π Fix command injection vulnerability in PR review script#404
π Fix command injection vulnerability in PR review script#404seonghobae wants to merge 1 commit into
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OpenCode Review Overview
OpenCode Agent did not produce a valid review payload after all current-head GitHub Checks completed.
OpenCode runtime evidence:
No blocking review was submitted because this is an agent/runtime failure, not a source-backed code finding. |
π― What: Command injection vulnerability in
β οΈ Risk: An attacker controlling git refs/branches could execute arbitrary commands when this script attempts to dispatch workflows or merge PRs.
dispatch_opencode_reviewandenable_auto_mergedue to unsanitized ref and sha parameters directly injected into a subprocess gh command.π‘οΈ Solution: Added explicit
validate_git_refandvalidate_git_shachecks using regex to verify refs only contain valid word characters/slashes/dashes/dots and shas are precisely 40-character hex strings.PR created automatically by Jules for task 14548064859255373281 started by @seonghobae