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docs: name two disruption limits in the security design - #60
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- What Privex doesn't protect against: whoever holds a session token, the TLS-terminating proxy, or a compromised server can make new contacts' first messages fail (one-time prekeys are unsigned by design, as in Signal) or empty the message queue - never read anything. - Known limitations: one mailbox per account - with two active devices, the one that can't decrypt a message confirms it and the other never gets it; per-device mailboxes would reveal your device count, so they aren't built. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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- A token holder isn't in the path, so only the proxy or server can drop traffic. - Signal signs its one-time post-quantum prekeys; the comparison is to its one-time curve prekeys, which Privex's are. - Any new chat session draws a one-time prekey, not just a new contact's. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Documents two limits the owner decided to accept and document, not build around. Docs only; no code change.
§7, What Privex does not protect against: disruption by whoever holds a session token or sits in the path. That covers:
Any of these can:
They can't read anything; that needs the signed prekey and identity private keys. The same parties could simply drop traffic anyway. Signing one-time prekeys would stop only a token-only attacker, for whom there's no realistic path (see #57), so it isn't built.
§8, Known limitations: one mailbox per account. Live messages go to the newest open connection (#58). With two active devices, the one that can't decrypt a message (its chat session lives on the other device) confirms it, and the other never gets it. Per-device mailboxes would reveal your device count to the server, so they aren't built.
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