nocturne produces signatures and calldata that move real value on Morpho Midnight. Please treat
any correctness or signing issue as potentially security-relevant.
Do not open a public issue for security problems. Instead, report privately:
- Use GitHub's Report a vulnerability (Security → Advisories), or
- email oliverptipton@gmail.com with details and, if possible, a reproduction.
Please include the affected version/commit, the impact, and steps to reproduce. We aim to acknowledge within a few business days and will coordinate a fix and disclosure timeline with you.
In scope - anything that could cause a maker to sign or submit something other than intended, or a consumer to mis-read on-chain state:
- incorrect EIP-712 hashing / digest assembly (an offer or authorization that verifies differently than intended, or fails to verify)
- incorrect signature recovery, low-
snormalization, orvhandling - incorrect ABI encoding of
take/cancelRootcalldata - incorrect decoding of offers or on-chain state
- incorrect tick/price/APR, settlement-fee, sizing, or take-simulation math that diverges from the contracts
- panics reachable from untrusted input
- The Midnight smart contracts themselves (report those to the contracts repository).
- Issues in dependencies (report upstream), unless this crate uses them unsafely.
- Trading strategy, quoting logic, or key management on the consumer's side.
Protocol-critical hashing, signing, pricing, sizing, simulation, and encoding paths have dedicated
contract or TypeScript SDK parity coverage (cargo test). The full lifecycle is also exercised
against a real Midnight deployment on Anvil (crates/nocturne/e2e/). This coverage is extensive,
but it is not formal verification or an independent audit. A report that shows any divergence from
the contracts is exactly the kind of thing we want to hear about.