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Security: AndreeTorres/corner

SECURITY.md

Security Policy — Corner

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report vulnerabilities privately via GitHub's built-in reporting: Security tab → "Report a vulnerability" on this repository. Do not open a public issue for security problems.

You can expect an acknowledgement within a few days. Once fixed, the report and fix are disclosed in the release notes.

Supported versions

Only the latest release receives fixes. There is no backporting.

Security posture

What Corner does — and deliberately does not do — from a security standpoint:

  • No network attack surface in normal use. The app makes no network requests except a single user-initiated HTTPS GET to GitHub's API when you click "Check for updates" (see PRIVACY.md).
  • No third-party dependencies. 100% Apple frameworks. There is no supply chain beyond Apple's SDK and the build tooling (XcodeGen, GitHub Actions).
  • Memory safety: written entirely in Swift 6 strict-concurrency mode.
  • No elevated privileges. Corner requests no accessibility permissions, no screen recording, no input monitoring. Global hotkeys use Carbon's RegisterEventHotKey (no permissions needed); the hot corner reads the cursor position only — Corner cannot see your keystrokes or your screen.
  • Hardened Runtime: enabled.
  • App Sandbox: not yet. Documented decision: enabling it relocates the data store into a sandbox container, which requires a data migration for existing users. It is on the roadmap together with notarization; the attack surface it would mitigate is already small (no untrusted input, no network, no file access outside its own support folder).
  • Code signing: releases are ad-hoc signed and not notarized yet (no paid Apple Developer account). macOS Gatekeeper will warn on first open. If this concerns you, build from source — the release workflow is reproducible (see docs/DEVELOPMENT.md) and CI builds are public in the Actions tab.

Scope

In scope: anything that could expose or corrupt user data, escalate privileges, or make Corner perform network/file activity beyond what is documented above. Out of scope: the Gatekeeper warning itself (known, documented), and issues requiring an already-compromised machine.

There aren't any published security advisories