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The leaf certificate that rekor.sigstore.dev serves since 2026-11-14 14:05Z carries two SCTs, both from Static CT API (tiled) logs. The CT check found the log of an SCT with loglist3's FindLogByKeyHash, which in certificate-transparency-go v1.3.3 searches only the RFC 6962 logs of the log list and never its tiled logs. Each SCT failed with "SCT log ID not found in trusted log list", so every connection to Rekor failed. Without Rekor, build_transparency_log, provider_signer_recognition and component_signature_recognition fail, and where they are enforced, as for NEAR direct, the model is blocked. A provider host that moves to a certificate with tiled-log SCTs only fails the same way. The check now also looks the log ID up in the tiled logs of the same log list and verifies the SCT with that log's key, in the same way as an SCT of an RFC 6962 log. An SCT of a log that is not in the list still fails. To verify: go test ./internal/tlsct -run TestCheckTLSState_TiledLogSCT. The test fails without the fix with "SCT log ID not found in trusted log list". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The test of an SCT that carries a listed tiled log's ID but has another key's signature only checked that an error occurred. It now also checks that the log was found and the signature check failed, so a parse error or a missed lookup cannot pass for the expected failure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Author
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#235 fixes the same lookup and merges first. After it lands, this branch is reduced to what #235 does not carry: the regression test |
Owner
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#235 covers everything now. Closing. |
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Problem
Since 2026-11-14 14:05Z, rekor.sigstore.dev serves a new leaf certificate (issuer GTS WR3, serial
595C63398C07D82410BAB077CB6DFC2D). It embeds two SCTs, and both come from Static CT API (tiled) logs. Their extensions start with00 0005, the leaf_index extension of the Static CT API.Teep's CT check looks up the log of each SCT with
loglist3.LogList.FindLogByKeyHash. In certificate-transparency-go v1.3.3, that function searches onlyOperators[].Logs, the RFC 6962 logs. It never searchesOperators[].TiledLogs, although Google's log list holds the tiled logs. Each SCT therefore fails with "SCT log ID not found in trusted log list", and every connection to Rekor fails:Effect of the defect
sigstore_verificationfails, andbuild_transparency_log,provider_signer_recognitionandcomponent_signature_recognitionfail with "no Rekor provenance fetched".Change
In
internal/tlsct/checker.go, whenFindLogByKeyHashfinds no log, the newfindLogKeyalso looks the SCT's log ID up in the tiled logs of the same log list. It uses a constant-time comparison. The SCT is then verified with that log's key through the samectutil.VerifySCTcall as an SCT of an RFC 6962 log. Static CT API SCTs have the RFC 6962 signature form, and the leaf_index extension is part of the signed data. An SCT of a log that is not in the list still fails.The change adds no option, no list file and no second trust anchor.
Effect
Certificates whose SCTs come from tiled logs pass the CT check when the SCT verifies with a listed tiled log's key. Rekor can be reached again, and the Sigstore factors are evaluated as before 2026-11-14 14:05Z.
To verify
TestCheckTLSState_TiledLogSCTbuilds a log list with one tiled log only and an SCT that this log signed, with a leaf_index extension. It checks three cases:Without the fix, the first case fails with "SCT log ID not found in trusted log list".
Checklist
make checkpasses.make integrationandmake reportspass.