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…e-role audit
Production security hardening pass (Phase 7), layered on top of the existing
RLS + session-gated auth without weakening any auth/money/RLS correctness.
Zero new npm dependency; build + Vitest stay green with zero env vars.
- Security headers + CSP (src/lib/security/headers.ts, wired via next.config.ts
headers()): strict static CSP (default-src 'self', object-src 'none',
frame-ancestors 'none', enumerated connect/frame/script-src for Supabase +
Stripe + Base RPC, upgrade-insecure-requests) + HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options,
X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, COOP. No-nonce trade-off
documented (middleware matches protected surfaces only).
- Rate limiting (src/lib/security/{rate-limit,http}.ts): zero-dep in-memory
fixed-window limiter + route guard returning 429 + Retry-After. Applied to
PIN, customer magic-link (per IP+email), order create, payment, refund.
No-op under tests / RATE_LIMIT_DISABLED so CI + dev never throttle.
- Audit logging (src/lib/security/audit.ts + expanded AuditAction): tenant-
scoped, fail-open coverage for staff/admin sign-in, PIN switch, refund/void,
menu 86, Connect change, subscription change, tenant go-live.
- Service-role audit (PRODUCTION_READINESS §11d): inventory confirms the
service-role key is used only by the driver, every tenant query carries an
explicit tenant_id/location_id filter. Fixed an authz gap: the refund
endpoint had NO auth (any caller could refund any payment) — now requires
tenant membership; Connect start now requires owner|manager.
- Input validation (src/lib/security/validate.ts): 256 KB body cap (413),
non-negative integer money guards, bounded id/email guards on the money +
auth routes.
- Tests: rate limiter, HTTP guard/no-op, validators, CSP/headers, audit
(incl. fail-open). 150 tests pass; typecheck + lint + build green, zero env.
- Threat model: plans/arrabbiata-71129-phase-7-security-hardening.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Production security hardening (Phase 7)
Defense-in-depth on the multi-tenant SaaS POS, layered on top of the existing
RLS + session-gated auth without weakening any auth/money/RLS correctness.
No new npm dependency;
package.jsonuntouched. Build + Vitest stay greenwith zero env vars.
1. Security headers + CSP
Applied to every route via
next.config.tsheaders()(src/lib/security/headers.ts):default-src 'self',object-src 'none',base-uri 'self',form-action 'self',frame-ancestors 'none',upgrade-insecure-requests; enumeratedscript/style/img/font/connect/frame/worker/manifest-src(Supabase REST+WSS, Stripe API/JS, Base RPC, PWAblob:).payment=(self)), COOP: same-origin.script-srcallows'unsafe-inline', but the app ships no author inline scripts /dangerouslySetInnerHTML, and every other vector is locked down. Upgrade path documented inheaders.ts+ PRODUCTION_READINESS §11a.2. Rate limiting
Zero-dep in-memory fixed-window limiter (
rate-limit.ts) + route guard (http.ts) returning 429 + Retry-After + RateLimit-*. No-op under tests /RATE_LIMIT_DISABLEDso CI + dev never throttle.POST /api/terminal/pinPOST /api/shop/auth/magic-linkPOST /api/ordersPOST /api/payments·/api/payments/refundTenant/platform login calls Supabase Auth directly from the browser (Supabase enforces its own auth limits) — noted in §11b.
3. Audit logging (broadened)
Tenant-scoped, fail-open (
audit.ts) coverage beyond impersonation:auth_sign_in(per membership, in/auth/callback),staff_pin_switch,payment_refund/payment_void,menu_86,connect_change,subscription_change,tenant_go_live.4. Service-role audit
Inventory (PRODUCTION_READINESS §11d): the service-role key is read only by the driver (
src/lib/db/supabase.ts); every tenant-scoped query carries an explicittenant_id/location_idfilter (no un-scoped query found). The auth flows correctly use the user-scoped (RLS, anon-key + session) client instead.Authz fix:
POST /api/payments/refundpreviously had no auth (any caller could refund any payment) — now resolves the payment's tenant and requires membership;POST /api/connectnow requiresowner|manager.5. Input validation
readJsonBody256 KB cap (413), non-negative integer money guards, bounded id/email guards on the money + auth routes (validate.ts).Tests / checks
New tests: rate limiter, HTTP guard/no-op, validators, CSP/headers, audit (incl. fail-open). 150 tests pass;
typecheck+lint+buildgreen with zero env.Threat model:
plans/arrabbiata-71129-phase-7-security-hardening.md.🤖 Generated with Claude Code