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🛡️ Sentinel: HIGH Fix Timing Attack in Codex Routes - #856
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- Replaced simple string equality (`!==`) with `crypto.timingSafeEqual()` when verifying `x-internal-secret` in `apps/auth-service/src/routes/codexRoutes.ts`. - Prevents timing attacks on the codex device authorization endpoint. Co-authored-by: Mihir-Rabari <169349389+Mihir-Rabari@users.noreply.github.com>
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- Replaced simple string equality (`!==`) with `crypto.timingSafeEqual()` when verifying `x-internal-secret` in `apps/auth-service/src/routes/codexRoutes.ts`. - Prevents timing attacks on the codex device authorization endpoint. - Fixed unrelated lint errors in web dashboard pages (unencoded HTML entities and unescaped comment nodes). Co-authored-by: Mihir-Rabari <169349389+Mihir-Rabari@users.noreply.github.com>
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🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: The internal secret comparison in Codex routes was using simple string equality (
clientSecret !== internalSecret).🎯 Impact: This allows attackers to perform a timing attack by observing the response time of the request to guess the internal secret character by character, potentially leading to unauthorized access to the codex device auth endpoint.
🔧 Fix: Replaced simple string comparison with
crypto.timingSafeEqual()from Node's built-in crypto module. Ensured buffers are the exact same length prior to comparison to prevent unhandled exception crashes.✅ Verification: Ran
cd apps/auth-service && pnpm testand standard workspace tests to ensure no regressions were introduced. Added learning journal to.Jules/sentinel.md.PR created automatically by Jules for task 17194298471825686780 started by @Mihir-Rabari