Releases: Barnes70/TLCTC
TLCTC v2.1 Golden — Claude Code Plugin
TLCTC v2.1 (Golden)
Marks the v2.1 framework as Golden — the canonical, stable release of the v2.1 specification, now distributable as a Claude Code plugin.
What's New
Claude Code Plugin Scaffold (commit 2f761bf):
.claude-plugin/marketplace.json— repo-level marketplace manifestplugins/tlctc/.claude-plugin/plugin.json— plugin manifest (v2.1.0, CC-BY-4.0)plugins/tlctc/skills/tlctc-classify/SKILL.md— full v2.1 master prompt as an auto-loading skill (10 axioms, 10 clusters, all R-* rules, attack-path notation, 22 worked examples, verification checklist)plugins/tlctc/commands/tlctc-analyze.md—/tlctc-analyze [path|URL|text]slash command
Install
/plugin marketplace add Barnes70/TLCTC
/plugin install tlctc@tlctc
/reload-plugins
Once installed, the tlctc-classify skill auto-loads whenever a security document, CVE, threat-intel report, or attack-path question is in scope — no need to paste the master prompt manually.
Carries Forward from v2.1.0
- Complete v2.1 specification: transit (
⇒), intra-system (|...|), and unresolved-step (?/…) operators - npm supply-chain decompositions
- Agentic AI Attack Path J
- 698 MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise → TLCTC mappings
- 987 MITRE CWE → TLCTC mappings (experimental)
License
CC BY 4.0 — cite TLCTC v2.1 when re-using definitions.
TLCTC v2.1.0 — npm Supply Chain Decompositions & Agentic AI Path J
What's New
2025 npm Supply Chain Attack Paths (Layer 3 Instances)
Three major 2025 npm campaigns fully decomposed into schema-validated attack path instances:
- S1ngularity/Nx (
attack-paths/s1ngularity-nx-2025.json) — 10-step path: CI workflow abuse → credential theft → package poisoning → consumer-side QUIETVAULT execution including LLM coding assistant weaponization - Chalk/Debug Phishing (
attack-paths/chalk-debug-phishing-2025.json) — 7-step path: phishing → credential use → publish → trust acceptance → browser-based crypto wallet address substitution - Shai-Hulud Worm (
attack-paths/shai-hulud-worm-2025.json) — 14-step path: first recursive/cyclic supply chain worm with[RECURSIVE]propagation annotation and conditional destructive fallback (DRE: Ac)
New Reference Example
- Chalk/Debug 2025 (
json-schemas/layer-3/examples/chalk-debug-2025.json) — Joins SolarWinds 2020 as the second Layer 3 reference example. Demonstrates v2.1 transit boundary notation, R-CRED credential duality, and the canonical#10 → #1 → #7install chain.
Agentic AI: Path J — LLM Weaponization via Supply Chain
- New attack path (
examples/agentic-ai/attack-paths/path-J-llm-weaponization-supply-chain.json) — First documented real-world pattern of malware co-opting a deployed AI coding assistant as a credential-scanning tool (S1ngularity/Nx precedent). - New scenario: AgentWeaponizedByMalware — Third agentic AI scenario alongside LegitimateAgentCompromised and MaliciousAgentIntroduced. The agent is a secondary LOLBin discovered and directed by external malware.
npm Supply Chain Pattern Mapping
New mapping directory (mappings/npm-supply-chain/) with:
- 5 canonical patterns — Install-time compromise, maintainer phishing, typosquatting, build-to-secret-theft, self-replicating worm — each with full cluster decomposition and per-step control mappings
- Incident-to-control walkthrough — Chalk/Debug 2025 worked end-to-end: incident facts → cluster decomposition → control mapping → risk register entry
Blog Post
documentation/npm-supply-chain-blog-final.md— "Anatomy of a Worm: The 2025 npm Supply Chain Attacks Through the TLCTC Lens"
Key Structural Findings
#10is a trust boundary, not a mechanism — the mechanisms are #9, #1, #4, #7- The
#1between#10and#7is the most undertapped control surface in npm security - R-CRED exposes a universal kill chain: controls at #4 break every campaign regardless of credential acquisition method
- #1 Abuse of Functions is the dominant cluster across all npm attack patterns
- Shai-Hulud's recursive
#10generation breaks the conventional linear supply chain risk model
Validation
All Layer 3 JSON files validate against json-schemas/layer-3/tlctc-attack-path.schema.json.
Full Changelog: v2.0.0...v2.1.0
TLCTC v2.0.0 — Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters
TLCTC v2.0 — The first cause-oriented, axiomatic cyber threat taxonomy
TLCTC provides the missing semantic foundation for cybersecurity: a stable, non-overlapping classification of cyber threats based on why compromise happens — the generic vulnerability exploited — rather than what happens afterwards.
A cyber threat is defined by the generic vulnerability it exploits, not by who performs it and not by what consequence follows.
The 10 Threat Clusters
| # | Cluster | Topology |
|---|---|---|
| #1 | Abuse of Functions | Internal |
| #2 | Exploiting Server | Internal |
| #3 | Exploiting Client | Internal |
| #4 | Identity Theft | Internal |
| #5 | Man in the Middle | Internal |
| #6 | Flooding Attack | Internal |
| #7 | Malware | Internal |
| #8 | Physical Attack | Bridge |
| #9 | Social Engineering | Bridge |
| #10 | Supply Chain Attack | Bridge |
What's in this release
Framework Core
- 10 threat clusters, each defined by exactly one generic vulnerability
- 10 axioms — the non-negotiable logical foundation
- 6 classification rules (R-EXEC, R-ROLE, R-FLOOD, R-SUPPLY, R-MITM, R-CRED)
- Attack path notation with velocity classes (VC-1 through VC-4) and Data Risk Events
Three-Layer JSON Architecture (JSON Schema Draft 7)
- Layer 1 — Framework definition (static): cluster definitions, axioms, rules
- Layer 2 — Reference registry (context): responsibility spheres, boundary contexts
- Layer 3 — Attack path instances (dynamic): incident analyses with step sequences and velocity
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Mapping
- 698 techniques mapped to TLCTC clusters with rationale
- Decision tree methodology
- SOC-to-risk walkthrough example
MITRE CWE Mapping (experimental, AI-assisted)
- 987 weaknesses mapped to TLCTC clusters with rationale
- Verdict system (Allowed, Allowed-with-Review, Discouraged, Prohibited)
- Decision tree and control walkthrough
Agentic AI Threat Analysis
- 9 attack paths (Paths A–I) analyzing AI agent threats through TLCTC
- Consequence chains, tool profiles, and irreversibility matrices
Glossary
- 55 machine-readable terms with definitions, disambiguation, cross-references
- JSON Schema for universal cyber security vocabulary
Tools
- Threat Modeling Tool — SDLC threat modeling and architecture analysis (standalone HTML)
- Attack Path Architect — incident documentation and CTI exchange (standalone HTML)
Documentation
- V2.0 White Paper (PDF)
- Glossary (PDF)
- JSON Architecture Specification (PDF)
- "Why Exactly Ten" — framework architecture rationale (PDF)
License
CC BY 4.0 — free to use, integrate, and build upon.
Links
- Website: tlctc.net
- White Paper: tlctc.net/tlctc-v2.0-whitepaper.html
TLCTC Cyber Security Glossary v0.1.0
TLCTC Cyber Security Glossary — Initial Release
A machine-readable, universal glossary for cyber risk and cyber security terminology. Establishes precise, unambiguous definitions to create a common language across frameworks, teams, and organizations.
What's included
- JSON Schema (
tlctc-glossary.schema.json) — Draft 7 schema defining the glossary structure - 55 terms (
tlctc-glossary.json) — seeded from TLCTC v2.0:- 10 threat clusters with generic vulnerabilities
- 10 axioms
- 6 classification rules (R-EXEC, R-ROLE, R-FLOOD, R-SUPPLY, R-MITM, R-CRED)
- Attack path notation (delta-t, velocity classes, parallel groups)
- Three-layer JSON architecture (framework, registry, instance)
- Data Risk Events (C, I, A, Ac)
- Verdict system for framework mappings
Key features per term
- Normative definition — precise, unambiguous
- Disambiguation ("not to be confused with") — resolves common conflations
- Cross-references — links to related terms within the glossary
- Domain classification —
tlctc-core,tlctc-classification,tlctc-notation,tlctc-architecture,tlctc-mapping, with expansion domains forcyber-risk,cyber-security,governance - Source attribution — traceable to TLCTC v2.0 axioms, rules, and specifications
- Examples — illustrative usage where applicable
Why this matters
Cybersecurity suffers from semantic diffusion — the same terms carry different meanings across frameworks, teams, and organizations. NIST alone has over 20 definitions of "cyber threat." This glossary anchors terminology in TLCTC's cause-oriented, axiomatic foundation: threats are causes, not outcomes; classification follows the generic vulnerability, not the actor or the consequence.
License
CC BY 4.0 — free to use, integrate, and build upon.