From 5b4efc0f215ebea328086cdf16121ef8b97d5f69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yakimoto <66892052+yakimoto@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 13:19:47 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 1/6] ci: this repo's public-repo-guard never scanned a single issue or comment body MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Measured across all 28 public wave-av repos (claude-workstation#1747, #1794): TWO coverage shapes satisfy the one required check name `Secrets + content policy`. 27 repos triggers: pull_request, push, workflow_dispatch jobs: guard 1 repo triggers: + issues, issue_comment jobs: + body-guard This repo is in the 27. All 28 report the same green check. The outlier is wave-moq-edge, and its own comment says why it matters: "`edited` matters as much as `opened`: a body can be made to leak long after the PR is first raised, and until this workflow covered it, nothing ever re-scanned." A PR/issue/comment BODY is exactly as world-readable as the tree, and until now it was scanned by nothing server-side. That gap was not theoretical on wave-moq-edge: a PR was blocked for naming a private repo in wrangler.toml while the very same name, with more operational detail attached, sat unchallenged in its body. WHAT LANDS HERE — the bundle the workflow's own header names, minus what this repo already has (.gitleaks.toml and content-policy.sh are already vendored): .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml replaced (73 -> 163 lines) scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh new, mode 100755 scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh new, mode 100755 Copied from wave-moq-edge, which has run this shape in production. Modes preserved via the git trees API — the contents API would have created both scripts 100644. HONEST ABOUT WHAT IT CAN DO. On a PR this PREVENTS the merge. On an issue or comment the text is already public the moment it posts, so this is DETECTION: it says go redact, fast. Only a client-side pre-write hook stops that class before publication. Also inherited from the reference: concurrency moves from workflow-level to PER JOB, because the two jobs want opposite behaviour. A workflow-level group forced one policy on both, and rapid body edits cancelled the tree job repeatedly — every cancelled check-run stays attached to the commit, so the PR reported UNSTABLE while the live runs were green. The body gate ships with its own fixtures and runs them in CI. Its NEGATIVE cases are the load-bearing half: a leak gate that blocks legitimate cross-repo references gets switched off, and then it protects nothing. Refs wave-av/claude-workstation#1747. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) --- .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml | 100 ++++++++++++- scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh | 139 ++++++++++++++++++ .../tests/body-policy.test.sh | 108 ++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 342 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100755 scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh create mode 100755 scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh diff --git a/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml b/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml index 719718a..bba2f67 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml @@ -13,10 +13,11 @@ name: public-repo-guard # wave-av/.github must not be able to alter another repo's secret scanner). The # gitleaks binary is version-pinned AND SHA-256-verified before it runs. # -# To install on a new repo, copy all three files together: +# To install on a new repo, copy all four files together: # .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml # .gitleaks.toml # scripts/public-repo-guard/content-policy.sh +# scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh # # Scan scope: the published working TREE (gitleaks --no-git), NOT git history. The # goal is "what is public right now is clean", so a shallow checkout is sufficient. @@ -25,24 +26,44 @@ name: public-repo-guard # path glob to a repo-root `.guardignore`, or extend the repo-local `.gitleaks.toml`. on: + # `edited` matters as much as `opened`: a body can be made to leak long after the + # PR is first raised, and until this workflow covered it, nothing ever re-scanned. pull_request: + types: [opened, edited, reopened, synchronize] + issues: + types: [opened, edited] + issue_comment: + types: [created, edited] push: branches: [main, master] workflow_dispatch: +# `pull_request`, deliberately NOT `pull_request_target`: a fork PR must never get +# a write token or repo secrets just because a gate wanted to read its body. permissions: contents: read -concurrency: - group: public-repo-guard-${{ github.ref }} - cancel-in-progress: true +# Concurrency is per JOB, not per workflow: the two jobs want opposite behaviour. +# A workflow-level group would force one policy on both, and it showed: rapid body +# edits cancelled the tree job over and over, and every cancelled check-run stays +# attached to the commit, so the PR reported UNSTABLE while the live runs were green. jobs: guard: name: Secrets + content policy + # Skips issue/comment events (the tree scan has nothing to say about a comment, + # and the org should not pay for a gitleaks run every time anyone posts one) and + # skips `edited` (a title or body edit does not change the tree). + if: >- + (github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action != 'edited') + || github.event_name == 'push' + || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' + concurrency: + group: public-repo-guard-tree-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }} + cancel-in-progress: true runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@93cb6efe18208431cddfb8368fd83d5badbf9bfd # v5.0.1 + - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 # gitleaks' GitHub Action requires a paid license for organizations; the CLI # itself is MIT-licensed and free. Pin the version AND verify the release @@ -71,3 +92,72 @@ jobs: env: GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS: ${{ vars.GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS }} run: bash scripts/public-repo-guard/content-policy.sh . + + # The body gate's own fixtures. Its negatives are the load-bearing half — a + # leak gate that blocks legitimate cross-repo references gets switched off, + # and then it protects nothing. Runs here so a regression is caught by CI + # rather than by a leak. + - name: body policy self-test (fixtures) + run: bash scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh + + # The other half of a public repo's surface. `guard` above scans the published + # TREE; a PR/issue/comment BODY is just as world-readable and, until this job, + # was scanned by nothing server-side. That gap was real, not theoretical: a PR + # was blocked for naming a private repo in wrangler.toml while the very same + # name, with more operational detail attached, sat unchallenged in its body. + # + # Honest about what it can and cannot do. On a PR this PREVENTS the merge. On an + # issue or comment the text is already public the moment it posts, so this is + # detection — it tells us to go redact, fast. Only the client-side pre-write hook + # can stop that class before publication. + body-guard: + name: Body content policy + if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' || github.event_name == 'issues' || github.event_name == 'issue_comment' + concurrency: + # Keyed on the specific PR / comment / issue rather than github.ref, because + # issue events all report the default branch and a ref-keyed group would let + # two comments cancel each other, leaving one unscanned. + # + # cancel-in-progress is deliberately FALSE. Every version of a body deserves a + # verdict, the job is seconds long, and a cancelled check-run lingers on the + # commit and makes an otherwise-green PR look broken. + group: public-repo-guard-body-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.comment.id || github.event.issue.number || github.ref }} + cancel-in-progress: false + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + # Only the gate's own scripts are needed — no reason to pay for the whole + # tree on every comment. + sparse-checkout: scripts/public-repo-guard + sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false + + - name: Install ripgrep + run: command -v rg >/dev/null || (sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq ripgrep) + + # The body is read straight out of the event payload FILE and written to + # another file. It is never interpolated into a run: block and never placed + # in an environment variable, so shell metacharacters in a hostile PR body + # have nothing to act on. jq is preinstalled on the GitHub-hosted images. + - name: Materialize the untrusted title/body to a file + run: | + set -euo pipefail + mkdir -p "$RUNNER_TEMP/bodyscan" + # An UNRECOGNIZED payload shape must fail, never quietly scan nothing and + # report a pass. If the event schema ever moves, this job must go red + # rather than become a green rubber stamp over an unscanned body. + if [ "$(jq -r 'has("pull_request") or has("issue") or has("comment")' "$GITHUB_EVENT_PATH")" != "true" ]; then + echo "::error title=public-repo-guard (body-guard)::Event payload contains no pull_request/issue/comment object — refusing to report a pass on an unscanned body." + exit 1 + fi + jq -r '[.pull_request.title, .pull_request.body, + .issue.title, .issue.body, + .comment.body] + | map(select(. != null)) | join("\n")' \ + "$GITHUB_EVENT_PATH" > "$RUNNER_TEMP/bodyscan/body.txt" + echo "scanning $(wc -l < "$RUNNER_TEMP/bodyscan/body.txt") line(s) of body text" + + - name: body policy (PR / issue / comment text) + env: + GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS: ${{ vars.GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS }} + run: bash scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh "$RUNNER_TEMP/bodyscan/body.txt" diff --git a/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh b/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..a0b421f --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# WAVE public-repo BODY policy — the internal-leak gate for PR/issue/comment text. +# +# Companion to content-policy.sh. That script scans the published working TREE; +# this one scans the other half of a public repo's surface: pull-request titles +# and bodies, issue bodies, and comment bodies. Those are equally world-readable +# and, until this script existed, were scanned by NOTHING server-side. That gap +# was not theoretical — a PR was merged whose wrangler.toml was correctly BLOCKED +# for naming a private repo while the PR body named the same repo, with more +# operational detail attached, and sailed through. +# +# Usage: scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh +# holds the untrusted text, already materialized to disk. It is passed as +# a PATH and only ever read — the body is never interpolated into a command line +# or an environment variable, so no amount of shell metacharacters in a PR body +# can influence what runs here. +# +# Exit: 0 clean · 1 blocking violation · 2 scanner error (fail closed). +# +# Allowlisting: a line carrying `guard:allow ` is exempt (an accidental +# leak never carries the marker; a deliberate one is visible in a public diff), as +# is any line matching the ABOUT-THE-CONTROL allowlist below. +set -uo pipefail + +FILE="${1:-}" +[[ -n "$FILE" && -f "$FILE" ]] || { echo "::error::body-policy: usage: body-policy.sh "; exit 2; } +command -v rg >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "::error::body-policy: ripgrep (rg) required"; exit 2; } + +VIOLATIONS=0 + +# Lines that TALK ABOUT the control rather than leaking through it. Without this, +# the gate blocks its own pull requests and every security discussion — the +# self-referential trap that gets a gate switched off. Ported verbatim in intent +# from the client-side gate's allowlist, which was built for exactly this. +ABOUT_THE_CONTROL='(public-repo-guard|body-policy|content-policy|public-github-write-gate|\bNDA\s+(gate|guard|policy|denylist|sweep|scan|hook)\b|\bno\s+NDA\b|responsib\w*\s+disclos|SECURITY\.md)' + +# check +check() { + local sev="$1" name="$2" re="$3" why="$4" + [[ -z "$re" ]] && { echo "::error::body-policy: internal bug — empty regex for rule '$name'"; exit 2; } + # rg exit: 0=match, 1=no match, >=2=real error → FAIL CLOSED. A gate that passes + # because its scanner broke is worse than no gate: it reports success. + local raw rc + raw="$(rg -nP --no-filename -- "$re" "$FILE" 2>/dev/null)"; rc=$? + if (( rc >= 2 )); then + echo "::error title=public-repo-guard ($name)::ripgrep failed (exit $rc) scanning rule '$name' — failing closed." + exit 2 + fi + # Filter with rg, not grep: BSD/macOS grep has no -P, so a `grep -P` allowlist + # silently errors out locally while working on GNU/CI — the gate would then + # disagree with itself depending on where it ran. rg is already required above. + local matches + matches="$(printf '%s' "$raw" \ + | rg -vN -- 'guard:allow[[:space:]]+[^[:space:]]' \ + | rg -vNiP -- "$ABOUT_THE_CONTROL" || true)" + [[ -z "$matches" ]] && return 0 + local count; count="$(printf '%s\n' "$matches" | grep -c '')" + # Print the LINE NUMBER only — never the matched text. This annotation is itself + # world-readable, so echoing the hit would re-publish the very thing we caught. + echo "::group::[$sev] $name — $why" + printf '%s\n' "$matches" | sed -E 's/^([0-9]+):.*/ line \1: «match redacted — view the body to see it»/' + echo "::endgroup::" + if [[ "$sev" == "BLOCK" ]]; then + echo "::error title=public-repo-guard ($name)::$why — $count occurrence(s) in the title/body. Edit the body to remove it, then re-run." + VIOLATIONS=$((VIOLATIONS+1)) + else + echo "::warning title=public-repo-guard ($name)::$why — $count occurrence(s) (non-blocking; review)." + fi +} + +# --- Credential formats — never legitimate in prose -------------------------- +check BLOCK stripe-live-key '(sk|rk)_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}' 'Live Stripe secret/restricted key' +check BLOCK stripe-account 'acct_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}' 'Live Stripe account ID — financial infra, never publish' +check BLOCK anthropic-key 'sk-ant-(api|admin)[0-9]{2}-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}' 'Real Anthropic API/admin key' +check BLOCK github-pat 'github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{30,}' 'GitHub fine-grained PAT' +check BLOCK supabase-pat 'sbp_[a-f0-9]{40}' 'Supabase personal access token' +check BLOCK aws-akid 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}' 'AWS access key ID' +check BLOCK private-key '-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----' 'Embedded private key material' + +# --- Infrastructure identifiers ---------------------------------------------- +# shellcheck disable=SC2016 # $CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID is literal guidance text +check BLOCK cf-account-id 'account_id\s*[:=]\s*["'"'"']?[0-9a-f]{32}' 'Hardcoded Cloudflare account_id — reference the env var instead' +check BLOCK internal-ip '100\.(6[4-9]|[7-9][0-9]|1[01][0-9]|12[0-7])\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}' 'Internal Tailscale-CGNAT IP (100.64.0.0/10) — internal fleet address' +# shellcheck disable=SC2016 # $HOME is literal guidance text +check BLOCK abs-user-path '/(Users|home)/(?!runner/)[a-z][a-z0-9._-]+/' 'Operator absolute home path — leaks identity and local layout' + +# --- Self-identified internal material --------------------------------------- +# USE vs MENTION. A body that SAYS "internal-only" is leaking; a body that QUOTES +# the phrase is describing a policy — including this one. The lookarounds exempt a +# marker wrapped in straight, smart, or backtick quotes. +# +# Not hypothetical: the first run of this job failed on its own pull request, +# because a review bot had edited the PR body to summarize the change and its +# summary quoted the phrase verbatim. The line-level allowlist could not help — +# that line named no gate. Only use-vs-mention separates the two. +# +# A quoted marker is also a trivial bypass, and that is an accepted trade. The +# threat here is the ACCIDENTAL paste; a deliberate evader has easier routes, and +# `guard:allow ` already exists as the honest, visible one. +check BLOCK internal-marker '(?#260"). A gate that fires on all of +# those gets switched off, and then it protects nothing. +# +# So a bare mention stays silent. What fires is a private repo name within ~140 +# characters of INTERNAL OPERATIONAL DETAIL — a SCREAMING_CASE credential NAME, a +# secret-binding verb, a service binding, or a secret COUNT. That is the topology +# of what is wired to what, and it is the shape that actually leaked. +# +# Names are NOT hardcoded (this file is public); CI injects them via the +# GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS variable. Unset locally → this check is skipped. +if [[ -n "${GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS:-}" ]]; then + OPS_DETAIL='(?:[A-Z][A-Z0-9]*_(?:SECRET|TOKEN|KEY|PASSWORD)|wrangler\s+secret|secret\s+(?:is\s+)?(?:bound|binding|list)|(?:is\s+)?bound\s+on|service\s+binding|\d{2,}\s+secrets)' + _ALT='' + IFS=', ' read -r -a _PRIV <<< "$GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS" + for _name in "${_PRIV[@]}"; do + [[ -z "$_name" ]] && continue + # Regex-escape so metacharacters in a name match literally. + _esc="$(printf '%s' "$_name" | sed -E 's/[][(){}.^$*+?|\\]/\\&/g')" + _ALT="${_ALT:+$_ALT|}${_esc}" + done + if [[ -n "$_ALT" ]]; then + # Both orders: name-then-detail and detail-then-name. + check BLOCK private-repo-ops \ + "(?i)\\b(?:${_ALT})\\b[^\\n]{0,140}?\\b${OPS_DETAIL}|${OPS_DETAIL}[^\\n]{0,140}?\\b(?:${_ALT})\\b" \ + 'A private WAVE repo named alongside internal operational detail (credential name, secret binding, or secret count) — the wiring topology is not public' + fi +fi + +if (( VIOLATIONS > 0 )); then + echo "::error::public-repo-guard: $VIOLATIONS blocking body-policy violation(s) — see annotations above." + exit 1 +fi +echo "public-repo-guard: body policy OK" diff --git a/scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh b/scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..13cc9bf --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# Fixture tests for body-policy.sh. +# +# Deliberately fixture-only: the gate is NEVER proved by writing a real leak into a +# live public PR body, because doing so would publish the exact thing it guards. +# +# The negatives here are the load-bearing half. A leak gate that blocks everything +# is trivially "correct" and useless — it gets disabled within a week. The bare +# cross-reference case below is the one that keeps this gate deployable. +set -uo pipefail + +SCRIPT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)/body-policy.sh" +TMP="$(mktemp -d)" +trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT + +# The names the real gate is configured with come from an org variable; the tests +# pin their own so they are hermetic and do not depend on CI configuration. +export GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS="wave-gateway, wave-transports, agent-money" + +PASS=0; FAIL=0 + +# expect +expect() { + local want="$1" name="$2" body="$3" out rc + printf '%s\n' "$body" > "$TMP/body.txt" + out="$(bash "$SCRIPT" "$TMP/body.txt" 2>&1)"; rc=$? + if [[ "$rc" == "$want" ]]; then + PASS=$((PASS+1)); printf ' ok %s\n' "$name" + else + FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); printf ' FAIL %s — want exit %s, got %s\n%s\n' "$name" "$want" "$rc" "$out" + fi + # The annotation is world-readable; a hit must never echo the matched text. + if [[ "$rc" == 1 ]] && printf '%s' "$out" | grep -qF "$body"; then + FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); printf ' FAIL %s — LEAKED the matched text into the annotation\n' "$name" + fi +} + +echo "body-policy fixtures" + +# --- must BLOCK --------------------------------------------------------------- +expect 1 'private repo + credential name' \ + 'Flip is live: WAVE_VIEWPORT_LEASE_SECRET is bound on wave-gateway now.' +expect 1 'private repo + credential name, reverse order' \ + 'The MOQ_JOIN_SECRET was added; wave-transports picks it up on deploy.' +expect 1 'private repo + secret count' \ + 'wave-gateway went from 74 secrets to 75 after this change.' +expect 1 'private repo + service binding' \ + 'This adds a service binding from the worker to agent-money for settlement.' +expect 1 'operator home path' \ + 'Repro: run it from /Users/someoperator/Documents/notes and it fails.' # enforce-ignore (fixture) +expect 1 'internal-only marker' \ + 'Attaching the internal-only rollout plan for context.' +# Assembled at run time rather than written as a literal: a fixture that LOOKS like +# a live AWS key trips this repo's own pre-commit secret scanners (it did, on the +# first draft). Splitting the prefix keeps the fixture exercising the real regex +# without parking a credential-shaped string in source. +AKID_FIXTURE="AKI""A1234567890ABCDEF" +expect 1 'AWS access key id' \ + "The failing job had ${AKID_FIXTURE} configured." +expect 1 'internal tailscale IP' \ + 'It resolves to 100.71.4.19 from inside the fleet.' + +# --- must PASS (precision — these keep the gate deployable) ------------------- +expect 0 'bare private-repo cross-reference' \ + 'This is the companion change to wave-transports#260; merge that one first.' +expect 0 'two private repos, no operational detail' \ + 'Both wave-gateway and wave-transports will need a follow-up for this.' +expect 0 'credential NAME with no private repo nearby' \ + 'The handler now reads SOME_API_TOKEN from the environment instead of a literal.' +expect 0 'public runner path is not an operator path' \ + 'CI checks out to /home/runner/work/repo/repo before the scan runs.' # enforce-ignore (fixture) +expect 0 'talking about the control' \ + 'body-policy blocks a private repo named next to a SECRET_TOKEN; that is intended.' +expect 0 'explicit guard:allow with a reason' \ + 'Example for the docs: wave-gateway holds EXAMPLE_SECRET — guard:allow documented-example' +expect 0 'ordinary clean body' \ + 'Bumps the draft revision and regenerates the fixtures. No behaviour change.' +# Regression: the first CI run of this job failed on its own PR, because a review +# bot edited the body to summarize the change and quoted the marker verbatim. +expect 0 'marker MENTIONED in straight quotes is a description' \ + 'Blocks infra identifiers and markers (account_id, home paths, "internal-only" text).' +expect 0 'marker MENTIONED in a code span' \ + 'The rule matches `internal-only` and `for internal use` in body text.' +expect 0 'marker MENTIONED in smart quotes' \ + 'Blocks operator home paths and “internal-only” text.' +expect 1 'marker USED unquoted still blocks' \ + 'Attaching the internal-only rollout plan; do not share outside the team.' + +# --- fail closed -------------------------------------------------------------- +# Invoked directly, not through expect(): expect() always materializes a file, so +# it cannot reach these paths. A gate that returns "OK" when it was handed nothing +# to scan is the failure mode this whole file exists to prevent. +for case in "no argument at all::" "nonexistent path::$TMP/does-not-exist.txt"; do + name="${case%%::*}"; arg="${case##*::}" + if [[ -n "$arg" ]]; then bash "$SCRIPT" "$arg" >/dev/null 2>&1; else bash "$SCRIPT" >/dev/null 2>&1; fi + rc=$? + if [[ "$rc" == 2 ]]; then + PASS=$((PASS+1)); printf ' ok %s → exit 2 (fails closed)\n' "$name" + else + FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); printf ' FAIL %s — want exit 2, got %s\n' "$name" "$rc" + fi +done + +echo " ---" +if (( FAIL > 0 )); then + echo " $PASS passed, $FAIL FAILED"; exit 1 +fi +echo " $PASS passed, 0 failed" From 4108a81122023cd72d6e6b908413bfdbd72575bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yakimoto Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 17:31:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/6] ci: run body-guard from the trusted base ref and tighten body-policy scoping Review follow-ups: - body-guard now checks out the base repo's default branch, so a fork PR can no longer ship a neutered body-policy.sh that passes its own body; a loud, documented bootstrap skip covers the installing PR itself - the about-the-control allowlist is scoped to the prose rules (internal-marker, private-repo-ops); credential/infra rules are never exempted by merely mentioning the gate or SECURITY.md - (?i) in private-repo-ops is scoped to the repo names only, so lowercase prose (auth_token, api_key) near a private repo name no longer blocks - ripgrep is verified to have PCRE2 and, when missing, installed from the pinned checksum-verified release binary instead of apt; body-policy.sh fails closed with a clear message on a PCRE2-less build Co-authored-by: Codesmith --- .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml | 58 +++++++++++++++++-- scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh | 29 ++++++++-- .../tests/body-policy.test.sh | 12 ++++ 3 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml b/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml index bba2f67..97c9faa 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml @@ -85,8 +85,25 @@ jobs: - name: gitleaks (secret scan — published tree) run: gitleaks detect --no-git --source . --config .gitleaks.toml --redact --no-banner --exit-code 1 - - name: Install ripgrep - run: command -v rg >/dev/null || (sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq ripgrep) + # Both policy scripts run every rule through `rg -P` (PCRE2), and not every + # rg build has it: Ubuntu 22.04's apt package is built WITHOUT PCRE2, which + # would make every rule fail closed on perfectly clean input. Accept a + # preinstalled rg only if it actually has PCRE2; otherwise install the + # official release binary (which bundles PCRE2), pinned and SHA-256-verified + # the same way gitleaks is above. + - name: Install ripgrep (PCRE2-enabled, pinned + checksum-verified) + env: + RIPGREP_VERSION: "14.1.1" + RIPGREP_SHA256: "4cf9f2741e6c465ffdb7c26f38056a59e2a2544b51f7cc128ef28337eeae4d8e" + run: | + if rg --pcre2-version >/dev/null 2>&1; then exit 0; fi + curl -fsSL --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -o ripgrep.tar.gz \ + "https://github.com/BurntSushi/ripgrep/releases/download/${RIPGREP_VERSION}/ripgrep-${RIPGREP_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz" + echo "${RIPGREP_SHA256} ripgrep.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - + tar -xzf ripgrep.tar.gz --strip-components=1 "ripgrep-${RIPGREP_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/rg" + sudo install -m 0755 rg /usr/local/bin/rg + rm -f rg ripgrep.tar.gz + rg --pcre2-version - name: content policy (WAVE trade-secret / internal-leak gate) env: @@ -125,15 +142,35 @@ jobs: cancel-in-progress: false runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: + # TRUST BOUNDARY: on `pull_request` the default checkout is the PR's merge + # ref, which would let a fork PR ship a neutered body-policy.sh and pass its + # own body — the PR would supply the very script that gates it. This job + # needs no PR code at all (the text under test comes from the event payload), + # so it checks out the BASE repo's default branch and always runs the + # already-reviewed copy of the scanner. A PR that changes body-policy.sh + # still has its copy exercised — by the self-test step in `guard`, against + # fixtures on the tree, where the required check reviews it. - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 with: + ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }} # Only the gate's own scripts are needed — no reason to pay for the whole # tree on every comment. sparse-checkout: scripts/public-repo-guard sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false - - name: Install ripgrep - run: command -v rg >/dev/null || (sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq ripgrep) + - name: Install ripgrep (PCRE2-enabled, pinned + checksum-verified) + env: + RIPGREP_VERSION: "14.1.1" + RIPGREP_SHA256: "4cf9f2741e6c465ffdb7c26f38056a59e2a2544b51f7cc128ef28337eeae4d8e" + run: | + if rg --pcre2-version >/dev/null 2>&1; then exit 0; fi + curl -fsSL --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -o ripgrep.tar.gz \ + "https://github.com/BurntSushi/ripgrep/releases/download/${RIPGREP_VERSION}/ripgrep-${RIPGREP_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz" + echo "${RIPGREP_SHA256} ripgrep.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - + tar -xzf ripgrep.tar.gz --strip-components=1 "ripgrep-${RIPGREP_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/rg" + sudo install -m 0755 rg /usr/local/bin/rg + rm -f rg ripgrep.tar.gz + rg --pcre2-version # The body is read straight out of the event payload FILE and written to # another file. It is never interpolated into a run: block and never placed @@ -160,4 +197,15 @@ jobs: - name: body policy (PR / issue / comment text) env: GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS: ${{ vars.GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS }} - run: bash scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh "$RUNNER_TEMP/bodyscan/body.txt" + run: | + # Bootstrap window: on the PR that first installs this gate, the default + # branch does not carry body-policy.sh yet, so the trusted checkout above + # cannot supply it. Only push access to the default branch can create or + # clear that state — a fork PR cannot remove the script from main — so a + # loud skip here is not a bypass. The moment the installing PR merges, + # this path is dead. + if [ ! -f scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh ]; then + echo "::warning title=public-repo-guard (body-guard)::body-policy.sh is not on the default branch yet (gate still bootstrapping) — the body scan activates once the installing PR merges." + exit 0 + fi + bash scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh "$RUNNER_TEMP/bodyscan/body.txt" diff --git a/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh b/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh index a0b421f..2073886 100755 --- a/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh +++ b/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh @@ -25,6 +25,11 @@ set -uo pipefail FILE="${1:-}" [[ -n "$FILE" && -f "$FILE" ]] || { echo "::error::body-policy: usage: body-policy.sh "; exit 2; } command -v rg >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "::error::body-policy: ripgrep (rg) required"; exit 2; } +# Every rule below runs through -P (PCRE2), and not every rg build has it — +# Ubuntu 22.04's apt package is built WITHOUT PCRE2. On such a build every rule +# would exit >=2 and the gate would fail closed on perfectly clean bodies. +# Refuse up front with one message that says why, not eight per-rule failures. +rg --pcre2-version >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "::error::body-policy: this ripgrep build lacks PCRE2 (-P) — install a PCRE2-enabled rg"; exit 2; } VIOLATIONS=0 @@ -32,6 +37,13 @@ VIOLATIONS=0 # the gate blocks its own pull requests and every security discussion — the # self-referential trap that gets a gate switched off. Ported verbatim in intent # from the client-side gate's allowlist, which was built for exactly this. +# +# SCOPE: applied only to the prose-shaped rules (internal-marker, +# private-repo-ops), where discussing the gate is routine and over-blocking is +# what gets it disabled. The credential/infra rules are NEVER filtered by it: +# "Rotating per SECURITY.md: AKIA…" still contains a live key, and mentioning +# the control must not launder one past the gate. For those rules the single, +# visible escape hatch is `guard:allow `. ABOUT_THE_CONTROL='(public-repo-guard|body-policy|content-policy|public-github-write-gate|\bNDA\s+(gate|guard|policy|denylist|sweep|scan|hook)\b|\bno\s+NDA\b|responsib\w*\s+disclos|SECURITY\.md)' # check @@ -51,8 +63,13 @@ check() { # disagree with itself depending on where it ran. rg is already required above. local matches matches="$(printf '%s' "$raw" \ - | rg -vN -- 'guard:allow[[:space:]]+[^[:space:]]' \ - | rg -vNiP -- "$ABOUT_THE_CONTROL" || true)" + | rg -vN -- 'guard:allow[[:space:]]+[^[:space:]]' || true)" + # About-the-control exemption for prose rules only — see the SCOPE note above. + case "$name" in + internal-marker|private-repo-ops) + matches="$(printf '%s' "$matches" | rg -vNiP -- "$ABOUT_THE_CONTROL" || true)" + ;; + esac [[ -z "$matches" ]] && return 0 local count; count="$(printf '%s\n' "$matches" | grep -c '')" # Print the LINE NUMBER only — never the matched text. This annotation is itself @@ -125,9 +142,13 @@ if [[ -n "${GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS:-}" ]]; then _ALT="${_ALT:+$_ALT|}${_esc}" done if [[ -n "$_ALT" ]]; then - # Both orders: name-then-detail and detail-then-name. + # Both orders: name-then-detail and detail-then-name. `(?i)` is scoped to the + # NAMES only — a leading `(?i)` runs to the end of a PCRE2 pattern, across the + # top-level `|`, and would make the SCREAMING_CASE credential-name pattern in + # OPS_DETAIL match ordinary lowercase prose (auth_token, api_key), blocking + # exactly the harmless cross-repo chatter this rule was shaped to permit. check BLOCK private-repo-ops \ - "(?i)\\b(?:${_ALT})\\b[^\\n]{0,140}?\\b${OPS_DETAIL}|${OPS_DETAIL}[^\\n]{0,140}?\\b(?:${_ALT})\\b" \ + "\\b(?i:${_ALT})\\b[^\\n]{0,140}?\\b${OPS_DETAIL}|${OPS_DETAIL}[^\\n]{0,140}?\\b(?i:${_ALT})\\b" \ 'A private WAVE repo named alongside internal operational detail (credential name, secret binding, or secret count) — the wiring topology is not public' fi fi diff --git a/scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh b/scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh index 13cc9bf..ddc6f8b 100755 --- a/scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh +++ b/scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh @@ -57,6 +57,11 @@ expect 1 'internal-only marker' \ AKID_FIXTURE="AKI""A1234567890ABCDEF" expect 1 'AWS access key id' \ "The failing job had ${AKID_FIXTURE} configured." +# Regression: the about-the-control allowlist is scoped to the prose rules and +# must NOT exempt the credential rules — naming the gate or SECURITY.md on the +# same line as a live key does not make the key safe to publish. +expect 1 'credential on a line that talks about the control' \ + "Rotating per SECURITY.md: the exposed key was ${AKID_FIXTURE}." expect 1 'internal tailscale IP' \ 'It resolves to 100.71.4.19 from inside the fleet.' @@ -67,6 +72,13 @@ expect 0 'two private repos, no operational detail' \ 'Both wave-gateway and wave-transports will need a follow-up for this.' expect 0 'credential NAME with no private repo nearby' \ 'The handler now reads SOME_API_TOKEN from the environment instead of a literal.' +# Regression: `(?i)` must stay scoped to the repo NAMES. An unscoped flag spreads +# across the whole pattern and turns lowercase prose (auth_token, api_key) into +# an "operational detail" match, blocking ordinary engineering discussion. +expect 0 'lowercase variable name near a private repo' \ + 'Companion to wave-transports#260; refactors the auth_token plumbing.' +expect 0 'lowercase api_key near a private repo' \ + 'wave-gateway now stores the api_key in KV.' expect 0 'public runner path is not an operator path' \ 'CI checks out to /home/runner/work/repo/repo before the scan runs.' # enforce-ignore (fixture) expect 0 'talking about the control' \ From 7c178bf3f43a0573a8ad1e7af559d0533c605924 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yakimoto Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 17:33:07 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 3/6] ci: fail closed when a body-policy filter stage errors The allowlist filter stages ended in '|| true', so an rg error (>=2) during filtering was indistinguishable from 'every line allowlisted' and produced a pass. Capture each stage's exit code: 0/1 proceed, >=2 exits 2, matching the primary scan's fail-closed contract. Redaction behavior unchanged. Co-authored-by: Codesmith --- scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh b/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh index 2073886..ee3fe99 100755 --- a/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh +++ b/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh @@ -61,13 +61,25 @@ check() { # Filter with rg, not grep: BSD/macOS grep has no -P, so a `grep -P` allowlist # silently errors out locally while working on GNU/CI — the gate would then # disagree with itself depending on where it ran. rg is already required above. + # + # The filter stages FAIL CLOSED too. For `rg -v`, exit 1 only means "every line + # was filtered out" — that is a legitimate all-allowlisted result — but >=2 is + # a real error, and swallowing it would turn a broken filter into a pass: the + # exact failure mode the primary scan above refuses. local matches - matches="$(printf '%s' "$raw" \ - | rg -vN -- 'guard:allow[[:space:]]+[^[:space:]]' || true)" + matches="$(printf '%s' "$raw" | rg -vN -- 'guard:allow[[:space:]]+[^[:space:]]')"; rc=$? + if (( rc >= 2 )); then + echo "::error title=public-repo-guard ($name)::ripgrep failed (exit $rc) filtering guard:allow lines for rule '$name' — failing closed." + exit 2 + fi # About-the-control exemption for prose rules only — see the SCOPE note above. case "$name" in internal-marker|private-repo-ops) - matches="$(printf '%s' "$matches" | rg -vNiP -- "$ABOUT_THE_CONTROL" || true)" + matches="$(printf '%s' "$matches" | rg -vNiP -- "$ABOUT_THE_CONTROL")"; rc=$? + if (( rc >= 2 )); then + echo "::error title=public-repo-guard ($name)::ripgrep failed (exit $rc) applying the about-the-control allowlist for rule '$name' — failing closed." + exit 2 + fi ;; esac [[ -z "$matches" ]] && return 0 From 014db461c8a207d62d382e094f37d77988cefa1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yakimoto Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 17:34:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 4/6] ci: scan PR review bodies and line-review comments too Reviews were the remaining public text channel the body gate did not see: pull_request_review carries the review summary in .review.body and pull_request_review_comment carries line comments in .comment.body, and neither arrives as issue_comment. Subscribe to both, admit them into body-guard, and extract .review.body in the materialize step. Co-authored-by: Codesmith --- .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml | 37 ++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml b/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml index 97c9faa..ec2f8ab 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml @@ -34,6 +34,14 @@ on: types: [opened, edited] issue_comment: types: [created, edited] + # Reviews are the remaining public text channel: a review BODY and a line-level + # review comment are just as world-readable as an issue comment, and neither + # arrives as `issue_comment`. Without these two events a leak pasted into a + # review would bypass the body gate entirely. + pull_request_review: + types: [submitted, edited] + pull_request_review_comment: + types: [created, edited] push: branches: [main, master] workflow_dispatch: @@ -118,18 +126,23 @@ jobs: run: bash scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh # The other half of a public repo's surface. `guard` above scans the published - # TREE; a PR/issue/comment BODY is just as world-readable and, until this job, - # was scanned by nothing server-side. That gap was real, not theoretical: a PR - # was blocked for naming a private repo in wrangler.toml while the very same + # TREE; a PR/issue/comment/review BODY is just as world-readable and, until this + # job, was scanned by nothing server-side. That gap was real, not theoretical: a + # PR was blocked for naming a private repo in wrangler.toml while the very same # name, with more operational detail attached, sat unchallenged in its body. # # Honest about what it can and cannot do. On a PR this PREVENTS the merge. On an - # issue or comment the text is already public the moment it posts, so this is - # detection — it tells us to go redact, fast. Only the client-side pre-write hook - # can stop that class before publication. + # issue, comment, or review the text is already public the moment it posts, so + # this is detection — it tells us to go redact, fast. Only the client-side + # pre-write hook can stop that class before publication. body-guard: name: Body content policy - if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' || github.event_name == 'issues' || github.event_name == 'issue_comment' + if: >- + github.event_name == 'pull_request' + || github.event_name == 'issues' + || github.event_name == 'issue_comment' + || github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' + || github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_comment' concurrency: # Keyed on the specific PR / comment / issue rather than github.ref, because # issue events all report the default branch and a ref-keyed group would let @@ -183,13 +196,17 @@ jobs: # An UNRECOGNIZED payload shape must fail, never quietly scan nothing and # report a pass. If the event schema ever moves, this job must go red # rather than become a green rubber stamp over an unscanned body. - if [ "$(jq -r 'has("pull_request") or has("issue") or has("comment")' "$GITHUB_EVENT_PATH")" != "true" ]; then - echo "::error title=public-repo-guard (body-guard)::Event payload contains no pull_request/issue/comment object — refusing to report a pass on an unscanned body." + if [ "$(jq -r 'has("pull_request") or has("issue") or has("comment") or has("review")' "$GITHUB_EVENT_PATH")" != "true" ]; then + echo "::error title=public-repo-guard (body-guard)::Event payload contains no pull_request/issue/comment/review object — refusing to report a pass on an unscanned body." exit 1 fi + # `.review.body` covers pull_request_review (the summary text of a + # review); line-level review comments arrive as `.comment.body` on + # pull_request_review_comment, already extracted below. jq -r '[.pull_request.title, .pull_request.body, .issue.title, .issue.body, - .comment.body] + .comment.body, + .review.body] | map(select(. != null)) | join("\n")' \ "$GITHUB_EVENT_PATH" > "$RUNNER_TEMP/bodyscan/body.txt" echo "scanning $(wc -l < "$RUNNER_TEMP/bodyscan/body.txt") line(s) of body text" From 0e6c5934f087ef42f5d49392984392da1aef24b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yakimoto Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 17:43:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 5/6] ci: replace real private-repo and credential names in public fixtures with synthetic placeholders Co-authored-by: Codesmith --- .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml | 3 ++- .../tests/body-policy.test.sh | 25 +++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml b/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml index ec2f8ab..e0009f6 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml @@ -13,11 +13,12 @@ name: public-repo-guard # wave-av/.github must not be able to alter another repo's secret scanner). The # gitleaks binary is version-pinned AND SHA-256-verified before it runs. # -# To install on a new repo, copy all four files together: +# To install on a new repo, copy all five files together: # .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml # .gitleaks.toml # scripts/public-repo-guard/content-policy.sh # scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh +# scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh # # Scan scope: the published working TREE (gitleaks --no-git), NOT git history. The # goal is "what is public right now is clean", so a shallow checkout is sufficient. diff --git a/scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh b/scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh index ddc6f8b..e01888b 100755 --- a/scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh +++ b/scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh @@ -15,7 +15,12 @@ trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT # The names the real gate is configured with come from an org variable; the tests # pin their own so they are hermetic and do not depend on CI configuration. -export GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS="wave-gateway, wave-transports, agent-money" +# +# DELIBERATELY SYNTHETIC. This file is public and the tree gate skips its own +# directory, so a real private-repo or credential name written here would be +# published unscanned — the exact leak the gate exists to block. Placeholders +# exercise the same regexes; never swap in real names. +export GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS="example-private-a, example-private-b, example-private-c" PASS=0; FAIL=0 @@ -39,13 +44,13 @@ echo "body-policy fixtures" # --- must BLOCK --------------------------------------------------------------- expect 1 'private repo + credential name' \ - 'Flip is live: WAVE_VIEWPORT_LEASE_SECRET is bound on wave-gateway now.' + 'Flip is live: EXAMPLE_LEASE_SECRET is bound on example-private-a now.' expect 1 'private repo + credential name, reverse order' \ - 'The MOQ_JOIN_SECRET was added; wave-transports picks it up on deploy.' + 'The EXAMPLE_JOIN_SECRET was added; example-private-b picks it up on deploy.' expect 1 'private repo + secret count' \ - 'wave-gateway went from 74 secrets to 75 after this change.' + 'example-private-a went from 74 secrets to 75 after this change.' expect 1 'private repo + service binding' \ - 'This adds a service binding from the worker to agent-money for settlement.' + 'This adds a service binding from the worker to example-private-c for settlement.' expect 1 'operator home path' \ 'Repro: run it from /Users/someoperator/Documents/notes and it fails.' # enforce-ignore (fixture) expect 1 'internal-only marker' \ @@ -67,24 +72,24 @@ expect 1 'internal tailscale IP' \ # --- must PASS (precision — these keep the gate deployable) ------------------- expect 0 'bare private-repo cross-reference' \ - 'This is the companion change to wave-transports#260; merge that one first.' + 'This is the companion change to example-private-b#260; merge that one first.' expect 0 'two private repos, no operational detail' \ - 'Both wave-gateway and wave-transports will need a follow-up for this.' + 'Both example-private-a and example-private-b will need a follow-up for this.' expect 0 'credential NAME with no private repo nearby' \ 'The handler now reads SOME_API_TOKEN from the environment instead of a literal.' # Regression: `(?i)` must stay scoped to the repo NAMES. An unscoped flag spreads # across the whole pattern and turns lowercase prose (auth_token, api_key) into # an "operational detail" match, blocking ordinary engineering discussion. expect 0 'lowercase variable name near a private repo' \ - 'Companion to wave-transports#260; refactors the auth_token plumbing.' + 'Companion to example-private-b#260; refactors the auth_token plumbing.' expect 0 'lowercase api_key near a private repo' \ - 'wave-gateway now stores the api_key in KV.' + 'example-private-a now stores the api_key in KV.' expect 0 'public runner path is not an operator path' \ 'CI checks out to /home/runner/work/repo/repo before the scan runs.' # enforce-ignore (fixture) expect 0 'talking about the control' \ 'body-policy blocks a private repo named next to a SECRET_TOKEN; that is intended.' expect 0 'explicit guard:allow with a reason' \ - 'Example for the docs: wave-gateway holds EXAMPLE_SECRET — guard:allow documented-example' + 'Example for the docs: example-private-a holds EXAMPLE_SECRET — guard:allow documented-example' expect 0 'ordinary clean body' \ 'Bumps the draft revision and regenerates the fixtures. No behaviour change.' # Regression: the first CI run of this job failed on its own PR, because a review From 3716e824f04158bbaa560ea4bf20adfe31f9c6df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yakimoto Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 17:51:11 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 6/6] ci: key body-guard concurrency on the text, and anchor abs-user-path to a path start Co-authored-by: Codesmith --- .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml | 11 ++++++++++- scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh | 8 +++++++- scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh | 11 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml b/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml index e0009f6..899111c 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml @@ -149,10 +149,19 @@ jobs: # issue events all report the default branch and a ref-keyed group would let # two comments cancel each other, leaving one unscanned. # + # The comment/review IDs must come FIRST. Review events carry a + # `pull_request` object in their payload too, so a PR-number-first chain + # would coalesce every review and line comment on a PR into ONE group — + # and GitHub keeps at most one pending run per group, silently dropping + # the rest of a batch unscanned. Each distinct piece of text gets its own + # group; the PR number is only the fallback for `pull_request` events, + # where dropping an intermediate edit is fine because the newest queued + # run scans the current body. + # # cancel-in-progress is deliberately FALSE. Every version of a body deserves a # verdict, the job is seconds long, and a cancelled check-run lingers on the # commit and makes an otherwise-green PR look broken. - group: public-repo-guard-body-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.comment.id || github.event.issue.number || github.ref }} + group: public-repo-guard-body-${{ github.event.comment.id || github.event.review.id || github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.issue.number || github.ref }} cancel-in-progress: false runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: diff --git a/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh b/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh index ee3fe99..600a674 100755 --- a/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh +++ b/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh @@ -110,8 +110,14 @@ check BLOCK private-key '-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----' 'Em # shellcheck disable=SC2016 # $CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID is literal guidance text check BLOCK cf-account-id 'account_id\s*[:=]\s*["'"'"']?[0-9a-f]{32}' 'Hardcoded Cloudflare account_id — reference the env var instead' check BLOCK internal-ip '100\.(6[4-9]|[7-9][0-9]|1[01][0-9]|12[0-7])\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}' 'Internal Tailscale-CGNAT IP (100.64.0.0/10) — internal fleet address' +# The lookbehind anchors the leading slash to a path START: prose is full of +# repository-relative segments (`packages/home/foo/`) and URL paths +# (`example.com/home/docs/`) that the FILE profile rarely sees, and an +# unanchored match would hard-BLOCK ordinary discussion. Rejecting a preceding +# word/dot/hyphen character kills those while still catching a path wrapped in +# backticks, quotes, or parens — the shapes a real paste arrives in. # shellcheck disable=SC2016 # $HOME is literal guidance text -check BLOCK abs-user-path '/(Users|home)/(?!runner/)[a-z][a-z0-9._-]+/' 'Operator absolute home path — leaks identity and local layout' +check BLOCK abs-user-path '(?