diff --git a/plugins/codex-security/references/final-report.md b/plugins/codex-security/references/final-report.md
index 5886eff61..8fa17bd1e 100644
--- a/plugins/codex-security/references/final-report.md
+++ b/plugins/codex-security/references/final-report.md
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ Affected lines must include the root broken control or dangerous sink line when
 Then render these subsections under each finding:
 
 - `#### Summary`
-  - Explain why the issue matters, what the vulnerable path is, and why the current controls are insufficient.
+  - Start with how to reproduce the issue and what happens in the product, then explain why the code causes that behavior.
   - Wrap code identifiers, RPC names, functions, types, fields, parameters, configuration keys, and literal values in single backticks.
 - `#### Root Cause`
   - State the violated security invariant and explain exactly how the implementation breaks it.
diff --git a/plugins/codex-security/references/finding-detail-fields.md b/plugins/codex-security/references/finding-detail-fields.md
index da6979888..df5d5fa82 100644
--- a/plugins/codex-security/references/finding-detail-fields.md
+++ b/plugins/codex-security/references/finding-detail-fields.md
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ For every reportable finding in `findings.json`, preserve the validated reasonin
 
 ## Writing Rules
 
+- Lead the title and `summary` with the user action and product impact.
+- Use `attackPath.summary` to briefly explain how to reproduce the issue.
+- Explain how the code causes that product behavior in `rootCause.summary`. Use plain language and avoid repetition.
 - Wrap RPC names, functions, types, fields, parameters, configuration keys, literal identifiers, and short expressions in single backticks. For example: `environment/add`, `environmentId`, `execServerUrl`, and `EnvironmentManager::upsert_environment()`.
 - Keep code out of prose. Put source snippets in `codeEvidence[].code`, then reference them from the section that explains why the snippet matters. The workspace consolidates those referenced snippets under **Root cause** so the violated invariant and its source proof stay together.
 - Root cause must be a source-backed walkthrough, not a verdict paragraph. Start with the code where user-controlled data is declared, decoded, or read; follow each meaningful call, transformation, or state transition; then show the missing control, dangerous operation, and later consumer when it affects impact.
@@ -106,11 +109,7 @@ The following shape shows how to encode the `environment/add` reserved-environme
   "validation": {
     "method": "static source trace",
     "summary": "The source trace confirms that an `environment/add` caller controls both inputs, the RPC forwards them unchanged, and runtime insertion accepts `local`.",
-    "evidenceRefs": [
-      "rpc-input",
-      "rpc-forward",
-      "runtime-upsert"
-    ],
+    "evidenceRefs": ["rpc-input", "rpc-forward", "runtime-upsert"],
     "assertions": [
       "The runtime path lacks the reserved-ID check present during startup.",
       "Inserting `local` replaces the existing `HashMap` entry."
@@ -139,11 +138,7 @@ The following shape shows how to encode the `environment/add` reserved-environme
       "entrypoint": "experimental `environment/add` RPC",
       "outcome": "future operations selected for `local` are routed to the remote executor"
     },
-    "evidenceRefs": [
-      "rpc-forward",
-      "runtime-upsert",
-      "default-lookup"
-    ],
+    "evidenceRefs": ["rpc-forward", "runtime-upsert", "default-lookup"],
     "impact": {
       "level": "medium",
       "why": "Later commands and filesystem requests selected for `local` can be routed to the attacker-controlled remote executor."
diff --git a/plugins/codex-security/skills/track-findings/SKILL.md b/plugins/codex-security/skills/track-findings/SKILL.md
index 93608afa0..e546e2c16 100644
--- a/plugins/codex-security/skills/track-findings/SKILL.md
+++ b/plugins/codex-security/skills/track-findings/SKILL.md
@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ Treat failed requests, incomplete exact-identifier searches, unread plausible ma
 
 ### 4. Preview The Exact Writes
 
+Follow the Writing Rules in `../../references/finding-detail-fields.md`. Explain the problem, how to reproduce it, the cause, the proposed fix, and validation. Put source locations and scan identifiers last.
+
 Present a compact review before any mutation. For every finding show:
 
 - finding id and fingerprint
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/src/publication.ts b/sdk/typescript/src/publication.ts
index dfa3bef36..03f8a6719 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/src/publication.ts
+++ b/sdk/typescript/src/publication.ts
@@ -112,7 +112,50 @@ function renderFindingDescription(
 ): string {
   const { coverage } = contract;
   const { scan } = contract.manifest;
-  const lines = [
+  const lines = ["## Summary", "", finding.summary];
+
+  if (finding.attackPath?.summary !== undefined) {
+    lines.push("", "## Reproduction summary", "", finding.attackPath.summary);
+  }
+
+  const rootCause = finding.rootCause;
+  if (typeof rootCause === "string") {
+    lines.push("", "## Root cause", "", rootCause);
+  } else if (rootCause !== undefined) {
+    lines.push("", "## Root cause", "", rootCause.summary);
+    if (rootCause.code !== undefined) {
+      lines.push("", fencedCode(rootCause.code, rootCause.language));
+    }
+  }
+
+  lines.push("", "## Remediation", "", finding.remediation);
+
+  const validation = finding.validation;
+  const limits = [
+    ...new Set([
+      ...(validation?.limitations ?? []),
+      ...(validation?.counterEvidence ?? []),
+      ...(finding.attackPath?.limitations ?? []),
+    ]),
+  ];
+  if (validation?.summary || validation?.method || limits.length > 0) {
+    lines.push("", "## Validation", "");
+    if (validation?.summary) lines.push(validation.summary, "");
+    if (validation?.method) lines.push(`**Method:** ${validation.method}`, "");
+    lines.push(...limits.map((limit) => `- ${limit}`));
+  }
+
+  if (finding.codeEvidence !== undefined && finding.codeEvidence.length > 0) {
+    lines.push("", "## Source-code evidence");
+    for (const evidence of finding.codeEvidence) {
+      lines.push("", ...renderCodeEvidence(scan.target, evidence));
+    }
+  }
+
+  lines.push(
+    "",
+    "---",
+    "",
     "## Codex Security finding",
     "",
     `**Scan ID:** ${scan.id}`,
@@ -148,30 +191,7 @@ function renderFindingDescription(
     ...finding.locations.map((location) =>
       renderLocation(scan.target, location),
     ),
-    "",
-    "## Summary",
-    "",
-    finding.summary,
-  ];
-
-  const rootCause = finding.rootCause;
-  if (typeof rootCause === "string") {
-    lines.push("", "## Root cause", "", rootCause);
-  } else if (rootCause !== undefined) {
-    lines.push("", "## Root cause", "", rootCause.summary);
-    if (rootCause.code !== undefined) {
-      lines.push("", fencedCode(rootCause.code, rootCause.language));
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (finding.codeEvidence !== undefined && finding.codeEvidence.length > 0) {
-    lines.push("", "## Source-code evidence");
-    for (const evidence of finding.codeEvidence) {
-      lines.push("", ...renderCodeEvidence(scan.target, evidence));
-    }
-  }
-
-  lines.push("", "## Remediation", "", finding.remediation);
+  );
   return `${lines.join("\n")}\n`;
 }
 
diff --git a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/publication.test.ts b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/publication.test.ts
index 5581d118e..ac969d4e5 100644
--- a/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/publication.test.ts
+++ b/sdk/typescript/tests-ts/publication.test.ts
@@ -150,9 +150,58 @@ describe("scan publication preparation", () => {
     expect(issue.description).toContain("**Uploaded:** 2026-06-01T10:30:00Z");
     expect(issue.description).toContain("without containment validation");
     expect(issue.description).toContain("Normalize destinations");
+    expect(
+      issue.description.indexOf("without containment validation"),
+    ).toBeLessThan(issue.description.indexOf("**Scan ID:**"));
+    expect(issue.description.indexOf("Normalize destinations")).toBeLessThan(
+      issue.description.indexOf("**Scan ID:**"),
+    );
     expect(issue.description).not.toContain("/blob/deadbeef/");
   });
 
+  test("keeps the reproduction and validation limits ahead of scan metadata", async () => {
+    const scanDirectory = await copyExample();
+    const findingsPath = join(scanDirectory, "findings.json");
+    const findings = await readJson<FindingsDocument>(findingsPath);
+    const finding = findings.findings[0]!;
+    const reproduction =
+      "Import an archive containing ../escape.txt. The importer should reject it; source review shows it writing outside the selected directory. This was not run.";
+    const unrun = "No runtime reproduction was run.";
+    const attackPath = {
+      summary: reproduction,
+      limitations: [unrun, "Files must be writable by the importing process."],
+    };
+    const validation = {
+      method: "Source review",
+      summary: "The importer passes the entry name to the filesystem write.",
+      limitations: [unrun],
+      counterEvidence: ["The user must first choose to import the archive."],
+    };
+    finding.attackPath = attackPath;
+    finding.validation = validation;
+    await writeJson(findingsPath, findings);
+    await reseal(scanDirectory);
+
+    const { description } = (
+      await prepareScanPublication(scanDirectory, DESTINATION)
+    ).issues[0]!;
+
+    const metadata = description.indexOf("**Scan ID:**");
+    for (const text of [
+      finding.summary,
+      reproduction,
+      validation.summary,
+      validation.method,
+      ...validation.limitations,
+      ...validation.counterEvidence,
+      ...attackPath.limitations,
+    ]) {
+      expect(description).toContain(text);
+      expect(description.indexOf(text)).toBeLessThan(metadata);
+    }
+    expect(description.split(unrun)).toHaveLength(2);
+  });
+
   test("uses the canonical scan directory beneath an aliased parent", async () => {
     const root = await mkdtemp(
       join(tmpdir(), "codex-security-publication-alias-"),