The neutral, open, implementation-independent boundary contract for proof-bound consequential execution. Defines the wire shape every Actenon artefact speaks. Zero runtime dependencies. Any language, any framework, any cloud.
The claims: machine-verified badge links to a CI gate
(verify-claims.yml) that fails on
every PR, push to main, and once a day if any factual claim this README
makes about the package stops being true:
- Zero runtime dependencies — read from
pyproject.toml, not prose. - The vector count — "129 hash-locked test vectors" is compared against
the actual files in
conformance/vectors/. - The refusal catalogue — the pre-compiled JSON the package ships is byte-checked against the human-editable YAML source of truth.
- Install commands — every
pip install/npm installin this README is resolved against the live registry. - The ecosystem table — rendered from
ecosystem.yaml, never hand-edited; the Python version badge is generated the same way.
If the badge is green, this README is telling the truth. If a claim drifts, the badge goes red before a human notices.
The Protocol is one of the independent repositories that together close the execution gap — the gap between upstream authorization and the execution edge that actually performs a consequential side effect.
| Repository | Role | Depends on | Packages |
|---|---|---|---|
actenon-protocol ← you are here |
The neutral wire contract — what every artefact looks like on the wire | — | actenon-protocol (PyPI) · @actenon/protocol-types (npm) |
actenon-kernel |
The open verifier — defines what a valid proof is | actenon-protocol |
actenon-kernel (PyPI) |
actenon-permit |
The developer on-ramp and authority broker | actenon-kernel, actenon-protocol |
actenon-permit (PyPI) · @actenon/sdk (npm) |
actenon-scan |
The independent static-analysis scanner | — | actenon-scan (PyPI) |
Optional: actenon-cloud — a managed control plane (source-available; see its LICENSE). Not required by any component above; every capability in this ecosystem works without it.
The Protocol is the only repo the other four share as a common dependency — and even that is by choice, not by force. Every artefact defined here is implementable in any language with no runtime dependencies on any Actenon code.
The Protocol defines the wire format that every Actenon component speaks. It is:
- Neutral — no runtime dependencies, no framework assumptions, no cloud requirement, no opinion on how you implement verification.
- Versioned — v1.3.0 (backward-compatible with v1.0.0–v1.2.0). Versioning policy in
VERSIONING.md. - Cross-language — Python (PyPI v1.3.0), TypeScript (npm v1.3.0), Go (
go get github.com/actenon/sdk-go@v1.0.0), and Rust (git dependency; crates.io pending) SDKs all conform to the same hash-locked conformance vectors. See Multi-language SDKs for the packaging status of each SDK. - Hash-locked — conformance vectors are versioned and frozen; an implementation that passes v1.0.0 vectors will keep passing them forever.
- Implementation-independent — the same protocol can be implemented by Actenon, by a vendor, by an open-source competitor, or by an in-house team. Conformance, not pedigree, decides validity.
Modern agent stacks have plenty of proof formats, capability tokens, and audit schemas — JWT, PASETO, UCAN, macaroons, OAuth tokens, SPIFFE SVIDs, custom audit JSON. None of them, however, are designed to answer the question the execution edge needs to answer:
Is the exact consequential action about to execute still the exact action that was authorized — for this endpoint, this tenant, this subject, this target, this scope, this time window, and this single execution attempt?
The Protocol exists to give that question a public, implementation-independent answer. It defines:
- the request shape (
Action Intent) - the proof shape (
ExecutionProof, a.k.a. PCCB — Proof of Constrained Capability Bound) - the success shape (
ExecutionReceipt) - the failure shape (
ExecutionRefusal) - the discriminated result shape (
ExecutionResult) - the boundary-mapping shape (
BoundaryManifest)
…and nothing else. It does not define how proof is issued, how policy is evaluated, how credentials are brokered, or how tenants are managed. Those are intentionally left to the implementer.
| Artefact | Purpose | Schema |
|---|---|---|
ExecutionProof (PCCB) |
Cryptographic proof that a specific action was authorized for a specific audience, tenant, subject, target, scope, and time window. Single-use. | schemas/execution_proof.v1.json |
ExecutionReceipt |
Durable record that a proof was verified and an action executed (or definitively refused before execution, in the refused-receipt path). | schemas/execution_receipt.v1.json |
ExecutionRefusal |
Structured refusal with two-layer disclosure (public-safe disclosed_code + trusted-only internal_code). |
schemas/execution_refusal.v1.json |
ExecutionResult |
Discriminated union: BrokeredExecutionResult | ResourceOwnedExecutionResult — disjoint field sets, no ambiguity. |
schemas/execution_result.v1.json |
BoundaryManifest |
Declarative mapping from HTTP endpoints to canonical Actenon actions, with parameter extraction rules. | schemas/boundary_manifest.v1.json |
| Mode | Who verifies | Who executes | Receipt issuer | When to use |
|---|---|---|---|---|
brokered |
In-stack Kernel verifier (typically inside the agent framework) | Broker (Permit) — credentials resolved server-side after verification | Broker | You control the agent framework and want credentials never to reach the agent |
resource_owned |
Resource boundary (independent Kernel verifier) | The resource itself (FastAPI route, Express endpoint, Go handler) | Resource | You cannot fully trust the agent, or the resource is shared by multiple callers, or the resource team is a separate org |
Submission is not execution. A submitted state is non-final. succeeded requires a cryptographically verified receipt. The protocol enforces this distinction with disjoint result field sets — brokered and resource-owned results cannot be confused.
The mode is explicit, never inferred — it appears on every proof, receipt, refusal, and result. There is no "default mode."
Every signed and digested artefact in the protocol uses the same canonicalisation profile:
canonicalization_profile: "actenon-jcs-sha256-v1" # cross-repo wire contract name
canonicalization_label: "ACTENON-JCS-STRICT-1" # protocol-canonical labelThis is a strict subset of RFC 8785 (JCS). It freezes:
- deterministic JSON canonicalisation (sorted keys, no insignificant whitespace)
- SHA-256 digesting
- float rejection — floating-point values are refused outright (model monetary/quantity values as integers or strings)
- Unicode and string handling
- duplicate JSON object keys are invalid — runtime parsers must reject duplicates before canonicalisation
- base64url without padding where base64url is required
- 1 MiB max output, 32-level depth limit
- no in-place future changes
See canonicalisation/ACTENON-JCS-STRICT-1.md. This profile is what makes action-hashes stable across Python, TypeScript, Go, and Rust implementations.
20 canonical refusal codes organised in a two-layer model:
disclosed_code— public-safe umbrella code returned to untrusted callers. Always collapses to one of a small set (PROOF_INVALID,REPLAY_DETECTED,UNAUTHORIZED,FORBIDDEN,ACTION_REFUSED).internal_code— specific code disclosed only to trusted callers (AUDIENCE_MISMATCH,ACTION_MISMATCH,TENANT_MISMATCH,SUBJECT_MISMATCH,EXPIRED,NOT_YET_VALID,REVOKED,SCOPE_EXCEEDED,BUDGET_EXCEEDED,RATE_LIMITED,APPROVAL_REQUIRED,PARAMETER_DIGEST_MISMATCH, etc.)
This prevents an attacker from probing the verifier by enumerating refusal codes, while still giving operators the specific information they need to debug. Full catalogue in refusals/catalogue.v1.yaml.
The protocol reserves a small set of identifier prefixes so any artefact is recognisable across implementations:
| Prefix | Artefact |
|---|---|
intent_ |
Action Intent |
authz_ |
Authorised Execution Intent |
grant_ |
Grant (capability token) |
proof_ |
ExecutionProof / PCCB |
exec_ |
Execution attempt |
rcpt_ |
ExecutionReceipt |
rful_ |
ExecutionRefusal |
See identifiers/prefixes.v1.yaml.
| Implementation | Status | Path |
|---|---|---|
| Python reference | Stable v1.3.0 on PyPI | python/ — pip install actenon-protocol |
| TypeScript types | Stable v1.3.0 on npm | typescript/ — npm install @actenon/protocol-types |
| Go SDK | v1.0.0 — go get github.com/actenon/sdk-go@v1.0.0 |
Actenon/sdk-go |
| Rust SDK | v0.1.0 — git dependency or cargo add --git |
Actenon/sdk-rust (crates.io publish pending token) |
| OpenAPI 3.1 components | Stable | openapi/components.yaml — drop into any OpenAPI-aware toolchain |
| JSON Schemas | Stable v1 | schemas/ — validate any artefact in any language |
Honest status: the wire protocol is fully cross-language — the
conformance vectors are hash-locked JSON that any language can pass. The
packaging is now at near-parity: Python and TypeScript are both at v1.3.0
on their respective registries. Go is at v1.0.0 and can be installed with
go get github.com/actenon/sdk-go@v1.0.0. Rust is at v0.1.0 as a git
dependency (cargo add --git https://github.com/Actenon/sdk-rust);
crates.io publication is prepared (Cargo.toml has all required fields,
publish workflow is in place) and will complete once the
CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN secret is added to the sdk-rust repo.
Every implementation runs against the same hash-locked conformance vectors in conformance/vectors/. Conformance, not pedigree, decides validity.
pip install actenon-protocol
npm install @actenon/protocol-typesThe runtime package has zero dependencies — only the Python standard library. Pydantic types, YAML loading, and conformance tooling are gated behind optional extras so adopters who only need the wire contract pay no dependency cost:
pip install "actenon-protocol[types]" # Pydantic models for the protocol shapes
pip install "actenon-protocol[yaml]" # Direct YAML loading of the refusal catalogue
pip install "actenon-protocol[conformance]" # jsonschema + rfc8785 for the conformance runner
pip install "actenon-protocol[all]" # all of the abovefrom actenon_protocol import (
ExecutionMode, # "brokered" | "resource_owned"
BrokeredExecutionState, # succeeded | failed | refused | outcome_unknown
ResourceOwnedExecutionState, # submitted | accepted | refused | ...
canonicalize_json, # ACTENON-JCS-STRICT-1 canonicalisation
RefusalCode, # 20+ structured refusal codes
ExecutionProof,
ExecutionReceipt,
ExecutionRefusal,
BoundaryManifest,
)
# Canonicalise any artefact deterministically (raises on floats / duplicate keys)
canonical_bytes = canonicalize_json({
"action": "payment.refund",
"target": "invoice:INV-7831",
"amount_minor": 250000, # integer minor units — never floats
"currency": "USD",
})Looking for the canonical conformance map? See
CONFORMANCE.mdfor the single page that maps the Protocol's 129 vectors and the Kernel's 51 vectors onto "what you must pass to claim what."
The protocol ships 129 hash-locked test vectors across 6 categories:
| Category | Valid | Invalid | Total | What it tests |
|---|---|---|---|---|
canonicalisation |
22 | 15 | 37 | ACTENON-JCS-STRICT-1 (float rejection, duplicate keys, Unicode, depth/size limits) |
proof |
15 | 14 | 29 | ExecutionProof schema, identifier prefixes, protocol version, required fields |
receipt |
12 | 8 | 20 | ExecutionReceipt schema, outcome enum, both execution modes, required fields |
refusal |
20 | 5 | 25 | All 20 refusal codes from the catalogue, two-layer disclosure, retryability |
execution-mode |
10 | 0 | 10 | Mode distinction (brokered vs resource_owned), mode-specific constraints |
execution-result |
4 | 4 | 8 | Discriminated union: disjoint field sets |
| Total | 83 | 46 | 129 |
129 vectors run on every PR via the CI workflow, across Python 3.10 / 3.11 / 3.12, plus the TypeScript conformance suite (21 tests).
An external implementation is Actenon-compatible v1.3.0 if it accepts every valid vector and rejects every invalid vector. The Runner Specification defines the interface, and the standalone runner is a ready-to-use Python script that external implementations can subclass:
pip install -e ".[dev]"
# Run the conformance suite against the Python reference
python conformance/runner.py
# JSON output for CI integration
python conformance/runner.py --json
# Run a single category
python conformance/runner.py --category refusalVectors are generated by conformance/generate_vectors.py for maintainability — regenerate with python conformance/generate_vectors.py. See conformance/README.md for details.
- Mode is explicit, never inferred — on every proof, receipt, refusal, and result.
- Canonicalisation is deterministic —
ACTENON-JCS-STRICT-1(RFC 8785 subset), sorted keys, no whitespace, floats rejected, duplicate keys rejected. - Refusal codes have two layers — public-safe umbrella (
PROOF_INVALID) + trusted detail (AUDIENCE_MISMATCH). - Results are discriminated — brokered and resource-owned results have disjoint field sets.
- Backward-compatible — v1.3.0 is purely additive over v1.0.0–v1.2.0.
- Hash-locked — conformance vectors are versioned and frozen.
- No ambient authority — no field implies trust in an issuer, signer, or control plane. Trust is configured by the verifier.
protocol/ # Human-readable specs (01–12)
01-action-intent.md
02-execution-proof.md
03-execution-modes.md
04-execution-receipt.md
05-execution-refusal.md
06-boundary-manifest.md
07-canonicalisation.md
08-outcome-codes.md
...
schemas/ # JSON Schemas (v1) — validate any artefact in any language
canonicalisation/ # ACTENON-JCS-STRICT-1 profile definition + test fixtures
identifiers/ # Identifier prefix registry (prefixes.v1.yaml)
refusals/ # Refusal-code catalogue (catalogue.v1.yaml)
conformance/ # Hash-locked conformance vectors + Python suite
python/ # Python reference implementation (pydantic models)
typescript/ # TypeScript types (@actenon/protocol-types)
openapi/ # OpenAPI 3.1 components
For the full adoption path — including how to wire the protocol into an existing service without pulling in any other Actenon repo — see INTEGRATION_GUIDE.md. The short version: install this package, validate every incoming Action Intent + ExecutionProof against the JSON Schemas, canonicalise with canonicalize_json, and verify the proof signature against your configured issuer keys. That alone gives you protocol-conformant refusal — even before you adopt the Kernel, Permit, or Cloud.
- Issue grants or proofs (that's Permit's job, or any compliant issuer's job).
- Verify proofs (that's the Kernel's job, or any compliant verifier's job).
- Execute provider calls (that's the broker/adapter's job).
- Manage tenants, approvals, evidence, or audit (that's Cloud's job, or your own).
- Make any trust claim about the issuer, signer, or control plane.
- Provide a hosted transparency log (the artefact shape exists; the operation is separate).
The Protocol is the contract. It is deliberately the smallest, most boring, most implementable thing in the ecosystem — because that is exactly what a wire contract needs to be.
This repo depends on nothing. Zero runtime dependencies. It can be adopted by any implementation in any language without pulling in Permit, Kernel, Cloud, or Scan. Conformance is the only claim an implementation needs to make.
Apache-2.0 — see LICENSE.