["ADR-0057", "ADR-0066"],
+      "invariant": "The superuser bypass derives solely from a resolved set carrying the `objects['*']` wildcard with `viewAllRecords`/`modifyAllRecords` (ADR-0066 D2) — no stored boolean, no role fast-path. Scope depth (own/unit/unit_and_below/org) resolves to an effective access depth per operation class (ADR-0057 D1); an unenforceable depth is a compile error, never silent fail-open (ADR-0049)."
     }
   ]
 }