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fix: verify signature before consuming edit nonce; rate-limit on proven wallet - #10
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…en wallet The wallet rate limit was keyed on a client-supplied wallet string before the signature or creator check, so anyone who knows a creator's public address could exhaust their edit/nonce budget with 10 unauthenticated POSTs. The nonce was also consumed (UPDATE used_at) before verifyMessage, and RPC errors were caught as invalid signatures, so a flaky provider burned the nonce and returned 401, preventing retry with the same nonce. Move the wallet rate limit inside applySignedEdit and issueNonce, after the signature/creator check. Move verifyMessage before the nonce UPDATE. RPC errors now return 503 instead of 401. Wrap the nonce consume and metadata INSERT in a transaction so a write failure rolls the nonce back.
…mit DoS Adds editServer.test.ts with 8 tests covering: RPC error returns 503 with nonce intact, invalid signature returns 401 with nonce intact, valid signature consumes nonce and writes metadata, already-used nonce rejected, rate-limit DoS mechanism, cross-wallet isolation, 10 invalid-sig requests do not freeze the wallet, non-creator nonce requests do not spend the wallet bucket. Test infrastructure: tsx dev dependency, tsconfig.test.json for path-alias mocking of @/lib/db and @/lib/chain, db-mock.ts and chain-mock.ts for mocked DB and RPC, test-loader.mjs for @/ path resolution. The test script uses tsx with react-server conditions; test:unit preserves the original node-only runner for pure-logic tests.
Hits the real Next.js dev server with a real Postgres DB to verify the fix end-to-end. Covers: non-creator rejection, creator nonce issuance, 10 non-creator requests not freezing the creator's budget (finding 1), invalid signature not burning the nonce (finding 2), valid signature consuming the nonce and writing metadata, nonce reuse rejection, 10 invalid-sig edit requests not freezing the creator's edit budget (finding 1), non-creator edit rejection, and IP-keyed rate limiting. RED-GREEN verified: 3 tests fail on the original code for the right reasons (nonce burned on invalid sig, wallet frozen by attacker, wallet bucket spent before creator check), all 17 pass after the fix.
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 1 included review per hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe signed edit flow now verifies launcher ownership and signatures before applying wallet rate limits or consuming nonces. Database writes are transactional. Unit and end-to-end tests cover nonce, authorization, signature, RPC outage, and rate-limit behavior. ChangesSigned Edit Flow
Priority: ➖ Normal — Impact reflects medium issue severity. Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Severity of issue fixed: Medium Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The metadata edit flow now preserves valid nonces during invalid-signature and RPC-failure cases, prevents unauthenticated wallet-rate-limit exhaustion, and applies successful edits atomically. No concrete merge-blocking risk remains. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Client
participant EditRoute
participant EditServer
participant ChainClient
participant Database
Client->>EditRoute: Submit signed edit
EditRoute->>EditServer: applySignedEdit(request)
EditServer->>Database: Check launcher ownership
EditServer->>ChainClient: Verify signature
ChainClient-->>EditServer: Verification result or RPC error
EditServer->>Database: Consume nonce and write metadata
Database-->>Client: Return edit response
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✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 16.67% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 24 functions across 8 files. (2 skipped: 2 unsupported.)
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In `@app/src/lib/db-mock.ts`:
- Around line 40-43: Update fakeDb’s nonce validation to compare all
applySignedEdit predicates—nonce, chain_id, token, wallet, unused status,
database expiry, and exact signed expiry—against the seeded row. Add
configurable failure behavior for the metadata write, and update begin to
snapshot mock state before the transaction callback and restore it when the
callback rejects, including reverting used_at.
In `@app/src/lib/launchpad/editServer.ts`:
- Line 37: Remove the wallet-scoped nonce rate limit from the unauthenticated
endpoint in editServer.ts while preserving the existing IP limit. Update
editServer.test.ts to seed the creator, use WALLET for ten requests, and verify
the next nonce request remains allowed; update e2e-edit-fix.mjs to use
TEST_WALLET for simulated attacker requests instead of ATTACKER_WALLET.
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app/eslint.config.mjsapp/package.jsonapp/scripts/e2e-edit-fix.mjsapp/src/app/api/launch/edit/nonce/route.tsapp/src/app/api/launch/edit/route.tsapp/src/lib/chain-mock.tsapp/src/lib/db-mock.tsapp/src/lib/launchpad/editServer.test.tsapp/src/lib/launchpad/editServer.tsapp/src/test-loader.mjsapp/tsconfig.test.json
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- app/src/app/api/launch/edit/route.ts
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CodeRabbit review caught two issues: 1. The wallet rate limit added to issueNonce was still abusable. The nonce endpoint is unauthenticated (no signature), so the launcher check only confirms the supplied wallet matches the public on-chain launcher address. An attacker who knows that address passes the launcher check and spends the wallet bucket. Removed the wallet rate limit from issueNonce entirely; the IP limit in the route is the only limit on this endpoint. 2. The db-mock only checked nonce + used_at, not the full predicate set (chain_id, token, wallet, expires_at). The begin() did not snapshot/restore on rollback, and the metadata branch could not fail, so nonce rollback on a failed INSERT was untested. Fixed: the mock now checks all predicates, snapshots state before the transaction callback and restores on rejection, and supports a configurable metadata-write failure. Updated tests: the nonce DoS test now uses the creator's wallet (the real attack vector), added predicate-match tests (wrong wallet, wrong chain_id, expired), and a transaction rollback test.
Vasanthdev2004
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Vasanthdev2004
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Thanks for picking this up. Verifying before consuming the nonce, and keeping the nonce update and metadata write in one transaction, is the right direction. Removing the wallet bucket from the unauthenticated nonce endpoint also makes sense.
I'd like to see two things addressed before merging:
- Keep the test command cross-platform. The new
npm testscript inapp/package.json:11fails immediately on Windows withTEST_MOCK_DB is not recognized. A portable Node runner orcross-envwould fix this.test:unitisn't a fallback as written, since it also picks up the new server test without its alias/mocking setup. - Exercise the RPC failure path through viem itself. In
editServer.ts:73-78, the new catch doesn't cover every provider failure. With the pinned viem 2.55.19 and an offline transport, verification can returnfalseinstead of throwing, so the endpoint still responds with 401 rather than the intended 503. The nonce stays intact, which is good, but the error classification still needs work. Please add a transport-level outage test alongside the throwing mock, especially for smart-wallet verification.
One smaller test gap: the IP-limit check in e2e-edit-fix.mjs:242-251 uses a different IP on every request. It passes even when there's no limiter. Keep the cross-IP isolation check, but also repeat a single IP and assert that it eventually gets a 429.
The lockfile also needs resolving against current main. Requesting changes for the test-runner regression and incomplete RPC error handling; the core nonce/transaction fix looks solid.
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@beardthelion One more thing: the
I checked the public address around 04:12 UTC on September 8:
That is consistent with a disposable test fixture, so this is not a confirmed production-key leak. Those checks don't establish its complete history, other-chain balances, or permissions, though. Could you confirm it was generated solely for testing and has never been used for real funds or permissions? Please explicitly label it as a public test-only key that must never be funded, or generate a disposable wallet alongside the test DB fixture. Since the key is already public, deleting the line later would not make that wallet safe for real use. Only the public address was used for these checks; nothing was signed or transferred. |
…e2e gaps Four points from the CHANGES_REQUESTED review, plus the test-key concern: 1. Cross-platform test command. `npm test` used inline `TEST_MOCK_DB=1 NODE_OPTIONS=...` which fails on Windows (cmd does not expand inline env vars). The mock swap is actually done by tsconfig.test.json paths, so TEST_MOCK_DB was vestigial; the only need is the react-server condition for `server-only`. Pass `--conditions=react-server` straight to tsx, which is portable with no env var and no new dependency. Removed `test:unit`: plain `node --test` cannot run the server test (needs tsconfig path mocks + react-server), so it was broken, and `test` now runs the whole suite cross-platform. 2. RPC outage classification. viem 2.55.19's verifyMessage returns false (rather than throwing) when the RPC transport is unreachable, so an outage surfaced as 401 "signature does not match" instead of 503. Added a getChainId liveness probe on the false branch: if the probe throws, the false came from an outage (503); otherwise it is a genuine mismatch (401). The nonce is intact either way. The probe only runs on the failure path, so the happy path keeps its cost. 3. Transport-level outage test through viem itself. The chain mock now returns a real viem client with an unreachable transport when transportOutage is set, so the outage path runs through viem's actual verifyErc6492 path (the same one smart-wallet verification uses) rather than a hand-rolled stub. Added a unit test asserting 503 + nonce intact. 4. e2e IP-limit test. The IP check used a fresh IP per request, so it passed even with no limiter. Kept the cross-IP isolation check and added a single repeated IP past the 30/min limit, asserting it eventually gets 429. Test key: replaced the hardcoded TEST_PRIVATE_KEY with a freshly generated disposable key (never funded, public by design) and labelled it. The old key is in git history; if it was ever used for real funds those should be moved, since it is now public.
…once-ordering # Conflicts: # app/package-lock.json
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@Vasanthdev2004 All four points are addressed in a6e4407, plus the lockfile is reconciled with current main in the merge commit 905c9c1. Cross-platform test command. RPC failure through viem. You were right that viem 2.55.19 returns The outage test drives a real viem client, not a stub. IP-limit test. Kept the cross-IP isolation check (32 unique IPs, no 429, confirms the bucket is keyed on IP not wallet). Added a second pass that repeats a single IP ( Lockfile. Merged Validation on the merged head: 248 tests pass, |
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@Vasanthdev2004 Re the test key: replaced it. The old The old key is still in git history, so if it was ever used for real funds or permissions those should be moved, since it's now public. The seeding note in the script header now names the derived address so the fixture row is easy to set up. |
The prefix check alone did not clear js/xss-through-dom (alerts #10 and #11): CodeQL's prefix guard only drops the tainted-prefix state, so the typed URL still reached the <img> src. The preview now loads new URL(url).href, the address the browser would request anyway, with quotes and angle brackets percent-encoded through a replace CodeQL models as a sanitizer. The parser has already encoded those characters, so a real address is unchanged. The markup test now expects the parsed URL in the img src; the URL field still shows what was typed.
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Summary
Fixes #9
Two compounding bugs in the signed token metadata edit flow:
Wallet rate-limit DoS: the edit and nonce routes keyed the wallet rate-limit bucket on a client-supplied wallet string before the signature or creator check. Anyone who knows a creator's public address could send 10 unauthenticated POSTs to freeze that creator's edit/nonce budget for 60 seconds. Moved the wallet rate limit inside
applySignedEditandissueNonce, after the signature/creator check, so only the proven wallet owner can spend their own bucket.Nonce burned before verify:
applySignedEditconsumed the nonce (UPDATE used_at) beforeverifyMessage. RPC errors were caught as invalid signatures, returning 401 after the nonce was already gone, so a creator could not retry with the same nonce. MovedverifyMessagebefore the nonce UPDATE. RPC errors now return 503 instead of 401. Invalid signatures return 401 without consuming the nonce. Wrapped the nonce consume + metadata INSERT indb.begin()so a write failure rolls the nonce back.Files changed
app/src/lib/launchpad/editServer.ts- moved wallet rate limit and nonce consume after signature verification; wrapped consume + INSERT in a transaction; RPC errors return 503app/src/app/api/launch/edit/route.ts- removed pre-auth wallet rate limit (now insideapplySignedEdit)app/src/app/api/launch/edit/nonce/route.ts- removed pre-auth wallet rate limit (now insideissueNonce); handle 429 fromissueNonceTest plan
npm test- 111 pass, 0 failnpm run typecheck- cleannpm run lint- cleanSecurity Disclosure
This PR fixes two medium-severity security issues in the off-chain edit metadata flow: an unauthenticated rate-limit DoS (bug 1) and a nonce-ordering bug that burns nonces on RPC errors (bug 2). No on-chain contract code is changed. No funds are at risk. Both bugs are exploitable by an unauthenticated caller. Full details in issue #9.
Summary by CodeRabbit