Context
The conversation-trust privacy landing (Slice A + B) ships sealed audio, restricted-meeting policy, egress controls, audit, and PARA. The in-app Recall / AI Assistant — the native chat panel and the developer/terminal "Discuss with AI" Recall — is deferred (Slice C's live Context/Recall orchestration) and ships fail-closed / temporarily unavailable in this landing.
What still works (not deferred)
The MCP path stays fully functional and policy-enforced: Claude Desktop / Cowork / external agents read your meetings with restricted meetings excluded/filtered. Plus search, CLI, summarize, audit, and PARA. So "the AI remembers your meetings" still works via MCP — only the in-app assistant surface defers.
Why deferred
The in-app Recall paths are live-egress surfaces (Slice C territory), and under adversarial review they were incompatible with the restricted-meeting promise in ways that generated attack round after attack round (the live-Recall analog of the graph #513 / durability #510 defers):
- Terminal/"Discuss with AI" Recall creates a symlink to the raw corpus and instructs the agent it has complete meeting history and may raw-grep it — a total restricted-bypass; meeting mode directly materializes the selected transcript.
- Native chat egress had provider identity that was name/env-based (spoofable), unbounded history/response bytes, raw Claude stream metadata reaching the UI bus, and Ollama cancel that didn't abort transport.
Hardening all of this is C-scope live-fence engineering; deferring it keeps it off the trust-landing critical path while cleanly preserving the restricted-meeting guarantee (with all in-app Recall entry points unavailable, no live assistant path remains to bypass policy).
Until then (this landing's behavior)
- In-app native Recall chat, terminal/"Discuss with AI" Recall, and any assistant spawn are fail-closed "temporarily unavailable until Slice C."
- Legacy assistant-workspace capabilities/instructions/raw-corpus symlinks are scrubbed on startup.
Slice C rebuild requirements (the follow-up)
- Descriptor-authorized exact snapshots; transitive history reauthorization; no raw-corpus symlink or "raw-grep everything" instruction.
- Authentic provider identity (not name/env), loopback-only no-proxy for local providers, tool-less launch for cloud providers.
- Bounded history/response bytes; no raw stream metadata to the UI bus; cancellation that aborts transport; ordered egress under one deadline/budget.
Context
The conversation-trust privacy landing (Slice A + B) ships sealed audio, restricted-meeting policy, egress controls, audit, and PARA. The in-app Recall / AI Assistant — the native chat panel and the developer/terminal "Discuss with AI" Recall — is deferred (Slice C's live Context/Recall orchestration) and ships fail-closed / temporarily unavailable in this landing.
What still works (not deferred)
The MCP path stays fully functional and policy-enforced: Claude Desktop / Cowork / external agents read your meetings with restricted meetings excluded/filtered. Plus search, CLI, summarize, audit, and PARA. So "the AI remembers your meetings" still works via MCP — only the in-app assistant surface defers.
Why deferred
The in-app Recall paths are live-egress surfaces (Slice C territory), and under adversarial review they were incompatible with the restricted-meeting promise in ways that generated attack round after attack round (the live-Recall analog of the graph #513 / durability #510 defers):
Hardening all of this is C-scope live-fence engineering; deferring it keeps it off the trust-landing critical path while cleanly preserving the restricted-meeting guarantee (with all in-app Recall entry points unavailable, no live assistant path remains to bypass policy).
Until then (this landing's behavior)
Slice C rebuild requirements (the follow-up)