diff --git a/docs/guides/client/messages.mdx b/docs/guides/client/messages.mdx
index c5539fb55..00d8c0725 100644
--- a/docs/guides/client/messages.mdx
+++ b/docs/guides/client/messages.mdx
@@ -129,6 +129,14 @@ const resumed = await session.send({
 await resumed.result();
 ```
 
+For response-authorized approvals, submitting `approve` creates a responder-bound candidate; it does not immediately close the shared request. Keep consuming the durable stream:
+
+- `approval.candidate` reports safe pending, rejected, failed, timed-out, and stale outcomes. Candidate-local UI should be private to its responder.
+- candidate-correlated `authorization.required` carries a private sign-in challenge.
+- `approval.settled` is the terminal authority for removing shared controls and shows whether the request was approved or cancelled.
+
+Delivery only acknowledges ingestion. OAuth may resume the same candidate later, so reconnecting clients should replay settlement history to repair stale UI.
+
 You can send `message`, `inputResponses`, and `clientContext` together when the resumed turn needs both a human answer and follow-up text.
 
 ## Single-use responses
diff --git a/docs/tools/human-in-the-loop.md b/docs/tools/human-in-the-loop.md
index 01e008f2a..2cbe33587 100644
--- a/docs/tools/human-in-the-loop.md
+++ b/docs/tools/human-in-the-loop.md
@@ -56,6 +56,33 @@ Policies can also return `"approved"` or `"denied"` to decide automatically. Use
 
 Gating a side effect on approval is also how you make non-idempotent work safe across replays: a charge or email that sits behind `always()` can't fire from a re-run step without a fresh human decision.
 
+### Authorize who may approve
+
+Request-time approval decides whether a tool call prompts. To also authorize the person responding, use the object form:
+
+```ts
+approval: {
+  policy: always(),
+  async authorizeResponse({ request, responder, session, auth }) {
+    const identity = await auth.getToken(approverAuth);
+    return await canApprove({ identity, request, responder, session })
+      ? "allowed"
+      : {
+          status: "rejected",
+          safeReason: "You are not permitted to approve this action.",
+        };
+  },
+},
+```
+
+`request` contains the stable request, call, tool name, and tool input. `responder` is the identity derived by the authenticated channel ingress. `session` exposes read-only identity and lineage. `auth` exposes only `getToken` and `requireAuth`; it has no sandbox, skill, model, channel, or tool-execution capability.
+
+Calling `auth.getToken()` uses the same durable `authorization.required` flow as tool execution. If sign-in is needed, eve keeps the shared approval pending, binds the private challenge to that responder, and re-runs the currently deployed authorizer after callback. Return an authored `safeReason` only when it is safe to show privately to the responder. Thrown errors and the ten-second authorizer timeout fail closed with generic retry feedback.
+
+Approval controls are **Approve / Cancel**. Approve runs `authorizeResponse`. Cancel means “do not run this proposed call” and uses the channel's ordinary authenticated interaction boundary without running the authorizer. Multiple responders may validate concurrently; the first approved candidate or Cancel settles atomically, and late candidates become stale.
+
+The stream exposes `approval.candidate` progress and terminal `approval.settled` events. Candidate submission acknowledges ingestion only; clients keep shared controls open until settlement. Credentials, OAuth URLs, and raw provider errors are not included in candidate audit history.
+
 ### Skipping approval for schedule-dispatched turns
 
 `session.auth.current` identifies the caller of this turn. Markdown schedules use the app principal (`authenticator: "app"`, `principalId: "eve:app"`, `principalType: "runtime"`) automatically. A `run` schedule must pass its `appAuth` to `receive(...)` for the child session to use that principal. Match all three fields to skip approval for automated turns while still prompting when a person calls the same tool:
diff --git a/packages/eve/src/client/message-reducer.test.ts b/packages/eve/src/client/message-reducer.test.ts
index 1adf4f961..1fc13ad3d 100644
--- a/packages/eve/src/client/message-reducer.test.ts
+++ b/packages/eve/src/client/message-reducer.test.ts
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import {
   createActionsRequestedEvent,
   createAuthorizationCompletedEvent,
   createAuthorizationRequiredEvent,
+  createApprovalSettledEvent,
   createInputRequestedEvent,
   createMessageAppendedEvent,
   createMessageCompletedEvent,
@@ -427,6 +428,50 @@ describe("defaultMessageReducer", () => {
     ]);
   });
 
+  it("marks shared approval UI only after durable settlement", () => {
+    const reducer = defaultMessageReducer();
+    let data = reducer.reduce(
+      reducer.initial(),
+      createInputRequestedEvent({
+        requests: [
+          {
+            action: { callId: "call_1", input: {}, kind: "tool-call", toolName: "bash" },
+            options: [
+              { id: "approve", label: "Approve" },
+              { id: "cancel", label: "Cancel" },
+            ],
+            prompt: "Approve?",
+            requestId: "approval_1",
+          },
+        ],
+        sequence: 0,
+        stepIndex: 0,
+        turnId: "turn_1",
+      }),
+    );
+
+    data = reducer.reduce(
+      data,
+      createApprovalSettledEvent({
+        outcome: "approved",
+        requestId: "approval_1",
+        responderPrincipalId: "slack:T1:U1",
+        sequence: 1,
+        stepIndex: 0,
+        turnId: "turn_1",
+      }),
+    );
+
+    expect(data.messages[0]?.parts).toEqual(
+      expect.arrayContaining([
+        expect.objectContaining({
+          approval: { approved: true, id: "approval_1", reason: undefined },
+          state: "approval-responded",
+        }),
+      ]),
+    );
+  });
+
   it("marks input requests as responded when the client submits a response", () => {
     const reducer = defaultMessageReducer();
     let data = reducer.reduce(
diff --git a/packages/eve/src/client/message-reducer.ts b/packages/eve/src/client/message-reducer.ts
index a033a6085..b80d0628b 100644
--- a/packages/eve/src/client/message-reducer.ts
+++ b/packages/eve/src/client/message-reducer.ts
@@ -168,6 +168,42 @@ function reduceMessageData(data: EveMessageData, event: EveAgentReducerEvent): E
       return next;
     }
 
+    case "approval.candidate":
+      // Candidate progress is responder-specific. Applications can consume the
+      // raw stream event for private UI without changing the shared tool part.
+      return data;
+
+    case "approval.settled": {
+      const existing = findToolPartByApprovalId(data, event.data.requestId);
+      if (existing === undefined) return data;
+      if (event.data.outcome === "approved") {
+        return updateToolPart(data, existing.toolCallId, {
+          approval: { approved: true, id: event.data.requestId, reason: undefined },
+          input: existing.input,
+          state: "approval-responded",
+          stepIndex: existing.stepIndex,
+          toolCallId: existing.toolCallId,
+          toolMetadata: existing.toolMetadata,
+          toolName: existing.toolName,
+          type: "dynamic-tool",
+        });
+      }
+      return updateToolPart(data, existing.toolCallId, {
+        approval: {
+          approved: false,
+          id: event.data.requestId,
+          reason: "Tool execution was cancelled.",
+        },
+        input: existing.input,
+        state: "output-denied",
+        stepIndex: existing.stepIndex,
+        toolCallId: existing.toolCallId,
+        toolMetadata: existing.toolMetadata,
+        toolName: existing.toolName,
+        type: "dynamic-tool",
+      });
+    }
+
     case "action.result": {
       const descriptor = normalizeActionResult(event.data.result);
       const existing = findToolPart(data, event.data.result.callId);