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🛡️ Sentinel: HIGH Fix Timing Attack Vulnerability in Secret Comparison - #860
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Fixed timing attack vulnerability in `apps/auth-service/src/routes/codexRoutes.ts` when comparing `clientSecret` and `internalSecret` by correctly importing and utilizing `crypto.timingSafeEqual()`. Buffer conversion and length checks were added prior to equality check. Co-authored-by: Mihir-Rabari <169349389+Mihir-Rabari@users.noreply.github.com>
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🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: Simple string comparison (
===or!==) was used to check internal service secrets instead of constant-time comparison.🎯 Impact: Allows an attacker to slowly brute-force the secret character by character by measuring response times.
🔧 Fix: Used
crypto.timingSafeEqual()for comparing sensitive tokens, secrets, or hashes. Ensure both inputs are cast toBufferand their lengths are checked prior to comparison.✅ Verification: Ensure tests pass and the secret validation still succeeds with the correct secret.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 17748498919860594595 started by @Mihir-Rabari