diff --git a/.github/actions/setup-openclaw/action.yml b/.github/actions/setup-openclaw/action.yml
index fb3cc1a478..d4a8367db7 100644
--- a/.github/actions/setup-openclaw/action.yml
+++ b/.github/actions/setup-openclaw/action.yml
@@ -81,7 +81,15 @@ runs:
       shell: bash
       env:
         ACTION_DIR: ${{ github.action_path }}
-      run: |
+      # zizmor github-env, analysed and accepted: the audit fires on any
+      # $GITHUB_PATH write, because a write whose value an attacker controls
+      # puts a directory of their choosing ahead of the real tools. The value
+      # here is `github.action_path` — the runner's own checkout path for this
+      # action, not a caller input, not event data — bound through env rather
+      # than expanded into the script. Exposing its own node_modules/.bin is
+      # the whole point of the step, and there is no other way to put a
+      # composite action's binaries on PATH for the steps that follow.
+      run: | # zizmor: ignore[github-env]
         set -e
         npm ci --no-audit --no-fund --prefix "$ACTION_DIR"
         echo "$ACTION_DIR/node_modules/.bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
@@ -103,7 +111,15 @@ runs:
       shell: bash
       env:
         OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN_INPUT: ${{ inputs.gateway-token }}
-      run: |
+      # zizmor github-env, analysed and accepted: the audit fires on any
+      # $GITHUB_ENV write built from a value the step did not define itself,
+      # because $GITHUB_ENV is line-oriented and a newline in the value
+      # defines extra variables for every later step in the job. That is
+      # exactly the case the `case` guard below rejects, loudly and before
+      # the write — which is the mitigation the audit asks for, and predates
+      # this declaration. The value also reaches the script through env
+      # rather than being expanded into it, so it is never parsed as shell.
+      run: | # zizmor: ignore[github-env]
         set -e
         # Downstream workflow steps read this to authenticate dashboard
         # requests against the running gateway. Empty token = dashboard
diff --git a/.github/workflows/supply-chain.yml b/.github/workflows/supply-chain.yml
index a4e0ee6fa7..a91f5759f3 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/supply-chain.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/supply-chain.yml
@@ -249,17 +249,26 @@ jobs:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
         run: |
           mkdir -p audit
-          # Workflow definitions only, which is the scope the SecurityAuditScanner
-          # component describes.
+          # Workflow definitions AND the composite actions under .github/actions.
           #
-          # The composite action under .github/actions/ is a real gap and is NOT
-          # covered here: its steps run inline in the calling job, with that job's
-          # token and secrets, so it carries the same rule families a workflow
-          # does, and nothing scans it today. Widening this input set to include
-          # it is a one-line change, but it is a scope the blueprint does not
-          # describe, so it needs the product record first rather than arriving
-          # as a side effect of turning the scanner on. Tracked as follow-up.
+          # A composite action's steps run inline in the calling job, with that
+          # job's token and secrets, so it carries the same rule families a
+          # workflow does — and until now nothing scanned it. This was recorded
+          # here as a known gap and deferred; clawmetry-cloud closed the same
+          # gap on its own mirror of this scan (cloud #2299), which left this
+          # repo the only one of the three whose actions nothing audited.
+          #
+          # Composite actions are named individually rather than by directory:
+          # pointing zizmor at a directory hands it every YAML file inside, and
+          # a non-action YAML landing there later would abort the audit
+          # (recorded as a scanner outage below) rather than be skipped.
           inputs=".github/workflows"
+          if [ -d .github/actions ]; then
+            while IFS= read -r a; do
+              inputs="$inputs $a"
+            done < <(find .github/actions -type f \
+              \( -name 'action.yml' -o -name 'action.yaml' \) | sort)
+          fi
           # Record the file set the scanner was handed. A finding list is
           # identical whether it audited thirty-seven files or none, so
           # coverage is the one thing the JSON cannot tell you afterwards.