ci: PyPI release workflow (Trusted Publishing) - #2
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The package builds and passes `twine check`, but nothing ever pushed it: the name is unclaimed on PyPI and the README had to send readers to a git URL. This adds the tag-triggered release job. It uses OIDC rather than an API token, so there is no publishing secret in the repo to leak. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VWTgH2xDR5xafCX83YvQQV
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…ttest Two post-review hardening fixes that close the gap between the marketed USP and what the code delivered. #1 Signature tamper-evidence (was cryptographically hollow) - _sign() no longer writes a companion .pub next to the .sig. A pub that travels with the signature is no trust anchor: an attacker edits the fingerprint, re-signs with their own key, ships their own pub, verify passed. Tamper-evidence was effectively 0. - verify() now checks the signature against a PINNED public key (indelible.pub, committed) or one supplied out-of-band via --pubkey. A signature with no pinned key is a hard error, never a silent pass. - init now emits indelible.pub (and re-derives it for pre-existing keys). - Documented the honest trust model in SECURITY.md / README / llms.txt: authenticates origin+integrity relative to a pinned key, not attester honesty; cross-party verification must pin the key out-of-band. #2 Determinism (baseline was maximally noisy) - New IndelibleConfig.temperature, default 0.0, threaded through all three providers (Anthropic/OpenAI-compat temperature, Ollama options.temperature). Attestation ran at provider-default temp (~1.0), injecting sampling noise into every signal and manufacturing false breaches. - temperature is part of the canonical config hash (different temp = different behavioral baseline). Also: softened over-reaching EU AI Act claim to "supporting evidence"; documented latency as network-influenced/informational; hand-tuned tolerances flagged as uncalibrated. TDD: 17 new tests (tamper-resign attack, wrong-key, missing-anchor, temperature threading + canonical hash). Full suite 164 passed, ruff + mypy clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MrPredic
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The package builds and passes `twine check`, but nothing ever pushed it: the name is unclaimed on PyPI and the README had to send readers to a git URL. This adds the tag-triggered release job. It uses OIDC rather than an API token, so there is no publishing secret in the repo to leak. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VWTgH2xDR5xafCX83YvQQV Co-authored-by: MrPredic <269417388+MrPredic@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MrPredic
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Aug 7, 2026
…ttest Two post-review hardening fixes that close the gap between the marketed USP and what the code delivered. #1 Signature tamper-evidence (was cryptographically hollow) - _sign() no longer writes a companion .pub next to the .sig. A pub that travels with the signature is no trust anchor: an attacker edits the fingerprint, re-signs with their own key, ships their own pub, verify passed. Tamper-evidence was effectively 0. - verify() now checks the signature against a PINNED public key (indelible.pub, committed) or one supplied out-of-band via --pubkey. A signature with no pinned key is a hard error, never a silent pass. - init now emits indelible.pub (and re-derives it for pre-existing keys). - Documented the honest trust model in SECURITY.md / README / llms.txt: authenticates origin+integrity relative to a pinned key, not attester honesty; cross-party verification must pin the key out-of-band. #2 Determinism (baseline was maximally noisy) - New IndelibleConfig.temperature, default 0.0, threaded through all three providers (Anthropic/OpenAI-compat temperature, Ollama options.temperature). Attestation ran at provider-default temp (~1.0), injecting sampling noise into every signal and manufacturing false breaches. - temperature is part of the canonical config hash (different temp = different behavioral baseline). Also: softened over-reaching EU AI Act claim to "supporting evidence"; documented latency as network-influenced/informational; hand-tuned tolerances flagged as uncalibrated. TDD: 17 new tests (tamper-resign attack, wrong-key, missing-anchor, temperature threading + canonical hash). Full suite 164 passed, ruff + mypy clean.
MrPredic
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Aug 7, 2026
The package builds and passes `twine check`, but nothing ever pushed it: the name is unclaimed on PyPI and the README had to send readers to a git URL. This adds the tag-triggered release job. It uses OIDC rather than an API token, so there is no publishing secret in the repo to leak. Co-authored-by: MrPredic <269417388+MrPredic@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Package builds clean and passes
twine check, but the name is unclaimed on PyPI and there was no release job. Adds a tag-triggered publish over OIDC — no API token stored anywhere.Needs one manual step before the first tag: add the pending publisher on PyPI (project name, owner
MrPredic, workflowrelease.yml, environmentpypi).