Anbu Care

Autonomous eldercare and insurance coordination for NRI families — a multi-agent system that coordinates healthcare and insurance for aging parents in India on behalf of their adult children abroad.

Built for the All Things Agentic Hackathon (Google / Devpost), Taskmaster track.

Try it, three ways, none of them needing a login

1. From your phone. WhatsApp +1 239 453 5380 and send START.

You are given a synthetic family of your own, with your number holding three roles on it at once: hers, her son's, and a neighbour's. Every message back is captioned with which of the three it was for, because one handset is playing three parts. Then tell it she has chest pain, or photograph a hospital bill, and watch what each one sets off.

This is not the door being left open. An unknown number still resolves to nobody, which is the claim this whole system rests on. START hands you a different record and legitimate roles on it: nothing you do reaches the family in the demo, the parent and the policy are invented, and it is yours for a day. An unknown number that sends anything else is told what this is, that its message was not stored, and where to look.

2. From a terminal. A synthetic parent of your own, a case, and the signed chain, with no credential anywhere:

URL=https://anbu-care-37j4eofpwq-el.a.run.app
PARENT=$(curl -sX POST "$URL/api/demo/seed?scratch=1" | jq -r .parent_id)
CASE=$(curl -sX POST $URL/api/intake -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d "{\"parent_id\":\"$PARENT\",\"symptoms\":[\"chest pain\"],\"reported_by\":\"judge\"}" | jq -r .case_id)
curl -s $URL/api/cases/$CASE/verify | jq

?scratch=1 matters: without it the seed reuses the demo family, and every reader running this would open a case on the record being filmed.

3. Offline, with no Google Cloud project and no model access.

make install && make test     # 1,259 tests
make demo                     # the full spine, no LLM in the loop,
                              # ending with a tamper the chain catches

Dashboard: /app · health, naming what is simulated: /api/healthz

Architecture at a glance

Agents propose, guards decide, the chain records. The deterministic guard band is drawn as its own layer because that separation is the architecture: Gemini contributes terms and transcripts and never a verdict, every action passes through code the model cannot reach or widen, and one receipt per action lands on a chain anyone can verify without a credential. Source: docs/diagram/architecture-diagram.svg, built by scripts/build_architecture_svg.py · two-page PDF · PNG. Hand-authored rather than auto-laid-out, because a layout engine drew a refusal, an autonomous tick and a human decision as the same arrow.

The two access models, both enforced server-side

Live: https://anbu-care-37j4eofpwq-el.a.run.app · agent UI: /dev-ui/

This contrast is the design, not a configuration detail:

curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' $URL/api/parents/{parent_id}     # 401 — clinical content
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' $URL/api/cases/{case_id}/verify  # 200 — open to everyone

Verification proves the record was not altered without revealing what it says, which is why it needs no credential. Anything returning case or patient content requires a credential. Two are accepted:

The demo credential, anbu-demo-family-token, published deliberately: secrecy is not what is being demonstrated, server-side enforcement is. Take the token out of the page and the 401 still happens.
A Google account, verified against Google's keys — and then checked against this parent's family contacts, which is the half that matters. A verified stranger gets 403, not a record.

A signed link sent to a consented family member is a third, narrower one: it opens the case it was minted for and cannot mint further links for anyone else.

All demo data is synthetic. Liveness probe is /api/healthz.

"If something happens to my parent right now, who makes sure the right decisions get made, fast, and that I actually know what's happening?"

Today that role is a family friend, a paid proxy, or a frantic sibling WhatsApp thread. Every existing service — Sahaayak, Samarth Care, Care247, Policybazaar's NRI Care Program — answers it with a human coordinator. Anbu Care answers it with an agentic decision layer that knows the parent's history, the local hospital landscape, and the insurance policy, and acts within minutes.

What is real, and what is not

This matters more than any feature list, so it comes first.

Real and demonstrable:

Multimodal document parsing into structured, queryable observations, with "new and abnormal" distinguished from "consistent with known baseline".
Severity classification and hospital routing, including the explanation of what was traded for extra travel distance.
The WhatsApp compliance boundary — enforced in code, before send.
Claim packet assembly, coverage and sub-limit checks, and STEP_UP evidence scoring.
SLA tracking against the regulatory cashless and reimbursement windows, run against real wall time. The window lengths are implemented as real deadlines in anbu_care/service.py and are now verified against the source: IRDAI/HLT/CIR/PRO/84/5/2024, 29 May 2024, the Master Circular on Health Insurance Business — one hour for cashless authorisation, three hours for final discharge authorisation, thirty days for reimbursement settlement, with interest at two percent above the bank rate on delay. See docs/CITATIONS.md.
Cashless pre-authorisation at admission, filed without being asked. The escalation that opens a case also files it, the same simulated adjudicator answers, the one-hour clock starts on real wall time, and a scheduler records the breach if the hour lapses without a decision. Requested is not authorised, and authorised is not settled: cashless means the insurer pays the hospital, which Anbu Care never does and never claims. On a breach it states what the policyholder is entitled to and nothing more — it has not filed a grievance, cannot compel anyone, and does not claim it will be won.
The signed, tamper-evident receipt chain, and the verification that detects a silent edit.
Wellbeing check-in over inbound WhatsApp, including voice notes. A voice note is stored, transcribed by Gemini in a single call, and read for symptom terms — and the audio, not the transcript, is treated as the record. Alerts say "we heard", never "she said". Multilingual and verified from a real handset in Tamil script, transliterated Tamil, Hindi and code-mixed English.
Escalation and care-circle notification. A recognised red flag opens a case, runs triage, alerts the family, and can ring a care-circle contact. It also hands the treating team a link without anybody being asked: a write-scoped emergency-access link is minted at escalation and sent to the people who are physically with her, so the neighbour who reaches the hospital has something to show a doctor. Before this the link only existed if the son minted one from the dashboard, which meant the person the whole system stands in for had to wake up and copy a URL. The son is told; he is not the courier, and on an escalation he is skipped for the link entirely because he was already alerted as family.

The seeded family now includes the neighbour, Meena, who holds outbound_notify and nothing else. Without her the care circle was the son, so every workflow reaching for "whoever is with her" reached for a man in Nashville: the mechanism was right and the data made it a no-op, which is the worst kind of wrong because nothing looks broken. She can be told to go round and handed a link to show a doctor. She cannot read the record, cannot authorise a payment, and receives no clinical detail.
Per-purpose consent, read live. Seven purposes across four directions — what a family member may be SENT, what they may SEND IN, what may be SHOWN to a third party, and what may be sent TO THE PARENT herself — deliberately disjoint. Conflating two of them was a real shipped defect, since fixed and regression-tested; the fourth direction exists so recovery check-ins could not repeat it by borrowing an agreement somebody else made.
Outbound Tamil, as translation and never as authorship. Messages to a recipient whose language preference is Tamil are rendered from the recorded English by Gemini, which stays the source of truth, and carry the line "translated from the recorded <bill / check-in question / status update>". Per-recipient, so the mother reads Tamil while her son keeps English — and a preference may name both, en+ta, which sends the English record with the Tamil beneath it for a reader who has both. The preference lives on the person, not the role: a daughter in Thoothukudi is a family contact too, and a message twice as long is not a kindness to her. A translation with no source record is refused — there is no code path that produces Tamil for text nobody wrote down first. The gate rules on the English before anything is rendered, because CLINICAL_PATTERNS cannot read Tamil script, and any failure falls back to the recorded English with a note saying plainly that it could not be rendered. It never guesses.
Recovery check-ins — the son who keeps caring after the emergency. A recorded discharge summary opens a fourteen-day window, and one question a day goes to her at 09:00 her time: how are you feeling, did you take today's medicines, any new discomfort. In Tamil, through the same gated path as every other message. Her reply comes back through the unmodified W1 inbound path — same signature check, same transcription, same store — labelled phase=recovery from stored state alone, never from reading her words. The window ends by the calendar, not because anything decided she was better, and consent is read live at every tick so a withdrawal or a STOP stops it on the next message. It asks and records; it never advises. A concerning reply gets the full existing escalation — case opened, the same deterministic table, the family told — with an alert that says "we heard X" and names no cause.
Google Places verification of the hospital knowledge base, and a real map of the routing decision. Verification caught a genuine bug: the previously seeded coordinates were out by 1.4 to 5.0 km, which changed which hospital was nearest and therefore what the routing explanation claimed.
An emergency clinical summary for the treating team, reachable by a clinician with no login through a scoped link the family mints and can revoke. Allergies first, every line traced to the stored field it came from, and no field anywhere an instruction could live in — this is the record, not the doctor.
A clinician's update, not just their orders. A treating team says "she is stable, chest pain has settled" far more often than they order anything, and that used to be answered with "could not tell which test was being ordered" and thrown away. A clinician message is a note first and an order second, and a test rides on the same note when one is actually heard.

The words are kept behind the case credential now. They never were: the chain carried a hash and nothing kept the text, so a note was write-only and the family could see one had been left without ever reading it. The chain is unchanged and still carries only the hash, because /verify is public.

And the family reads it in their own language. A Tamil note shows the English above and the clinician's own words underneath, labelled as translated from them, the same way a Tamil test label does.

The message now carries the sentence. It used to say only that an update existed, on the reasoning that clinical detail has no business on WhatsApp. The reasoning was sound and the result was not: a son eleven time zones away got "an update was left, go and read it" at 4am, which is a notification about a notification — and the sentence is the only part that tells him whether to get on a plane.

So the words go, under an exception the gate knows by name rather than by weakening the rule. CLINICAL_EXCEPTIONS is one template wide, and every part of it is load-bearing: the treating team's own words, one direction, about the reader's own parent, on a case they hold a credential for, to a contact who consented to status updates — and recorded as an exception on the receipt, so a message carrying clinical detail is never indistinguishable from one that did not. Any other message with the same words is still refused, whatever it declares. The English rendering is what is sent, labelled as rendered rather than spoken.

This is a real trade and it is worth stating plainly: Meta's healthcare policy and DPDP both restrict health data over WhatsApp, and this crosses that line deliberately, narrowly, and on the record.
Clinician notes, typed or spoken. A voice note is transcribed by Gemini and shown back for confirmation; an unconfirmed transcript writes nothing. The receipt carries the hash of the confirmed text, never the words.
Bill capture. A family member photographs a hospital bill over the same WhatsApp thread, Gemini reads the line items, and the existing sub-limit rules produce an itemised covered / not-covered / you-pay split with a running total across the stay. The photograph is kept privately so every number stays checkable against the paper it came from.

Reading takes longer than the webhook window, so the reply is acknowledged first and the read runs after it. That cost durability once: a deploy replaced the instance nine seconds into a read and the family got "reading it now" and then silence, with nothing in Firestore to show it had arrived. The photograph is now written down before the acknowledgement and the row stays open until a message has actually been sent about it, so the next instance to start finishes what the last one dropped.
Document capture, four kinds beyond bills. The same WhatsApp thread takes a discharge summary, a lab report, a prescription or a policy schedule. One Gemini call classifies and extracts together — two calls would let the second never disagree with the first — and each kind lands somewhere different: a prescription replaces the medication list, a policy schedule sets the sub-limits the coverage estimate is computed from, a discharge summary fills in the dates, diagnosis, condition and follow-up the arrival brief was reporting as "not yet known". The refusals are the interesting part. A reading that finds no medication does not empty the list; a policy read with no sum insured does not zero the cover; a discharge summary merges allergies and never removes one, because a shorter list is not a retraction of something someone has carried for years.
Interim bill payment, bounded by a mandate the family grants. A hospital wants money on day two, before any insurer has decided anything. The family authorises a destination, a per-bill cap, a total cap and a window; after that a photographed bill is paid without waking anyone, or it is refused and it says which check stopped it. Nine deterministic guards run in order — mandate_live, within_window, case_scope, not_duplicate, per_bill_cap, standing_live, total_cap, payee_from_mandate, no_anomaly — and the last is a set of named signals rather than a judgement: an amount spike against the running mean, a payee or vendor disagreeing with the mandate, spend velocity, sitting just under a cap, or arriving in the last tenth of the window.

It pays the family's share, not the hospital's whole balance. Where a cashless pre-authorisation is in force the insurer settles its part with the hospital directly, so paying the printed balance would pay the insurer's share out of the family's money and leave them to argue it back. On the demo's day-four bill that is INR 27,300 where INR 9,733 is owed. The split comes from the coverage estimate, is capped at the printed balance, and is skipped entirely where the hospital has already posted the credit itself — deducting twice would underpay by the whole covered amount. The receipt carries which basis was used, and the family is told the residual is Anbu Care's estimate rather than the insurer's decision. Without an authorised pre-auth nothing changes: reimbursement means the family really does pay first, and the printed balance is right.

The authority is granted before the admission exists. Scoped to one admission it put the son back in the loop at the exact moment he cannot be in it: a case opens at 3am in Thoothukudi while he is asleep in Nashville, and until he wakes and grants something a bill cannot be paid — the system meant to stand in for him waiting on him. Deciding how much may be spent is his job. Being conscious when an ambulance arrives is not.

So a standing mandate lives on the parent and each case adopts it as it opens, writing a mandate.standing_applied receipt that says in as many words that nobody authorised anything for this admission. A case whose bills were paid under an authority its own record never mentions would be unauditable.

One rule makes that safe, and it is the whole of the design: the total cap is a ceiling across every case the grant covers, not a fresh allowance for each. Copying the cap onto each new admission turns one signature into as many as there are admissions — INR 400,000 authorised, INR 1,200,000 gone across three, every individual decision looking correct. The enforcer counts spend across all adopting cases, and the burst window is widened the same way for the same reason.

Two further guards, both about revocation meaning revocation. An adopted copy can outlive the grant it came from, so standing_live re-checks the grant on every decision — revoke once and admissions already carrying it stop too. And declining it on one admission is recorded, because otherwise the next question re-adopts the grant it was just told to stop. An explicit per-case grant still wins: a narrower, later human act, and the way to cap a single admission without withdrawing the arrangement.

The family is told what happened to the money. The bill message says the payment was sent and "is not confirmed as settled yet" — a promise of a second message, and for a long time there was none: the rail confirmed, a receipt was written, and the person whose money it was found out by opening a dashboard if they thought to. Settled, failed and wrong-amount now each send, from the webhook handler where the news actually arrives. The failure matters most: nobody has to act on money that arrived.

A bill can never set where money goes. The destination comes from the mandate, always. A UPI ID printed on a bill is read as evidence — a bill claiming a different one is refused, never followed. That guard was inert until bills started carrying an address to check, which is why the synthetic bills now print one.

A photograph is not an identity. The same bill photographed twice — a retake after a blurry one — is one debt, matched on the bill number the hospital printed rather than on the image bytes. Before that it was two bills, twice the money owed, and a second payment eligible to go out.
Diagnostic referral — what a present son does when a test is ordered. The doctor says she needs a repeat troponin. A son in Nashville would open his phone, find the nearest labs, check what he honestly could about coverage, and send the list. Anbu Care does that: a clinician records the order through the existing confirmed-note path, and a live Google Places search near the admitting hospital returns real Thoothukudi centres, ranked by the same transparent scoring hospital routing uses.

Three walls, one test each. The order comes from the clinician — nothing here originates one, and a referral with no order behind it is refused. No coverage promise: network status is read from the same seeded KB routing uses, in that module's own words, "is listed as empanelled with X", never "is covered" — there is no coverage field in the model and a test asserts the word never appears. No mobility verdict: if the clinician did not say whether she can travel, both paths are shown and the message says the people with her decide. Surfacing options arranges nothing on its own — booking is a separate lane with its own authority, below.

The clinician can speak the order rather than type it. The dictation is transcribed by Gemini and read for which test is being ordered, and that reading is a proposal: it lands in the field, editable, and only what the clinician submits is recorded. Same rule the note path already held, and for a sharper reason here — a misheard test written down unchecked sends her for the wrong scan, with a receipt saying a clinician ordered it. An unclear dictation proposes nothing and says so; two tests in one sentence are reported as two rather than silently reduced to the first.

It works in Tamil, which matters because she is in Thoothukudi and so is her doctor. Verified end to end against the real model and real Places: a Tamil dictation is transcribed in Tamil script, the order is read out of it in Tamil, and a Tamil query returns seven local centres. Code-mixed Tanglish keeps the English clinical terms the clinician actually used. The words are never translated before the search, because translating them would be deciding what was ordered.

The family reads it in theirs. A Tamil order shows the English on top and the clinician's own words underneath, labelled as translated from them, because a son in Nashville seeing only "ரத்த பரிசோதனை" on his mother's record learns nothing. Same wall as outbound Tamil, pointed the other way: the dictation is the record, the English is derived from it, a failure shows the dictation rather than a guess, and a label already in English costs no model call.

The diagnostic.referral receipt carries counts, place ids and the source label, never the test name, so /verify stays public and leaks nothing.
It books the appointment. Surfacing options was the half of the job that was easy to make safe, and stopping there means the system does the easy half and hands a seventy-one year old the hard half at 4am. A present son books the appointment. A real browser drives the centre's own form, and a real booking has been made at a real Thoothukudi clinic.

This is the first lane where being wrong reaches a third party who never agreed to any of this. A wrong payment can be refunded; a wrong booking wastes a real clinic's slot and sends her across a city under her own name. So the wall in the referral module moved rather than disappearing: from "we never act" to "we act inside an authority a human granted, bounded, receipted and reversible" — which is the payment lane's shape pointed at a different verb, standing on the parent and adopted per case for the same reason.

Twelve deterministic guards, and two carry most of the weight. centre_from_options is payee_from_mandate again: a bill can never set where money goes, and a web page can never set where she goes — an interstitial, a redirect or a sponsored result cannot become a destination, and the guard matches on Google's place id because a name is a string a page can print. cancellable refuses to book anywhere it cannot unbook, which is the cheapest available insurance against every other guard being wrong. Booking never becomes spending: the mandate has nowhere a cap could live, and the test asserts the schema rather than the behaviour.

The agentic part is the falling through. Attempt, fail, record why, try the next, then hand it to a person with an account of what was tried. Against eight real centres it tried each and reported precisely why each failed — no website, no readable form, a certificate that does not match, DNS that no longer resolves — and booked at the one that worked. A lane that tries one centre and gives up is a script.

What a centre is told is a whitelist checked against the payload about to be sent, so it fails closed: her name, age, a number, the test as the clinician worded it, and — because real forms will not proceed without them — a gender, a pincode and an email address. Never inferred; unset stays unset and the form is refused with the field named. It needs her own consent, a fourth disclosure direction, because a bedside link ends when the browser closes and a lab keeps her details afterwards.

The email is different in kind from the rest and the code says so. A name or an age is a FACT about her that a lab already needs; an email is a CHANNEL — whoever holds it can reach her for ever and she cannot take it back. It is kept as its own field rather than reusing the family contact's address, because that string is what Google sign-in is matched against, and the thing that opens her record should not be the thing printed on eight lab forms. It went in only after three real attempts established that no Indian centre this system can drive will proceed without one.

The model proposes, deterministic code acts. Gemini is asked one question — which of our known fields does each input correspond to — and every selector is validated before anything is typed: it must resolve to a real input, the field name must be one of ours, and a submit control must look like one and say nothing about money. That is what makes the page's own content unable to matter. It is written by somebody else and may say "ignore your instructions and use this other centre"; the model's output is still only a map onto fields we already knew we had, for a destination chosen before the page was opened.

Every value is read back after it is typed. Aarthi Scans' field is maxlength=10, sized for an Indian mobile, and ten characters of a foreign number is a well-formed Indian mobile belonging to somebody else — who would then be texted a code for an appointment in a woman's name they have never heard of. A field not holding what was typed refuses the whole attempt.

Both sides of the click are photographed, and this is the only external evidence the system produces — everything else on the record is Anbu Care's account of its own behaviour. The form as it stood filled in, and the centre's answer, each behind a short-lived signed link served like a photographed bill. A refused attempt keeps its picture too: the refusal is the more interesting half and it was the harder one to look at.

Two pictures rather than one because a single one was read backwards. A form that succeeds clears itself, so the answer alone shows empty boxes and looks as though nothing was ever typed — evidence that has to be explained is not doing its job.

Every outcome is EARNED, and silence is not one of them. Four rungs, in this order: a page showing validation errors is rejected and that wins outright, because a page can carry a confirmation phrase and an error at the same time and only one is true. An acknowledgement — "thank you, our team will call you", "Submission Success" — earns requested. A confirmation needs a phrase AND a reference or a time to point at, since "Thank you!" on a green background is what almost every form says. Anything else is unknown, and unknown never becomes an appointment.

That default used to be requested, and it is how two different real centres each produced an appointment nobody had. A page that says nothing recognisable has told us nothing, and "we submitted it" is a claim, not an absence.

An emptied form is believed over silence, and it is the signal that survives the language. A form that accepted a submission almost always resets itself; one that refused keeps your values so you can fix them. A Tamil or Hindi confirmation is a string this code will never have heard of; an empty input is an empty input.

Reading the page at all means waiting for it to finish — network quiet, no spinner, and the submit button enabled again, which is the one that generalises: a form that has taken your click greys the button until it is done, whatever it calls its spinner.

The dashboard pill is amber "requested, not yet confirmed", never green, because it would be easy to make a callback request look like a booked appointment and it is not one.

The one-time code is relayed through the person in the room. Nearly every real slot-booking flow in India sends an OTP, and defeating it is out of scope permanently — it is an identity control doing its job. But the code goes to a phone a human is holding, so Anbu Care asks the neighbour for it: a person supplying their own one-time code, which is what the control requires, and the care circle rather than the son because he is asleep eleven time zones away. The session must stay alive to receive it — an OTP is bound to the session that asked, so finishing and resuming later would trigger a fresh code — which is why the browser service runs one instance with concurrency above one.

The inbound branch is the narrowest in the webhook. Digits are a shape ordinary messages have — "6" is an answer to how she slept, "104" is a temperature — so it fires only while a request is actually outstanding for that parent, within minutes, from a resolved sender, on a message that is digits and nothing else. Verified live: the same "123456" is a wellbeing check-in with no request open and a code with one. The code is never stored, logged or receipted; the chain carries that one was asked for and that the request was closed, and nothing that would let anybody replay it.
The treating team gets a WhatsApp channel, bound by the credential they already hold. "How does Anbu Care know that is the doctor" has two obvious answers and both are wrong. You cannot register them in advance, because a treating clinician is whoever is on shift when your mother is admitted. And you cannot read it off the message, because "Dr Kumar here, she needs an MRI" is a sentence anybody can say — if that grants ordering rights on a woman's record it grants them to everyone.

So the answer is the one the handoff link already uses: a capability. The care circle shows the doctor a QR at the bedside; he opens it, taps once, and sends a WhatsApp message carrying a one-time code only that link could have produced. The handset is bound by the credential, not by a claim. It is scoped to one case, dies with the grant that made it, is revoked in the same act as the family's links, and the binding is on the chain. What it deliberately does not do is identify a human — an order carries "as recorded by", never "verified as".

After that the doctor just talks. A Tamil voice note becomes an attributed note on the record with the English derived from it, a test order fans out into a live Places search, and STOP hands the handset back. On one phone that handback is load-bearing: while it is connected as the treating team a photograph from it is refused with the reason and the way out, because a photo from a handset holding a clinical grant could as easily be a lab report as an invoice, and choosing between those is a guess this system does not make.
The neighbour can hand the system a bill; she cannot read the family's money. Doctors do not photograph bills — the person standing in the corridor holding the paper does. Meena held only outbound_notify, so she could be told things and send nothing: her photograph was dropped with a 204 and no error anywhere. On a shared handset that was invisible, because the index gets to the parent and resolve_sender finds the son on the same number and uses his consent. Give her her own phone and the bill lane was dead.

She holds inbound_wellbeing now and deliberately not billing_updates. The amount, what was claimable and what was refused go to the son's thread, not hers. Helping is not the same as being entitled to look — and because the sender of a bill is now routinely not the person its outcome is for, the acknowledgement stopped promising everybody that the answer would follow in a moment. She is told he is being told.
Links a frightened person will actually tap. Every URL carries a signed credential, which is what makes it openable without an account and also what made it wrap to four lines on a phone — reading at 4am as exactly the sort of thing you are told never to tap. The credential has to be there; it does not have to be on screen. A twelve-character alias stands in front, minted at the point of sending so every template gets it without being changed, and after rendering, because a translator handed a URL will happily rewrite the characters inside a signature.

It is a bearer token like the URL it hides and is sized for that: sixty bits of randomness and never sequential, since anything enumerable turns one leaked link into all of them; it inherits the expiry of the token inside it and may not outlive it; and it only ever wraps this deployment's own base URL, because a shortener that redirects anywhere is an open redirect, and one on a domain people have been told to trust is worth more to an attacker than anything else here. The alphabet drops 0 O 1 l I — these get read aloud down a phone line between Thoothukudi and Nashville.
Sign in with Google, with identity kept apart from permission. The ID token is verified server-side against Google's published keys with the client id pinned as the audience — a token minted for another application is a valid Google token and still not a credential for this one. Authorisation is a separate check: the verified address must already be a family contact on the parent being read, or the answer is 403. Being a real person is not permission to read somebody's mother's lab results. The demo credential still works alongside it, so the boundary can be shown without an account.
A decision trace: the chain rendered as the sequence a person can follow — the counterparty raising a query, the agent gathering what was asked for, the re-adjudication that followed. One step per receipt, so the view cannot invent a beat the chain does not contain.

Simulated, and labelled as such everywhere it appears:

The insurer/TPA response. No production insurer or TPA API exists to integrate against in this window. The liaison agent submits to a simulated endpoint. Packet assembly and SLA tracking are real; only the counterparty's answer is mocked.
Hospital capability and insurer empanelment. anbu_care/kb/data/hospitals_thoothukudi.json is split provenance, and only half of it is seeded. Locations are real: all five hospitals carry a Google Places place_id and a location_verified_on date, so identity, coordinates and therefore distance are verified rather than guessed. Capability and empanelment are seeded and must be spot-checked against current listings before any public writeup or recorded narration. Google can say where a hospital is; it cannot say who bills which insurer, or which centre can run a cath lab at 2am.
Booking is DRY BY DEFAULT, and that is a deployment switch. The browser service treats an absent ANBU_BOOKING_DRYRUN as on: it navigates, finds the form, fills every field, captures the cancellation path and reads the page, and does not click submit. These are real clinics, and a deploy that books by accident wastes a real appointment for a patient who does not exist. Every deploy of that service resets the flag, which turns out to be a good safety property. robots.txt is consulted, and a site that has said not to has said not to.

A real booking has been made and photographed: DLABS Diagnostics in Thoothukudi, whose page answered "Submission Success, Thanks for getting in touch!" with every field cleared. Both sides of the click are kept — the form filled in, and the centre's answer — so the claim rests on that clinic's own page rather than on this system's account of itself.

It took five attempts, and every failed one was this lane claiming something it had not verified: a form that rejected the submission on a missing email, a page still spinning when it was read, a spinner it did not recognise, and an acknowledgement whose wording it had never heard. Each was found by the screenshot and not by the code, which is the entire argument for keeping one.
No centre found so far can CONFIRM online. A booking lands as requested — the centre has the request and has agreed nothing. The confirmed path is implemented and tested and has never fired against a real centre, because every centre this system can drive takes a callback and nothing more, so the agreement happens in a phone call Anbu Care is not on. The card's pill stays amber for exactly that reason.

Of eight real Thoothukudi centres, one can be booked. One has no website, three are React applications the driver cannot read, two have hostnames that no longer resolve, and one never answers within the wait. Chennai, scouted for comparison, is better built and wants MORE — Anderson requires a package chosen from its own catalogue, which would be this system deciding which test she has. The realistic Indian path is the call bridge, not the form. The OTP relay is complete and verified in every part — the parked session, the delivery, the narrow inbound branch, one-shot closure — and the full loop has never run end to end, for the same reason: nothing we can drive has asked for a code.
WhatsApp delivery. The gate decision is real and always has been; the transport behind it is real code with real credentials. Whether a message actually leaves depends on the configured provider, and the system never claims a send that did not happen — a permitted-but-undelivered message is recorded as comms.not_delivered, with sent_at left unset.

Two providers are wired, and Twilio is the working path. The account is upgraded (type: Full), and a freeform Body send with no ContentSid reaches a real handset — verified end to end on 2026-08-22, status: delivered. This reverses an earlier note in this README: on a Twilio trial account freeform sends are rejected with 21654 ContentSid Required while the Content API that would satisfy it returns 20003 not available on a Trial account. That catch-22 is real, and upgrading is what resolves it.

Meta's Cloud API is implemented but is a dead end on this project. The test sender registers and connects, the token is valid, and sends still fail 131030 Recipient phone number not in allowed list — the only UI for that allow-list permanently reports "No phone numbers available for this app", reproduced across two apps in two separate business portfolios. There is no public Graph API for the list. The code stays because it works given a populated allow-list; it is not the path this demo uses.

One live constraint remains on the working path: the account has no Content templates, so freeform sends only succeed inside WhatsApp's 24-hour customer service window. A cold, business-initiated send still fails, and fails honestly as comms.not_delivered.

Neither is general production reach. Sending to an arbitrary number needs Meta business verification and template approval, roughly 10–15 business days. Whatever the transport, clinical detail never traverses WhatsApp — that is the classifier's job, and it runs before the transport is reachable at all.

Settlement. The deciding is autonomous; the money is not. Three rails, and the receipt records which one carried each payment, because "settled" on one is a different claim from "settled" on another.

`ANBU_PAYMENT_MODE`	What actually happens
`razorpay`	A real Razorpay API call in test mode. Real payment link, real webhook, test money. A person opens the link — a Payment Link is a collection instrument, so a lane ending in one ends with somebody clicking.
`razorpayx`	A real RazorpayX payout — money pushed to a beneficiary, nobody present. Needs a provisioned RazorpayX account; the Payouts endpoint 404s without one. Falls back and says so when unconfigured.
`payout`	The payout shape with no provider behind it. Settles without a human and labels itself simulated on every surface.

No mode moves real money. Autonomous debit needs UPI Autopay or an NPCI e-mandate, and NPCI caps AFA-free mandate debits at ₹15,000 — the raised ₹1,00,000 tier is restricted to merchant categories hospital billing is not in, so a ₹31,650 interim bill would prompt for a UPI PIN every time. A payout carries no such step, which is why the payout rail is the one with a route to being real, and why the blocker is merchant KYC rather than code.

Diagnostic centre coverage. The centres are real and live — Google Places, queried at the moment of the referral. What is not live is whether any of them is in a family's insurance network: the KB holds five hospitals, so for almost every centre the honest answer is "Anbu Care has no network information for this centre", and that is what it says. Nothing is connected to any lab, in either direction.

Real, but narrower than it looks:

Wellbeing check-ins are self-reported, never a measured vital. The dashboard labels them so. An absent entry reads "no check-in yet" — a missing check-in is not evidence that anything is well.
A transcript is not what she said. It is what a model heard. That is why the audio is retained and playable, and why nothing in the system attributes the transcript to her as speech.
The care circle is a set of notified parties, not integrated providers. Nobody in it can reply into the system, and no hospital or clinician system is connected in either direction.
A placed call is not an answered call. The telephony reports that a call was placed; whether anyone picked up is outside what this system can know, and it never claims otherwise.
Anbu Care does not sense anything. There is no location tracking, no monitoring, and no autonomous detection. Every input is something a person deliberately sent.
The handoff link cannot say who opened it. A link is a bearer credential, so the access receipt records that the summary was read and when, and states in its own payload that this was a link holder rather than an identified clinician. Naming a doctor it cannot verify would be the same false claim as reporting a message delivered when the provider only accepted it.
A clinician note is attributed to whoever held the link, and the system cannot check that either. What it can prove is that the text was confirmed before it was written, and that nobody has altered it since.
The trace shows the deciding; it is not the deciding. It renders receipts that already exist. Where a step left no receipt it shows nothing — which is how the gather in the claim loop was found to be invisible, and then fixed by recording it rather than by inferring it.
Nothing here is a hospital integration. No EHR is connected, nobody writes back, and the clinician view says so on its own face.
A bill split is an estimate, not a settlement. It comes from the policy rules, not from the insurer, who has not been asked and does not know this system exists. Every field is named estimated_, and settled_inr stays None until a real adjudication says otherwise — because nobody having decided is a different thing from nothing being owed. On a reimbursement claim the family pays first and is repaid later, so even a correct estimate is not money they hold.
"Autonomous payment" is autonomous deciding. Nothing here moves money by itself in any mode, and the surfaces say which rail carried each payment rather than leaving "settled" to be read as more than it is. The interesting claim is the refusal: an over-cap bill, a bill from another hospital, a bill naming a different UPI ID, and a second photograph of a bill already paid all stop without a human, and each names the check that stopped it.
Initiated is not paid. A payment leaves the enforcer unconfirmed and stays that way until a settlement confirmation arrives, written by a different actor — payment_rail, never payment_enforcer. The money view counts the two separately, and a rail that reported its own success would be the failure this lane is built to avoid.
A destination leaves the store by exactly one door. Every response carries payee_ref, a hash prefix that proves which destination without being one. One named, authenticated endpoint serves the real address with a UPI QR, because nobody can pay an account they have not been given — and the page renders it only there, read-only, on request.
An extracted amount is a reading, not a fact. A model that reads ₹96,000 where the paper says ₹9,600 produces a number that looks exactly as authoritative as a correct one. So the lines are checked against the bill's own printed total, a mismatch is flagged rather than reconciled, and the image is retained — credentialed — so the figure can be checked. A bill whose photograph could not be stored is refused outright rather than recorded as unverifiable numbers.

Every market figure quoted in the project brief is directional and unverified. See docs/CITATIONS.md before repeating any of them.

Quick start

make install          # uv sync --extra dev
make test             # 1258 tests, no GCP or model access needed
                      # (one more needs a Memory Bank and skips without it)
make preflight        # the state that silently ruins a recording, in ~2s
make demo             # the full spine, end to end, with no model in the loop

./booker/ the browser service, deployed apart from the API Dockerfile Playwright image; Chromium will not fit beside the API driver.py navigate, read the form, validate, fill, submit app.py two endpoints and a session parked on a one-time code scripts/demo_run.sh drives the deployed service through the full demo narrative — fresh synthetic cases each run, a separate throwaway case for the tamper beat, and --reset to clean up. It is the reproducible path: it needs no beat sheet and no person reading one, which is the point.

make demo runs scripts/demo_spine.py: onboarding, document ingestion, the triage decision, the WhatsApp gate, packet assembly, the STEP_UP gate, submission with a live SLA clock, and then it tampers with a receipt to show the chain catching it. Nothing in it depends on what an LLM does on the day.

To talk to the agents:

gcloud auth application-default login
cp .env.example .env          # then set GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT
make keygen                   # mint a stable signing key, put it in .env
make verify-stack             # confirm Vertex, Firestore, Pub/Sub are reachable
make chat                     # terminal conversation with the coordinator
make serve                    # agent API + ADK dev UI on :8080

Note that gcloud auth application-default login resets ADC's quota project to your gcloud default every time you run it, which silently bills and meters every Vertex and Firestore call against the wrong project. .env pins GOOGLE_CLOUD_QUOTA_PROJECT so that reset cannot take effect — verified by pointing ADC at the wrong project and confirming Vertex still resolves correctly.

The stack

Every mandatory requirement, and where it is actually load-bearing.

Requirement	Used for
Gemini 3.5 (Vertex AI)	Multimodal reasoning over discharge summaries, lab reports, ECG images and prescriptions; policy-clause matching; and single-call transcription of inbound WhatsApp voice notes. Deployed default is `gemini-3.5-flash`, configurable via `ANBU_MODEL`: any Gemini 3.5+ model satisfies the mandate.
Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite (Vertex AI)	The one call that deliberately does not use `ANBU_MODEL`. It decides which language she actually writes in, so the next admission's first check-in is not in the language somebody chose for her on a form. A question with a two-letter answer, on a path that already owes her a reply inside fifteen seconds, is the wrong place to spend a frontier model. The answer is checked against a closed list of eight languages before it is believed.
Google ADK	Five sub-agents with isolated tool scopes under one coordinator.
Cloud Run	Hosts the agent API, the Twilio webhook, and the dashboard.
Firestore	Case state and the hash-chained receipt ledger, single-table PK/SK.
Pub/Sub	Async multi-day case tracking — intake events, case updates, claim status.
Memory Bank	A Vertex AI Agent Engine Memory Bank in `asia-south1`, live on the deployed revision: `/api/healthz` reports `"memory_bank": "vertex ai agent engine, asia-south1 (persistent)"`. It holds lessons: the small class of fact that is true of the person rather than of the admission. Two today. How she answers (voice note or typed), observed from how her messages arrive. And which language she actually writes in, detected by a second, smaller model and read back to decide what the next admission's first check-in is written in, rather than trusting the language a son in another country picked on a form. Written on her own inbound messages, read by the next recovery check-in. Recall is an exact scope lookup, not a similarity search, and there is no free-text path into the store, so nothing clinical can enter it.

Architecture

   Parent in India                    NRI Family (dashboard + WhatsApp)
   (WhatsApp voice note / text)                     |
              |                                     |
   +----------v-----------+                         |
   | Inbound wellbeing    |  Gemini transcribes     |
   | (Twilio webhook)     |  audio in ONE call;     |
   | audio is the record, |  RED_FLAGS table (code) |
   | transcript derived   |  decides, not the model |
   +----------+-----------+                         |
              |                                     |
              |  red flag -> open case, triage      |
              +------------------+------------------+
                                 |
                 +------------+--+---------+
                 |  Onboarding / KB Agent  |
                 |  (medical hx, docs,     |
                 |   insurance baseline)   |
                 +------------+------------+
                              |
                 +------------+------------+
                 |   Coordinator (root)    |  (ADK)
                 +------------+------------+
                              |
      +-------------+---------+---------+-------------------+
      |             |                   |                   |
 +----v-----+ +-----v------+   +--------v-------+  +--------v-------+
 | Triage   | | Evidence / |   | Insurer/TPA    |  | WhatsApp Comms |
 | Agent    | | STEP_UP    |   | Liaison Agent  |  | Agent          |
 | severity+| | (pre-submit|   | (submits pre-  |  | (template-     |
 | location+| |  evidence  |   |  validated     |  |  compliant     |
 | hospital | |  enrich)   |   |  packet;       |  |  status to     |
 | matching | |            |   |  *SIMULATED*   |  |  parent + NRI) |
 +----+-----+ +-----+------+   +--------+-------+  +-------+--------+
      |             |                   |                  |
      |             |                   |          +-------v--------+
      |             |                   |          | Care circle    |
      |             |                   |          | NOTIFIED only, |
      |             |                   |          | never          |
      |             |                   |          | integrated     |
      |             |                   |          +----------------+
      |             |                   |
      +-------------+---------+---------+
                              |
                 +------------v------------+
                 | Signed Receipt /        |
                 | Provenance Chain        |
                 | (Firestore, hash-chained|
                 +------------+------------+
                              |
                 +------------v------------+
                 | Memory Bank             |
                 | (cross-session, multi-  |
                 |  month family + policy) |
                 +-------------------------+

See docs/ARCHITECTURE.md for the design decisions and why each one was made.

The one idea worth stealing

Guardrails that matter are code, not prompts.

Four things in this system must hold on every single run, including the run where the model is confused, the caller is reassuring, or someone is trying to talk their way past the boundary:

A red-flag symptom escalates. anbu_care/triage/severity.py decides severity. The agent relays it and is instructed never to soften it. "She says it's probably just gas" does not downgrade chest pain.
Clinical detail leaves over WhatsApp only where a named exception says so. anbu_care/comms/policy.py classifies the content, not the caller's claim about it. A message declared as logistics that carries a troponin value is blocked anyway — and the block is written to the receipt chain as evidence the boundary held.

There is exactly one exception and it is a frozen set of template names, not a flag a caller can pass: the treating team's own update, to the family, about their own parent. It is allowed by name, its detection is not suppressed, and the receipt records that an exception was applied and what it found. The distinction worth stealing is that the exception is as auditable as the rule — a message carrying clinical detail is never indistinguishable from one that did not.
A counterparty never chooses the destination. A bill may propose an amount and can never propose a payee; a web page may hold a booking form and can never choose which centre she goes to. Both are the same guard pointed at different nouns, both assign from the mandate rather than comparing against it, and the booking one matches on Google's place id because a name is a string a page can print.
A decision cannot be silently rewritten. Every consequential action appends a signed receipt whose hash covers the previous one. Editing an earlier entry breaks every hash after it, and verify_case_chain reports exactly where.

An agent that is merely told not to leak a lab value is not a control.

Repository layout

anbu_care/
  agent.py              root coordinator — ADK entrypoint (`root_agent`)
  agents/               five sub-agents, one file each
  tools/                one tool module per agent — isolated scopes
  triage/               severity rules + hospital ranking (deterministic)
  comms/                WhatsApp message policy (deterministic), outbound translation, link aliasing
  recovery/             the fortnight after discharge: window, cadence, stop conditions
  preauth/              cashless pre-authorisation at admission, and the insurer's 1-hour clock
  bills/                bill vision, line items, sub-limit and co-pay arithmetic
  diagnostics/          live Places search, ranking, and reading an order from dictation
  payments/             standing and per-case mandates, the nine guards, the settlement rails
                        and `share.py`, which pays her residual rather than the insurer's part
  booking/              holding an appointment: the mandate, twelve guards, the OTP relay
                        and `result.py`, where an arriving report closes the test it belongs to
  tpa/                  the adjudicator, the claim that files itself on discharge, and the
                        Part A claim form a person could actually sign
  memory/               the one store that outlives a case, and the two lessons allowed in it
  intake.py             photographs kept until they have actually been read
  docvision/            the other four document kinds: classify, extract, apply
  brief/                the arrival brief, composed from receipts and the record
  handoff/              scoped clinician links, and binding a handset to one case
  webauth.py            credentials: demo token, signed link, Google identity
  provenance/           hash chain, Ed25519 signing, Firestore/memory store
  kb/                   seeded Thoothukudi hospital knowledge base
  service.py            case state transitions, SLA clocks, Pub/Sub
  server.py             Cloud Run entrypoint (ADK API + dashboard routes)
scripts/
  demo_spine.py         end-to-end run, no model, no transport, no GCP
  verify_stack.py       confirms Vertex / Firestore / Pub/Sub are reachable
  make_bill_images.py   synthetic Indian hospital bills, for the vision lane
  make_documents.py     synthetic discharge summary, lab report, prescription, policy
  link_google_account.py  link a Google address to a family contact
  backfill_document_details.py  re-read stored photographs into `details`
  retake_bill.py        the same bill photographed a second time, for the dedupe
  collapse_demo_family.py  fold accumulated demo families back to the live one
  preflight.py          the state that silently ruins a take (`make preflight`)
  clear_rehearsal_debris.py  fold repeated photographs of one admission back to one
  build_architecture_svg.py  the architecture diagram, hand-authored rather than laid out
  make_architecture_pdf.py   the two-page PDF, and the README's PNG, from that one SVG
  seed_breach.sh        an already-lapsed cashless clock, for demonstrating the breach
tests/                  1258 tests, no GCP or model access needed
infra/deploy_cloud_run.sh
infra/deploy_booker.sh
infra/schedule_recovery_tick.sh  the two ticks Cloud Run cannot hold itself

HTTP endpoints

Beyond ADK's own agent API:

Route	Purpose
`GET /api/healthz`	Liveness, plus whether the signing key is stable and Memory Bank is wired
`GET /api/hospitals`	The seeded KB, served with its provenance attached
`POST /api/demo/seed`	Create the Thoothukudi demo family, returns its `parent_id`
`POST /api/intake`	Direct triage — how an automated intake signal enters the system
`GET /api/parents/{id}`	Baseline record and every ingested document
`GET /api/cases/{id}`	Case metadata and current chain head
`GET /api/cases/{id}/trail`	Every decision on the case, in order, with hash links
`GET /api/cases/{id}/brief`	The arrival brief, degrading to "not yet known" in every hole
`GET /api/cases/{id}/verify`	Independent chain verification — deliberately unauthenticated
`POST /api/wellbeing/inbound`	Twilio webhook — inbound check-ins, text and voice notes
`GET /api/parents/{id}/wellbeing`	Check-in history for a parent
`GET /api/parents/{id}/care-circle`	Care-circle contacts and their consent purposes
`POST /api/recovery/tick`	Send any recovery check-in that is due. Credentialed — it is the trigger for the only outbound channel pointed at the parent herself
`POST /api/cases/{id}/preauth`	Ask the simulated adjudicator whether cover exists for this admission. Idempotent: one admission is one pre-authorisation
`GET /api/cases/{id}/preauth`	Every pre-authorisation on the case and how its clock stands right now
`POST /api/claims/sla-tick`	Record every cashless clock that has actually lapsed. Credentialed — an open version would let anybody put a regulatory breach on somebody else's record
`POST /api/cases/{id}/preauth/backdate`	Move a pending clock's start into the past, for demonstration. The deadline stays start plus one hour and the breach still has to be genuinely past it; the request and the breach both carry `requested_at_source: demonstration_seed` so a seeded clock can never read as an hour that elapsed on its own
`GET /api/parents/{id}/recovery`	The recovery window, whether consent is held, and the answers recorded
`POST /api/cases/{id}/notify-claim`	Claim-status message to the family, through the comms gate
`POST /api/cases/{id}/notify-care-circle`	Care-circle notice, through the comms gate
`POST /api/intake-signal`	Structured intake event
`GET /api/intake-channels`	Which intake channels are configured
`GET /api/map-config`	Maps browser key and the hospital-provenance source note
`GET /api/cases/{id}/trace`	The decision sequence — one step per receipt, nothing synthesised
`POST /api/cases/{id}/handoff-link`	Mint an emergency-access link for a treating clinician
`POST /api/cases/{id}/handoff-link/revoke`	Kill every outstanding link for the case
`GET /api/cases/{id}/diagnostics`	Clinician-ordered tests on the case. Credentialed — the test a doctor ordered is clinical detail
`POST /api/cases/{id}/diagnostics/{order_id}/options`	Live Places search near the hospital. Refuses if no clinician ordered anything
`POST /api/cases/{id}/diagnostics/{order_id}/notify`	Tell the family, logistics only, without naming the test
`POST /api/parents/{id}/booking-mandate`	Authorise Anbu Care to hold an appointment. Standing, and carrying no authority to spend
`DELETE /api/parents/{id}/booking-mandate`	Withdraw it, including from admissions already carrying it
`POST /api/cases/{id}/diagnostics/{order_id}/arrange`	Choose a centre and try to hold the slot, falling through on failure
`GET /api/cases/{id}/appointments`	What was arranged, what was only requested, and every centre tried on the way. Credentialed — where she will be on Thursday is a fact about her
`POST /api/cases/{id}/appointments/{id}/cancel`	Withdraw one, and hand back the path for telling the centre
`GET /api/cases/{id}/appointments/{id}/evidence`	A signed link to the centre's own page. `?stage=sent` for the form as it was filled. Credentialed — the page carries her name and a number
`GET /api/cases/{id}/appointments/{id}/evidence/view`	The same, as a redirect, so a WhatsApp message can carry the proof beside the claim
`GET /api/cases/{id}/attempts/{n}/evidence/view`	The page of a centre that REFUSED, by its position in this case's own escalation receipt. The object is never named by the caller
`GET /api/cases/{id}/claim-form`	A short-lived signed link to the filled Part A for this admission. Credentialed — it states a diagnosis, which is exactly why it is the one document that never rides on a message
`GET /api/cases/{id}/claim-form/view`	The same, as a redirect, so the form can be opened in one tap
`POST /api/demo/seed?scratch=1`	A synthetic parent of your own, with no phone number on it. The default reuses the demo family, which is right for a demo and wrong for a stranger following the testing instructions
`GET /api/preflight`	The state that silently ruins a recording, in one round trip. Credentialed
`GET /api/cases/{id}/bills`	Photographed bills and the estimated policy split
`POST /api/parents/{id}/payment-mandate`	Authorise standing, ahead of any admission. Every case opened while it is live adopts it and they share the total cap
`DELETE /api/parents/{id}/payment-mandate`	Withdraw it, including from admissions already carrying it
`POST /api/cases/{id}/payment-mandate`	Authorise for one admission: destination, per-bill cap, total cap, window. Wins over the standing grant
`DELETE /api/cases/{id}/payment-mandate`	Revoke it. Every further bill needs approval
`GET /api/cases/{id}/payments`	What is paid, what is merely initiated, what authority remains, and every refusal with the check that caused it
`POST /api/cases/{id}/bills/{bill_id}/consider`	Put a bill already on file to the guards
`POST /api/cases/{id}/payments/approve`	A human approving what the enforcer refused. Authorises an amount, never a destination
`POST /api/cases/{id}/payments/{payment_id}/confirm`	Record that a settlement confirmation arrived
`GET /api/cases/{id}/payments/{payment_id}/upi`	The UPI intent and QR for one payment. The only response that carries a raw destination
`POST /api/payments/razorpay`	Provider webhook — collections and payouts. HMAC-verified, deliberately session-less
`GET /api/cases/{id}/bills/{bill_id}/image`	Short-lived signed URL for the source photograph
`GET /api/parents/{id}/documents/{doc_id}/image`	The same, for a photographed document
`GET /api/auth-config`	Which sign-in methods this deployment offers
`GET /api/whoami`	Who the presented credential says you are. Never 401s
`GET /s/{code}`	Follow a short alias to the link it stands for. Unauthenticated, like the long URL it hides; unknown and expired answer the same 410
`GET /handoff/{token}`	The clinician's read-only summary. No login, by design
`POST /handoff/{token}/note/draft`	Transcribe a spoken note for review. Writes nothing
`POST /handoff/{token}/note/confirm`	Record a confirmed note
`GET /app`	The dashboard

Everything returning case or patient content sits behind require_case_access / require_family_session and answers 401 without a session. Two deliberate exceptions, and they are different in kind:

/api/cases/{id}/verify proves integrity without revealing content — no name, no allergy, no hospital, no rupee figure — so it needs no credential.
/handoff/{token} shows clinical content to someone who has never authenticated, because a nurse holding an unconscious patient will not create an account. It is not a second way in: only a caller who already holds a family session can mint the token, so it delegates a subset of that access rather than bypassing it. One case, sixty minutes, revocable, and every open writes a receipt the family can see.

Smoke-testing a fresh deploy is three calls. This one deliberately does NOT pass ?scratch=1: a fresh deploy has no demo family and the point here is to create it. Anybody who is not setting up a deploy wants the scratch version at the top of this file, which touches nothing that is being filmed.

PARENT=$(curl -sX POST $URL/api/demo/seed | jq -r .parent_id)
CASE=$(curl -sX POST $URL/api/intake -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d "{\"parent_id\":\"$PARENT\",\"symptoms\":[\"chest pain\"],\"reported_by\":\"neighbour\"}" \
  | jq -r .case_id)
curl -s $URL/api/cases/$CASE/verify | jq

The verify route is unauthenticated on purpose. The point of a receipt chain is that a family or an insurer can check it without trusting us to run the check for them.

Deploying

make keygen                                  # mint a stable Ed25519 key
export ANBU_SIGNING_KEY_B64=...              # deploy refuses without it
make deploy                                  # gcloud run deploy --source .

The deploy script refuses to run without a stable signing key. An ephemeral key means each revision signs with a different one, and receipts written before a restart stop verifying — which defeats the entire point of the chain.

Memory Bank

The one store that outlives a case. Create an Agent Engine in the same region and point the service at it:

gcloud auth print-access-token | xargs -I{} curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer {}" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"displayName":"anbu-care-memory"}' \
  "https://asia-south1-aiplatform.googleapis.com/v1/projects/$PROJECT/locations/asia-south1/reasoningEngines"

export ANBU_MEMORY_BANK=projects/<num>/locations/asia-south1/reasoningEngines/<id>
make deploy

/api/healthz then reports the store and its region instead of "in-memory (not persistent)". The runtime service account needs roles/aiplatform.user, which it already has for Gemini.

Absent the variable nothing breaks: lessons are neither written nor read, every check-in falls back to the profile, and the health endpoint says so. The test suite forces it empty so a developer's .env can never put test data in a real bank. To exercise the live cross-session write-and-recall, ask for it by name:

ANBU_MEMORY_BANK_LIVE=projects/.../reasoningEngines/... \
  .venv/bin/python -m pytest -m memory_bank

First deploy on a fresh project

Two things bite once, and neither is obvious from the error message.

1. Firestore needs a composite index. The single-table layout queries pk-equality + sk-range + order-by, which Firestore refuses without one — and it fails at query time, so writes succeed and reads blow up. Create it before the first real run:

gcloud firestore indexes composite create --collection-group=anbu \
  --field-config=field-path=pk,order=ascending \
  --field-config=field-path=sk,order=ascending

The definition is recorded in infra/firestore.indexes.json.

2. The default compute service account needs build roles. A fresh project's PROJECT_NUMBER-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com cannot read the source bucket Cloud Build uploads to, and the deploy fails with a storage.objects.get 403:

SA=PROJECT_NUMBER-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com
for role in roles/storage.objectViewer roles/logging.logWriter \
            roles/artifactregistry.writer roles/cloudbuild.builds.builder; do
  gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding PROJECT_ID \
    --member="serviceAccount:$SA" --role="$role" --condition=None
done

Public access under domain-restricted sharing

--allow-unauthenticated grants roles/run.invoker to allUsers. If your organization enforces constraints/iam.allowedPolicyMemberDomains, that grant is refused and the deploy still reports success — you get a service nobody can reach, with only a warning in the output.

infra/deploy_cloud_run.sh therefore uses --no-invoker-iam-check instead, which is Google's documented alternative for projects under DRS. It is scoped to the one service and modifies no organization policy.

The booker is the opposite and deliberately so. infra/deploy_booker.sh deploys it with --no-allow-unauthenticated and grants roles/run.invoker to the API's service account and nothing else: a browser that will type a stranger's name into a form on request is not left open to the internet. Cloud Run answers an unauthorised caller with 404, not 403 — refusing without admitting the service exists — so a "not found" from that service usually means the caller is not an invoker rather than that the route is missing.

# make public
gcloud run services update anbu-care --region=asia-south1 --no-invoker-iam-check
# make private again
gcloud run services update anbu-care --region=asia-south1 --invoker-iam-check

Google Sign-In

Optional. Unset, /api/auth-config reports null, the button says it is not configured, and the demo credential still works — nothing else changes.

The client is created in the console; there is no gcloud path for a Web OAuth client (gcloud alpha iap oauth-clients is IAP brands, a different thing).

Google Auth Platform → Get started. Audience Internal if the project sits in a Workspace organization: no test-user list, and no "Google hasn't verified this app" interstitial, which External-in-Testing shows even to test users.
Clients → Create client → Web application. Authorized JavaScript origin is the deployed base URL, scheme and host only — no trailing slash, no path. Leave redirect URIs empty: Google Identity Services returns the ID token to the page, so there is no redirect leg to authorise.
ANBU_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=...apps.googleusercontent.com and redeploy.

The client ID is public by design — it identifies the app to Google and ships in every page offering the button. The client secret in the downloaded JSON is not used by this flow and is stored nowhere.

Signing in is not permission. The verified address must already be on the parent's family contacts:

uv run python scripts/link_google_account.py --parent parent-xxxx \
    --contact Karthik --email you@example.com --apply

Without that, a perfectly valid Google account gets a 403, which is the system working rather than failing.

Liveness is `/api/healthz`, not `/healthz`

Google Front End reserves the bare /healthz path and never forwards it to the container, so a route defined there works locally and returns 404 in Cloud Run — with no server: Google Frontend header, which is the tell. The liveness route is served under /api/ for that reason. See infra/DEPLOYED.md.

WhatsApp delivery credentials

Secrets are read from the environment only — never committed, never logged, never baked into an image layer. Locally they go in .env (gitignored); on Cloud Run, inject them as secrets rather than plain env vars.

Meta Cloud API (implemented, but a dead end on this project — see the honesty note above):

# From the Meta app dashboard: WhatsApp -> API Setup
ANBU_WHATSAPP_MODE=meta
WHATSAPP_ACCESS_TOKEN=...        # "Generate access token" — temporary, expires
WHATSAPP_PHONE_NUMBER_ID=...     # the numeric ID, not the phone number
WHATSAPP_API_VERSION=v25.0

No conversation window exists until the recipient has written to you, so the first contact must be a pre-approved template. transport.open_session(to) sends hello_world for exactly that purpose. It is an operational handshake, not a family update: it carries no case content and does not go through the gate, because there is nothing to classify.

Twilio (the working path; needs a non-trial account, see the honesty note above):

ANBU_WHATSAPP_MODE=twilio
TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID=AC...
TWILIO_API_KEY_SID=SK...         # preferred: revocable without rotating the
TWILIO_API_KEY_SECRET=...        # account auth token
TWILIO_WHATSAPP_FROM=whatsapp:+1...   # your sandbox sender, NOT the docs default

On Cloud Run:

printf %s "$WHATSAPP_ACCESS_TOKEN" | gcloud secrets create whatsapp-access-token --data-file=-

gcloud run services update anbu-care --region=asia-south1 \
  --update-secrets=WHATSAPP_ACCESS_TOKEN=whatsapp-access-token:latest \
  --update-env-vars=ANBU_WHATSAPP_MODE=meta,WHATSAPP_PHONE_NUMBER_ID=...

The runtime service account needs roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor on those secrets. ANBU_WHATSAPP_MODE=off (the default) records gate decisions and sends nothing.

Runtime service account needs explicit roles

If your organization enforces constraints/iam.automaticIamGrantsForDefaultServiceAccounts, the Cloud Run runtime identity gets no Editor role and every Firestore write fails with a 500. Grant it explicitly:

SA=PROJECT_NUMBER-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com
for role in roles/datastore.user roles/pubsub.publisher roles/aiplatform.user; do
  gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding PROJECT_ID \
    --member="serviceAccount:$SA" --role="$role" --condition=None
done

Then deploy a new revision — running instances do not pick up IAM changes.

Future work

Gemma as an intake normalizer — DEFERRED, precheck negative (not pending). The plan was a small model converting messy free-text intake ("amma fell, chest heavy, sweating, BP 160") into the structured fields the deterministic triage table consumes — advisory input only, never able to set severity or write a receipt. Not built: Gemma is not available as a managed endpoint on this project's Vertex AI (absent from the publisher listing; gemma-3-27b-it, gemma-3-12b-it and gemma-2-9b-it all return 404 on generateContent). Serving it would mean deploying from Model Garden to a dedicated GPU-backed endpoint, billed per hour rather than per token. Deferred as infra cost out of proportion to a component that by design cannot change any decision.
The reimbursement claim files itself on discharge. The claim lane was the last one here that still waited to be asked: everything around it had learned to act, and the moment a family would most want movement was the one moment somebody had to call a tool. A photographed discharge summary now assembles the packet, submits it, starts the real 30-day clock, and renders a filled Part A claim form — an actual PDF a person could sign and send, filled from the policy captured at onboarding, the dates and hospital off the summary, and the amounts off the photographed bills. Fields the system does not hold print as not on record rather than being guessed, the form is unsigned, and Anbu Care has sent it to nobody. It is credentialed like the record it came from, never attached to a message, because it states a diagnosis. One claim per admission, and no claim at all without a policy or a bill — each refusal receipted with its reason. The counterparty remains a simulated adjudicator. See anbu_care/tpa/on_discharge.py and anbu_care/tpa/claim_form.py.
The booking loop now closes on a result — PARTLY SHIPPED. A photographed lab report closes the test it can only belong to. When exactly one order is outstanding on an admission, the arriving report moves it to resulted, a status of its own: weaker than the centre confirming, stronger than the silence it replaced, and honest about the difference. With two outstanding it refuses to guess and receipts why, because attributing a report to one of two orders means reading it to decide which, and that is a model choosing which clinical order was carried out. A report predating the order is refused too. See anbu_care/booking/result.py.

Still open: nothing moves requested to confirmed for a callback-only centre, nothing reminds anybody a request has gone unanswered — the staleness nudge — and cancel still marks only our record while saying plainly it has not contacted the centre, so a family that rings to cancel leaves the record wrong with nothing to reconcile it.
Voice calls are decided but not placed. An escalation rings the care circle as well as messaging them, and with no voice transport configured the call is recorded as voice.not_placed with the reason and the words it would have spoken. That is the system declining to claim something it did not do, which is the right failure — but it is still a lane that has never carried a call. Wiring a provider is configuration, not design work.
The dashboard grants per-case, the API grants standing. The mandate form in webui/index.html posts to /api/cases/{id}/payment-mandate, so granting from the UI narrows authority to that one admission — correct behaviour for that route, and the wrong default now that standing grants exist. The parent route has no control in front of it yet.
Per-analyte reference change values. A repeat lab reading drifts for reasons that are not clinical, so changes inside a flat 10% band are narrated as "within normal variation" rather than "new and abnormal" — which is what stops a 1.7% cholesterol drift burying an HbA1c move from 7.1 to 8.4. A flat percentage is the crude version: real practice derives a reference change value per analyte from assay and biological variation. The band is narrative only — the high/low flag against the reference range is untouched, and no triage or adjudication decision reads it.
Ingestion provenance receipts — PARTLY SHIPPED. A photographed document now writes a document.ingested receipt carrying both a content hash and an image hash, so a stored-then-altered reading is detectable and a duplicate photograph is refused rather than double-counted. The remaining gap is the tool path: onboarding_tools.ingest_document, used by the agent and the seed script, still writes no receipt, so a document that never came through a photograph is ground-truthed only by a stored count. The topology audit in docs/proposals/ingestion-provenance.md found the chain core is already subject-agnostic — verify_chain, sequence and prev_hash logic carry no case knowledge, so this is a new PK prefix rather than a refactor. Deliberately deferred, not unexamined: the case-chain tamper beat already carries the verifiability story, so the hour went to the adjudicator instead.

Writeup material

DISCLOSURE.md — prior-work and simulated-adjudicator disclosure
docs/CITATIONS.md — every market figure, and its verification status
infra/DEPLOYED.md — the live environment

Disclosure

Anbu Care reimplements two patterns from our own prior work, written fresh during the submission window. See DISCLOSURE.md.

Licence

MIT — see LICENSE.

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Anbu Care

Try it, three ways, none of them needing a login

Architecture at a glance

The two access models, both enforced server-side

What is real, and what is not

Quick start

The stack

Architecture

The one idea worth stealing

Repository layout

HTTP endpoints

Deploying

Memory Bank

First deploy on a fresh project

Public access under domain-restricted sharing

Google Sign-In

Liveness is `/api/healthz`, not `/healthz`

WhatsApp delivery credentials

Runtime service account needs explicit roles

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Name		Name	Last commit message	Last commit date
.claude/skills		.claude/skills
.github/workflows		.github/workflows
anbu_care		anbu_care
assets		assets
booker		booker
docs		docs
infra		infra
scripts		scripts
tests		tests
.dockerignore		.dockerignore
.env.example		.env.example
.gitignore		.gitignore
DISCLOSURE.md		DISCLOSURE.md
Dockerfile		Dockerfile
LICENSE		LICENSE
Makefile		Makefile
README.md		README.md
pyproject.toml		pyproject.toml
uv.lock		uv.lock

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Anbu Care

Try it, three ways, none of them needing a login

Architecture at a glance

The two access models, both enforced server-side

What is real, and what is not

Quick start

The stack

Architecture

The one idea worth stealing

Repository layout

HTTP endpoints

Deploying

Memory Bank

First deploy on a fresh project

Public access under domain-restricted sharing

Google Sign-In

Liveness is /api/healthz, not /healthz

WhatsApp delivery credentials

Runtime service account needs explicit roles

Future work

Writeup material

Disclosure

Licence

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Liveness is `/api/healthz`, not `/healthz`