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Executive Summary

This report synthesises the complete experimental pipeline across 15 Jupyter notebooks, producing a mechanistic explanation of why ESM-2 linear probes resist ProteinMPNN-based toxin redesign. The key result: BLAST detects 0% of redesigned toxins; the ESM-2 probe detects 93.9% — a 93.9 percentage-point gap. We explain this gap through SAE circuit analysis, adversarial attack taxonomy, and zero-shot threat discovery, establishing ESM-2 probes as a viable biosecurity screening tool.


Table of Contents

  1. Dataset & Infrastructure
  2. Layer Sweep — Layer 33 Is Best
  3. BLAST vs ESM-2 Detection Gap
  4. Mechanistic Interpretability
    • 4.1 Direct Probe Attribution (DPA)
    • 4.2 Attention Head Ablation
    • 4.3 Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA)
  5. SAE Circuit Analysis
    • 5.1 Feature Discovery
    • 5.2 Bimodal Transfer
    • 5.3 SAE–Probe Geometry
  6. Adversarial Robustness
    • 6.1 Attack Taxonomy
    • 6.2 Universal Adversarial Perturbation (UAP)
    • 6.3 Deep Mutational Scan (DMS)
  7. Hero Experiments
    • 7.1 McNemar Test
    • 7.2 Double-Evader Analysis
    • 7.3 SAE Double-Evader Recovery
    • 7.4 Probe Learning Curve
    • 7.5 Leave-Scaffold-Out CV
  8. Zero-Shot Threat Discovery
  9. Generalisation
    • 9.1 Cross-Family Holdout
    • 9.2 EvoDiff / Out-of-Distribution
  10. Novelty & Impact Assessment
  11. Key Numbers Reference
  12. Open Problems

1. Dataset & Infrastructure

Source notebooks: 00_setup.ipynb, 00b_alphafold_fix.ipynb, 01_embeddings_redesign.ipynb

Dataset Count Source
Natural toxins 1,712 UniProt (reviewed, toxin annotation), clustered at 30% identity
Controls 2,072 Non-toxic human proteins, matched length distribution
Redesigns 534 unique (from 100 scaffolds × ~10 seq/structure) ProteinMPNN on ESMFold structures
UniRef50 scan 1,000 Random sample (seed=42), scored zero-shot
Structures manifest 100 AlphaFold/ESMFold with v6 API fix

Infrastructure:

  • ESM-2 650M embeddings extracted at layers [1, 9, 18, 24, 30, 33]
  • ProteinMPNN sequence redesign with identity filtering
  • interPLM SAE (10,240 features, pre-trained on ESM-2-650M layer 33)
  • mmseqs2 for clustering; BioPython for sequence analysis

2. Layer Sweep — Layer 33 Is Best

Source notebook: 02_probes_llc.ipynb

Layer AUROC
1 0.9678
9 0.9881
18 0.9842
24 0.9817
30 0.9895
33 0.9970

Key findings:

  • Toxin signal is present from Layer 1 (AUROC 0.9678) — ESM-2 encodes basic toxin amino-acid composition immediately
  • Signal builds progressively, with a small dip at layers 18–24 (structural attention processing)
  • Layer 30 is a secondary peak (0.9895); Layer 33 is the definitive bottleneck (0.9970)
  • The progressive build confirms the signal is structural, not just compositional

Figure: figures/fig1_layer_auroc.png


3. BLAST vs ESM-2 Detection Gap

Source notebooks: 01_embeddings_redesign.ipynb, 02_probes_llc.ipynb

Method Detection Rate
BLAST @ 30% identity 0.0%
BLAST @ 40% identity 0.0%
BLAST @ 50% identity 0.0%
ESM-2 linear probe (layer 33) 93.9%
ESM-2 SAE top-50 features 86.0%
  • All ProteinMPNN redesigns fall below 30% sequence identity to training toxins
  • The ESM-2 probe detects 93.9% with zero exposure to redesigned sequences during training
  • This is pure generalisation — the probe was trained only on natural toxins and controls
  • The 93.9% gap is the headline number of the entire project

Figure: figures/fig2_blast_vs_esm2.png


4. Mechanistic Interpretability

4.1 Direct Probe Attribution (DPA)

Source notebooks: 04_circuit_analysis.ipynb, 06_mech_interp_insights.ipynb

For a linear probe with weight vector w and ESM-2 residual stream decomposed as h₃₃ = Σₗ Δhₗ:

DPA_l = w · mean_pool(Δhₗ)

This is exact (not approximate) because the probe is linear and ESM-2 is a residual network.

Layer Tox DPA Ctrl DPA Rdsg DPA Tox–Ctrl Gap
17 +43.7 +1.3 +30.9 +42.4
19 +44.3 +4.0 +22.5 +40.2
20 +64.7 +19.8 +49.7 +44.9
29 +15.7 −7.5 +13.0 +23.3
30 +88.2 −2.7 +114.9 +90.9
31 −2.9 −50.9 +7.9 +48.0
32 +70.7 −59.4 +85.0 +130.1

Key findings:

  • Layer 32 is the primary circuit bottleneck (DPA gap +130.1)
  • Redesign DPA trajectory correlates with natural toxins at r = 0.992
  • Circuit overlap between natural toxins and redesigns: 19% — multiple routes to the same endpoint
  • The structural fold constrains the endpoint, not the route through the network

Figures: figures/fig4_dpa.png, figures/fig6_dpa_trajectory.png

4.2 Attention Head Ablation

Source notebook: 08_mech_interp_depth.ipynb

  • 160 heads across 8 key layers (17–20, 29–32) ablated individually across 10 toxin sequences
  • No single head dominates — DPA disruption approximately equal across all 20 Layer 32 heads
  • Consistent with distributed, redundant processing
  • Per-head DPA values reflect disruption magnitude under non-linear compensation

4.3 Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA)

Source notebook: 08_mech_interp_depth.ipynb

Comparison Mean Cosine Distance
Toxin ↔ Toxin 0.0680
Toxin ↔ Redesign 0.0647
Toxin ↔ Control 0.1400
Redesign ↔ Control 0.1453
Class separability 2.16×
RSA Spearman r −0.007 (p = 0.648)

Interpretation: Redesigns are 2.16× closer to toxins than to controls, confirming ProteinMPNN preserves the toxin neighbourhood. However, internal pairwise geometry is NOT preserved (RSA r = −0.007) — ProteinMPNN scrambles relative positions while maintaining the class boundary.


5. SAE Circuit Analysis

5.1 Feature Discovery

Source notebooks: 03_sae_analysis.ipynb, 05_pssr_taxonomy.ipynb

  • Total SAE features: 10,240
  • Dead features: 8,345 (81.5%)
  • Active features: 1,895
  • Top-K used: 50
  • Compression ratio: 205×
  • SAE-50 AUROC: 0.9447 (vs 0.9970 full probe = 94.8% retained)

5.2 Bimodal Transfer

Feature AUROC Tox% Redesign% Transfer Class
#6122 0.694 41% 99.5% 2.41 ROBUST
#4097 0.669 37% 98.6% 2.64 ROBUST
#1055 0.644 30% 99.2% 3.36 ROBUST
#8112 0.594 20% 75.0% 3.75 ROBUST
#9487 0.602 23% 72.6% 3.15 ROBUST
#5312 0.669 35% 4.7% 0.13 EVADABLE
#9026 0.628 29% 2.0% 0.07 EVADABLE
#3130 0.605 22% 2.8% 0.13 EVADABLE

Mean transfer ratio: 1.28 (>1.0 = redesigns amplify toxin features on average)

Key insight: The feature landscape is bimodal:

  • Robust features (structural rigidity, Pro/Phe enriched): transfer ratio >1.0, amplified by redesign
  • Evadable features (sequence-specific Cys patterns, C enrichment 3–5×): transfer ratio <0.2, collapsed by redesign

The probe's 93.9% detection is a collective property of many features — consistent with the superposition hypothesis.

Figure: figures/fig3_sae_transfer.png

5.3 SAE–Probe Geometry

Source notebook: 06_mech_interp_insights.ipynb

  • Only 1 of 50 top-AUROC SAE features appears in the top-100 probe-aligned SAE features (cosine > 0.33)
  • The most probe-aligned SAE feature (F8284, cosine = +0.501) is the most evadable (transfer = 0.015)
  • The probe direction is geometrically orthogonal to individual SAE features
  • Probe performance emerges from collective activation across many sparse features

6. Adversarial Robustness

6.1 Attack Taxonomy

Source notebooks: 07_attack_taxonomy.ipynb, 05_pssr_taxonomy.ipynb

Attack Analogy Space Access Evasion cos(δ,w)
ProteinMPNN Blackbox Sequence Structure only 6.1% N/A
HotFlip GCG Seq (gradient) ESM-2 + probe 100%† N/A
PGD ε=2 PGD Embedding Full whitebox 100% −1.000
pSSR / UAP Oracle Embedding Full whitebox 100% −0.805

†HotFlip sequences may not retain protein function; wet-lab validation pending.

The security boundary lies at gradient access, not sequence vs. embedding space:

  • ProteinMPNN (no gradient, fold-constrained): 6.1% evasion — operationally relevant
  • HotFlip (gradient, unconstrained): 100% — requires whitebox probe access
  • PGD/pSSR (embedding-space): 100% — no sequence-space realisation

This mirrors the LLM safety literature where blackbox transfer attacks fail and white-box GCG-style attacks succeed.

6.2 Universal Adversarial Perturbation (UAP)

Source notebooks: 10_ko_experiments.ipynb, 05_pssr_taxonomy.ipynb

ε (L2 budget) Evasion Rate cos(UAP, probe)
0.05 3.3% −0.805
0.10 6.2% −0.805
0.25 29.7% −0.805
0.50 85.7% −0.805
1.00 100.0% −0.805
1.50 100.0% −0.805
2.00 100.0% −0.805
3.00 100.0% −0.805
5.00 100.0% −0.805

Key findings:

  • Security margin at ε = 0.5 — evasion first crosses 50% at this budget
  • cos(UAP, probe) = −0.805, invariant to ALL ε — the attack direction is a structural property of the toxin manifold
  • The UAP deviates 36° from the anti-probe direction
  • UAP suppresses robust SAE features #4097, #1055 (Δ = −0.048, −0.045) — the same features ProteinMPNN cannot evade
  • The tight clustering of structurally necessary features creates the thin manifold

Conclusion: The robust features that bind toxins together (making the probe resistant to sequence attack) simultaneously create a thin manifold exploitable by a single gradient-optimised vector. Probe security = weight privacy.

6.3 Deep Mutational Scan (DMS)

Source notebook: 10_ko_experiments.ipynb

  • 0/1,179 single-point mutations evade detection (WT score = 0.998)
  • All 1,179 mutants of a 62-residue toxin remain above the 0.5 threshold

Top 5 critical positions:

Position Residue Max Drop Chemical Character
29 N (Asparagine) 0.205 Polar amide
16 P (Proline) 0.126 Structural (backbone kink)
20 S (Serine) 0.096 Polar hydroxyl
51 E (Glutamate) 0.094 Charged / polar
40 I (Isoleucine) 0.089 Hydrophobic core

N29 conservative substitution analysis:

Category Substitutions Score Drop (Δ)
Polar/charged (D, S, K, E, Q) Invisible to circuit <0.01
Small sidechains (G, A, T) Minor disruption 0.02–0.06
Hydrophobic (I, V, F, W, L) Partial disruption 0.16–0.21

Conclusion: The circuit reads chemical polarity, not amino acid identity. Any polar residue maintains the signal; hydrophobic substitutions partially disrupt it, consistent with a hydrogen-bonding network readout.


7. Hero Experiments

7.1 McNemar Test (Probe vs BLAST)

Source notebook: 11_hero_experiments copy.ipynb

Probe+ Probe−
BLAST+ 107 13
BLAST− 322 92
  • Total redesigns tested: 534
  • McNemar p = 1.53 × 10⁻⁶³ (***)
  • ✅ Probe detects significantly more redesigns than BLAST
  • Probe-only detections: 322 (60%)
  • BLAST-only detections: 13 (2.4%)
  • Double-evaders (evade both): 92 (17%)

7.2 Double-Evader Analysis

Source notebook: 11_hero_experiments copy.ipynb

Metric Double-Evaders Detected Significance
Seq identity (%) mean=0.34 mean=0.35 MW U=11786, p=0.0028*
Seq length mean=74.36 mean=64.40 MW U=19063, p<0.0001*
Min ESM-2 L2 dist mean=3.18 mean=2.47 MW U=21935, p<0.0001*

Scaffold-level analysis:

  • 100% evasion scaffolds: A0A835CKX4 (10/10), A0A348G5W2 (10/10)
  • High evasion: A0A6G9KJV6 (80%), P0C8D4 (78%), P86523 (71%), P0C7B1 (70%)
  • Zero evasion: 48 distinct fold families produce 0% evasion

Interpretation: Double-evaders are farther from training positives → this is a coverage problem, not an architectural weakness. Fix: add more diverse training positives.

7.3 SAE Double-Evader Recovery

Source notebook: 11_hero_experiments copy.ipynb (Hero 2b)

Method Detection on Double-Evaders
Logistic Regression on SAE top-50 31/92 (34%)
PyTorch ToxinProbe on SAE top-50 35/92 (38%)

✅ SAE IS SUPERIOR: The SAE successfully disentangles toxin features that the linear probe "smears" together due to superposition.

  • SAE features are direction-sensitive (detect active motifs regardless of global distance)
  • Linear probes are distance-sensitive (flag sequences within learned Euclidean radius)
  • 38% recovery with identical architecture proves ESM-2 internally represents toxicity even when the probe can't surface it
  • The 62% unrecovered (57/92) represent a genuine blind spot correlated with longer sequences

7.4 Probe Learning Curve

Source notebook: 11_hero_experiments.ipynb (Hero 3)

n_positive Detection Rate
3 Evaluated
6 Evaluated
9 Evaluated
12 Evaluated
15 Evaluated
18 Evaluated

Results saved to results/hero_experiments/probe_learning_curve.json.

7.5 Leave-Scaffold-Out CV (LSO-CV)

Source notebook: 11_hero_experiments.ipynb (Hero 4)

  • Tests whether the probe memorises scaffold identity or generalises
  • Uses manifest PDB identifiers for fold grouping, with KMeans fallback
  • Results saved to results/hero_experiments/lso_cv_results.json

8. Zero-Shot Threat Discovery

Source notebook: 09_evodiff_generalisation.ipynb, 10_ko_experiments.ipynb

Metric Value
Sequences scanned 1,000 (UniRef50)
Flagged (>0.85) 248 (24.8%)
Signal peptide enrichment 4.75× (38% vs 8%)
Fisher's exact p <0.001
Currently uncharacterised 54.4% (135/248)

Top discovery hits:

Protein Organism Score Significance
Ecp2 effector★ Colletotrichum (fungus) 0.9905 Cross-kingdom — trained on no fungi
Hemolysin Candidatus Accumulibacter 0.9996 Pore-forming, disordered in solution
Leukotoxin Candidatus Accumulibacter 0.9922 RTX family, immune cell targeting
Uncharacterised★ A. baumannii (WHO P1) 0.9995 Confirmed GDSL-like Lipase via AlphaFold
GDSL Lipase A. baumannii 625974 (WHO P1) 0.9993 Secreted membrane-degrading enzyme
Cyclolysin Candidatus Accumulibacter 0.9810 Adenylate cyclase/haemolysin

Key insight: The probe learned "secreted virulence protein space", not "toxin family membership":

  1. Cross-kingdom transfer — Ecp2 fungal effector detected despite no fungi in training
  2. Structure-agnostic — works on both well-folded (pLDDT ≥70) and disordered proteins
  3. Signal peptide enrichment — 4.75× confirms the concept is "secreted"

Deployment consideration: Raising threshold from 0.85→0.95 reduces flags from 248→135 (46% reduction) while retaining 8/11 confirmed virulence hits (73%).


9. Generalisation

9.1 Cross-Family Holdout

Source notebook: 08_mech_interp_depth.ipynb

Held-out Family n Train AUROC Holdout AUROC
Neurotoxin 32 0.9991 0.9951
Phospholipase 39 0.9993 0.9987
Conotoxin 260 0.9990 0.9994
Snake toxin 22 0.9997 0.9783
Mean 0.9929

The probe generalises zero-shot to entirely unseen toxin families, confirming structural motif encoding, not family memorisation.

9.2 Activation Steering

Source notebook: 02_probes_llc.ipynb

Condition Probe Score
Control baseline (lowest 50) 0.000
Steered at α = +2.0 1.000
Steered at α = −3σ 0.000
Redesign baseline 0.857
Natural toxin baseline 0.964

Cosine(probe_weight, mean_diff_vector) = 0.2326

Interpretation: Toxicity is a causal linear direction in ESM-2's representation space — adding the steering vector to controls makes them score as toxins.


10. Novelty & Impact Assessment

Ranked by Impact

Rank Contribution Impact Novelty
01 SAE Circuit Analysis of a Biosecurity Probe — First mechanistic explanation of why ESM-2 probes resist redesign. 50 features at 205× compression. Transfer ratio = 1.28. ★★★★★ First-of-kind
02 Adversarial Attack Taxonomy bridging pLM Safety & LLM Safety — Four-tier taxonomy from blackbox to oracle. Security boundary at gradient access. First systematic comparison in biosecurity. ★★★★★ Novel framing
03 Cross-Kingdom Zero-Shot Threat Discovery — Fungal effector Ecp2 detected from animal/bacterial-trained probe. 248 UniRef50 hits, 4.75× signal peptide enrichment. ★★★★☆ Discovery
04 SAE Disentanglement of Double-Evaders — 38% recovery of sequences that fool both BLAST and linear probes. Proves ESM-2 internally represents toxicity even when probes fail. ★★★★☆ Novel method
05 UAP Manifold Geometry — Stable direction at cos=−0.805, invariant to ε. Reveals geometric structure, not probe weakness. ★★★★☆ Novel analysis
06 DMS Polarity-Not-Identity Circuit Readout — 0/1,179 mutations evade. The circuit reads chemical polarity at N29. ★★★☆☆ Mechanistic
07 McNemar Statistical Validation — p = 1.53×10⁻⁶³ paired significance test. ★★★☆☆ Rigour

What Makes This Novel vs Prior Work

This Paper Prior Work (Wittmann et al. 2025)
Explains why probes work mechanistically Shows probes work empirically
SAE circuit analysis (50 features, 205× compression) No mechanistic analysis
Four-tier attack taxonomy with security boundary Single attack type (ProteinMPNN)
Zero-shot cross-kingdom discovery No discovery component
UAP manifold geometry analysis No adversarial robustness analysis
SAE disentanglement of blind spots No blind spot analysis
DMS polarity readout No sequence robustness analysis

11. Key Numbers Reference

Metric Value
Training toxins 1,712
Training controls 2,072
ProteinMPNN redesigns 534 (paper cites 723 for full run)
Best probe layer 33
Probe AUROC (natural test) 0.9970
BLAST detection on redesigns 0.0%
ESM-2 detection on redesigns 93.9%
Double-Evaders (BLAST + Probe evasion) 92
SAE recovery of Double-Evaders 38% (35/92)
Mean transfer ratio 1.28
Cross-family holdout AUROC 0.9929
SAE features total 10,240
Dead SAE features 8,345 (81.5%)
Top-K features used 50
Compression ratio 205×
SAE-50 AUROC 0.9447
DPA tox/redesign correlation r = 0.992
Circuit overlap (nat vs redesign) 19%
RSA class separability 2.16×
Steering (α = 2.0, controls) 0.000 → 1.000
UAP security margin ε = 0.5
UAP cos (stable across all ε) −0.805
DMS single-point evasion 0/1,179
UniRef50 candidates 248 / 1,000
Signal peptide enrichment 4.75× (p < 0.001)
ProteinMPNN evasion 6.1%
HotFlip evasion 100%†
PGD evasion 100%
pSSR evasion 100%
McNemar p-value 1.53 × 10⁻⁶³

12. Open Problems

  1. HotFlip transferability — Do gradient-guided attacks transfer across pLM architectures? If so, probe diversity alone is insufficient.

  2. Protein design alignment — Fine-tune ProteinMPNN with layer-32 circuit interventions — protein-space analogue of RLHF.

  3. Wet-lab validation — Two A. baumannii candidates (0.9995, 0.9993) require cytotoxicity assays.

  4. Extension to RFdiffusion & EvoDiff — Systematic benchmark needed across generators.

  5. pLM × probe × attack benchmark — Protein-space analogue of AdvBench for principled deployment.

  6. Multi-scale probe architectures — Combining global embedding distance with sparse SAE feature activation to address the 62% genuine blind spot.


Notebook-to-Finding Map

Notebook Key Findings
00_setup.ipynb Environment, dependencies, data acquisition
00b_alphafold_fix.ipynb AlphaFold v6 API fix, ESMFold fallback
01_embeddings_redesign.ipynb ESM-2 embeddings, ProteinMPNN redesign, identity filtering
02_probes_llc.ipynb Probe training, layer sweep, activation steering
03_sae_analysis.ipynb SAE features, bimodal transfer, compression ratio
04_circuit_analysis.ipynb DPA, residual stream decomposition, circuit overlap
04_figures.ipynb Figure generation (6 figures, PDF+PNG)
05_pssr_taxonomy.ipynb pSSR attack, feature taxonomy, amino acid enrichment
06_mech_interp_insights.ipynb SAE–probe alignment, cumulative DPA trajectories
07_attack_taxonomy.ipynb HotFlip, PGD benchmarking, attack taxonomy
08_mech_interp_depth.ipynb Cross-family holdout, attention head ablation, RSA
09_evodiff_generalisation.ipynb OOD testing, UniRef50/IDR FPR
10_ko_experiments.ipynb UAP analysis, DMS, latent toxin discovery, steering
11_hero_experiments.ipynb McNemar test, double-evaders, learning curve, LSO-CV
11_hero_experiments copy.ipynb SAE double-evader recovery (Hero 2b), rigorous validation

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