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π‘οΈ Sentinel: HIGH Fix Timing Attack in Codex Auth - #862
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Replaced simple string equality check with constant-time crypto.timingSafeEqual() to prevent timing-based side-channel attacks on the internal service secret. Co-authored-by: Mihir-Rabari <169349389+Mihir-Rabari@users.noreply.github.com>
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Replaced simple string equality check with constant-time crypto.timingSafeEqual() to prevent timing-based side-channel attacks on the internal service secret. Co-authored-by: Mihir-Rabari <169349389+Mihir-Rabari@users.noreply.github.com>
π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: In
apps/auth-service/src/routes/codexRoutes.ts, a simple string comparison (clientSecret !== internalSecret) was used for verifying the internal service secret in the Codex authentication flow. This exposes the system to timing-based side-channel attacks, because string equality checks short-circuit on the first mismatched character.π― Impact: An attacker could potentially discover the internal service secret byte-by-byte by carefully measuring the API response times of failed requests, leading to unauthorized access.
π§ Fix: Replaced the direct string comparison with Node.js's
crypto.timingSafeEqual(). Buffered both secrets and explicitly checked for length equality before the comparison to ensure constant-time execution independent of the input values and avoidTypeErroron mismatched buffer lengths. Included an inline Sentinel comment.β Verification: Verified using workspace wide
pnpm testand specificcd apps/auth-service && pnpm test. Checked that formatting and linting pass for the specific modified service usingpnpm formatandpnpm lint --filter auth-service. The patch introduces no new regressions.PR created automatically by Jules for task 11433560090034243071 started by @Mihir-Rabari