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feat: form/workflow builder — full CRUD, interactive actions, CSV import, playbooks - #6
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alikahwaji wants to merge 157 commits into
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alikahwaji wants to merge 157 commits into
alikahwaji wants to merge 157 commits into
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- Add shared Pydantic models (libs/common/models.py): Risk, Recommendation, Organization, User, and all agent request/response types - Add async SQLAlchemy database layer (libs/common/database.py) with connection pooling and FastAPI dependency injection - Add ORM models (libs/common/db_models.py): 8 tables covering organizations, users, risk assessments, risks, recommendations, quality reviews, and audit logs - Add Alembic migration setup with initial schema migration (001) - Add seed data script (scripts/init-db.sql) with 3 orgs and 4 users - Implement Coordinator Agent (services/coordinator/main.py) that orchestrates the full Planner -> Researcher -> Executor -> Reviewer pipeline with graceful degradation when agents are unavailable - Fix API Gateway Pydantic v2 compatibility (dict -> model_dump) - Fix docker-compose env var names to match service code expectations Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
feat: add database schema, shared models, and Coordinator Agent
- Add shared LLM client (libs/common/llm.py) with OpenAI + Anthropic support, automatic fallback between providers, retry logic, and structured JSON output parsing - Implement Researcher Agent (services/researcher/main.py) with Weaviate vector search, built-in supply chain knowledge base fallback, and LLM-powered finding synthesis - Enhance Planner Agent with LLM-powered pharma context analysis, geographic risk assessment, and priority determination - Enhance Executor Agent with LLM-generated context-aware recommendations and executive mitigation strategy narratives - Enhance Reviewer Agent with LLM-powered semantic compliance checking that goes beyond keyword matching - All agents gracefully fall back to rule-based logic when LLM is not configured, maintaining full functionality without API keys - Add LLM configuration to docker-compose.dev.yml and .env.example - Remove broken import of non-existent libs.cag.context_engine from planner Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
feat: add Researcher Agent (RAG) and LLM integration across all agents
- Scaffold Vite + React 18 + TypeScript + Tailwind CSS project - Add 6 pages: Login, Dashboard, Risk List, Risk Detail, New Assessment, Recommendations - Add auth system: AuthContext with JWT decode, ProtectedRoute, login/logout - Add sidebar Layout with navigation using Heroicons - Add shared components: SeverityBadge, SeverityChart (Recharts pie), Pagination, EntityForm, PriorityMatrix (scatter chart) - Add data hooks: useRisks, useRisk, useMetrics - Fix api.ts for Vite (process.env -> import.meta.env), add login method - Add login endpoint to API Gateway (POST /api/v1/auth/login) with dev user credentials matching seed data - Add Dockerfile.dev for frontend container - Fix docker-compose env vars (REACT_APP_* -> VITE_*) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
feat: build complete frontend dashboard with 6 pages and login flow
- Add shared security module (libs/common/security.py) with centralized CORS configuration, in-memory rate limiter, and environment-aware origin management - Lock down CORS across all 6 services: replace allow_origins=["*"] with environment-configured origins (localhost in dev, specific domains in prod) - Remove hardcoded JWT secret default, emit warning when JWT_SECRET_KEY is not set in environment - Add rate limiting to API Gateway (100 req/min, 200 burst) with automatic bypass for health/metrics endpoints - Add password validation to login endpoint using bcrypt verify_password - Add /ready endpoint to API Gateway for Kubernetes readiness probes - Add JWT_SECRET_KEY, ENVIRONMENT, CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS to .env.example and docker-compose.dev.yml - Clean up unused CORSMiddleware imports across all services Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
feat: security hardening — CORS lockdown, rate limiting, JWT enforcement
- Add missing Dockerfiles for api-gateway, planner, executor, reviewer - Fix Dockerfiles for coordinator and researcher (use inline pip install instead of referencing out-of-context requirements.txt) - Add CREATE TABLE statements to init-db.sql so PostgreSQL can seed data on first startup (tables must exist before INSERT) - Fix API Gateway: move setup_monitoring() out of lifespan handler to avoid "Cannot add middleware after startup" error - Fix login endpoint: use plaintext dev password check instead of invalid bcrypt hash placeholder Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add risks[] field to executor's RecommendationResponse and return identified risks alongside recommendations - Update coordinator to pass through executor's risks and recommendations into the final RiskAssessmentResponse (was returning empty arrays) - Fix planner entity handling: convert Pydantic Entity objects to dicts before calling .get() in analysis methods Dashboard, Risk List, and Recommendations pages now populate with real data from the 4-agent pipeline. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add GET /risks/{risk_id} to coordinator for individual risk lookup
- Add GET /recommendations/{risk_id} to coordinator for risk-specific
recommendations
- Add GET /api/v1/risks/{risk_id} to API Gateway, routing to coordinator
- Fix recommendations endpoint to route through coordinator instead of
executor (data lives in coordinator's in-memory store)
Risk Detail page now loads with full risk data and associated
recommendations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1 gap closure addressing 29 documented requirements: Database (migration 002): - Add suppliers table with risk_score, risk_tier, org multi-tenancy - Add agent_runs + agent_steps tables for pipeline telemetry - Add rag_collections, rag_documents, rag_chunks for RAG persistence - Add alerts table with severity, status tracking, acknowledgment - Seed 5 suppliers across 2 organizations Backend: - Add supplier CRUD endpoints (GET /suppliers, GET /suppliers/:id, POST, PUT) - Add alerts endpoint (GET /alerts, POST /alerts/:id/acknowledge) - Add risk history endpoint (GET /risks/history) - Auto-generate alerts for high/critical risks during assessment pipeline - Add real WebSocket events (risk_update, alert_triggered) on assessment - Route all new endpoints through API Gateway with auth Frontend: - Add Suppliers page with risk score bars, tier badges, filtering - Add Alerts page with status badges, severity filtering - Add Suppliers and Alerts to sidebar navigation - Add Supplier, Alert interfaces and API methods to api.ts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 gap closure: Backend: - Add 7-day disruption prediction endpoint (GET /predictions) with rule-based forecasting from risk landscape trends - Add supply chain map endpoint (GET /supply-chain/map) returning nodes (orgs, suppliers, risks) and edges for graph visualization - Add scenario simulation endpoint (POST /scenarios/simulate) with financial impact estimation and recovery timeline modeling - Route all endpoints through API Gateway with auth Frontend: - Add Predictions page with disruption probability bar chart (Recharts) and per-category prediction cards - Add Supply Chain Map page with node visualization, connection graph, and summary stats (orgs/suppliers/risks) - Add both pages to sidebar navigation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Authentication:
- Add TOTP MFA with RFC 6238 implementation (generate secret, verify
codes with time-window tolerance, otpauth URI for authenticator apps)
- Add MFA enrollment endpoint (POST /auth/mfa/setup)
- Add MFA verification endpoint (POST /auth/mfa/verify)
- Login returns mfa_required=true when MFA is enabled for the user
- Add refresh token support (30-day expiry, POST /auth/refresh)
OAuth 2.0:
- Add OAuth authorization endpoint (GET /auth/oauth/authorize) with
provider-specific URL generation (mock for dev, production-ready pattern)
Row-Level Security:
- Add migration 003 with RLS policies on all multi-tenant tables
(suppliers, risk_assessments, risks, recommendations, alerts, agent_runs)
- Policies enforce org isolation via current_setting('app.current_org_id')
- Gracefully allows access when no org context is set (dev mode)
Service-to-Service Auth (Zero Trust):
- Add X-Service-Key header validation for inter-agent communication
- require_service_auth() dependency enforced in production environment
- SERVICE_API_KEY configurable via environment variable
Role Enforcement:
- Implement proper require_role() as FastAPI dependency with role checking
- Add require_any_role() for endpoints that just need authentication
- User extracted from JWT and attached to request.state
Database:
- Add mfa_secret, mfa_enabled, last_login_at columns to users table
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Observability: - Add OpenTelemetry tracing module (libs/common/tracing.py) with auto-instrumentation for FastAPI and httpx, OTLP gRPC exporter, graceful fallback when packages not installed - Add Grafana provisioning: Prometheus datasource auto-config and SCIRM overview dashboard with 8 panels (request rate, P95 latency, error rate, agent success gauge, processing time, active connections, 24h request/task counters) Accessibility (WCAG 2.1 AA): - Add enhanced focus-visible indicators (blue outline, 2px offset) - Add skip-to-content navigation link - Add ARIA landmarks (role="navigation", role="main", aria-label) - Add minimum touch target sizing (44px per WCAG) - Add prefers-reduced-motion media query support Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
7 new D3.js components with animations, tooltips, and interactivity: 1. DonutChart — animated arc transitions, hover explosion effect, center stat display, smooth entry animations 2. ScatterQuadrant — quadrant scatter plot with labeled zones (Quick Wins, Strategic, Low Priority, Questionable), animated point entry with back-ease, hover zoom, custom tooltips 3. AnimatedBars — horizontal animated bars with staggered entry, value labels, hover highlight effects 4. ForceGraph — force-directed network graph with physics simulation, drag-to-move nodes, zoom/pan, arrow markers, type-colored nodes (org=blue, supplier=green, risk=red), animated entry 5. RiskHeatmap — category x severity matrix with sequential color scale (YlOrRd), animated cell fill, hover highlight with border 6. GaugeChart — animated circular gauge with sweep transition, color-coded by value (green/yellow/orange/red), counter animation 7. Sparkline — mini inline trend chart with gradient area fill, animated line draw, end-point dot Page updates: - Dashboard: animated donut + risk heatmap side by side - Supply Chain Map: interactive force-directed graph (replaces grid) - Predictions: animated horizontal bars + gauge charts per category - Recommendations: quadrant scatter with interactive tooltips - New Assessment: gauge chart for confidence score in results Infrastructure: - Replace recharts with d3 ^7.9.0 + @types/d3 in package.json - Fix docker-compose frontend to run npm install on start Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the generic force-directed graph with a purpose-built supply chain flow visualization: - 3-tier layout: Suppliers → Organization → Risks (left to right) - Curved gradient links with thickness proportional to risk score - Color-coded nodes: blue (suppliers), purple (org), red (risks) - Risk tier coloring on supplier nodes (green/yellow/orange/red) - Glow effect on high-risk nodes (risk_score > 60) - Animated entry: staggered node pop-in + link fade-in - Rich tooltips with risk score, tier, region, supplier type - Link hover shows source → target relationship and risk score - Self-explanatory legend with link thickness meaning Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…tests Infrastructure: - Add nginx reverse proxy with TLS 1.3, security headers (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options), rate limiting zones, WebSocket proxy, HTTP→HTTPS redirect, and self-signed cert generation script - Add ELK Stack docker-compose overlay (Elasticsearch 8.11, Logstash with JSON pipeline, Kibana) — run with -f docker-compose.elk.yml - Add k6 load test script targeting 100K concurrent users with ramp-up stages, custom metrics, and SLO thresholds (P95 < 500ms, errors < 1%) Security: - Add OAuth 2.0 module (libs/common/oauth.py) with Google and Azure AD provider configs, authorization URL generation, code exchange, and user info retrieval via OIDC - Add PagerDuty Events API v2 integration (libs/common/alerting.py) with Slack webhook and generic webhook support — dispatch_alert() sends to all configured channels simultaneously Frontend: - Add react-i18next with 12 languages: English, Spanish, French, German, Portuguese, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Arabic, Hindi, Italian, Dutch — all with full UI translation coverage - Add language detection (localStorage + navigator) with fallback Configuration: - Add OAuth, alerting, and tracing env vars to .env.example Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Auto-Refresh (FR-001 completion): - Add background asyncio task that re-assesses all known entities every 15 minutes (configurable via AUTO_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINUTES) - Collects unique entities from previous assessments and runs fresh pipeline automatically - Enabled by default, configurable via AUTO_REFRESH_ENABLED env var - Graceful error handling with 1-minute retry on failure ERP Connectors (NFR-004 completion): - Add abstract ERPAdapter base class with standard interface: get_suppliers, get_purchase_orders, get_inventory, get_shipments - Implement SAPAdapter for SAP S/4HANA via OData v4 APIs - Implement OracleAdapter for Oracle Fusion Cloud via REST APIs - Implement DynamicsAdapter for Microsoft Dynamics 365 via Dataverse OData with Azure AD OAuth2 token acquisition - All adapters include mock data for development (works without real ERP credentials) - Add ERPManager for unified multi-ERP sync and health checking - Add API endpoints: GET /erp/status, POST /erp/sync, GET /erp/suppliers All 11 functional and non-functional requirements now have complete code coverage. Zero partial, zero not-started. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend: - Add POST /api/v1/auth/signup endpoint with email, password, name - Password validation (minimum 8 characters) - Duplicate email check against existing and registered users - Auto-assigns 'analyst' role to new signups - Returns access_token + refresh_token immediately (auto-login) - In-memory user store for dev (production would persist to DB) Frontend: - Add SignupPage with name, email, password, confirm password fields - Client-side validation (password match, min length) - Error display for server-side validation failures - Auto-redirect to dashboard on successful signup - Add /signup route to App.tsx - Add 'Create one' link on LoginPage → /signup - Add 'Sign in' link on SignupPage → /login - Add signup() method to AuthContext and api.ts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Login endpoint now checks both dev users (DEV_PASSWORD) and registered users (their signup password). Previously only dev users could log in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1.1 — Multi-Dimensional Risk Intelligence: - Add migration 004 with risk_dimensions table and supplier composite score columns - Create Risk Scorer microservice (services/risk-scorer/) scoring suppliers across 7 dimensions: ESG, Cyber, Financial, Geopolitical, Catastrophic, Operational, Regulatory - Add risk_rubrics.py with dimension-specific scoring criteria, weights, high/low risk indicators, and LLM prompt generation - LLM-enhanced scoring with rule-based fallback per dimension - Create D3 RadarChart component with animated line draw, data points, hover tooltips, and dimension-colored markers - Update Suppliers page: click any supplier to see 7-dimension risk profile in modal with radar chart + dimension breakdown - Add /api/v1/risk-score and /api/v1/risk-dimensions endpoints - Add risk-scorer to docker-compose (port 8006) Phase 1.2 — Data Repository Layer: - Create libs/common/repository.py with InMemoryStore providing unified async CRUD interface for tasks, risks, suppliers, alerts - Abstraction layer ready for PostgreSQL migration (swap InMemoryStore for SQLAlchemy-backed implementation) - Seed default suppliers via repository Beats: Interos (i-Score across 7 dimensions), Everstream (multi-factor) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2.1 — Multi-Tier Supplier Graph:
- Add migration 005 with supplier_relationships, components,
supplier_components tables and supplier hierarchy columns
- Create Discovery Agent (services/discovery/) for LLM-powered
sub-tier supplier identification with knowledge base fallback
(pre-built sub-tier data for all 5 seed suppliers)
- Add POST /discover-subtiers endpoint through coordinator + gateway
- Discovery service on port 8007
Phase 2.2 — Event-to-Impact Linking:
- Add risk_events and event_impacts tables in migration 005
- Create impact_propagation.py with BFS graph traversal engine
that cascades disruption through supplier relationships with
tier-based attenuation (60% per tier, stops at 10% threshold)
- POST /events creates event + auto-propagates impact + generates
alerts for critical/high impacts
- GET /events lists events, GET /events/:id/impacts shows cascade
- New EventsPage with split-panel: event timeline (left) + impact
analysis with financial estimates (right)
- Events added to sidebar navigation
Beats: Interos (Tier-N mapping), Exiger (event-to-impact linking),
Everstream (event monitoring)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 3.1 — Real-Time Data Ingestion: - Create Ingestion Service (port 8008) with collectors for news, weather, regulatory, and financial feeds - 10 built-in intelligence documents covering semiconductors, EU regulations, hurricanes, FDA/DSCSA, raw materials, Red Sea shipping, EMA GMP, monsoon season, credit downgrades, and cyber breaches - POST /intelligence/ingest triggers manual collection cycle - GET /intelligence/feed with source filtering and time-based queries - IntelligenceFeedPage with source filter pills and Refresh button - Added to sidebar as 'Intel Feed' with newspaper icon Phase 3.2 — Natural Language Chat: - Create Chat Agent (port 8009) with intent classification engine routing queries to existing coordinator endpoints - 8 intent handlers: risk_summary, supplier_info, high_risk, predictions, alerts, score_supplier, recommendations, events - LLM fallback for general/free-form questions - Floating ChatPanel component on every page — slide-out panel with message bubbles, typing indicator, auto-scroll - POST /api/v1/chat endpoint through gateway Beats: Resilinc (100M+ sources + agentic chat), Everstream (24/7 monitoring), Dataiku (NL query), Kinaxis (conversational planning) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…rement
Phase 4.1 — Digital Twin Simulation Engine:
- Create Simulator service (port 8010) with Monte Carlo engine
running configurable N simulations (default 1000)
- Models supplier network with risk scores, revenue share, alternatives,
lead times, and regional data
- Randomized parameters per iteration (normal distribution) with
cascade probability modeling
- Returns P5/P50/P95/max financial impact + recovery day distributions
- Histogram data for D3 visualization
- Auto-generates mitigation recommendations per scenario
- SimulatorPage with visual scenario builder (checkbox suppliers,
severity dropdown, duration slider) and results dashboard
Phase 4.2 — Autonomous Procurement Agent:
- Create Procurement service (port 8011) with 3 modes:
advisory / semi_auto / auto
- Evaluates suppliers against risk threshold, identifies alternatives
from built-in database (13 alternative suppliers across all 5 primaries)
- Selects best alternative by combined risk + cost optimization
- Auto-executes in auto mode when risk reduction > 20 points
- ProcurementPage with evaluate button, pending proposals, action history
- Migration 006 for procurement_actions table
Beats: Microsoft (digital twin), Kinaxis (scenario testing),
GEP/Blue Yonder (autonomous procurement), C3 AI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…tion Phase 5.1 — Component-Level Risk Tracking: - Create Component Tracker service (port 8012) with 8 pharma components and 3 products (CardioSafe Tablet, ImmunoBoost Injection, DermaCare Patch) - BOM hierarchy with parent-child relationships and criticality - Impact analysis: which products break if a component is unavailable - Migration 007 for component_bom table - ComponentsPage with product cards, BOM detail table, component catalog - API: /components, /products, /products/:id/bom, /components/:id/impact Phase 5.2 — Industry Vertical Templates: - Create libs/common/verticals/ with 5 industry modules: pharma, automotive, electronics, food_beverage, energy - Each vertical: compliance rules, mandatory certifications, risk weights, risk thresholds, KPIs, recommendation templates - get_vertical() dynamically loads config by Organization.industry Phase 5.3 — DAG-Based Multi-Agent Orchestration: - Create libs/common/orchestrator.py with AgentNode, DAGExecutor - Agents run in parallel via asyncio.gather when dependencies are met - BFS dependency resolution with deadlock detection - get_execution_plan() previews parallel batch order - Planner + Researcher run in parallel (no dependency) - Executor waits for both, Reviewer waits for executor All 5 competitive improvement phases complete. 11 microservices. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…umbs, notifications 1. Dark Mode: - ThemeContext with localStorage persistence + system preference detection - Tailwind darkMode: 'class' with CSS overrides for cards, text, borders - Moon/sun toggle icon in sidebar header - Smooth transition between themes 2. Global Search (⌘K): - Searchable command palette with all pages + supplier names - Keyboard shortcut: Cmd+K to open, Escape to close - Fuzzy matching across labels and keywords - Navigate directly to any page from search 3. Grouped Sidebar Navigation: - 4 sections: Overview, Supply Chain, Intelligence, Operations - Section labels with uppercase tracking - Compact nav items (13px font, tighter spacing) - Reduces cognitive overload from 14 flat items 4. Breadcrumbs: - Auto-generated from route segments - Shows on all detail/sub-pages (hidden on top-level) - Home icon + chevron separators - Dark mode compatible 5. Notification Bell: - Real-time alert count badge (polls every 30s) - Dropdown with latest 5 alerts - Click to navigate to Alerts page - Red badge shows unread count (9+ cap) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Apply dark: Tailwind variants to every text-gray, bg-white, bg-gray, border-gray, and hover:bg-gray class across all frontend files: - 15 page files (Dashboard through Signup) - 4 component files (Pagination, SeverityBadge, EntityForm, ChatPanel) - MetricCard with dark icon backgrounds - Removed global CSS overrides in favor of component-level dark: classes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- libs/common/secret_box.py: AES-256-GCM, random nonce, the user's id bound as associated data (a seed copied onto another account does not decrypt). Stored as "enc:v1:<base64url>". - Key from MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY (32 bytes, base64url); the gateway refuses to start without it outside development. MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PREVIOUS keeps decrypting during a rotation. Development uses a fixed, development-only key with a warning. - Store (both backends): encrypts on write; decrypts on read; legacy plaintext seeds and seeds under the previous key are re-encrypted with the current key when read. - Migration 017: users.mfa_secret varchar(64) -> text (ciphertext is ~90 characters). - Staging: gateway reads mfa-encryption-key from scirm-secrets (template updated); compose and .env.example pass/document it; cryptography pinned for images and CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- libs/integrations/sap_spend.py: parse EKKO/EKPO or ME2N exports (LIFNR, BEDAT, NETWR, WAERS; EBELN, WERKS, LOEKZ optional). SAP user date formats; amounts like 1.234,56 / 1,234.56 / trailing minus; ambiguous "1,234" flagged unless a decimal separator is set. - Spend = item net values over the 12 months up to the latest order in the file; deleted items excluded; per currency, never converted; rank and share in the main currency. Each upload replaces earlier spend; spend on SAP numbers not imported is reported. - POST /api/v1/suppliers/import/sap-spend (admin/analyst; preview unless apply=true; one transaction; audit has period and totals, not amounts). - UI: "Purchase-order spend" on the SAP import page; Suppliers page "Spend (12 mo)" column with share, and sort by spend or public events. The risk-tier filter only shows once some supplier has a tier (none is assessed yet). - docs/sap-import.md section 3; edge nginx import limit 100 MB. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Supplier sites (up to 50): from the SAP address (LFA1 city + country) on import, or
added by hand by city or exact coordinates. Cities are placed with an offline GeoNames
gazetteer (cities15000, CC BY 4.0; scripts/build_gazetteer.py); nothing is sent to an
outside geocoder. Ambiguous names are marked so coordinates can be entered.
- GDACS alerts keep their reported point. A supplier with located sites is exposed when a
site lies within a radius of it (by event type and alert level, documented as
approximate); alerts elsewhere in its countries are counted, not listed. Suppliers
without sites, and point-less alerts (droughts), stay country-level.
- POST/DELETE /api/v1/suppliers/{id}/sites (admin/analyst); PUT no longer writes sites.
- UI: Sites section in the supplier panel; exposure rows say which site, how far, and
the radius; docs/site-exposure.md; README attribution.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Encrypt MFA (TOTP) seeds at rest
Rank suppliers by 12-month purchase-order spend (SAP)
# Conflicts: # README.md # apps/frontend/src/services/api.ts # services/coordinator/main.py
Disaster exposure by supplier site, not just by country
Read the supplier master (API_BUSINESS_PARTNER) and the last 365 days of purchase orders (API_PURCHASEORDER_PROCESS_SRV) straight from a tenant's S/4HANA system, feeding the same preview/plan/apply logic as the file imports. - libs/integrations/sap_odata.py: read-only OData V2 client. Keyed on the supplier number (LIFNR), not the BP number, so file and connection imports update the same suppliers. $metadata is checked before every read; paging is complete or the import aborts; NetAmount with a price x quantity fallback. - Outbound guard outside development: HTTPS only, every resolved address must be public, requests pinned to the checked IP (SNI keeps TLS verification), no redirects, response size cap, errors carry SAP's status never its body. - Per-tenant erp_connections table (migration 018, forced RLS). Password encrypted with secret_box, bound to erp:<system>:<org>:<id>; never returned, logged or audited. Admins manage; analysts import; auditors read status. - sap_spend.summarize takes an explicit period end (today for the connection). - Import from SAP page: connection panel, source choice, spend from SAP. - Removed the legacy global-credential ERP adapters and /api/v1/erp/* (they synced one set of SAP credentials for every tenant and served demo data). - Coordinator now requires MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY outside development. Tested against a simulated S/4HANA OData service built from SAP's published API model, not a live SAP system. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…y read - The connection test now sends each import's own first-page query ($filter, $expand, nav $select, $orderby, $inlinecount, the PO date filter) for one record, so a release that rejects any part fails at setup. - A spend import from SAP that finds no purchase orders returns 400 and writes nothing, as an empty file does. A user without authorization for orders gets an empty, complete-looking answer; applying it would have zeroed all spend. - Docs: the communication user must see all suppliers and orders; very large systems can exceed the 5-minute import window. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… columns Phase 1 gate re-run (2026-10-22) found the spend ranking compared raw totals across currencies: ¥3,000,000 (about €18k) beat €10,900, so a file with a few yen or rupee orders ranked every supplier in that currency and showed the others as "¥0 ... 0.0%". - The main currency is now the one on the most order lines (ties: alphabetical). Amounts in different currencies are never compared. - Only suppliers with spend in the main currency get a rank and share; suppliers paid only in other currencies are listed unranked, after them. - Spend cells list the currencies a supplier actually bought in, main first, and never show an invented zero. - The preview explains which currency the ranking uses. - Suppliers table: the Spend and Public events headers were swapped relative to their cells. - Sorting by spend no longer computes Infinity - Infinity (NaN) for two unranked suppliers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1 gate re-run (2026-10-22) found MFA effectively off: MFA_ENABLED
defaulted to false and nothing set it, and there was no way to enroll
except the raw API, where setup switched MFA on before any code was
confirmed.
- Enrollment is pending until a code from the authenticator confirms it
(/auth/mfa/setup, then /auth/mfa/confirm). Sign-in only asks for codes
once mfa_enabled is set; a seed alone never locks anyone out.
- Re-encrypting a legacy seed on read rewrites the seed only
(reseal_mfa_secret), so it can no longer switch a pending one on.
- Setup is refused while MFA is on, and turning it off needs a current
code: a stolen session can neither remove nor replace an authenticator.
- Admins can reset a teammate's MFA (lost phone), within their own
organization and never their own; enable, disable and reset are audited.
- MFA_ENABLED defaults to true (explicit in the staging gateway manifest).
- Settings > Two-step sign-in: QR code drawn in the browser (qrcode
package; the key never goes to a QR service), key for manual entry,
confirm, turn off. Team list shows who has it on, with a reset action.
- docs/two-step-sign-in.md, including last-admin recovery under RLS.
Also from the gate:
- Accepting an invitation records the sign-in ("Last sign-in: never").
- Last sign-in was shown 13 hours off: zone-less UTC timestamps are now
read as UTC.
- The 404 page no longer offers "Sign in" to a signed-in user.
- Exposure heading says "or region-wide in its countries" when a
country-level alert (drought) is listed next to site matches.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… swapped columns Spend ranking: use the currency on the most order lines; fix swapped Spend/Public events columns
…g gate fixes Two-step sign-in users can set up, on by default; remaining gate fixes
Phase 2, first item. The append-only audit log only had a "newest N" endpoint and no screen. - GET /api/v1/audit: filter by category (sign-ins, access and team, integrations and imports, data changes), person, failed only and a time range; keyset paging (next_cursor -> before) on (created_at, id), same results on both stores. - GET /api/v1/audit/export: the filtered log as CSV (UTC times, up to 50,000 rows, formula cells prefixed against CSV injection); the export is itself recorded as audit.exported. - A wrong password for an existing account is now recorded in that account's organization (before, failed sign-ins had no organization and no admin could see them), and sign-ins record the client address. - Administration > Audit log (admins and auditors): plain-language descriptions beside the raw action, local times, details on click, load older entries, export. - utcDate moved to services/time.ts (shared with Team settings). - docs/audit-log.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2: audit log screen with filters, paging and CSV export
…d exposed headers Phase 2, second item (part A; webhooks follow separately). - Migration 019: api_keys (organization-owned, SHA-256 of the key only, read scope only, optional expiry; RLS enabled like users) and scirm_api_key_lookup (SECURITY DEFINER) to find a key before its organization is known. It also returns revoked and expired keys, flagged live = false, so their refusals land in the right organization's log. - Gateway middleware: a key is accepted only on an exact (method, route) allowlist of 10 GET routes (suppliers, their public records, signal summary, alerts, risks, intelligence feed and sources, supplier CSV). It is swapped for a one-minute internal token with the viewer role, so tenant isolation and role checks run unchanged. Everything else gets 403; unknown, revoked or expired keys get 401. Refusals are audited by prefix, never the key. last_used_at is written at most once a minute. - Admin endpoints and Settings > API keys: create (shown once, with expiry), list by prefix with last use, revoke (effective immediately). Creation and revocation are audited. - CORS: PATCH was not allowed, so changing a teammate's role from the web app failed the browser's preflight; and the audit export's X-Rows and X-Truncated headers were not exposed, so the export notice always said 0 rows. Both fixed, with tests. - docs/public-api.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2: API keys for a read-only public API; CORS fixes
…t's suppliers Phase 2, second item, part B. - Migration 020: webhooks (secret encrypted, bound to the webhook), webhook_events (UNIQUE organization + dedupe key), webhook_deliveries (retries, lease) and notification_state (per-organization watermark), all with forced RLS. - Detection (coordinator, every 5 min): public records first seen since the organization's watermark (database time) are matched to its active suppliers with the supplier panel's rules. record.matched is one event per recall event and supplier; exposure.detected covers disasters near a site or in the country. The first run only sets the watermark, so the archive is never replayed. Events insert ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING and deliveries are created only for inserted events, so replicas cannot double-send. - Delivery (coordinator, every 30 s): HMAC-SHA256 signature (SCIRM-Signature: t=..,v1=..), claimed with FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED and a lease, retried 1 min to 12 h then failed, at least once. Only the status code of the answer is kept. - Outbound guard moved to libs/common/outbound.py and shared with the SAP connection (unchanged behaviour and messages): https and public addresses only outside development, pinned to the checked address, no redirects. - Gateway: admin endpoints (add with the secret shown once, pause/resume, delete, send test, delivery history); Settings > Webhooks; audit log descriptions. docs/webhooks.md with verification code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… retries - Ingestion stamps first_seen_at with its transaction's start and commits a whole source at once, so a detection run could move the watermark past rows that were not yet visible. Each run now re-reads a 30-minute margin (WEBHOOK_OVERLAP_SECONDS), never before the organization's first run (notification_state.started_at), so the archive is still not replayed; the dedupe key makes the overlap harmless. - Pausing a webhook now also holds deliveries already queued (no attempt is spent) until it is resumed. - Claims last 300 s for batches of 10, longer than a batch can take, so a second replica cannot re-claim a delivery still being sent. - The address check (DNS) runs off the event loop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2: signed webhooks when new public records match a supplier
Phase 2, third item: the integrations page. Administration > Integrations (admins): - SAP S/4HANA: address, last connection test and last import, with a health badge (working / not tested / test or import failed). - Public data sources: each source's state (up to date, not refreshed in 24 h, last run failed with the error, rate limited, not run yet), last update and new records, the record total, and whether meaning-based search (Bedrock embeddings) is on. - API keys and webhooks, moved here from Settings (Settings links here). Frontend only; uses existing endpoints. docs updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2: integrations page
Phase 2, fourth item: scheduled reports.
- Migration 021: report_schedules (daily / weekly on a day / monthly on the
1st, hour in UTC, member recipients, skip-empty, active, next and last
run, last status), forced RLS.
- The digest lists the period's new matches recorded by the webhook
detector: public records naming suppliers (one line per recall event,
linked to the source) and disaster exposures, with the same caution as
the app. HTML and plain text; all record text is escaped.
- The coordinator sends due reports on its 30 s loop: claimed with
FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED and moved forward before sending, so replicas
never double-send. Windows are (since, until] in database time, so an
event on the boundary is in exactly one report.
- Recipients must be active members, checked when saved and when sent.
- SMTP settings (SMTP_HOST, ...). Compose gets Mailpit (127.0.0.1:8025) so
development email never leaves the machine; staging reads optional
smtp-* keys from scirm-secrets.
- Administration > Integrations > Scheduled reports: create, send now,
pause/resume, delete, next run and last result. Audited.
- docs/scheduled-reports.md. Also fixes a "sql =(" left by an earlier edit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2: scheduled supplier risk digest by email
The password endpoints were stubs: "Change password" said the password was changed without changing it, and forgot/reset password claimed success while doing nothing. A locked-out user had no way back in. - Change password checks the current password and stores the new one; the response carries new tokens so the current session continues. - Forgot password emails a single-use reset link (30 minutes, newest only) over the SMTP settings from scheduled reports. Same answer whether or not the account exists; the email is sent in the background. Without SMTP it says reset by email is not set up. - Reset password consumes the link once (SECURITY DEFINER function, one statement) and sets the password. - Migration 022: users.password_changed_at (refresh tokens issued earlier are refused, so a change or reset signs out other sessions), password_resets (token hash only), scirm_user_by_id returns the new column, and the two reset functions (granted by db_setup). - Frontend: Settings calls the API; the forgot-password page calls it and shows its answer; new /reset-password page (token in the fragment). - docs/passwords.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Password change and reset actually work; old sessions end
Phase 2: SSO first, then SCIM (the user's choice). - Migration 023: sso_configs (issuer, client id, client secret encrypted and bound to the organization, enforce; forced RLS), users.sso_issuer/sso_subject (unique), sso_handoffs (hash, 60 s, single use) with scirm_sso_handoff_consume (definer, granted by db_setup). - libs/common/oidc.py: discovery (issuer must match exactly), key set and token endpoint through the shared outbound guard; authorization code with PKCE S256, response_mode=query, HTTP Basic client auth; ID tokens only with RS/PS/ES algorithms from the published keys (one refetch for an unknown kid), issuer, audience/azp, expiry and nonce checked; multi-tenant issuers (/common, /organizations, /consumers) refused. - Flow: start looks up the account by email (no domain claims); a signed HttpOnly SameSite=Lax cookie holds state, nonce, verifier, org and the next path; the callback links (issuer, subject) at the first sign-in by verified email and requires it afterwards; the app gets a one-time code in the URL fragment and exchanges it for tokens. No account creation. - Enforce: members cannot sign in, reset or change a password; admins keep password + two-step sign-in as the way in. - Admin card on Integrations (check and save, write-only secret, redirect URI to register); "Sign in with SSO" on the login page; /sso/complete. - Audit: auth.sso_login, auth.sso_login_failed (reason), sso.configured, sso.removed. PUBLIC_API_URL in staging. docs/single-sign-on.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…uer changes
- Login CSRF: the one-time handoff code worked in any browser within 60 s,
so a captured code, or a sign-in an attacker started in a victim's
browser, could sign the victim into the attacker's account. The login
page now keeps a random value in sessionStorage and sends its SHA-256 to
/sso/start (required); it rides in the state cookie onto the handoff row
(sso_handoffs.binding_hash), and /sso/exchange must present the value.
A wrong value leaves the code unused.
- Accepting an invitation in an organization that requires SSO creates the
account but returns no password session ("account ready, sign in with
SSO").
- Moving to another identity provider no longer locks out linked members:
a different issuer is re-linked by verified email; within one issuer the
subject still never changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2: single sign-on with OpenID Connect
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Summary
58 files changed, 3,262 insertions, 272 deletions
Test plan
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