Add Dev.to launch post for MCP security scanner

dev-to/launch-post.md

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+---
+title: "Your MCP Server Is Probably Overprivileged — Here's a Scanner For It"
+published: false
+description: MCP servers expose tools to LLMs, but most configs grant tools broader permissions than they need, ship without auth, and leak prompt-injection surface in tool descriptions. This scanner finds it before your model does.
+tags: ai, security, llm, javascript
+cover_image: <COVER_IMAGE_URL>
+canonical_url: https://github.com/hailbytes/mcp-security-scanner
+published_at: 2026-05-20 13:00 +0000
+---
+
+<!--
+COVER IMAGE PROMPT (1000x420, 2.4:1 banner):
+
+Flat vector illustration, isometric perspective. A stylized server rack on the right, with a
+large translucent magnifying glass hovering over it. Inside the lens: red warning triangles
+and a small unlock / open-padlock icon, hinting at exposed surface. A subtle silhouette of an
+AI brain / neural-net node-graph faintly visible in the background, suggesting the LLM
+consumer. Dark navy (#0a1628) background, electric cyan (#00d4ff) for the server and
+magnifier, red (#ff4d6d) only for the warning indicators, amber accent on the brain motif.
+Banner composition, generous negative space. No text in the image.
+
+Suggested generators: Midjourney v6+ with `--ar 1000:420 --style raw`, DALL-E 3, or Flux.
+After generation, host on Cloudinary or GitHub raw and replace <COVER_IMAGE_URL> above.
+-->
+
+Most MCP servers I've audited in the last few months had the same three issues:
+
+1. A `shell` or `fs` tool was scoped to the entire filesystem when the use case needed exactly one directory.
+2. The transport ran without auth because the local-dev SSE config got promoted to prod.
+3. Tool descriptions echoed verbatim into prompts with no sanitization — a perfect injection surface.
+
+[`@hailbytes/mcp-security-scanner`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@hailbytes/mcp-security-scanner) is what I wish I'd had on day one of building MCP servers. It's a static + dynamic scanner for MCP configs and live endpoints that flags these patterns.
+
+## CLI
+
+```bash
+# Scan a local config
+npx @hailbytes/mcp-security-scanner ./mcp-config.json
+
+# Scan a live endpoint
+npx @hailbytes/mcp-security-scanner https://my-mcp-server.example.com
+
+# SARIF output + fail the build
+npx @hailbytes/mcp-security-scanner ./config.json --output=sarif --exit-code
+```
+
+## Programmatic
+
+```ts
+import { scan } from "@hailbytes/mcp-security-scanner";
+
+const report = await scan({ configPath: "./mcp-config.json" });
+
+if (!report.passed) {
+  console.error(report.findings);
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+```
+
+## What it checks
+
+- **Overprivileged tools** — broader permissions than the declared function needs (filesystem scope, shell access, network egress)
+- **Missing or weak authentication** — unauthenticated transports, missing token validation, plaintext secrets in config
+- **Prompt injection surface** — tool descriptions and output paths that pass through to model context without sanitization
+- **Unsafe defaults** — insecure transport defaults, verbose error exposure, CORS wildcards
+
+The SARIF output drops straight into GitHub Code Scanning, so findings show up as alerts on PRs — same place your SAST results live.
+
+```bash
+npm install -g @hailbytes/mcp-security-scanner
+```
+
+Source: [github.com/hailbytes/mcp-security-scanner](https://github.com/hailbytes/mcp-security-scanner) — MIT licensed. Pairs nicely with [`@hailbytes/mcp-server-template`](https://github.com/hailbytes/mcp-server-template) if you want a scaffold that comes up secure by default.