fix: block self-escalation of profiles.is_admin / is_approved - #646
JakubAnderwald wants to merge 2 commits into
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The "Users can update own profile" policy only checked row ownership, so any signed-in user could PATCH their own profile to is_approved = true and is_admin = true with the public anon key and their own JWT, bypassing the approval gate and gaining admin rights. Add a BEFORE UPDATE trigger on public.profiles that raises 42501 (HTTP 403) when either flag changes from the authenticated/anon roles unless public.is_admin() is true. The function is SECURITY INVOKER so current_user is the caller's role. service_role and postgres are not gated, so both approval routes, the admin bootstrap and display_name self-edits keep working with no app-code change. Tests: a static CI check pinning the guard shape, plus an opt-in live check against the dev project. Docs and ADR-0039 record the decision. Closes #457 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change adds a ChangesProfile privilege guard
Priority: ⬆️ High Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Change: Bug fix · Severity of issue fixed: High Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant AuthenticatedUser
participant SupabaseAPI
participant guard_profile_privilege_columns
participant profiles
AuthenticatedUser->>SupabaseAPI: PATCH is_admin or is_approved
SupabaseAPI->>guard_profile_privilege_columns: Run BEFORE UPDATE trigger
guard_profile_privilege_columns-->>SupabaseAPI: Raise 42501
SupabaseAPI-->>AuthenticatedUser: Return HTTP 403
Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to An incorrect HTTP dev URL could expose a privileged credential. Require the exact HTTPS origin before merging. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 16.67% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 6 functions across 2 files. (5 skipped: 5 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Actionable comments posted: 1
- 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
In `@scripts/__tests__/profile-privilege-guard.live.test.mjs`:
- Line 28: Update isDevProject to compare the parsed URL’s complete origin
against the expected HTTPS origin for DEV_PROJECT_REF, rejecting HTTP URLs while
preserving the hostname validation.
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📒 Files selected for processing (7)
docs/adr/0039-profile-privilege-column-guard.mddocs/adr/README.mddocs/features/auth.mddocs/features/email-and-approval.mdscripts/__tests__/profile-privilege-guard.live.test.mjsscripts/__tests__/profile-privilege-guard.test.mjssupabase/migrations/20260922000001_guard_profile_privilege_columns.sql
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Factory code reviewNo new findings at
What I verified against
Not re-raised: CodeRabbit's open thread on Before this card moves to Approved, as the PR body itself says, two acceptance criteria are still unmet:
The static test also reads only |
isDevProject compared only the hostname, so an http:// URL for the dev project passed and the service-role key went out in cleartext on the first request. Compare the full origin against the HTTPS dev origin and update the header comment and auth.md to match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Factory code reviewNo findings. The guard does what the issue asks, and I found no bypass in the paths I checked.
What I checked (reviewed at
Still open (operator steps, not code defects): the PR body says the migration has not been applied to dev and the live check has not been run. So the acceptance criteria for dev verification and the from-scratch chain apply are still unverified. The PR also needs the |
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1 participant
Closes #457
Summary
Before this change, any signed-in user could approve themselves and make themselves an admin. The "Users can update own profile" policy checks row ownership only. So a
PATCH /rest/v1/profiles?id=eq.<own-id>with{"is_approved":true,"is_admin":true}went through with just the public anon key and the user's own JWT.This PR adds one migration with a
BEFORE UPDATEtrigger onpublic.profiles. The trigger raises42501(HTTP 403) whenis_adminoris_approvedchanges, the caller's role isauthenticatedoranon, andpublic.is_admin()is false. The function isSECURITY INVOKER, socurrent_useris the caller's role.service_roleandpostgresare not gated. No app code changes: both approval routes, the admin bootstrap, anddisplay_nameself-edits keep working.Implements the approved plan.
Parity report
parityOverride = infra-only. Nothing underapps/**orpackages/shared/**changes.supabase/migrations/20260922000001_guard_profile_privilege_columns.sql✅scripts/__tests__/profile-privilege-guard.test.mjs,scripts/__tests__/profile-privilege-guard.live.test.mjs✅docs/features/auth.md,docs/features/email-and-approval.md,docs/adr/0039-profile-privilege-column-guard.md,docs/adr/README.md✅migration-approved, and the dev apply has not been done yetThis PR needs the
migration-approvedlabel before it can move to Approved.The migration has not been applied to dev, and the live check has not been run. The implement stage may not run
supabase db pushor other deployment commands, and may not start a local Supabase stack. So I could not meet two acceptance criteria myself: checking behaviour onhuhzactreblzcogqkbsd, and applying the full chain from scratch. Both are operator steps:The live test refuses to run against any host other than
huhzactreblzcogqkbsd.supabase.co, and it deletes every user it creates in anafterhook. Accounts that already escalated themselves keep their flags, because the data sweep is out of scope. A quick prod audit isselect id, is_admin, is_approved from profiles where is_admin.Test plan
node --test __tests__/profile-privilege-guard.test.mjs(scripts): 7/7 pass. Mutation-checked: seven deliberate breakages of the migration are each caught. They wereand→oron the role gate,security invoker→definer, droppingnotbeforeis_admin(),before→after update, a wrong errcode, droppingauthenticatedfrom the role list, and replacingis distinct fromwith=. All were reverted.pnpm --filter @drafto/web test: 1044 passed, 1 skipped (the existing account-deletion live test). Unchanged and green.pnpm lint: 0 errors (24 web warnings, all there before this PR).pnpm typecheck: 4/4 successful.pnpm format:check: clean.pnpm migration:check: 0 errors. The 13 warnings were all there before; the new file adds none.cd scripts && node --test __tests__/*.test.mjs): 1696/1699 pass. The 3 failures are infactory-agent-intest.test.mjs(lane-kill tests). They happen on this Mac mini runner becauselsofis not on its PATH (scripts/factory-agent.sh:1691). Those files are untouched here, andmainCI (ubuntu) is green.I couldn't run a real Postgres here, so I also ran an adversarial multi-agent review of the diff. It covered PostgreSQL/PostgREST semantics, bypass hunting, test correctness, and docs accuracy. The semantics, bypass and test reviewers found nothing. The docs reviewer's one finding was refuted on verification: the line it flagged predates this PR and is still accurate.
Drift vs. approved plan
The PR matches the plan's "Files to touch", with these additions and one omission:
docs/adr/0039-profile-privilege-column-guard.md, plus its README index row and "Related ADRs" links in both feature docs. The plan didn't list an ADR. CLAUDE.md requires one for a new enforcement pattern with trade-offs: trigger vs. column grants, the privileged-role bypass, and the denylist role gate.docs/features/auth.mdthan the plan listed. The invariant at the old line 230 said "Only the service-role client should flip it". That was already wrong, since the interactive route flips it as an admin through the user session. It is rewritten to name the trigger. There is also a new "must change together" bullet for adding privilege columns.security invokeris written out in the function, rather than left as the default, so the intent is visible and the static test can pin it.pnpm supabase:link:dev && pnpm supabase:push, and the localsupabase start+db resetchain check. Both are outside what the implement stage may run (deployment commands and host Docker). They are left to the operator, as described above.🤖 Generated by the dark factory (approved plan)
Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Documentation
Tests