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14 changes: 7 additions & 7 deletions README.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -230,16 +230,16 @@ serving inference exposes none, and the core tee_* factors state that. See
| 39 | `gateway_tee_quote_structure` | Gateway quote parses as valid QuoteV4 or SEV-SNP report |
| 40 | `gateway_tee_cert_chain` | Gateway cert chain verifies against Intel or AMD root CA |
| 41 | `gateway_tee_quote_signature` | Gateway quote signature valid |
| 42 | `gateway_tee_debug_disabled` | Gateway debug bit is 0 (production enclave) |
| 42 | `gateway_tee_debug_disabled` | Gateway debug bit is 0 (TDX TD_ATTRIBUTES or SEV-SNP guest policy) |
| 43 | `gateway_tee_measurement` | Gateway measurements match the gateway policy allowlists |
| 44 | `gateway_tee_hardware_config` | Gateway RTMR[0] matches hardware config allowlist |
| 44 | `gateway_tee_hardware_config` | Gateway RTMR[0] matches hardware config allowlist; for an SEV-SNP gateway, the guest policy forbids debug, the migration agent and single-socket mode, allows SMT, and the firmware build and version meet the minimums |
| 45 | `gateway_tee_boot_config` | Gateway RTMR[1] and RTMR[2] match boot config allowlists; not applicable to an SEV-SNP gateway, whose launch measurement (`gateway_tee_measurement`) covers the boot |
| 46 | `gateway_tee_reportdata_binding` | Gateway REPORTDATA binding verified |
| 47 | `gateway_compose_binding` | Gateway sha256(app_compose) matches TDX MRConfigID |
| 48 | `gateway_cpu_id_registry` | Gateway CPU PPID verified in Proof of Cloud registry |
| 49 | `gateway_event_log_integrity` | Gateway event log replayed; all 4 RTMRs match quote |
| 50 | `gateway_tee_tcb_current` | Gateway TCB SVN meets minimum threshold (SEV-SNP) |
| 51 | `gateway_tee_tcb_not_revoked` | Gateway TCB SVN is not revoked (SEV-SNP) |
| 47 | `gateway_compose_binding` | Gateway sha256(app_compose) matches TDX MRConfigID; not applicable to an SEV-SNP gateway |
| 48 | `gateway_cpu_id_registry` | Gateway CPU PPID verified in Proof of Cloud registry; not applicable to an SEV-SNP gateway |
| 49 | `gateway_event_log_integrity` | Gateway event log replayed; all 4 RTMRs match quote; not applicable to an SEV-SNP gateway, which exposes no event log |
| 50 | `gateway_tee_tcb_current` | Gateway TCB SVNs (bootloader, TEE, SNP, microcode) meet the minimum thresholds (SEV-SNP) |
| 51 | `gateway_tee_tcb_not_revoked` | Same check as `gateway_tee_tcb_current` (SEV-SNP); teep does not read the AMD CRL, so this factor does not test revocation |

</details>

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12 changes: 6 additions & 6 deletions README_ADVANCED.md
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Expand Up @@ -134,14 +134,14 @@ This provides true end-to-end encryption: the shared secret is derived between t

| Provider | Attestation | Channel Security | REPORTDATA Binding |
|----------|-------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Venice AI | TDX + NVIDIA | E2EE (secp256k1 ECDH + AES-256-GCM) | `keccak256(enclave_pubkey)` + nonce |
| Venice AI | dstack: TDX + NVIDIA; ACI/1: gateway TDX, plus relayed upstream GPU evidence (absent from some responses) | E2EE (secp256k1 ECDH + AES-256-GCM): dstack to the model enclave; ACI/1 to the gateway | dstack: `keccak256(enclave_pubkey)` + nonce; ACI/1: `keccak256(gateway signing key)` + nonce in the gateway quote |
| NEAR AI Direct | TDX + NVIDIA | TLS pinning (model subdomain) | `sha256(signing_address ‖ tls_fingerprint)` + nonce |
| NEAR AI Cloud | TDX + NVIDIA | TLS pinning (gateway) | `sha256(signing_address ‖ tls_fingerprint)` + nonce |
| NanoGPT | TDX (dStack), or ACI/1 gateway TDX + NVIDIA | None by default (plaintext over TLS to NanoGPT); with `e2ee = true`, ACI/1: E2EE v2 (secp256k1 ECDH + AES-256-GCM) to the gateway | None (dStack format); ACI/1: `keccak256(gateway key)` + nonce in the gateway quote |
| NanoGPT | Chutes evidence relayed by NanoGPT: TDX + GPU evidence; dstack: TDX + NVIDIA; ACI/1: gateway TDX, plus relayed upstream GPU evidence | None (plaintext over TLS to NanoGPT). With `e2ee = true`, ACI/1 requires E2EE v2 (secp256k1 ECDH + AES-256-GCM) to the gateway; NanoGPT does not forward it, so no model is served | Chutes evidence: not verifiable (the relayed response carries no `e2e_pubkey`); dstack: `keccak256(signing key)` + nonce; ACI/1: `keccak256(gateway signing key)` + nonce in the gateway quote |
| Chutes | TDX + GPU evidence | E2EE (ML-KEM-768 + ChaCha20-Poly1305) | `sha256(nonce_hex + e2e_pubkey_base64)` |
| Phala Cloud | ACI/1 gateway TDX | E2EE v2 (secp256k1 ECDH + AES-256-GCM) to the gateway | `sha256` of the ACI/1 statement over the keyset digest and the nonce, in the gateway quote |
| Tinfoil Cloud | SEV-SNP | E2EE (HPKE X25519 + AES-256-GCM) | `sha256(nonce ‖ hpke_key ‖ tls_fp ‖ gpu_hash)` in REPORTDATA |
| Tinfoil Direct | SEV-SNP | E2EE (HPKE X25519 + AES-256-GCM) | `sha256(nonce ‖ hpke_key ‖ tls_fp ‖ gpu_hash)` in REPORTDATA |
| Tinfoil Cloud | SEV-SNP | E2EE (HPKE X25519 + AES-256-GCM) | `sha256(algorithm URI ‖ nonce ‖ sha256(crypto_material) ‖ sha256(device_evidence))` in REPORTDATA[0:32], zeros in [32:64]; `crypto_material` holds the HPKE key and the TLS key fingerprint |
| Tinfoil Direct (disabled since 2026-11-12) | SEV-SNP | E2EE (HPKE X25519 + AES-256-GCM) | `sha256(algorithm URI ‖ nonce ‖ sha256(crypto_material) ‖ sha256(device_evidence))` in REPORTDATA[0:32], zeros in [32:64]; `crypto_material` holds the HPKE key and the TLS key fingerprint |

## Verification Factor Reference

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -215,14 +215,14 @@ exposes none, and the core `tee_*` factors state that.
| 40 | `gateway_tee_quote_signature` | Signature over the gateway quote body is valid. |
| 41 | `gateway_tee_debug_disabled` | Gateway debug bit is 0 (production enclave). |
| 42 | `gateway_tee_measurement` | Gateway measurements match the gateway policy allowlists. Allowed to fail by default for NEAR Cloud and for the ACI/1 routes of Venice, Phala Cloud and NanoGPT: the allowlist changes only with a teep release, so a gateway release fails this factor, and teep reports the failure. |
| 43 | `gateway_tee_hardware_config` | Gateway RTMR[0] matches the hardware config allowlist. |
| 43 | `gateway_tee_hardware_config` | Gateway RTMR[0] matches the hardware config allowlist. For an SEV-SNP gateway, the guest policy forbids debug, the migration agent and single-socket mode, allows SMT, and the firmware build and version meet the minimums. |
| 44 | `gateway_tee_boot_config` | Gateway RTMR[1] and RTMR[2] match the boot config allowlists. Not applicable to an SEV-SNP gateway, whose launch measurement (`gateway_tee_measurement`) covers the boot. |
| 45 | `gateway_tee_reportdata_binding` | Gateway REPORTDATA binding verified: nearcloud binds `sha256(signing_address ‖ tls_fingerprint)`; Venice ACI/1 binds `keccak256(signing key)` + nonce; Tinfoil binds the HPKE key and endorsed section hashes. |
| 46 | `gateway_compose_binding` | Gateway `sha256(app_compose)` matches TDX MRConfigID, with the `app_compose` rules of `compose_binding`. Enforced for Venice ACI/1 — the gateway publishes its manifest with digest-pinned images. |
| 47 | `gateway_cpu_id_registry` | Gateway CPU PPID verified against the Proof of Cloud registry. |
| 48 | `gateway_event_log_integrity` | Gateway event log replayed; all 4 RTMRs match the gateway TDX quote. |
| 49 | `gateway_tee_tcb_current` | Gateway TCB SVN meets minimum threshold (SEV-SNP; TDX defers to Intel PCS collateral). |
| 50 | `gateway_tee_tcb_not_revoked` | Gateway TCB SVN is not revoked (SEV-SNP; TDX defers to Intel PCS collateral). |
| 50 | `gateway_tee_tcb_not_revoked` | Same check as `gateway_tee_tcb_current` for an SEV-SNP gateway; teep does not read the AMD CRL, so this factor does not test revocation. TDX defers to Intel PCS collateral. |

## TOML Configuration

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