Add an unverified audience reader for routing and diagnostics#7
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Expose a way to read a JWT-SVID's aud claim without verifying the signature, for routing and diagnostics — e.g. choosing which trust context to verify under before an expected audience is known: unverified_audience (Python), unverifiedAudience (TypeScript), UnverifiedAudience (Go). All three reject an array aud rather than silently coercing a multi-audience token, and report a missing aud as empty (None/null/""). The result is attacker-controlled and must always be followed by verify.
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Expose a way to read a JWT-SVID's
audclaim without verifying the signature, for routing and diagnostics — e.g. choosing which trust context to verify under before an expected audience is known.unverified_audience→str | NoneunverifiedAudience→string | nullUnverifiedAudience→(string, error)All three implementations behave identically:
aud→ reported as empty (None/null/""), no error.aud→ rejected, never silently coerced to a single audience.The result is attacker-controlled and must always be followed by
verify; the docstrings and CHANGELOG say so explicitly.Verification
go vet,tsc --noEmit,ruff checkall cleancheck-parityskill and the[Unreleased]CHANGELOG entry updated