| Tool | Risk | Confirmation |
|---|---|---|
| read/list/search, git status/diff/log/branch, inspect | LOW | none |
| write/create/move, git checkout/stash, run_tests/linter/formatter, fetch_url | MEDIUM | configurable |
| delete_file, git_commit, github_create_* | HIGH | required |
| git_push, sudo/system/remote-changing commands | CRITICAL | always (no setting can skip) |
dangerous commands (rm -rf /, mkfs, dd to disk, curl|sh, credential files, fork bomb…) |
BLOCKED | refused before any prompt |
- Workspace jail: paths are resolved with
realpath; escaping the project (.., absolute, symlink) is refused. - Secrets files (
.env,*.pem,*.key, ssh keys) cannot be read or written by the agent;git_commitnever stages them. - Commands run without a shell (argv), with API-key/token env vars scrubbed, with a timeout and output cap.
- Git refs are validated (no option injection).
fetch_urlrejects non-http(s)/private/loopback addresses (SSRF). - Keys come from env vars or the OS keyring only; never from config, logs or memory (
redact()masks them;MemoryStorerefuses text that looks like a secret). - Plugins cannot lower risk: their tools are floored at MEDIUM/configurable.
- The
.gitdirectory is off-limits to file tools (a plantedcore.fsmonitoror hook would run code on the nextgit status), and git itself runs withcore.fsmonitor=false; delete/move act on a symlink itself, never its target. fetch_urlalso re-checks every redirect and the address it actually connected to (SSRF / DNS rebinding); the GitHub and character-shop clients only send a token to their own origin and never re-send it on redirects.- A running command is killed together with everything it spawned when you press Stop or the timeout hits.
- Config files (
config.ini,brok.json, memory) are written atomically and are private from the first byte. healthfindings are heuristic, not a security audit.
Limits you should know: command classification is pattern-based (it can be fooled by obfuscation, which is why anything unlisted asks first); there is no OS-level sandbox/container yet.