A privacy-first desktop utility protecting sensitive tokens, passwords, and cryptocurrency addresses from background clipboard-snoop malware.
Standard operating systems share a universal plaintext clipboard across all unprivileged applications. Any background process or rogue browser tab can continuously monitor clipboard contents to intercept master passwords, private keys, and API tokens.
SafeCopy enforces a zero-trust boundary around the system clipboard:
- Ephemeral In-Memory Encryption: Stored entries exist only in volatile RAM encrypted with AES-256-GCM; zero plaintext writes to disk.
- Automated Memory Zeroization: Clipboard buffers are cryptographically overwritten and cleared after configurable countdown windows (e.g. 30 seconds).
- Clipboard Obfuscation: Injects decoy nonces upon paste execution to blind continuous clipboard pollers.
flowchart TD
UserCopy[User Copies Password / Private Token] --> SafeCopyEngine[SafeCopy RAM Enclave]
subgraph CryptographicProtection["Volatile RAM Enclave"]
SafeCopyEngine --> AESEncrypt[AES-256-GCM In-Memory Encryption]
AESEncrypt --> CountdownTimer[Configurable Auto-Purge Countdown
(Default: 30 Seconds)]
end
CountdownTimer --> PasteTrigger{User Triggers Paste}
PasteTrigger -->|Within Time Window| PasteDecrypted[Decrypt & Inject via Simulated Keystroke]
PasteTrigger -->|Countdown Expired| AutoZeroize[Memory Buffer Zeroized with CSPRNG Junk]
AutoZeroize --> ClearedClipboard[(OS Clipboard Cleared)]
security-linting: Zero persistent disk writes for transient secrets.clean-code: Strict memory zeroization protocols (SecureZeroMemory/memset_s).
Distributed under the MIT License. Maintained by Jaswanth Reddy — Passionate learner & creative problem solver learning from and giving back to the open-source community.