memory: confirm two documented MCP/gha gotchas recur in Morrison-Lab/psw

memories/gha-reusable-workflow-permissions.md

@@ -43,6 +43,26 @@
 - **Do:** see `github-actions.md`'s "GitHub Actions workflow authoring
   gotchas" for the permission-grant mechanism and remedy; this only adds
   where to find the error text once you've hit it.
+- **Confirmed again, different repo, different permission**:
+  `Morrison-Lab/psw`'s `claude-code-review.yml` caller granted `contents`,
+  `pull-requests`, `issues`, `id-token` but omitted `actions`, while the
+  callee's `claude-review` job requests `actions: read` (to let
+  `claude-code-action` install its `github_ci` MCP server). Same
+  `startup_failure`, zero jobs, nothing in `pull_request_read`
+  `get_check_runs` or `get_job_logs`. `WebFetch` on the run's `html_url`
+  reliably surfaced the Annotations text verbatim -- "The nested job
+  'claude-review' is requesting 'actions: read', but is only allowed
+  'actions: none'." -- confirming this isn't `d-morrison/qwt`-specific and
+  that a plain `WebFetch` (not just a dedicated `get_page_text` browser
+  tool) is sufficient to read it. (Morrison-Lab/psw#43/#44, 2026-08-10.)
+  This exact `actions: read` gap -- same four granted permissions, same
+  `startup_failure`/zero-jobs shape -- had already happened once before,
+  in `ai-config` itself rather than a downstream consumer
+  ([`github-actions.md`](github-actions.md), ai-config#224).
+  So this is the third occurrence, not the second, and "not
+  `d-morrison/qwt`-specific" above undersells it -- the gap recurs
+  independently of which repo is calling `Morrison-Lab/gha`, ai-config's
+  own repo included.
 
 ## A caller-level `concurrency:` group with the same name as a nested job's own group deadlocks the run
 

memories/github-mcp-tools.md

@@ -381,6 +381,53 @@
   leave a broken file on the branch waiting for the next review round to catch
   it. (Hit on lab-manual#376: an editing slip sent a truncated placeholder
   instead of the real fragment text; caught by checking the returned `size`.)
+  **Confirmed again with a different downstream symptom, and it defeats a
+  naive round-trip check.** Passing an already-base64-encoded string produced
+  a `size` of 2310 bytes for content that should have been 1710 -- a ~4/3
+  inflation, the base64 expansion ratio, rather than a suspiciously *small*
+  number this time. The GitHub Actions symptom was different too: since the
+  stored blob was a bare base64 scalar rather than a YAML mapping, the
+  workflow read as having no triggers at all -- a dispatch-time `422
+  Workflow does not have 'workflow_dispatch' trigger` on that ref (dispatch
+  to the unmodified default branch worked fine), and the push itself
+  produced a generic `failure` conclusion with zero jobs (not
+  `startup_failure`, which is the permissions-cascade shape covered in
+  [`gha-reusable-workflow-permissions.md`](gha-reusable-workflow-permissions.md)).
+  A naive "does it decode without erroring"
+  round-trip check does not catch this: base64-decoding what
+  `get_file_contents` reads back just undoes your own accidental encoding
+  and returns the intended text, which looks like confirmation. The `size`
+  comparison against the source's real byte length is the check that
+  actually discriminates. (Morrison-Lab/psw#44, 2026-08-10.)
+  **A third instance is not an encoding mistake at all --- the `content`
+  parameter can simply be constructed wrong.**
+  A follow-up call meant to correct the two case records above instead sent
+  a literal placeholder string as the whole file body, caught immediately
+  by `content.size` reading 21 bytes for a ~50KB file.
+  **A local clone plus a real `git push` avoids this class of mistake
+  entirely, when push is available.**
+  `git clone --depth 1 --filter=blob:none --sparse` plus `git push` from
+  that clone worked in this same session, for a branch that was neither
+  harness-assigned nor the working directory's own repo --- consistent
+  with [`github.md`](github.md)'s "the proxy allows branch creation/push
+  but BLOCKS branch deletion."
+  `git config -l` showed no local credential (only
+  `http.proxyauthmethod=basic` and `credential.interactive=false`, no
+  `~/.git-credentials` or `~/.netrc`), so authentication happens somewhere
+  in the outbound proxy layer rather than the checkout --- consistent with
+  this environment's outbound HTTPS being proxied, though the exact
+  mechanism wasn't traced further.
+  Once a branch exists to push to, prefer editing the file locally and
+  pushing over `create_or_update_file`/`push_files` for anything beyond a
+  trivial edit: the committed content is exactly what `git diff` shows, and
+  `git hash-object` verifies it byte-for-byte before AND after the push,
+  with no encoding step or parameter-construction step for a mistake to
+  hide in.
+  Not every session gets this --- some are restricted to the
+  harness-assigned branch only, or fully read-only, per
+  [`github-actions.md`](github-actions.md)'s "403 caveat" and "fully
+  READ-ONLY" entries --- so test with a throwaway push before relying on
+  it.
 - **Issue *writes* 404 while *reads* succeed → the issue was transferred to
   another repo, not a permissions gap.** If `mcp__github__add_issue_comment` /
   `issue_write` to `owner/repo#<N>` fail (`404 Not Found`, or `Could not resolve
@@ -708,4 +755,3 @@
   where the table actually lives. (Caught in ai-config#137 review: the gip
   skill referenced a table ai-config didn't have at the time; ai-config#327
   later added `tool-mappings.md` to close that gap.)
-