Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 6: Arbitrary file access during archive extraction ("Zip Slip") - #10
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…ring archive extraction ("Zip Slip")
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ShadowDara
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September 9, 2026 15:01
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Potential fix for https://github.com/ShadowDara/finder/security/code-scanning/6
To fix Zip Slip safely, validate each archive entry name before any filesystem operation, then continue using the existing resolved-within-root check as defense in depth.
Best single fix in
internal/bt/gitrepo/gitrepo.go(insiderestoreZiploop):file.Name:filepath.Clean(filepath.FromSlash(file.Name))filepath.IsAbs(...)andfilepath.VolumeName(...) != "")..traversal segments using segment-aware checks (not just substring)filepath.Join(destination, cleanedName).resolvedunderroot) intact.This addresses both CodeQL variants at line 420 and 427 because tainted, unvalidated names no longer reach directory creation or file creation paths.
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